



SOMALIA STABILITY FUND
END OF PROGRAMME
REPORT 2016-2021

END OF PROGRAMME REPORT - FEBRUARY 2022

IMPLEMENTED BY ADAM SMITH INTERNATIONAL

DELIVERING PEACE & STABILITY IN SOMALIA

'IT IS BETTER TO HAVE AN ACHING LEG THAN ACHING SPIRIT'

SOMALI PROVERB



Image Credit : ©AMISOM

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



This progress report provides a summary of Somalia Stability Fund's (SSF)¹ investments and impact throughout phase II of the Fund (November 2016–December 2021) at both the output and outcome levels. The report also provides a set of learnings and recommendations for SSF and partner programmes to take forward to improve the delivery of stability programming in Somalia. The report provides a review of key aspects of fund delivery, including approach to risk management, value for money, and operational and financial management.

SSF II is a \$119.5m multi-donor fund that supports the development of a peaceful, stable, and secure Somalia. It aims to enhance government legitimacy and reduce political and communal conflict through initiatives that increase government visibility and community engagement around shared priorities. Further, the Fund strives to enhance popular participation in governance, particularly for women and marginalised groups, and to address structural drivers of conflict and instability.

As a multi-donor fund, SSF provides regular political analysis and policy advice to its donors to inform their governance, development, and peacebuilding policy agenda. Phase II of SSF had a portfolio of 215 investments valued at \$85.2m, including with 55 Somali private sector and civil society organisations.





Image Credit: ©AMISOM



STABILITY IN SOMALIA

The political settlement in Somalia remains fragile with marginal improvements over the past five years being eclipsed by disagreement on key transitional tasks, such as completing the Provisional Federal Constitution, election model, and the transition from an elite pact to a more participatory election, as well as reforming the security sector. Acute disagreements over these issues intensified the tensions between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Federal Member States (FMSs), who consequently spent much of the current government's term (2017–2021) infighting.

During the SSF programme period, the FGS managed political transitions in Galmudug, Hirshabelle, and South West State, and consequently built strong relations with them. In contrast, the FGS's relationship with Jubaland and Puntland has deteriorated over this period. The FGS's refusal to recognise President Ahmed Mohamed Islam 'Madobe' after the contested Jubaland selection process in 2019, and its subsequent decision to send Somali National Army (SNA) soldiers to Gedo region, where they clashed with Jubaland Security Forces, have compounded the divide between the two administrations. Meanwhile, the relationship with Puntland has continued to deteriorate as President Said Abdullahi Deni has continuously accused the FGS of attempting to influence the region—an issue which has manifested itself in the sacking of the Puntland Parliament's speaker in November 2019, who Deni accused of being part of an FGS attempt to infiltrate the state parliament to challenge him.

In the run-up to the 2020/21 presidential elections, Somali leadership faced setbacks in organising and agreeing on election procedures before the end of the four-year term of President Farmajo, whose presidency expired on 8th February 2021. To facilitate election discussions, the FGS and FMS held

several virtual and face-to-face consultative meetings. However, Puntland and Jubaland leadership representatives both withdrew from these meetings at various times, as they questioned Farmajo's commitment to agree on a solution. This fragility erupted into violence as gunfire plagued Mogadishu in April 2021, culminating in further delays, with still no final pathway in sight. In November 2021, Somalia began indirect elections for the lower house, which were criticised for high levels of delegate manipulation and candidate intimidation.

Over the course of SSF phase II, security in Somalia has gradually improved, yet Al-Shabab continues to conduct attacks targeting civilians, the Somali state, and AMISOM. The nature of these attacks remains the same: suicide bombings in public places such as teashops, explosives-laden rickshaws, car bombs in military locations, violence and attacks at the Somalia–Kenya border, and attacks on UN and other entities. AMISOM's mandate to hand over authority to Somali security forces during this period has faced several delays and setbacks, hence the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council voting to extend AMISOM's mandate until the end of 2021. Despite the continued threat posed by AS in Somalia, no territories in which SSF has worked and invested in have fallen back under AS control. Communal conflict in Somalia has also decreased over this phase of SSF, although the status of this remains fragile and clan violence does still arise. The common themes surrounding conflict in Somalia persist, including: land conflict—particularly in economic hubs where disputed land is close to seaports, airports, and construction projects; customary conflict-resolution issues, such as revenge killings linked to unpaid diya (compensation payments); and tensions over new resources—when resources are introduced locally, different communities respond to perceptions of unfair distributions.

RESPONDING TO EMERGING PRIORITIES

Throughout SSF phase II, the Fund has proved agile in its response to emerging priorities in Somalia. The Fund has remained responsive to the volatile political landscape in Somalia and has adapted to other emerging priorities such as drought, flooding, and COVID-19. SSF's approach to emerging challenges has been to analyse events, share analysis with donors, and respond through investments and make recommendations on how donors should respond.

SSF has provided analysis to donors on political processes in each FMS and at the FGS level; has facilitated high-level meetings of the international community to discuss critical issues, such as elections and the climate crisis; and has pivoted its portfolio to meet the changing context—such as a set of investments designed to directly respond to the economic and health impact of COVID-19.

In 2021, SSF aimed to support district council formation in locations across Galmudug; however, the delayed federal elections increased likelihood of government interference in the process. As a result, SSF discontinued DCF to avoid reducing the legitimacy and validity of the work. The level of ambition in SSF's strategy at impact, outcome, and output level is high, and the Fund has consistently taken on challenging investments to increase stability in Somalia. Progress to date under SSF shows that the Fund has matched or exceeded all outcome targets, and that despite the array of political, economic, security, and humanitarian challenges in Somalia over the duration of the Fund.

IMPACT-LEVEL PROGRESS²

The overall goal of SSF is to contribute to enhancing stability in Somalia. The SSF Outcome Indicator 1³: Somalia's Scoring under the Fragile States Index is a measurement of Somalia's stability profile on the Fragile States Index. Since 2017, the scores have indicated positive progress against the indicator, with Somalia's Fragile States Index score decreasing from 113 to 110.9. However, it is worth noting that the 2021 index was published early 2021 based on 2020 data, and during 2021 Somalia political fragility deteriorated significantly.

Overall, there is a trend towards stability gradually improving in Somalia but the state-building processes continue to produce significant elite contestations putting previous gains at risk. This analysis matches the findings from SSF evaluations, showing moderate positive progress being made against the SSF outcome indicators towards enhancing state legitimacy and reducing political and communal conflict in Somalia. The resilience of the gains made will be clear only once the current round of elite contestations abates at least for the time being.

SSF has contributed to the gains made through investments such as district council formation in Hirshabelle, Galmudug, Puntland, and South West states. Similarly, the scores for state legitimacy have improved, which is due to improved perceptions of representativeness and government service delivery. Key SSF investments in infrastructure—such as the Barawe airstrip and the youth centre in Kismayo—have contributed to this. Domination of the political space by factionalised elites has remained constant and has undermined stability, as key issues remain unaddressed while political struggles dominate the agendas of Somalia’s leaders and opposition.

OUTCOME-LEVEL PROGRESS

At its outcome level, SSF aims to contribute to enhancing state legitimacy and reducing political and communal conflict. SSF’s results under Outcome Indicator 2: Status of Communal Conflicts has improved from a score of 5 to 5.5, which reflects the overall slightly reduced level of conflict at communal level, for instance between different community groups, such as clans in areas of Somalia where SSF has worked. SSF’s delivery in locations such as Galkayo, where the Fund has been instrumental in driving the peace agreement, has had a tangible benefit in reducing conflict.

Similarly, in Abudwaq, SSF has contributed to increased resilience to conflict. Despite the prolonged and contentious Galmudug elections, Abudwaq has remained relatively peaceful in contrast to previous Galmudug state elections where the Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama and pro-government divide manifested itself in an upsurge of violence in the district. Jubaland has also seen minimal communal conflict despite the fierce contestation over the state (s)election process and the ensuing rift between Gedo and Kismayo, suggesting

that community security has improved. However, resource conflict has increased in some areas, such as in Benderbeyla where the increase in resources has proven to be a new cause of tension, with the minority Bahamuumin and Baaho clans accusing the more powerful Amaanle and Osman Mohamoud clans of monopolising new resources. This was not an issue at baseline when the administration was considered to be representative by local communities.

SSF’s results under Outcome Indicator 3: State Legitimacy is Enhanced, and Status of Political and Communal Conflict is Reduced have improved from 3 to 3.75, mainly due to reduced inter-state conflict while both intra-state and FGS–FMS conflicts remain a challenge. A central focus of SSF’s strategy in building longer-term stability in Somalia is to address key political fault lines. As a result, SSF responds to issues which it understands to be the key barriers to inclusive and consolidated political settlements. Intra-state conflicts varied across states. However, ongoing elite disagreements over the state-building process, especially around electoral processes both in the states and the national politics may have reversed some of the gains previously recorded.


Overall, the past few years have seen subsiding of intra-state conflict, in Puntland, with Galkayo gaining significant improvement in peace and security in 2020. However, Puntland state has faced renewed conflict more recently. But elsewhere intra-state conflict still remains a key driver of instability as states, such as Hirshabelle continue to battle political divisions and increased tensions. In Hirshabelle, the Hawaadle population in Beletweyne has been alienated politically and become increasingly hostile to the state government, contributing to continued instability and conflict. One of the most potentially significant and positive findings in 2020 is the trend in FMS politics of seeking some form of a unity government as a

means of dealing with conflict and defectors within the FMS. The quality of the FGS–FMS relationship has, however, not showed signs of improvement. FGS–FMS conflict was particularly evident in the FGS’s relationships with Puntland and Jubaland which have been characterised by mutual distrust. The already weak Jubaland–FGS relations deteriorated further when the FGS refused to accept the selection process which returned Madobe as state president. Tensions turned violent when SNA forces were sent to Gedo region and battled local Jubaland security forces. The Puntland–FGS relationship has deteriorated over accusations of the FGS meddling in Puntland affairs. The tense FGS relationship with these two states has been exacerbated by disagreement over the process for the FGS elections. In contrast, the FGS’s relationship with the other states is strong; the FGS has managed the electoral processes in all the other FMSs and ensured that friendly administrations are elected.

SSF’s results under Outcome Indicator 4: Government Legitimacy have improved overall compared to baseline, although there have been significant regional variations in performance. SSF’s objective is to support and improve inclusiveness and representation of diverse communities’ interests by the FMSs, in addition to improving government accountability, fair distribution of public services, and government responsiveness to address community needs.


In Jubaland, the contested elections were largely seen to have excluded the Marehan clan and were rejected by numerous actors, including the FGS. Consequently, Jubaland and SNA forces came into conflict in Garbahare and Bardhere, and now Gedo is effectively no longer under Jubaland government control. As a result of this major upheaval and contestation for power, it is inevitable that government legitimacy has fallen. However, other states have been on a far more positive trajectory. In South West State, there is cross-communal agreement that inclusivity has increased, which has increased legitimacy. In addition, President Abdiyaz Laftagareen is perceived to have been effective, regularly travelling around the state and attracting investment, which has helped to increase government legitimacy. SSF’s investments, such as the Barawe airstrip, have contributed to the perceived improved ability to attract investment. Puntland has seen a moderate increase in government legitimacy, which can largely be attributed to continued improvements to infrastructure and government service delivery, such as the SSF-funded police station in Bossaso. Additionally, findings of the 2021 evaluation indicate that the successful delivery of the historic ‘one-person, one-vote’ (OPOV) pilot elections which took place in October 2021 in Puntland have bolstered government legitimacy.

Output 1: Reduced risk of federal and inter- & intra-state political conflict



TOTAL SPEND ON OUTPUTS

\$85,203,163.07



SSF II SPEND BY OUTPUTS AND SUPPORT SERVICES

Output 1
Reduced risk of federal and inter-
& intra-state political conflict

\$4,438,593.46
Reported Expenditure

Output 2
Enhanced popular participation
and voice in governance,
particularly for women and
excluded communities

\$15,236,015.83
Reported Expenditure

Output 3
Government visibility, community
engagement, and reduced
community vulnerability to conflict

\$64,365,106.41
Reported Expenditure

Output 4
Research, communications, and knowledge
brokering on issues of democratisation,
local governance, and reconciliation

\$1,163,447.36
Reported Expenditure

Fund Manager Team

\$17,771,497.69
Reported Expenditure

Phase 2


Total Spend
\$117,966,604.44

**Engineering
Supervisory Services**
\$5,391,950.31
Reported Expenditure

**Secretariat Office Policy
& Governance Advisory**
\$3,002,733.66
Reported Expenditure

**Short-Term Technical
Assistance**
\$2,757,003.46
Reported Expenditure

**M&E, Knowledge
Management, and Learning**
\$3,840,256.27
Reported Expenditure





TOTAL
\$85,203,163

**SSF II OUTPUT SPEND
BY STATE/REGION**

	\$4,856,637 SOOL & SANAAG
	\$15,736,968 PUNTLAND
	\$16,178,060 GALMUDUG
	\$6,314,868 MULTI-REGION
	\$11,429,961 HIRSHABELLE
	\$3,253,688 BANAADIR
	\$14,644,395 SOUTH WEST
	\$12,788,586 JUBBALAND

RISK SUMMARY

Over the duration of the Fund, SSF has managed risks through a tailored system that presents these at the portfolio and investment level. SSF has deployed its Risk Management Framework which details the key tools that are used to ensure effective risk management. The overall portfolio risk trend was continually high over the course of the programme period with gradual decline in the final year of programming. The significant risk faced by the programme are largely attributable to the high trend in the security and external context risks, including political risks, which present opportunities to adapt our delivery mechanisms.

Additionally, programmatic changes have impacted the downward trend in the final year, with reduced delivery and fiduciary risks owing to successful close-out of investments. The Fund has seen a rapid decline in reputational risk, mainly owing to shifts in strategy in 2021 with a streamlined workstream approach to delivery; increased communication on SSF II's impact and sharing of learnings to wider stakeholder groups; and successful closure of investments. SSF demonstrated its flexibility by pivoting some investments to respond to the economic and livelihoods challenges presented by COVID-19, as well as supporting investments to communicate and raise awareness about COVID-19 and how to prevent it. Security continued to be a delivery risk for SSF; the programme faced a range of AS-related risks, such as travel limitations and shelling of the Dhusamareb airstrip—support for the fencing of which was being provided by SSF. A detailed analysis on the risk trends for external context, reputational, delivery, security, fiduciary, and safeguarding are presented in the Risk Management section of this report.





Image Credit: ©AMISOM

Image Credit: ©AMISOM



KEY RECOMMENDATIONS:

SSF STRATEGIC APPROACH

1. Streamline the SSF approach to reduce the breadth of the SSF portfolio and instead focus on the delivery of specific thematic areas which are most impactful on stability and where the Fund has leading expertise, such as leveraging SSF's success in implementing the Wadajir Framework and driving state-level democratisation.
2. Adopt a model for effectively embedding Gender Equity and Social Inclusion (GESI) policies and objectives in all investments rather than setting up standalone investments to address GESI concerns.
3. Ensure communications form an integral part of the Fund's work; delivering products in Somali improves the accessibility and distribution of key pieces of research to Somali stakeholders.
4. Remain committed to a Problem Drive Adaptive Approach. "Flex and Adapt" as a principle means that the Fund can respond quickly and swiftly to wide-ranging circumstances, such as wider political risks, election delays or global pandemic; this approach is critical in programming to ensure that the Fund's investments are needed and relevant.
5. Ensure conflict sensitivity is central to SSF programming. SSF is operating a very fluid and fragile context. It remains imperative that the Fund understands these dynamics and that the SSF team and future implementing partners adjust their activities to maximise their contribution to peace and minimise any unintended harm.
6. SSF should be a thought leader in key stability challenges that Somalia faces. This requires a long-term commitment to research and ensuring this feeds into the design of future investments. In turn, learning from programmatic efforts needs to be captured to inform future analysis.

See also the Learnings section for additional suggestions regarding specific activities and how they can best be taken forward to impact stability, as well as adaptive programming, addressing drivers of instability, GESI and research.





SSF AT A GLANCE

People




Image Credit: ©AMISOM


SSF II is a flexible fund supporting the development of a peaceful, stable, and secure Somalia. The Fund adapts to emerging lessons and the evolving and dynamic context in Somalia. SSF's strategy is inspired by problem-driven iterative adaptation principles: it identifies and articulates a core problem at the root of instability in Somalia and determines how to address it. SSF takes this approach to achieve four key outputs:

- Addressing fault lines for political conflict based on priorities identified in the macro-analysis.
- Enhancing popular voice and participation, particularly for women and excluded groups.
- Increasing government visibility and community engagement around key priorities such as services and livelihoods.
- Reducing community vulnerability to conflict through targeted conflict resolution approaches.

SSF phase II began in October 2016 and will end in December 2021. \$119.5m of funding has been raised from seven donors¹. SSF phase II is delivering a portfolio of transformative investments across Somalia and the disputed regions of Sool and Sanaag. The Fund proactively engages government, civil society, and communities to understand their priorities and deliver investments that meet their peace, stability, and security needs. This includes a range of complimentary economic development, support for gender equality and social inclusion (GESI), democratic governance, and conflict resolution investments that tackle key stability challenges in more than 60 districts.

**\$119.5M OF
FUNDING
CROWDED IN
FROM SEVEN
DONORS**





SSF recognises that Somalia is a complex and diverse

TAILORED APPROACH TO THE CONTEXT

country facing a wide array of challenges in different locations. To deliver impactful investments, it is vital to understand the unique

ACH


geographical, socio-political, and economic factors across the Fund's locations. This enables SSF to deliver a sustainable, impactful portfolio of investments to improve the lives of Somalis and strengthen stability in Somalia. To ensure that SSF has this strong understanding, the Fund takes a locally-led approach to selecting and managing its portfolio. The Fund has a devolved team of staff operating across all five Federal Member States and in Mogadishu. These locally embedded staff have strong contextual understanding and networks that position them exceptionally to appreciate local priorities, recognise local challenges, and identify key entry points to deliver impactful and sustainable investments.

SSF underpins this locally driven approach with granular analysis and regular scenario planning, which helps to ensure that SSF is proactively able to identify and adapt to changes at the national, state, and local level. SSF leverages its in-house policy analysis team, research partners, and flexible facility of short-term experts to ensure that the Fund has an up-to-date and robust evidence base to complement the staff's local knowledge on the ground. This approach equips the Fund to make well-informed decisions to maximise the impact of investments and minimise the risk of delivery.

SSF'S MANDATE

SSF WAS DESIGNED TO SUPPORT FIVE BUILDING BLOCKS REQUIRED TO MOVE TOWARDS STABILITY AND PROSPERITY:⁴

- FAIR POWER STRUCTURES THAT BROADEN INCLUSION, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY OVER TIME, WHILE MANAGING TENSIONS TO PREVENT VIOLENCE IN THE SHORT TERM
- INCLUSIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WHICH CREATES WIDESPREAD BENEFITS, REDUCES INCENTIVES FOR CONFLICT, AND CURBS ILLICIT ECONOMIES
- CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISMS—BOTH FORMAL AND INFORMAL—THAT HELP TO MANAGE CONFLICT, HELP PEOPLE TO COPE WITH THE LEGACIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT, AND STRENGTHEN WOMEN'S ROLE IN THE RESOLUTION PROCESS
- EFFECTIVE AND LEGITIMATE INSTITUTIONS, BOTH STATE AND NON-STATE, THAT BUILD TRUST WITH THOSE WHOM THEY GOVERN, AND GROW IN EFFECTIVENESS OVER TIME
- A SUPPORTIVE REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT THAT ENABLES COMMUNITIES TO BE MORE RESILIENT TO TRANSNATIONAL STRESSES AND SHOCKS, INCLUDING ORGANISED CRIME AND VIOLENT EXTREMIST IDEOLOGIES.



BSF

SSF HAS A SET OF DELIVERY PRINCIPLES THAT UNDERPIN THE FUND'S APPROACH:

1. CONTEXT-APPROPRIATE

SSF strategy and programming are based on regular analysis and scenario-planning, ensuring a flexible and adaptive approach which responds to changes on the ground.

2. RIGHT PEOPLE RIGHT PLACES

SSF empowers Somali staff who speak the language and bring strong local understanding and political networks. This ensures that all decisions are robustly informed by local expertise.

3. PUT POLITICS FIRST

SSF engages with Somali politics to understand incentives and identify investments. It funds projects to build confidence in political processes and to underpin the agreements that come out of them, including through the use of performance funding where opportunities emerge.

4. LEARNING AND ADAPTING

SSF has a learning agenda which enables the iteration and adaptation of strategy and programming in line with emerging evidence and lessons.

5. COALITION BUILDING:

SSF uses diverse fora to share SSF analysis and learning and to encourage a commonality of intent in pursuing policy objectives. This ensures that SSF collaborates with partners to drive a cohesive strategy for tackling the drivers of conflict.

6. LOCAL OWNERSHIP:


SSF aligns with government priorities and promotes government visibility and leadership across its investments. The Fund also supports government-community engagement and responsive delivery as essential building blocks for trust between communities and government and ensuring sustainability.

7. GENDER AND CONFLICT-SENSITIVITY

SSF positively addresses conflict dynamics and shifts gendered power relations to promote women's empowerment.

8. RISK AND RETURN

SSF takes a balanced portfolio approach to risk; this ensures that high-risk projects are balanced by low-risk projects, being honest about why certain risks (political, security, etc.) are worth taking.





SSF'S APPROACH



CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS



Image Credit: ©AMISOM

DIRECTION OF TRAVEL FOR STABILITY

Somalia has been progressing towards the second-best scenario of 'negotiated settlement'; however, continued political contestation at FMS level is closer to the second-worst trend⁵. This progress occurred despite worrying signs suggesting the possibility of 'discontinuation'—including growing state weaknesses at both the centre and periphery—which could potentially take the country back to 'ruptured continuity' or even a complete fracturing of the state. Recent centre–periphery negotiations have successfully overcome the political hostility paralysing the nation, paving the way to agreements on the preparations for, and organisation of, national elections. While there is increased interest over the prospect of (s)elections, the new agreement faces complex challenges and Somalia can easily fracture if the political elites fail to work out key national electoral issues.

PEACE & SECURITY

CONSOLIDATION OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

SECOND-WORST TREND:

Insecurity (ACLED data on number of deaths)⁶

Al-Shabab capabilities

Piracy activities

Localised conflicts in FMSs

Inter-state conflict

Extension of state authority in newly recovered areas

SECOND-BEST (HOWEVER CONTINUED POLITICAL CONTESTATION AT FMS LEVEL IS CLOSER TO SECOND WORST) TREND

Contestation at the FGS level

FGS–FMS relations

Inter-state relations

Contestation within FMS

Political settlement at FMS level

Completion of transitional tasks

Commitment to tackling corruption

INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

SECOND-BEST TREND

- Stability in troop-contributing countries
- Interest of the international community in Somalia
- Relations between TCC/AMISOM and the government
- Relations with Gulf powers

SECOND-BEST TREND

- Revenue base of the FGS and FMS
- Humanitarian situation
- Service delivery and the role of government
- Employment rate
- Access to concessional finances

COMPLETION OF TRANSITIONAL TASKS BETWEEN 2016–2021

During this period, the country was dominated by a political crisis instigated by disagreements between FMSs and the FGS on election management and overshadowed by widespread vote-rigging. The tensions between the centre and the periphery, which have been ongoing since 2018, significantly slowed down federal legislative activities and efforts to implement other political priorities. As a result, the country's political stakeholders have continued to disagree on critical transitional tasks, including:

- Completing the Provisional Federal Constitution
- Election model and transition from elite pact towards a more participatory election
- Reforming the security sector

These issues were deprioritised as the FGS and FMSs spent most of Farmajo's term (2017–2021) infighting. Instead of focusing on the transitional tasks, discussions about the electoral law dominated the discourse for much of this term.

Opposition groups, including Puntland and Jubaland and the Council of Presidential Candidates (CPC), argued that the electoral law approved by parliament did not define the geographical boundaries of constituencies or grant 30% of seats to women. It also failed to clarify the modalities for participation of Somaliland representatives and further failed to define the status and representation for Mogadishu. Opposition groups suggested that this law was a pretext for term extensions for incumbent politicians and this dispute led political elites to focus on this disagreement rather than addressing critical national transitional tasks.

After an extended period of complete disconnect, the FGS and FMS began to hold virtual and face-to-face meetings from June 2020 to discuss the 2020/21 election. Puntland and Jubaland leaders initially sent representatives to attend but withdrew them as they questioned President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo's commitment to agree on a solution. On 27 July 2020, Halima Ismail, the chair of the National Independent Election Commission (NIEC), presented a roadmap for the election to Parliament.

She ruled out holding 'one-person, one-vote' (OPOV) elections by 27 November 2020, as scheduled, and proposed two alternative options:

- An election based on biometric registration to take place in August 2021, or
- A manual-based registration to be held in March 2021.

President Farmajo and the Speaker of the Lower House, Mohamed Mursal Abdirahman, quietly supported the proposal, but CPC, Puntland, and Jubaland rejected the recommendations. They advocated for the temporary suspension of the NIEC in favour of a politically and mutually agreed - electoral model. Mohamed Hashi, the Upper House Speaker, and the then Prime Minister, Hassan Ali Khaire, both released statements calling for a timely and politically agreed election but without providing any clear proposals. Khaire's statement was the first sign of division between himself and the president and contributed to his subsequent ousting on 25 July 2020.





Khaire's removal was supported by some circles within the CPC but eventually became an issue of concern for Jubaland and Puntland, who refused to attend the third round of discussions on the electoral process in Dhusamareb. However, Farmajo and the presidents of Galmudug, Hirshabelle, and South West states accused Puntland and Jubaland leaders of trying to force their will on others and proceeded with the discussions despite their absence.

On 20 August 2020, President Farmajo, the presidents of Galmudug, Hirshabelle, and South West, and the governor of Benadir region agreed to a new electoral model based on electoral constituency caucuses. The agreement represented the first time that Farmajo had abandoned the concept of an OPOV election model.




The leaders of Jubaland and Puntland initially rejected the deal but—after intense negotiations and some pressure from the international community—agreed to a revised version of the model. The amendments included:

- A reduction of the number of electoral delegates from 301 to 101;
- Removal of political parties' participation and a role for NIEC in election management instead;
- Leaders agreed to form temporary election committees; and
- A reduction of electoral sites from a minimum of four locations to two; though there were constant demands by Jubaland and Puntland to reduce this further to one location—a demand PM Roble continued to refuse even in late 2021.

The fragility caused by the disagreements over the elections was exemplified by the events of 19 February 2021 in Mogadishu. Gunfire was heard around Madina Hotel, where two former presidents were staying. There were subsequent conflicting reports of what took place. However, the government claimed that its troops patrolling the Daljirka Dahsoon area responded after coming under attack

from gunmen guarding the hotel. However, other reports suggest that government forces initiated an attack without any provocation. Protesters were mobilised by opposition movements, to which government forces responded with gunfire, killing five people in Mogadishu. The opposition laid down three conditions to the government for them to stop organising further protests, including a public apology for its "cruel treatment", transfer of some of President Farmajo's powers to the prime minister, and a new arrangement for election security.

The opposition suspended its rallies but maintained the three demands above in response to the government's expressed regret over the incidents. The FGS, though, insisted that Farmajo's constitutional mandate only expires when a new president is elected—a position based on their interpretation of the 17 September 2020 agreement signed by all FMSs, praised by all presidential candidates, and endorsed by parliament. However, the opposition disagreed with this interpretation. Moreover, trust between stakeholders remained at their lowest, with the opposition accusing President Farmajo of monopolising power, limiting political space to compete,



and designing a system favouring the re-election of the incumbent.

On the other hand, supporters of President Farmajo opined that his opponents were determined to oust him by any means necessary as they could not persuade MPs to vote for an opposition candidate. Despite the agreements in Dhusamareb, Mogadishu, and Baidoa, zero-sum politics has exacerbated clan grievances, inter-state tensions, and the centre-periphery rifts.

The following events further exacerbated tensions. On 12 April 2021, the Federal Parliament's House of the People voted to extend the term of its mandate and that of the president of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) by two years, after a sizeable number of MPs tabled a motion in which they accused federal and state executives of protracted disagreement on an election roadmap. It was, however, vocally opposed by the Upper House Speaker, CPC, and the state presidents of Puntland and Jubaland. Surprisingly, Galmudug and Hirshabelle and PM Roble, who were initially dubbed as close allies of the incumbent, publicly denounced the extension, forcing president Farmajo to make a U-turn on the term extension in a speech to parliament. In addition, the move was condemned by

the international community (IC), including the UK, EU, US, African Union (AU), and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). As a result, the PM successfully negotiated with crucial Mogadishu-based opposition groups to support the removal of security forces from the streets in Mogadishu.

The ongoing political impasse turned violent on 25 April 2021 as intermittent gunfire rocked Mogadishu, with rival forces clashing following the breakdown of election talks. Some reports indicated the violence displaced as many as 100,000 in the capital.

A committee was formed to agree on the terms and oversee the implementation of the agreement, which included fair treatment of security forces who had opposed term extension and came out to defend opposition presidential candidates. Prime Minister Roble also called for a new FGS-FMS political dialogue, convened on 20 May 2021. This FGS-FMS meeting concluded on 27 May 2021 and allowed for an agreement to be reached among critical groups.

However, in May 2021, President Farmajo and PM Roble were locked in a power struggle over the fate of the spy chief and the disappearance of a spy agent. This tension erupted after Roble suspended the Head of the National Intelligence and Security Agency, Fahad Yasin, for failing to investigate the Ikran Tahlil case (a NISA employee) which shocked the nation. But the president, who was angered by the humiliation of his right-hand man, appointed Yasin as his national security advisor instead. He also suspended the powers of the PM. In response, PM Roble also appointed Abdulahi Mohamed Nur, a staunch enemy of the President, as Minister of Internal Security. After weeks of political standoff, the two men agreed to end their dispute shortly after the PM visited Qatar.

This agreement also ended the impasse over the lower house election, with the country's lower house's first two seats elected on 1 November 2021. However, before this, the Senate election was completed in a process characterised by an unprecedented level of delegate manipulation, candidate intimidation/blocking, and the exchange of massive amounts of cash-for-votes.



However, political stakeholders, including President Farmajo, PM Roble, and most opposition presidential candidates, praised the start of the election, but when it became apparent that the incumbent's favourite MPs were winning in Galmudug and SWS, the CPC denounced the process. Once again, the CPC's objections and Puntland's and Jubaland's reluctance to start the lower house election increased concerns about another delay and the potential that the outcome of the presidential (s)election may be contested.

Internally, the growing mistrust between the FGS and FMS over the electoral process has delayed and damaged security reforms, diverting focus away from Al-Shabab (AS). As a result, AS activities have increased and, while thus far there have been no violent inter-FMS clashes, hostility is growing between those states supporting President Farmajo's re-election and those opposing it.

Internationally, the dispute over Kenya and Somalia's maritime border, alongside Kenya's continued support for State President Ahmed Mohamed Islam 'Madobe' in Jubaland, have caused Kenya-Somalia relations to deteriorate further. In March 2021, Kenya demanded the closure of two refugee camps within its territory, and that Somali refugees residing there be relocated back to Somalia. In addition, competing Emirati and Qatari relations with rival Somali actors are sowing further mistrust among the country's political actors, providing a major obstacle to the state-building process.



FGS–FMS CONTESTATION



The final year of the Somali government's mandate typically leads to increased tension as incumbents and political aspirants position themselves for top positions; meanwhile, local, regional, and international actors also try to leverage the situation to protect their own interests. Continued discord between the FGS and FMS leadership has frayed elite settlement throughout the last five years, and this has been exacerbated by the FGS's use of direct military force in Jubaland, Southwest and Galmudug. There are concerns that the ongoing elections and the end of the president's term will continue to threaten wider stability, but the September 2020 agreement between the FGS and FMS leaders on the basic parameters of indirect elections in late 2020 and early 2021 indicates that the existing political settlement is holding, albeit, only just.


The state electoral cycles in the last five years have deepened the conflicting relationship between the centre and the periphery under President Farmajo's administration. Relations between the FGS and Puntland and Jubaland have deteriorated, while, more dangerously, the controversial role of the FGS in the Galmudug election pushed Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama (ASWJ) militia and other actors to the brink of war before a successful agreement that accommodated all sides was negotiated. On a positive note, the poor centre–periphery relations did not stop the FGS from transferring critical financial support and equipment to help flood-affected communities or to tackle COVID-19.

Puntland's already weak relationship with the FGS has deteriorated further due to:

- President Said Abdullahi Deni's unconditional support for the Jubaland leadership, which the FGS perceived as illegitimate, and
- FGS support to parliamentarians who oppose Deni.

Puntland's leadership has consistently led accusations that the FGS has failed to consult with the FMSs in line with the Provisional Constitution; while the FGS has accused Puntland (and other states) of taking on roles that it has no constitutional right to engage in, such as contracts with foreign governments for port management. The gaps and ambiguities in the Provisional Constitution aggravate these disputes, whereas legally well-defined functions and funding roles and responsibilities between different layers of governments—backed up by a dispute resolution mechanism/process—would be critical in supporting the ongoing state-building processes in Somalia. In the absence of clearly defined roles and mechanisms for resolving political, social, economic, and security disputes, the FGS continues to accrue financial and military powers which further exacerbate tensions between the centre and its constituent units and increase the likelihood of these disputes leading to violence.

The Puntland–FGS conflict has also impacted state-level politics. In early November 2019, a dispute erupted between President Deni and former Speaker of the Puntland State Parliament, Abdihakim Mohamed Ahmed, which resulted in the sacking of the latter. Deni blamed the dispute on FGS attempts to infiltrate the state parliament to challenge him. A similar contentious issue emerged in May 2020 when the FGS Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources visited Buuhodle town in the contested Sool region (which both Puntland and Somaliland claim to be part of their territories) without notifying Puntland



authorities. Puntland denounced the visit as an attempt by the FGS to build relations with elders and Puntland MPs to undermine the Puntland leadership's influence in the state. However, the minister, who comes from that area, insisted that he had a responsibility to deliver COVID-19 medical aid to his constituency. The relationship with Sool and Sanaag communities is critical for Puntland's leadership, hence Deni tries to avert any FGS attempts to gain the influence of the Harti communities in those regions.

The Jubaland–FGS relationship remains strained following the contested re-election of President Ahmed Mohamed Islam 'Madobe' on 22 August 2019. Immediately after the Jubaland election, the FGS arrested Jubaland's Minister of Security, Abdirashid Janan, on unsettled charges of human rights violations. His subsequent escape from house arrest and flight to Kenya have been a source of tension between the FGS and the Kenyan government, which backs the Madobe administration. The FGS sent 700 Somali National Army (SNA) soldiers to Gedo region in February, 2019 which led to continued clashes between the SNA and Jubaland security forces in the border town of Bulo Hawa, which in March 2021, threatened to escalate and bring SNA forces into conflict with Kenyan Defence Forces. Madobe called the deployment of SNA forces "naked aggression" and an attempt to set up a rival administration in Gedo, while President Farmajo defended the move as essential to guard Somali borders.

