

**THE TRANSATLANTIC
SLAVE TRADE
VOLUME 2**

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THE BRITISH TRANSATLANTIC
SLAVE TRADE

Volume 2

General Editor: Kenneth Morgan

**Volume Editors: Robin Law
Kenneth Morgan
John Oldfield
David Ryden**

THE BRITISH TRANSATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE

VOLUME 2

THE ROYAL AFRICAN COMPANY

Edited by
Kenneth Morgan



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INTRODUCTION

The texts reprinted in this volume highlight the changing fortunes of the leading chartered trading organisation involved in the British slave trade, namely the Royal African Company. Created in 1672, when it received a charter from Charles II, the company played a prominent role in the supply of slaves from Africa to the Americas, especially the British Caribbean, in the late seventeenth century. It continued to trade in slaves, as well as gold and other commodities, into the early Hanoverian era but gradually found its role and purpose eroded by the movement away from joint-stock organisations in trade that occurred at that time (with the notable exceptions of the East India Company and the Hudson's Bay Company). The six contemporary texts presented here are the tip of the iceberg of a wealth of documentation on the Royal African Company; much more exists in manuscript form, principally in the Public Record Office and the British Library.¹ Collectively, the texts emphasise some leading themes in the development of the company: the details of the charter under which it traded; the financial pressures of maintaining fortified establishments in west Africa; the rivalry provided by the African companies of other European powers; the increased presence of private merchants in the slave trade; and the role of such a company in maintaining Britain's imperial and naval power.

English interest in the slave trade had begun over a century before the Royal African Company came into being. In the 1560s the Elizabethan seadog Sir John Hawkins led several raids on the African coast for slaves.² There was little follow-up to these voyages until well into the Stuart era, however, probably because English involvement in Africa and the Caribbean was at a low level until the 1620s.³ Thereafter a relatively small

¹ For an outline of these records see Hilary Jenkinson, 'The Records of the English African Companies', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 3rd series, 6 (1912), pp. 185–220; Evelyn C. Martin, 'The English Establishments on the Gold Coast in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 4th series, 5 (1922), pp. 194–6.

² The account of his third and final African voyage is reprinted in Volume 1, this series, pp. 3–32.

³ P. E. H. Hair and Robin Law, 'The English in Western Africa to 1700' in Nicholas Canny (ed.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire: Vol. 1: The Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 246–7.

number of English-backed private ventures participated in the slave trade, including regular dabbling by London investors in the 1640s and 1650s. They were especially active in supplying slaves to Barbados.¹ The English East India Company dispatched a small number of ships to Africa between 1657 and 1668, but these traded mainly in gold and other non-human commodities (apart from the purchase of a few slaves for use locally in West Africa).² There also existed a chartered company with a specific remit to trade with Africa. This was the Company of Adventurers of London Trading to the Parts of Africa, usually called the 'Guinea Company'. Founded in 1618, it operated voyages from London to Africa in the early Stuart period on a modest scale, and was concerned mainly with commodity trade, particularly gold, rather than black human cargoes. Before the mid-seventeenth century the English remained late starters in the slave trade compared with the Spanish, the Portuguese and the Dutch. Spain and Portugal had been trading across the Atlantic in slaves since the early sixteenth century, while the Dutch entered transatlantic slaving after they occupied north-eastern Brazil in the 1630s.³ Compared with the thousands of slaves shipped under the flags of Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands, the early English slave trade was small in scale. In fact, English ships carried fewer than 2,000 slaves per year to the Americas before 1660.⁴

Reorganised in 1631 and again just after the Stuart Restoration, the Company of Royal Adventurers into Africa received new royal charters in 1660 and 1663. The second of these charters was the first granted in England to a trading organisation that referred to the pursuit of the slave trade. This company never raised its full subscribed capital and found its finances strained during the second Anglo-Dutch naval war in the mid-1660s. It had virtually stopped trading on a joint-stock basis by

¹ John C. Appleby, 'A Guinea Venture, c. 1657: A Note on the Early English Slave Trade', *The Mariner's Mirror*, 79 (1993), pp. 85–6; Appleby, 'A Business of Much Difficulty': A London Slaving Venture, 1651–54', *The Mariner's Mirror*, 81 (1995), pp. 3–14; Ernst van Boogaart and Pieter C. Emmer, 'The Dutch Participation in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1596–1650' in Henry A. Gemery and Jan S. Hogendorn (eds), *The Uncommon Market: Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic Slave Trade* (New York, Academic Press, 1979), p. 371; Larry Gragg, 'To Procure Negroes': The English Slave Trade to Barbados, 1627–60', *Slavery and Abolition*, 16 (1995), pp. 65–84.

² Margaret Makepeace, 'English Traders on the Guinea Coast, 1657–1668: An Analysis of the East India Company Archive', *History in Africa*, 16 (1989), pp. 237–84.

³ David Eltis, 'The Volume and Structure of the Transatlantic Slave Trade: A Reassessment', *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd series, 58 (2001), pp. 23–5.

⁴ For the level of British slave trading before 1660 see David Eltis, Stephen D. Behrendt, David Richardson and Herbert S. Klein, *The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade: A Database on C.I.D.-ROM* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999); David Eltis, 'The Volume and African Origins of the British Slave Trade before 1714', *Cahiers d'Études africaines*, 35 (1995), p. 618.

1668.¹ In 1672 the newly-created Royal African Company bought up the Adventurers' assets and gained a royal monopoly over the English trade with Africa. Most of the investors were men already concerned in overseas trade. The Royal African Company was managed by a Governor, Sub-Governor, Deputy Governor and twenty-four assistants. Its headquarters was in London. As a joint-stock organisation, it was entitled to the privileges of incorporation (thereby controlling who joined it) and the pooling of capital (with trading done on a common account). The company held two General Courts each year, one for the election of officers and the other for hearing statements about the company's stock. The Court of Assistants, chosen annually by shareholders, dealt with most of the company's business, meeting at least once a week. It had four sub-committees for accounts, for correspondence, for the purchase of goods and for the provision of shipping and the prevention of private trade. A senior official attended each of these sub-committees. The Royal African Company also had an overseas presence. In west Africa it maintained usually between fifteen and twenty fortified establishments housing 200 or 300 civilian and military personnel. The company's Agent-General resided at Cape Coast Castle in the middle of the Gold Coast. He could call on the services of sailors, native crew, small craft and canoes. He received the accounts of the company's factors at factories and dependent lodges such as Anomabu and Accra. A Court of Judicature sat on the African coast to listen to mercantile disputes associated with the company.² Captains and supercargoes on the company's vessels liaised with the company's personnel in west Africa to pick up slaves.³ In the West Indies, the company maintained permanent agents to receive slaves for sale from the company's owned or hired ships. Barbados and Jamaica kept two or three agents; the Leeward Islands had one or two. The latter earned annual salaries of 6,000 lb. sugar in the 1670s

¹ George Frederick Zook, *The Company of Royal Adventurers Trading into Africa* (Lancaster, PA, 1919); K. G. Davies, *The Royal African Company* (London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1957), pp. 41–3, 57. The charters of the 'Guinea Company' of 1618 and the Company of Royal Adventurers are printed in Cecil T. Carr (ed.), *Select Charters of Trading Companies A. D. 1530-1707* (London, Bernard Quaritch, Selden Society Publications, 28, 1913), pp. 99–106, 177–81.

² Davies, *The Royal African Company*, pp. 24, 28, 64, 97–9, 154–5, 157–8, 164, 240–1, 251, 295. This is the standard history of the RAC. The later, post-1713 history of the company awaits its historian. The charter of the RAC is printed in Carr (ed.), *Select Charters of Trading Companies*, pp. 186–92. A useful late seventeenth-century description of Cape Coast Castle is included in P. E. H. Hair, Adam Jones and Robin Law (eds), *Barbot on Guinea: The Writings of Jehu Barbot on West Africa 1678-1712*, (2 vols, London, Hakluyt Society, series II, nos. 175–6, 1992), vol. 2, pp. 391–3.

³ The transactions carried out by one supercargo, who sailed on an RAC vessel to New Calabar and Barbados, are outlined in W. F. Hutchinson, 'A Seventeenth Century Slaver's Diary', *Elder Dempster Magazine*, 14 (June 1925), pp. 60–2; 15 (September 1925), pp. 141–3; 17 (March 1926), pp. 32–4.

plus their share of slave sales. The agents sold slaves to a variety of purchasers among whom merchants, planters and officeholders predominated.¹

The Royal African Company's fortified trading bases were concentrated in certain zones along about 1,800 miles of the west African coast. The Gold Coast and the Bight of Benin as far as Whydah had the protection of the company's forts, castles and factories. By the late 1680s there were eight of these establishments on the Gold Coast: Cape Coast, Sekondi, Komenda, Fredericksburg (later called Fort Royal), Anashan, Anomabu, Egysa and Accra. The company also had a presence at James Island, in the River Gambia, the most westerly of the English forts; at Bance Island in the River Sierra Leone; at York Island on the River Sherbro; and at Whydah, the most easterly of the English forts and factories.² Very few forts were situated on the Grain or Ivory coasts. And no forts stood within 700 miles to the south and east of Sherbro on the Sierra Leone coast. Some of these buildings were large structures with extensive equipment and personnel. The Royal African Company had built several of these establishments from scratch, including Dixcove fort, begun in 1692, and the factory at Whydah, built from 1682 onwards. But others had been captured from other European powers, such as Cape Coast Castle, taken from the Dutch by an Anglo-Danish force in 1664. In all, over thirty forts belonging to different European powers were situated on the Gold Coast. These forts and factories were run as joint African-European ventures in practice, for they employed a good many Africans to carry out trade and to act as brokers, interpreters and porters.³

Cape Coast Castle served as the headquarters of the Royal African Company in west Africa. Most of the company's slaves were purchased there. It had fortifications consisting of outworks, platforms and bastions plus apartments for the Director-General, chief merchants, chaplain, factors, writers, surgeons, labourers and soldiers; numerous workhouse and stores; enough space to lodge a thousand Africans; and small vessels to fetch and carry materials for the fort.⁴ In 1749 Cape Coast had 367 castle or factory

¹ David W. Galenson, *Traders, Planters, and Slaves: Market Behavior in Early English America* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986); Trevor Burnard, 'Who Bought Slaves in Early America? Purchasers of Slaves from the Royal African Company in Jamaica, 1674-1708', *Slavery and Abolition*, 17 (1996), pp. 68-92. The activities of one RAC agent in the Leewards are documented in David Hancock (ed.), *The Letters of William Freeman, London Merchant, 1678-1685* (London, London Record Society's Publications, 36, 2002).

² Robin Law (ed.), *The English in West Africa 1685-1688: The Local Correspondence of the Royal African Company of England 1681-1699 Part 2* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), p. ix. Much useful information on these establishments can be found in A. W. Lawrence, *Fortified Trade-Posts: The English in West Africa 1645-1822* (London, Jonathan Cape, 1969); Albert Van Dantzig, *Forts and Castles of Ghana* (Accra, Sedco, 1980).

³ Lawrence, *Fortified Trade-Posts*, pp. 12-13, 33; David Northrup, *Africa's Discovery of Europe 1450-1850* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 55.

⁴ See below, p. 130.

slaves and seventy-five guns. These slaves were distinct from those held for sale into the Middle Passage: they were retained around the forts to help in the conduct of trade. A wide variety of occupations were represented among the castle slaves. There were carpenters, bricklayers, goldsmiths, doctor's servants, gold takers, blacksmiths, bricklayers, gunners, cooks, coopers, chapel servants, canoe men and armourers.¹ The largest and strongest British fort on the Gold Coast after Cape Coast Castle was Komenda. Other British forts run by the Royal African Company were less impressive in size and scope.

Cape Coast Castle and the other forts were originally built to withstand attacks by pirates and therefore their guns pointed out to sea; few of them were maintained properly, however, as the Royal African Company underwent its long decline after 1713.² The forts were also constructed initially to facilitate the trade in gold. In this respect it is worth remembering that the slave trade accounted for less than half of total English trade with Africa in the later seventeenth century, and that most English exports to African regions at that time were sent to the Gold Coast.³ The fortified castles could sometimes prevent hostile African powers without heavy arms from raiding certain parts of the coast; they also helped to rebuff attacks by European pirates, which were more common in west Africa than is commonly supposed. But possession of these forts was a double-edged sword: they provided a convenient rendezvous point for collecting African captives during the era of regulated trade but were expensive and cumbersome to maintain.

The Royal African Company had an initial capital of £111,100 but this soon proved insufficient for its needs. The forts, factories and lodges in west Africa drained its finances and, even worse, large sums of money were owed to the company from the sales of slaves on credit in the Caribbean. By 1690 the company was owed £170,000 in Barbados, Jamaica and the Leewards in debts. Between 1691 and 1708 the company's deteriorating financial position was met by substantial borrowing and calls for more capital. But taking out loans led to new debt charges and at the end of 1708 the company had debts at interest of £301,195 and book debts of £11,429. The company had paid nearly one third of its initial capital to obtain the forts on the Gold Coast and had spent around £20,000 per year on defending them. There were other problems, too. The level of the company's exports to Africa and its supply of slaves to the Americas failed to meet

¹ J. J. Crooks, *Records Relating to the Gold Coast Settlements from 1750 to 1874* (Dublin, Browne & Nolan, 1923), pp. 4-7.

² Conrad Gill, *Merchants and Mariners of the 18th Century* (London, Edward Arnold, 1961), pp. 78-9.

³ David Eltis, 'The Relative Importance of Slaves and Commodities in the Atlantic Trade of Seventeenth-Century Africa', *Journal of African History*, 35 (1994), pp. 244, 246.

expectations over the long run. During the War of the League of Augsburg (1689–97) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–13) the company lost £300,000 in merchant shipping to foreign privateers. By 1712 such were the financial burdens of the company that it was technically insolvent.¹

The first text reprinted in this volume seems to have arisen from a paper commissioned by the Royal African Company's Court of Assistants in September 1679, with the intention of presenting arguments to Parliament in defence of the company's monopoly. When this failed to eventuate, the findings were summarised in pamphlet form.² *Certain Considerations relating to the Royal African Company of England ...* (1680, pp. 3–14) sought to demonstrate the advantages of the slave trade to England and to underscore the need for the trade to be carried on via a joint-stock company. It recounted the royal charters granted in the seventeenth century to promote the African trade and argued that the financing of such companies and the forts they established in Africa were essential components of the benefits that could accrue to the mother country from the trade they generated. The pamphlet claimed that trade with Africa was stimulated under the auspices of a joint-stock organisation; that the Royal African Company supplied slaves to plantations at a better rate than private traders; that only such a company would have the capital to maintain the forts; that the company had established firm commercial contacts in west Africa; and that European competitors all used companies to conduct their 'Guinea trades'.³ Certainly, the Royal African Company maintained strong commercial links with traders and middlemen near its forts and factories in west Africa.⁴ Whether, as the pamphlet implies, it was in a better position to sustain these links than private traders is more debatable and is, in fact, a point repeatedly referred to in all the texts included in this volume. All those writings also underscore the context of international rivalry in the African trade and the corresponding competition over imperial endeavours in the Atlantic world that featured prominently in mercantilist thinking of the era.⁵

¹ Davies, *The Royal African Company*, pp. 74, 77, 83, 87, 96, 205. For discussion of the RAC's finances from 1672 to 1720, see William Robert Scott, *The Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish and Irish Joint-Stock Companies to 1720* (3 vols, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1910–12), vol. 2, pp. 20–35.

² Davies, *The Royal African Company*, p. 108.

³ See below, pp. 5–14.

⁴ For detailed evidence see Robin Law (ed.), *The English in West Africa, 1681–1683: The Local Correspondence of the Royal African Company of England 1681–1699 Part 1* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997); Law (ed.), *The English in West Africa, 1685–1688*.

⁵ Kenneth Morgan, 'Mercantilism and the British Empire, 1688–1815' in Donald Winch and Patrick O'Brien (eds), *The Political Economy of British Historical Experience 1688–1914* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 165–91.

The Royal African Company appeared to be initially successful compared with its predecessor. It soon substantially increased the number of enslaved Africans taken aboard British ships. In the period of the restored Stuart monarchy, the British carried almost two-thirds more slaves to the Americas than their two main rivals – the Portuguese and the Dutch – combined.¹ Not all slaves carried by English vessels were taken under the auspices of the Royal African Company; private traders also played their part. In fact, the contribution of interlopers and separate traders to English slave trading activity was substantial. The Royal African Company probably accounted for around two-thirds of the British slave trade between 1672 and 1689 and for a half in the 1690s; the remaining portion of the trade was in non-company vessels. Between 1662 and 1713, when the Royal African Company delivered at least 125,000 slaves to British America, less than half of all English slaving vessels in the Atlantic were company ships. Some of the private vessels were ships operating with licences to trade from the Royal African Company (a resort to the need to raise capital).² Most of these vessels, whether company or private ships, set out from London, though some Bristol ships were also involved.³

The rapid failure of the Royal African Company to secure profits and the activity of private traders soon attracted parliamentary attention. In 1690 a committee of the House of Commons was appointed to examine whether the African trade could be organised other than on a joint-stock basis. In supplying evidence the company stated that it spent around £19–20,000 per year on its forts in west Africa. It added that neither the African trade nor the maintenance of the forts could be continued unless the joint-stock basis of the company was continued. The Commons committee described the forts as weak; it stated that the strongest – Cape Coast – could only resist 200 Europeans equipped with cannon. This early parliamentary airing of the company's financial problems revealed its precarious state during the period when it still had a royal monopoly.⁴

¹ David Eltis, *The Rise of African Slavery in the Americas* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 166. For the volume of the British slave trade in this period see David Eltis, 'The British Transatlantic Slave Trade before 1714: Annual Estimates of Volume and Direction' in Robert L. Paquette and Stanley L. Engerman (eds), *The Lesser Antilles in the Age of European Expansion* (Gainesville, FL, University Press of Florida, 1996), pp. 182–205.

² Davies, *The Royal African Company*, p. 125; Eltis, 'The Volume and African Origins of the British Slave Trade', pp. 621–2; Eltis, 'The British Transatlantic Slave Trade before 1714', pp. 183, 188–91. Cf. Joseph E. Inikori, 'The Volume of the British Slave Trade, 1655–1807', *Cahiers d'Études africaines*, 128 (1992), pp. 677–84. The most recent estimates of the volume of the English slave trade before 1700, and of the relative contribution of company and private ships, are contained in Eltis *et al.*, *The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade*.