The international community's recognition of Madobe forced the FGS to recognise him as interim president for two years and demand that he deliver a broad-based reconciliation process for all clans in Jubaland.

While some stakeholders in Gedo region welcomed the FGS's 'interim' recognition of Madobe's presidency, he rejected this term, further deepening the mistrust between the two administrations. Despite this, Farmajo and Madobe have had meetings to address the fate of Gedo region, which has become increasingly disconnected from Kismayo since the contested elections. However, these talks failed to yield any progress.

FGS relations with the leaderships of Galmudug, Hirshabelle, and South West are positive, thanks in part to the FGS's intervention in installing friendly administrations. The proximity of Hirshabelle and South West to Mogadishu and their dependence on an FGS budget subsidy due to their limited revenue generation capacity, explains the strong relations that Jowhar and Baidoa have with Mogadishu. The ability of the FGS to engage in direct intervention in FMS affairs has increased and marks a major change since the beginning of FMS formation in 2012. The most dramatic example occurred in Galmudug, where the FGS sent SNA forces to combat ASWJ, effectively defeating and absorbing local FMS forces into the SNA. The FGS's direct intervention in the Galmudug political impasse resulted in a peaceful transfer of power from President Ahmed Duale Gelle Haaf to the new Galmudug President Ahmed Abdi Kariye 'Qoorqoor'—an ally of the FGS. In South West, FMS and SNA forces collaborated in operations against Al-Shabab (AS), indicating growing cooperation after a period of tension in late 2018 when the FGS directly intervened in the South West presidential selection process and arrested Sheikh Mukhtar Robow.

Even in these 'friendly' states, relations with the FGS have been strained. In Hirshabelle, President Mohamed Abdi Waare, who resigned on 2 November 2020, tested close ties to the FGS by siding with Jubaland in criticising the SNA deployment in Gedo and banned pro-FGS rallies. In Galmudug, Qoorqoor set up a unity government against the will of the FGS leadership. Meanwhile, constituencies in South West continue to demand the release of the imprisoned Sheikh Robow.

POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AT FMS LEVEL

PUNTLAND

In Puntland, President Said Abdullahi Deni seems to have consolidated his power with the support of the UAE since he became the most vocal opponent of the FGS. Nonetheless, Puntland has witnessed significant unrest in the reporting period. Since Deni was elected as the state president, communal discontent often appeared in Qardo, Galkayo, and Bossaso over his leadership style, which became Mogadishu-centred. His opponents claim that he demonstrated a tendency of authoritarianism by sacking anyone who challenged him, including state assembly members. In 2019, President Deni removed the speaker and eight MPs from parliament, accusing them of conspiring with FGS, but they insisted that they were victims of parliamentary scrutiny of government performance. In any case, President Deni's rivalry with the FGS made Puntland exposed to political, security, and economic challenges.

Protesters in Qardho, Galkayo, and Bossaso complained about government measures enforcing the Somali shilling for transactions instead of the US dollar, a decision that caused uncontrollable inflation and sparked massive protests across the state.

On 24 February 2021, demonstrations erupted in Bossaso, with protesters shouting pro-FGS slogans. They also denounced President Deni's rhetoric against the FGS and his stance on the current electoral impasse. As a result, security forces arrested several protesters and three journalists, sparking concerns from human rights organisations over what was described as a "worrying development for media freedom in the region" as the country moves towards federal elections.

During the reporting period, two regional governors were killed by Al-Shabab, while another survived a shooting by the region's Police Commissioner, Abdiqadir Shire Farah, also known as 'Ereg'. In addition, Commissioner Ereg shot his deputy, Bile Farah Ali, who sustained a leg injury in the incident.


Despite these challenges, Puntland successfully concluded local elections won by an opposition coalition in Qardho, Eyl, and Ufeyn districts on 26 October 2021. After decades of an elite-led political system, residents of these districts were required to cast their vote, raising hopes across Somalia of the possibility of an OPOV election in the country.

In November 2021, a military standoff between Puntland Security Forces (PSF) and the Puntland President created tensions in Bossaso, leading to some of its residents fleeing the district—a town that always felt excluded from the state centres of power. The timing of the decision to sack the PSF commander came shortly before the lower house election, which was planned to kick off in the district where the seats of many of President Deni's arch-rivals are contested, raising suspicions that President Deni aimed to bring all security forces under his command to manipulate the upcoming election after his defeat in previous local elections.

GALMUDUG

Since the formation of the state, Galmudug has remained tense, with a risk of being pushed to the brink of clan-based conflict. Key stakeholders including ASWJ, opposition figures, and the FGS have had prolonged negotiations throughout the FGS's term in office since 2017. While ASWJ initially opposed the FGS-led power-sharing proposal, they compromised and agreed to accept 20 representatives in the state assembly.



A map of the Galmudug region in Somalia, showing its boundaries and internal administrative divisions. Three text callouts are overlaid on the map, each connected to a specific area by a thin line. The callouts provide context on the region's political and military situation.

Before this compromise, ASWJ repeatedly threatened to withdraw from negotiations because of FGS deployment of foreign troops (Ethiopian and Djibouti forces) to the region. Similarly, former Galmudug President Haaf also threatened to withdraw from the process and to 'reclaim' his executive powers—previously relinquished to the Federal Minister of Interior in a deal with the FGS to act on his behalf on state election matters. He cited dissatisfaction with the FGS's approach towards reconciliation and power-sharing negotiations. Sources indicated that the FGS's deal with Haaf included substantial payments which were consistently delayed.

Despite the challenging process, Galmudug did elect a new president and state parliament in 2020 which received endorsements from across the state. Subsequently, former President Haaf peacefully transferred power to his successor, Ahmed Qoorqoor, who was not widely known in the political establishment but has since become a popular state leader.

Galmudug averted clan conflict, which many analysts had predicted. President Qoorqoor, who was perceived as Farmajo's man in Dhusamareb, showed political skill in convincing prominent opposition figures to rally behind him. He secured broad support by selecting an inclusive cabinet including heavyweights from both sides of the political aisle. For instance, the state's Interior Minister, Abdi Mohamed Wayel, is a well-known supporter of Villa Somalia, while the Minister of Internal Security, Ahmed Moalin Fiqi, is a high-profile opposition politician. Qoorqoor has demonstrated his independence in the negotiations on the national election model between the FGS and FMS. Alongside South West's President Laftagareen, he applied pressure on Farmajo to make key concessions.

In October 2021, Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama (ASWJ) militias took over Guriel town, some 64 km south of Galmudug capital Dhusamareb. Despite several peace deals with the successive Galmudug administration, ASWJ claimed that the Qoorqoor-led administration is not inclusive. Their surprise security showdown proved to be a strategic blunder this time, leaving them without a significant political ally. President Qoorqoor, who came to power after an agreement between the FGS and ASWJ, accused the group of using violence to get parliamentary seats, and he demanded complete withdrawal from Guriel, rejecting another concession for them. Subsequently, the FGS immediately deployed the national army, which allowed Galmudug state to retake the district after a bloody fight that killed nearly 70 people. FGS support also revived President Qoorqoor's relationship with President Farmajo, which had become strained ever since the former opposed the FGS's attempt to extend the latter's mandate.

SOUTH WEST STATE

Political stability in South West improved following a confrontation in December 2018 between militias loyal to Robow and the Ethiopian army, which was supporting the current state president. Despite some tensions that followed the formation of the new parliament in March 2020, the state is more stable than in previous years. The mandate for the South West Parliament ended in November 2019, and President Laftagreen succeeded in delivering on his election pledge to reduce the number of MPs from 149 to 95 in line with the state's constitution. This caused some frustration as the Hawiye clan argued that the reduction had disproportionately reduced their representation in the state legislature. These complaints angered some within the Digil and Mirifle, who consider Hawiye communities as new settlers in the region as a result of the civil war—rather than indigenous communities. The dispute triggered brief communal fighting between the Gaalje'el (Hawiye) and Shanta Caleemood (Digil and Mirifle), but elders and political leaders quickly intervened to stop the unrest.


SSF has identified Lower Shabelle as a key political fault line prone to political and security tensions due to a combination of civil war legacies, communal conflicts, AS rule, and the importance of the profitable main supply Mogadishu–Baidoa road.


Some Leysan clan elders continue to express frustration over the detention of Robow, a former AS spokesperson and deputy commander, who defected to the government in 2017. Robow tried to run for the South West presidency, but Ethiopian forces in Baidoa arrested him on 13 December 2018 at the request of the FGS, and he has since been in detention. President Laftagreen and the FGS Lower House Speaker, Mohamed Mursal Abdirahman, have attempted to secure his release but failed.

JUBALAND

During the reporting period, Jubaland witnessed violent intra-state contestations. However, over the last three years, the situation moved from bad to worse, resulting from the growing schism between Kismayo and Gedo. Immediately after the FGS and Jubaland indicated a relative rapprochement, political and administrative leaders in the Gedo region announced that they were no longer part of Jubaland.

This announcement effectively makes President Madobe leader of only Kismayo, given that AS control most of Middle Jubba. Madobe accused the FGS of interference in Gedo to fragment Jubaland; however, the anger at Madobe in Gedo not only derives from FGS frustration, but also from the Ogaden–Marehan clans' contestation for dominance in the region. The Ogaden–Marehan competition has been an underlying cause of conflict since the creation of the state and will remain a challenge even if there is a change in the FGS administration. In particular, the Marehan are aggrieved that Madobe's Ogaden clan have benefited from significant support from Kenya. Nearly ten months after the FGS and the international community recognised his legitimacy as Jubaland President (despite disputed elections),





President Madobe, on 19 May 2021, appointed his new cabinet of 23 ministers, 22 deputy ministers and 5 state ministers—including 1 female minister and 4 female deputy ministers.. In Jubaland, President Madobe failed to accommodate most non-Ogaden communities, but unlike others who accept the status quo, the Marehan community—predominantly in Gedo—has always proved a challenge to his authority ever since he became state leader nine years ago. Moreover, the 2017 election of FGS President Farmajo—who has Marehan lineage—further emboldened Marehan leaders in Gedo, with them subsequently becoming increasingly vocal in their opposition to Madobe.

In March, Abdirashid Janan, Jubaland Security Minister and a key Marehan ally of Madobe, switched sides following closed-door negotiations with the FGS. The defection came as latent tensions between Janan and Madobe surfaced. In January, Janan's militia was humiliatingly defeated in an attack on Somali National Army (SNA) troops in Beled Hawo.

Janan had acted independently, following Madobe's withholding of financial support and Kenya's unwillingness to support an attack based on the potential reputational and human costs. Janan's switch of allegiance was brokered by Marehan elites in Gedo, who were concerned that Madobe's opposition to Farmajo and growing relationship with Puntland are not limited to a contest over Gedo, but stem from a more profound plan to form the so-called 'Kablalah' clan grouping (an alliance of Harti and Ogaden tribes) against the Marehan leadership. Meanwhile, Janan was concerned about being outmanoeuvred by Madobe's own talks with Villa Somalia.

Janan's defection came at a critical time for Jubaland. Given that Janan was the most significant Marehan figure in the Jubaland administration, Madobe's inner circle was concerned about the impact of his departure regarding Gedo and Kismayo. In addition, reports suggested that the Jubaland Vice President Mahamoud Sayid is not on good terms with Madobe, and that these developments could embolden other senior elites within the state leadership to withdraw their support, further undermining Madobe's authority.

BENADIR

In Benadir, tensions emerged between Mayor Filish and the former FGS Prime Minister Khaire over responsibilities for Mogadishu security and management of local sports activities. The dispute came after the mayor questioned the role of the FGS Minister of Youth and Sports who currently oversees sports and youth engagement in Mogadishu. This tension is among key issues fuelling the debate over the status of Mogadishu.

Members of the Forum of National Parties tabled a motion to initiate a constitutional discussion on the status of Benadir. Farmajo identified this as an opportunity to convince the larger Mudalood community (a key population in Benadir) to support him, rallying behind the issue and demanding improved status for Benadir. Immediately the parliament approved 13 senate seats for Benadir, despite opposition from Puntland and Jubaland leaders. Determining the status of the capital is critical because it will impact discussions on clan power balance and allows the major population in Benadir to have political representation.

PEACE AND SECURITY

Al-Shabab continues to be the primary perpetrator of attacks against civilians, the government, and AMISOM. In the last five years, Somalia has experienced high-profile and devastating Al-Shabab attacks in Mogadishu and the states. For example, on 14 October 2017, Somalia witnessed its deadliest attack, when more than 640 people were killed in the bombing in Hodan district—the heart of the capital.

At least 81 people were killed and a further 125 injured in a suicide bomb attack in Mogadishu in December 2019. However, the number of attacks and casualties has decreased throughout 2020 and 2021.

Al-Shabab targeted Turkish engineers and their security staff working on the Afgoye area of the Mogadishu–Baidoa supply route, but most victims were local people and commuters. Twenty students from Benadir University were among those who lost their lives on the 28 December 2019 attack. The Somali National Intelligence Service Agency (NISA), for the first time, blamed “a foreign government” for orchestrating this attack. However, immediately after the NISA statement, Al-Shabab claimed responsibility. It is unusual for the militants to claim responsibility for attacks with a high civilian death toll as they risk community backlash. Influential sources in Mogadishu suggest that this was not the first time that evidence has linked AS attacks to foreign governments. NISA is yet to name these “foreign governments”.

The group also carried out attacks on all of the states; however, apart from suicide bombings and hit-and-run attacks, the militants failed to capture significant new territories compared to gains they made in early 2010. In addition, the government managed to liberate several key villages in South West state; while Galmudug, Puntland, and Hirshabelle also foiled militant attempts to create new strongholds in those states.

Image Credit: ©AMISOM




Image Credit: ©AMISOM





Image Credit: ©AMISOM



Image Credit: ©AMISOM



Image Credit: ©AMISOM

INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT

Over the past four years, the partnership between Somalia and the international community has made significant forward progress thanks to the latter's support. Somalia has received increased support in the form of aid and grants since the collapse of the state in 1991. In addition, international financial institutions commenced engagement with Somalia, enabling the country's fledgling institutions to take the necessary measures to start receiving debt relief under the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. The government also received direct budget support from the European Union for the first time. However, the partnership also witnessed its most intense episodes as the FGS expelled the United Nation's Permanent Representative to Somalia as well as regional and international representatives.

The maritime dispute between Kenya and Somalia, piracy activities off the coast of Somalia, regime change in Ethiopia, and the increased involvement of Gulf states in the country's national affairs all represent fundamentally shifting relations of power, reinforcing the differing views regarding how to define such foreign relations.

The centre-periphery competition for regional and international allies worsened the political contestations between Mogadishu and state capitals. As a result, the transitional tasks, including the constitutional and security sector reforms, faced significant obstacles.

The international community focused on conducting shuttle diplomacy between the FGS and FMSs over the last three years; but, unfortunately, efforts to push for a political settlement paving the way for an agreed election process yielded few results.

The zero-sum politics of the Somali political elite has forced the international community to significantly reduce support to key institutions. However, both central and state leaders have responded by thumbing their noses at diplomats and opting for less critical partners. As the influence of the traditional members of international partners reduced, the role of regional actors—including the UAE, Qatar, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Turkey—increased.

Although he is still a front-runner, there is a growing lack of faith that Farmajo can maintain the presidency, with the consequence that Doha might consider supporting alternative candidates. Rumours are spreading that former PM Khaire could be another candidate for Doha. The UAE also seems to have dropped other candidates and heavily supports Puntland's president as their candidate. Despite hopes by some observers, the Gulf rapprochement (rekindling of relations between Qatar and its Gulf neighbours) had a minimal bearing on the UAE's and Qatar's competition for influence in Somalia. Somalia is likely to witness a substantial increase in political financing from Abu Dhabi and Doha in the coming months.

Regarding Somalia's relations with the region and troop-contributing countries, FGS relations with Ethiopia remain strong. Relations with Kenya continue to be strained due to the Kenya-Somalia dispute over the maritime border and Nairobi's alleged ties with FGS opposition leaders, including Jubaland President Madobe. The deadly 25 January 2021 clashes between the SNA and Jubaland forces led by Abdirashid Janan saw Kenya accused of facilitating violence.



On 14 March 2021, Kenya pulled out of the maritime dispute case before the International Court of Justice, accusing the court of “bias and unwillingness to accept its request to delay hearings due to the pandemic”; but the court ruled that most of the disputed water falls under Somalia’s territorial boundaries.

Meanwhile, Somalia’s relationship with Djibouti has become increasingly tense.

Following Janan’s attack on Gedo in January, IGAD investigated at the behest of Somalia. Djibouti led the investigation, which exonerated Kenya of involvement. This escalated tensions between Somalia and Djibouti, with accusations made that the latter is siding with Kenya against Somalia.

Finally, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is currently scheduled to end on 31 March 2022. There are significant concerns that a sudden withdrawal would allow Al-Shabab to take over much of Somalia; yet the AU’s relations with the Somali government appear strained, and the cost and value of the mission are coming under heavy criticism.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT


Somalia—and in particular the Gedo region in Jubaland—suffered a critical water shortage due to weak deyr rains. This increased fears of the onset of a deepening humanitarian crisis. In total, 35 schools were closed in the Gedo region after drought forced families to leave their homes. The FGS appealed to international donors to provide urgent aid for drought-affected communities, particularly those in Gedo, Bakool, Mudug, Bari, and Sool.

The weekly number of reported COVID-19–related deaths in Somalia jumped from two at the end of January to eleven at the end of March 2021, with actual numbers thought to be much higher. The public health measures taken to control its spread shook the Somali economy, forcing many businesses already facing severe challenges before the pandemic to close and lay off employees. Businesses in coastal towns such as Bossaso, Berbera, Kismayo, and Mogadishu and border towns like Beletweyne, Togwajaale, and Beled Hawo suffered the most significant impact due to reduced levels of travel and business in these areas. However, unlike the previous COVID-19 wave, the price of goods remained stable across the country, as there were adequate supplies in the markets, alongside a government tax waiver for essential goods.

A key impact of the pandemic was the disruption to remittance flows. Money sent by the Somali diaspora represents a critical lifeline for Somali households. However, due to repeated lockdowns in Europe and North America and disruptions to international air travel, Somali diaspora communities struggled to send money, while the ability of remittance companies to transfer money has also reportedly been diminished, though exact numbers are difficult to obtain.



COVID-19 also exposed Somalia’s fragility, including its limited and ill-equipped health facilities and the major economic impact. Somalia was vulnerable to major challenges in cashflows into the country, including the aforementioned reduction in remittances. Although the FGS quickly reduced taxes on imports of essential goods to limit price inflation, which helped to protect Somalis against some of the worst economic impact, this reduction in government revenue has a major impact on the government’s ability to pay the salaries of its civil servants and military personnel.



RESULTS FRAMEWORK






Image Credit: ©SSF

In late 2020, SSF was extended for a year to December 2021. The extension presented an opportunity to update and refresh the Fund’s strategy, and the Fund Manager was requested to respond to a revised Terms of Reference by its donors. Over the 2021 period, SSF has taken a two-pronged approach to delivery, capitalising on the successes of the existing pipeline, whilst reorienting towards a more focused long-term approach to stability. The two aspects of the approach were as follows:

- Delivering on previously-agreed investments within the existing SSF pipeline, which have already been discussed with Somali counterparts; and
- Shifting SSF towards a ‘workstream’ approach to develop a set of focused and closely connected investments that address underlying long-term stability challenges

The revisions to the M&E Framework were driven by: SSF’s strategic changes to the SSF work plan in its extension period; the changing context in Somalia; and the findings of the Fund’s endline surveys, progress report, and annual review findings. An additional influencing factor was related to key challenges identified with the SSF Results Framework. Thus the revision sought to establish: the use of robust sampling procedures for data collection from representational stakeholder populations; the cost-efficient design of surveys and case studies to gather data to track attribution and/or contribution of results; and robust analysis of performance against the selected criteria from the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria. In line with this, SSF adjusted the results framework at the level of most output indicator statements, definitions, and Means of Verification (MoV). Certain indicators were discontinued as they were not relevant to the revised strategic focus. Given the extension, new targets were included for 2021 at both the outcome and output levels. SSF took on board FCDO advice to move away from quantitative targets and instead use narrative milestones, which are easier to understand and can capture, with more nuance, the role the programme has played against each objective. Because of this shift, the setting of targets to measure progress in 2021 is not connected to the targets for previous years, and comparative analysis is neither relevant nor possible.



Image Credit: ©SSF



Image Credit: ©SSF

Qatar

The word "Qatar" is rendered in a large, bold, sans-serif font. The letters are filled with a solid orange color and have a thin white outline. The text is set against a background image of a desert landscape with people wearing traditional head coverings. The background image is also tinted with the same orange color, creating a cohesive visual theme.

Image Credit: ©AMISOM

RESULTS AND ACHIEVEMENTS



The overall goal of SSF is to contribute to enhancing stability in Somalia. The SSF Outcome Indicator 1: Somalia's Scoring under the Fragile States Index is a measurement of Somalia's stability profile on the Fragile States Index. Since 2017, the scores have indicated a gradual and slight progress against the indicator, with Somalia's Fragile States Index score decreasing from 113 to 110.9.

Overall, there is arguably a trend towards stability moderately improving in Somalia. This analysis matches previous findings from SSF evaluations, showing moderate positive progress being made against the SSF outcome indicators towards enhancing state legitimacy and reducing communal conflict in Somalia. However, ongoing elite disagreements over the state-building process, especially around electoral processes both in the states and the national politics, may have reversed some of the gains previously recorded. In recent years, Somalia has seen an increase in elite contestations over the political process, at times violent, which has likely reduced previous gains and improvements in overall stability.

SSF has contributed to this stability through investments such as district council formation in Hirshabelle and Galmudug but some of these achievements were later negatively impacted by state and national political disagreements. Similarly, the scores for state legitimacy have improved, which is due to improved perceptions of representativeness and government service delivery. Key SSF investments in infrastructure—such as the Barawe airstrip and the youth centre in Kismayo—have contributed to this. Continued domination of the political space by factionalised elites has remained constant and has undermined stability, as key issues remain unaddressed while political struggles dominate the agendas of Somalia's leaders and opposition.



Image Credit: ©AMISOM



OUTCOME/OUTPUT-LEVEL RESULTS

At its outcome level, SSF aims to contribute to enhancing state legitimacy and reducing political and communal conflict.

OUTCOME INDICATOR 2: STATUS OF COMMUNAL CONFLICTS

Indicator definition: This indicator focuses on communal conflict, which is defined as conflict between different community groups, such as clans. As such, higher-level political conflicts are only discussed here if they were found to relate to the identified communal conflicts in the districts surveyed by the evaluations. This indicator aims to measure:

- Intensity of conflict. The number of conflict incidents and battle-related casualties in a district over the 12 months prior to evaluation studies as listed in the ACLED, compared to the historical maximum across Somalia in the five years preceding the baseline.
- Communities in conflict. This component scores the share of all clans present in a district involved in ongoing conflicts.⁸
- Trend. Conflicts are categorised as escalating, unchanging, or de-escalating.

This section presents the findings of the endline evaluation studies conducted in 2020 on communal conflicts during phase II. The scores for the indicator are outlined first, followed by key trends observed across the five states, and finally an in-depth analysis of the conflicts and endline study findings.

5.6 - Midline 2018 Actual

5.5 - Endline 2020 Actual

5.4 - Baseline

5.0 - 2020 Target

7.0

KEY ACHIEVEMENTS AND RESULTS

The overall score for Outcome Indicator 2 has remained unchanged. In many districts, positive developments are linked to SSF investments by community members.

6.0

Galmudug and Puntland have seen an increase in the score due to reduced levels of communal conflict. However, South West has seen an opposite development. Hirshabelle and Jubaland, meanwhile, remain at the same level as at baseline. However, since 2020 when baseline data were collected, critical events have taken place in all of these locations, especially in Hirshabelle and Jubaland states, where the politics have been particularly damaging, which has likely reduced previous achievements.

5.0

4.0

3.0

2.0

1.0




Image Credit: ©SSF

AVERAGE SCORES FOR COMMUNAL CONFLICT



Image Credit: ©SSF



RESULTS 2021

The evaluation conducted in 2021 indicates that through its earlier (2017/18) interventions, the SSF was found to have contributed to a reduction in communal conflict in two districts of Galmudug: Hobyo and Abudwaq. The third targeted district, Balanbale, did not experience a reduction in communal conflict over the same period. It is important to note that the 2021 evaluation focused on the three districts in which the Fund did significant work throughout the year.

KEY

-  CONFLICT TRENDS
-  COMMUNITIES IN CONFLICT
-  INTENSITY OF CONFLICT

Scale: 1 = No communities in conflict
7 = 100% communities in conflict

7.0

KEY TRENDS

States and districts differ greatly in their developments. Various issues have been identified across the states and districts. Namely, land continues to be at the heart of most conflicts, and systematic efforts to address structural issues in land dispute arbitration will be required.

6.0

Similarly, the issues in customary justice as regards reconciliation and conflict resolution are highlighted, as is the need for security sector reform for sustainable peace processes.

5.0

In 2020, across the five FMSs, the average score for communal conflict (see Table 2) was 5.5, slightly exceeding the endline target of 5. In 2020, the highest scoring state for communal conflict was Galmudug at 6.4, but in 2019 Puntland had the highest score at 5.3. Puntland was recognised for the relative peace in the state, due to factors which included a decline in communal conflict, mainly as a result of the de-escalation of the Galkayo conflict, and a smooth electoral process that led to a peaceful transfer of power to a new administration—albeit one which faced multiple claims of corruption and underrepresentation of women in parliament. Intensity of conflict looks at the number of violent events and casualties in the study districts in the ACLED. The higher the score, the lower the levels of violence. In terms of intensity, the country has seen an improvement, reflected in the score increase from 5.4 to 5.9, from baseline to endline respectively.

4.0

3.0

2.0

1.0

In Galmudug, the political conflict between factions in Adaado and Dhusamareb did see armed clashes, most notably in February 2020 in Dhusamareb. However, this political conflict did not spill over to exacerbate communal conflicts that were still present at baseline. For example, Abudwaq witnessed no violence relating to the political crisis, while at baseline the community was divided into those who

supported ASWJ and those who supported Galmudug state authorities. This absence of violence is telling of the strength of the SSF-funded Wadajir Framework peace process in the district.

The 2020 scores demonstrate improved progress. In 2018 and 2019, the status of communal conflict was mixed across Galmudug, with progress towards reconciliation made in Galkayo, and a contrasting increase in communal conflict in Herale. The ACLED data recorded deaths from communal conflict, increasing from 45 in 2018 to 78 in 2019. FMS-level contestation spilt over into violence in towns such as Balanbale, while districts that received SSF peacebuilding and governance investments, such as Abudwaq, proved resilient. There were significant economic improvements in Galmudug through increased SSF-supported infrastructure investments in Galkayo, Abudwaq, Hobyo, Guriel, and Dhusamareb. These provide incentives for communities in Galmudug to avoid communal conflict and capitalise on economic opportunity. Most notable among these major investments is the Hobyo port, which could have a transformative economic impact on the town if a conflict-sensitive approach is used to manage this new investment.

Meanwhile, the ACLED data shows fewer incidents and casualties for Puntland as the campaign against AS and retaliatory bombings have dissipated. Most casualties reported in 2020 have been a result of targeted assassinations by AS against high-level government, security, and justice actors. In 2019, the findings indicated that as a result of the continued de-escalation of the Galkayo conflict brought about by the collaboration of the Puntland and Galmudug governments, Puntland saw a decline in communal conflict. The number of deaths related to communal conflict decreased in Puntland from 48 (2018) to 17 (2019).¹⁰


Despite the progress addressing communal conflict in most of Puntland in the months leading up to the 2019 state elections, both Puntland and Somaliland stoked communal tensions in the contested border regions of Sool and Sanaag. In 2020, recurring clashes over land disputes and drawn-out cycles of revenge killings were still observed, both within clan families and across the border with Galmudug. It is noteworthy, however, that a clash between Galmudug and Puntland forces on 2 May 2020 did not result in large-scale fighting between the two states. This is testimony to progress made in state building on both sides.

Jubaland, similarly, has seen a decline in overall levels of violence despite the continuing campaign against AS, clashes between the FGS and Jubaland, and inter-clan fighting relating to land conflict in Kismayo. Overall, Jubaland's endline score under this sub-indicator is 6/7, reflecting a significant improvement of 1.2 since the baseline and following a strong positive trend in which inter-communal clashes have declined. While violence associated with AS was higher, there has been some reduction since baseline; the scale and deadliness of AS-related confrontations has reduced since 2017. Given the dramatic political developments that have taken place in the state in the past year, it is worth noting, with some optimism, that these have not escalated into large-scale violence—marking a positive trajectory within Jubaland.

Hirshabelle, the youngest FMS, scored 5.8 for communal conflict. The score stays the same on aggregate. Indeed, no clear trend in the state can be observed as district-level developments diverge significantly. Beletweyne no longer seems to be the epicentre in the battle against AS as the confrontations between security forces and AS have moved westward. This has led to a substantial increase in the score there.

Meanwhile, Mataban has seen a small escalation in violence due to increased fighting with AS. The same has been observed in Jowhar, as AS seems to be shifting its focus from Lower Shabelle to Middle Shabelle and they are being resisted by local clan militia—the Macawisley. Warsheikh has also seen an increase in spillover violence from the fight between government forces and AS in Balcad. The evaluation findings in 2019 highlighted the rushed nature of the state formation process in Hirshabelle, with some experts describing it as a “forced marriage” between the Hiraan and Middle Shabelle. One expert observed, “The first task of any government or state is the security of its citizens. The fact that this state is almost unable to provide any sort of security to its people or even itself means its legitimacy is limited.” Many of the communal conflicts in the state are related to land and resource disputes, such as ongoing violence in Mataban over grazing land and water access.

At the SSF midline (2018), AS was observed to be on the back foot in South West. This trend appears to be continuing. In 2020, military operations by security forces are ongoing in rural parts of Lower Shabelle. The overall trend of the state being more able to establish security is evident in 2020 in the urban centres of Baidoa and Xudur, which have seen the largest improvements in scores. This is an improvement from the intensity of conflicts between 2018 and 2019, which was reflected in the increased level of casualties. These higher levels of communal conflict in South West were linked to its historic marginalisation in Somalia. The experts highlighted that the predominantly Digil and Mirifle communities that reside in South West have suffered years of socio-economic marginalisation and political exclusion.



TRENDS IN 2021

In the targeted districts of Galmudug (mid-2017 to 2018) and Puntland (2021), SSF support to social reconciliation activities and the broader reconciliation conferences contributed to the signing of social contracts and peace agreements, which directly contributed to an immediate reduction in communal conflict.

In the targeted districts of SWS (2021), SSF supported established district councils (DCs) to deliver services through cash-for-work projects and organise community dialogue events bringing together the DCs, other government officials, and community members. Easier access to local officials, increased visibility of local government structures, and improved service delivery were the three major factors identified as contributing to stronger trust and positive opinion of the DCs.



Image Credit: ©SSF

COMMUNITIES IN CONFLICT

The number of communities in conflict is calculated via a conflict analysis to score the number of clans in the district who are involved in conflict. The higher the score, the lower the level of communities in conflict.

In terms of the number of communities in conflict in the research districts, no aggregate change can be reported as districts differ significantly in their trends.

For Hirshabelle, Puntland, and South West, the number of conflicts and the number of communities involved in these conflicts remain largely unchanged. In Puntland, the conflicts that had seen some violence around the midline in Bossaso are no longer violent; yet we would not go as far as to say that they have been resolved as the structural conditions remain. Similarly, while it is very encouraging that the conflict between Galmudug and Puntland has not recently escalated into a full-on confrontation between the states' armed forces, clashes do still occur between clans on different sides of the border. Further structural solutions are also required for joint management of Bossaso city. As such, while the developments are positive, the conflict remains short of being fully resolved.

South West, again, shows little change in the scores since baseline, masking divergence at the district level. Ceel Barde has seen an uptick in violence as Ethiopian forces have withdrawn from the city. Barawe remains largely without communal conflict, but significant tensions are reported around competition for increased resources, as construction of the airport and the projected move of the South West capital to the area are pushing land prices up.

In Hirshabelle, the key conflict fault lines remain largely unchanged at endline, with only a slight decline. This is reflected in the score for communities in conflict, which has seen no notable change since the baseline. The conflicts relating to the fertile riverine land as well as over political representation and control of local administrations continue. Additionally, in Warsheikh, endline data reveals a new conflict between two sub-clans of the Hawiye-Abgal, resulting from a power vacuum created as a new district council was formed but has not yet become effective in enforcing order in the district.

In both Jubaland and Galmudug, the scores have seen a slight decline since baseline as previously dormant clan conflicts have reignited in violent clashes in Kismayo and Hobyo. Both conflicts have since been brought under control and can be seen to be either de-escalating (Hobyo) or remaining largely the same (Kismayo). However, given that these conflicts were not active at baseline and as such not captured in the score at the time, the score for the two states has declined slightly since then.






Image Credit: ©AMISOM



CONFLICT TREND

CONFLICT TREND SCORES

The conflict trend looks at whether the communal conflicts in the different districts are seen to be escalating, de-escalating, or remaining the same. A higher score indicates de-escalation.

On aggregate, it seems that most conflicts in the research districts are indeed on a positive trajectory, as the overall score for this indicator remains at 5.3 out of 7.

Galmudug and Puntland both show significant improvement, both overall and in specific districts which were part of our sample. For both states, the positive trend of conflict de-escalation in Galkayo contributes to an increase in the score. In Galmudug, the de-escalation in Abudwaq further improves the scoring as the district has not seen violent confrontations since the Wadajir Framework reconciliation conferences.

Hirshabelle, conversely, has shown a reverse development. In Warsheikh, a new conflict has emerged and is escalating as the new district government is unable to enforce peace, and `delayed district council formation (DCF) has created a power vacuum which the belligerents are seeking to fill. As the 'District Council Formation: Lessons Learned Study' for SSF has discussed, it is important in future reconciliation processes to account for the need for peace enforcement locally in order to avoid a repeat of such power vacuums emerging. Most armed forces in Somalia are locally affiliated with clan lineages. To avoid the possibility of armed conflict linked to local political struggles, it is necessary either to seek commitment from external—preferably FMS or FGS—armed forces to be stationed in the area, or to reform local forces to be mixed and more representative of the different groups locally.

So far, as local security forces are essentially clan militias and thus loyal to their commanding kinsmen, the risk of groups using armed conflict to improve political outcomes remains salient.

Jubaland's score is affected negatively by the fact that the inter-clan conflict over land in the suburbs of Kismayo remains unaddressed in structural terms. As such, while the conflict is currently not violent, it cannot be categorised as de-escalating.

Finally, in South West, the developments are negative overall. The departure of Ethiopian troops from Ceel Barde has allowed for communal conflicts to resurface, leading to an escalation. These conflicts had already been coming to the fore through multiple failed attempts at DCF. In Baidoa, meanwhile, one of the communal conflicts is escalating while another is de-escalating. A similar story emerges from Xudur, where one conflict is de-escalating due to a fine imposed by the local administration; however, another conflict over resources has sprung up in instead. Barawe, meanwhile, reports significant tensions around the increased resources in the district, but this has not yet turned violent.

ATTRIBUTION TO SSF

The evidence from the SSF evaluation and endline studies indicates that certain districts in the five states where SSF supports interventions have improved their scores on conflict due to SSF's programmes. The following districts have shown the most change since baseline.

CHANGE IN INDICATOR SCORE SINCE BASELINE

District	Status of Communal Conflict
Abudwaq	2.8
Benderbeyla	0
Hobyo	-1.3
Ceel Barde	-4
Galkayo South	2.3
Galkayo North	2.3
Mataban	0.7



With the exception of Galkayo, it is noteworthy that the districts with positive changes in conflict scores tend to also have seen positive changes in the governance indicators (SSF Outcome 4). Indeed, the three districts that are part of the Wadajir Framework—namely Abudwaq, Balanbale, and Hobyo—boast increases in all indicators, apart from the conflict indicator in Hobyo which decreased due to clashes that took place just before the programme started. The respondents in these districts explicitly state that the conflict reduction in the district is due to the reconciliation activities that form part of the programme. The evidence from these three districts would therefore seem to suggest that the Wadajir Framework is an effective approach to addressing issues of governance and conflict.

In terms of SSF's programme in geographical terms, the work in Puntland has been quite successful. Galkayo has seen success in conflict reduction since the baseline. While SSF is in no way the only actor in the area, its work with youth and women across the green line has undoubtedly contributed positively to conflict reduction, as community members view these two groups as important stakeholders who contribute to peacebuilding. In Galkayo, the conflict was escalating at baseline in both its communal and political dimension, and respondents, as well as an Interpeace assessment, indicated that business owners and youth and women's groups were the most promising avenues for peacebuilding across the green line.

At midline, this had taken place with support from SSF-funded youth clubs and Conflict Dynamics International (CDI)-engaged business communities with SSF funding.

In Goldogob, meanwhile, the split of the district into Goldogob and Bursalah has removed many points of contention. Furthermore, investment activities by Care International have fostered inter-communal communication through consultations. Community members give explicit credit to Care for consultations and point to the road construction with solar streetlights as improving the local market and helping to tackle crime. Indeed, both Galkayo and Goldogob are examples of effective interventions by civil society actors in combination with consultative, participatory project activities that have succeeded at bridging communal tensions and establishing collaboration up to elder and administrative levels; such changes have proven effective in absorbing or dissipating tensions that would have previously led to an outbreak of wider armed violence. However, it is important to remember that inclusive investment should not be limited to consultations. District councils that are in fact inclusive are lauded for providing non-violent avenues for political contestation.

While the credit for the peace process in Galkayo was explicit at midline, when a peace agreement was recent and the roles of youth (SSF youth centres) and the business community (CDI engagements) were visible—linking the SSF investments to outcomes at endline was slightly more challenging. However, SSF partners, The Centre for Peace and Democracy and Puntland Youth and Social Development, have been conducting a wide range of conflict resolution, peace maintenance, and peacebuilding investments along the Galmudug–Puntland border. These were not explicitly credited by respondents for conflict reduction but do reflect situational awareness and flexibility as well as relevant adaptation by SSF and may have contributed to containing the conflict and thus mitigating the overall risk of conflict in the area.

Similarly, with SSF funding, the Danish Demining Group's investment 'Nabad iyo Amni' formed the community-police dialogue committees, including training in rights-based community policing, training of trainers, and additional equipment such as vehicles and police stations. The police stations illustrate the lingering tension in Galkayo, as land allocation for stations in Towfiq appear to have contributed to conflict between Towfiq (Puntland) and Afbarwaqo (Galmudug). Moreover, a training in Saaxo was postponed due to insecurity. However, again there was no spillover into large-scale conflict between the states, which is testimony to the durability of the peace.

In Jubaland, the indicator development since baseline has been by and large negative. The environment has been exceedingly difficult for programming for the past two years as the conflict between Mogadishu and Kismayo has intensified.

In terms of SSF's programmes, youth marginalisation—a key driver of recruitment for extremist organisations as well as armed groups—has been tackled under investments in SSF II focused on generating youth employment. Though this area needs more research, such investments may have played a role in reducing youth vulnerability to AS recruitment and other forms of violence. However, the evidence acquired for this report cannot conclusively show this to be the case. Similarly, enhanced horizontal community cohesion and the absence of extant community conflict in Gedo may be in part attributable to SSF's DIALOGUE investment implemented by Danish Refugee Council/ Danish Demining Group. Collectively, it is plausible that by fostering horizontal relations and interactions at the community level, these investments supported the enhanced community cohesion among Bardhere and Garbahare's community groups, including between minority or more fractious clans.

Image Credit: ©SSF



The score under Outcome 2 has improved since the baseline and midline, and there has been a noteworthy absence of inter-communal conflict in Gedo through the course of the high-level political crisis between the FGS and Jubaland since August 2019, with decisive action by the respective leaders; here, we can identify perhaps SSF's greatest contribution to stability and peace in Jubaland. However, the same investment's efforts to improve Gedo-Jubaland relations were not successful; respondents said that it had no impact because Jubaland was not involved.

COMMON THEMES IN CONFLICT

LAND CONFLICT

Land continues to be at the heart of almost every conflict in the districts where SSF operates. In 2020, land conflicts intensified in Kismayo and in the riverine areas of Hirshabelle, as well as in Hobyo and Barawe, as the value of land is projected to rise due to the seaport and airport construction projects. Even multi-layered political conflicts often tend to be linked to rural factors and control over land and land-based resources such as pasture and water points. Many community members view rural pastoralists as a risk factor and potential spoilers in the conflict resolution process. Yet, conflict resolution rarely seems to account for this aspect, so the peace process tends to be more urban-focused, including urban land conflict—and much of AS's appeal locally has to do with their ability to arbitrate land disputes and enforce decisions taken. More attention should be paid to addressing this aspect of conflict in future.

CUSTOMARY CONFLICT RESOLUTION ISSUES

The midline report touched upon some of the issues regarding the reliance on Xeer—the customary justice system for conflict resolution. For example, in many localities, the cycle of revenge killings is linked to unpaid diya (compensation payments). As a respondent in Beletweyne elucidates:

Families that lost their people in the previous years could not get the diya or their assets back. Then they informed their militia to kill the people from the other side and that made the situation problematic.

Indeed, diya puts a strain on already asset-stripped communities affected by flooding and/or droughts and may not always reach the

families of the aggrieved either, as elders or entrepreneurs may appropriate the payment. This adds to collective grievances. These diya payment issues have been clearly present in the Wadajir Framework districts of Hobyo, Abudwaq, and Balanbale; and respondents in Mataban have also talked about this problem.

Xeer is at times ill-suited to stop the cycle of revenge killings for three reasons. Firstly, elders cannot enforce decisions unless they are backed by a militia or another armed force. Secondly, the collective responsibility of the customary justice system does not always effectively deter revenge killings. In districts where these cycles have effectively been stopped, such as in Abudwaq, the community tends to transfer to a Shari'a system; that is, a death penalty is imposed on those who carry out revenge killings. Thirdly, more powerful clans enjoy more power under Xeer, leading to a situation where the less powerful party may continue to be disgruntled despite a resolution to the incident at hand.

Therefore, many conflicts have become seasonal and re-occurring. Yet, when community members were interviewed, they viewed the conflicts as resolved, as if no violence was occurring. As such, many districts that had no active conflict at baseline have seen violence erupt during the past few years, given unresolved structural factors. This was the case with the land conflict that took place in Kismayo earlier this year.

Similarly, the conflict in Hobyo between the Sa'ad and the Saleebaan lineages of the Hawiye–Habr Gidir reignited before midline as land started to become more valuable in the district.

Given that the Xeer is integrally involved in the Wadajir Framework and other reconciliation investments, it is important to seek solutions to these shortcomings of the customary system.



NEED FOR SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

Another well-documented issue is that security forces often wear many hats and are rarely professional, independent, or representative of the population they are supposed to protect. When district-level security forces are affiliated with certain lineages, as they frequently are, they tend to become pulled into confrontations between clans, and clashes between individuals risk becoming a wider clan issue. Indeed, in the districts where the peace process has seen successful enforcements and consequently a cessation of violence, there has been an external and thus impartial security force in place. This happened in Abudwaq, which saw a vicious cycle of revenge killings end over two years ago. The FGS dispatched NISA and SNA troops to the district, who enforced a curfew and disarmed the militias. As a women's group representative noted,

Previously there were clan militias in this district, and they were brought up as result of existing conflicts in the district in the past years. But currently none of the clans in the district have active militia. The clan militias were dissolved after the peace agreements were reached during the president's visit in 2018.

In Hobyo and Balanbale, meanwhile, violence occasionally erupts as there is no external security force to enforce the peace. As long as clans have affiliated militias, the incentive to use violence for political gains will always remain. External enforcers, however, may not be the best long-term solution as they require a lot of funding and long-term commitment from their backers. In Ceel Barde, we have seen the aftermath of a strong external guarantor of peace leaving and the district descending into communal conflict in the power vacuum that followed. Also, Abudwaq has seen soldiers mutiny due to unpaid salaries.

Ideally districts would see a coordinated effort of security sector reform concurring with the development of local revenue collection to fund them. Districts should have mixed security forces that have been professionally trained and are answerable to civilian authorities. Efforts like the Wadajir Framework should seek to incorporate the element of peace enforcement.

INCREASED RESOURCES CREATE NEW CONFLICT

With militias often linked to different lineages, we have observed that the introduction of new resources has often sparked conflict. In Barawe and in Hobyo, large-scale investments led to increases in communal conflict as land grabbing became more common and militias were called upon to support different parties. As one focus group discussion participant at midline in Hobyo explained,

When they heard these news [of seaport construction], everybody who was here or outside claimed ownership of the land around it. That caused conflicts, and it will lead to wars if it continues this way.

In Benderbeyla, some tensions have appeared following new investments. The minorities (Bahamuumin and Baato) accuse the more powerful clans (Amaane and Osman Mohamoud) of enriching themselves with incoming resources rather than sharing them equitably and have started demanding greater representation within the district administration. This was not a point of contention at baseline as the administration was seen as fair and direct representation was not necessary as members of different communities felt adequately consulted. Thus, it appears that when new resources are introduced locally, careful negotiations are required to ensure that different parties feel that the distribution is equitable.



Image Credit: ©AMISOM



CLASHES DUE TO DISTRICT COUNCIL FORMATION

Perhaps unsurprisingly, there have been clashes in the research districts resulting from the DCF process. Most notably, in Warsheikh, powerful lineages have started fighting following the establishment of the council, which has been powerless in the face of the violence. In Ceel Barde, multiple failed attempts at forming the council have compounded the fragile security situation where the Ethiopians have left the district, contributing to clan clashes in the district. The districts in Beletweyne and Buloburde have also seen clashes relating to this process. Meanwhile, all Wadajir Framework districts in Galmudug are paused at the stage of the process where the clans need to negotiate the shares of seats for the district council. This is an extremely contentious process as it touches upon the core issue of conflict in every locality: political representation—particularly as capture of administrations continues to be viewed as synonymous with resource control. As such, with DCF it would be safer to assume that there will be clashes around seat allocation and reconciliation. In addition, alongside the considerations discussed above, namely the limits of customary arrangements and peace enforcement, it is important to be mindful that the reconciliation process leading to DCF tends to bring back to the surface some of the very emotional and traumatic past events that community members will revisit in the process. The chances of success are likely to diminish with every effort if the process is not seen through on the first attempt.

OUTCOME INDICATOR 3: STATE LEGITIMACY IS ENHANCED, AND STATUS OF POLITICAL AND COMMUNAL CONFLICT IS REDUCED

A central focus of SSF’s strategy in building longer-term stability in Somalia is to address key political fault lines. As a result, SSF responds to issues which it understands to be the key barriers to inclusive and consolidated political settlements. Accordingly, ‘political conflict’ refers to conflict, violent or non-violent, between the FGS–FMS level on one hand, and at the inter- and intra-state (FMS) level on the other.

Indicator definition: This indicator is a measure of whether the status of key fault lines has declined, remained constant, or improved across the target states and Somalia, specifically at the FGS–FMS level contestation and conflict and at the inter- and intra-state level conflict.

3.75 - Endline 2020 Actual

3.5 - Midline 2018 Actual

3.0 - Baseline

3.0 - 2020 Target



Image Credit : ©SSF

7.0

6.0



5.0

KEY RESULTS AND TRENDS

- The endline score slightly exceeded the target for 2020 and showed progression against the baseline.
- Galkayo made significant improvement in peace and security in 2020.
- The SSF 2020 evaluation indicates limited progress has been made in the quality of the FGS–FMS relationship, in state building, or in negotiating the roadmap on completion of the federalism process.

4.0

- The FGS–FMS relationship has been the main arena of political conflict in Somalia in 2020.
- The conflict between the FGS and FMSs has worsened, especially in Puntland and Jubaland.

3.0

- Poor leadership at all levels was found to be a significant part of the problem.
- Intra-state level conflict subsided in 2020.
- Intra-state conflicts in Jubaland and Hirshabelle are worrying.

2.0

- FMS politicians are seeking some form of a unity government as a means of dealing with conflict and defectors within the FMSs.
- Inter-state level conflict and political tensions between neighbouring FMSs have, for the most part, remained dormant in 2020.

1.0

FGS–FMS RELATIONSHIP

While the evaluation scores gathered to measure the quality of the FGS–FMS relationship in 2020 indicated an overall annual improvement against both the target and the baseline, the experts consulted during the endline evaluation largely reported that the relationship had not significantly improved.

The 2020 findings generally indicate that the FGS leadership remains inadequate as intra- and inter-friction between the presidency, parliament, and FMSs have resulted in inertia, and at times localised conflict. Limited progress was made in state building or negotiating the roadmap to complete the federalism process and security governance. Parliament and the executive at the FGS level function minimally. These findings largely reflect a continuation of the results in 2019, indicating the worsening relationship between the FGS and FMSs. The endline findings also match other monitoring studies conducted by SSF, which indicate that the FGS–FMS relationship has been the main arena of political conflict in Somalia in 2020. The quality of relationships varied by location, with key findings indicating an especially strained relationship between the FGS and Puntland and Jubaland.

Some evidence suggests that the parliament appears to have been co-opted by the FGS. Feedback from key experts highlights that the FGS, in its aim to solidify its control on all state affairs, leaves little room for cooperation or concessions with the FMSs. Other expert feedback painted a dire picture:

If the parliamentary body can be used as bait to determine outcomes of serious political issues and challenges as opposed to enacting their duties as legislators and providing checks and balances, it completely fractures the process, leaves room for infiltration in the pursuit of personal interests resulting in serious conflict resolution challenges.

Recently limited progress has been made in terms of elections and timelines. Much could change with changes in personalities as the institutions are largely powerless. The question of the nature, durability, and future of the political settlement or elite compact in Somalia produced wide-ranging views. There is a broad consensus among the endline evaluation experts that the FGS–FMS relationship is “frayed” and “deteriorating”. The conflict-management skills of the FGS and parliament are reported to be limited. This matches SSF monitoring studies in 2019, showing the national political settlement or elite compact to be fraying badly and in danger of collapse.

There was less consensus on the nature and future of the political settlement. Some observations of note:

- The old elite compact is/was a clan-based resource-sharing deal among a small number of elites; it is not an inclusive political settlement.
- The political settlement enshrines clan-based division of power and the 4.5 formula.
- The most recent manifestation of the elite compact—the Dhusamareb agreement on the holding of 2020/21 elections—was more the result of pressure by external actors and not a ‘natural’ accord.
- The Dhusamareb agreement suggests that the status quo will continue post-election, based on the 4.5 formula.
- The unfinished constitution embodies the inability to build a real political settlement, and efforts to complete and ratify the constitution will produce conflict.
- More important than the constitution is the lack of written political norms guiding political behaviour.

- It was observed that the actual process of ensuring some form of proportional representation by clan involves careful balancing and negotiations of allocation of positions and power at the district, regional, and national level, which are extremely complex and prone to unravelling. It has also made it much harder to advance the goal of greater representation for minorities and women.
- Most of the population's primary demand is for security. In addition, demand was rising for fair representation—not along clan lines but for youth and women's representation.
- It was noted that the current practice of balancing representation along clan lines makes it harder to expand representation to women and youth because clans are disinclined to cede their representation to those groups. Moving away from the logic of the 4.5 formula, some noted, would advance representation for women and youth.

Poor relations between the FGS leadership and the authorities in Puntland and Jubaland were emblematic of the discord, and direct military force in Jubaland and Galmudug signalled to some observers a new and dangerous moment in FGS–FMS relations. However, in contrast, one expert reported:

There has been no progress [to the FGS–FMS relationship] but then there hasn't been much deterioration, which in the bigger scheme of things can be considered progress.

The evaluation found varying causes for the lack of progress. Poor leadership at all levels was found to be a significant part of the problem. There was also a general lack of consultations between the FGS and FMS, with the two trying to "defeat each other", and cooperation reportedly only happening when the international community forced negotiations.

Given the lack of consultation between the FGS and FMSs over the last three years, little progress has been enabled towards negotiating key political settlement issues. In addition, competition for resources and control of seaport and airport revenues at FMS level have been points of contestation with the FGS, and cooperation is unlikely in the near term. Experts agreed that increased external financial and security aid and diplomatic support were tilting FGS–FMS power relations in favour of the FGS, and contributing to short-term instability as the FGS developed new ways to intervene in FMS affairs—including, in the case of Jubaland, with military forces.

Moreover, it was observed that over 60% of the FGS's 2021 budget of \$670 million is from foreign aid, which produces an unaccountable 'rentier' state over which political figures fight. A government depending on taxes would be more accountable to its people. The share of internal revenue raised by the FGS and the FMS governments continues to be minuscule compared to needs. Also, there is little agreement on both functions and financing responsibilities between levels of governments.

In cases where the FGS had installed its preferred government in an FMS, this was clearly seen as an example of control rather than a reflection of cooperation. As one expert stated:

Federalism is not advancing as the states that are cooperating with Mogadishu are not independent but rather appointed by FGS and controlled by them to a large extent. The states with conflict with FGS do not have an agreement with Mogadishu over key questions.

The FGS's ability to install preferred FMS governments was evaluated as having mixed results. The FGS has increased its financial and military leverage, which has enabled it to intervene in FMS affairs and, in some cases, remove political rivals. In the short term, such actions have increased instability and conflict, but have also resulted in the installation of FMS governments that are friendly with the FGS and under its influence.

A key finding is that conflict between the FGS and FMS has worsened in Jubaland. Jubaland has both an FGS–FMS and an inter-clan conflict. 2020 saw the introduction of SNA forces into northern Jubaland and subsequent clashes with troops loyal to Jubaland's leadership. FGS–FMS tensions are likely to remain high in Gedo region as it faces long-term difficulties. It was noted that if a change of FGS leadership occurs as a result of elections, the relationship between the FGS and Jubaland could improve. But the stand-off between Marehan and Absame clans over control of Kismayo and Jubaland state will endure.





INTER- AND INTRA-STATE-LEVEL CONFLICTS

SSF monitoring studies indicate inter-state-level conflict and political tensions between neighbouring FMSs have, for the most part, remained dormant in 2020.

The evaluation found that, with some exceptions, the past year has seen a subsiding of intra-state conflict. Galkayo's significant improvement in peace and security was notable; although Galkayo continues to face localised conflict, ASWJ has been marginalised—but it is biding its time to re-enter politics in the region.

Intra-state conflicts varied across states, with some FMSs experiencing reduced conflict and others, heightened conflict. Several ongoing conflicts often divided regions by territory and clan. For instance, Jubaland's schism is especially severe and deserves priority attention. Tensions between existing FMS authorities and regional rivals and rejectionists grew in Jubaland and Hirshabelle. Long-standing communal clashes and AS attacks or influence constitute recurring sources of conflict within FMSs.

With Puntland's exception, all of the FMSs are still in a state of formation and feature contested elections of questionable legitimacy and divided constituencies. The federal parliamentary elections are "landmines for all most states"; especially Galmudug, where competition for seats is intense. Hirshabelle is expected to have a contested election, along with the ongoing alienation of the Hawaadle population in Beletweyne. Whatever the outcome of the current electoral process, the state is likely to remain dysfunctional and divided. Political settlements within FMSs have generally been weak and subject to group defections, but showed significant variation. One of the most potentially significant findings from SSF reporting over the past year is the apparent trend in FMS politics to seek some form of a unity government as a means of dealing with conflict and defectors within the FMSs.

Several experts reinforced the point that at all levels, AS violence against those in the FMSs and FGS remains a top source of conflict, and that trends over the past suggest that the group's capacity to launch assassinations and terrorist attacks remains strong. Some Somalis feel that a negotiated settlement with AS is the only way to end the violence. Regional actors in the Horn and Gulf continue to play destabilising roles in Somalia's internal conflicts. Ethiopia's internal political turmoil could divert attention from Somalia, but it has not occurred to date.

OUTCOME INDICATOR 4: GOVERNMENT LEGITIMACY

Indicator definition: Government legitimacy is understood and measured through four concepts:

- **Inclusiveness.** The political participation of youth, women, and members of minority and marginalised clans, and the extent to which they feel that their community is represented by the FMS, with a focus on those respondents who do not belong to a dominant clan in the district.
- **Accountability.** The availability of FMS officials, their visits, and the community and marginalised group members' ability to raise issues with them.
- **Fairness.** The non-dominant clan members' satisfaction level with services provided by the FMS as well as access to those services.
- **Responsiveness.** How confident community and marginalised group members are that the state government will support them when they have a problem.

3.8 - Endline 2020 Actual

3.6 - Baseline **3.6 - 2020 Target**

3.4 - Midline 2018 Actual



KEY RESULTS AND TRENDS

- There has been some overall progress reported since baseline. Puntland shows moderate increases in the legitimacy score. However, there has been regression caused by negative political developments in Galmudug, Hirshabelle, and Jubaland.

- In Jubaland, the score for every district declined. While in Garbahare and Bardhere, this most likely relates to the conflict between the FGS and Jubaland; in Afmadow and Kismayo it seems to highlight the lack of inclusivity already visible at midline.

- In Galmudug, the developments are split: the Wadajir Framework districts of Hobyo and Abudwaq have seen substantial improvements since baseline, but Dhusamareb, having seen battles between Galmudug and ASWJ, has declined drastically. In Galkayo, legitimacy remains very low, and community members report being excluded.

- Puntland scores lower than South West, which has the highest legitimacy score. Meanwhile, Hirshabelle, has not been consolidated, and the state has the lowest government legitimacy score. Key challenges of territorial control and exclusionary political settlements remain unaddressed.

In terms of government legitimacy themes, almost all of the states are incomplete in their formation, both in terms of geographic control as well as governance infrastructure.

However, some strides have been made in this regard, as some of the districts that— at baseline—hosted communities that felt abandoned and remote have since been incorporated into their respective state, and

resources have started to come in. Most notably, this is the case with Hobyo and Benderbeyla.

While inclusion clearly contributes to perceptions of government legitimacy, it remains wanting in most places. Governments tend to be linked to specific lineages and more representative administrations continue to be rare. The new Mogadishu-affiliated leaders of South West and Galmudug are very actively reaching out to different communities to consolidate their power.

There was a slight positive change in the government legitimacy score against the aggregate score and the 2020 target of 3.6. The average score across the five FMSs at endline was 3.8, while it was 3.6 at baseline and 3.4 at midline. The developments and performance against the indicator were found to vary greatly across the study areas.

In 2020, the highest score for government legitimacy was in South West at 4.5, while in 2019, Puntland scored highest at 5, reflecting its progress in both broadening and deepening government legitimacy. Puntland was observed, for instance, to have strengthened its institutions, its ability to generate its own revenue (\$70 million per annum), and its ability to attract a number of key investments into traditionally neglected parts of the state.

In South West, there is little change in legitimacy since baseline, but the state continues to make progress and scored the highest in 2020. A slight increase was recorded in Baidoa (+0.3) and a slight decrease in Ceel Barde (-0.4). As per the midline, Barawe and Xudur districts both show upticks for the indicator score (Barawe +0.6 and Xudur +2.2). Some key observations for the state can be made. Firstly, South West is perceived to be more inclusive and more legitimate.

Community members value power sharing. At midline it was noted that the South West government is highly inclusive and supported by a strong elder council. Communities across the state saw their state government as legitimate if they had representatives within it. This was noted by communities in Xudur, who were positive about being represented in the new parliament, and in Ceel Barde. However, the converse is also true—communities that did not feel adequately represented in the state were less likely to support it. Secondly, it appears that the new president, Laftagareen, is well perceived in the communities, as evidenced by key informant interviewees' positive responses. Community members recounted that he has travelled across the state, bringing investments and broadly attempting to create power sharing within the district and state-level parliaments. In 2019, SSF monitoring studies indicated the state's relationship with the FGS had improved since the contested election, but the detention of former AS Somalia leader, Robow, by the FGS and its role in determining the election outcomes remain issues in South West, especially in areas where Robow enjoyed huge popularity. The communities acknowledged the new leadership's effort to reach out to those communities who held grievances; but, while on the surface there appears to be political stability, beneath it remain deep-seated community grievances that AS may be able to continue to exploit.

Whereas at baseline, Puntland and South West were close in their scores for state legitimacy, Puntland has now seen a decline in its score. This may seem somewhat counter-intuitive, given Puntland's level of infrastructure and capacity to deliver services, as well as the homogeneity of communities and absence of conflict in the state. However, the Puntland data does not reveal the kind of extensive reaching out to different areas and communities that Laftagareen appears to be undertaking in South West.

Moreover, since baseline, the criticisms towards Puntland's 3.5 system have been strong. The prevailing perception in the state is that the three Mohamoud Saleebaan clans (Osman Mohamoud in Bari, Isse Mohamoud in Nugaal,

Omar Mohamoud in Mudug) split power among themselves, while all other clans are left with whatever remains. This may not necessarily be entirely reflected in the composition of assembly and vote shares, but instead in the control of various hard and soft-power resources and positions in the executive. Indeed, the score had dipped at midline in the context of elections, which may suggest that elections call into question a status quo that is otherwise more easily accepted.

Galmudug, meanwhile, shows divergent outcomes in government legitimacy. While the state has managed to incorporate new areas under its control, this seems to have come with a price in older areas in the state. Hobyo and Abudwaq, which have effectively become part of the state during and through the Wadajir

Framework investments boast substantially higher legitimacy scores at endline: the score has risen by 1.3 points in Hobyo and 0.7 points in Abudwaq. In these districts, the SSF-funded investment has been clearly linked to the government, has been acknowledged for bringing other investments into the districts, and has been closely involved in conflict resolution. In Galkayo, however, the developments are more concerning. While state authorities are acknowledged for involvement in the peace process, this does not appear to be enough; the score has improved slightly since midline but remains among the lowest in the country at 3.3. The narrative of Galmudug being far from Galkayo continues among respondents.





Yet Dhusamareb too has seen a more negative turn of events since midline when it saw a rupture in 2019 between the ASWJ and the Haaf-led Galmudug administration as a major threat to political stability in the state. In 2019, the district was controlled by ASWJ and had just entered into a power-sharing agreement with Galmudug authorities. The agreement has since failed and armed confrontations took place in the district between ASWJ and the federal army. Given the long history of ASWJ governance and the popular support it seemed to enjoy, it is not that surprising that the score for government legitimacy in the district has seen a 1.8 decrease since midline. The long-term stability of Galmudug depends on a peaceful and credible political transition.

For Jubaland, we have seen a pattern in which baseline (4.1) to midline (4.2) scores improved for government legitimacy, but from midline to endline (3.3) they significantly decreased—in some places quite sharply. This is the result of the disputed August 2019 Jubaland elections and resulting FGS–Jubaland political impasse. The score has decreased most sharply by 2.1 points since the baseline in the district of Bardhere, which was caught between the two administrations.

Furthermore, as was observed at midline, a lack of inclusivity continues to be a major shortcoming within Jubaland, which has diminished perceptions of the administration's legitimacy. By endline, this problem was even more visible. The state seems to be experiencing a maturing in terms of governance expectations, whereby even communities in Afmadow, who are typically supportive, have an increased appetite for government service delivery by the Jubaland authorities. Clan affiliation appears increasingly to be less of a guarantor of government legitimacy, while more positive views based on a perception of government meritocracy are on the rise among communities. As the state matures, provision of security alone is no longer enough to acquire popular support—community members increasingly demand more.

Moreover, government legitimacy was found to be affected by the impact of external actors—specifically that of Ethiopia and Kenya on the political transition—and undermined by the shrinking political space and challenges faced by the administration to extend state authority among parts of the Marehan, Digil, and Mirifle, and other traditionally marginalised groups both in Gedo and Lower Jubba.

In addition, it was noted that, as one of the longest-established states, Jubaland's ability to raise revenue is higher than in most FMSs; however, its spending on social services remains small, increasing from 10% to 15% between 2018 and 2019.

Finally, Hirshabelle has limited legitimacy in the districts included in this study, as seen by the small change in this indicator since baseline (from 3.2 to 2.9). The key challenges identified at baseline remain largely unaddressed. State formation remains unconsolidated at the community level, having limited geographical reach. Periphery clans are still mistrustful of the state, which often breathes new life into long-standing inter-communal conflict. Community members do not view the state-building investment as something organic to the community, but rather as something imposed from above and from elsewhere. As observed by SSF in 2019, communities had mixed feelings about the relationship between Hirshabelle and the FGS, with some considering it unproductive (in terms of improving access to financial and technical support to the state) and "a marriage of convenience since Hirshabelle State is close to Mogadishu; the Hirshabelle political elites are not able to independently chart their own political course".

In more specific terms, Hirshabelle continues to be the lowest-scoring state in the inclusiveness indicator, which measures the inclusion of women, youth, and marginalised groups. Despite the election of the first woman mayor in Beletweyne, this has not translated into greater gains for women across the state. In addition, similar to Jubaland, the political settlement in Hirshabelle is very exclusive. Hirshabelle has seen the largest decline in the 'fairness' indicator, which measures the perceived fairness of the state by all marginalised clans. As the lowest scoring state in this indicator, Hirshabelle demonstrates its exclusive political settlement in which all marginalised clans have been left out of the state-formation process. Notably, the main cities of Beletweyne and Jowhar score the lowest for this indicator in the country, at 2.3 and 1.7 respectively. Only Jubaland's Bardhere and Garbahare score lower than the two cities that are supposed to be the core support areas for the nascent state. Surprisingly, Mataban—which has not been practically incorporated into Hirshabelle yet—is the only one demonstrating positive attitudes towards the state.



Image Credit : ©AMISOM

RESULTS 2021

The findings of the 2021 evaluation indicate that the successful delivery of the 'one-person, one-vote' (OPOV) election pilot in Puntland under the democratisation and governance workstream bolstered government legitimacy.

The evaluation of the infrastructure projects indicates that large infrastructure investments were found to improve local opinion of the government. However, no indication has been found that this has translated into longer-term improvement in government legitimacy.

ATTRIBUTION TO SSF

The evidence from SSF studies indicates that certain districts where SSF supports interventions have substantially improved their scores on conflict as a result of SSF's programmes. The table below includes the districts have shown the most change since baseline.

CHANGE IN INDICATOR SCORE SINCE BASELINE

District	Outcome 4: Government Legitimacy
Abudwaq	0.7
Benderbeyla	1.6
Hobyo	1.3
Ceel Barde	-0.4
Galkayo South	-0.1
Galkayo North	-0.3
Mataban	1.4

With the exception of Galkayo and Ceel Barde, the findings indicate that many districts achieved positive changes and improved governance legitimacy. The emerging results suggest that SSF's support to the Wadajir Framework (WF) and the positive progress made are a result of the way in which SSF supported the community consultations for peace dividend investments as part of the WF; the involvement of the FMS and the district administration in the process; as well as cooperation between the government and the community.

Looking at the experience of the Wadajir Framework, the evidence to date indicates that SSF has made better progress in the relatively more stable environment of Galmudug—especially during the initial stages when the FMS was closely involved in programme implementation. State government involvement might be the key to successful implementation. Indeed, across the study districts, community responses show that if they believe that the government has acquired a development investment for the area, they tend to be more favourable towards the government. In Xudur, South West, this sentiment was apparent as community members thanked the government for bringing in SSF's investment in solar lights. The FMS–community engagement indicator has increased by 2.3 points since midline in the district. Community members in Hobyo and Abudwaq similarly justified their increased satisfaction with the Galmudug government in terms of their role in acquiring new investments in the districts.

It seems that the economic development initiatives, however, have not had a systematic effect, as no clear pattern of changes in the indicators can be found. Economic development initiatives in Galmudug have been difficult to link to governance outcomes. Evaluation reports show that community members often did not attribute the programme to the government at all, and most did not think the government played any role in the economic development investments in Abudwaq and Dhusamareb. Similarly, in Beletweyne, there are few linkages between the economic development initiatives and tangible gains in fostering peace or increased community–government relations.

Meanwhile, in Jowhar, Hirshabelle, economic development programmes targeting marginalised groups and key conflict fault lines are linked to better community relations. It seems that in places where there are clearly disadvantaged groups, economic

development investments can have a direct or indirect link to conflict reduction as they provide a more equal footing, while simultaneously tackling key resource-based fault lines. Indeed, given the case of Jowhar and the fact that the Wadajir Framework initiatives have been successful in being linked to the government, more attention is perhaps required in thinking about how to include the government in these programmes in the future.

In the other three implementing districts in Hirshabelle, SSF's and the Wadajir Framework's achievements are not as clear. Beletweyne DCF is on hold because the community has not been able to agree on seat allocation. Moreover, the implementing organisation, SOYDEN, has decided to carry out more reconciliation activities before proceeding to the council formation. In Beletweyne, the indicator score for district–administration–community relationship has increased slightly since the baseline. FMS engagement and legitimacy have remained the same while conflict has decreased somewhat. In Warsheikh, the story initially seemed like a success. The district council was successfully formed. However, since then, a conflict has emerged in the district. According to community members, it has to do with the power vacuum created in the process, as the new council is largely unable to establish order and take control. Warsheikh had a very high starting point at midline which has now diminished, as all of the indicators have since declined. Arguably some of the high scores could be explained by an initial hope and aspiration that had come with the state becoming more active in the district; but that hope has now evaporated. It is possible that Mataban is currently exhibiting something similar as the changes are not yet sustainable; the district is in fact experiencing clan conflict, and the reconciliation activities and local council formation process have not been concluded.