³ Madge Dresser, *Slavery Obscured: The Social History of the Slave Trade in an English Provincial Port* (London, Continuum, 2001), pp. 13–15.

⁴ Ephraim Lipson, *The Economic History of England*, vol. 2: *The Age of Mercantilism*, 6th edn (London, Adam & Charles Black, 1956), p. 356.

The Royal African Company originally operated without parliamentary sanction. Under William III's government, however, royal monopolies increasingly came under the scrutiny of a parliament strengthened by the political settlement associated with the 'Glorious' Revolution. In such circumstances, the Royal African Company sought confirmation of its charter. But influential lobbyists, encouraged by the critical view of chartered organisations, petitioned Parliament in 1698 for an open trade to Africa. This was the theme, for example, of the petition sent to the House of Commons by the mayor, aldermen and common council of Bristol along with that city's prestigious Society of Merchant Venturers.¹ The legislation revoking the Royal African Company's monopoly occurred when other chartered organisations were pressurised by the government's desire to promote private merchant interests and freedom of trade and by coalitions of merchants, manufacturers, sea captains and planters who petitioned Parliament regularly for the removal of barriers to their own commercial endeavours. Several English chartered companies came under attack, including the Eastland Company and the Merchant Adventurers of England. In the late 1690s the English East India Company, the Hudson's Bay Company and the Russia Company began to allow outsiders to join their ranks. The Levant Company was the one English chartered organisation that experienced little change during William III's reign.²

The act that opened up the slave trade to a wider group of merchants was a severe blow to the Royal African Company, which had delivered more slaves to the western hemisphere by the late seventeenth century than any other single business.³ The statute relating to the slave trade in 1698 (9 Will.3 c.26), represented a decisive change in the conduct of the traffic. It rescinded the Royal African Company's monopoly and opened the trade to Africa to private traders, who until 1712 were required to pay a 10 per cent tax to the Collector of Customs at the port from which their vessel cleared. The levy was based on the value of all goods imported into and exported from Africa, apart from redwood, which paid 5 per cent, and gold, silver and slaves, which were free. The opening up of the trade was the culmination of a process that began in 1688. Thereafter the Royal African Company did not enforce its monopoly rights and the slave trade was conducted by the company, by separate traders (the 'ten per centers') and by clandestine interlopers (who had already been operating in the 1670s).

¹ Petition dated 23 Feb. 1698 in W. E. Minchinton (ed.), *Politics and the Port of Bristol in the Eighteenth Century: The Petitions of the Society of Merchant Venturers 1698-1803* (Bristol, Bristol Record Society's Publications, 23, 1963), pp. 2-3.

² Lipson, *The Economic History of England*, vol. 2, pp. 265-7, 307-11, 325-6, 332-4, 351-2, 361-2.

³ Eltis, *Rise of African Slavery in the Americas*, pp. 212-13.

There was also a fair amount of fraud carried out by ship captains on company vessels who were involved in the 'running of negroes' behind the backs of the company's Caribbean factors. After 1698 private merchants traded in slaves from west Africa legitimately and soon overtook the Royal African Company's vessels in terms of the ships they dispatched to Africa and the number of slaves they delivered to the Americas.¹ From 1713 onwards, when private traders no longer paid the 10 per cent tax, the Royal African Company's role in the slave trade diminished. The vast majority of the c. 3 million slaves taken by British ships to the New World in the eighteenth century, when Britain became the largest national carrier of slaves, were shipped in privately-owned vessels from London, Bristol and Liverpool.²

Private traders made impressive inroads into the trade of the Royal African Company between 1698 and 1712, when the 10 per cent tax operated. As early as 1701 great numbers of 'ten per centers' were noted at Whydah, for example, where they were said to be pushing up slave prices.³ In 1714 several representatives of the Royal African Company wrote from Cape Coast Castle that 'the English interlopers continue to infest that Coast ... Annamabo is Seldom without Five or Six of them, and Shidoe constantly frequented by them'.⁴ The rapid rise of the private traders was achieved despite difficult wartime trading conditions during the War of the Spanish Succession when French privateers roamed the English Channel and the sea lanes leading out into the Atlantic, capturing British vessels and seizing their cargoes as prizes. In the war years 1688-97 and 1702-12 the Royal African Company lost a quarter of the 183 ships it sent out from England and some 114 vessels on the homeward run from the West Indies. Most of these vessels were the victims of enemy action. These losses had serious financial consequences: up to 1708, forty-four ships lost en route to Africa cost the company £124,652 and goods worth £136,641 were lost from ships returning home from the Caribbean.⁵

The battle between the Royal African Company and private merchants was particularly strong between 1698 and 1712, but it raged for several years thereafter. It eventually simmered down by the mid-1720s when it

¹ Davies, *The Royal African Company*, pp. 38-135.

² David Richardson, 'The British Empire and the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1660-1807' in P. J. Marshall (ed.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. 2: *The Eighteenth Century* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 442, 446.

³ Robin Law, *The Slave Coast of West Africa, 1550-1750: The Impact of the Atlantic Slave Trade on an African Society* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 137.

⁴ Gerrard Gore, James Phipps and Robert Blean to the RAC, 11 June 1715, in Elizabeth Donnan (ed.), *Documents Illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade to America* (4 vols, Washington, D. C., Carnegie Institute of Washington, 1930-5), vol. 2, p. 195.

⁵ Davies, *The Royal African Company*, pp. 206-8.

became clear that the company's long-standing hope for a renewal of their monopoly had faded and that the private merchants had won. Various arguments for and against the company's monopoly were widely discussed in the first quarter of the eighteenth century. Between 1689 and 1714 Parliament debated legislation or enquired into the organisation of the British trade to Africa in fifteen separate sessions and the printed literature on the company's monopoly generated 198 titles. This was probably the most widely discussed economic controversy in Britain during the reigns of the last two Stuarts.¹ In 1707 the Royal African Company could no longer withstand competition from private traders and so it petitioned Queen Anne to restore its monopoly. The Queen referred the petition to the Board of Trade, and this began a lengthy struggle between the company and the separate traders over their respective claims. Neither group was happy with the operation of the 10 per cent tax, and both knew the levy was due to expire in 1711.² In 1707, 1708, 1709, 1711, 1725 and 1726 the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations conducted extensive investigations into the Royal African Company's affairs. They collected evidence on the company's conduct of the slave trade and held hearings and received testimonies from the private traders.³

The Board of Trade was prominent in attacks on the Royal African Company between 1707 and 1710. It took advantage of the only Whig administration of Queen Anne's reign to carry out its campaign against the renewal of monopoly rights in the British slave trade. In 1708 and 1709 it advocated an open and free trade to Africa but insisted that the African forts be preserved. This argument stymied the company's attempts to procure a bill to reconfirm its charter and monopoly. The Board was more cautious in its campaign against the company, however, after a Tory revival in the Commons in 1710 created a more favourable political atmosphere for the support of chartered trading organisations.⁴ In 1708 a flurry of pamphlets brought to the surface the animosity between the company and

¹ Tim Keirn, 'Monopoly, Economic Thought, and the Royal African Company' in John Brewer and Susan Staves (eds), *Early Modern Conceptions of Property* (London, Routledge, 1995), pp. 430, 437. The pros and cons of the printed literature dealing with debates over the RAC's monopoly are covered in *ibid.*, pp. 437–45.

² D. A. G. Waddell, 'Queen Anne's Government and the Slave Trade', *Caribbean Quarterly*, 6 (1960), p. 8; I. K. Steele, *Politics of Colonial Policy: The Board of Trade in Colonial Administration 1696–1720* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1968), p. 126.

³ Donnan (ed.), *Documents*, vol. 3, p. xxxi; *Journal of the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations from April 1704 to February 1708–9 preserved in the Public Record Office* (London, 1920), pp. 444, 446–7, 449–50, 452–4.

⁴ Steele, *Politics of Colonial Policy*, pp. 126–31; Keirn, 'Monopoly, Economic Thought, and the Royal African Company', pp. 435–6.

the private traders.¹ Numerous petitions also reached the floor of the House of Commons: between 12 and 16 March 1708 several petitions were received there from the merchants, planters and separate traders to Africa, Virginia, Maryland, Jamaica, Barbados and the Leeward Islands, requesting relief from the burden of the 10 per cent tax.² At times it seemed as if the entire manufacturing and trading community of England was engrossed in the tussle. Thus petitions arguing the merits of the company and the separate traders poured in to Parliament from the shipwrights, ropemakers, sailmakers and tradesmen dealing in naval manufactures in London; the shipowners of Edinburgh; the gunmakers and cutlers of Birmingham; those engaged in the woollen industry in Exeter and London; the mayor, aldermen, merchants and tradesmen of Liverpool; the Society of Merchant Venturers of Bristol; and the corporations of Plymouth, Bridgewater and Bristol.³

In a report presented in 1709 to the House of Commons, the Royal African Company argued that African slave suppliers took advantage of the increased and more varied range of traders to advance the price of slaves and trade goods, and that slaves cost £10 each to purchase in Africa whereas previously they only cost £3. They believed that slaves were not so expensive on those parts of the African coast not frequented by private traders, such as Calabar and Angola. They argued that the 10 per cent duty was insufficient to provide the revenue needed to cover the costs of the forts and castles maintained by the company in west Africa: between 1698 and 1707 the charges incurred by these fortified settlements, originally built to withstand Dutch rivalry, exceeded the sum raised by the duty by £185,707. The Royal African Company also complained that Africans had grown insolent and were encouraged by other traders to cripple the economic viability of the company's forts. Moreover, disloyal employees in the forts colluded with captains of private traders to defraud the company. Foreigners took advantage of this confusion to try to destroy the company's interests in Africa.

The private traders replied to all of these points. They admitted that the price of slaves was less expensive in parts of west Africa where they did not

¹ The Board of Trade to the Governors of the English Colonies, 17 Apr. 1708, in Donnan (ed.), *Documents*, vol. 2, pp. 44–6; *Considerations on the Trade to Guinea* (London, 1708), pp. 13, 25–30; *The Falsities of Private Traders Discover'd, and the Mischiefs they Occasion Demonstrated* (London, 1708).

² Leo Francis Stock (ed.), *Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliament respecting North America* (4 vols, Washington, D. C., Carnegie Institute of Washington, 1930), vol. 3, pp. 190–1.

³ Petitions to the House of Commons, 20 Dec. 1709 and 24 Jan. 1710, in Donnan (ed.), *Documents*, vol. 2, pp. 107–8; *Journals of the House of Commons*, vol. 15, pp. 599, 602, 612, 625–6, 631.

interfere with the existing interests of the Royal African Company but attributed this to the fact that the commodities they supplied maintained their value in places where the company had few or no settlements. They added that too much was spent on forts and castles in west Africa, including excessive salaries for the personnel employed there and extravagant entertainment and bribes given to 'working negroes' to help procure slaves for them. They concluded that the 10 per cent levy was unnecessary when these other outlays were already excessive. The private traders argued that the company had indeed experienced difficulty with Africans but that this was owing to their ill usage and bad treatment of them. As for collusion between the private traders and the company's factors, the former group insisted that their ships were forbidden to correspond with the Royal African Company or to go near their factories. The answer of the 'ten percenters' to the confusion in the management of the trade was to put all trade to Africa – both private and by the company – on an equal footing.¹

The second text reprinted in this volume amplified some of these points. But *A True State of the Present Difference between the Royal African Company, and the Separate Traders ...* (1710, pp. 17–57) provides additional arguments favouring the private traders' cause. It suggests that the Royal African Company assisted Dutch interlopers on the west African coast while failing to support English private traders, and that the £87,465 raised since 1698 by the 10 per cent duty should have enabled the company to maintain its forts in a better condition than had been the case. In the view of this anonymous writer, a return to the exclusive privileges of the Royal African Company would harm England's interest in the slave trade: it would hamper the supply of slaves to the plantations, reduce the employment of those engaged in shipping and navigation, and advance the price of staple produce to the British consumer.²

The private traders added weight to their arguments by pointing out that they, too, needed a substantial capital in order to conduct the slave trade. In 1711 Humfrey Morice and Richard Harris, acting on behalf of the separate traders to Africa, cited statistics to support this argument taken from a list supplied by Colonel Yates of Bristol and from the custom house books of the port of London. They suggested that some £233,000 was tied up in the provision of ships, cargoes, wages, insurance and the 10 per cent

¹ These arguments are set out in detail in the Report on the Trade to Africa, 27 Jan. 1709, in Donnan (ed.), *Documents*, vol. 2, pp. 49–68, citing PRO, CO 390/12, fols 172–282. For similar arguments, collected by Robert Bristow of London in the early eighteenth century, see Boston University, Mugar Library, Special Collections, Bortman MS file: American Plantations: Trade with the Plantations, 2 vols, vol. 1, fols 21–39. Some of the points mentioned here are also outlined in PRO, CO 388/13, L 80, Dalby Thomas and others to the RAC, 26 Nov. 1709.

² See below, pp. 43–55.

duty for forty-four ships in which they were concerned. They had debts in the plantation colonies amounting to nearly £300,000. Therefore the separate traders needed a stock of nearly half a million pounds in order to continue trading. Morice and Harris concluded that 'in noe time there ever was soe great a stock employed in this trade even in time of peace by an Exclusive Company as now in time of war by separate traders'.¹ On several later occasions Bristol and Liverpool private traders rebutted the Royal African Company's propaganda regarding the preservation of its monopoly.²

The Royal African Company mobilised its own counterattack. Support for the company came not just from its leaders and the London mercantile community; interested parties in the Caribbean also registered their support. In August 1709 a group of planters from Barbados petitioned the House of Commons to assert that only the Royal African Company was able to supply sufficient slaves at affordable prices for their sugar estates: since 1698 the price of acquiring Africans had risen and the sale price demanded for them at disembarkation had increased to between £25 and £40 per head. Moreover, the supply of slaves to Barbados and the Leeward Islands had dwindled in recent years. The petitioners wanted the monopoly of the Royal African Company restored so that planters would no longer be reliant on a set of 'transient and unconstant separate traders'.³ Not all Bajans took the same view. On 9 December 1709 the House of Commons received a petition from the planters and inhabitants of Barbados arguing that the opening of the trade to Africa had benefited them greatly. Previously they were obliged to buy slaves solely from the Royal African

¹ PRO, CO 388/15, fol. 97v, Humphry Morice and Richard Harris for the Separate Traders to Africa, 1711.

² See, for example, Cecil Headlam (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial Series America and West Indies 1726-1727 preserved in the Public Record Office* (London, 1936), no. 86, Samuel Ogden and Charles Pole on behalf of the Liverpool merchants trading to the coast of Africa to the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, 22 Mar. 1726, pp. 36-7; Minchinton (ed.), *Politics and the Port of Bristol*, pp. 2-4, 7; Stock (ed.), *Proceedings and Debates*, vol. 3, pp. 195-6, 206, 223, 251; Patrick McGrath, *The Merchant Venturers of Bristol: A History of the Society of Merchant Venturers of the City of Bristol from its Origin to the Present Day* (Bristol, The Society, 1975), pp. 60-1; PRO, CO 388/25, S37, fols 161-2, Representation of John Becher, Peter Day and William Jefferis, Bristol merchants, on behalf of themselves and other merchants in that city trading to Africa..., 17 Mar. 1725; Donnan (ed.), *Documents*, vol. 2, p. 433, n.1. Donnan includes a detailed discussion of the battle between the RAC and the private traders in *ibid.*, vol. 3, pp. xxxi-xxxii, 97-9, 102, 107-8.

³ PRO, CO388/25, fols 155-6, *A Joint Letter from the most considerable Proprietors of the Island of Barbados to Colonel Richard Scot, Colonel Robert Steward, Richard Bate, Patrick Mein, and Thomas Fullerton, Esqs; and other Friends in England, having Estates or Interests in the said Island, touching the Petition which they lately transmitted to be given to the Honourable House of Commons, for having the Trade to Africa carried on by a Company of a Sufficient Joint-Stock; together with their Reasons subjoin'd* (Barbados, 1709).

Company at the prices and quality that the company sought to offer the buyer. They now considered that an open trade would give the purchaser more choice and replenish the number of slaves on Barbados, which they argued had diminished during the present war.¹

Even while it held its monopoly, the Royal African Company failed to deliver slaves to meet the level of transatlantic demand. In 1686–7, when the traffic was thriving, company ships delivered 10,815 African captives to the West Indies, but this figure fell to below 3,000 slaves annually within a couple of years and then remained at a relatively modest level.² Available statistics also show that the Royal African Company rapidly lost the competition for the supply of slaves to the colonies after 1698. Between that year and 1725 Londoners fitted out 1,100 ventures for Africa, 850 being financed by private traders and less than 250 by the Royal African Company.³ A contemporary pamphlet argued that even in the first years of official private trade, from 1700 to 1702, the Royal African Company only delivered 4,000 slaves out of more than 42,000 disembarked at Barbados, Jamaica and Antigua.⁴ In the period 24 June 1698 to December 1707 West Indian governors estimated that the company delivered 6,854 slaves to Jamaica compared with 35,718 from the separate traders; and that the equivalent figures for Barbados were 9,006 and 25,577 slaves respectively.⁵ Another return covering 25 December 1707 to 25 December 1708 stated that 1,543 slaves were delivered to Jamaica by company ships and 3,365 by the separate traders.⁶ Returns from governors of other colonies indicated the same trend. A summary of all the information submitted to the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations showed that in the first ten years of free trade, some 75,000 slaves had been brought to Jamaica, Barbados, Antigua, Montserrat, Virginia, Maryland and New England combined, including only 18,000 from the Royal African Company.⁷

Public dissemination of these statistics appears to have stirred the company into action, for in November 1710 a statement from African House, London claimed that in the past two years the Royal African Company had

¹ Stock (ed.), *Proceedings and Debates*, vol. 3, p. 223.

² Davies, *The Royal African Company*, p. 363.

³ David Richardson, 'The Eighteenth-Century British Slave Trade: Estimates of its Volume and Coastal Distribution in Africa', *Research in Economic History*, 12 (1989), pp. 169–71.