In Hirshabelle, SSF has invested in an inclusive DCF process in Warsheikh through the Wadajir Framework, engaging rural community members, women, youth, and marginalised groups. This led to a successful DCF and the selection of 21 district council committee members, 4 of whom are women. However, it appears that in the programme there were limited considerations concerning sustainability, and the council is currently not operational, not consulting the community, and not delivering services—mainly as a result of a lack of salary payments for the council members. There has been a drop in community–government relations in the district as a result of the newly selected council's lack of effectiveness. It does also appear that in Warsheikh, local dynamics were to an extent overlooked. Despite Warsheikh being the peace outlier at midline, having no overt conflicts, the change in political and dispute resolution structures, compounded by a lack of effective peace enforcement mechanisms, have led to a power vacuum in the district. As a result, inter-communal conflict has re-emerged between two clans.

More evidence is needed to assess the impact of social reconciliation in Beletweyne. Programme activities have been halted as it has been decided that further reconciliation is needed before any attempts at DCF. SSF is prioritising engaging with the traditional elders instead of directly with political structures. This demonstrates adaptability and understanding, as sections of this group are seen as spoilers and potentially opposing DCF.

Meanwhile, in Mataban, lack of effectiveness of Peace Committees and social reconciliation have demonstrated the limitations of traditional elders to resolve conflicts in contexts where there is no security structure in place.

SSF's investments within Kismayo have included support to the state in drafting the Jubaland Constitution, generating youth employment (working with the district administration), and constructing a youth centre and ministries office complex. Collectively, these investments may have fed into community perceptions of better functioning government, which may explain the positive overall trend across the different clans regarding their favourability towards government.

THEMES IN LEGITIMACY

STATE FORMATION REMAINS INCOMPLETE

Apart from Puntland, no FMS controls the majority of its territory. Large areas of Jubaland, South West, and Galmudug remain in the hands of AS. The situation is perhaps most acute in Hirshabelle as the state's governance infrastructure is not complete. The state's leadership mostly resides in Mogadishu and is unable to travel by road to Jowhar, the state's capital. Even the two key groups, the Abgal and the Hawaadle—who the state formation is supposed to appease—are not happy with the arrangement. Meanwhile, other groups are also unhappy and serious grievances linger, particularly among the minority groups in the state's riverine areas. As a young woman from Beletweyne said,

The Beletweyne people are not served in a good way. We are the majority of the region and Beletweyne is not getting what it deserves because suitable people are not working in the Hirshabelle administration. The people who are called 'administration of Hirshabelle' are mostly people who participated in the fighting and the problem of Hiraan and Middle Shabelle regions.

REMOTE DISTRICTS CONNECTED TO THE STATE

Some districts had not yet been included in the state at baseline, and this was reflected in negative attitudes towards the state. This was the case in Hobyo, Galmudug; and Benderbeyla, Puntland, in 2017. Since then, both districts have been effectively incorporated into their respective states and demonstrate increased connectivity and have access to resources. This has generated higher scores for state legitimacy. In remote locations in Galmudug, however, this development seems to have come with a cost, as community members in Galkayo seem to feel slightly excluded. A clan elder from Madhibaan, Galkayco noted, "Galmudug administration did not arrive in this part of the state yet."

INCLUSION INCREASES LEGITIMACY, BUT REMAINS WANTING

In South West, inclusion has led to increased support for the government, yet many gaps remain. Demands for increased representation and more equitable resource-sharing are increasing in Jubaland. Meanwhile, in Hirshabelle, negative sentiments towards the exclusionary political settlement in the state seem to be becoming more common. A women's group representative said,

The Hirshabelle is weakest state in Somalia, they failed to serve their communities or to protect them by providing security and stability and the other services; they are also lacking good leadership qualities that the district administration officials should have.

MOGADISHU-AFFILIATED LEADERS ARE ACTIVE IN RECONCILIATION

The new presidents of Galmudug and South West, both affiliated with the FGS, seem to be aware of the lack of trust in government legitimacy. Both leaders have been active in seeking to consolidate power by making agreements with different groups in their respective states. Laftagareen is generally well-perceived in South West as he has travelled across the state, bringing investments and broadly attempting to create power-sharing within district and state-level parliaments.

REVENUE AND RESOURCES

Most FMSs have limited capacity to generate their own revenue and depend on the FGS and external actors. This not only has huge implications for the long-term viability of these FMSs but also the extent to which outside influence may become an increasingly critical factor. The more well-established FMSs typically have higher revenue (Hirshabelle had the lowest revenue of all five FMSs). In election years, revenues decreased in all the FMSs, including revenue sources from the FGS. Experts suggested that this was because revenues were siphoned for use to assist actors to increase their influence on election outcomes. Experts also highlighted that revenues from the FGS correlated strongly with the strength of each individual FGS-FMS relationship. The majority of expenditure across all FMSs was on running costs and salaries for government and security. There was limited spend on social services, although it was notable that Jubaland has had a marked increase in spending on social services in recent years.

KEY FINDINGS 2021

Evidence gathered through this assignment indicates that large-scale infrastructure investments do lead to a modest and probably transitory increase in state legitimacy. The Beletweyne road project has generated strong feelings of goodwill towards the local administration, alongside some surprise that the administration managed to deliver a project that has benefited both sides of the divided city. Similarly, the new Dhusamareb buildings have clearly demonstrated to the local people that the government is present, visible, active, and here to stay. If the aggregate effects of all the new ministry buildings are considered, the local population feel that service delivery is improving, and this translates into increased legitimacy. However, these effects may be transitory, and the local governments must continue to deliver new projects and better services if this sense of goodwill and legitimacy are to remain.

Peace dividend investments have the potential to increase community engagement, but only when they involve community members, are grounded to local theories of change, and are linked to local peacebuilding efforts, such as parallel capacity-building training. Evidence collected during this assessment indicates that the Mataban Women's Centre made a strong contribution locally to increasing community engagement, and by assumption reduced communal conflict, as facilities were used by civil society, government, and the community regularly for meetings and engagement. Evidence suggests that the Hobyo Health Centre's contribution to increased community engagement was limited, however, it could be argued that its positive healthcare results in the town had contributed a stronger sense of community in the area.

Image Credit : ©SSF





QUALITY



Image Credit : ©AMISOM

CHANGES IN OUTPUTS BETWEEN 2016–2020 AND 2021



Image Credit : ©SSF





Between 2016 and 2020, Output 2 was the focal point for implementing SSF's gender equality and social inclusion (GESI) strategy with a particular focus on increasing voice, agency, and political representation for women and excluded groups. The GESI strategy identified women and girls, traditionally marginalised groups, and youth as the target groups for interventions, and mandated a role for SSF both in mainstreaming GESI concerns throughout its programming and in developing workstreams with explicit GESI objectives. SSF used a holistic approach, which included GESI-related funding quotas; engaging with men and women who are GESI champions; a disability response; and ensuring that evidence and learning from SSF investments inform policymaking.

SCORE FOR OUTPUT INDICATOR 1: QUALITY, RELEVANCE, AND EFFECTIVENESS OF SSF-DELIVERED WORK CONTRIBUTING TO ADDRESSING IDENTIFIED FAULT LINES

OUTPUT 1: FAULT LINES FOR POLITICAL CONFLICT (FGS–FMS, INTER- & INTRA- STATE) ARE IDENTIFIED AND APPROPRIATELY ADDRESSED

It is important to note that in 2021, SSF had a shorter implementation period that necessitated the need to focus on those activities that could be completed within the shorter implementation window. As a result, the Fund revised its results framework by reviewing some outputs and assumptions, but also narrowing the scope of focus for some outputs that were retained.

RESULTS 2016–2020

Output 1 aims to identify and address areas of political tension or contestation (fault lines) within FMSs as well as between different states and the federal government. By identifying and addressing these tensions, SSF aims to reduce the risk of these triggering further violent conflict. SSF recognises that key political fault lines are often the key barriers to inclusive and consolidated political settlements that would lead to longer-term stability. Effective reconciliation of fault lines is central to building stability in Somalia. The work to address these tensions takes the form of direct interventions (e.g., support for peace talks), as well as indirect action (e.g., investments to support cross-community cooperation). This work requires SSF to navigate sensitive and difficult issues and manage relationships with a range of stakeholders. SSF added Output 1 to the SSF updated strategy and results framework in April 2018.

6.1 - Endline 2020 Actual

5.3 - Actual

5.2 - Midline 2018 Actual

5.0 - Baseline

5.0 - 2020 Target

7.0

OUTPUT INDICATOR 1: QUALITY, RELEVANCE, AND EFFECTIVENESS OF SSF-DELIVERED WORK CONTRIBUTING TO ADDRESSING IDENTIFIED FAULT LINES

6.0

Indicator definition: Quality is understood as how well the activity was designed and implemented (looking at issues of participant targeting, responsiveness, approaches to conflict sensitivity, etc.). Relevance and effectiveness are defined by the DAC criteria for evaluating development assistance. Relevance looks at the extent to which the aid activity is suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient, and donor. Effectiveness is a measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives.

5.0

This section presents the findings of the endline evaluation studies conducted during SSF phase II. The scores for the indicator are outlined first, followed by key trends observed across the five states, and an in-depth analysis of performance against the indicator.

4.0

3.0

2.0

1.0

Image Credit : ©AMISOM



KEY ACHIEVEMENTS AND RESULTS

The endline score exceeded the 2020 target and made good progress against the baseline. The investments were found to be relevant to community needs and priorities in both Galkayo North and South. The peace dividend investments were rated highly by communities.

Good levels of stakeholder engagement were achieved in the investments. SSF has made good progress in supporting both the identification and addressing of fault lines. In 2018, SSF identified and addressed key fault lines focused on political contestation between the FGS and FMSs and inter- and intra-state conflict. SSF strove to understand the political conflict and to promote engagement on identified fault lines. SSF played a critical role in contributing to the new FGS Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs, and Reconciliation's stabilisation strategy by convening stabilisation donors to better coordinate and integrate their planning. SSF supported the establishment of a multi-stakeholder forum through the Human Capital Development Mechanism (HCDM) to allow for dialogue between the FGS and FMS governments, civil society, and the private sector.

In 2019, SSF successfully coalesced the international community around a common set of issues to address these tensions, focusing on the inter- and intra-state level and identifying successful examples of direct and indirect approaches. Examples include reconciliation work to address the ongoing conflict in Mataban, which is inhabited by trans-state communities. SSF supported dialogue through a series of consultations and social reconciliation meetings with the affected communities in Mataban, followed by peace dividend investments, thus limiting further conflict escalation.

Similarly, in Jubaland's Gedo region, SSF supported inter-clan conflict resolution via community and public investments. SSF matched funds (via government systems) raised by communities for investments across all districts in Gedo, supporting shared community ownership of assets, improving perceptions of government delivery, and encouraging cooperation between communities. In Galkayo, SSF supported the ongoing peace settlement and reinforced the process by training the Peace Committee members to improve their political negotiation and conflict mediation skills. However, proposed work in Jubaland around the elections did not proceed due to a lack of political will and support for political reconciliation, and support to elections in Galmudug was not provided due to the reputational risk being too high. However, scoping work for both ensured that SSF was able to mobilise the international community to respond to subsequent opportunities to provide technical assistance to the Puntland electoral commission. These are good examples of analysis being used to assess plans and adjust according to the risks involved.

Three of the Fund's most high-profile investments are the Joint Galkayo Peacebuilding Initiative Project, the DIALOGUE Project in Gedo region, and the ASWJ Galmudug Peace Agreement. The case studies are presented below.



Image Credit: ©SSF

CASE STUDY 1: JOINT GALKAYO PEACEBUILDING INITIATIVE PROJECT

The Joint Galkayo Peacebuilding Initiative (JGPI) was supported by SSF and implemented between May 2019 and September 2020 to target communities in Galkayo North and Galkayo South and their respective administrations in Puntland and Galmudug following long-running clan conflict involving Hawiye and Darood, rooted in colonial-era territory demarcations. For many years, Galkayo town witnessed multiple and deadly clashes between the south and north of the city, which are controlled by Galmudug and Puntland respectively. The SSF intervention objectives, determined through administration and community discussions, were to enhance community capacity to prevent, resolve, and contain conflicts through the establishment of effective and integrated community management and dispute settlement mechanisms—with the ultimate intention to enhance and ensure social cohesion. Building community peacebuilding and conflict resolution mechanisms would be achieved through working together, understanding differing views, and defining joint priorities.

Utilising consensus building, JGPI focused on six key areas: strengthening and outreach of conflict resolution mechanisms; women’s role in peacebuilding; youth participation in peacebuilding; media communication; business/community collaboration; and rehabilitation of solar streetlights. Further, the project invested in identifying connectors to form strong foundations for long-term peace in Galkayo, including infrastructure investments such

as road construction and police stations. To address the protracted conflict, as well as providing training and capacity building to peace actors, the investment leveraged existing community peace structures in the two locations to create the highly effective Joint Peace Committees (JPC). However, it is important to point out that while JPC members were clan leaders and were seen as a symbol of peace in their respective communities, there are times when their clan affiliations superseded the quest for peace and neutrality. However, the JGPI enhanced their capacity to further spearhead the peace agenda, including with peace and reconciliation conferences. There was also support from the FGS, as finding a solution to the Galkayo conflict was a key priority. SSF endline findings indicate an almost 100% satisfaction level with the JPC’s work among community members in both Galkayo North and South.

As a participatory peacebuilding approach, critically the inclusion criteria were determined during investment design, thus informing the implementation model and approach; all investment stakeholders and key community segments, to varying degrees, were involved in the design and implementation stages. A gender conflict analysis was carried out to bring in a wide range of formerly marginalised groups; however, the specific roles of these and other groups were not clear from the endline findings. Challenges remain, for example, as although there were high levels of women’s inclusion, their roles were considerably

more limited, indicating the authority in local decision-making held by elders in the patriarchal context.

The investment scored 6 for overall quality. This high score reflects the high levels of responsiveness by the investment in the face of challenges, and when faced with community demands, the investment adopted a 'Do No Harm' strategy and realigned accordingly. Challenges included protracted 'revenge' conflicts, insecurity as a result of AS terror attacks, and the commercialisation of conflict as some sought to benefit from the instability. It was noted that the investment period was short, since peacebuilding efforts are a continuous process and need to settle over the longer term. To address protracted conflicts, the investment harnessed the existing community structures in resolving them.

The investment scored 6.5 on relevance having successfully identified and realigned its design to match community needs and priorities. Peace was a key driver identified by the communities to secure areas such as livelihoods. The endline findings found the peace dividends investments to be high priority and highly valued investment opportunities for recipient communities. These included the building of a peace centre in Lanwaley and a health centre in Afbarwago to complement the already existing community peacebuilding initiatives. As women are key peacebuilding stakeholders, they were specifically asked about what would be useful; they chose the rehabilitation of the general hospital's paediatric section and the construction of the women's peace centres in the two regions. These serve as meeting venues

and offices for women's groups; and being constructed near government offices meant improved access to government services as well as development opportunities from the government. As one participant noted:

The community were happy with the peace dividends from the project as opposed to the standard peacebuilding projects where soft activities are done and end with the project implementation. They are therefore looking forward to similar projects that leave a long-term impact among community members.

The investment scored 6 for effectiveness, with the endline findings indicating that the current situation is more peaceful than at any other time in history. At the time of the evaluation, there were no active conflicts in the two locations. The improved political relationship between the governments of Galmudug and Puntland at district, regional, and local level is a key factor driving the change in the district, thus promoting peaceful coexistence, free movement of people and goods, as well as trade and enhanced business opportunities among community members of Galkayo North and South. The two governments were also said to collaborate in state activities/events, and a case in point was the recent joint assessment of the roads linking the two regions constructed and funded by SSF. As one local administrator from Galkayo North noted:

"THE CURRENT POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INTERACTIONS OF THE TWO REGIONS IS AT ITS BEST SINCE [THIS] HAS NEVER HAPPENED IN HISTORY."

CASE STUDY 2: DIALOGUE PROJECT

Based on the findings of a 2017 feasibility study as part of SSF's intensive analytical work to understand the complexities of fault line issues and their interconnected nature, the DIALOGUE project was designed to build trust between communities and government authorities in Gedo region through resource mobilisation and to address ongoing inter-clan conflict. The investment was implemented by the Danish Refugee Council and ended in December 2018.

Gedo region has historically been isolated both geographically and politically from the Kismayo-based Jubaland administration. On the basis of a funding scheme that supports community and public projects, the investment channelled resources through Jubaland's Single Treasury Account (STA) in the form of matching grants to district authorities and/or community groups. Evaluations of the investment found that it successfully promoted participatory decision-making processes and generated high levels of local ownership, collective action, and strengthened state-society mutual accountability and trust. These achievements effectively met the needs identified by SSF to address the political fault lines for Jubaland, namely that "negotiating the pragmatic management of revenue flows (to Gedo) will be key to maintaining the Jubaland State's stability".

The investment's funding scheme supported 35 community projects across all seven districts. More than 30% of each community project was co-funded by targeted communities and districts.

Working with Jubaland's Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Finance, SSF funds were channelled through the STA, then disbursed using a fin-tech platform. The DFID (now FCDO)-funded public finance management programme in Somalia, PREMIS, accessed the STA's weekly budget reports to monitor investment transactions.

Baseline and endline quantitative assessments find that the investment approach was highly innovative, and the investment scored 5.4 for quality, demonstrating responsiveness, and adaptability.

Image Credit: ©AMISOM



The evaluations found the investment's application of a new approach to targeting used a public lottery system, allocating 'treatment' and 'control' villages at random, and was effective in reducing clan bias (particularly between Marehan and non-Marehan communities) and ensuring that the rural, poorer, and marginalised communities were equally likely to be included.

None of the evaluation findings identified perceptions of 'clan favouritism' which was significant given the prevailing perception that revenue and resource flows are often driven by patronage. As one youth representative explained,

The beautiful thing this project has left behind is that communities in Gedo have learnt the importance of cooperating on things that are of importance to them. As a youth organisation, we are in contact with our counterparts in other districts and discuss how we can further (implement) projects like this. So, there is a sense of positive competition between districts on what they can do together.

Evaluations found the investment's shift away from a "typical service-delivery oriented theory of change" to focus on the "process of resource mobilisation"—that is, "government authorities being able to manage citizens' money in a transparent, accountable and efficient way"—was key to enhancing community trust in Jubaland state, and in turn addressing the political fault line between the Gedo community and Jubaland state. The investment's support of technological platforms and infrastructure to collect funds and monitor illicit transfers was found to be effective.

The evaluations raised the need to have further information on the extent to which the financial flow "alters or is a condition for other [financial] flows to Gedo", and the effect on formal taxation flows in investment locations.

The evaluation findings clearly indicate the STA was effective in promoting perceptions of Jubaland state as more transparent and accountable. As a local administration assistant chief in Dollow observed,

[The] Jubaland government disbursing funds for [the] project through accounts only has brought positive opinion, that has eliminated... suspicion for the money to be syphoned or misused.

However, the evaluations also found no significant change in tax morale in the district government, indicating that the effects on formal tax payment may not hold in the long term. Similarly, perceptions towards Jubaland were mixed, and seemed more positive in districts with a historically more positive attitude toward the state.

Evaluations found that trust in other clans increased to a greater extent in 'treatment' relative to 'control' villages, implying greater inter-community collaboration as a result of this investment. It scored 5.1 for effectiveness, indicating that it had succeeded in building trust between communities and government authorities in Gedo region through resource mobilisation and inter-clan conflict resolution. However, the evaluation raised questions about the scalability, replicability, and sustainability of the intervention.



CASE STUDY 3: HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM

In 2017, SSF commissioned an options paper on how it could better support economic development in Somalia. The paper noted that a cohesive strategy for human capital development (HCD) was lacking and was highlighted as a gap by all stakeholders. Through a consortium of the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies and City University, SSF collected baseline data from across Somalia on HCD in the education, health, labour, agriculture, livestock, and fishery sectors, and supported a HCD mechanism (HCDM) to develop Somalia's first national HCD strategy and working group, with outputs feeding into the National Development Plan. The investment also addressed the political fault line identified in the 2017 SSF macro-analysis between the centre (FGS) and the periphery (FMSs) by providing areas for technical collaboration between the FGS and FMSs through shared HCD strategy development.

SSF evaluations find that the investment was highly relevant in addressing a coordinated HCD approach in Somalia and scored 5.5 for relevance. While the investment did not explicitly align with SSF's fault line, it indirectly fostered structured dialogue between the FGS and FMSs. As one expert explained,

The process of bringing together many people around a known issue and need in Somalia can be used to mitigate or rise above other tensions and agreements.

The investment scored 5.4 for quality, reflecting the evidence of HCDM responding to challenges faced and the revision of programme strategy accordingly. The evaluation study noted that the investment's "adaptation to political challenges, including high political turnover, positioning for the upcoming elections and patronage and conflict entrepreneurs seeking personal gain" has aligned the investment more closely with the fault line that it was addressing. A concern raised by the evaluation was the inability of the investment to ensure inclusivity, specifically for minority and women's groups. The investment responded to this concern by enlarging the number of regional delegations.

In 2020, the HCDM in Puntland, Jubaland, Galmudug, Hirshabelle, and South West states have undertaken various activities, including the HCD strategy document and dissemination of videos to raise awareness of the strategy. The investment developed the HCDM web portal, a hub for the HCDM stakeholders and community. There was a general consensus that the fault line had been addressed, with direct engagement with both the FGS and FMSs being successful and support from ministries at both levels.



CASE STUDY

INDICATOR 1.1: RELEVANCE AND OUTREACH OF POLICY ENGAGEMENT TO ADDRESS POLITICAL CONFLICT FAULT LINES

In 2021, the indicator was revised to track the relevance and outreach of policy engagement on issues related to political conflict fault lines. Measurement of the indicator focused on quantitative analysis of the number of fault line assessments, number of political conflict risk assessments, and number of hotspot analyses. An experts panel was also established to periodically peer review the relevance of the design, methodology, and emerging findings of the analytical products and to provide feedback.



Image Credit: ©SSF

RESULTS 2021

This output focused on delivering detailed analysis of conflict fault lines in Somalia, inclusive of long-standing fault lines as much as emerging and nascent disputes that may likely escalate into violence. Through either rapid or deeper research and analysis, the Fund would be able to identify targeted actions that could work to address these fault lines or to mitigate and de-escalate violence.

Conflict hotspot analysis: The key findings of the analysis and how the findings informed SSF investment decisions

The 24 April 2021 saw an escalation of violence in Mogadishu between elites contesting the federal elections. While tensions were concentrated at that moment in Mogadishu, fears existed that without careful analysis and advance preparedness, electoral politics could spill into violence in other parts of the country. SSF mobilised a series of consultative discussions internally, taking advantage of the high level of local knowledge and analytical capability within the field teams. This was complemented by discussions with analysts and peer agencies working on issues of election conflict monitoring and oversight to understand the kind of work that was already being performed and the mitigation measures already in place.

From the analysis, an initial briefing paper was produced. This reflected on the drivers of political violence and the sub-regional context and where or why violence may escalate in each of these areas. It identified existing monitoring and response mechanisms and identified gaps and recommendations. Policy dialogues were performed with JDC members and at the ambassadorial level to disseminate findings.

SSF, having identified a gap in response mechanisms to de-escalate violence, instigated funding to support two initiatives, firstly, to promote peaceful dialogue and violence de-escalation through interactive communications through African Voices Foundation. The second initiative was to provide a direct mediation mechanism that could be agile and responsive to the threat of violence, able to engage political elites, and encourage a de-escalation of tensions. This led to an investment with Interpeace to establish a team of eminent individuals who could engage as mediators and peace brokers at the elite level.

While these investments were undergoing start-up, given the evolving and dynamic context, a second conflict hotspots analysis was performed. Once again, it drew on SSF's field team, consultations with analysts and peer agencies, and updated the analysis of the regions most susceptible to election-related violence—especially given the growing momentum for the upper house selections. The research delivered analysis on the evolving conflict risks around the country, made recommendations around the utilisation of established conflict monitoring mechanisms, and stressed the importance of monitoring delegate lists as a particular source of contention for contesting elites and monitoring elite attitudes, public messaging, and other early conflict warning indicators, such as the price of weapons.

MEDIATED RESPONSE TO CONFLICT HOTSPOTS

In order to respond to the risk of conflict escalating in regional parts of Somalia and the lack of clear response mechanism, the Fund supported Interpeace to establish a High-Level Reconciliation Group (HLRG) that was to be deployed to engage and mediate with contesting political elites. The mediating team was comprised of selected and renowned individuals known for their independence and neutrality and command of respect across political and clan divides. Although deployed over a brief period, the team worked to de-escalate some significant disputes that threatened stability in Somalia. Notably, they worked to overcome the political split between President Farmajo and Prime Minister Roble that emerged over PM Roble's sacking of the Head of NISA and President Farmajo's 'right-hand man', Fahad Yasin. The dispute threatened to see Roble—who had become a steadying presence in government and who had managed to help steer the electoral process forward while garnering trust from all contesting parties—sacked and would have alarmingly re-escalated the threat of conflict election violence. The group of eminent individuals further engaged the presidential candidates to encourage a conflict-sensitive approach and to avoid provoking violence amidst the PM–Presidential dispute. The team engaged with FMS electoral teams and political elites and FMS administrations around the country to promote the need for cooperation to work to move the elections forward in a non-violent manner. Finally, they also engaged in pro-peace messaging, participating in peace fairs and the Galkayo book fair.

AFRICAN VOICES FOUNDATION

Amidst preparations for long overdue elections in Somalia, there are new risks and other outstanding issues unfolding which make an already fragile situation even more dire. SSF recognises that this can be averted by promoting peaceful dialogue between communities, government, and elites in addressing early warning and violence de-escalation before, during, and after elections in Somalia. AVF taps into popular forums and stimulates discussion between people of different genders, ages, and communities through evidence-based learning, early warning, and pro-peace messaging across identified hotspot locations, as well as promoting peaceful civic engagement and participation in the electoral process, normalising non-violence, and promoting peaceful dialogue. AVF formulates media interventions that build dialogue through interactive discussions and localised content using trusted voices and sources of authority with a specific focus on the marginalised groups.

This investment delivered 7 radio shows operating across 25 radio stations to facilitate dialogue on peaceful federal elections. The programme also hosted 31 magazine programmes on democratisation and reconciliation on 25 radio stations across Puntland. Questions posed by AVF included, "What would you want the coming elections to achieve?", which saw citizens emphasise their desire for political stability, non-violence, and prosperity for the country. Over 7,364 respondents engaged via the SMS service, sending a total of 15,323 messages to share their views and perspectives on the federal elections and their aspirations for the future, helping to build a Somali narrative around their political concerns. On the Puntland elections, a total of 9,131 citizens responded by sending text messages, with the programme receiving 24,925 messages.

CIVIL SOCIETY CONSULTATIVE FORUM: 18 MARCH 2021

On the 18 March 2021, SSF convened leading civil society representatives from Somalia together with donors and the Political Dialogue Platform. The forum was conducted in response to the ongoing political crisis in which an agreement between the current FGS and opposition groups has yet to be determined to enable an electoral process to (re)appoint government to occur. The forum brought together 21 participants, of which 10 were civil society, 6 donors, and 3 from RVI; of these, 7 were women and 14 were men.

The forum discussed the kind of activities that CSOs can undertake in relation to the current political crisis and highlighted their challenges at having access to and an audience with political elites. A common concern voiced was the lack of coherence and unity of civil society. SONSA, a national umbrella organisation for civil society, noted that they would be providing a conflict early-warning mechanism during whatever electoral process emerges. PDRC have noted their ability to engage with their Puntland authorities, however this access does not translate to the national level.

While CSO capacity to engage and mediate with political elites on the issue appears limited, one notable point of analysis was the emphasis of a concern that the current 17 September electoral model may not be supported by political contenders any longer, which may be what is fuelling the reluctance by political elites to meet and negotiate on the substantive issues.

FAULT LINES ASSESSMENTS: THE KEY FINDINGS OF THE ASSESSMENTS AND HOW THE FINDINGS INFORMED SSF INVESTMENT DECISIONS

To ensure that the Fund can direct investments and deliver policy guidance to address conflict fault lines effectively, it has performed conflict fault line assessments at multiple junctures over the course of the programme, in 2017, 2019, and 2021. These assessments have consolidated knowledge and analysis of FMS contexts while highlighting the array of fault lines and helping to identify areas where the Fund can strategically engage to deliver work that can be conflict transformative.

The year 2021 saw the revision of the fault line assessments for the five FMSs updating the context analysis to acknowledge the many political changes that have taken place since late 2018 and the various FMS elections that have taken place over this time. Despite assessing and identifying fault lines, determining where the Fund could meaningfully deploy investments was constrained by the complexity of some of the challenges, alongside the protracted electoral contest which was making it difficult to invest funds to engage political stakeholders on major decisions when their tenure may expire in a matter of weeks or months, undermining the investment in the long term. Nevertheless, fault lines identified in Hirshabelle around greater mediation and social reconciliation in Balanbale resulted in the Fund supporting Zamzam Foundation to perform reconciliation work there. Similarly, through the fault lines analysis, the impact of climate-related conflict between communities in Jowhar was identified, leading to a responsive investment to enable communities to discuss the impact of climate-related shocks, such as flooding and droughts, and to think about collective responses or mitigation of conflict at times when resources become stressed as a result.

In Puntland, the primary conflict fault lines and risks to inter-communal and political conflict rested upon inadequate access to governance and political inclusion, with areas such as Iskushaban and Qandala highlighted as causes for particular concern where the lack of state presence acts as a driver of grievance and radicalisation. The fault lines reinforced the findings made by the “Wadajir Framework: Rapid assessment for new locations” exercise performed in February 2021, which stressed the same locations as needing district council formation as a vehicle to extend the state reach and foster greater political inclusion of communities here.

In South West State, conflict fault lines highlighted the need for greater reconciliation in Baidoa given the high numbers of IDPs and marginal communities and long-standing political grievances between the Hariin and Leysan. The Fund will respond to this need through the conduct of a gendered political economy analysis of Baidoa and conduct of social reconciliation as part of the Wadajir Framework implementation (see Output 3).

In Galmudug state, conflict fault lines highlighted tensions related to intra-Hawiye political interests and their linkages to national political calculations and alignments. Additional conflict fault lines highlighted the role of land conflict and resource competition which intersect with climate-related shocks, such as droughts. While these are recognised to be concerns, the complexities of the Galmudug political settlement mean that until the federal elections have occurred, there is likely to be few meaningful opportunities for programming that could confer durable results.

For Jubaland, numerous fault lines were identified across the state, not least that between the Marehan community in Gedo and the Jubaland administration in Kismayo which had seen Gedo effectively disengage from the Jubaland administration. However, should an initiative attempt to reconcile these issues in such a short time frame, if left unfinished without a resolution, it could prove more detrimental and be a conflict risk—more so than inaction. Unfortunately, SSF delivery time constraints for 2021 would prove a barrier to conflict-sensitive engagement across many of the FMSs, meaning that the programme had to focus on realistic and achievable outcomes that would not exacerbate fault lines if time ran out.





Image Credit: ©AMISOM

OUTPUT 2: ENHANCED POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNANCE, PARTICULARLY FOR WOMEN AND EXCLUDED COMMUNITIES (2016–2020)

Indicator 2.1: Quality, relevance, and effectiveness of SSF-delivered work to increase popular participation in formal and informal governance structures

Indicator definition: This was measured by the extent to which the SSF investment design addressed:

- Quality: Responsiveness, stakeholder participation, and inclusion of women and marginalised groups.
- Relevance: Alignment with community priorities and alignment with SSF strategy.
- Effectiveness: Attainment of objectives and sustainability.

The scoring mechanism was based on the OECD DAC criterion where the lowest score was 1 and the highest was 7. The scoring methodology is listed in Annex 2.

Alindi fabric is one of the many traditional fabrics worn by Somali women. It is often worn at weddings by brides and bride's maids.

23

WOMEN CONTESTED SEATS IN PARLIAMENT

6^{of} 27

SEATS IN GALKAYO DISTRICT COUNCIL WON BY WOMEN

NUMBER OF WOMEN MPS IN GALMUDUG INCREASED FROM

8^{to} 9

10^{of} 21

MEMBER COUNCIL IN DINSOOR (SOUTH WEST) WERE NOW WOMEN

KEY ACHIEVEMENTS AND RESULTS

- A marked improvement was observed over the investment implementation period, as reflected in the significant increase in score from 5 at baseline to 5.6 at endline.
- Evidence showed that SSF's five GESI-specific investments increased community-level awareness on women's rights, particularly in decision-making processes; increased the awareness and confidence of women—particularly young women—on their rights and encouraged participation in political processes through training and skills building; and created platforms and networks that strengthened women's coalitions' ability to advocate for their rights.
- Evidence indicated increased participation of women and other marginalised groups in formal decision-making structures in each of the five FMSs as a result of SSF's presence and activities.
- Significant shifts were made in the attitudes of elders and male leaders towards the acceptance of women's participation in community and government decision-making.
- In Hirshabelle, women were now included in a Council of Elders.
- In Galmudug, the number of women MPs increased from 8 to 9.
- In Jubaland, a record 23 women contested seats in parliament. 8 won, increasing the number of women MPs by 5.
- In South West, 10 of the 21-member council in Dinsoor were now women.
- In Puntland, women won 6 of the 27 seats in Galkayo District Council, and Badhan District appointed a woman deputy mayor.
- Increase in women's and socially excluded groups' participation in community decision-making and success in seeking and achieving elected and public office.
- Greater community acceptance and positive perceptions of women in decision-making and leadership roles.
- Increased understanding among women of the importance of their roles in decision-making and heightened awareness, aspirations, and demand to achieve the 30% quotas.
- Increase in women's confidence and ability to speak in public to influence decision-making.
- Increased participation in women-focused platforms and networks.

Somali women and other marginalised groups continued to face enormous challenges to being recognised and acknowledged as valued participants in community affairs and political processes, and they remained significantly under-represented at all levels of community and government decision-making.

Although women were valued as peacebuilders and peace activists, they were consistently excluded from peace talks, other than as observers, due to the prevalent patriarchal system which inhibits women from participating in public discourse and decision-making. This systematic exclusion of women and marginalised groups resulted in disproportionate levels of poverty, illiteracy, and exposure to poor health conditions.

SSF's five GESI-specific investments faced enormous individual challenges—with the added complications of COVID-19 in 2020. Nevertheless, evidence demonstrated that SSF disrupted social norms and achieved significant milestones. There were positive inroads to increased women's and other marginalised groups' involvement in formal decision-making structures, including district and state-level government, across the five FMSs as a result of SSF's presence and activities.

SSF evaluation studies at baseline and the 2020 endline found that perceptions of women's leadership became more positive over the period. However, the evaluation found that women across the FMSs felt under-represented in decision-making, and that most would like to see a greater role for women in local, district, and national political processes. The studies also highlighted significant shifts in attitudes of elders and male leaders towards accepting women's participation in community and government decision-making.

Changes from baseline to endline showed that GESI investments led to more women believing that they are able to influence community decisions, increasing from 25% at baseline to 40% at endline. This was consistent with the qualitative findings which showed that, as a result of improved skills and confidence, more women were participating in community affairs and governance processes. The success of the newly created women's platforms and networks led to invitations from district administrations alongside traditional elders to participate in community meetings and governance forums. Across the FMSs, there were signs of increasing participation in policy and decision-making as more women were successfully standing for elective office and achieving deputy leader and deputy mayoral positions.

Further, the GESI investment enhanced women's capacity by sensitising them to the 30% quota for women. According to the women who took part in the projects, their participation in community meetings had changed—from being withdrawn and disinterested to being active and interested in community affairs.



Image Credit: ©SSF

Since its launch in 2018, SSF's GESI investments in all five FMSs achieved success promoting women's participation in district councils. Women won 6 out of 27 seats in the Galkayo District Council. These results also inspired some women to contest council seats in districts outside of the investment districts. A record number of women have since clinched seats with the support of the Ministry of Interior.

Despite the enormous social barriers against women's leadership, there was increased women's representation in district councils including Galkayo, Bossaso, Dahar, Ufeyn, Buran, and Badhan. For the first time, a woman was elected as deputy mayor in Badhan district. These successes were replicated at village levels where many women were elected as village heads. Despite this progress, there remained no legal safeguard for the 30% quota for women.

While all of the GESI projects encountered challenges at inception, there were significant improvements in several areas compared to the baseline. SSF created platforms for engagement between citizens and political representatives, thus enhancing peoples' awareness and knowledge about the community representatives in the district administration and federal state. The participation of women leaders in various conferences enhanced their visibility in their local communities, and several said that they had "woken up" to the value of women's importance in leadership positions as a result of participating in GESI activities.

Women leaders in Galmudug state take part in a debate at Galmudug Shadow Parliament organised for women leaders.


In addition, the endline results showed an increase in the perception of the performance of women as trustworthy, hardworking agents of peace in leadership positions.

This led to an increase in those (men and women) who support women's inclusion in leadership positions.

Puntland: Key achievements during this period included an increase in women's ability to influence decision-making, women's awareness of the 30% quota, and the establishment of the women's coalition network. SSF aimed to build the capacity of women and marginalised groups to participate in and contribute to political processes at regional and district levels in Puntland. The investment was launched in July 2018 and was extended from December 2019 to April 2020. The investment scored 4.8 in 2018, and an improved score of 5 in 2020.

The investment achieved some key successes. The formation of women's coalition networks in Bossaso, Galkayo, and Garowe contributed to significant political progress for women. In Galkayo, the Women's Coalition Network supported and lobbied for women candidates who were contesting district council elections. As a result, women won 6 out of the 27 council seats, which was a historic win for women candidates at the district level. This success was replicated at village level in all three districts, where 27 women who participated in the training won seats as village heads. The participation of women candidates in various district council elections in Puntland demonstrates that the leadership skills gained increased the confidence of women of all ages to contest council seats outside of the investment districts, indicating that the investment inspired women candidates to use skills developed to effectively campaign. This also showed the changing community perception towards women's leadership. As one woman elder said,

The forums offered us to have frank dialogue about the impact of community marginalisation and raised hopes when elders said they were not against our participation in governance process.



Hirshabelle: Key achievements included women successfully being included in the Council of Elders, a significant increase in women's ability to have a say in decision-making, and wider acceptance among men that women are capable leaders and should be given leadership opportunities. SSF aimed to support women's platforms and other project stakeholders such as non-state actors, marginalised groups, and youth and gender champions to host sensitisation and mobilisation activities. In 2018, the overall score for the investment was 5.8; in 2020 this had risen to 6.3.

The investment made notable gains. In Beletweyne, the appointment of a woman as the new mayor, Safiya Hassan, was, in part, credited to the intense lobbying from the Women Community Service Organisation leadership who were key stakeholders in the investment. Several women's unions at universities in the project sites also created platforms for women students to be part of university student leadership. As one focus group discussion participant in Jowhar explained,

We never thought of having our own women's clubs at the universities, but we got this idea after the CED project reached us...the club has created a space for us to debate and discuss our own affairs and even to improve our communication skills.

Women leaders in Galmudug take part in a debate at the Galmudug Shadow Parliament organised for women leaders.

Similarly, 20 women who prominently participated in community advocacy on women's leadership were appointed as elders in Hiraan region. The women's platform enables women to take the lead in organising grassroots advocacy sessions that challenge gender-based social norms, myths, and stereotypes that undermine women's aspirations for leadership roles. During the reporting period, 40 advocacy activities, such as community campaigns, were carried out in Jowhar, Beletweyne, and Warsheikh. The women's platforms were instrumental in coordinating the sessions at community level. Consultative meetings with district councils, the Women's Quota Verification Committee, the Deputy Minister for Women and the Deputy Speaker of Parliament in Hirshabelle, rights campaigners, and grassroots campaigns were held to negotiate for 30% quotas on inclusion of women at district and state level.

In addition, following the investment's focus on creating dialogue avenues for community members to engage with government leaders, it provided an avenue for citizen-government engagement, linking constituents and their representatives in the district and FMS administrations to address the citizen-



Image Credit: ©SSF

government gap. The training and the capacity building on leadership and advocacy for women, youth, and marginalised groups drove demand to participate in the upcoming state elections and, for those who want to, to contest seats at the parliamentary level. A youth representative said,

The project came at a crucial time. Through the trainings, we have gained immense knowledge and awareness, we are very positive we will attain significant results on the quota most probably in the coming elections. A lot of positive changes can be seen, key being empowered women and more female aspirants.

Galmudug: Key achievements included the increase to 9 women out of the 87 MPs, with the Deputy Speaker a woman and 4 women cabinet members. The Chief Minister called for more women to be appointed to state institutions, and there was increased recognition of women's representation in community meetings. SSF supported objectives to advocate and lobby for women's rights and political inclusion at community, district, and state levels; to establish shadow parliaments where women and men gender champions have a safe space to discuss women's rights and needs; and to improve skills development for women and state and non-state actors on women's rights and social inclusion. The investment scored 5.2 in 2018, rising to 5.8 in 2020. The investment launch coincided with a politically tense period emanating from a political contest that pitted the executive against parliament. The investment successfully negotiated the politically charged atmosphere by adopting a neutral stance and engaging with all parties across clans and districts.

Overall, the investment was considered to be well-designed, inclusive, and able to adapt to the local context, including continuing to deliver despite the political contestation at the FMS level. The SSF 2020 evaluation

indicated that the investment strengthened the connection of women's networks across the districts around common interests. While the investment did not resolve the leadership wrangles, the reconciliation efforts did reduce tensions and persuade women's networks to set aside their differences and unite for a common cause. As a civil society organisation (CSO) member noted,

The programme created a platform for women CSOs to interact with women leaders who shared their experiences and provided tips on how to promote the rights of women and champion change.

The investment organised joint forums for women, traditional elders, religious leaders, and government officials to discuss social discrimination and the role of women. The spiritual leader of ASWJ, Sheikh Ahmed Shakir, supported increased women's participation. He declared support for the women's representation quota and was supported by Senator Jawaahir Ahmed Elmi from the federal government's upper house.

This investment contributed to an incremental change in attitude and behaviour among men and women towards women's participation in social and political affairs through an acknowledgement that cultural practices, such as denying girls the right to education, have been retrogressive and must end as they have alienated critical constituencies in society.

As a result of the investment, Galmudug's women representatives met with the Election Commission to lobby for recognition of women. As a consequence, 8 women were elected, in addition to Fadumo Abdi Ali who was elected Deputy Speaker. A woman activist who was re-elected in Dhusamareb said, "Women's representation is not only in political space but other decision-making organs of the state."

Jubaland: Key achievements included the August 2019 election, in which 23 women contested different clan positions—the highest number recorded in Jubaland’s political history. 8 won seats in parliament, increasing the number of women MPs in the state from 3 to 8. This achievement was credited partly to SSF’s interventions and advocacy efforts initiated by the investee, as 4 of the newly elected MPs were direct participants in the investment. A CSO member stated:

We actively participated in the recent Jubaland state election. 23 of our female candidates vied for parliamentary positions and we managed to secure eight seats which is good progress because this was an increase from three seats in the previous parliament. Most of these female candidates were partly motivated by the leadership trainings received from the GESI investment.

WOMEN LEADERS TAKE PART IN A LEADERSHIP EVENT SPONSORED BY SSF.

Despite numerous cultural and social barriers faced by women, the investment contributed to attitude change and increased acceptance of women in community decision-making. For example, women platform members assumed active roles in peacebuilding and reconciliation committees at community and state levels that had previously been dominated by men. These new roles were welcomed and widely accepted by communities, which inspired more women to engage in peacebuilding and support local peace initiatives and government institutions in their respective districts. One CSO representative said,

Women became involved in peacebuilding initiatives, which was exclusively dominated by men for decades, thanks to the GESI initiative.

South West: Key achievements included the increase of the number of women members in the 2020 (s)election of 10 women members to the 21-member Dinsoor district council. While SSF supported the Promoting Participation and Representation of Women in Political Decision-Making investment, the Fund did not participate in the council selection process directly. However, SSF support to the Somali women’s political participation investment covered the three districts of Xudur, Berdale, and Baidoa. The investment scored 5.5 in 2018 and dropped slightly to 5.3 in 2020.

The 2020 SSF evaluation indicated that progress was made in increasing women’s participation in community decision-making. The investment scored well on its adaptive capacity in response to the contested South West presidential elections. In addition, it contributed to a peaceful electoral process in the 2020 parliamentary electoral cycle through the broad participation of women as peacebuilders at the local level. SSF supported the Ministry of Women, Family Affairs, and Human Rights to support the election of 9 women as Members of Parliament in the South West state assemblies. In total, 16 women were elected out of 95 seats, representing a 17% increase. Women reported that their decision to run for office was prompted by motivation and self-confidence, which increased as a result of SSF’s capacity-building activities.

In collaboration with South West’s Ministry of Women, SSF supported the Women’s Network which has been the epicentre of all campaigns for women’s political representation in the state. The newly formed network is the most popular women-led organisation in Baidoa. As one respondent noted,

We believe that the formation of Bay Women Network is the best thing that has happened to us in the last two years; we as women feel like we have just realised the importance of our role and position in society.



**A BAIDOA MP SAID,
'THIS PROJECT HAS NOT ONLY
OFFERED BENEFICIAL SKILLS
TO ORDINARY CITIZENS BUT
THROUGH SPECIFIC TRAININGS
TO WOMEN MPS, WE ARE NOW IN A
BETTER POSITION TO LEGISLATE,
FOR EXAMPLE, BESIDES THE
SEXUAL OFFENCES BILL THAT IS AT
DRAFT STAGE, WE ARE AMENDING
THE SWS [SOUTH WEST] LAWS ON
WOMEN QUOTA.'**



Image Credit: ©SSF

OUTPUT 2: ENHANCED POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN FMS GOVERNANCE (2021)

As previously mentioned, SSF revised the SSF II results framework in 2021, largely informed by the need to tighten the theory of change and attribute results to SSF work as per the findings and recommendations of various endline surveys completed in 2020 and the annual review. Revisions to the results framework were also informed by the decision to extend SSF II to the end of 2021, and the refreshed 'workstream' approach for the year. In line with this, SSF revised Output 2 and the corresponding indicator 2:1 to focus on FMS governance—in particular, aligning it to the Fund's 2021 subnational democratisation workstream. SSF also revised the output to ensure the definition of popular participation includes all citizens, while continuing to mainstream GESI of marginalised groups across all work streams.

Indicator 2.1: Relevance and appropriateness of SSF-delivered work to increase popular participation in formal governance structures at FMS level

Indicator definition: This was measured by the extent to which the SSF investment design addressed:

- **Relevance:** The extent to which SSF's interventions were informed by community priorities and by the FMS government's strategic approach to delivering local government elections.
- **Appropriateness:** Whether the support provided by SSF was a valid approach and what lessons can be drawn from the process to inform future democratisation processes in other contexts.

Puntland: Into 2021, SSF's support to the Puntland democratisation agenda has been via technical and financial support to TPEC and PUNSAA to hold pilot elections at the local government level in Ufeyn, Qardho and Eyl. The LGE are intended to lead to the election of a district council and mayor as well as identify the three winning political parties to participate in parliamentary elections. Winners of the parliamentary elections would eventually select the presidency.

SSF II SUPPORT TO TPEC INCLUDED:

- Various assessments and studies to inform the democratisation agenda. These include, for instance, legal framework assessment, IFES assessments on the BVR kits and alternative voter registration options, and conflict analysis
- Technical support to TPEC's strategic plan, development of operational policies, internal guidelines, and legal framework adjustments
- Purchase of 41 BVR kits and a central voter register server
- Support on the operationalisation of the conflict resolution committees
- Five months' salary support for TPEC secretarial staff, including the secretary general
- Information, Communication, and Technology (ICT) support to meet the needs of TPEC's main office, communication office, and regional offices

The SSF supported PUNSAA's "Supporting Election Observation Systems, Training for Political Associations, and Strengthening Human Resources for Electoral Delivery in Puntland" project. This included civic education support and political party capacity building. This assessment focuses on the delivery of these interventions and their contribution to aligned outcome and output statements in the SSF II results framework.



FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO TPEC

SSF support to TPEC is ongoing and SSF signed a memorandum of understanding with TPEC, and provided \$313,107 USD to cover the costs of procuring 41 of the initial 60 biometric voter registration (BVR) kits and paying TPEC staff salaries for five months, as well as to support operationalisation of the elections dispute resolution committee. Based on consultations with both TPEC and other donors, this support was identified as critical but underfunded. The support for staff salaries is short-term and will eventually be taken over by TPEC through funding from the government and other donors. More broadly, this support is part of SSF's wider efforts aimed at ensuring credible elections based on universal suffrage.



Image Credit: ©AMISOM

TPEC VOTER REGISTRATION RESULTS

In the final week of June 2021, TPEC announced the voter registration results for the three pilot election districts. A total of 48,353 voters have registered across the three districts, with 2,166 voters identified as either having incomplete documentation for registration or having registered twice in the system. With the correction of these anomalies, the actual number of registered voters stands at 46,187. The event at which the number of registered voters was announced was attended by political association members, government officials, and non-state actors, all of whom congratulated TPEC on a job well done. The voter registration data indicates more women registered as voters than men, as can be seen in the summary of voter registration numbers below:

Following the successful voter registration exercise, Puntland conducted early elections in the three districts, which is historic as it was the first time a 'one-person, one-vote' system has been successfully conducted in Somalia since the collapse of the state.

OUTPUT INDICATOR 2.2: RELEVANCE AND APPROPRIATENESS OF SSF- DELIVERED WORK TO INCREASE POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN FORMAL GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AT FMS LEVEL

NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS FOR THE TPEC PILOT ELECTIONS




Image Credit: ©AMISOM



RESULTS 2021

SSF-funded support to the TPEC and PUNSAA in Puntland was perceived as relevant and appropriate by a range of interviewed stakeholders.

Both the TPEC and PUNSAA felt that the areas where SSF had provided support were relevant and directly responded to technical and financial gaps. Close coordination between SSF and both actors was credited with delivering a responsive approach. The SSF also played a key role in linking the TPEC with other major donors. The overall approach was informed by a series of commissioned assessments, which guided the SSF in focusing its resources and produced recommendations for the TPEC and others. The SSF approach is therefore considered valid and, although the LGEs as a whole were considered underfunded by some stakeholders, the election was implemented successfully.

The election process inspired greater confidence among local communities that their government could effectively deliver the election. This was based on the generally positive experiences of how the election process had been delivered and a perception that a broad range of actors had been able to effectively engage in the election process. Stakeholders noted that the IDP populations in particular have been adequately engaged in the process. Furthermore, a high percentage of respondents felt represented by the political associations available and were optimistic that the party that best represented them would win. At this point there has been limited communal conflict around the elections. Instead, disputes around border demarcations, voter registration, and other aspects of the election process have been raised by different community actors with the Electoral Disputes Resolution Commission (EDRC).

Image Credit: ©AMISOM



**SCORE FOR OUTPUT INDICATOR 3.2:
QUALITY OF ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN
THE FMS AND TARGETED COMMUNITIES**

**SCORE FOR OUTPUT INDICATOR
3.3: QUALITY OF ENGAGEMENT
BETWEEN THE DISTRICT
ADMINISTRATIONS AND TARGETED
COMMUNITIES**

**OUTPUT 3: INCREASED GOVERNMENT
VISIBILITY AND COMMUNITY
ENGAGEMENT (2016–2020)**


For the reporting period 2016–2020, Output 3 aimed to increase government visibility (e.g., government buildings and public infrastructure) and community engagement around key priorities (e.g., service delivery and security) and to revive local economies. Through these investments, SSF aimed to improve trust among communities and between communities and the government. The output performance was measured against the following key indicators:

**INDICATOR 3.1. QUALITY OF
ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN THE DISTRICT
ADMINISTRATIONS AND TARGETED
COMMUNITIES**

Indicator definitions: The quality of engagement between government (at the FMS and district levels) and targeted communities is measured through a combination of the following four concepts:

- **Involvement:** Visibility plus openness (transparency) plus engagement plus accessibility.
- **Shared priorities:** Government and people have aligned priorities.
- **Reciprocity:** Government participates with people and people participate on behalf of government.
- **Trust:** Government keeps its word and delivers on commitments with integrity and honesty.

This section presents the midline and endline evaluation studies' findings during phase II for both indicators 3.2 and 3.3. The indicator scores are outlined first (against a scale of 1–7) and are based on a qualitative analysis of the case studies conducted at endline, midline, and baseline. The key achievements and results are then presented, followed by the trends observed across the five states, and an in-depth analysis of the performance against the indicator from baseline to endline.



7.0



6.0

5.0



4.0

3.0

38,360

HOUSEHOLDS BENEFITED FROM SOCIO-ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES

2.0

2,540

INDIVIDUALS TRAINED IN BUSINESS AND TECHNICAL SKILLS

1.0

67%

OF BUSINESSES SUPPORTED BY SSF REPORT THEIR PERFORMANCE IMPROVED

KEY ACHIEVEMENTS AND RESULTS

- Output indicator 3.3 met expectations and target scores; indicator 3.2 fell short of its target.3
- Peaceful districts received higher scores for increased trust between communities and government, but some sub-scores decreased as community expectations of government service delivery increased beyond basic security provision.
- Positive community perceptions were notable in high-visibility investments, including those with infrastructure projects or where the FGS or FMS had visited the project sites.
- SSF supported the installation of a solar mini-grid in Warsheikh, making it one of the first Somali towns to be completely solar-powered and improving relations between the district administration and the community.
- 38,360 households benefited from socio-economic opportunities enabled by SSF, including marginalised groups, women, youth, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and returnees.
- Six socio-economic investments made with high levels of Somali ownership and community contributions of more than 20%.
- 2,540 individuals trained in business and technical skills; 1,891 internships and job placements created; and capacity built of 124 farmer/fishing cooperatives and business/village savings and credit associations with a total membership of 3,030.
- Small to medium-sized enterprises strengthened: 1,003 supported, and 334 new ones established. 67% report their performance improved as a result of SSF support.

KEY TRENDS

Developments at the district level are idiosyncratic to the extent that no clear patterns of change can be observed for the two indicators in government–community engagement. The two indicator scores remain effectively unchanged since baseline.

The evaluations discovered several interesting themes. For most districts, the scores for the two levels of governments are linked, as when the score has declined for one, it tends to have decreased for the other as well, and vice versa. This highlights the community view that the different levels of government are supposed to work together.

Some primary regional cities such as Beletweyne, Galkayo, and Jowhar score among the lowest in the country. This illustrates the issues of governance problems in main cities with high political stakes and diverse populations.

In districts with higher peace levels, communities felt safe and had higher expectations of the local administration's capacity to provide additional services beyond security.

Some districts were observed to have high aspirations of joining the FMS, leading to high governance scores before the districts had effectively even become part of the state. This is reflective of an overall atmosphere of hope and indicative of the momentum in the districts. If the state cannot follow through and use the momentum, the scores may decline, as in Warsheikh and Dhusamareb districts where people felt let down.

The endline evaluation findings indicate that indicator 3.3 positively met expectations and target scores. While indicator 3.2 fell short of its target, it did not regress against the baseline. Overall, the aggregate scores for both indicators and the quality of engagement between government and community remain unchanged since baseline. Developments and performance against the indicators varied greatly across the state and districts. This made identifying trends across locations challenging, but highlighted the finding that performance against the indicator was often context-specific.

In 2020, progress was recorded against the indicators in various locations across the states, including Kismayo, Jubaland, where the local governance score increased, while the FMS-level score declined. Similarly, certain districts in South West, such as Baidoa and Ceel Barde, improved their local government scores. There was substantial improvement against the indicator in Hobyo and Abudwaq districts in Galmudug. In Puntland, Benderbeyla saw a considerable increase in its FMS-level score since baseline. At the time of baseline, Benderbeyla was essentially not part of the state. However, it has since seen significant increases in government presence and activity, which are reflected in the score increase.

A key finding in 2018–19 demonstrated that FMS-level scores are typically higher in districts where the FMS was able to enforce peace or mediate conflict. Evaluation studies in 2019 revealed that districts not directly affected by political contestation (i.e., Hobyo and Abudwaq) at the state level generally had more favourable scores for FMS, community engagement, and vice versa. Those districts affected by conflict demonstrated low scores for government and community engagement at both district administration and FMS level, including Balanbale, which was directly affected by the Galmudug crisis.

The evaluation studies also found that communities' increasing demand for improved governance reflects their shifting expectations after government fulfils basic security. In other words, in districts with higher levels or periods of peace, communities felt safe and had higher expectations of the local administration's capacity to provide additional services beyond security.

Evaluation studies in 2019 found examples of 'shared priorities' when both the district administration and the FMS were seen to be very engaged, where the FMS or district administration had visited the project site, or where the government was in some way involved in a project, such as the Danish Refugee Council's DIALOGUE project in Gedo region, Jubaland. Nevertheless, this did not always translate into higher scores for reciprocity or involvement. For some respondents, reciprocity had limited potential with district administrations that had not been elected by local communities. District administrations, and in some cases FMSs, were seen as supporting SSF investments and providing the enabling environment for investments to be implemented. Only in a handful of investments was the government seen as directly involved, which is reflective of the limited capacity, visibility, and reach of government at the local level.

The endline studies of SSF's economic development Portfolio finds that 38,360 households have benefited from SSF-supported socio-economic opportunities delivered via community-government collaboration. Many investments demonstrated strong Somali ownership levels with impressive levels of community (including private sector) contributions ranging from 20–60%. This achievement reflects the progress made by SSF's community engagement strategy.

This strategy sought to promote local ownership, sustainability, and maintenance of the public assets supported by SSF's investments.

Puntland: Overall, the governance indicators in the more established state did not progress from the baseline. In the city of Bossaso, for instance, both indicators have declined nearly one point since baseline. The same tendency can be observed on both sides of the divided city of Galkayo. There are instances, however, of specific endline studies measuring progress against the indicators. The endline evaluations of SSF's economic development portfolio, for instance, tracked some achievements.

Evaluations of SSF's economic development investments in Puntland in 2020 indicate a positive rise in public perceptions of the district administrations, including greater engagement with their communities. For example, a high number of community members linked to the SSF supported the American Refugee Council project (from 39% at baseline to 69% at endline) and reported that the local administration was fairly responsive to the issues and concerns they raised. The respondents rated levels of engagement with the district administration higher than engagement with the FMS. The district administration was found to be more engaged, accessible, and approachable. Yet despite this perception, only 20% of community members sampled in 2020 (17% in 2019) had actually reported issues, concerns, or grievances to the local administration, still preferring to go to their clan elder, who they felt could better represent them.

Many respondents felt that the district administration and FMS offices have limited resources and capacity. Nevertheless, some respondents stated that in times of crisis both levels of government stood with the community. For instance, during the COVID-19 outbreak, communities reported that government officials helped with awareness-raising and distribution of face masks and hand washing materials; and during recent floods, the district administration mobilised communities to support IDPs with food and other items.

A 2019 analysis of government visibility via the provision of public infrastructure, services, and reviving local economies also saw positive achievements recorded in Puntland where the focus has been on extending state authority to communities who feel particularly excluded from the political settlement (e.g., Puntland's coastal community affected by piracy).

Investments to more remote locations have included installing solar streetlights, constructing police stations, and supporting improving community safety. An endline community survey of the installation of solar streetlights in Bari and Kakaar regions demonstrated that over 80% of respondents listed the following benefits from the streetlights: ability to conduct business at all times; general trust in safety; ability to move freely; ability to socialise at all times; improved sense of safety in the community; and reduction of accidents.

80%

OF RESPONDENTS LISTED THE FOLLOWING BENEFITS FROM THE STREETLIGHTS:

ABILITY TO CONDUCT BUSINESS AT ALL TIMES;

GENERAL TRUST IN SAFETY;

ABILITY TO MOVE FREELY;

ABILITY TO SOCIALISE AT ALL TIMES;

IMPROVED SENSE OF SAFETY IN THE COMMUNITY;

AND REDUCTION OF ACCIDENTS.

Image Credit: ©SSF



Residents in Galdogob carry out their business at night following installation of solar lights by SSF.

In addition to the construction of police stations, SSF investments have promoted community–police dialogue and community policing units. Emerging evidence indicates that this has helped to bring the communities and police closer together and generally provided a safe space for people to report incidents, improve safety, and support stability in their towns. As one community member said,

Community–police relations have improved; police are now seeing themselves as the servants of the people. Since the community–police dialogues, we see an increase in communities calling the police to report crimes. Since human rights training, women feel empowered to approach the police, not waiting for male family members to deal with things for them.

This was also found to be transformational for marginalised groups such as minority clans and IDPs. A human rights monitor and community member in Bossaso noted,

I think [the project has benefited] a lot of community members who didn't trust police a lot and now when they see someone from their community who is community-police they are more inclined to trust them

and work with them. Most of the community police are people from vulnerable communities.

Jubaland: Overall, the governance indicators in the more established state did not progress in 2020 from baseline. All districts in the state except Kismayo have declined for both levels of government. In 2019, there was some progress against the indicator in Doolow and Garbahare districts which was partly linked to the improved services offered by the district administration.

SSF has invested significantly in Jubaland with aims to solidify stability gains in places under the administrative control of the state through strong government visibility and to increase state government outreach with the Gedo community, which felt excluded from the Kismayo political settlement. SSF has supported numerous economic development investments, including a community resource mobilisation project; socio-economic opportunities for youth, women, and socially excluded groups; and skills training for economic empowerment (e.g., developing fisheries' value chains). The Fund also supported the

construction of police posts to improve community–police relationships and other high-visibility infrastructure projects (e.g., dams, government and ministry buildings, and youth centres).

SSF's economic development portfolio evaluations tracked evidence of positive progress against the indicator on certain investments. For instance, high-visibility infrastructure projects which raised the profile of the government, and cases of improved levels of engagement between target communities and their district administrations related to investments such as the DIALOGUE project, which promoted a government-centric approach towards community resource mobilisation. The project's support for the Single Treasury Account had a particularly positive effect on people's assessment of the FMS. A Garbahare business owner said,

This [project] has changed the views of the community for the Jubaland regime in ways that are positive. For example, the funds now cannot be stolen by a specific person or a group... We interacted really well with the people in the community and the district administration.

South West: SSF aimed to increase the state's visibility by helping it reach out to communities recently recovered from AS and by moving the capital to Barawe. SSF has supported the completion of the Barawe airstrip, socio-economic opportunities for communities as part of its stabilisation work, and development of the local fishing industry.

There was positive evidence of progress in South West. For instance, Baidoa and Ceel Barde districts improved their scores for local government against baselines, although no change was observed for districts in their relationship with the FMS. Community members link the improved district administration and community relationship to the government's ability to provide security as well as power-sharing agreements locally. However, the communities' perceptions of their engagement with the FMS were divided. In Baidoa, some communities feel less connected, and in Ceel Barde, the FMS administration is associated by some with unequal distribution of resources. The state is also linked to unsuccessful attempts at DCF.

Meanwhile, elsewhere there was positive progress against the FMS–community engagement indicator. For instance, in Xudur and Barawe, a kind of optimism for joining the FMS can be detected in both districts. Xudur has seen the district council successfully formed, and the state's leadership has been visibly involved in this process. A 2.6-point increase was recorded for the district since midline. Barawe, meanwhile, is slightly less straightforward. The predominantly Tunni population in the city tend to view South West as a Mirifle project. Communities in Barawe were vocal about their disapproval of this, feeling excluded from the state-building project in terms of positions allocated, investments, and resources. Despite this, communities still remain optimistic about the district becoming the capital of South West. In both Xudur and Barawe, there was no change in the score for district administration and



community engagement. Both administrations are severely resource-constrained and are at the fringes of the state. Xudur consults different segments of the community but excludes women. Barawe is a divided city, where tensions are high, but the community is more unified due to an AS presence and frequent attacks.

SSF economic development investments in South West engaged the government through line ministries and local administration and promoted their active participation in investment implementation. The investments created opportunities for line ministries to engage communities on key issues. Positive evidence of progress against the indicator was found in the case of improved community perceptions of engagement with district administrations and the FMS as a result of the SolarGen investment. Elsewhere, however, limited progress was evident against the indicators. For instance, 58% of community members in the SSF-supported Africa Development Solutions (ADESO) investment in Baidoa, 41% of community members in



the SSF-supported *Societas Socialis* (SOS) investment in Xudur and Dinsoor, and 63.3% of community members in the Somalione investment in Barawe did not associate the investment with either the district administration or the FMS.

Hobyo and Abudwaq have seen substantial improvements in governance. Both districts at baseline were practically excluded from the state. Abudwaq because of the insecurity at the time and Hobyo because of its remoteness and limited accessibility. These issues have since been successfully addressed through investments supported by SSF. In Abudwaq, the SSF-supported Wadajir Framework, alongside the government, has been attributed with achieving the peace that has been in place for more than two years. In Hobyo, SSF has been successful in facilitating a reconciliation process. The district has also benefited from the Galkayo road repairs funded through community contributions. In both towns, Wadajir Framework activities have resulted in people thanking the government for acquiring new resources for the locality.

The investment has also improved the relationship between the people and the administration, as the community consultations have allowed members of different groups to get together and decide collectively what investment the districts need.

Elsewhere, progress against the indicators is less clear. In Galkayo, it seems that the prolonged period of peace has made community members expectant of improved government—a demand that thus far has not been met, leading to a decline in the FMS score for the district. Dhusamareb has recently gone through a violent confrontation between ASWJ and Galmudug/SNA where the ASWJ group surrendered. This led to a restructuring of local government. The new administration, appointed by Galmudug, has not yet gained full community support, and some grievances appear to linger. The violent confrontations between the state and the group that used to govern the city undoubtedly explain the decline in the FMS score for the district.

The findings are reflected in the specific evaluation studies of SSF economic development investments in Galmudug, which indicate low overall scores at both levels of government. An exception was Adaado district, where the quality of engagement between the district administrations and targeted communities was found to have improved partly due to SSF's support for successful economic development investments. SSF invested in various initiatives in Galmudug, including supporting livestock and agricultural producers to improve production and improve access to finance; building the capacity of a vocational training centre; leveraging investors to deliver community-driven projects; rehabilitating an airstrip; and providing business skills training. These investments successfully included activities that targeted marginalised groups, such as women and youth.

Hirshabelle: The newest FMS contends with a fragile political settlement, security threats from AS, high levels of communal conflict, and low levels of stabilisation and economic development support in newly recovered areas, as well as the need to strengthen the state's capability. SSF has focused on increasing government visibility by investing in economic recovery, peacebuilding, and local government support.

Due to an inconclusive state formation process, Hirshabelle has not fully established itself in the districts of the SSF endline evaluation studies. As such, the state tends to score the lowest for both indicators. Overall, the relationship between the government's provision of security and support by the population is not linear. While




Image Credit: ©SSF

security is necessary for the government to be supported, and this is often reflected in upward trends in the scores initially, the mere provision of security is not enough for the government to enjoy popular support in the long term. In many districts it was evident that after extended periods of peace, people started to demand more from their government. This is reflected in negative trends in the governance indicator scores for such districts. Insecurity in Hirshabelle often inhibited SSF's support and, overall, the investments' ability to impact community-district administration or community-FMS relations was limited.

Mataban district was one of the only areas to show positive progress against the indicators, exhibiting some very positive trends observed for Warsheikh at midline. The district has had a rather high level of communal conflict, and so community members are happy for a new influx of resources. Respondents acknowledge the district administration and FMS for attracting investments, reflected in an increase for both indicators (1.3 points and 1.8 points respectively).

Balacad community members and stakeholders also indicated improved perceptions of the relationship between the community and the district administration. SSF-supported investments successfully raised the participation of the district administration to engage clan elders. The district administration successfully engaged community groups, raising awareness of the specific community dynamics, and facilitated dialogue between groups in case of disagreements and when tensions arose. The district administration's performance improved the quality of engagement and levels of trust within the community. Community perceptions improved further during the COVID-19 outbreak when the district administration responded effectively by conducting awareness-raising campaigns for handwashing and face mask use, closing schools, and limiting

social gatherings. Most stakeholders attributed the curbing of the outbreak to the district administration's (and Hirshabelle government's) response. The leader of a minority clan said,

They [the district administration] handled the outbreak very well and reduced the spread of COVID-19 by providing awareness programmes to the community, and by curfews.

However, the DCF process in Warsheikh appears to have had a negative impact on government–community relations. The newly elected district council is perceived by respondents as not consultative and ineffective in delivering services. At midline, respondents had a close relationship with the previous administration, as different segments of the community were consulted weekly. This relationship has changed, as the newly elected council does not meet with the community. The council has been unable to control the district, and fighting has broken out between the two most powerful Hawiye–Abgal lineages in the area. Also, Hirshabelle's governance issues have become very visible in the case of Warsheikh as, at endline, all respondents were critical of the state which was perceived as being absent in providing basic services, notably security and justice, in the district. They were seen as ignoring Warsheikh, especially the issues around non-payment of salaries for district council staff and enforcing security on Mogadishu's road. Hirshabelle is perceived as a weak state, without much political influence in the region. In addition, state administration members rarely visit the district, in part because of challenges to security in Middle Shabelle.

The Wadajir Framework intervention in Beletweyne was necessary, as the local administration remains one of the lowest-scoring in the country despite a 0.6-point increase since baseline. Accusations of corruption are common, and many in the

community view the district administration as accountable only to the Hirshabelle leadership. Jowhar also has negative perceptions of the FMS government and is among the lowest-scoring for the FMS–community engagement indicator, having seen a decline of 1.7 points since baseline. Indeed, the state formation process does not appear to have much support among the communities of either one of the two regions making up the state. Jowhar has also seen a substantial decrease of 2.0 points for the district administration–community engagement indicator. This is probably due to the deteriorating security situation in the state's capital, as most community members view the state as unable to keep them safe.