⁴ See below, p. 51.

⁵ Report on the Trade to Africa, 27 Jan. 1709, in Donnan (ed.), *Documents*, vol. 2, pp. 64–5. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 25–9, 86–7.

⁶ PRO, CO 388/11, 1 67, List of slaves due to be delivered from Africa to Jamaica, 1708.

⁷ Davies, *The Royal African Company*, p. 143. No returns for Nevis and St Kitts are available. For a tabulation of slaves imported and sold in Antigua by the RAC from 24 June 1698 to 25 Dec. 1707 see Antigua Accounts, 2 Feb. 1702–26 Aug. 1707, in Donnan (ed.), *Documents*, vol. 2, pp. 34–43.

sent more slaves to Barbados and the Leeward Islands than the separate traders, whose greatest import of slaves was made at Jamaica.¹ Whether or not this was true or merely a general assertion made during a war of propaganda, there is little doubt that the private traders continued to take the lion's share of slaves from Africa in British vessels after the 10 per cent tax lapsed. The pamphleteer Joshua Gee, a supporter of the private traders, noted in 1729 that the Royal African Company never supplied more than 6,000 slaves yearly to the colonies whereas the private traders took over 30,000 slaves per annum.² The company delivered 1,743 slaves to the British plantation colonies between 1715 and 1721, but this diminished to 536 between 1725 and 1729.³

Colonial Office records show that the Royal African Company imported 4,226 slaves into Barbados between 1708 and 1725 whereas the private traders imported 49,777 slaves there.⁴ A return for Montserrat indicates a similar trend. From 25 March 1721 to 25 December 1729, seventeen private traders delivered 3,120 slaves to the island whereas only two Royal African Company ships, carrying ninety slaves, disembarked slaves there.⁵ Montserrat had been three times better supplied with slaves since the 10 per cent duty ceased than before: planters there had as many Africans delivered as they could pay for, and they never received equivalent supplies from the Royal African Company. In 1726 Samuel Wragg, who had traded to Carolina for seventeen years, stated that the Royal African Company had never supplied Carolina with any slaves on their own account except by a particular contract with him, and that the colony was regularly supplied with all the slaves it wanted by the separate traders. In the same year it was reported that no company ships had entered Virginia in the past three or four years; that Antigua was well supplied with slaves by the separate traders; and that, since before 1712, private traders had imported seven slaves into Jamaica for every one brought by the Royal African Company.⁶

Why did the separate traders dent the trade of the Royal African Company so quickly and decisively after 1698? The company tried to compete

¹ PRO, CO 388/13, L 57, 'An Account of the 10 per cent paid by the separate traders to the Royal African Company's Account of the Exports - charge of the forts - Negroes imported to the Plantations, and of the Company's Settlements in Africa', 17 Nov. 1710.

² Joshua Gee, *The Trade and Navigation of Great-Britain Consider'd* (London, Sam. Buckley, 1729), p. 26.

³ Davies, *The Royal African Company*, pp. 344-5.

⁴ Frank W. Pitman, *The Development of the British West Indies 1700-1763* (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1917), p. 72.

⁵ PRO, CO 152/18, T67, fols 75r-76v: Mountserrrat, 'An Account of the Number of Negroe Slaves imported in this Island from the 25th March 1721 to the 25th December 1729'.

⁶ *Journal of the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations from January 1722-3 to December 1728 preserved in the Public Record Office* (London, 1928), pp. 254-5.

effectively with the private traders by sending out exports to Africa worth £160,000 between 1701 and 1704, double the figure dispatched from 1694 to 1697. But the separate traders mustered more ships and goods and bid better prices for Africans while the company experienced financial difficulties and had to pay for the upkeep of its forts and castles (something it was obliged to do under its charter). Because the 10 per cent traders had no permanent establishments in areas such as the Gold Coast, they had to offer better credit terms and superior quality goods to attract African traders.¹ And this was achieved even though the separate traders had no protection on the west African coast: they could not trade at forts and initially lacked the range of commercial contacts with traders on the African coast that the Royal African Company had sedulously cultivated over several decades in the late seventeenth century.

Nevertheless, private traders conducted their transactions as and when they wanted without the obligation to do so continuously. They were not obliged to continue trade with just those parts of west Africa where the Royal African Company had established forts and factories. In making this decision, they took account of a number of matters: the supply patterns of slaves in different regions; the current purchase prices for African captives; the assortment of goods they could muster to meet local African demand; the extent of their commercial connections with white and mulatto traders; the general healthiness of particular areas; the state of international competition on different parts of the west African coast; the political circumstances of African societies that controlled the supply of slaves. They also adapted to changing conditions in the trade more readily than a monopoly organisation. They switched from slave trading to other forms of commerce without any public direction. They coped with poor voyages better than the company: private traders registering a losing voyage either stayed out of the trade or went bankrupt in serious cases of loss, whereas the Royal African Company had to continue trading in the same line even after loss-making voyages.² Private traders could time their voyages more flexibly than the company, with economic benefits accruing to them as a result. Thus the President of the Virginia Council stated that private traders brought more slaves than the company to the Old Dominion but could charge more for them because they timed voyages to arrive in Virginia early in the summer season, whereas the company's ships did not arrive until after the autumn fieldwork had been completed.³

¹ Kwame Yelboah Daaku, *Trade and Politics on the Gold Coast 1600-1720* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 41.

² Davies, *The Royal African Company*, pp. 135-51.

³ Steele, *Politics of Colonial Policy*, p. 128.

Feeling the pressure of competition from the private traders, the Royal African Company tried to develop commodities for export from Africa. Schemes to this effect were undertaken between 1705 and 1712 by Sir Dalby Thomas, the governor of the company resident on the Gold Coast, who was particularly interested in developing gold and cotton for export. The plans came to nothing because the company's white servants on the coast were usually more committed to their private trade, which they carried out at the expense of the company's business. In addition, local Africans were more concerned with producing their own subsistence crops than with turning their attention to gold extraction or cotton planting.¹ The Royal African Company also tried to extend its operations in west Africa by erecting a fort on the Loango Coast between 1721 and 1723. This was the first time that a European trading organisation had attempted to establish hegemony on that part of the slaving coast. The fort was duly constructed overlooking the anchorage of Cabinda Bay, but its personnel soon encountered friction with Portuguese, French and local Woyo interests in that area. The British garrison at Cabinda Bay surrendered in May 1723 after an attack by a Portuguese expedition sent from Lisbon.²

These examples show that the Royal African Company tried various schemes to improve its weakened position in the early eighteenth century; but the plans implemented rapidly failed. Other difficulties emerged with the operation of the company. Adam Smith argued in *The Wealth of Nations* that the Royal African Company failed in the early eighteenth century because its managing directors handled investors' money and lacked sufficient motivation to drive the trade efficiently in the face of competition. But it is rather the case that failure lay in the company's inability to generate sufficient profits from its early days in the 1670s and 1680s; from the economic burden of its west African forts; from its inability to monitor effectively the performance of its employees in west Africa and the Caribbean; and from accumulated debts from planters in the West Indies that exceeded the company's own equity.³ The burden of supporting forts was considerable: Charles Haycs, writing in 1744, reckoned that the Royal African Company had spent £17,000 per year to support its forts and settlements in west Africa whereas about £30,000 annually, preferably by means of a parliamentary allowance, was needed.⁴ So heavy was the burden

¹ Joseph E. Inikori, *The Chaining of a Continent: Export Demand for Captives and the History of Africa South of the Sahara, 1450-1870* (Mona, Jamaica, Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, 1992), p. 47.

² Phyllis M. Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast 1576-1870: The Effects of Changing Commercial Relations on the Vili Kingdom of Loango* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1972), pp. 81-3.

³ Davies, *The Royal African Company*, pp. 63-74; Galenson, *Traders, Planters, and Slaves*, pp. 145-50.

⁴ See below, p. 140.

that the company abandoned some of its forts. This occurred in Sierra Leone in 1728 and 1729, when the company quit the Sherbro area and left its business there in the hands of private English and mulatto traders.¹ The removal of the protection granted under the Royal African Company's charter meant that the market structure of Anglo-African trade altered decisively: the company, as a dominant firm, faced penetration from fringe operators in the form of interlopers in the 1690s. As the property right in the charter lapsed after 1698, the interlopers assumed the role of a substantial trading interest that could increase their market share rapidly. It has therefore been claimed that 'the decline of the Royal African Company was the result of the historical accident of the rise of the House of Orange'.² This conclusion nevertheless ignores the evidence pointing to the failure of the company to make profits before the Revolution of 1688 undermined its charter.³

Apart from these reasons, the Royal African Company also faced problems through its association with the South Sea Company in the provision of slaves to South America. During the negotiations over the Treaty of Utrecht, which concluded the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–13), the London-based South Sea Company won the prized right, under the 'asiento', to supply the Spanish American colonies with slaves; in other words, it became an exclusive private contractor dealing with the Spanish government and supplying money for the Spanish royal treasury. It paid the British government £7,500,000 for this privilege. The South Sea Company was limited, under article 10 of the asiento treaty, to trading with the Atlantic shores of Spanish America; and though it was permitted to supply slaves, it was debarred from taking English merchandise to the Spanish colonies.⁴ This was the first time that the asiento had been awarded to British merchants: previously it had been dominated by the Dutch in the 1670s and 1680s, by the Portuguese in the 1690s and by the French during the War of the Spanish Succession.⁵

Britain participated in the supply of slaves to Spanish American markets before receiving the asiento. Before 1713 the British split the delivery of slaves to Spanish America with the Dutch. Some of this commerce was a

¹ Adam Jones, *From Slaves to Palm Kernels: A History of the Gambia Country (West Africa) 1730-1890* (Wiesbaden, F. Steiner, 1983), p. 27.

² Ann M. Carlos and Jamie Brown Kruse, 'The Decline of the Royal African Company: Fringe Firms and the Role of the Charter', *Economic History Review*, 2nd series, 49 (1996), pp. 291–313 (quotation on p. 312).

³ For details see Davies, *The Royal African Company*, pp. 74–9.

⁴ Jean O. McLachlan, *Trade and Peace with Old Spain 1667-1750: A Study of the Influence of Commerce on Anglo-Spanish Diplomacy in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1940), pp. 59, 61.

⁵ Johannes Menne Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1600-1815* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 46.

contraband trade in which slaves brought by the Royal African Company to Jamaica were sold to the Spaniards.¹ David Eltis considers that this flourishing British trade supplied c. 20,000 slaves to Spanish America between 1701 and 1714, a greater number than appears in the Royal African Company's records.² Most of these slaves were probably supplied from British West Indian islands rather than directly from Africa.³ The asiento arrangement lasted for thirty-five years but it was inactive when Britain and Spain were in conflict (1718–21 and 1727–9) and during the war years from 1739 till 1748. The contract with the Spanish allowed the South Sea Company to deliver a maximum of 4,700 slaves a year to Spanish American colonies. For supplying slaves to the Spanish colonies, the company received 4,800 *piezas de Indias* per annum, each of which was the equivalent of importing a healthy adult male, aged between fifteen and thirty, in good physical condition. Between 1714 and 1739 the South Sea Company delivered 74,760 slaves to various ports in Cuba and South America. Over half that total arrived at Panama and Porto Bello, Buenos Aires and Cartagena; another 20 per cent disembarked at Havana, Caracas, and Vera Cruz.⁴ In practice, the carrying of slaves for the company was undertaken by London merchants associated with the Royal African Company, who competed vigorously for the business. Indeed, the connections between the South Sea and Royal African companies were considerable: many subscribers to South Sea stock had served on the African Company's Court of Assistants.⁵ Moreover, the South Sea Company signed contracts with the Royal African Company for the provision of slaves. In 1713, for example, a contract between the two companies provided for the following proportions of slaves from different parts of the African coast: Whydah, 1,900 slaves; Cape Coast and adjoining factories, 1,500 slaves; the Windward and Cape coasts, 500 slaves; Gambia, Sierra Leone and Sherbro, 200 slaves; and Gambia and adjacent parts, 700 slaves.⁶

The South Sea Company was not really successful in its operations. This was true of its general commercial operations as well as of its participation

¹ Nuala Zahedieh, 'The Merchants of Port Royal, Jamaica and the Contraband Trade, 1655–1692', *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd series, 43 (1986), pp. 590–1.

² Eltis, *Rise of African Slavery in the Americas*, pp. 209, 212–13.

³ In addition, between 1698 and 1713 English ships took 4,033 slaves directly from Africa to the colonies of rival European powers, mostly to the French Antilles: see Eltis, 'British Transatlantic Slave Trade', pp. 195, 199–200.

⁴ Colin A. Palmer, *Human Cargoes: The British Slave Trade to Spanish America, 1700–1739* (Urbana, IL, University of Illinois Press, 1981), pp. 79, 84–6, 99, 130–42.

⁵ James A. Rawley, 'The Port of London and the Eighteenth Century Slave Trade: Historians, Sources, and a Reappraisal', *African Economic History*, 9 (1980), p. 94; Keirn, 'Monopoly, Economic Thought, and the Royal African Company', p. 436.

⁶ For these details and a transcription of the 1713 contract see Donnan (ed.), *Documents*, vol. 2, pp. 158–68.

in the slave trade. The company had been founded in the hope that Spanish concessions at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession would enable it to exploit commercial opportunities in the great south sea, the Pacific Ocean. But the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) brought with it no such concessions from Spain and the company never sent a single ship into the Pacific. The South Sea Company also operated as a finance house, concerned particularly with buying up part of the National Debt; but after intense speculation led to the South Sea Bubble in 1720, a spectacular crash on the stock market, its financial reputation was tarnished. As for its slave trading operations, the South Sea Company repeatedly failed to supply its annual quota of slave deliveries to Spanish settlers in America. Claims that the company annually exported more slaves than private traders from Jamaica were an exaggeration.¹ The South Sea Company eventually dropped out of trade by surrendering the *asiento* in 1750.

By the late 1720s the Royal African Company had almost become defunct as a supplier of slaves to America, though some mercantilists continued into the 1740s to regard it as something more than a lost cause. Four texts reproduced here stem from this period, when the company was already a weak supplier of slaves to the New World. But, as the documents show, a case could still be made for the maintenance of the forts in west Africa. *The Case of the Royal African Company of England* (1730, pp. 61–94) reminds its readers of the considerable struggle between the English, the Dutch and the French over the African trade from the middle of the seventeenth century onwards. This account of the rivalry between European powers over the African trade forms the context for a discussion of the parlous financial state of the Royal African Company, which has the responsibility for maintaining the forts. According to the pamphlet, the company had expended £250,000 on these forts since the 10 per cent levy on private traders elapsed in 1712 and, in all, had probably spent £851,000 on these establishments and their upkeep since receiving its charter in 1672. The pamphlet accepts – unlike earlier polemical literature published in Queen Anne's reign – that the slave trade is now an open trade; hence there is no call here for the restoration of the company's monopoly. However, there is a request for parliamentary support for the forts because of the slave trade's critical role in promoting the growth of British plantations in the Americas.² The pamphlet may well have played some part in publicising the Royal African Company's inability to pay for its west African

¹ E.g. [James Houstoun], *A True and Impartial Account of the Rise and Progress of the South Sea Company; wherein the Assiento Contract is particularly considered* (London, T. Cooper, 1743), p. 14.

² See below, pp. 63–94.

forts and factories because in 1730 the government provided a subsidy of £10,000 to assist this work, a sum renewed annually until 1743.¹

This annual grant proved insufficient to meet the Royal African Company's needs in maintaining its forts. In 1744 the government tried to alleviate the situation by increasing the annual subsidy to the company to £20,000.² The last three texts provide evidence about the state of the company's forts, factories and expenses to show that further public sums are needed; that the African trade is inextricably bound up with the plantation trade to the West Indies; and that Britain's transatlantic commerce is threatened by inattention to the African forts during a major war with the French, who had been making inroads into the British slave trade.³ *The Importance of Effectually Supporting ...* (1744, pp. 97–145) argues that the maintenance of forts is better than positioning stationed ships to protect Britain's African trade in a period of warfare on the oceans. Despite the government subsidy offered since 1730, the Royal African Company had incurred a shortfall of nearly £17,000 annually between the end of 1729 and the end of 1741. A parliamentary allowance of £30,000 per year, it is argued, would benefit the nation in order to protect Britain's stake in the slave trade. Details of the situation of fifteen Royal African Company forts are included to underscore the need for financial aid.⁴

Malachy Postlethwayt's argument in support of the Royal African Company is to link the African and West Indian trades as one indivisible whole supporting the slave plantations in the British Empire and, through that means, the wealth and power of Britain itself. *The African Trade, the Great Pillar and Support ...* (1745, pp. 149–94) expresses particular concern at Franco-British rivalry over the maintenance and output of the Caribbean sugar plantations. The French and Dutch, according to Postlethwayt, have given more bounties and credit than the British to support their African and West Indian trades. He feared that the *asiento* would pass to either of these rivals if the Royal African Company was dissolved. This was clearly a forced argument, for the *asiento* had declined some time before this pamphlet was written and was no longer a central part of the British slave trade. But the Royal African Company had spent more than £100,000 per year in the fourteen years since 1729 over and above what it received as government subsidy. Some might have argued that the size of the deficit was owing in large part to inefficient running of the company. This issue was sidestepped by Postlethwayt, however, who emphasises the need to give greater public

¹ Davies, *The Royal African Company*, p. 345.

² *Ibid.*

³ For the French impact on British slave trading in Africa at this time, see Kenneth Morgan, *Bristol and the Atlantic Trade in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 142.