GOVERNMENT VISIBILITY REMAINS LOW

SSF's endline evaluation of economic development investments highlights the trend that most community participants in Hirshabelle do not associate the SSF investments with the government. This is partly due to the need, in some cases, to disassociate investment activities with the local governments despite the objectives to improve government visibility and community perceptions. For instance, in Beletweyne, close association with the district administration or FMS was problematic, given the political and conflict context. Similarly, in Jowhar, the SSF investment understood that community members may be reluctant to participate in any activities associated with the local government out of fear of AS retaliation. As such, few communities attribute the investment to the district or state administrations. Overall, the endline evaluations indicate limited improvement in government visibility or engagement in Hirshabelle.

OUTPUT INDICATOR 3.3: QUALITY OF ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN DISTRICT ADMINISTRATIONS AND TARGETED COMMUNITIES (2021)

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WADAJIR FRAMEWORK IN GALMUDUG

SSF resumed DCF work in Balanbale district of Galmudug during this reporting period, following the project's closure at the end of SSF II. First, a coordination meeting was held in Dhusamareb with Galmudug state's Ministry of Interior regarding the resumption of DCF in Balanbale. Together with the then minister for the Galmudug Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs, and Reconciliation, Abdi Mohamed Jama (Waayeel), and the technical team in charge of DCF, the project was officially re-launched in Balanbale. The re-launch was attended by 6 members of parliament from Galmudug, ministers, clan elders, and over 200 community members drawn from the various segments of society, including youth, women, members of the business community, and minority groups. The minister and political leaders promised to provide leadership in the DCF process in order to ensure its success. Following the re-launch of the DCF process, community meetings were facilitated at which clan and sub-clan elders confirmed their ongoing support for the power-sharing agreement concluded in Balanbale in 2019.

However, a challenge to the DCF process arose due to competition for the position of district commissioner between the district's two sub-clans (Urmidhig and Rer Guled Farax, both belonging to the Marehan clan), with one clan advocating for consensus in selecting who would take up the post, and the other preferring a contested election.

These differences emanated from the power-sharing formula in place between the Urmidhig, Cali Dhere, and Rer Guled Farax sub-clans of the wider Marehan clan, which involved the allocation of four seats. Each sub-clan was to take a single seat, with the remaining seat allocated through a consensus agreement between the three sub-clans. However, when consensus failed due to all three sub-clans wishing to take the seat, the Council of Elders decided to determine the seat's occupant through a competitive process. This would involve five members from the three sub-clans voting: two Urmidhig, two Rer Guled Farax, and one Cali Dhere. However, the Urmidhig—whose preferred candidate was from the Rer Guled Farax—sensed that the other two sub-clans had formed an alliance. The resulting standoff led to demonstrations in front of the office used by the technical team. The minister, together with local leaders at both the Galmudug and federal level, intervened and started consensus-building between the two sub-clans (Urmidhig and Rer Guled Farax), eventually resolving the contentious issues. Following this, each sub-clan submitted the names of its delegates based on the 2019 power-sharing agreement formula. The delegates were trained on their roles, and the democratic election process was used to determine the council members.

The delegates elected 21 district council members, 5 of whom were women, thereby ensuring women would be represented in the council. However, on 29 May 2021, the Galmudug administration suspended all DCF processes for 90 days. On 27 May 2021, at the end of the most recent FGS–FMS political agreement on the national electoral process, SSF was informally asked by SWS and Galmudug to halt DCF and state-level democratisation activities until the federal electoral process is concluded. Meanwhile, Puntland announced that the early local elections scheduled for August would be postponed to 25 October 2021.

SSF learned that state administrations are concerned that both local and federal elites focused on winning national seats may take advantage of these overtly political processes, using communal disagreements to further their own agendas. The Fund has focused efforts on resolving these state-level issues, but the impact of national processes has already caused implementation delays and will likely cause further delays across the portfolio.

SSF has a 'Do No Harm' approach. Thus, while the Fund will push for progress where it is deemed feasible, investments will be paused in locations where there is a threat of being caught up in political processes. It is important to note that though SSF investments have been delayed in many locations, critical groundwork has been laid, which the Fund will be well-placed to capitalise on following the conclusion of the federal elections (likely in phase III).



Image Credit: ©SSF

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WADAJIR FRAMEWORK IN PUNTLAND

As part of the support provided under the Wadajir framework, SSF is finalising procurement aimed at assisting the Puntland Ministry of Interior, Local Government, Federal Affairs, and Democratisation (MoLLGRD) to conduct conflict-resolution and social-healing activities between different clans in Qandala and Iskushuban. These are follow-on activities arising from the political fault-lines assessment conducted by SSF in the previous quarter.

SSF held a meeting with MoLLGRD to discuss implementation of DCF work in the two districts. During the meeting, the minister assured SSF that the two districts were being prioritised by the Puntland administration and requested that Alula district be added among the target districts. SSF accepted this request and will therefore implement DCF work in three of Puntland's districts (Qandala, Iskushuban, and Alula).

RESULTS 2021

SSF-funded work with the DAs in Puntland and with the DCs in SWS in 2021 was found to translate into improved quality of engagement between those bodies and targeted communities and into an improved perception of local governance structures.

In the targeted districts of the SWS (2021), the SSF supported established district councils (DCs) to deliver services through cash-for-work projects and organise community dialogue events bringing together the DCs, other government officials, and community members. Easier access to local officials, increased visibility of local government structures, and improved service delivery

were the three major factors identified as contributing to stronger trust and positive opinion of the DCs.

The SSF has worked in partnership with line ministries and local governments to build their technical capacity in areas like conflict resolution and peacebuilding strategies. While these efforts were assessed as effective in achieving their immediate objectives, they have not yet been sufficient to build sustainable capacity within the state and district-level institutions.

Established DCs also face serious financial and technical challenges due to an unclear legislative framework and lack of public finance management (PFM) capacity. The SSF is aware of this issue and commissioned a report on the sustainability of the DCs, which was completed in October 2021.

DELIVERING ON 'LEGACY' INVESTMENTS

DHUSAMAREB AIRSTRIP PERIMETER FENCE

SSF completed installation of a 7.5 km chain-link perimeter fence around Dhusamareb airstrip, Galmudug. In response to COVID-19-related challenges that had previously led to delays in undertaking the work, SSF recommended mitigation measures that have since been implemented and the work completed.

ABUDWAQ AIRSTRIP

SSF completed construction of a 2 km gravel runway complete with full concrete apron at Abudwaq airstrip. Completion was facilitated through engagement with the local community, which resulted in the scope of work being revised from an asphalt renovation to a longer gravel runway. This project aims to enhance stability in the region by opening it up to travel and trade and promoting the government's legitimacy.

BELETWEYNE ROAD

SSF completed construction of a key road in Beletweyne, which had previously been delayed due to various challenges encountered following the commissioning of the project in January 2020. Immediate observable successes in the town resulting from the road's completion include better flood control arising from improved road drainage and a greater number of youth-operated taxis, which indicates increased employment opportunities. The road has also opened the town up to trade, easing the movement of both people and goods.

OUTPUT 4: REDUCED COMMUNITY VULNERABILITY TO CONFLICT (2016-2020)

Output 4 aims to reduce community vulnerability to conflict. SSF's investments under this output have ranged from: support to peacebuilding initiatives, with a particular emphasis on establishing and strengthening new and/or existing credible peace and reconciliation committees; to integrating economic development and trust-building initiatives to enable communities to leverage the transformative impact of economic development to unite communities through collaboration on shared priorities for the benefit of all; and finally to supporting reconciliation tied to local governance strengthening, particularly through DCF.



Image Credit: ©SSF

SCORE FOR OUTPUT INDICATOR 4.1: QUALITY, RELEVANCE, AND EFFECTIVENESS OF SSF INTERVENTIONS AIMED AT DE-RISKING OR DE-ESCALATING CONFLICTS

INDICATOR 4.1: QUALITY, RELEVANCE, AND EFFECTIVENESS OF SSF INTERVENTIONS AIMED AT DE-RISKING OR DE-ESCALATING CONFLICTS

Indicator definition: This indicator aims to measure SSF's contribution to reducing communities' vulnerability to conflict, with reference especially to de-risking or de-escalating communal conflict—a necessary component of enhancing stability in Somalia. The indicator is measured based upon an aggregated score rating the quality, relevance, and effectiveness of investments targeting specific districts. This indicator aims to measure:

- **Quality:** How well the investment was designed and implemented according to 1) responsiveness, and 2) equity, especially in terms of stakeholder engagement and conflict sensitivity.
- **Relevance:** The extent to which the investment is aligned with the SSF strategy and addresses the key issues identified in the SSF gender context analysis and approach.
- **Effectiveness:** The extent to which an investment attains its objectives as per 1) attainment of objectives, 2) contributing factors, and 3) sustainability.

This section presents the findings of the endline evaluation studies conducted on communal conflicts during phase II. The scores for the indicator are outlined first, followed by key trends observed across the five states, and finally an in-depth analysis of the conflicts and endline study findings.

5.5 - Midline 2018 Actual

5.0 - 2020 Target

5.0 - Endline 2020 Actual

5.0 - Baseline

7.0

KEY ACHIEVEMENTS AND RESULTS

- Output Indicator 4.1 met its target score. The aggregated score across the districts and states evaluated includes significant differences, with some regions scoring as high as 6.5 but other regions scoring as low as 3.5.

6.0

- SSF’s Wadajir Framework activities have generated good levels of community awareness of the DCF process. Overall, it seems that there is little resistance to the idea of DCF locally—in fact, many community members specifically call for it.

5.0

- Similarly, SSF’s social reconciliation activities and support to peace dividend investments are viewed positively by community members who state that the initiatives have created increased community interaction.

4.0

- The design and implementation of investments in Warsheikh and Mataban (Hirshabelle) were appropriately aligned to the intra-state fault line.

3.0

- There is positive evidence that SSF’s support promoted inclusivity in the DCF processes and activities. For instance, the quality of the design and implementation of the investments was found to positively demonstrate engagement of key and relevant stakeholders in Warsheikh and in Mataban.

2.0

- The representation of women in Warsheikh district council was promoted, and female candidates were identified and supported with an election platform; in Mataban, participation by women was successfully promoted in the peace platform and Peace Committees.

1.0

- In other districts, only low levels of inclusion of women were achieved. A major challenge was the difficulty in harmonising the existing clan-based approach with gender inclusivity.

- In some cases, stakeholder engagement was found to be limited and lacking broader inclusion of communities; for instance, in Beletweyne, this was partly due to the limited capacity of the Peace Committee to set up representation in each of the communities.
- Support to reconciliation efforts in Abudwaq has led to the near total cessation of conflict in the town and the establishment of a gun-free zone.
- Most districts successfully completed construction of the peace dividend investments, selected through inclusive community consultations.
- District councils were successfully formed in Warsheikh, making it the first district in Hirshabelle to have an elected district council.
- In Beletweyne, the process has stalled due to clan tensions; the process mainly focused on social reconciliation and resolving outstanding conflicts between the large number of sub-clans in the district.
- In Galmudug, the process in three districts has been on hold since late 2018 due to the Galmudug political crisis. The crisis appears to be resolved and activities may hopefully be completed.
- SSF support to the Wadajir Framework in both Hobyo and Abudwaq has directly contributed to the government being credited with the near cessation of communal conflict in the districts.
- In Afmadow, an economic development project provided a water-needs responsive infrastructure that served a large community base and reduced pressure on local natural resources, improving social cohesion and reducing vulnerability to conflict.
- In certain cases, investments were delayed and constrained by flooding and the COVID-19 pandemic in Beletweyne.

Image Credit: ©AMISOM



The Wadajir Framework is the FGS roadmap to working on local governance, with the ultimate aim to create a governance system that builds up from the bottom, breaks down social barriers, mends social divides, and re-energises the spirit of working together for the common good. Barriers to this process have been identified as: lack of social reconciliation and integration; lack of understanding of democracy in action; lack of opportunity for widespread participation in political processes; lack of capacity and resources to facilitate and deliver on local governance; and fragmentation of media and consequent lack of unbiased national dialogue. Consequently, the Wadajir Framework takes a sequenced approach for building local governance by beginning with social reconciliation activities where reconciliation conferences and, in some cases, trauma-healing activities seek to create a foundation for locally negotiated peace agreements or social contracts to bring community conflicts to a halt. From there, people in the localities have an opportunity to decide through community consultations on a peace dividend investment.

SSF has supported the implementation of the Wadajir Framework as part of its objectives to decrease conflict and to improve government-community relations. SSF aims to strengthen local governance and DCF processes. DCF in the south and central areas of Somalia is in its early stages, and very few district councils exist to date. Where councils have been formed, they tend to be in the more rural and peripheral areas of the states, but they do tend to struggle with resources and functioning.

The Fund has supported Wadajir Framework programmes in the Galmudug districts of Abudwaq, Balanbale, and Hobyo since 2017. In Hirshabelle, SSF started supporting Wadajir Framework activities in 2018 in Beletweyne and Warsheikh. A major focus for SSF is to form a more inclusive district council in each location. To help facilitate this, SSF has supported a series of awareness-raising campaigns and dialogue events. SSF's support to the Wadajir Framework has also focused on promoting women's priority projects (selected exclusively by female members of the communities).



SSF investments to support conflict prevention and manage reconciliation processes made good progress in some FMSs and some districts. The investments helped to address the root causes of conflict and supported reconciliation efforts based on the premise that vulnerability of target communities to conflict is determined by multiple factors, including low levels of social cohesion, weak state institutions, scarce resources (particularly water and land), and the intersection of communal tensions with political schisms. The Fund's investments were largely found to be responsive to existing dynamics and trends; in addition, the Fund achieved its stated objectives of de-risking or de-escalating certain communal conflicts. There were, however, cases where SSF investments were not appropriately tailored to the contexts to suitably address the conflicts at hand; for instance, in Beletweyne, where the SSF endline evaluation recommends various improvements to the SSF investment design to enhance its relevance and effectiveness.

To date, SSF has supported DCF, although the operations and sustainability of the district councils is still to be addressed, and this is a key focus of the conclusions and recommendations for SSF programming in 2021 (see chapter 8). SSF's long-term aim is to support DCF so that the new district councils can take over core service delivery and governance in their respective localities. In particular, the district governments will take a lead in the health care and education sectors as well as building infrastructure for livelihoods development. FMSs have their own local government laws. The councils will be given the right to collect taxes and revenues which, alongside funds from donors and the state government and any other sources of funding, will be used to finance operational costs and the cost-of-service provision.

SSF's Wadajir Framework implementation activities have generated good levels of community awareness of the DCF process. Overall, it seems that there is little resistance to the idea of DCF locally—in fact, many community members specifically call for it.

SSF has aimed to support appropriate and effective DCF processes and structures. The approach applied includes promoting and ensuring stakeholder inclusiveness. The councils typically include 21 members and are supposed to be representative of all of the different clans and minority groups in the district, as well as include a minimum of one third female councillors. The elected council will then elect one of their members to be the chair or commissioner alongside two deputy chairs of the council.

There is positive evidence that SSF's support promoted inclusivity in the DCF processes and activities. The SSF evaluation and review findings indicate that youth are actively involved in the DCF, to the extent that some community members view DCF effectively as a transfer of power from the old to the young. In addition, the SSF initiatives achieved in ensuring clan representation. However, the evidence to date indicates low levels of inclusion of women. A major challenge was the difficulty in harmonising the existing clan-based approach with gender inclusivity.

The SSF evaluation findings are based on a set of case studies conducted to explore the quality, relevance, and effectiveness of SSF interventions aimed at de-risking or de-escalating conflicts. Some of the case studies are presented below.

CASE STUDY: WADAJIR FRAMEWORK IMPLEMENTATION IN HIRSHABELLE

SSF supported the implementation of the Wadajir Framework in three districts in Hirshabelle: Warsheikh, Beletweyne, and Mataban. The peace dividend investments were separately implemented from the reconciliation, civic dialogue, and DCF activities. Overall, the performance of the investments varied significantly between the different districts, largely due to the varying contextual factors in each district. In Warsheikh and Beletweyne, SSF supported DCF; this was successfully completed in Warsheikh, whereas the Beletweyne process mainly focused on social reconciliation and resolving outstanding conflicts between the large number of sub-clans in the district.

In Warsheikh, there have been a variety of community-identified peace dividend investments, including streetlight installation, household electrification, and the construction of a borehole. A women's priority investment and a mini-grid was also installed in the district. In Beletweyne, the peace dividend investment is seeking to address the problematic relationship between different communities by constructing a road linking the east and the west of the city. While SSF has funded GESI work in the district, Beletweyne has not had a women's priority project selected through a community consultation, like the ones in Abudwaq, Balanbale, and Hobyoy in Galmudug. SSF investments were largely found to demonstrate good quality in appropriately monitoring the changing conflict, security, and contextual factors

across the districts to steer and design the investments accordingly. Investment design was found to be aligned to the intra-state fault line identified by the Sahar Research mapping and to the Wadajir Framework. In Warsheikh and Mataban, the design also appropriately addressed contextual factors, stakeholder priorities, and recommendations. In Mataban, for instance, SSF was found to aptly tailor the investment design to emerging contextual factors and adapt the design to initiate a reconciliation process after the implementation of peace dividends to create a more neutral starting point for inter-clan dialogue. In Beletweyne, however, the design of the initial investment was not adequately nor specifically tailored to the specific clan and conflict dynamics, resulting in the recognition that adjustments needed to be made.

The investment's design quality and implementation were found to positively demonstrate engagement of key and relevant stakeholders in Warsheikh and in Mataban. For instance, the Hirshabelle government and the Minister of Interior were actively engaged in Warsheikh to reconcile any tensions and to ensure DCF legitimacy and the district council election process. The investment's success in gaining the support and approval of the Hirshabelle state government proved crucial for the ultimate formation of the district council.

Moreover, the investment aligned with SSF's GESI strategy. Women played a key role in the investment in Mataban, which promoted the representation of women in the district council; three seats for women were secured, and women candidates were identified and supported with an election platform. Participation by women was successfully achieved through the peace platform and Peace Committees. The investment supported the formation of women's groups from different clans, which served as an example to male clan members. The women's group grew into an umbrella organisation for women of all clans. The women's groups were often asked for support in solving smaller conflicts, together with the Peace Committees. In Mataban, all relevant sub-groups were consulted on the choice and design of peace dividends, including the sustainability plans for the women's centre, hospital, and high school. Stakeholders in Mataban showed a clear understanding and active support of the investment objective, and indicated that the investments were aligned to their priorities.

Warsheikh district has seen the successful completion of DCF, making it the first district in the state to have selected a more representative district council. The district council consists of 21 members, including 4 women. Moreover, the implementation team put much emphasis on including the rural areas on the peripheries of the town, conducting social reconciliation activities in 11 surrounding villages. Consequently, 17 out of the 21 members of the council are from the district's rural areas. The evaluation finds the council is largely seen as inclusive, and no complaints have been reported as to the exclusion of any group from the council. However, there is significant concern regarding sustainability of the newly formed council in terms of its ability to function; this is mostly due to financial constraints, including the ability to pay newly elected council members' salaries.



Meanwhile, in Beletweyne, as in Warsheikh, extensive trauma-healing sessions have been conducted as part of social reconciliation activities. Yet, the process in the district is currently paused, as much more reconciliation in the district is necessary before the programme can proceed to DCF. The implementer cites the presence of spoilers in the form of elders, politicians, and other community members who do not want to see inclusive government as well as lack of understanding of the process as the reasons why more time is required to complete the process. SSF evaluation indicates that resolving the conflict(s) in Beletweyne is much more complicated than in Warsheikh since the community in the former district is very heterogenous, whereas Warsheikh is largely composed of two sub-clans of the Hawiye-Abgal and some minority groups. Nevertheless, the evaluation finds Beletweyne stakeholders were unanimous in believing that conflict has reduced in the district, and that the investment has successfully brought the community together to create more interactions and cooperation where these were previously lacking. As one district administration representative noted, stakeholder engagement in Beletweyne was found to be lacking inclusion of communities in social dialogue activities, partly due to the limited capacity of the Peace Committee to set up representation in each of the communities. Peace Committee members reported they were more than once accused of favouritism. The evaluation finds that the SSF investment did not adequately address these capacity issues, and that the lack of stakeholder inclusion may risk reducing community goodwill. SSF needs to enhance

Image Credit: ©SSF



reconciliation activities to address clan tensions related to the power-sharing arrangements between Hawaadle and Gaalje'el sub-clans. The Hirshabelle state government decided that no DCF should take place in the Hiraan district given the high risk of an outbreak of violence.

Regarding the effectiveness of the investments and their contribution to de-risking or de-escalating conflicts in Hirshabelle, the results are mixed.



There is some positive evidence that the process of forming the district councils led to positive changes—but there is limited evidence that the district councils are operating and generating clear results of contributions to de-risking or de-escalating conflicts.

In Warsheikh, the evidence from the DCF process indicates successful stakeholder engagement in social dialogue, trauma-healing sessions, and awareness sessions.

Stakeholders state that women, youth, and minority clans all took part in the activities, and that the majority of community members (74%) feel their views were considered during the DCF process. This was highest among majority clan members and youth (up to 35 years old). When guiding negotiations about power-sharing agreements between clans, investments in Warsheikh had to drop the 6–8 female district council members target. Although the district council in Warsheikh was selected, it is not currently active because it is unable to gain sustained funding for its activities.

The evaluation finds that the relationship between the community, the district administration, and the Hirshabelle government has improved due to the DCF process. For example, community members reported that the administration's priorities have shifted to issues that are directly relevant to the community, such as education, health care, and security. Further positive evidence indicates that trust between the community and the district administration, and the community and the Hirshabelle government, improved as well. This may be attributed to the clear power-sharing agreements and the Hirshabelle government's approval, which gave the election process legitimacy.

In Mataban, no improvements have been made towards the originally established objectives of strengthening gender inclusion and youth participation and representation or inclusive governance and administration, nor have intergovernmental relationships improved. However, women and youth are taking a more active role in reconciliation and civic dialogue activities, and all clans indicate increased trust in the conflict resolution mechanisms in place. The investment managed to reach all of the target groups: women, youth, members of minority clans, and key community, district, and state representatives. While reconciliation efforts have not yet led to the possibility of DCF in Mataban, motivation to complete the reconciliation process is still present. The investment established additional mechanisms to support this process further: the peace platforms and women's organisations.

In terms of the peace dividends, the evaluation finds high levels of community ownership and a clearly defined sustainability plan with the community's approval. For some aspects, like medication provision for the hospital, other funding sources have been secured. It remains to be seen, however, if the income-generating systems (parents paying teachers' salaries, the women's centre renting out meeting rooms, and the hospital charging out-of-pocket payments) will be sufficient to cover the running costs of the peace investments sustainably.

The SSF DCF initiatives in Hirshabelle and other states have faced numerous challenges. For example, compensation payments are a part of most of the agreements arising from the social reconciliation processes. At times, communities are unable to make the payments due to financial constraints.



Image Credit: ©AMISOM

This may become an obstacle to peace as it contributes to continued revenge killings. In addition, traditional conflict resolution mechanisms have not always addressed the root causes of conflict in terms of creating resource-sharing agreements or other such arrangements. Addressing the rural dimension of conflict is also necessary. Similarly, SSF may have, at times, underestimated the difficulty of power-sharing negotiations locally, particularly as it relates to seat allocation to the district council. Thus, it seems that there is a need for better understanding of local peace infrastructure as well as a more in-depth political economy analysis. This will become particularly pertinent as DCF begins in districts with more significant economic activity—and potentially stronger economic interests.

In terms of other key factors, security arrangements in the districts need careful consideration. In many districts, the security forces are clan-affiliated and lack professional training. The lack of representative or independent police or armed forces is a structural problem which poses a risk to the process of creating more inclusive government. The presence of clan militias leaves some groups with the option of using violence for political aims.

Meanwhile, the relationship between and involvement of different levels of government has been one of the most difficult aspects of implementing DCF. There are no easy solutions to this challenge. So far, districts where council formation has been successful have tended to be ones where a close relationship between the FMS, the FGS, and the local leadership can be observed. Conversely, projects in locations where this relationship has had problems have seen significant delays. In terms of other political authorities, the involvement of traditional leaders is a double-edged sword. Elders have been very helpful in the process by lending it legitimacy and mobilising the community as well as leading the reconciliation efforts; yet their role after DCF has been completed may pose problems. Some community members in Warsheikh see elders who are no longer part of the new governance arrangements as potential spoilers to peace in the district.

Finally, much of the economic sustainability of the district councils will depend in the initial stages on the coordination between actors involved in pre-DCF and those involved in supporting the district council once it has been established. Ideally, the newly founded district councils would have the funding to deliver services once they have been established and support would be given to them to begin revenue collection. Further, a strategy will be required to sequence the formation of the district councils so that the FMS can grow their revenue base in order to support poorer districts.



LEARNING STUDY: SSF SUPPORT TO THE WADAJIR FRAMEWORK AND DISTRICT COUNCIL FORMATION IN GALMUDUG

In Galmudug, SSF is funding the implementation of the Wadajir Framework in Abudwaq, Balanbale, and Hobyo; projects began in July 2017. Thus far, the projects have completed the reconciliation phase, whereby reconciliation conferences were held between the clans in the districts and a social contract (Hobyo) or peace agreement (Abudwaq, Balanbale) was signed. During the programme, violence has largely abated in each of the Wadajir Framework districts in Galmudug.

Meanwhile, each district has completed construction of the peace dividend investments, selected through inclusive community consultations. In Abudwaq and Balanbale, football stadiums and women's centres were constructed. However, some tensions have arisen between women's groups, with ongoing reconciliation efforts. In Hobyo, community members voted for the expansion of a district administration building and the expansion of the medical centre.

In terms of district council establishment, the process in all three districts has been on hold since late 2018. This is due to the Galmudug political crisis which saw the state divided and governance effectively paralysed as a consequence for approximately two years as different sides claimed to represent the state. The crisis appears to be resolved, as the newly elected President Kariye has managed to come to an agreement with outgoing President Gelle, while ASWJ was defeated in armed clashes in Dhusamareb this February. The new government has announced that they will see DCF completed, and there are discussions between Galmudug and SSF about continuing funding for the projects. A women's group representative from Balanbale said,

THE BIGGEST CHALLENGE FACING THIS PROGRAMME WAS THE GALMUDUG POLITICAL CRISIS, SINCE THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR WAS NOT ACTIVELY WORKING DURING THE CRISIS.



Image Credit: ©SSF



The political conflict has paralysed the process for three reasons. Firstly, as the quote above illustrates, the Galmudug government—initially very active in the Wadajir Framework—was not available to see the process through. Secondly, many of the key community members involved in the Wadajir Framework have had to direct their attention to resolving issues at the FMS level instead. Thirdly, the political conflict is closely linked to the negotiations over power-sharing at the district level as community members wait to find out how the distribution of seats turns out at the FMS level. In Balanbale, the process was further complicated by the fact that the Galmudug crisis resulted in two rival district administrations effectively removing government partners at district level.

According to the Wadajir Framework implementation plan, the next steps for DCF would include community consultations leading to an agreement on how seats are to be allocated between different clans while ensuring representation of women and youth. Once this is complete, 100 delegates will be selected in each district. Next, candidates for the district council election will be vetted and verified. The delegates will then vote to select the 21 council members. Finally, the 21 council members will select from among themselves the district commissioner. Before the political crisis, the Galmudug districts involved in the Wadajir Framework were making headway in creating the conditions to complete the DCF process. Negotiations were under way on seat allocation between different groups in the district, and it is hoped that this will continue.

OUTPUT 4: RESEARCH, COMMUNICATIONS, AND KNOWLEDGE BROKERING ON ISSUES OF DEMOCRATISATION, LOCAL GOVERNANCE, AND RECONCILIATION (2021)

In 2021, Output 4 was revised to focus on SSF support and delivery of research, communications, and knowledge brokering for the SSF 2021 workstream priorities of democratisation, local governance, and reconciliation.

INDICATOR 4.1: RELEVANCE AND OUTREACH OF RESEARCH ON RECONCILIATION, DEMOCRATISATION, AND GOVERNANCE

This new indicator was developed to track the performance of SSF research of reconciliation, democratisation, and governance issues. SSF aimed to generate high-quality evidence and research in 2021 to guide SSF strategy, design, and investments in the new workstream agenda. Measurement of the indicator focused on quantitative assessment of the number of assessment/research/communication papers produced and disseminated by SSF. In addition, an experts panel was established to periodically peer review the relevance and usefulness of the ongoing research design, methodology, and emerging findings, and to provide feedback. SSF would also convene a knowledge-brokerage research event consisting of a series of workshops to disseminate findings to key stakeholders. An end-of-event perception survey was used to collect stakeholder feedback on the relevance and potential usefulness of the SSF research products.

Image Credit : ©AMISOM





WADAJIR FRAMEWORK ASSESSMENT

In February 2021, SSF commissioned a consultant to perform a rapid assessment of Puntland, Galmudug, South West State, and Benadir to identify potential new districts in which SSF can embark on Wadajir Framework investments. The consultant deployed an assessment tool that sought to assess districts against certain criteria to ascertain the feasibility of undertaking WF implementation. This exercise saw the production of a high-quality report, with the recommendation of districts in which SSF could work. Based upon these recommendations, SSF has determined to go ahead with two districts in Puntland, Iskushuban and Qandala; two districts in South West State, Baidoa and Barawe; and rather than embark upon Wadajir framework initiatives in Benadir—given the complexity highlighted in the report, and the fact that Benadir’s administration is closely tied to the politics of the FGS—the decision was to focus on performing a detailed political economy of conflict analysis which can lay the foundations for greater planning on how best to advance district council formation in this region.

GENDERED POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS OF BENADIR

The initial Wadajir Framework rapid assessment of new locations stressed that to date Benadir was yet to undergo any attempts at establishing more inclusive governance through the implementation of the Wadajir Framework for Local Governance. Drawing from the WF Lessons Learned paper produced in 2020, one specific recommendation was to ensure that a comprehensive and gendered political economy analysis was performed in districts where WF programming was being planned. Given the complexity of the Benadir context—which has a unique governance structure and whose political status remains unclear, alongside being a hub of numerous economic and political interests—it was felt that a comprehensive political economy analysis should be performed; initially to better understand the Benadir context, and secondly to develop a deeper analysis of three potential target districts where SSF could look to implement WF programming in future. GIST Research together with Hiraal Institute were contracted to undertake the research. The final paper set out the legislative underpinnings of the current Benadir administration and the political and economic interests in maintaining the status quo—with specific reference to clan communities that benefit from or are disadvantaged by the status quo. The paper looked at the experience and exclusion of IDPs, as well as the status of marginal clan communities and their political and economic influence within the region and subsequently in three target districts of Shibis, Shangani, and Bondhere. The research stressed a need to tread carefully around vested interests in the utilisation of power and patronage to make political and economic gains. It emphasised a need to strengthen systems and processes around fiscal management and transparency at the Benadir Regional Administration level

while also emphasising the need for greater civic engagement around district-level governance without necessarily advancing the establishment of new district commissions, as this may be perceived as too great a threat to current power dynamics that it would bring about opposition and potential escalations of grievance and conflict.

GENDERED POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS OF BAIDOA

Building on the findings and recommendations of the WF Lessons Learned performed in 2020, together with the WF rapid assessment conducted in 2021, a gendered political economy analysis of Baidoa was undertaken with a view to mapping out the various communities and political and economic interests in Baidoa, in order to better understand the potential and prospects for district council formation. The study was conducted by Consilient Research and delivered in November 2021. It highlighted the dynamics and modalities of inter-clan competition in the district and their intersection with major economic interests, such as land and economic resources and how power is allocated and deployed in the district. It highlighted the domination of the police by certain clan communities as a means of delivering benefits to that community while being comparatively subordinate within the district administrations' political echelons. Overall, while it highlighted the reasons why certain communities local to the area may mobilise against district council formation, it also stressed the importance of local reconciliation programming in the first instance which could help to form a base and foundation from which more challenging aspects can be addressed around how district administrations are constituted with fewer conflict risks attached.



CONFLICT RISKS ASSESSMENTS FOR ELECTIONS IN SOUTH WEST STATE AND GALMUDUG

Following the progression of subnational elections in Puntland that SSF has been instrumental in advancing, the Fund embarked upon foundational work that could help to guide investments in future to support subnational democratisation in other FMS locations as well.^[1] The first part of this is to perform a conflict risk assessment in both of these locations in order to identify potential conflict that may emerge or escalate into violence should efforts to democratise take place. Following an open tender for proposals, Consilient was selected to perform assessments in both Galmudug and South West State.

Both papers identified specific challenges and localised dynamics that would likely come to the fore in an electoral process. In both states, issues of district border demarcation were prevalent, as well as fears that stronger clans would utilise force to carve out district border areas that would be politically favourable to them—either to gerrymander political success or to establish new districts in their favour. Democratisation efforts undertaken in major urban centres, such as Baidoa, would likely give rise to heightened tensions between already competing and well-armed clans who are known to deploy violence; and in places such as Lower Shabelle, where there are tensions between indigenous and migrant communities relating to how power is allocated, this may further create scope for violence. Cutting across both states is the threat of armed group Al-Shabab and its capacity to disrupt and undermine the conduct of elections. Finally, the lack of institutional capacities; lack of legislation; lack of existing democratic norms and spaces

of engagement or policy dialogue; and lack of understanding of how elections work all feed into a climate in which elections would be likely to induce conflict.

The research stressed the importance of a long-term lens in the advancement of 'one-person, one-vote' elections in these regions. This recognises the long trajectory of Puntland's progression, and the reality that elections are more than a technical activity. Rather they require investments into spaces of democratic practice—such as participatory dialogues on local policy issues, dialogue on legislation, civic education, and development of political associations and parties—alongside the development of legal frameworks and election management bodies; such investments are essential prerequisites and ones that may require years to mature.

SUBNATIONAL DEMOCRATISATION: POLICY STEPS, PROCESSES AND CONSIDERATIONS

Building on the body of work around subnational democratisation has been the production of a paper that consolidates information on the kind of policy steps, processes, and considerations that an FMS needs to consider in advancing elections at the FMS level. As a technical document, it draws on the experiences of Puntland and Somaliland to date and sets out the policy options and choices that have been encountered by both, detailing the positive and negative outcomes of these options and allowing policymakers to make informed decisions regarding the steps and pathways that they would need to take if they are to advance OPOV elections at the FMS level. Considerations centre on the electoral model; the voter registration system; voter criteria; model of political associations or parties;



and issues of gender equality and social inclusion. The paper has been translated into Somali and will serve as a technical tool to support policy discussions with Somali government partners at both the federal and state levels to help build their capacity to make policy decisions, without being directive of what decisions should be made.