⁴ See below, pp. 129–36, 140–1.

financial support for the Royal African Company so that Britain can compete effectively with France as a naval and commercial power.¹

The unprofitability and chronic indebtedness of the Royal African Company was a common theme running through these and other publications printed in London in 1744 and 1745. In an unpublished account, it was claimed that the company had acknowledged themselves bankrupt three times and that the African trade had only been preserved for Britain by the separate traders. There was no question, in the view of this anonymous writer, of the African trade operating again on a joint-stock basis.² In 1745 a letter from a naval commander to the Admiralty noted further that insufficient merchandise was dispatched to support the Royal African Company's forts and that, as a result, it was difficult to carry on a brisk trade with African traders. The head of Sekondi fort so lacked necessary trade items that he intended to lock up the fort and return to Cape Coast, having been obliged to borrow from a neighbouring Dutch fort to meet the subsistence requirements of his establishment.³

Despite these problems, the Royal African Company made strenuous efforts to convince the government that additional funds were necessary to support its forts. Its creditors came to the fore in clamouring for such support during the parliamentary session of 1747–8 but no extra finance was voted by Parliament.⁴ The annual grant of £10,000 that the company received from Parliament until 1747 was not renewed thereafter. The company therefore became self-supporting. It now faced strong pressure from the larger body of traders who wanted to keep the trade to Africa open to private traders and not the preserve of a monopoly company. Sovereignty and possession, it was recognised, were important reasons for maintaining forts and settlements on the west African coast, but by the 1750s the company trade along the Gold Coast was a minor part of British slave trading compared with the activities of private merchants from London, Liverpool and Bristol. Petitions to support the private traders' point of view flowed regularly to the Privy Council and the House of Commons from groups such as the Mayor and Council of Bristol, the Merchant Venturers of Bristol and leading merchants of London and Liverpool.⁵

¹ See below, pp. 153–94.

² British Library, Add. MS. 33,053, fols 292–5: 'Observations on the Severall Plans for settling the African Trade which have been discuss'd in Parliament and in favour of the Bill now depending in the House of Lords', n.d. but 1740s, Newcastle Papers, vol. CCCLXVIII.

³ PRO, CO 388/44, CC 23, Extracts of a letter from Capt. Pocock, commander of His Majesty's Ship the *Sutherland* to Mr. Corbett, 9 Feb. 1745.

⁴ David Hancock, *Citizens of the World: London Merchants and the Integration of the British Atlantic Community, 1735–1785* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 182–3.

⁵ For examples from 1748, 1749 and 1750 see Minchinton (ed.), *Politics and the Port of Bristol*, pp. 67–9, 71, 75; *Journal of the House of Commons*, 25 (1745–50), pp. 977–8.

In 1749 Bristol and Liverpool merchants were largely responsible for proposing a bill for the reorganisation of the African trade. Their suggestions became the basis of the African Trade Act of 1750, which opened the trade to all British subjects between Sallee, near Marakesh, and the Cape of Good Hope. The Royal African Company's forts were to be maintained under a new company known as 'The Company of Merchants Trading to Africa'. Admission to the new company was open to all British subjects on payment of a fee of forty shillings. Subscribers who joined became freemen of the company organised in three separate groups in London, Bristol and Liverpool. An annually elected committee of nine became responsible for the management of the African forts, which were now to be maintained out of an annual parliamentary vote. After 1752 the committee became a permanent body of sixteen. The new company had a council comprising a governor, president, vice-president, the chiefs of Anomabu and Komenda forts, plus an accountant and surgeon. The governor and council were supposed to correspond with London, take steps to protect the Gold Coast, and maintain order, discipline and efficiency in the forts. Unlike the practice under the Royal African Company, there were no sub-committees. The new company was not permitted to trade as a corporate body but it was charged with maintaining the English forts and trading factories in Africa. After the early 1750s the forts and factories on the African coast were maintained on behalf of private traders from the English slaving ports; individual merchant interests were thereby protected against the encroachment of a commercial monopoly.¹

The days of monopoly over the African trade had ended some eighty years after the Royal African Company had been formed; the future conduct of the English slave trade lay exclusively with private traders. An act of 1765 (5 Geo. III c.44) divested the Company of Merchants trading to Africa of its authority over Senegal and Gambia, which became the British crown colony of Senegambia. The other forts remained under company control. In 1783 the crown restored the forts in Senegambia to the Company of Merchants trading to Africa. The African Company survived the abolition of the British slave trade in 1807 but was dissolved by parliamentary act in 1821.²

¹ Hancock, *Citizens of the World*, pp. 183-5; Eveline C. Martin, *The British West African Settlements 1750-1821: A Study in Local Administration* (London, Longmans, 1927), pp. 10, 29-30, 33-4, 37; Margaret Priestley, *West African Trade and Coast Society: A Family Study* (London, Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 4.

² Martin, *The British West African Settlements*, p. 64; Lipson, *The Economic History of England*, vol. 2, pp. 359-60.

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Certain Considerations Relating to the Royal African Company of England. In Which, The Original Growth, and National Advantages of the Guinea Trade, are Demonstrated: As Also That the same Trade cannot be carried on, but by a Company and Joint Stock (London, 1680)

This anonymous pamphlet seems to have arisen from a paper commissioned by the Royal African Company's Court of Assistants in September 1679, with the intention of presenting arguments to Parliament in defence of the company's monopoly. When this failed to eventuate, the findings were summarised in pamphlet form. *Certain Considerations...* is written from a classic mercantilist perspective and is notable as 'the first recognition of the need to justify the African monopoly to public opinion' (K. G. Davies, *The Royal African Company* (London, Longman, 1957), p. 108). It argues that a trade that is so vital to the nation's wealth is best provided by joint-stock companies. Such organisations, rather than the individual trader, are able to promote the public good. Royal charters issued to sanction the 'Guinea' trade have underpinned the success of commerce with Africa. A new charter of 1662 raised new stock for the English slave trade by subscription and the traffic came under the auspices of the newly-created Company of Royal Adventurers into Africa. During the second Anglo-Dutch War (1665–7), however, some English forts plus around £200,000 of this company's stock was seized. In 1672 Charles II offered a new charter and called for raising stock by subscription to remedy the situation. The Royal African Company was created under this charter and has since flourished.

The pamphlet recounts the commercial benefits that accrue to the nation from pursuit of the slave trade by the Royal African Company. It is claimed that woollens and other manufactured exports have been stimulated by the growth of the African trade. England also imported gold, elephants' teeth, beeswax and other commodities from Africa that would not be available from another source. It is argued that supplying slaves at reasonable rates to the plantations, with extensive credit advanced to planters, has occurred

at a greater rate than private traders could attempt. Almost as an after-thought, the view is expressed that supplying slaves to the colonies prevents the depopulation of English subjects from their native country through emigration.

The third section assesses what losses would result if the traffic were not carried on by the Royal African Company under a joint-stock arrangement. First and foremost is the need to maintain fortifications in west Africa to withstand other European competitors and to awe the native traders. Only a large joint-stock company would have the £20,000 annually needed in peacetime (a greater sum would be required in wartime) to preserve the forts. In addition, it would be difficult to apportion among private traders the sums needed for the upkeep of fortified castles. If the Royal African Company is to retain the expense of maintaining forts, it should not be exposed to competition from traders who pay nothing for this protection, or so the argument here runs.

Two other reasons are adduced for the benefits that the Royal African Company's trade brings to Britain. One lies in the ability of the company's agents to barter with Africans: separate traders, it is suggested, are too transient in voyaging to Africa to sustain good commercial contacts with Africans. The other lies in the reality of international competition in the slave trade. Were the Royal African Company to languish because of a freer and open trade, Britain's commercial competitors would be the beneficiaries. Moreover, most of those rivals conducted their slave trade through chartered companies and did not operate their 'Guinea' commerce through private firms. In conclusion, the pamphlet argues that the English slave trade conducted by the Royal African Company is a national enterprise; that forts are required in west Africa to protect trade; and that such forts would not be maintained other than by the company operating under its royal charter. If these considerations were ignored, the British would soon be out-competed in the trade and would not recover their market share.


CERTAIN
CONSIDERATIONS
Relating to the ROYAL
African Company
OF
ENGLAND.

In Which,
The Original, Growth, and National Advantages of
the *Guiney* Trade, are Demonstrated :

As Also
That the same Trade cannot be carried on, but by a
Company and Joint-Stock.



Printed in the Year, MDCLXXX.



The Design of this Treatise is,

I. To open the Original and Growth of the *Guiney* Trade.

II. To demonstrate the Utility and Advantages which redounds to the Nation by the Trade

III. That the same National Advantageous Trade cannot be securely carried on but by a Company and Joint-Stock.

NO Man ever doubted but that Foreign Trade and Commerce is the great Concern and Interest of every Nation, because the Increase and Wealth of all States, is evermore made upon the Foreigner, for whatsoever is gained by one Native from another in one part of this Kingdom, must necessarily be lost in another part, and so the publick *Stock* nothing thereby Augmented. But Trade and Commerce cannot be maintained or increased without Government, Order, and regular Discipline; for in all confused Traffique it must necessarily happen, that while every single Person pursues his own particular Interest, the Publick is deserted by All, and consequently must fall to Ruine. For which Reason, the Crown hath Erected and Established Fraternities or Companies of Merchants, with Grant of Priviledges exclusive to all others, as His Majesties Ancestors and Himself
by

by their Royal Charters have been Graciously pleased to do to the Royal *African, East-India, Turkey, Hamburgh, Eastland* and *Muscovia* Companies; and the United Wisdom of the whole Nation in Parliament have thought fit to approve thereof, by confirming some of them by Publique Act: And the late Parliament did allow the same Policy, as appears by an Act, Intituled *An Act Declaratory concerning Bankrupts, made in the 14th. year of His Majesties Reign, for the encouragement of the East-India and Guiney Companies.* And that the Nobility and Gentry might not be discouraged in their Honourable Endeavours of Adventuring their Money in the said Societies, did exempt them from being subject to the Statutes against Bankrupts: And did therein further declare, That by such Undertakings, Navigation was Increased, and the Publique Good of the whole Kingdom very much advanced. And by another Act of the same Parliament made in the year of His Majesties Reign, they thought fit to own the *African* and *East-India* Companies, by Taxing their Joint-stocks by Name.

First.

First.

The Original and Growth of the Guiney Trade.

THE first Charter relating to the *Guiney Trade*, was Granted by King *James* in the 16th. year of his Reign, unto Sir *Robert Rich* and others, with express Exclusions and Prohibitions to all other His Majesties Subjects upon Forfeiture of Ship and Goods.

His late Majesty, King *Charles* the first of Blessed Memory, in the 7th. year of his Reign, Granted another Charter to *Humphrey Slaney*, *Nicholas Crisp*, and others, with the like Exclusions and Penalties; This Charter was confirmed and exemplified to *Rowland Wilson* and others in the year 1651. by the Power then in being. After which by the many Revolutions of Government here, the Trade of *Guiney* fell into great disorders, and the stock of that Company was much impaired by the intrusion of Interlopers; which the *Dutch* and *Danes* observing, encreased their Number of strong Forts, Factories and ships of War on the *Coast of Guiney*, and thereby did not only defend and encourage their own, but during those times took also the ships and Goods of the *English* private Traders, to the value of 300000*l.* or thereabouts, as was made appear to his Majesty after his happy Restauration, and afterwards complained of to the Parliament.

Whereupon, His Majesty was graciously pleased in the year 1662. to invite all his Subjects to the subscription of a new Stock, which being accordingly done, his Majesty in the same year Granted a new Charter with the same Immunities as before; But the *Dutch War* in two or three years after breaking forth, about 200000 *l.* of the said Stock, and some of the Forts which that Company were there possessed of, were seized and taken by eleven great *Dutch* Ships of War, sent thither on purpose, under the Command of their Admiral *De Ruyter*, whereby the whole Trade was in Eminent danger to be

be lost to this Nation. His Majesty then taking notice of the Difficulties which that Company labour'd under ; not only as they related to the Natives who are a Barbarous and Infidel People (with whom his Majesty hath no Articles of Peace and Commerce) but also as they related to the *Dutch* and *Danes*, whose Interest it was with all their Industry and Puissance, to ruine the *English* Commerce there. And conceiving he could not better prevent so great a Calamity and Danger, then by erecting a new Company, That so with the united strength of a great and considerable Body of Men and a sufficient Stock, a matter of this weight and importance might be supported, His Majesty in the Year 1672. was Graciously pleased Publickly to invite all his Subjects, as well residing in Forreign Plantations as here at home, to subscribe what sums of Money they pleased in the said New Stock ; And the Book for Subscriptions lay open to that purpose for Nine Moneths, and accordingly the present Stock being subscribed, by many of the Nobility, Gentry and Merchants, His Majesty Granted the present Charter with the same Exclusions and Priviledges as before ; Out of which Stock satisfaction being given to the former Company for all their Castles, Forts and other Remains by Agreement made with them, their Charter was surrender'd, and the Trade ever since hath been carried on, the Forts supported, new Fortifications rais'd, and the *English* Interest there, much enlarged by this present Company at their very great expence.

Secondly.

Secondly.

The Publique Utility and Advantages of the Guiney-Trade.

FOR the Utility and Advantages that redound to the Nation by the *Guiney Trade*. They are such as these.

I. The Exportation of our Native Woollen and other Manufactures in great abundance, most of which were imported formerly out of *Holland*; but have of late Years (by the present Companies Direction) been Manufactured at home. And for the greater expence thereof, have given express Orders to their Factors at *Guiney* to undersel all other Nations; whereby the Wooll of this Nation is much more consumed and spent then formerly; and many Thousands of the poor People employed.

II. The Importation of Gold, Elephants Teeth, Wax, and other useful Commodities thereby discharging this Nation of superfluities, and making compensation in things of Necessity and Conveniency, is a double advantage.

III. By the *Negro Trade* the Company yearly at very reasonable Rates, furnish with vast Numbers of Servants all His Majesties *American* Plantations, and that upon large Credit and Time given to the Planters for Payment; who at this present owe to the Company more then One Hundred Thousand Pounds Sterling, whereby they are enabled to carry on their Plantations to much greater advantage, which Credit neither ever was, nor probably will be given in like proportion by Private Traders, by which all the Plantations do flourish more then formerly. A great increase is made to His Majesties Revenue, and to the Wealth of this Nation. So that the Riches of that part of the World, (being the result and product of Industry and Labour) is in good Measure Owing to the *Royal African Company*. Besides that, it hinders the exhausting this Nation of its natural born subjects.

B

The

The Advantages accruing to the Nation by the *Guiney* Trade, as they relate to the increase of shipping, and Seamen, (though very considerable) are not here insisted upon, because they are productions common with the other Societies of Merchants of this Realm.

Thirdly.

The Guiney Trade lost, to this Nation unless carried on by Company and Joynt-Stock.

THE Advantages then accruing to the Nation, and His Majesties *American* Plantations by the *Guiney* Trade ; being so great and important as are here proved. It comes now in the third place to be demonstrated, that the same great and important advantages must be inevitably lost, unless the Trade be carried on by way of a Company and Joint-stock.

First, by long experience it is evident this Trade cannot be carried on but by a constant maintaining of Forts upon the place, and Ships of warre to protect the ships of Trade, and this is occasioned by reason of the Natural perfidiousness of the Natives, who being a Barbarous and heathen people, cannot be obliged by Treaties without being awed by a continuing and permanent Force, And partly because the *Dutch, Danes, French*, and other Nations, that likewise Trade in the same Country, are ever more vigilant for their own profit, frequently instigating the Natives against us, as well as by their own force, to extirpate and destroy the *English* Commerce there, as the *Dutch* did the *English* Factories in the Spice Islands and other parts of *India*, for want of a Constant force to protect them, which could never since be regained, they attempted the same in *Guiney* and forceably possess themselves of the Castle of *Cormantine*. The charge of maintaining this Force doth *Communibus Annis* amount to more then
20000 l.

20000 *l.* a year in time of peace, and must needs be much more in time of Warre: And it cannot be imagined that private persons who are *ad libitum*, can have either will or ability to defray a standing expence of this Magnitude. Besides it will not onely be impracticable to know what proportion of Tax to lay upon every private Trader or ship upon such occasions, but also it will be uncertain to find whether the Trade will answer the charge to be imposed, because Trading or not Trading, and for what value, will depend meerly upon the will and discretion of such Private Traders; And it will undoubtedly fall out, that when the charge is highest the Income will be lowest, as in time of Warre, either *Native* or *European*, which may be expected, and must be provided against. For when the danger and charge of supporting the Trade is greater then the present profit, those private Traders will desist, and consequently for want of supplies to defend the Forts, &c. the whole Trade in *Guiney* must be inevitably lost, and all the *English* interest there fall into the hands of Enemies. And (to say nothing of the Dishonour and Shame) how great *Damage* and *Debilitation* that would prove to this Kingdom and the *Plantations*, may be computed by what hath been before said of the *Utility* and *Advantages* redounding to this *Nation* and the *Plantations* by the *Guiney Trade*. But in the continuance of the *Present Company* and *Joint-Stock*, so great a misfortune can never probably happen, for there is a Stock of at least 150000 *l. sterl.* constantly engaged, and under the command of the Governours and Committee by common consent of the whole Company to be employed for the prosecution and necessary Defence of the Trade, a considerable part whereof alwayes remains in their Forts and Castles for that purpose.

Secondly, (Because Contraries alwayes appear best by Opposition, and the happiest experiences are those which are gained by the Calamities of other Men.) It is to be remembered in those times before the Charter in 1662 what Advan-

tages the *Dutch* took against the private Traders, whose losses as is before said, amounted to no less than 300000 Pounds, as by their several Petitions and Complaints to the House of Commons was alledged: and the Trade being then almost lost, great Endeavours were used by His Majesty for the Subscription of a New Stock. The like happened before to the *East-India* Trade from the Year 53, to 57, upon an open Trade used in those Years; from the Disorders and ill Success of which looseness of Trading; the Powers then in being presently united them into a Company and Joynt Stock again; and since by his Majesties Charter have so continued to this day. And how dangerous it will be to make a second Experiment after the sense of many Palpable Inconveniences and Mischiefs by the First: let the World Judge.

Thirdly, The maintaining of Forts and Ships of War, being of so great charge, and yet so Essential to the defence of the *Guiney* Trade, the Company cannot be able to defray the charge of the said Forts and Ships, if they may not enjoy the benefit of their Grant with exclusion to others.

Fourthly, There was never yet any substantial Commerce in the World carried on, but by the means of mutual Alliances and Confederations made with the *Natives* how Barbarous soever. Now it is manifest that Alliances and Confederations of this Nature, can be made only by Princes themselves, or by Powers derived from them, to Bodys Politick and Communities, who are Stable, Permanent and Responsible; and continually ready upon the place by their Agents to expostulate with, or give satisfaction to their Allies, and never can be maintained with individuals and single Persons, who are Transient and Mortal, and no Man knows where to find them when they have committed Injuries; an instance of which kind happened not long since upon the Coast of *Guiney*, when some considerable Natives coming aboard some private Traders Ships, they forthwith carryed them away, and sold them at the Plantations for Slaves; which perfidious action was afterwards revenged upon the Companies innocent

innocent Servants and Ships, some of his Majesties good Subjects having been Murder'd upon the same Account, and others kept long in Bondage, and Ruined in their Estates.

Lastly. Our Neighbours of *Holland* who so much Covet and Solicite Trade, will be glad to see this Inclosure broken down, and a loose and open Trade permitted here to *Guiney*, as foreseeing that thereby the *English* (their most formidable and puissant Competitor) must inevitably at last abandon that Trade, and therefore doubtless would be content to purchase the dissolution of the *Royal African Company* with a greater summe of Money than ever was subscribed to support it. But yet (contrary to the Native Humour and Genius of a Republicque) they themselves do oblige their own Subjects to Traffique by way of Company and Joint-stock, both to the *East-Indies* and *Guiney*; Endowing them with great Immunities, and obliging themselves to assist their *Guiney Company* with sixteen Ships of War, at the States Expence, upon any Emergency, as well knowing that there is no other secure way of Trading to those parts. The King of *Denmark* also hath done the like in point of Company and Joint-Stock; And (which perhaps is more Important than all the rest, and ought to make the deepest Impression in the Mynds of all *English Men*) the *French King*, who now Courts Trade beyond all his Predecessors, is Erecting a Company for management of a *Guiney Trade* by a Joint-Stock with Vast Incouragements and Immunities granted to them, and Exclusion of all other his Subjects. So that if our Forts, Factories, and Trade be not secured against the Attacks and Invasions of three so Puissant Nations (which, as is effectually demonstrated before, cannot be done but by a Company and Joint Stock) we of *England* must quickly bid a final Adieu to all future Trading upon the Coast of *Guiney*.

From

From all which hath been said, it is hoped it doth plainly appear,

First, That this Trade Incorporated in a Company, is in its Constitution, National.

Secondly, That without Forts and Force by Land and Sea, it cannot be secured to the Kingdom.

Thirdly, That without a Charter Exclusive to all other His Majesties Subjects, upon sufficient Penalties, and a large Joint Stock to support the Charge, those Forts and Forces cannot be maintained.

Fourthly, That not only all the Powers in force in this Nation, whether Legal or Usurped, ever since the *Trade of Guiney* hath been discover'd, but all *European* Nations using any considerable *Trade* thither, have, and still doe unanimously Prosecute the same by a *Company* and *Joint-Stock*, Exclusive to all other their Subjects.

To Conclude, It is an easie thing to unsettle and destroy a *Trade* not without great Labour, Danger, and Expence acquired, But it will be very difficult to regain it if once lost, especially this of *Guiney*, which all our Neighbour Nations so earnestly thirst to gain from us, and which if deserted but for one moneth, would certainly be possesst Either by the *French* or *Dutch*, so as not likely to be regained from them. And therefore it is hoped it will be maturely and seriously considered how great a damage the loss of this Trade would be to the Kingdom, and how dangerous the unhinging the present Constitution thereof may be.

FINIS.

*A True State of the Present Difference between the
Royal African Company and the Separate Traders ...
written by a true lover of his country
(London, 1710)*

This pamphlet attacks the Royal African Company's attempt to obtain an act during the parliamentary sessions of 1709/10 to exclude private traders from the African trade. It appeared at a time when the company's performance was under consideration by the Board of Trade and by parliamentary committees, and when scores of short publications appeared on the conduct of the commerce with Africa. The first charge against the company is the amount of money they claim to have expended upon their forts and settlements in Africa. The pamphleteer argues that an excessive amount in disbursements has been claimed by the company, presenting a false picture of the level of expenditure they have incurred. To verify this allegation, a case study is presented of the Royal African Company's fort at James Island on the River Gambia. The deficiencies of the fort are outlined and the costing of salaries and maintenance computed to total a figure far less than the 'mighty Sums they pretend to have disburs'd' (p. 26). A similar exercise is carried out for the company's settlements in Sierra Leone and Sherbro. There is also a refutation of the large sums the company allege they have expended in seeking alliances with African rulers.

The pamphlet argues that recently an inappropriate degree of cooperation has taken place between the Royal African Company and the French Senegal Company in Gambia. This 'amicable Correspondence and good Understanding between the Two Companies' (p. 29) was not in the British national interest at a time when Britain and France were fighting each other in the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–13). There is also an extended discussion of the deficiencies of the Royal African Company's forts. Why, it is asked, should there be public money raised, as well as the 10 per cent tax on private traders, when the defences of such forts and factories were so poor? The Royal African Company is accused of mismanaging these establishments. At the same time, the writer recognises the need for fortifications to protect Britain's African trade against her competitors.

The pamphlet notes that debates over whether the African trade should be confined to a chartered company or thrown open to private traders without penalty have recently gained much currency. To determine whether the Royal African Company has gained or lost by the 10 per cent tax raised from private traders, or whether it has been crippled by expenditure in Africa, the writer computes the charges arising at several forts and factories. The company has paid out £66,787 on the forts in the decade after 1698 but has received £87,465 from the 10 per cent duty. Therefore it is argued that the company should have been able to maintain their African trading posts in better condition than has been the case. The company is further accused of failing to support English private traders on the west African coast while supporting Dutch interlopers, and of supplying slaves for Portuguese shippers to take to Brazil. These practices are presented as 'plain Indications' of the Royal African Company's 'zealous Intention to ruin the Voyages of all Separate Traders' (p. 47).

The pamphlet ends with a comparative assessment of the supply of slaves to the British Caribbean by the company and the private traders. Estimates show that the private traders easily supplied more slaves to British America than the company's vessels, a finding that is confirmed by numerous other contemporary statistics (see above, pp. xxii–xxiii). Thus 'the Company's Allegation of their having been the continual Support of our Plantations abroad, is sufficiently prov'd to be a groundless Insinuation' (p. 52). Any return to the exclusive privileges of the Royal African Company in the conduct of the British slave trade would therefore be detrimental to the nation's economic interest: the supply of slaves to the Americas would be hampered, the employment of those engaged in shipping and navigation would be reduced, and the company would exercise its monopoly to advance the price of plantation produce to the British consumer.

A
TRUE STATE
Of the Present
DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN THE
Royal African Company,
AND THE
Separate Traders:

SHEWING

The Irregularities and Impositions of the Joint-Stock Managers; the Usefulness of their Forts; the Expence they are at in the Maintenance of the same; the Charge of supporting them in a Condition of Defence; the vast Sums they have receiv'd by the *Ten per Cent.* Duty in order thereunto, and what has been misapply'd to their own private Uses; the Advantages and Reasonableness of an OPEN TRADE to *Africa*; and, lastly, the Danger of an Exclusive Trade, not only to the Traders of *South and North Britain*, but, to our *American PLANTATIONS*.

*Written by a True Lover of his Country, and humbly submitted to the
Wise Consideration of Both Houses of PARLIAMENT.*

L O N D O N:
Printed in the Year 1710.

A true State of the present Difference between the Royal African Company, and the Separate Traders.

THE sedulous Endeavours the *Royal African Company* of England us'd last Sessions of Parliament to engross the whole Trade of *Africa* into their own Hands, by obtaining an Act to exclude all others of Her Majesty's Subjects from the beneficial Commerce of those Parts, and the reasonable Opposition made by the Merchants to render the Attempt of the said Company ineffectual, do continue at this time to be the daily Occasion of our Coffee-house Contests and Debates. Also the fresh Resolutions the Royal Company have taken, and the engaging Overtures it is reported they have made in order to accomplish their unreasonable Ends, having given new Life at present to the foregoing Differences, I thought it not amiss at this Juncture (having had Opportunities sufficiently to inform my self of the *African Trade*) to acquaint my Country with the great Dependances the *British Nation* in general, as well as our *American Plantations*, have, upon the Benefit of a Free Commerce with those wealthy Kingdoms. Also to let the World see what unwarrantable Stretches the Company have made, and what seditious Insinuations they have been pleas'd to use, in hopes thereby to bring the Legislative Power into a compassionate Temper of doing them that extravagant piece of Justice they seem to require at their hands.

To enable me the better for this necessary Work, I have been careful to read all the Printed Papers which have pass'd *pro* and *con* upon this Occasion between the Company and their Opponents, and cannot but acknowledge, that I think the latter have much the better of the Argument. Amongst other matters on the Company's behalf, I have had the perusal of their Petition to Her Majesty, wherein I find, as in their other Papers, the main thing that their Complaint turns upon are the extravagant Sums they pretend to be out of pocket in maintaining and supporting the many Forts and Castles upon the *African Coast* appertaining unto *Britain*, when other Merchants, to the Prejudice of the Company, have upon too easy Terms the Benefit and Protection thereof, and by trading thither upon their own private Stocks, have reduc'd the Shares of the Company to an inconsiderable Value; who alledge their Disbursements amount to at least

One Hundred and Eighty Thousand Pounds Sterling more than ever they receiv'd of the private Merchants, by virtue of an Act of Parliament imposing Ten *per Cent.* upon all Goods exported to any part of *Africa*, and Five Pounds *per Cent.* upon all imported from *Africa* into *Britain*; upon which Conditions the said Act does privilege any of Her Majesty's Subjects to have a free Trade to *Africa*, or any part thereof, and there to be protected by the Forts and Castles under all Advantages equal with the Company, during a certain Term of Years specify'd in the Act, to the Tenor of which, how far the Company have comply'd, shall in its proper Place be shewn.

Now in case the Company have really put themselves to such an extravagant Charge in maintaining and supporting Forts and Castles, not only for the Protection of the *African* Trade, but as well for the Honour of the *British* Nation as they pretend they have done upon these glorious Occasions: Then, in common Justice, the Hardships they have exhibited in a petitionary way, deserve the favourable Consideration of a generous Parliament; and no doubt but the Clemency of so wise an Assembly would speedily grant them such reasonable Immunities, as might balance their Disbursements, and repair their Losses.

But should this loud and tonitrous Allegation of One Hundred and Eighty Thousand Pounds, that only swelling and soniferous Article upon which their craving Petition is principally grounded, prove, upon right Examination, as deficient as their Stock; I cannot conceive they have any other Pretence to so extensive a Grant as they are willing to hope for at the hands of the Parliament, who are seldom so forward, as the Company desires they would be, to bestow such exorbitant Boons, but upon a just and wise Consideration.

I have therefore taken some pains to acquaint the Gentlemen of the House of Commons with as many real Particulars of the Affair premis'd, as it was possible to collect without a Perusal of the Company's Books relating to the vast Expences they pretend to have disburs'd, tho' to little purpose; and have also reminded them herein of the true Charge the Company have been at in the Maintenance of their Forts, &c. as it has appear'd already by undeniable Proof at the Bar of the House of Commons, where the Company's Accounts were evidently render'd false, scandalous, and fictitious; insomuch that themselves had no Pretence left to justify the Fallacy of their unreasonable Impositions: For the Charge of the Fort of *Gamboa*, which is one of the most considerable they have in *Africa*, was plainly prov'd to be so far short of the Disbursements they alledg'd, that it cannot be imagin'd the honourable Members of the Royal *African* Company could be any ways guilty of so large a Mistake, if they had not thought themselves such expert Accountants, as to be able to impose their Falsities without detection upon the Wisdom of the Nation.

I shall

I shall therefore begin with an impartial Description of the aforementioned Fort, that the Reader may be sensible of the Irregularities thereof, and from thence shall proceed to the Particulars of the Charge, which the Company are annually at (according to the best Computation that can be made) in the Support and Maintenance of the same; nor shall I omit afterwards what is necessary to be said of their other Forts and Castles, as they are pleas'd to call them, which are less considerable, having taken Care to insert nothing but Fact, beyond all Contradiction.

Of the Company's Fort on the River Gamboa.

THE Mouth of the River is in 12 Degrees, 47 Minutes, North Latitude. The Situation of the Fort is upon *James-Island*, which lies about Eight Leagues up in the Middle of the River *Gamboa*, which in that part is about three Miles over. The Breadth of the Island at Low Water does not contain, in its whole Circumference, above thrice the Ground that the *Royal Exchange* stands upon, and the Fort upon it is in a Quadrangular Figure, with four irregular Bastions, according to the Description annex'd.

By the Figure of the Fort any judicious Eye may discern at first View the Irregularities thereof; for every Bastion ought to be so built, as to be able to defend that side of the Face of the next Bastion, which is in the like Position; instead of which no Bastion in the Fort describ'd, for want of an Angular Termination, according as it is prick'd, is able to beat off any Assailants that shall attack the extream Side of the next Bastion, which ought to have ended in an Angle, as the Dots direct. Therefore as the Faces of all the Bastions terminate alike in flat Sides, and being wholly unable to defend one another, nor having other Works to supply the Deficiency, an Enemy may make their Approaches N. East, S. East, N. West, or S. West, and no Bastion shall be able to flank them, so as to do Execution.

Besides, the North-East and South-East Bastions are so out of all Proportions, as you see by the Figure, that it is scarce in the Power of a skilful Engineer to assign any other Reason for such gross Irregularities, besides the Ignorance of the Builder.

Therefore, for the Reader's better understanding, the black Lines, describe it as it is, and the Pricks as it ought to be.

But suppose this Fort regular, and built with all the Advantages its Situation would allow it, yet its present Condition of Defence, and the Circumstances it has been under all this War, has render'd it so weak, as not to be tenable; for several Reasons.

First,

First, That it is without a Tank, or any other Conveniency for keeping so much as one Days Water, to supply the Garrison, seated upon a salt River, in a Country where the Weather is so extreemly hot, that it is morally impossible they should be able to subsist many Hours without it : So that an Enemy has no more to do, than to intercept their Water-boat in its Passage to the Main, and the Governor must be forc'd in forty eight Hours to surrender the Fort, for want of fresh Water : So that an Enemy has no occasion to run the hazard of losing their Men, in formally attacking it, since they may effectually do their Work by the foregoing Method, with greater Ease, more Expedition, and less Danger. Besides this single Inconveniency renders the Garrison at all times liable to the Insults of the Natives, who, to my own Knowledge, upon the slightest Pretences imaginable, have put an Embargo upon the Water-boat, purely to oblige the Governor to send a Present to their King; which he is forc'd readily to comply with, or must of Necessity perish, for the Fort hath seldom more than one Boat for that Employment.

Secondly, The Houses within the Fort are all cover'd with Straw, so that an Enemy once landed upon the Island, which they may do easily in the Night, without Danger, have little occasion for any other Trouble, than to cast a spur'd Granado into the Thatch, which must infallibly fire the Houses, and force all within the Fort to jump over the Walls, to escape the Fury of the Flames, or otherwise submit themselves to be worse roasted than a *Bartholomew* Pig, the Fort not being large enough to afford any Security to those in Garrison under such an Extremity, as was once manifested by Experience, in the Year of our Lord 1703-4, when the Thatch taking fire by Lightning or Carelessness, forc'd those within to quit the Fort, for the Safety of their Lives; for too much Fire, and the want of Water in such narrow Limits would make the bravest Man hazard his Neck by a dangerous Leap, to escape the Death of St. *Lawrence*.

Thirdly, They have no Place to preserve their Powder in a useful Condition but those thatch'd Houses aforementioned, which are liable to such Accidents, as I have already hinted. I confess, in one of their Bastions there remains a damp Cavity, which I suppose originally was design'd for a Powder-Room, but being only cover'd with Dirt, without either Arch or Terrass, it is render'd so unfit for the aforesaid Purpose, that when it rains, it would not only damnify Powder, but any other Goods or Commodities that should be lodg'd therein.

Fourthly, There is not one Platform appertaining to the Fort, nor ever was since the Commencement of the Act for private Merchants to pay *Ten per Cent.* to the Company, the Guns standing or lying on the Ground after an idle manner.

Within the Fort they have twenty one Guns, chiefly Sakers and Minions, but so unservicably mounted upon old rotten Carriages, that
in

in time of need they would prove but harmless scare-crows to any resolute Assailants.

The number of Guns without the Fort are seventeen, ten of which are laid upon Timber on the North side with their Muzzles in the Air, like those on the *Tower Wharf*, not design'd as a defence against an Enemy, but for friendly Salutation; the other seven lying scatter'd on the Ground in several places, as if totally neglected.

The Walls of the Fort in height are about seventeen Foot, and of an answerable thickness, built tolerably well with small sandy Stones cemented with the Lime of the Country, which proving very strong makes a firm Macerial that is able to endure long battering; But the Irregularity of its Form, it being built contrary to the known Rules of Fortification, render it very insecure and easily to be taken.

Sometimes the Garrison happens to be indifferently well stock'd with Arms, but that is just as Trade offers and the Market governs, for they are too apt to prefer Profit to Security, and according to the Text, to take no thought for to Morrow.

Indeed if we consider rightly how the Fort we are speaking of has been secur'd by the Company from the Attacks of the *French* by the Clandestine Treaties, contrary to Law, they have had with those People, it is no wonder that the Fort is continu'd in so despicable a Condition, and not repair'd, and put into a better Posture of defence: But this I shall postpone for a little time, having a further occasion to speak more largely upon that Head than the present Place will admit of, I shall therefore proceed to the Particulars of the Charge the Company are at Monthly, for the support of their Fortification on the River *Gambos*, which is what we are now treating of.

On the twentieth of *June* last, upon a Survey then made; the Garrison consisted of seventeen Men and Boys, the Governor, Factors, &c. included, to which Number may be added one Woman, a Jolly strapping *Virago*, sent over by the Company in Man's Apparel as a Soldier, but whether to strengthen or oblige the Garrison is something difficult to determine; if for the first they might be in the right of it, for their flat bottom'd Hero without dishonour to the rest of their Soldiery, made the best Appearance of any in the Fort: And having had her Education in a Culinary way, I am satisfy'd had it in her Power by dint of Ladle, to have made her self Governess, by baisting the whole Garrison into humble Obedience to her Kitchen Scepter; But if they design'd her for a more pleasing use, those that sent her might have spar'd their Pains, for the Garrison is seldom under such high feeding as to mutiny for want of a Female Convenience.

Belonging to the Fort at the time aforementioned, there was but one *Canoo* to fetch Wood, Water, Provisions, &c. and that so very small

small that it held no proportion with the Stomachs of the Men, in-
somuch that the Soldiers us'd to cry to those that paddl'd her, *viz.*
Stretch the Canoe you Rogues when you have her a shoar, or we must pray
to God to take away our Appetites.