GUIDANCE NOTE: ENTRY POINTS FOR STRENGTHENING GENDER EQUALITY AND SOCIAL INCLUSION WITHIN SUBNATIONAL DEMOCRATISATION

Ensuring gender equality and social inclusion within nascent electoral processes has been a struggle in Somalia, where conservative and patriarchal attitudes prevail amidst a climate of high-stakes political competition. Across both SSF and peer agencies and donors, many efforts have been made to advance GESI within this space. This guidance note seeks to draw upon the experiences of advancing subnational democratisation to date and highlights the spaces and opportunities in which strengthening greater inclusion of women and marginal groups can be undertaken, as well as some of the activities that can promote it. It considers policies that can support women to succeed as political candidates, or types of technical support for women and marginal group candidates to enhance their ability to contest, such as dropping candidate fees. Finally, the paper identifies how and where women and marginalised groups can be better included in non-political areas, such as election management bodies, election implementation personnel, and civil society.



Image Credit : ©AMISOM



PUNTLAND'S PATH TO THE POLLS

While significant investments across donors had been made to progress Puntland's early district council elections that took place in October 2021, in the run-up to the elections SSF produced a briefing paper on the Puntland election. This was informed by the need to ensure that policymakers, donors, and Puntland communities had a sense of what had been accomplished to date, how the electoral process would be undertaken, and some of the risks, challenges, and successes being encountered so far. Through a briefing paper, policymakers and practitioners would be well placed to undertake advocacy or strengthen interventions to support the process in its final stages.

The briefing paper set out the electoral process, the steps taken to date, and the debates and discussions around gender equality and social inclusion, as well as highlighting the highly progressive approach taken towards integrating IDPs. It further stressed the successes and challenges of the voter registration process to date and engaged with political associations on their attitudes and perspectives towards the elections, while fully aware that the 2013 failed attempt was marred by anxiety and uncertainty driven by contesting parties who felt that an electoral process may not be fair.

While the final paper was presented to international and Puntland stakeholders, SSF was able to benefit from the research and analysis from an earlier stage. SSF identified specific challenges, such as around political associations' lack of understanding of the electoral process, emerging anxieties among some political associations, and grievances around campaign financing for associations. Consequently, the Fund mobilised funds to deploy a Somali technical political party capacity-building expert to perform targeted capacity building to political associations. In this way, associations would have a standard and clear understanding of the technical election process and be empowered to undertake campaign fundraising and develop their policy platforms.

Image Credit : ©AMISOM



IN-DEPTH RESEARCH INTO WORKSTREAM PRIORITIES

Over the course of 2021, the Fund instigated research into six thematic areas. The intention was to interrogate core areas of the Fund's work with a view to informing future programme strategy, direction, and/or technical approach.

RISK, CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR SUBNATIONAL DEMOCRATISATION

Given the challenges encountered by attempts to introduce OPOV at the federal level and contrasted with the relative success of Puntland's efforts to democratise, there has been a growing interest in whether a subnational model may be complementary to the federal approach deployed to date. Nevertheless, any change in approach needs to be informed of the potential risks, challenges, and opportunities so that policymakers can be adequately informed to navigate the risks or exploit the potential opportunities.

Consilient Research was contracted to undertake this study. The paper highlighted the potential benefits that an unharmonised electoral calendar could deliver, alongside the potential for a greater focus on local politics and the ability to de-link local elections from often highly divisive federal politics—which a harmonised federal led process may engender. One challenge centred on the voter register and how an unharmonised national register and different voter eligibility rules across FMSs may lead to disenfranchisement of certain groups, such as IDPs. The paper stressed that some of the challenges were not insurmountable but required consensus building between and across FMSs on some

key issue areas, such as voter eligibility—especially as regards IDPs and migrants and age; however, other aspects could be left to the FMSs to determine, and the study noted that an unharmonised schedule could offer the kind of flexibility that the Somali context requires. The paper finally contrasted the risks and challenges of a subnational approach with the risks associated with a continuation of the status quo and prioritisation of a federal-first model; this highlighted the risks of electoral stagnation, donor and community fatigue, and conflict risks associated with the continued use of negotiated settlements at the FMS level, which were often underpinned by the use or threat of violence.

DURABLE LOCAL RECONCILIATION: LESSONS LEARNT AND PROSPECTS FOR COHERENCE WITH POLICING AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT

Local reconciliation has become a frequent endeavour across peacebuilding programming in Somalia. However, many efforts break down despite initial successes in reaching peace agreements between conflicting groups. This research aims to deepen understanding of effective local reconciliation in Somalia, identify key lessons and best practice from current programming, and understand whether there are linkages to peace enforcement and how this has been successfully deployed in Somalia with a view to replication.

The research findings were unequivocal: that all instances of effective local reconciliation entailed peace enforcement. However, that alone is insufficient and requires softer inter-relational reconciliation aspects. The findings stressed that the inclusion of peace enforcement—often in the form of a cross-clan enforcement unit—with clear

capacity to enforce decisions and clarity on what responses to transgressions would be undertaken was an essential ingredient to success. Added to this finding was the beneficial role of women and youth as far as their socialisation of a peace agreement and reconciliation helped to build cross-community buy-in and therefore adherence. Such findings are important in shifting the argument for the inclusion of women and youth away from a basis of equity alone to one of technical and strategic impact. Recommendations stressed the importance of greater roles for women and youth and specifically enabling elders, who traditionally lead inter-clan reconciliation, to better understand the valuable role that women and youth bring. They further stressed the importance of clear inter-clan agreements and the establishment of enforcement mechanisms; particularly the potential benefit of greater linkages between policing and reconciliation programming—with the Wadajir Framework as a vehicle to support sequencing.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SUSTAINABILITY OF DISTRICT COUNCIL FORMATION

This research hones in on the need for newly established district councils to be sustainable, both politically and fiscally. District council establishment has the potential to create more locally accountable and inclusive governance; at the same time, it may create friction around established political norms and vested interests, as those who may have benefitted from the status quo have had these interests disrupted. For district councils to be sustainable, it is essential that they are able to generate revenue and manage their financial systems while integrating into a national revenue and fiscal management system.

This research will help to identify the current needs, the challenges, the opportunities, and likely sources of risk that district council establishment may give rise to, especially as district council formation increasingly moves into areas where there are higher levels of economic concerns, such as in major urban centres and cities.

ASSESSING THE SCOPE AND PARAMETERS FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN SOMALIA

The establishment of the National Reconciliation Framework for Somalia set out the central pillars of work required to achieve national reconciliation. Pillar II honed in on the need to address the past, however, to date, there has been no clarity on the kind of mechanism that could feasibly do this. SSF contracted GIST Research to perform an initial interrogation of the issue and to begin to explore and identify the kind of challenges a transitional justice approach will need to grapple with; the relevant needs and expectations of Somalis; and the potential avenues and approaches that could meaningfully advance this. The research furthermore considered the experiences of Somaliland and other countries that had undergone transitional justice processes to identify relevant lessons or approaches that may have beneficial application in the Somali context.

Key findings emphasised that Somalis are keen for some resolution to the past, however there was a stress that excavating old and painful memories cannot be for nothing. The desire for dealing with the past was tempered by concerns that the ability to hold people accountable would be limited due to issues such as a lack of evidence, but also the limitations of existing legal systems and capacities. This suggested that there may be a need for a special judicial mechanism to be

established for the purposes of transitional justice—one which could incorporate customary (Xeer) and statutory as well as Shari’a principles. SGBV was acknowledged as a serious area that transitional justice should tackle, however it would need careful consideration given the challenges of shame associated with victims and the issue that not all perpetrators were known—or even if they were, the evidence threshold may not be passed to permit prosecution. Finally, there were some suggestions that an international mechanism may be needed to address political leaders who oversaw or directed violence. Going forward, the research suggested a need for community consultation to enable a more participatory approach to the establishment of a transitional justice mechanism, and that such an approach should be led by Somalis with international agencies providing technical support.

STRENGTHENING REGIONAL AND MIDDLE EASTERN STATES’ ENGAGEMENT IN SOMALI STABILITY: OPTIONS AND ENTRY POINTS

While much of Somalia’s internal political conflict can be attributed to the actions of Somali political elites and domestic stakeholders, at the same time, Somalia is also heavily subject to the interests of foreign states. Ethiopia and Kenya have a direct presence within Somalia through AMISOM and have been influential in Somali politics for some time, whether supporting FMS establishment or advancing economic concerns of their own. More recently, there has been a surge in the role and behaviour of Gulf states which in 2017 pushed FMSs and the FGS to align themselves, exacerbating internal tensions between FMSs and the FGS more broadly. This research aims to understand these dynamics in the first

instance, while subsequently attempting to understand the potential entry points and mediation potential to address this.

The research found that Middle Eastern states—inclusive of the UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey—were viewed in wildly different ways. Turkey was broadly understood to be a long-term partner who was transparent in their approach, investing into Somalia while also seeking economic gains. Other states, however, were viewed as being interested in advancing their own interests alone and operating in ways that were destabilising. Somali political elites, however, were aware that they themselves were benefiting from international competition for influence in Somalia, courting different countries for political finance and allegiance, and in turn recognised that this contributed towards domestic instability. The research did however highlight that there were avenues for mediating and strengthening regional and Gulf states’ involvement in Somalia; these included capacitating IGAD and the nascent Red Sea Council and enhancing dialogue in this space, building the conflict sensitivity of regional and Gulf states to encourage less politically destabilising behaviour, and building greater inter-state economic and cross-border cooperation and trade, potentially utilising the Somali Business Council and various federal and state-level Chamber of Commerce.

LAND CONFLICT: LITERATURE REVIEW AND GAP ANALYSIS

Land conflict is one of the most complicated and contentious issues in Somalia. The issue of land ownership goes beyond simple economic concerns and hits at the heart of Somali cultural notions of homeland, residency, and political rights. At the same time, land values have sky-rocketed, and within a context of limited rule of law and limited institutional reach of the state, land

grabbing together with inadequate resolution of land disputes have become rife. Although much research has been performed to date, there is a need for greater consolidation of what is already known, analysis to understand what the gaps in knowledge are, and gains to be made from understanding and drawing lessons from the experiences of other fragile and conflict-affected states who often tackle similar issues. SSF contracted Rift Valley Institute to lead this research. Key findings stressed the need to better understand the principles and procedures that underpin land dispute adjudication; the need to perform an impact assessment on urban land reforms from northern Somalia; and the need to better understand how exactly Al-Shabab manage land conflict given their anecdotal success in this area. Further recommendations suggested a need to gain clarity on the Mogadishu cadastre around which many rumours exist as to its whereabouts, and the need to establish a “fit for purpose” land registration mechanism.

KNOWLEDGE BROKERING

SSF conducted a series of knowledge brokering events during 2021 with a view to sharing research and harnessing the analysis and learning of others to the benefit of all.

The Fund conducted an internal knowledge brokering event to share the findings of research conducted through SSF-supported DIALOGUE programming in Gedo and Sool. The International Centre for Development Tax undertook research into informal revenue generation mechanisms and public–private revenue generation for community-driven development, which has produced high-quality research regarding the effectiveness of these approaches at creating more sustainable bottom-up development initiatives; improved local ownership of initiatives; and improved state–society relations and inter-communal trust as a result.

In September, in advance of the Puntland early local elections, SSF undertook two knowledge sharing and policy dialogue events to disseminate the analysis and research of the ‘Puntland’s Path to the Polls’ paper, and the Fund’s analysis of the situation in Puntland. One event undertaken in Nairobi engaged donors and policymakers on the findings and saw discussions with TPEC, Abdijalil Afqarshe, and SSF Puntland Investment Manager, Abshir Mohamed, covering the progress towards the early elections and the technical challenges that were likely to emerge. Another, held in Garowe, saw SSF present research findings and analysis to civil society, media, and policymakers in Puntland while supporting the UK Ambassador’s engagement with TPEC, the Puntland administration, and local stakeholders.

RESEARCH DISSEMINATION EVENTS

The Fund undertook two research presentation events on the 18 and 25 November 2021. These two days served as vehicles to deliver and disseminate research findings and instigate debate on the thematic issues covered within the six major research pieces. Hosted at the Movenpick Hotel in central Nairobi, each of the six events supported in-person and online participation alongside simultaneous English–Somali translation, making the event accessible to all and ensuring inclusivity of both international donors and partners as well as Somali audiences. For each 1.5-hour-long event, there was a presentation delivered by the research consultancy and accompanied by expert contributions by a panel of up to three people. The events enabled participants from across SSF donor agencies, peer agencies, consultancy firms, expert analysts, UNSOM personnel, Somali civil society, and human rights representatives, as well as institutions such as the World Bank, to convene and reflect on the research findings.

RESULTS 2021

SSF assessed the research pieces it produced by seeking the views of stakeholders on the relevance and usefulness of the research and its likelihood of informing policy decisions and programming. The majority of the research was assessed as relevant and potentially useful by reviewing experts and dissemination event participants.

According to most respondents and expert reviewers, the papers fed into research and policy gaps and added to an existing body of knowledge. They could be made more relevant by increasing the amount of time dedicated to each research assignment and by including more quantitative data and field-based research.

Some of the research papers, like the 'Wadajir Framework Assessment', were completed early enough to directly inform SSF programming in 2021. Most of the papers completed later in the year were assessed as likely to be useful in informing future SSF direction by the expert reviewers and as useful by the survey respondents. According to the expert reviewers, utility of some of the papers could be improved by restructuring the conclusion and recommendation sections, ensuring that gender equality and social inclusion are covered in final deliverables and by validating findings through stakeholder roundtables.



Image Credit : ©SSF



COMMUNICATIONS

The Fund has heavily invested in communications products over the course of 2021, with a view to ensuring a high level of effective dissemination and awareness of the range and impact of work that SSF has delivered on, and to share the research that has been produced with relevant policy, donor, and practitioner communities. Specific communications products have included:

The design and production of the six major research pieces. This has also seen separate executive summaries produced as more accessible documents, with these executive summaries translated into Somali. Additional research products that have been translated include the paper titled, 'Subnational Democratisation: Policy Steps, Processes, and Considerations', the guidance note on gender equality and social inclusion within subnational democratisation, and the briefing paper, 'Puntland's Path to the Polls'.

In addition, the Fund has prepared an Impact Paper that sets out the overarching achievements of the Fund that have been delivered over the past six years. This has been complemented by Lesson Learned documentation, and a 10-minute video that sets this out in both English and Somali, ensuring that the Fund is able to share its work in a variety of accessible mediums.

AMP



SSF OVERALL APPROACH TO VALUE FOR MONEY (VFM)



Image Credit : ©SSF

In 2018, SSF developed a VfM strategy to ensure that the fund delivers value for money across the whole portfolio. The strategy heavily borrowed from the DFID/FCDO smart guide on DFID's Approach to Value for Money, but was contextualised for the operating environment in Somalia. The strategy defines VfM and helps to create clarity and coherence in the Fund in the assessment and reporting on VfM. At the investment level, VfM means SSF endeavors to design, procure, manage, and evaluate its investments to maximise outputs and outcomes, given available resources. At the SSF portfolio level, SSF aims to allocate resources to maximise outcomes by doing the right things (based on evidence), in the right places (based on a clear targeting criteria), and in the right ways, using best practice approaches and engaging partners who demonstrate the capability to navigate the challenging political and security situations in many of the locations where SSF is implemented.

At SSF management level, VfM appraisal involves assessment of the cost-effectiveness of the SSF fund management structure and efficiency of fund delivery processes and structures. This is expressed in terms of: a) the % of fund management costs to the value of SSF, b) key cost drivers for the fund manager, and c) economies of scale resulting from the use of ASI's Common Service Platform. To ensure equity in the delivery of investments, SSF focuses on how the priorities for each investment are established (in an inclusive manner) and who accesses the benefits created by each investment. This is informed by SSF's gender equality and social inclusion (GESI) strategy and evidence generated from the ground to inform the targeting strategy.

Through the VfM strategy, SSF has managed to mainstream value for money throughout the programme delivery cycle. Some of the achievements in the implementation of the SSF VfM strategy include:

- VfM assessment has been incorporated into all key decision-making points within the fund, i.e., development of investment business cases, approval of investments for procurement, request and evaluation of proposals, selection of implementing partner, continuous monitoring of investments, evaluation, and reporting.
- SSF has developed and tracks a set of VfM metrics at portfolio & investment levels on a quarterly basis. Specific sets of indicators were developed for clusters of similar investments. The metrics are analysed to inform decision making and for the quarterly and annual VfM report.
- SSF has established a set of benchmarks for identified VfM metrics and has been using these metrics to assess VfM performance across all of the investments. On an annual basis, a comparative analysis is undertaken to establish whether specific investments are on track to deliver on VfM and where necessary measures could be taken to improve on the VfM of the investments.
- To validate the VfM performance of the portfolio as well as specific investments, VfM assessment has been incorporated in the evaluation of all investments.
- SSF staff and partners have been trained on VfM, and additional coaching provided where necessary to ensure compliance with VfM guidelines.






Image Credit : ©SSF

A large, stylized number '10' is positioned on the left side of the page. The number is filled with a light blue color and has a white outline. Inside the number, there is a photograph of a landscape with a tree and a field. The background of the entire page is a solid dark blue color.

**OVERALL
PROGRAMME
VALUE FOR MONEY
PERFORMANCE**

METHODOLOGY

This VfM assessment was done through a review of programme and financial documents from the SSF portfolio. A sample of 31 different investments from the SSF portfolio was selected for the review, including investments in political and conflict analysis, conflict resolution, infrastructure, economic development, gender equality and social inclusion, and technical support to government institutions.

ECONOMY

To assess the economy of investments, a comparative analysis is conducted on the actual cost of inputs and established VfM benchmarks for each cluster of SSF investments (GESI, economic development, stabilisation, technical support, research and analysis, reconciliation and conflict resolution, and strategic communications). For the purpose of this analysis, such input costs include: consultancy fees, training costs, convening costs, and media and equipment costs. The benchmarks and averages of actual costs have been included in Table 1 below. Overall, the programme has performed well in ensuring economy in the procurement and delivery of investments. Detailed budget reviews are undertaken by the finance and risks team for economy of the investments, and explanations have been provided in cases of significant variations from the set benchmarks. 71% of the programme procurements are done through competitive bidding, and in the exceptional cases where single sourcing is used, a strong justification has been provided, in compliance with the requirements in the procurement policy. Security and political risk are key reasons for limited competition or single sourcing of investments in the portfolio.

Out of the 31 investments reviewed for the annual report, 61.2% (19 projects) have retained the same level of performance on economy as established at inception, 6 investments have a decreased economy, while 5 have an improved economy. The economy of the infrastructure, GESI, and economic development investments has been adequate, with costs remaining within the established economy benchmarks. 80% of the investments in the three portfolios have remained within the set benchmarks. Technical support, research, and conflict and political analysis all had costs that were generally higher than the set benchmarks, recording a poor performance on economy. Conflict and political analysis investments had the lowest performance on economy, with variations of up to 35% above the set benchmarks. The high costs have been attributed to the relatively high risk involved in conflict and political analysis and a relatively small pool of service providers who have the contextual understanding and local networks to effectively deliver this type of work, thus limiting competition. Specialised technical support areas, like elections support, also have significantly higher costs compared to other forms of technical support.

Cost per person trained (engaged in consultation)

Benchmark

\$60-\$90 for a 3-day training in rural areas
\$120-\$150 for a 3-day training in urban areas

Performance of SSF Investments

Rural - \$79
Urban - \$137.5

The cost varies between locations. Two benchmarks are assessed: 1) urban areas (Adaado, Dhusamareb, Galkayo, Kismayo, Baidoa, Garowe, Mogadishu, etc.); and 2) rural areas. The range within the benchmark is provided to accommodate the contextual differences between the different towns. 60% of the reviewed investments are within the benchmarks.

Cost per consultant day for research, market assessments, and technical support

Benchmark

\$200-\$350: Local
\$400-\$600: Regional/international

Performance of SSF Investments

Local - \$307
Regional/International - \$655

Benchmarks are set for the varying consultancy rates for local and international consultants. To calculate the average costs, 12 investments in supervisory engineering, M&E, political economy analysis, and technical support were reviewed. The political economy analysis investments have the highest consultancy costs, followed by technical support and M&E investments. The pool of experts and advisory firms in the two portfolios tend to be smaller and charge higher consultancy fees. Attempts by SSF to enhance competition have not yielded significant gains as only few firms responded to the call and even fewer were technically qualified for the work. However, for the assignments with long-term framework contracts, the loaded, weighted average consultancy fees are at least 12% lower compared to short-term, project-specific contracts.

Regional/International consultant

\$655

Local consultant

\$307



Solar Streetlight

\$1670

Average cost of solar streetlights

Benchmark

\$1940 (Purchase and installation costs)

Performance of SSF Investments

\$1670

SSF unit cost for the purchase and installation of solar streetlights is 14% lower than the benchmark derived from two other programmes operating in Somalia.

Competitive Procurement

71%

Percentage of procurement that is done competitively

Benchmark

75% of procurement are competitively sourced

Performance of SSF Investments

71%

The objective is to source a significant part of the investment portfolio competitively. 71% of SSF investments were sourced competitively; the balance was sourced using restricted bidding or single sourcing. In cases where single sourcing was used, a strong justification was always provided.

TV Program

\$2200

Average cost of media engagement (radio and TV)

Benchmark

500-\$1000 for 1hr radio program
\$1500-\$2500 for 1hr TV program

Performance of SSF Investments

Radio: \$850
TV: \$2200

Benchmarks for the media coverage were updated in 2020 to reflect the changing costs of media in Somalia. SSF has been supporting government strategic communication on Covid-19. Overall, the media costs have remained within the benchmarks.

Radio Program

\$850





Image Credit : ©SSF

Omniway

To assess the efficiency of SSF's investment portfolio, the balance of the operational costs compared to the programme costs and the delivery of outputs by programme are considered.^[1] 2020 and 2021 have been particularly challenging years for the delivery of results by the Fund due to Covid-19, which significantly delayed the delivery of key projects in the portfolio in 2020, and political uncertainty, which has prevailed for most of 2021. In addition, SSF has faced uncertainty over contracts, budgets, and timelines and this has put pressure on the SSF team's ability to deliver. As a result, procurement of key investments in 2021 was significantly delayed. The political context in Somalia has also been very challenging as a result of heightened political activity as the country gears up to election—significantly increasing the risk of the programme. In some instances, a decision has been made to temporarily hold investments despite having done the necessary groundwork through analysis and engagement, because the risk of implementing the investments in an uncertain political environment was considered too high.

It has been deemed appropriate to undertake the more overt political engagement around some of these investments in SSF when the context in Somalia has improved, and a more flexible, longer-term Fund Manager contract will be more conducive to delivering the ambitious, politically sensitive activities that SSF has planned under its democratisation and Wadajir Framework workstreams. However, a few investments in the portfolio have demonstrated strong performance despite the challenges faced during the year, e.g., SSF support to the electoral process in Puntland has remained strong and on course throughout this period. Notwithstanding these challenges, the Fund is on course to deliver on the key outputs for the year 2021, although some of the results will only be visible after the completion of the programme. 96% of the portfolio has been contracted and completed.

Fund management as a percentage of the total fund: Cumulatively (2016–2021), the fund management costs remain within an acceptable threshold at 14.5%, this is in line with the 15% that was agreed with FCDO in 2020, to accommodate adjustments whereby the Fund Manager absorbed some budget lines which were previously held under FCDO allocation. For the past years, the fund management costs have remained within the benchmark (slightly below actually); whereas in 2021, the delays in deployment have meant that the fund management cost went above the benchmark, albeit only by a small margin of 0.5% cumulatively. Specifically, this was as a result of the 2021 implementation period being squeezed from 9 to 6 months due to contracting delays, a revised scope which was even more dependent on a conducive political environment, and significant political turmoil, meant that SSF prepared (scoped, designed, engaged) several activities which ultimately could not be implemented in 2021. Additionally, it is important to note, the overall Fund Value, is not solely driven by Fund Manager costs. In particular, whilst the size of anticipated investments has decreased the number of investments has not, thus staff effort to run procurements and undertake due diligence on partners remains unchanged. Other costs are fixed in that they are driven by the presence the Fund needs to have in certain locations, e.g. offices, vehicles, security costs. The Fund Manager has managed to keep costs within the set limit despite all the challenges within the context of Somalia is indicative of prudence in fund management.

Allocative efficiency: In 2021, SSF adopted a workstream approach to programming, consolidating the portfolio into three key workstreams: district council formation through Wadajir Framework, state-level democratisation, and cross-cutting research. This consolidation has helped the programme to achieve allocative efficiency by providing a framework to inform programme priorities during the extension period. However, this has raised the risk profile of the programme significantly, with all of the workstreams being highly susceptible to political and security risk.

Adaptive programming: The programme has demonstrated its ability to respond effectively to evolving conditions and ongoing evidence about what works in order to optimise resource allocation, thereby continually improving allocative efficiency of the programme. There is adequate evidence that SSF uses a systematic process (e.g., project appraisal and approval processes with clear documentation) to achieve a balanced portfolio, in which the right mix of projects and activities creates a credible prospect of collectively generating all of the intended strategic outcomes and impacts (allocative efficiency). The programme management has been adaptive; i.e., delivery of programme outputs is responsive to context, opportunities, challenges/risks (including political economy), and ongoing learning and evidence about what works, including moving resources across investments to maximise programme performance.



Image Credit : ©SSF

96%
**OF THE PORTFOLIO HAS
BEEN CONTRACTED
AND COMPLETED**

**Fund management
(% of total fund)**

14.5%

**Cost of stabilisation
(% of total fund)**

40%

**Cost per person trained (engaged in
consultation)**

Benchmark

\$60–\$90 for a 3-day training in rural areas
\$120–\$150 for a 3-day training in urban areas

Performance of SSF Investments

Rural - \$79
Urban - \$137.5

The cost varies between locations. Two benchmarks are assessed: 1) urban areas (Adaado, Dhusamareb, Galkayo, Kismayo, Baidoa, Garowe, Mogadishu, etc.); and 2) rural areas. The range within the benchmark is provided to accommodate the contextual differences between the different towns. 60% of the reviewed investments are within the benchmarks.

**Operation costs as a percentage
of the total investment**

Benchmark

Investment level: 35–40%
Fund management costs (% of total fund): 14%

Performance of SSF Investments

Operational cost for stabilisation: 40%
Fund management costs (% of total fund): 14.5%

These analyses considered investments undertaken in 2021. Overall, the investments have much higher fund management costs (33%). Cumulatively, the fund management costs are within the required threshold.


Rural

\$79



Urban

\$137.50



Infrastructure built

\$476m²

**Supervision (% of
contract value)**

20.5%



**Supervision engineering costs as a percentage of the
construction costs**

Benchmark

10–15% of the contract value

Performance of SSF Investments

An average of 20.5% of the contract value

From a review of supervision contracts for infrastructure works by SSF that were undertaken during the year 2021, the supervision costs are on average 20.5%. There was limited infrastructure work happening in 2021 and the economies of scale generated by combining a number of projects into one supervisory contract could not be realised during the year. Cumulatively, the weighted average for supervision costs is at 18% over the Fund's lifetime[2]. The benchmark for this indicator was based on the construction industry benchmark; however the costs in Somalia have proved to be much higher due higher reimbursement costs for travel security and insurance; also, due to the remote locations where the projects are implemented and low capacity of partners to adequately implement these technical projects.

**Cost per unit of infrastructure
built**

Benchmark

Cost per square meter of infrastructure: \$400–600 per square meter

Performance of SSF Investments

For the BoQs reviewed, the average was \$476 per square meter

Final BoQs of all buildings under construction are within the established range. The construction costs vary significantly depending on location. Newly recovered areas, on average, have higher cost of construction due to access limitations and fewer contractors.

EFFECTIVENESS

To assess effectiveness, SSF tracks the performance of investments on outcomes, relevance and additionality, leverage, and sustainability. This requires looking beyond outputs to identify evidence of achievement of the intended outcomes identified in the results framework. For the purposes of this assessment, the review has looked at the relevance of the investments undertaken by SSF in relation to the strategic outcomes in the results framework, as well as the underlying evidence to support the linkage to the outcomes. The VfM assessment does not undertake independent analysis of achievement of outcomes; instead, it draws on findings of monitoring and evaluation reports and the extent to which they are able to provide information on SSF achievement of outcomes, relevance, and sustainability of investments.

Overall, SSF has followed good practice in managing key effectiveness drivers—conflict and political economy analysis, identifying and managing risk, monitoring and results management, identifying partners with the right capacity to deliver the investments, and adaptive programming—to ensure that investments remained relevant in the ever-changing context of Somalia.

Relevance and additionality: SSF investments remain relevant and additional to the needs of Somalia as a country, as well as to the communities where the investments are implemented. For example, evaluation findings confirm that social reconciliation activities reflected the priorities of community members in Puntland and Galmudug. Implementing partners have carried out conflict mapping and facilitated direct community involvement in the prioritisation of conflicts to be addressed, as well as identification of peace dividends. In Puntland, SSF social reconciliation activities implemented in 2021

appear to have contributed to an immediate improvement in the relationship between the community and the district administration. 84% of the respondents for a household survey undertaken in the locations have a positive opinion of the district administration, with more than 65% of respondents reporting that their opinion has changed compared to the previous year—mostly for the better. In Iskushuban in particular, SSF played a role in the resolution of a major clan dispute.

Within the communities in Eyl and Qardho in Puntland, the local elections were seen as a priority issue and were expected to lead to greater stability and improved local service delivery. In Galmudug, the government buildings are considered to be relevant as they give a much-needed platform for the state government to be present and visible, and to deliver services to a very local population. This contributes to Galmudug FMS's impressive consolidation. However, the buildings do not directly tackle local/regional drivers of instability, nor was construction conditional on restarting any peace processes. Research and analytical work are core parts of SSF work; evaluation findings indicate that the topics selected for the analytical work are relevant for the Somalia context and SSF contributions fill an important gap in policy and research.

Leverage and coordination: In 2021, SSF was not very successful in raising additional contributions from communities or other financiers towards investments in the portfolio. However, the programme has been successful in leveraging political capital from a wide range of actors to support the implementation of investments in the different locations. Political and social capital is crucial for the democratisation and social reconciliation efforts that were a core part of the programme in 2021. For example, SSF

was able to engage with TPEC, Kaalo, PUNSA, PDRC, Dokonia, Interpeace, and the Media Association of Puntland (MAP): all institutions which are supporting TPEC and Puntland's democratisation process. As a result of these engagements, TPEC organised a local coordination meeting in June 2021, with most of the organisation attending. All the participants appreciated the importance of such coordination meetings and agreed to hold them monthly, as well as to develop an activity matrix in which each organisation's support will be documented and shared with all of the partners to avoid overlap. These will help reduce the risk of duplication in the support provided to TPEC while creating a greater voice and coherent approach for the democratisation process from the development partners.

Sustainability: Most of the investments undertaken by SSF are anchored on government institutions at the district, FMS, and FGS levels, a majority of which still have capacity challenges both in terms of institutional capability as well as ability to raise adequate resources to continue or scale the work started by SSF. As such, the sustainability of many investments remains doubtful, particularly those that are still ongoing. In cases where there is a strong ownership and good relations between the community and local administration, raising resources to maintain the infrastructure or continue with reconciliation efforts is much easier—as demonstrated by SSF investments in Abudwaq and Hobyo. Evaluation results for SSF investments in peacebuilding and reconciliation found that the feeling of security was typically higher in districts where the FMS was able to enforce peace or mediate the conflict as a follow-up to the community reconciliation efforts. Also, districts that were not directly affected by political contestation at the state level (e.g., Hobyo and Abudwaq) generally had more favorable scores for FMS–community engagement and vice versa. For example, Balanbale had particularly low scores for government and community engagement at both district administration and FMS levels, as it had been directly affected by the Galmudug contestation. Consequently, the sustainability of the peace and security resulting from SSF investments is influenced by a wide range of factors—many of them linked to the capacity of the local institutions.

Image Credit : ©SSF





EQUITY

SSF's gender equality and social inclusion (GESI) strategy emphasises mainstreaming of GESI across the SSF portfolio. SSF has an objective of achieving a 30% minimum participation by marginalised groups across all investments. As such, inclusion is monitored across all investments to ensure that opportunities are not missed, and where necessary, deliberate measures are taken to include the marginalised. At the portfolio level, SSF continuously updates its context and political economy analysis to ensure that investments are responding to changes on the ground without alienating any groups. The portfolio of investments is allocated across states in a manner that ensures equitable distribution of resources between the states. Within the states, the districts are selected, putting into consideration intra-state inequalities to ensure that the excluded communities have a chance to participate in the SSF investments, and that investments are creating opportunities for greater engagement between government and excluded communities.

However, the level of inclusion of women and marginalised groups varies across the portfolio. For example, evaluation findings of the economic development portfolio of SSF demonstrates a strong representation of women. Women make up at least 40% of all beneficiaries sampled for the endline evaluations. CPD investment in Dhusamareb and Zamzam Foundation in Balanbale boasted women's representation at over 70%. MercyCorps investment in Adaado had the least at 38%. All projects included women representatives in community consultations and project design activities as standard operating procedure. However, lack of women in leadership and decision-making roles within the community obstructed the projects' ability to create gender-balanced committees of community leaders. As such, while women are included in project design and decision making, they are typically far outnumbered by male community leaders and representatives. Nonetheless, most (above 70% across investments) of beneficiaries felt that women's needs had been "well" or "very well" taken care of in the project priorities.

SSF support for the implementation of the Wadajir framework in the Balanbale district of Galmudug resulted in 21 district council members being selected, of whom 5 are women, thereby ensuring that women will be represented in the council. While all projects cite the inclusion of marginalised group representatives in community consultations and/or planning forums, ARC Investment in Kismayo, ADESO Investment in Baidoa, and Care investment in Guriel specifically have included IDP representatives across all decision-making structures.

Decision-making participation

16%

% of excluded and minority participating in the project and those accessing the resulting benefits

Benchmark
30%

Performance of SSF Investments
20%

Across the portfolio, measures have been taken to ensure the inclusion of minority groups, women, and youth in the investments—particularly for the direct activities. In some instances, it has been impossible to achieve the 30% representation of minorities, e.g., in business development activities due to low presence of minority communities in such activities. Most GESI and economic development-specific investments have exceeded the benchmark of 30%, but to a lesser extent with the stabilisation investments, e.g., some communities are hesitant to elect women representatives to the peace or reconciliation committees.

% of local youth, women, and minority groups participating in the decision-making structures at different levels

Benchmark
30%

Performance of SSF Investments
16%

This captures the participation of women and youth in economic activities, community committees, peace and reconciliation structures, and newly constituted district councils in the areas in which SSF works.

Participation in project

20%



Output delivery scoring is assessed based on investment progress reports, engineering supervisory reports for infrastructure, and independent third-party verification reports.

Weighted average has been calculated based on a sample of 16 infrastructure projects from the Fund.

Image Credit : ©SSF



FINANCE & PROCUREMENT

PROCUREMENT UPDATE

In 2021, SSF conducted 39 procurements valued at \$6.1m, resulting in 8 grant agreements and 31 contracts for service providers and construction. Cumulatively from the start of SSF phase II, 215 procurements have been undertaken resulting in 81 grant agreements and 134 contracts, all valued at \$97.2 million, (inclusive of M&E, knowledge management, learning, Engineering Supervisory services, and Short-Term Technical Assistance).

OVERALL FINANCIAL SUMMARY

The SSF phase II contract covers the period from October 2016 to December 2021, with a contractual fund ceiling of \$126.2m. Total donor commitments and interest income generated an available budget of \$119.5m. The overall actual expenditure for SSF II totalled \$118.0m, of which the Core Fund budget amounted to \$100.2m (85%), and the Fund Manager budget amounted to \$17.8m (15%).

BUDGET AND SPEND OVERVIEW

The SSF budget is broadly categorised into outputs, support services, and Fund Manager budget lines.

SSF spent a total of \$106.1m in between 2016-2020, and \$11.9m in 2021. This resulted in an underspend of \$1.5m. The underspend is largely attributable to termination of some investments from the workplan due to time limitations for delivery, changes in political context inhibiting delivery in some states, and dropping of some infrastructure investments.

UNDER OUTPUT 1: REDUCED RISK OF FEDERAL AND INTER- AND INTRA-STATE POLITICAL CONFLICT

SSF spent \$7,000 on Output 1 in 2021, and the cumulative spend over the course of SSF II is \$4.4 million, representing 4% of cumulative spend. The spend for 2021 relates to investments including provision of strategic advice to the office of the prime minister with advisors. While the spend under this output for 2021 was relatively low, most of the activities undertaken in this period—including conflict hotspots analysis, civil society consultative forum, fault lines assessment, policy engagement, and coordination work with other development partners—was all conducted by the in-house team. The spend highlighted under this output and the outputs in the next paragraphs relates to spend on core fund activities implemented through external partners, and thus excludes in-house team fees and expenses.

UNDER OUTPUT 2: ENHANCED POPULAR PARTICIPATION AND VOICE IN GOVERNANCE, PARTICULARLY FOR WOMEN AND EXCLUDED COMMUNITIES

The total spend in 2021 was \$1.1m representing 9% of the overall annual spend. The cumulative spend is \$15.2m, representing 13% of the overall cumulative spend. The spend in 2021 relates to technical assistance to TPEC (\$85,074); procurement of voter registration equipment for TPEC and domestic electoral observer mission, civic education, and political association capacitation (\$751,176); and support to TPEC and Puntland to assess early elections, voter registration, and electoral observation (\$152,749).

UNDER OUTPUT 3: GOVERNMENT VISIBILITY, COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT, AND REDUCED COMMUNITY VULNERABILITY TO CONFLICT

The total spend for 2021 was \$3.8m representing 32% of the overall annual spend. The cumulative spend is \$64.4m, representing 55% of total cumulative spend. The spend for 2021 relates to investments including: solar streetlights in Qardho (\$305,975); support to the newly formed local districts in Wajid, Bardale, Xudur and Dinsoor (\$381,250); support to Qandala, Alula, and Iskushuban DCF (\$335,039); promoting social reconciliation and political dialogue in Mataban district through the Wadajir Framework (\$267,042); environmental conflict mediation in Jowhar (\$232,360); supply and installation of a solar mini-grid for Adaado district hospital, Galmudug (\$ 233,915); Beletweyne road construction (\$1,022,349); Dhusamareb airstrip fence (\$268,200); and support to the Goodwill Ambassadors through UNDP (\$143,407)

UNDER OUTPUT 4: RESEARCH, COMMUNICATIONS, AND KNOWLEDGE BROKERING ON ISSUES OF DEMOCRATISATION, LOCAL GOVERNANCE, AND RECONCILIATION

This had a total annual spend in 2021 of \$1.2m, representing 10% of overall annual spend. The cumulative spend to date is \$1.2m, representing 1% of the cumulative spend. The spend relates to research work including: risks, challenges and opportunities of subnational democratisation (\$51,155); assessment of potential conflict risks associated to conducting state-level elections in Somalia targeting SWS and GSS (\$69,900); strategic communication to support district council formation and state-level democratisation workstream activities in Galmudug, Puntland, and South West state (\$394,835); elections conflict hotspots peace messaging (\$170,082); research into land conflict in Somalia (\$55,661); assessment of the district councils’ sustainability (\$55,756); political economy analysis of Baidoa (\$23,130) and Benadir (\$62,200); strengthening regional approaches to state building and peacebuilding in Somalia (\$88,379) durable local reconciliation: lessons learnt and prospects for coherence with policing and peace enforcement (\$46,500); and assessing the scope and parameters for transitional justice in Somalia (\$49,312).

The spend for support services in 2021 was \$1.9m, representing 16% of overall annual spend. The cumulative spend over the course of SSF II is \$15.0m, representing 13% of total cumulative spend. The support services include monitoring and evaluation, knowledge management and learning, engineering supervisory services, short-term technical assistance, and Secretariat Office support costs.

The annual spend in 2021 on Fund Manager fees and expenses was \$3.9m. The cumulative spend was \$17.8m. The breakdown of the spend per budget category is provided in Table 17.

TABLE 17: FINANCIAL OVERVIEW

Budget Categories
Output 1: Reduced risk of federal and inter- & intra-state political conflict
Output 2: Enhanced popular participation and voice in governance, particularly for women and excluded communities
Output 3: Government visibility, community engagement, and reduced community vulnerability to conflict
Output 4: Research, communications, and knowledge brokering on issues of democratisation, local governance, and reconciliation
Subtotal Outputs
Support:
M&E, Knowledge Management, and Learning
Engineering Supervisory Services
Short-Term Technical Assistance
Secretariat Office Policy & Governance Advisory
Subtotal Support
Fund Manager Team
Grand Total


	Budget Oct 2016 to Dec 2021 (USD)	Actual Spend Oct 2016 to Dec 2020	Actual Spend for Jan-Dec 2021	Cumulative Actual Spend:
		\$4,431,593.46	\$7,000.00	\$4,438,593.46
		\$14,160,241.04	\$1,075,774.79	\$15,236,015.83
		\$60,520,379.41	\$3,844,727.00	\$64,365,106.41
		\$0.00	\$1,163,447.36	\$1,163,447.36
		\$79,112,213.92	\$6,090,949.15	\$85,203,163.07
		\$3,042,972.37	\$797,283.90	\$3,840,256.27
		\$4,412,936.35	\$979,013.95	\$5,391,950.31
		\$2,757,003.46	\$0.00	\$2,757,003.46
		\$2,861,457.90	\$141,275.76	\$3,002,733.66
		\$13,074,370.08	\$1,917,573.61	\$14,991,943.69
		\$13,880,228.01	\$3,891,269.68	\$17,771,497.69
	\$119,490,185.32	\$106,066,812.00	\$11,899,792.44	\$117,966,604.44


RISK MANAGEMENT

Over the duration of the Fund, SSF has managed risks through a tailored system that presents risks at the portfolio and investment level. To this end, SSF has deployed its Risk Management Framework that details the key tools that are used to ensure effective risk management. This framework also describes the roles and responsibilities of staff at each level of the SSF risk management process.

PORTFOLIO-LEVEL RISK MANAGEMENT

The SSF portfolio risk trends presented in this section are based on the net risk level after applying appropriate risk treatment strategies that include mitigation, avoidance, acceptance, and transfer. Risks are tracked against six categories: external context, reputational, delivery, security, fiduciary, and safeguarding. Though the Fund's overall portfolio risk trend was at a continuous high over the course of the programme period, the trend gradually reduced in the final year. The continuous high trend over the course of the Fund period was largely attributable to the high levels of security and external context risks. The downward trend in the final year is mainly attributed to reduced delivery and fiduciary risks owing to successful close-out of investments. The detailed descriptions of the trends for each risk category are presented in the subsequent sections.





EXTERNAL CONTEXT RISK

The overall external risk trend has been severe over the course of the programme period. This is largely attributable to the political crisis that started the contestation between FMSs and the FGS and within member states. Continued discord between the FGS leadership and Puntland and Jubaland has increased tension throughout the last three years, and this has been exacerbated by FGS use of direct military force in Jubaland and Galmudug. The ongoing political impasse turned violent on 25 April 2021, as intermittent gunfire rocked Mogadishu, with rival forces clashing following the breakdown of election talks.

REPUTATIONAL RISK

Over the course of SSF II, reputational risks have generally been high over the last four years, with a downward trend in the final year of the Fund. Driving this trend in the past four years was the potential risk of increased transparency and publicity, particularly around infrastructure investments, generating adverse perceptions and politically motivated negative backlash, such as with the launch of the Barawe airstrip—though the negative politically motivated backlash on social media was quickly overcome with the immediate resulting social impact of the airstrip. The Fund has seen a rapid decline in reputational risk, mainly owing to shift in strategy in 2021 with streamlined workstream approach to delivery, increased communication on SSF II's impact and sharing of learnings to wider stakeholder group, and successful closure of investments.

DELIVERY RISK

Delivery risks decreased through the first year and beginning of the second year of SSF II due to successful close-out of investments that transitioned from phase I, such as the construction of the youth centres, the infrastructure investments in Adale, and

the streetlighting of Bardhere. However, the overall delivery risks increased in the latter part of the second year through to the third year of SSF II. This upward trend is mainly attributable to security challenges inhibiting access to investment locations, particularly in Jowhar; this led to termination of the construction of government buildings. The political uncertainty in Galmudug in 2018 and state elections in SWS and Jubaland also had an impact on the delivery of some investments, including construction of government buildings in Dhusamareb, Galmudug; support to state assemblies in Jubaland and Galmudug; and the DCF activities in Galmudug. COVID-19 and resulting restrictions had delivery implications accounting for the continuous upward trend in delivery risk through the second quarter of the 2020. SSF demonstrated its flexibility by pivoting some investments to respond to the economic and livelihoods challenges presented by COVID-19, as well as supporting investments to communicate and raise awareness and prevention measures. Most investments that were delayed due to COVID-19 and political uncertainties—for example, government buildings in Dhusamareb—got back on track, and all were successfully completed in the final year of SSF II, hence the downward trend in delivery risk in 2021.

SECURITY RISK

The security risks have been severe throughout SSF II, with high levels of AS and communal attacks. SSF operations were significantly impacted in the 15 January 2019 attack on the 14 Riverside Complex in Nairobi where SSF offices were located, and the incident resulted in the loss of two staff. This led to two weeks' disruption of work as the Nairobi team dealt with the grief and trauma associated with the incident.

There were incidents of targeted attacks by AS on the Barawe airstrip construction site, and in July 2018 AS launched two successive attacks, the first leading to the killing of one project foreman and a second attack injuring one AMISOM and one SNA soldier. This led SSF to officially suspend airstrip construction activities for one month, which allowed for enhanced security measures to be put in place that included the permanent deployment of an AMISOM contingent at the site. This enabled SSF to successfully complete and handover this infrastructure investment.

FIDUCIARY RISK

Over the course of the SSF II reporting period, fiduciary risks increased through to the third year of the Fund and reduced into the fourth and the final years. The upward trend is attributable to the comprehensive and increased frequency of SSF risk reviews, as well as spot checks of all implementation partners which identified their key areas of weakness in financial accountability and compliance in the first three years of SSF. The downward trend towards the final year is attributable to the continued improvement of SSF partners' internal controls and financial systems due to follow-up of previous recommendations and implementation of previous SSF risk reviews. The downward trend is also attributable to the enhanced fiduciary risk management approach that aims to detect and escalate incidents of fraud; applying this approach led to identifying, reporting, and closing five cases of suspected financial malpractice.

Travel to and from Hirshabelle's state capital, Jowhar, remains a challenge due to deteriorating security on the ground, and this has led the construction of government buildings in Jowhar to be terminated.

In the early part of 2021, AS had been shelling mortars on the Dhusamareb airstrip, support for the fencing on which was being provided by SSF. However, the intervention from the Galmudug and FGS security as well as the AMISOM forces provided the construction site with the necessary security, as well as securing Dhusamareb, the capital city of Galmudug, from AS takeover.

SAFEGUARDING RISK

The Fund's safeguarding risks have been progressively decreasing over the duration of SSF II. At the start of SSF II, the Fund developed guidelines that captured the environmental and social impacts and associated mitigation measures in the context of construction and economic development activities, including those in the agriculture and fishing sectors. The downward trend is attributed to the successful roll-out of these safeguards through the training of partners and monitoring the implementation of these safeguards via engineering supervisory firms. Environmental safeguarding of regenerative development for resilience was a key theme in an economic development learning event that took place on 30 April 2019. Environmental and social safeguarding along with preventing sexual exploitation and harassment were learning agendas in both the investee and partner compliance workshops undertaken over the course of SSF II.

Adopt



**LEARNING &
ADAPTING**

Adaptive

Image Credit : ©SSF

This chapter provides an overview of the learning studies SSF has recently completed⁷. In addition, key areas of learning and adaptation by SSF are also presented, including adapting SSF's portfolio to respond to COVID-19.

SSF adopted a flexible and adaptive approach to programming in phase II, whereby real-time monitoring data directly and regularly informs both the follow-up on any adjustments and decision-making required in managing and implementing the workstreams, and the new investment opportunities, needs, and problems to be addressed. During phase II, SSF has commissioned various learning studies to further develop its understanding and knowledge base of key areas of learning interest. The emphasis is to learn what is relevant, effective, and feasible—noting why and in what contexts. The learning studies explore the achievements, challenges, things that were successful or unsuccessful and why, ascertainment of stakeholder feedback, and critical steps and recommendations for any future approach.

Image Credit : ©SSF





LEARNING 1: THE IMPORTANCE OF DISTRICT COUNCIL FORMATION

Somalia's recent political, security, economic, and social development has been marked by poverty, famine, and recurring violence. More than four decades of conflicts have taken a toll on Somali society. The net result is a complex set of political, security, economic, and social grievances that remain a threat to the country's stability.

In 2012, a state-building conference in Mogadishu established a more permanent Somali parliament and president, and marked the end of more than dozens of internationally sponsored reconciliation and state-building conferences held outside the country. When the Somali central government collapsed in 1991, both the regional and district administrations also collapsed. Yet local communities have restored some level of governance in some districts, especially those in what is now Somaliland (a separatist entity) and Puntland (an FMS); while other districts, mainly in the south, have been ruled by warlords, local militias, or AS.

The establishment of federal governance and the adaption of the interim constitution in 2012 have led to the formation of four new FMSs—Jubaland (2013), South West (2014), Galmudug (2015), and Hirshabelle (2016)—following in the footsteps of Puntland which was formed in 1998. These developments have moved Somalia towards a more orderly and stable environment, although the country is far from peaceful.

In the current interim constitution, a three-tier federal structure has been envisioned and adopted—comprising federal, state, and district levels. Although over the past few years, the establishment of the new FMSs has nearly reached completion, significant work remains at the district level.

Many of the district administrations in the FMSs (except Puntland) are either non-existent or have loose local district administrations, which are usually dominated by the district commissioner appointed by the FMS administration, or the FGS in the case of recently liberated districts.

The existence of a local governance structure is critical for creating order in the political, economic, and social spheres of society. The absence of elected local governance institutions in most districts in Somalia has contributed to civil disorder, insecurity, human rights abuses, a dwindling economy, and resource-based conflicts. Further, this vacuum has contributed to clan rivalry over the control of the districts' security, economy, and politics. A democratically elected local council will increase governance legitimacy, reduce violent conflicts, and allow access to basic services. SSF's experience—for instance, in Galmudug's Hobyo district where the Fund supported DCF—showed that during the selection of the priority investments, communities voted for the construction of a district administration block under the government-driven development project, and later for the upgrading of the same through the Wadajir Framework investment. Equally, the community in Balanbale district, also in Galmudug, selected the rehabilitation of the district administration offices as a priority project. These underpin the importance of a legitimate local institution among the public.

According to a SSF case study, an elected district council is vital to a more inclusive system of governance. This is repeatedly flagged as a priority by respondents, and as one clan member explained,

An elected district administration is good for community empowerment and will increase participation of women and youth in peacebuilding and development. It will also remove corrupt appointed leaders in district administrations and improve democracy.



In the absence of democratically elected local councils, state-appointed councils have become the norm. This approach causes challenges, particularly when appointments are politically instigated. For example, the conflict in Galmudug's Balanbale district was exacerbated when opposing groups at state level appointed two different district commissioners for the same district. The issue later took on a clan lens and increased the already fragile clan tensions in the district. Thus, the process of deepening federalism is directly related to the finalisation of the interim constitution, and with it the finalisation of several political agreements (e.g., the structure of the state, the distribution of powers, etc.). This is a key stability driver as critical constitutional issues that determine the federal system, such as resource and revenue sharing, allocation of competencies and functions, fiscal matters, and the status of the capital—Mogadishu—within the

federation, are vital for Somalia's future stability. Moreover, an elected council could be a source of democratic practice and culture in Somalia and a foundation for its young population who have not witnessed democratically run institutions since the last democratic government in 1969.

In addition, the formation of elected councils also promises progress and aims to deepen agreements between the FGS, FMSs, and local district stakeholders over important constitutional arrangements, including tax and customs arrangements, roles and responsibilities, improving inter-governmental relations, and the review and development of relevant laws and policies. The importance of district councils to stability makes it a critical focal point for SSF to leverage improved governance at a local level.

Image Credit : ©SSF



AN OPPORTUNITY TO RECONCILE WARRING CLANS THROUGH SOCIAL HEALING

An inclusive, representatively selected district council will support ongoing initiatives to enhance community social cohesion by reconciling warring clans. A democratically chosen council will strengthen integration as warring communities can share power and resources governed by a legitimate and inclusive local government structure. Inclusivity brings about ownership and fair distribution of resources, thereby reducing resource-based conflict which is rampant in Somalia.

With the council in place, locally driven peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts will be more structured as the office coordinates all of the stakeholders involved. Genuine reconciliation at local level is a precursor for reconciliation at both state and federal level, hence an opportunity to bring about the peace and unity that the Somali people need. Equally, a strong administration can manage conflict triggers before they turn violent, because it will understand the drivers of conflict at the district level together with the dividers and connectors.

The absence of local institutions that can enforce clan social contracts and peace agreements causes peacebuilding in Somalia to be unsustainable. A legitimate local council can enforce agreements and develop local by-laws to legalise them. This is a key step to lasting peace in Somalia.





INCREASED DEVELOPMENT AT GRASSROOTS, THEREBY REDUCING RESOURCE-BASED CONFLICTS

A legitimate district council will foster rural development and reduce urban migration by generating local employment. As local councils increase the likelihood of peace, they increase social order and reduce barriers to trade, thus local economic growth is more likely. Somalia's youth will hugely benefit from rural development, because it will address high youth unemployment and therefore stop the recruitment of youth to criminal gangs, AS, and other militias. District councils can also be the entry point for the provision of social amenities to impoverished rural communities who lack access to basic education, healthcare, and infrastructure. With better access to services, these communities are likely to abandon violence for peace and co-existence.

CREATES AN IMPETUS FOR STATE BUILDING AND STRENGTHENING

With the set-up of democratically elected district councils, state building is likely to improve. This is because local structures will give states an opportunity to deliver services, and will improve strategic communication between the FGS, the state, and the district, creating a robust command structure which extends the authority of the state to the districts and localities. This will ultimately improve government legitimacy at the local level. The same benefits are also likely to accrue to the FGS.

TAKING ADVANTAGE OF EXISTING MOMENTUM FOR DISTRICT COUNCILS

As a result of the successful establishment of a district council recently in South Galkayo, the momentum built around DCF could support the process for Hobyo, Abudwaq, and Balanbale that SSF plans to continue to support. The Wadajir Framework investments in Galmudug can therefore build on these successes.

Image Credit: ©AMISOM



LEARNING 2: WOMEN'S POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN SOMALIA IS BEING RECOGNISED IN THEORY, THOUGH MORE NEEDS TO BE PUT INTO PRACTICE

SSF commissioned Somali Women's Studies Centre to conduct a landscaping study on women's political participation in Somalia, in order to gain in-depth knowledge of the prevailing gender and power dynamics that influence women's political representation and involvement in Somalia. The purpose of the study was to map the current political environment and assess the existing challenges and opportunities that hamper or promote women's political participation.

The study used qualitative data-collection methods which entailed literature review, consultative forums, and dialogues with 323 female and male participants. Data collection was conducted from February to May 2020 in seven areas that represent all of the FMSs: Mogadishu, Baidoa, Kismayo, Garowe, Dhusamareb, Beletweyne, and Jowhar. The consulted stakeholders included women activists, women MPs, aspiring women leaders, youth leaders, clan elders, politicians, political party officials, electoral commission officials, representatives from line FGS ministries, and FMS officials across five FMSs and the Benadir region in Somalia.

KEY FINDINGS

- Not all clans oppose women's representation in leadership and politics. While some regions neglect to nominate women for federal and state political leadership roles, in others, women do have greater opportunities to participate in parliament.
- Enhanced recognition of Somali women's voices requires increased unity, capacity building, and collective action amongst Somali women. Groups advocating for Somali women's representation must unite, take collective action, and demand inclusion at all levels of government, including district councils, FMS parliaments, and the federal parliament. Respondents reported that the lack of unity among women's groups and networks, inadequate access to financial resources for women, limited leadership skills, and low literacy skills among Somali women are key challenges that need to be overcome to reach the 30% quota of women's representation in these bodies as mandated in the constitution. Capacity strengthening in advocacy and leadership skills for women's representation through interventions by stakeholders, including civil society, women-led organisations, and international organisations, have already had a positive impact, and this will accelerate.
- Discriminatory cultural beliefs and attitudes on women's participation in leadership are shifting. The majority of those consulted suggested that there was a gradual acceptance and realisation that women's political participation is vital for inclusive politics, and this is critical for meaningful reconciliation and recovery. Most of the stakeholders perceived that women are resourceful, often work for the common good, and are less corrupt than men. Thus, increased women's representation in formal decision making was considered a broader societal benefit.
- There is an increased political commitment for a greater role for women in politics. All of the stakeholders consulted suggested that women's political representation and participation are increasing.
- There is growing recognition of the value of increasing the role of women in politics by FGS, FMSs, clan elders, political parties, women and men from diverse social and age groups, international organisations, civil society, and women activists supporting the development of women's political participation. However, the extent to which this support has improved the number of women representatives in leadership positions such as parliament and the cabinet, where they wield meaningful power—remains limited.
- Increasing mentoring and leadership development of women leaders and aspiring women leaders is key to equipping women to build effective alliances and partnerships in government, politics, civil society, and business. There is a need for additional capacity building in leadership, policy analysis, and advocacy skills to enable women to more effectively operate and drive change within Somali politics.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Promote positive working relationships with clan leaders to highlight the importance of selecting women to positions of leadership. It is important to work with clan leaders to shift their mindsets so that they can encourage the selection of experienced women leaders with genuine political ambitions and educational capacity, rather than inexperienced women who are easily manipulated and controlled by those who are selecting them. It is also important to influence clan elders to recognise the value of supporting the distribution of political seats to women at every level of politics, rather than giving them only to male candidates, which weakens women’s involvement in decision-making.
- Strengthen the capacity of women in parliament to understand the value of staying in contact with their constituents—including elders, religious custodians, minority groups, and civil society—and women’s networks. This will build confidence that women leaders are working in the interests of society, and will enable them to engage with women in other government positions to build consensus around the inclusion and gender equality agenda.
- National campaign strategy to promote women’s participation in 2021 national elections in Somalia. While acknowledging that Somali women are not a homogenous group, collaborating and aligning their political interests can create a power base upon which to build and advocate for their representation and political participation. This can help to increase their visibility and legitimacy.



Image Credit: ©AMISOM

LEARNING 3: THE SOUTH WEST STATE CONSTITUTION NEEDS TO BE IMPROVED—WHEN THE TIMING IS RIGHT

In 2019, SSF received a request from the FGS and the Minister of Constitutional Affairs of South West to support a review of the state's constitution. The state requested SSF support to draft a state constitution that demonstrates resource and power-sharing mechanisms for the communities in the three regions of Bay, Bakool, and Lower Shabelle. The current 2014 South West constitution is still a draft document; it was created in haste to facilitate the peace and state-building process that accompanied the formation of South West state, without the input and participation of many communities in the region.

In response, SSF commissioned an assessment of the feasibility of supporting the South West State government on the constitutional review process and the potential risks that might arise if SSF was to support this investment. The purpose of the assessment was to generate an in-depth analysis of the options and constraints associated with SSF supporting the South West constitutional review and informing better decision-making processes, as well as identifying the various stakeholders in the constitutional process arena and their agendas.

KEY FINDINGS

The study found that although there is a need to re-draft the South West Constitution to meet the state authorities' wishes and those of local communities that live in the three regions—the timing was not optimal. The study also identified political, environmental, reputational, security, and financial risks associated with implementing this activity. The researchers noted:

Any involvement by SSF as an external actor in a constitutional review process must therefore be justified in substance and timing. On neither of these two criteria did this study find consistent or well-thought-out explanations. Knowledge of the current constitution and what a constitution does, in general, appears scant not only among community members but also among government officials.

More importantly, the study suggested that a direct involvement of external actors or dependency on external funding can be detrimental to constitutional processes, especially those that are intended to have both political and peacebuilding objectives.

Moreover, the review found that scepticism towards the usefulness of a review of the current constitution was rooted in the fact that the “current constitution is barely known and rarely observed in practice”. Instead, the study recommended SSF to support the South West State administration in developing guidelines for—or engaging in—civic education, setting up social accountability mechanisms, and training for justice actors, law enforcement, and security forces on the current constitution. It suggested that SSF work with a variety of its partners, international and local, who are already engaged in supporting civil society and security and justice sector reform. In the end, the Fund agreed with the findings of the study and did not support the South West State's constitutional review agenda. However, the Fund could not invest in the other study recommendations due to the COVID-19 pandemic impacts. The Fund was facing time limitations as the current phase of the Fund was coming to an end, but work of this nature will be reconsidered in future.

LEARNING 4: THERE IS VALUE IN CONTINUING TO SUPPORT THE PUNTLAND DEMOCRATISATION AGENDA

In early 2019, the new Puntland administration led by President Deni prioritised a democratisation agenda to ensure the delivery of the 2023 parliamentary and presidential elections and 2021 local government elections. SSF quickly responded to this opportunity by supporting the Puntland Ministry of Interior to host a democratisation forum in Garowe, which included in-depth, multi-stakeholder discussions and concluded with the formal establishment of the Transitional Puntland Elections Commission (TPEC).

SSF also provided technical support to enable the completion of TPEC's strategic plan which was later presented to the wider donor community in Nairobi. A number of research pieces exploring the affordability, conflict risks, and legal basis of the elections were also completed, and a capping paper summarising key findings and recommendations has been finalised and presented to the Puntland government. A key learning of SSF's support to TPEC is the importance of early engagement with government counterparts, civil society, and the wider international community in order to align overall objectives and plans and to coordinate delivery among different stakeholders and partners.

In early October, SSF learned that TPEC started a tendering process for a Biometric Voter Registration (BVR) system. The Fund engaged IFES, an INGO with technical election

expertise, to assess the system that is currently being procured. They will provide a detailed review and assessment report covering the evidence base as to whether a system using facial de-duplication provides an effective low-cost solution to BVR (TPEC's choice as per their tender), and outlining the benefits and trade-offs of this approach, including an assessment of the likely cost of this system for the pilot in three proposed districts. The Fund has also sought advice on what the wider implications for Somalia would be for Puntland to move forward with this system (hence setting a precedent) vis-à-vis future federal-level BVR.

The Fund facilitated various policy discussions with key stakeholders (including TPEC and the Puntland government) and the donor community on the assessment findings and recommendations to further strengthen the Puntland democratisation agenda.

LEARNING 5: SSF ADAPTED SWIFTLY TO ADJUST ITS PORTFOLIO TO RESPOND TO COVID-19

The emergence of COVID-19 in the first quarter of 2020 posed a major threat to the smooth delivery of SSF. The pandemic impacted SSF at portfolio level, causing uncertainty over funding as well as affecting the delivery of SSF investments, including disrupting SSF's investees' supply chains, stopping all travel into and around Somalia, and requiring the need for social distancing, which disrupted a number of meetings and workshops.



LEARNING 6: RESPONDING TO DELAYS AT THE PORTFOLIO LEVEL

The global impact of COVID-19 affected several SSF donors' funding decisions. The economic impact of the pandemic affected all donor countries and, in some cases, led to uncertainty over budgets or caused donors to reallocate funding to respond to the emerging medical and economic challenges posed by COVID-19. The uncertainty over donor funding decisions in the first quarter of 2020 came at a particularly challenging time for SSF, which had a deadline of 31 March for fundraising decisions to enable the Fund to invest funds within 2020.

SSF recognised the major challenge that COVID-19 presented to donors and, in collaboration with the Joint Donor Committee, identified approaches to adapt the Fund to provide flexibility for donors. SSF delayed its fundraising deadline for 2020 to 30 June and reassessed the Fund's portfolio to identify investments that would address the immediate priority of mitigating the damage caused

by COVID-19. SSF also worked closely with DFID (now FCDO) on how to address delays to funding decisions and programming caused by COVID-19. As a result of collaboration between the Fund and its donors, SSF agreed a contract amendment to reallocate funds to extend the contracts of the Fund Manager and Secretariat Office teams so that they could deliver on delayed investments. In addition, as a result of the delay of the SSF funding deadline, several donors were able to increase their contributions to SSF to respond to specific priorities that had been identified—COVID-19 and economic growth investments respectively.

Alongside the rapid response to identified issues, in the short term, SSF has also worked closely with the FCDO and other donors to protect the Fund in the mid-term against some of the uncertainty that COVID-19 has caused. The Fund Manager, Adam Smith International, worked closely with the FCDO to agree a one-year extension to SSF to extend phase II through to December 2021.



Image Credit: ©SSF

LEARNING 7: RESPONDING TO THE PANDEMIC AT THE INVESTMENT LEVEL

At an investment level, SSF also faced major challenges. Many SSF infrastructure investments faced challenges as global supply chains slowed down; for instance, critical materials for SSF's Galmudug streetlights investment were held up, and this led the investee, Sky Energy, to have to identify an alternative source of materials, thus further delaying the investment. Elsewhere, several SSF investees delayed or were unable to carry out key workshops due to the need for social distancing. This significantly disrupted SSF's GESI investments in Jubaland, where investees Life and Peace Institute and Somali Women's Studies Centre were unable to carry out workshops with community members due to the risk of spreading the infection. Additionally, many SSF investments were delayed by the travel restrictions in Somalia. This not only disrupted travel for SSF investees but also made it more challenging for the SSF teams to do critical quality assurance work, including stopping SSF's in-house engineer from


carrying out essential verification exercises on infrastructure investments.

SSF's approach to addressing the challenges posed by COVID-19 has been built on mitigating against the impact of COVID-19 on investments, adapting investments to respond to COVID-19 challenges, and procuring a set of new investments that directly respond to the impact of COVID-19 on the lives and livelihoods of Somalis.

SSF has proactively responded to the challenges of financial flows in Somalia. As restrictions were placed on the movement of money within Somalia by Dahabshiil and other banks, SSF identified new approaches to disburse funds to our partners. Through a mix of diversifying SSF's account options in Somalia—such as opening an account with Somali Salaam Bank—and through engaging with partners to make some payments in Nairobi, the Fund avoided the potentially damaging prospect of delayed payment to investees. Similarly, on an investment level, SSF was quick to respond to the emerging challenges of delays to supply chains. SSF pre-emptively procured materials to construct Dhusamareb government buildings and deliver them to the construction site; this enabled the Fund to continue



Image Credit: ©SSF



the construction even as supply chains began to close down, as the investment already had the required resources on site.

As COVID-19 emerged as a major issue in Somalia, SSF leveraged its existing investments to be one of the first movers to respond to the impact of the pandemic. SSF's existing portfolio of investments included a number that are focused on communications, such as the AVF-led IMAQAL investment which leveraged a radio platform to raise awareness of the challenges women faced and the importance of representation for women and minority groups. Investees such as AVF provided SSF with an existing platform to reach and influence large numbers of people with reliable information. In Somalia, where misinformation around COVID-19 was rife, SSF's quick adaptation of these existing investments to begin messaging on how to prevent the spread was critical, through sharing information on hygiene measures such as hand washing and social distancing. By rapidly sharing this information, SSF was able to spread accurate information on COVID-19 and was able to empower women's groups to lead the dissemination of these essential messages.

Finally, SSF has pivoted its investment portfolio to deliver six new COVID-19-specific investments to enable the Fund to adapt to the emerging COVID-19 challenges Somalia now faces. The investments aim to better inform communities of the health risks and strategies for mitigating the risk of contracting and spreading COVID-19; provide PPE for communities, health-care workers, and prison staff; provide medical support and equipment for health-care institutions and professionals; support local governments to increase their response capacity; and provide economic support that is responsive to the unique economic challenges posed by the pandemic. For instance, SSF investee Care International has worked across Goldogob and Bursalah to prevent the spread of COVID-19 by disbursing PPE and hygiene supplies and setting up an isolation facility for COVID-19 treatment within Goldogob Referral Hospital. In addition, this investment has reduced the economic impact of COVID-19 through engaging with the community and diaspora to use the SOKAAB platform to raise funds to help the town to address funding challenges; as well as through supporting VSLA group members with small grants to enable them to continue their livelihoods, despite the economic impact of COVID-19.

ANNEXES

ANNEX A: SSF IMPACT PAPER



ANNEX B: SSF RESULTS FRAMEWORK



ANNEX C: BASE SCENARIOS FOR SOMALIA



ANNEX D: SSF LEARNING PAPER



ENDNOTES

- 1 Please note, when referring to SSF in this report, the reference is to SSF II, unless otherwise specified.
- 2 Please see Annex A on SSF Impact Paper.
- 3 Please see Annex B on the SSF's results framework that explains the scoring methodology.
- 4 DFID's 2016 Building Stability Framework.
- 5 Please see Annex C: Base Scenarios for Somalia 2017–2021 for details on the different scenarios.
- 6 As useful as it is, analysing the trend/implications for stability is difficult, as the Armed Conflict Location and Event Database (ACLED) does not differentiate between Al-Shabab deaths and AMISOM, Somali National Army, or civilian deaths.
- 7 Please see Annex D for a comprehensive SSF learning paper.

Adam Smith International



Norwegian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs



iskaashiga
jarmalka
DEUTSCHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT



Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Netherlands



MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF DENMARK

LEGAL NOTICE AND DISCLAIMER

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior approval in writing from The Somalia Stability Fund.

This report is not a legally binding document. It is a collaborative informational and analysis document and does not necessarily reflect the views of any of the contributing partners in all of its contents. Any errors are the sole responsibility of the authors.

Copyright © 2021 The Somalia Stability Fund



SOMALIA
STABILITY
FUND



WWW.STABILITYFUND.SO

IMPLEMENTED BY ADAM SMITH INTERNATIONAL

END OF PROGRAMME REPORT - FEBRUARY 2022

DELIVERING PEACE & STABILITY IN SOMALIA