There was also an old whetherbeaten Longboat as tatter'd and as
crazy, as if a superannuated Cast-off of *Grizly Charon*; In which the
Governor and his Officers, when necessity drove them, had the Cou-
rage to venture on shoar, or on board a Ship, which when the Suff-
ran high, was look'd upon as dangerous as a Witch's Voyage in a
Sieve, or an Eggshell.

Among the rest of their noble Fleet, they had a small Sloop with
six or seven Men and Boys belonging to her, being all Sailors, and
employ'd in Trading for the Company; therefore no ways concern'd
the publick Charge of the Fort as a Garrison, nor ought to be ad-
mitted into that Account.

Now the Company charges, or at least us'd to charge three thou-
sand seven hundred Pounds *per Annum*, for the support and main-
tainance of this particular Fort, when it is easily made evident that
they send not a Moiety of that Value to the aforesaid Factory in a
twelve Months time, take one Year with another; Therefore how
should they expend as much more as they commonly venture to the
Place.

However that the Reader may have a clearer view of the unreasonable
Mistakes, which the Company have been at leisure to make in the
Computation of their Charge; I think it proper to insert the parti-
cular Sallaries of every Person belonging to the Fort in *June* last,
having diligently enquir'd and truly inform'd my self of all that is
necessary in this Affair, that what I report may stand the test of the
severest Scrutiny.

Charges of the Fort in Gamboa in June, 1709.

	per Month.	l.	s.	d.
Mr. <i>John Snow</i> , Governor	_____	16	12	4
Mr. — <i>Holmes</i> , second Factor	_____	5	00	0
Mr. — <i>Adcock</i> , third Factor	_____	3	06	8
Mr. — <i>Cole</i> , Lieutenant	_____	5	16	8
Two Sergeants, at two Pounds each	_____	4	00	0
Two Corporals, at thirty Shillings each	_____	3	00	0
Nine Soldiers, at twenty Shillings each	_____	9	00	0

Bur

But what the generous Company allow'd their Cloven-belly'd Champion, I am wholly ignorant of
 For Maintenance of seventeen Men and Boys, at twenty }
 Shillings each *per* Month ———— } 17 00 0
 Amounting in all to 63 16 8

Which Sum multiply'd by twelve, gives the Annual Charge of seven Hundred sixty six Pounds; and tho we allow two Hundred Pounds more for Incidents, the whole amounts but to nine Hundred sixty six Pounds; which Sum, or the major part thereof, being paid in *African* Money, if reduc'd to *British* Coin, makes no more than five Hundred and twenty Pounds eighteen Shillings; which Sum is far short of three Thousand seven Hundred Pounds Sterling; besides, there ought to be a Deduction of the Sallaries of Mr. *Holmes* and Mr. *Adcock*, they being both Factors, intirely employ'd in Out-Factories in the Affairs of Trade on the Company's Behalf, and are seldom in the Fort, therefore ought not to be included in the publick Charge thereof.

I confefs, I have heard it reported, that the Governor, in *May* last, discharg'd three, if not four Men, belonging to the Fort, which, if allow'd to be true, could not augment the Charge to above six Hundred and fifty Pounds; and this is the utmost the Company can have paid, if every Man in the Fort had receiv'd the Salary of an Officer; instead of which their annual Expence has rather fallen short of the Sum I have computed, for the Company have stop'd the Payment of their Sallaries in *Britain*, and as for the Governor of the Fort, he has been so far unable to pay the Garrison their Dues, that he has oft complain'd, he had scarce Money enough left to supply the Men with Provisions, having had no more in the whole Year past than one Ship consign'd from the Company, and that but with a small Cargo.

But allow the Company had in the Fort of *Gamboa* forty Soldiers more than I have here inserted, tho I defy them to give an Instance of any such number for these ten Years past, yet then the whole Charge could not exceed twelve Hundred Pounds Sterling *per Annum*, as shall be shewn hereafter, which Sum falls far short of three Thousand seven Hundred Pounds, and is a palpable Contradiction of their fictitious Allegation, of being ruin'd by the Support and Maintenance of their Forts and Castles, when granting them the full Number of Men that the Fort of *Gamboa* requires, yet they have over-charg'd no less in that particular Garrison than two Thousand five Hundred Pounds Sterling *per Annum*, since the Commencement of the Act thereunto relating, which in nine Years time amounts to twenty two Thousand five Hundred Pounds, and ought to be deducted out of the false and scandalous Account the Company have given in to

the Curfitor Baron of the Exchequer, which ought to have been upon Oath.

But perhaps the Company may alledge, that truly most part of the Salaries afore-mention'd are, according to Contract, payable in *London*, which must consequently give a considerable Augmentation to their pretended Charge. In answer to which Allegation, this I can affirm of my own Knowledge, that when the Company contracts in *London* with a Person to serve them in *Gambia* for Thirty Pounds Sterling *per Annum*, and the Servant performs his Agreement in all Particulars, and refuses to receive any part of his Salary in *Africa*, that then the Company's Agent there is oblig'd to reduce his Salary into Bars, the Nominal Money of that Country, in which all their Accounts are kept at six Shillings *per Bar*, tho the Value thereof in *Africa* is never reckon'd above five, except in the Payment of their several Salaries; so that the aforesaid thirty Pounds amounts just to one Hundred Bars, for which the Agent gives the Servant a Certificate, which he brings or sends over to any Person impower'd, that his full Wages in Sterling, according to Contract, may be paid in *London* by the Company, who, instead of answering the Demand according to Agreement, reduce the Bars to three Shillings, which is their Value here, and amounts to no more than fifteen Pounds; which if the Servant or his Attorney refuses to accept, the Company puts them at Defiance, so that the Necessity of the Injur'd generally causes them to comply, rather than to run the Risque of suing such a powerful Corporation; so that from hence the world may be satisfy'd with what Care and Conscience they are accusom'd to discharge such slender Obligations.

Besides these mighty Sums they pretend to have disburs'd, in the Maintenance of their Forts, I remember the Company, or those that appear'd for them at the Bar of the House of Commons last Sessions of Parliament, made a wondrous Harangue upon the mighty Sums the Company annually expended, in procuring Alliances with the Monarchs and Potentates of the *African* Territories, which is so poor and empty a Pretence, that none but the Managers of so bad a Cause, would have offer'd to have insisted on.

For on the River *Gamboa*, and the Parts adjacent, the Friendship and Permission of the *African* Princes are so easily obtain'd, and upon Terms so inconsiderable, that whatever the Company can expend upon that account is not worth inserting. Therefore, in order to prove what I say to be Fact, I have here communicated to the Reader every Particular of the Charge that is paid by the Company for their Fort and Shipping, let them have ever so many arrive within the Year, tho every private Ship is forc'd to pay as much, let them be big or little, *viz.*

To

	<i>per Annum.</i>	<i>B:rs.</i>
To the King of <i>Barra</i>	_____	_____
Governor of the King's Town, to the King's <i>Alcade</i>	_____	40
Governor of the <i>English</i> Town, to the <i>Alcade</i> of <i>Jellofree</i>	_____	6
The King's Steward, to the King's <i>Charee</i>	_____	6
The Governor of <i>Jello-freeport</i> , where the <i>English</i> Shipping	_____	2
take in Water, to the <i>Alcade</i> of <i>Jello-freeport</i> ,	_____	} 4
A Present to the King and his Officers	_____	
	_____	14
	In all	72

Now allowing all these Duties annually paid in their best and dearest Goods, which are Iron Bars, that cost in *London* about three Shillings and six pence each, the whole arises to no more than twelve Pounds twelve Shillings Sterling; and suppose the Governor's Presents to other Kings may amount to the like Value, tho that can hardly be granted, since a Gallon of stinking Spirits, distill'd from Filth and Nastiness, the prime Cost of which seldom exceeds twenty Pence, is so highly in Esteem among the *African* Potentates, that three or four Quarts is an acceptable Present to the greatest of their Monarchs; so that they may preserve an Alliance with any of the smutty look'd Princes upon as easy Terms as they may purchase the Freedom of an *English* Cocker, or a *Kent-street* Broom-man. Nor indeed is there any Duty requir'd (more than what I first particulariz'd) in all the River, except at *Tendebah* and *Blake*. To the former, when the Fort have occasion, they send for Stones; and to the latter, for Lime, for which they pay so inconsiderable a Matter, that it is not worth mentioning. I am therefore confident, that the whole Charge, which they made such a bustle about at the Bar of the House of Commons, cannot amount to thirty Pounds Sterling *per Annum*, upon a clear Account.

Sometimes indeed the King and People of *Barra* pick a Quarrel with the Governor of the Fort, and make him purchase his Peace by a Present to the Prince; but then the Terms of Reconciliation are so very easy, that they seldom exceed the Value of ten Bars. But the mighty Monarch, as the Company is pleas'd to stile him, is very often contented with one or two; and this Imposition is entirely occasioned by the Garrison's depending daily on the foresaid People for their Water to drink: Whereas if there were Tanks on the Fort, they would at once free themselves from all such Irrogations, and be enabled thereby to keep their Neighbours in awe, to the great Advantage of the Garrison, as well as all private Ships trading to those Parts.

If in my Narrative of the Fort I have happen'd to lapse into any Error, to the Company's Disadvantage, I question not but I shall hear of my Mi-

stake after a warm manner; but I am so far satisfy'd of their Inability to raise any material Objections against the Truths I have offer'd, that I crave leave to assure the Reader, I have not wilfully been guilty of any false Insinuation thro' the whole Account; but on the contrary, have been careful to introduce nothing but what shall be justify'd to be Fact before the Parliament, whenever that honourable House, thro' their great Wisdom, shall think fit to enquire further into the Matter in hand.

Perhaps the Company may object, that I have not mentioned either Chaplain, Surgeon, or Gunner, in the List of the Number belonging to their Fort upon *James Island*. In answer to which, I affirm no such Officers were there in *June* last, nor have there been any for a considerable time, notwithstanding the two last are as useful in a Garrison, as a Priest and a Pettifogger in a Country-Town, the one to do Good, and the other Mischief.

I hope what has been already offer'd in Relation to the Fort, will be sufficient to demonstrate that 'tis of no Use, considering how its manag'd in protecting our Trade in those Parts, and indeed is so very little to the Honour of *Britain*, or the Security of our Merchants Ships, as they have been pleas'd to insinuate, that it is rather a Scandal to the one, and a Discouragement to the other, by the felonious Treaties which the Company have made with the open Enemies of Her Majesty, and her Kingdoms, as I shall now proceed to make sufficiently evident beyond all Contradiction.

In the Year 1704. by a private Negotiation between the *Royal African Company of Great Britain*, then of *England*, and the *French Senegal Company*, trading also into *Africa*, an amicable Treaty was clandestinely procur'd, as was afterwards prov'd by a Letter under the Hand of the Secretary to our *English Company*, wherein the Matter so very plainly appear'd, that some who were principally concern'd, had much difficulty to escape a scowring; therefore, as a further Proof, I shall only subjoin what the Governor of the Fort in *Gamboa* has transacted since in Obedience to the good Understanding between the *French* and *English Companies*, so very dishonourable to the Crown of *Great Britain*, as well as dangerous and hurtful to Her Majesty's Subjects trading into those Parts upon their own private Stocks; as a Proof whereof take the following Instances.

In the Year 1707. an *English Ship* nam'd the *Young Margaret*, under the Command of *James Frisby*, riding at Anchor in the *Gamboa*, near the Company's Fort, and seeing a *French Shallop*, or small Sloop coming up the River, with *French Colours*, flying and making directly for the Fort, was much surpriz'd at such an uncommon piece of Boldness. Upon which Captain *Frisby* having a Letter of Marque, fir'd several Guns upon her, and soon brought the *French Man* to an Anchor under him. Whereupon *Frisby* sent his Boat man'd and arm'd, and took her as free Prize; which was no sooner done, but a Master of one of the Company's Ships, whose Name

Name was *Cook*, being then in the Fort, was sent with a Boat mann'd and arm'd to demand the Prize on behalf of the Company's Governour ; which *Frisby's* Men refusing to comply with, *Cook* swore in a mighty Passion he would fire into their Boat. Whereupon *Frisby's* Men, in defiance of his Threats, stood to their Arms. But *Cook* upon second Thoughts not finding it consistent with his Safety to be as good as his word, return'd to the Fort without engaging, giving the Governour thereof an Account of the Repulse he had met with. The Governour not a little inflam'd at what had happen'd, went himself on board *Frisby's* Ship, and demanded the Prize, which *Frisby* refusing to deliver up, the Governour after some hasty Hectoring and bouncing Words, swore if a French Man of War or Privateer came into the River, he would see him taken e'er he would fire a Gun in his Defence; declaring, that the English and *Senegal* Companies were at Peace with each other, and that the Shallop *Frisby* had taken was sent by the French Governour to the Fort for Pitch and Tar ; and that there was also in her a small Present of Wine for himself: So that *Frisby* finding himself under these Hardships, was necessitated for his Safety to resign his Prize to the Company's Governour, without any Consideration, who return'd her to the French, notwithstanding she was worth several Hundreds of Pounds in Slaves, Goods, &c. there being several Persons now living in *London*, who were then on board of *Frisby's* Ship, that are ready to testify many more Particulars of this Action than I have here inserted.

Such unwarrantable Proceedings as these, I think, are plain Indications of a good Understanding between the two Companies, in open Defiance of her Sacred Majesty's Declaration of War, and of the known Laws of this Nation, as well as to the immediate Prejudice of the Subjects of *Britain* trading into *Africa* on their private Stocks for the Benefit not only of themselves, but the publick, to whose Interest the Company's ill Practices have prov'd so highly detrimental.

Nor is it to be doubted but all such Irregularities committed in their Factories abroad, especially Crimes of so high a Nature as are here represented, are not only countenanc'd by the Connivance, but done by the Order and Direction of the Company, for no Governour unless a Madman would hazard his Life, Honour and Employment, had he not thought himself safe under the Commands and Instructions of his Royal Masters.

On the 22d of *January*, in this present Year 1709. there happen'd another remarkable Instance of an amicable Correspondence and good Understanding between the Two Companies, which the Reader is desir'd to take as follows.

Upon the Day aforementioned a French Man of War, three Privateers, with three Sloops belonging to the latter ; also one of the French Company's Trading-Ships, with their Governour of *Gorce* on board, came toge-

ther up the *Gambôa*, and anchor'd before the English Fort, which was no sooner done, but the French Governour sent off a Boat with a Letter to the Royal Company's Governour, the Captain of the French Man of War at the same time sending another Boat with a Flag of Truce to acquaint the Fort that he was come into that River to take what Ships were to be found therein, and therefore desired that his Boats might have free Passage without any Interruption; for that he was credibly inform'd several Ships were run up the River for their better Security; which civil Courtesy the Governour of the Fort was so far from refusing, that the Flag of Truce had not been on Shoar above a quarter of an Hour, before he saluted the Enemy, as a Token of his Friendship, with eleven Guns, whilst her Majesty's Colours at the same time were flying in the Fort; in return of whose Compliment the French Man of War gave nine Guns, which were answer'd again by the Company's Governour with the like Number, by way of Thanks, who as soon as he had concluded this dishonourable Ceremony, taking with him one Lieutenant Cole, went on board the Enemies Ships, where they revell'd and junketted till the next Night nine of the Clock: The French in the mean time having sent three Sloops, one Barkalongo, and four Boats, up the River, in Chase of such Ships as had fled for their Security: The Governour not firing so much as one Shot at the Enemy as they pass'd the Fort. So that the French, upon the 25th of the same instant, return'd down the River with two Prizes, the one a Sloop, and the other a Ship nam'd the *Brigdwater*.

Upon the Governour and the Lieutenant's coming off from on board, the French Commadore, to confirm their hearty Welcome, gave them seven Guns more, which obliging Compliment was return'd from the Fort in the like Number. Thus they continu'd daily visiting and parting away their Powder at each other, after a friendly manner, till the 30th of the same Month, upon which Day the French Commadore sent his Boat on shore to invite the English Governour and his Lady to an Entertainment on board, which was accepted accordingly: The French in the same Boat having sent a Gunner with Worms and Ladles to take the Length and Bore of every Gun in the Fort, and to inspect into the Strength and Condition of the Garrison, which was permitted to be done without the least Scruple.

At Night the Governour and his Lady return'd to the Garrison, the Commadore saluting them with seven Guns, the Fort answering the Compliment with the same Number.

The next day the French Ships all weigh'd Anchor, being bound from thence down the Gold Coast, upon which the Governour saluted the Enemy at their Departure with eleven Guns from the Fort, which the French Commadore very kindly return'd in like manner. But our generous Governour, to shew his extraordinary Breeding and Civility to the detested Enemies

Enemies of our Queen and Country, thank'd the French with eleven more as if his Powder had been sent him by his Royal Masters for no other purpose.

Now who can fall under a less Imputation than that of Treachery to their Queen and Country, that can presume to be guilty of so high an Indignity to the Crown and Government of *Great Britain*, as to hold an amicable Correspondence with an open Enemy to her Majesty and her Kingdoms, in defiance of all Law, Justice, Duty and good Manners, to the best of Princes, at such a time too when all *Europe* is labouring to reduce the Pride and Tyranny of *France* within the Bounds of Reason. If such Dishonours abroad shall be offer'd to her Majesty under her own Colours flying in a British Fort, and countenanc'd at home by a parcel of false Pretenders to the Publick Welfare; I would fain know whether such a Corporation, who have made so ill a Use of the Powers and Privileges already granted them, can be thought to deserve such an Enlargement of their Charter as they are now aiming at.

But the Company perhaps may object, there can be no such Understanding between them and the Enemy as is here asserted, because the French lately took a Ship and a Sloop of the Royal Company's laden with Slaves, &c.

In answer to which, I think there are Reasons sufficient to suspect, that whatever has been transacted in that Nature, has been design'd as a Cloak for their unwarrantable Practices, and done by the mutual Consent of the *Royal and Senegal Companies*: For there having been some Noise in *Britain* (which had its Beginning above a Twelve month since) of the treasonable Agreements, and unlawful Treaties they had stoll'n with the Enemies of our Queen and Country, to the great Dishonour of the *British Kingdom*, as well as Injury to her trading Subjects. It is no wonder, that the *Royal Company*, when they found themselves likely to be detected in their Treachery, should by some Project or other endeavour to hide, or at least extenuate their Guilt, that they might skreen themselves the better from the Resentments of the Government; and that this pretended Loss was meant only for a Blind, I think is very obvious from the following Observations, *viz.*

First, That the Company's Ship so taken, was in a Readiness to sail three Weeks before the Enemy's Arrival in the River, and consequently might and ought to have been gone, if she had not staid purposely to give the *French* an Opportunity to carry on the Intrigue.

Secondly, That the Company's Governor had Knowledge of the Enemy's being then at *Gorce*, the *French Settlement*; with whom at that time he had a constant Correspondence, sending several Letters to, and receiving several from that Place, as we are able to prove by unexceptionable Persons, then residing in that Country; therefore he ought to have dif-

dispatch'd the said Ship on her Voyage, since her Loading was ready five Weeks before.

Thirdly, That the Sloop was return'd again by the Enemy, who never offer'd to meddle with the Fort during their Stay in the River ; but the *French* and *English* liv'd as lovingly together, as if both Sides had been Agents for the *Royal Company*.

Fourthly, That they tim'd the Execution of their Project so well, as that there was no private Ship at Anchor in the River to observe their Motions and Proceedings in this Affair, which otherwise must have given sufficient ground for any reasonable Man to have suspected their Contrivance from the Gestion of the Business.

Lastly, That the Company's Governour receiv'd several large Quantities of considerable Goods from the Enemy, which in all Probability might be by way of Satisfaction in part for the Ship they carry'd off with 'em.

Now what are these Gifts, Forbearances, and unaccountable Familiarities, but convincing Arguments, that whatsoever Ships the Company have lost after this manner, have been taken pursuant to a dark Agreement between the Enemy and themselves, that they might be timely furnish'd with a few specious Pretences, which they now hope, in some measure, may weaken the Credibility of what's alledg'd against them.

The Company may likewise object, that truly the Fort was also taken by the *French* in September was Twelve month, which cannot be deny'd ; but then it was taken and redeem'd after so odd a manner, that whoever hears the Story, must needs judge by the Managements and Compliances of both sides, that there was a mysterious Juggle in the Bottom of the Business, which was carry'd on and effected according to the following Particulars.

A small *French* Brigantine of eight Guns, and about eighty Men on Board, with a Commission from *Martinico*, came into the River *Gamboua*, where she was seen a whole Day by all the Garrison, before any Attempt was made upon the Fort ; at length the Captain of the Privateer, with about Twenty Men, came off in a Canoe at Ten a Clock at Night, and landed in *James* Island, where finding the Conveniency of a Ladder, as if laid there on purpose to oblige the Enemy, and erecting the same against the Fort, undiscover'd, scaled the Walls, and entering, seven Men surpriz'd the Garrison, which, with the Governour and other Officers, consisted of Twenty odd, who might, if they had pleas'd, defended the Fort against so small a Number, the Enemy being unable to pour in more Men, by reason the Ladder broke with the Weight of those who were attempting to follow the first seven. But instead of any Opposition, the Garrison surrender'd, without firing a Piece.

When the Privateer had thus made themselves Masters of the Fort, the Governour agreed with the *French* Captain, to give him forty or fifty
Slaves

Slaves (I am not positive which) as a Ransom for the Place; which was no sooner ratify'd, but one Monsieur *Godinseau*, a Native of *France*, then living upon the same River, sent the Governour the Negroes, to perform the Agreement; so that one *Frenchman* takes the Fort, and another redeems it, which is such a puzzling Piece of Checquer-work, that none but the Company, or the Managers for them, are able to account for; nor can any reasonable Man make a better Construction of such mysterious Proceedings, than that there is something in the Bottom, that has a nefarious Tendency to the Injury of fair Traders, and the Dishonour of the Kingdom.

Besides, at best, if this particular Transaction happen'd to be real, and not done on purpose, to furnish the Company with a plausible Argument against the private Treaty that is alledg'd against them, yet as the Privateer belong'd to a *French* Colony in the *West Indies*, it is very probable, she might be unacquainted with the friendly Correspondence between the Two Companies, and therefore, thro' Inadvertency, might commit an Act of Hostility upon an *English* Factory, notwithstanding the Companies had privately concluded an unlawful Peace.

But as for the Enemy's Ships of War, or Privateers, that sail out of any of their *European* Harbours, tho' many of them often frequent the *African* Coast, yet they never offer to molest the Fort, but always pass by after a friendly manner; which unaccountable Civility is certainly owing to the clandestine Treaty afore-mention'd, otherwise they would be for taking all Advantages, since their Privateers most commonly go out upon, No Purchase no Pay.

Therefore, if we rightly consider, first, the Company's Mismanagements, and unfair Practices at home, the Irregularities and Abuses to the *British* Nation, committed by their Governours and other Agents abroad, their great Civilities to, and frequent Correspondence with our Enemies Ships, and the *French* Settlement in *Africa*, the indefensible Weakness of their little more than Titular Fortifications on that Coast, as I shall further shew hereafter, the ill-Use and Misapplication they make of the vast Sums paid to 'em by the Merchants trading upon their own private Stocks, for the Protection of their Forts to no purpose, the false and exorbitant Accounts they deceitfully impose upon the Curstior-Baron, under the swelling Names of Generals without Soldiers, Governours of Mud-Walls, and Gunless Fortifications, Alliances with the mighty Kings and Potentates of *Africa*, who will come forty Miles on Foot to get drunk with a Quart or two of stinking Brandy; I say, if all these things are consider'd as they ought to be, we cannot do otherwise, than at once behold the great Disadvantages the Company have brought upon the *African* Trade, and the unpardonable Indignities they have offer'd to Her Majesty, as well as the great Dishonours they have put upon the *British* Nation, by their fe-

lonious Treaties with a proud and treacherous Enemy.

Serrelion and *Sherbrow* are the two next Places that fall in course under our Consideration; and as they are both govern'd by one Person, so I think it proper, for Brevity's sake, to give the Charge of 'em together.

In *Serrelion*, in *May* last, the Number of white Men consisted of Thirteen, Governour, Officers, &c. included, and in *Sherbrone* but four, who were only settled there to look after the Company's Effects. As to the Fortifications of the foregoing Places, (as the Company in the extravagant Account of their Expences are pleas'd to term them) I am satisfy'd none but themselves, not even their Deputy-Governour, can have the Assurance to affirm, that there are any Works that can properly fall under such a Denomination. For the only Huts that the Officers and Soldiers have to shelter in, are built with Mud, and cover'd with Thatch, not far exceeding the accustomed Magnificence of a Country Hog-sty. 'Tis true, there are several Guns in both these Places, lying on the Ground, without Carriages, which are certainly very unable to defend themselves, or to protect any Ships from the Insults of an Enemy, since they cannot be travers'd to do any Execution. However, as the Company are pleas'd to stile them Garrisons, I have here given the Particulars of the Charges thereof.

The Company's publick Expences at Serrelion and Sherbrow.

				<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
The Governour	—	—	<i>per Annum</i>	200	0	0
One Sergeant	—	—		24	0	0
One Corporal	—	—		18	0	0
The Gunner	—	—		25	0	0
The Surgeon	—	—		40	0	0
Twelve common Soldiers, at 12 <i>l.</i> each	—	—		132	0	0
Maintaining seventeen Men, at 12 <i>l.</i> each	—	—		204	0	0
Contingent Charges	—	—		40	0	0
				Sum	683	0 0

But the foregoing Sum is paid in *African* Money, and therefore amounts to no more than Three Hundred Forty One Pounds Ten Shillings Sterling; which is the whole Expence the Company can have been at this present Year, for maintaining and supporting the two Places aforementioned, notwithstanding they commonly charge Two Thousand Seven Hundred Pounds Sterling for the same; so that it plainly appears, in their Accounts deliver'd

ver'd in to the Curstior-Baron of the Exchequer, altho' upon Oath, that they have over-charg'd several Thousands of Pounds Sterling. Which intolerable Impositions the Company have long practis'd upon those Gentlemen, who, for want of true Information, and that Precaution which is needful, must of Necessity be ignorant of their Frauds and Subtilties, and therefore too apt to give Credit to their fictitious Story of being ruin'd by the Maintenance of their Forts and Gatties; when, upon a just Examination, it will manifestly appear, that they have not disburs'd one half of the Money they have actually receiv'd for that purpose; for the Reader may observe in their two last Forts, consisting only of thatch'd Huts, they have no more Men than seventeen, and are consequently very likely to be topping Garrisons. Besides three of that Number are Factors for the Company, concern'd only in their private Affairs, and therefore ought not to be reckon'd in the publick Charge of their Forts; however, in Compliment to the Company, I have allow'd them to be Soldiers, because their chargeable Garrisons which, they say, have undone them, should not appear so very thin, as otherwise they would do, to the Scandal of their Masters.

Now would I fain be satisfy'd, of what Use to *Great Britain*, or the Merchants thereof, these meely nominal Fortifications are able to prove upon occasion, when their present Condition is so very contemptible, that they are neither qualify'd to defend themselves, or a Ship, against the Attacks or Insults of the most despicable Enemy; as is evident, by their suffering themselves to be taken, not long since, by a few *French*, in an open Boat, without any Resistance; so that our Nation has only the Honour of being gull'd and flatter'd with the formidable Names of Forts, Garrisons, and Castles upon the *African Coast*: For which we pay very extravagant Sums, but receive no Benefit, tho the Advantages pretended ought indeed to be adequate to our Money, or why such a Duty upon all private Traders into those Parts? But I own, it is in vain to expect Benefit thereby, whilst under the sole Management of such a Company, who endeavour to secure themselves by a *French Treaty*, and leave the Effects of their Fellow-Citizens expos'd to the Danger of a barbarous Enemy, notwithstanding they pay so largely for the Protection of their Forts.

I shall now proceed to a brief Account of the Remainder of their Forts and Garrisons. But as I intend to give the full Charge of each in a Condition of Defence, I think it unnecessary to trouble the Reader with any further Particulars of the Company's Expence in the Maintenance of the same, since he may see by the former how useless they are render'd by the Company's Neglect, purely to sink the greatest Share of that Money which ought to be apply'd to the Support thereof; and I can assure the Reader, without imposing upon his Faith, that the rest of their Forts I am about to mention, have been all continu'd under as sorry Circumstances, in

proportion to their Bigness, as any of the former, of which I have spoke more largely.

Dicky's Cove is a small square Fort, which tho' it has eight Guns, does seldom muster above six Men, and sometimes not so many, it being kept up chiefly as a place to provide Lime, and fit Plank and Timber for the Repairs of their other Forts and Castles.

Sucande, a little House fortify'd with about eight Guns, where the whole Garrison consists but of two Men, and is as useless and ridiculous as a Castle painted upon the Back of an Elephant.

Commenda, a tolerable square Fort, with twenty four Guns, and seventeen Men; the Number of their Soldiers being so disproportion'd to that of their Artillery, that the Fortifications of the Place, as now garrison'd, would be able to make but a slender Defence against a resolute Enemy; but they depend not so much upon the Strength of their Forts, as upon their private Treaty.

Cabo Corfoe Fort, deservedly boasted on by the Company above the rest, is the best and strongest Hold they have in all *Africa*, and remains fortify'd with forty two Guns; but in proportion to the Allowance of their other Castles, have seldom in Garrison above thirty three Soldiers, besides their four General Officers, whose thundering Titles give so Authentick a Sound in the Company's Accounts, that were they to charge the Maintenance of a Regular Army, who can believe they have such a number of Generals, that would dispute the Truth of the Matter, their principal Leader being stil'd Captain General, Governour and Commander in Chief? &c. But their other three are such Amphibious Heroes, that they are doubly dignify'd as follows in two distinct Capacities, *viz.* Lieutenant General and Book-keeper, Lieutenant General and Store-keeper, Lieutenant General and Gold-taker. Thus their real Business is to factor for the Company, and their Marshal Titles are only given them, that the Company may have a Pretence to advance them large Salaries, out of the Money paid by the Separate Traders for the Support and Maintenance of their Forts and Garrisons, and so charge the Expence of their own private Business to their military Accounts.

Near *Cabo Corfoe* formerly stood *Fort Royal*, or *Deans Hill*, now demolish'd, because standing upon a Promontory, it overlook'd and commanded their principal Fort; tho' if the Company had but kept it in a tolerable Condition of Defence, they need not have fear'd it's being taken by an Enemy; for the Advantage of its Ground, with a very small Improvement, morally speaking, would have render'd it impregnable.

Winebah, a little square Fort with ten Guns and eight Men.

Annamabo, a small Fort in Figure of a half Diamond, with the same Number of Men and Guns as the Fort preceding.

Accra,

Accra, a strong square Fort, with three good Bastions, and a round Flanker, also a white Tower in the middle for the Chief's Lodgings, with a very serviceable Spur to the Land, and the Face of a good Platform to the Sea, but in the latter no Guns, in the Fort twenty six, and fifteen Men, whose Regular Fortifications, if garrison'd as it ought, would be able to make a very considerable Defence.

Annashan the Company number too among the rest of their Forts, tho' it's no other than a thatch'd House garrison'd with two Men, whose chief Business is to hinder the Natives from having any Commerce with our private Ships, who ought, upon the Conditions specify'd in the Act of Parliament, to have as free a Trade as the Company, and to be protected therein.

Agga is much such another Castle as the former, tho' but half so well garrison'd, for it has but one English Man in the place, who has singly the Honour to hold all Posts within himself, from Governour to Powder-monkey, for which he is generously allow'd twelve Pounds *per annum* in *African* Money. But this and the preceding Fort, as they are only employ'd in the Company's private Affairs, the Charge thereof ought not to be admitted into their publick Accounts.

Queen *Ann's* Point is built in the Form of a Tower fortify'd with six Guns, and commonly garrison'd with the like Number of Men, sometimes less, but never more, and was chiefly rais'd to obstruct the Natives from trading with our private Ships, especially with their Corn, which that part of the Country very much abounds with, unless the *African* Sellers or the Buyers, who are our private Merchants, pay a certain Duty upon every measure to the Company's Agent, or him that commands the Place, which is directly contrary to the Act aforemention'd; and such an Arbitrary way of dealing with their own free-born Countrymen, that nothing but Death or Imprisonment could be severer Usage, and this done even to those very Persons who pay so largely for Protection.

Quedah is a Neutral Port, where all Nations trade without any Distinction under the Protection of the King of the Country; and what Fort the Company have there, lies three Miles within Land, and is so far from giving the least Umbrage of Safety to any Ship appertaining to the Separate Traders, that it is only made a Warehouse for Goods belonging to the Company.

Therefore the four last Forts, as the Company in their publick Accounts are pleas'd to stile them, as they were first built for, and intirely employ'd in their own private Affairs, they ought not to be articled in their Military Charges, because they are neither of Use or Protection to any Separate Trader, whose Ten *per Cent.* Duty is limited only to the Support and Maintenance of such Forts and Castles as they may have Benefit thereby, for which Reason in my succeeding Computation of the Charge in main-
taining

taining the Forts and Castles upon the Coast of *Africa*, I have left out *Quedah, Queen Ann's Point, Asga, and Annashan*, as no ways concerning the publick Charge, being only useful to the Company:

Tho' it is the General Opinion of all Gentlemen concern'd for the Good of their own Country *Britain*, that Forts and Castles upon the *African* Coast are absolutely necessary for the Security and Promotion of that Trade; and that such Fortifications and Garrisons ought to be maintain'd and supported at the Charge of those who reap the Benefit thereof; yet the Neglects and Abuses of the Royal Company in that Particular, have occasion'd several Gentlemen to project divers Methods for the better Regulation of such Mismanagements as have brought the *African* Trade into its present Declension.

Some are apt to declare warmly for a free and open Trade, and for disfranchising the Company as a pernicious Corporation; alledging, 'tis impossible that our private Merchants should have any Encouragement or real Protection from a Body of Men whose Interest it is to circumvent them in their Trade.

Others object and query, if the Company were dissolv'd, how the Forts, &c. would be supported.

This Objection has been answer'd by some, That the Government are the fittest to take them into their hands, for then the trading Subject might reasonably hope to be better protected under her Majesty's Care, who is so highly concern'd for the General Good of the Nation, than by a Company, whose Business is always to consult their own private Interest, abstracted from the Publick's.

To this would be objected, that truly the Duty arising by the Ten *per Cent.* Act being found insufficient to defray the Charge of the Forts and Garrisons afore-mention'd, it would be an unreasonable Expectancy at this time of Day, that her Majesty, who has the Care of so expensive a War, should admit of an Augmentation of her present Charge, by supplying a Deficiency which ought to be made good by such Merchants who enjoy the Benefit of the *African* Trade.

Other Gentlemen are of the same Opinion with the Honourable House of Commons, who confirm'd, by a Vote the last Sessions of Parliament, *viz.* that a regulated Company were most for the Benefit of *Great Britain*.

Now I shall not undertake to determine which of the foregoing Methods are most conducing to the Advantage of the Nation; but shall proceed to a Computation of the Charge that the Maintenance and Support of their several Forts in *Africa* can really amount to in such a Condition of Defence as the Security of our Trade may reasonably require; and I defy the Company to give one Instance, since they have receiv'd the Duty of Ten *per Cent.* for the Maintenance of the same, that ever they have had
the

the like Number of Men in any of their Forts intirely employ'd in military Service, as I shall here allow them in the following Account : So that by comparing the necessary Expence of upholding their Forts in a defensible Condition, with the Duties they have receiv'd of the private Merchants since the Commencement of the Act for that purpose, we shall presently see whether the Company have been Losers, as they have endeavour'd to insinuate, or Gainers by the Bargain.

The Charge of the several Forts in a Condition of Defence.

For the Fort of Gamboa.

			l.	s.	d.
The Governour,	_____	per Annum,	200	00	00
The Captain-Lieutenant	_____		70	00	00
The Chaplain	_____		70	00	00
The Surgeon	_____		40	00	00
The Surgeon's Mate	_____		24	00	00
Two Sergeants	_____ 24 l. each		48	00	00
Two Corporals	_____ 18 each		36	00	00
Two Gunners	_____ 25 each		50	00	00
Two Gunners Mates	_____ 18 each		36	00	00
Forty eight Com. Sold.	_____ 12 each		576	00	00
The Maintenance of Sixty One Men at 12 l. each	_____		732	00	00
Contingent Charges and Customs	_____		100	00	00
For the Hire of Ten Grameters and their Diet per An.	_____		144	00	00
Total in African Money			2126	00	00
Total in English Money			1200	00	00

For Serelion and Sherbrow, which are so near-each other, that one Governour serves both.

			l.	s.	d.
The Governour,	_____	per Annum	150	00	00
Two Lieutenants	_____ 60 l. each		120	00	00
Two Serjeants	_____ 24 each		48	00	00
Two Corporals	_____ 18 each		36	00	00
Two Gunners	_____ 25 each		50	00	00
Two Gunners Mates	_____ 18 each		36	00	00
A Surgeon	_____		40	00	00
Surgeon's Mate	_____		24	00	00
Chaplain	_____		70	00	00

Ferry

Forty common Soldiers at — 12 l. each —	480	00	00
For the Maintenance of 54 Men at 12 l. each —	648	00	00
Contingent Charges and Customs —	100	00	00
For Ten Grameters at 9 l. each —	90	00	00
For their Maintenance at 3 l. each —	30	00	00

Total in *African Money* — 1922 00 00

Total in Sterling — 1068 00 00

The foregoing Account added, makes in Sterling — 2268 00 00

For the Fort of Dicky's Cove, a Place only for Lime and Plank.

	l.	s.	d.
The Governour, or rather Lieutenant, <i>per Annum</i> —	70	00	00
The Gunner —	25	00	00
The Serjeant —	24	10	00
Twenty common Soldiers at 12 l. each —	240	00	00
For the Maintenance of Twenty Three Men at 12 l. each —	276	00	00
Contingent Charges —	40	00	00

Total in *African Money* — 675 00 00

In Money Sterling — 337 10 00

The foregoing Account added, makes in Sterling — 2605 10 00

For the Fort Succandee.

	l.	s.	d.
The Governour, or Lieutenant, <i>per Annum</i> , —	70	00	00
The Gunner —	25	00	00
The Serjeant —	24	00	00
Ten common Soldiers at 12 l. each —	120	00	00
For the Maintenance of Thirteen Men at 12 l. each —	156	00	00
Contingent Charges —	20	00	00

Total in *African Money* — 415 00 00

In Sterling — 207 10 00

The foregoing Account added makes in Sterling — 2813 00 00

For

For the Fort Comenda.

	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
The Governour ———— <i>per Annum</i> , ————	100	0	0
The Gunner ————	25	0	0
The Serjeant ————	24	0	0
The Corporal ————	18	0	0
The Surgeon ————	40	0	0
Surgeon's Mate ————	24	0	0
The Chaplain ————	70	0	0
Twenty four common Soldiers at 12 <i>l.</i> each ————	288	0	0
Maintaining thirty one Men, at 12 <i>l.</i> each ————	372	0	0
Contingent Charges ————	60	0	0
Total in <i>African</i> Money ————	1021	0	0
Total in <i>English</i> Money ————	510	10	0

The foregoing Account added, makes
in Sterling ———— 3323 14 0

Note, The Chaplain, Surgeon, and his Mates, belonging to *Comenda*, are sufficient also to serve *Succandee* and *Dicky's Cove*, they lie so near each other.

For Cabo-Corfoe Castle, and Danes-Hill.

The Governour ————	500	0	0
Two Lieutenants, 70 <i>l.</i> each ————	140	0	0
Three Sergeants, 24 <i>l.</i> each ————	72	0	0
Three Corporals, 18 <i>l.</i> each ————	54	0	0
Two Gunners, 24 <i>l.</i> each ————	48	0	0
Two Gunners Mates, 18 <i>l.</i> each ————	36	0	0
One Surgeon ————	60	0	0
One Surgeon's Mate ————	30	0	0
The Chaplain ————	70	0	0
Eighty six Common Soldiers, 12 <i>l.</i> each ————	1032	0	0
Maintaining 102 Men, 12 <i>l.</i> each ————	1224	0	0
Contingent Charges ————	200	0	0

D

Ground-

	<i>per Annum</i>	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
Ground-Rents paid here for all the Forts on the Coast	—	800	0	0
Total in <i>African Money</i>	—	4266	0	0
In Sterling	—	2133	0	0
The foregoing Account added makes in Sterling	—	5456	14	0

For Annamabo Fort.

The Governour	—	<i>per Annum</i>	70	0	0
The Gunner	—		24	0	0
The Sergeant	—		24	0	0
The Corporal	—		18	0	0
Twenty common Soldiers, at 12 <i>l.</i> each	—		240	0	0
Maintaining 24 Men, at 12 <i>l.</i> each	—		288	0	0
Contingent Charges	—		40	0	0
Total in <i>African Money</i>	—	704	0	0	
Total in Sterling	—	352	0	0	
The foregoing Account added, makes in Sterling	—	5808	14	0	

For the Fort of Winebah.

The Governour	—	<i>per Annum</i>	70	0	0
The Gunner	—		24	0	0
The Serjeant	—		24	0	0
The Corporal	—		18	0	0
The Surgeon for this and <i>Annamabo</i> Fort	—		40	0	0
Twenty common Soldiers at 12 <i>l.</i> each	—		240	0	0
For the Maintenance of Twenty five Men at 12 <i>l.</i> each	—		300	0	0
Contingent Charges	—		40	0	0
Total in <i>African Money</i>	—	756	0	0	
In Money Sterling	—	378	0	0	
The foregoing Account added, makes in Sterling	—	6186	14	00	

For

For Acra Fort.

	<i>per Annum</i>	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
The Governour	—	100	00	00
The Chaplain	—	70	00	00
The Gunner	—	24	00	00
The Serjeant	—	24	00	00
The Corporal	—	18	00	00
The Surgeon	—	40	00	00
Twenty four common Soldiers at 12 <i>l.</i> each	—	288	00	00
For the Maintenance of Thirty Men at 12 <i>l.</i> each	—	360	00	00
Contingent Charges	—	60	00	00
Total in <i>African</i> Money		984	00	00
In Sterling		492	00	00
The foregoing Account added makes in Sterling		6678	14	00

Note, That tho Allowances are made for so many Forts as aforementioned, yet several of them are of no Use nor Protection to Trade; but the Charge of such useless Places may be added to strengthen the other Forts, and make them more formidable.

By the preceding Account, the Reader may see that the Charge *per An.* amounts to 6678 14 00

Which in ten Years time, since the Trade to *Africa* was laid open, makes the Sum of 66787 00 00

Now the *African* Company own they have received by the Ten *per Cent.* Duty in *England*, only from the time of the Act's commencing, to September, 1707. which is but little more than nine Years, the Sum of 87465 09 06

From whence it is evident, That the Trade to *Africa* is more than sufficient to support their Forts and Castles, in a better Condition of Defence than ever the Company have been careful to keep them; therefore they must have sunk very considerable Sums of Money, arising from the Duty aforementioned; for which the Company, as they are only Trustees, ought in Justice to be accountable.

I am satisfy'd, in the Account I have here given, I cannot err much in the Salaries of their Officers and Soldiers; and as for their Agents, Gold-takers, Store-keepers, Factors, and Writers, they are no ways to be consider'd in the publick Charge of their Garrisons, tho they have been foisted by the Company into their Military Accompts; so that if they were to be oblig'd to a fair Reckoning, I would make it manifestly appear, that they have not apply'd one Moiety of the Money they have received, to the true Uses and Purposes as limited in the Act.

I remember, in one of the Articles of the Company's Military Charges, they alledge, it has lost them abundance of Money in Transporting their Officers and Soldiers to *Africa*, which, like their other Pretences, is only rais'd upon a false Bottom.

But allow they have sent five Hundred Men in Military Stations within these Ten Years (which I am sure upon Examination they are unable to prove) and that one with another cost the Company four Pounds Sterling *per Head*, the whole Sum would amount to but Two Thousand Pounds; which is far short of what they have charg'd, and indeed is too like their Article of Assurance, which is so barefac'd, that all Men in Trade must be sensible of its Falshy.

But besides the vast Sums paid to the Company in *England*, our Plantations abroad, pursuant to the Act of Ten *per Cent.* Duty, have been also liberal Contributors of many Thousands of Pounds, their several and distinct Sums being as yet unknown, except what has been paid by the Island of *Barbadoes*, which in nine Years time amounts in the whole to seven Thousand, four Hundred forty three Pounds, fifteen Shillings and nine Pence. But the other Plantations, particularly our Islands in the *West-Indies*, have also carry'd on a considerable Trade into *Africa*; so that nothing is more evident, than that the Company have been Gainers by the Act of Parliament, and have been well enabled thereby to keep their Forts and Castles in a good Condition, and to carry on more Trade than they have had of late to that part of the World afore-mention'd.

Therefore if we allow the Company the full Charge that is necessary to maintain their Forts in a Condition of Defence (which they never have been in since the Commencement of the Act for laying the *African* Trade open) and that we grant 'em all the Incidents that can reasonably arise, yet let the Money they have expended upon that Account be justly balanced with the Duties they have receiv'd, and we shall find in their Hands a remaining Sum, large enough to maintain their Forts and Castles for several Years, without any thing paid further by the private Merchants; not but I believe the Separate Traders would be contented with the Duty that the Act directs, if they could but be secure of Christian Usage for their Money, and that the Natives were not hinder'd from coming on board their Ships, in order to trade, by the Agents of the Company, which

which they daily prevent, by all the Stratagems imaginable ; inasmuch that at *Acra* they have forc'd the Negroes into such a barbarous Agreement, *viz.* That whosoever is discover'd in going on board a private Trader's Ship, shall be branded publicly on the Cheek ; a most excellent, charitable, and christian Method of protecting and assisting their Fellow-Citizens and Merchants, who pay Ten *per Cent.* Duty for the Support of their Fortifications ; and if the Company can object against the palpable Truth of these Barbarities, if they please, I am not only willing, but able to prove the same, by a Letter under the Hand of their own Governour.

Nor is it long since their Agent in *Gamboa* was very much offended with the *Alcade* of a Town, for suffering the Merchants of that Country under his Jurisdiction to sell their Slaves, &c. to a private Trader, who bought them for one third less than the extravagant Price the Company's Agent would have had them sold for, to the great Hardship of those who pay the Company so largely for their Aid and Protection.

As a further Instance of not only their unwarrantable but their unnatural Proceedings, At *Annamabo-Fort* they have actually fir'd into the Boats of the Natives, when they have been carrying Corn and other Commodities, for Sale, on board the Ships of private Merchants, to terrify the *Africans* from dealing with any but the Factors for the Company.

Yet tho' the Governours for the Company are so very backward in aiding or assisting any English Ship belonging to the Separate Traders, they are forward enough in giving Protection to all Dutch Interlopers, because I suppose they are well paid for their Pains, and often save them from being seiz'd by the Dutch Company's Ships, to whom, if they are taken, they are free Prize, for which purpose they have always two or more Cruizers upon the *African* Coast, to intercept such Interlopers of their own Country as they happen to meet with ; but the Dutch clandestine Traders are so highly countenanc'd and encourag'd by the British Forts, to the Prejudice and Circumvention of our own Ships trading into those Parts, that they are grown so numerous as well as industrious, that most of the Gold and Elephants Teeth which that Coast affords, are bought up and ingross'd by the Dutch Interlopers ; so that tho the *African* Gold Coast produces annually about seven Thousand Mark of Gold, each to the Value of Thirty two Pounds Sterling, or thereabouts, yet our British Ships, by the Collusive Mismanagements of our Company's Forts, are so injuriously obstructed in their *African* Trade, that the Dutch Interlopers, by the Assistance of our Company's Governours, ingross at present the greatest part thereof.

Therefore well might the Gentleman who appear'd on the behalf of the Royal *African* Company at the Bar of the House of Commons last Sessions of

Parliament, endeavour to possess the Worthy Members thereof, that truly our Trade to *Africa* was much lessen'd and impair'd since the Liberty given to all private Merchants by the *Ten per Cent. Act*, and that formerly the Royal Company us'd to coin fifty Thousand Guineas *per Annum*, whereas their Importation of Gold is so very slender, by means of an Open Trade, that they are not in a Condition to coin any.

In answer to which, if the Royal Company's Governours of our British Forts would but refuse their Protection* and Assistance to the *Dutch* Interlopers and *Portuguese*, who to the unspeakable Injury of *Great Britain*, circumvent us daily in our *African* Trade, and upheld therein, in open Violation and Contempt of an Act of Parliament, by the Company's Agents abroad, this Nation would soon find instead of fifty Thousand Guineas, that they might annually coin in *African* Gold at least treble the Number.

Besides, notwithstanding Her Majesty's Subjects, trading into *Africa*, are under a strict Injunction, by the Act of *Ten per Cent. Duty, &c.* to import what Negroes they shall purchase, only into those Colonies belonging to *Great Britain*; yet the Company, in open Defiance of our Laws, in that Case provided, have continu'd to supply the *Portuguese* with Slaves for their Plantations in *Brazil*, to the irreparable Damage of our own Colonies, who have suffer'd extremely in a double Capacity, by the want thereof.

For, in the first Place, the Company barter their Negroes with the *Portuguese* for the same sort of Goods growing in *Brazil*, which are produc'd also by our own Plantations, and consequently impair the Welfare of our Colonies, by promoting the Consumption of those Commodities which are not the Growth or Manufactures thereof.

Secondly, They are highly injured in the Want of those Supplies of Negroes, who are carry'd from them into another Country, which is become their Rival in the same Trade; for the better our Plantations are recruited with Slaves, the larger Quantities of Goods they make, and the more they import hither by those very Ships that bring them such Supplies; besides, the Company's unlawful Disposal of those Negroes they sell to the *Portuguese*, is a great weakening to our Governments abroad.

* I don't mean that the Forts and Castles are capable to defend any Ship from the Attacks of the *Dutch*; but 'tis the Custom in *Africa* for every Fort, &c. of what Nation soever, to have a Road belonging to them; and as long as any Ship will continue in an English Road, no *Dutch* Company ship or Cruiser will offer to insult her.

Nor does this growing Mischief extend it self only to our Foreign Plantations, but to *Great Britain* it self, for the Portuguese carry Sugar, Rum, Tobacco, &c. into *Africa*, to purchase Negroes of the Company's Agents, it hinders a great Exportation of our British Manufactures, such as Woollen, &c. which would otherwise be carry'd out, to the great Advantage of the Nation, to purchase Slaves for our *American* Colonies; which, if imported there by the Company, and not sold clandestinely to the Portuguese, must consequently, in return, bring home the Product of our Plantations, and be a great Advantage to our Friends abroad, as well as our selves at home.

Yet all these Enormities, and Breaches of our Laws, are continually practis'd with Connivance and Impunity by the Company, and their Agents, to the great Obstruction of our *British*, *African*, and Plantation-Trades; when, if the Portuguese were not supply'd with Negroes by this unlawful Method, if the Parliament thought fit, they would be glad to contract with us for a much greater Number than they are now furnish'd with, and give us Gold instead of Goods; nor we need not impoverish our Plantations thereby, but employ the more Men and Shipping, to the Advantage of our Nation, and speedily so improve our *African* Trade, that we might be able also to send sufficient Supplies to our own Colonies, and bring home such solid Wealth from *Brazil*, (where without Slaves they cannot work their Mines) as would very much enrich the British Nation, and, in a great measure, make us amends for the Loss of the *Spanish* Trade: But all these Advantages, and abundance more, are obstructed by the Company, who are not content to make an evil Use of that Privilege the Parliament have left them, but are still aiming at an Exclusive Trade, that they may do fifty times the Mischief, and be more secure of Impunity.

Are not these plain Indications of their zealous Intention to ruin the Voyages of all Separate Traders; and instead of protecting them (according to the Act) to hinder and discourage them by unchristian Usage, notwithstanding they pay so dear for such deceitful Assistance, and meer notional Security? If such sort of Treatment be according to the Statute, in that Case provided, or worth Ten *per Cent.* I appeal to the Judgment of such Gentlemen who are impartial in the Matter.

The Company may offer what they please in their Defence, but I am well satisfy'd, that any *English* Ship not belonging to themselves, shall find more Civility, better Usage, and safer Protection from the *Dutch*, or any other *European* Nation that we are not at War with, than from their own Country, especially those employ'd in the Service of the Royal Company, as I could prove upon Occasion, by innumerable Instances.

Ha-

Having thus far given the Reader a Light into the false and exorbitant Accounts of the Royal *African* Company, their great Mismanagements, to the weakning and ruining of that Trade, the Dishonours they have done to the Best of Queens, and their own native Country, their cruel and unjust Dealings with the Separate Traders, the severe Usage and scandalous Abuses they impose upon their own Servants also, the subtle Pretences and groundless Falsties they have endeavour'd to insinuate to the House of Commons, in order to obtain an Exclusive Act, as a further Argument against so pernicious a Monopoly, I shall present the Reader with a short View of the many Mischiefs that must of necessity attend our Plantation-Trade, to the Ruin of our Merchants at home, as well as Colonies abroad, upon the Company's procuring so strict a Colligation of the *African* Trade as they are now aiming at.

All Gentlemen acquainted with the true Nature of foreign Commerce, must already be sensible of the unspeakable Advantages that are continually flowing from her Majesty's *American* Colonies into *Great Britain*, and how intirely the Prosperity of our *West-India* Plantations depend, beyond Exception, upon the *African* Trade, since they have no other way to occupy their Grounds, raise their Products, or manufacture their Commodities, but by hard Labour, and that not to be endur'd in such a sultry Climate by any but Negroes, who are by Nature season'd to the excessive Heat of those *American* Countries, it being morally impossible that any share of the Drudgery should be taken off either by Horses or Oxen, did their Islands abound, as they do not, with those laborious Creatures, because the various Products of those remoter Parts of the World require neither Plow nor Harrow, but their Grounds must be broken up and manag'd with the Hoe and other Instruments that can be no ways useful without humane Judgment and manual Dexterity; nor can any of their Commodities, as Sugar, Cotton, Indico, Ginger, Tobacco, &c. be brought to a Perfection, but by the constant Slavery and Attendance of such Men and Women who are qualify'd by Nature for the hardest Service in the hottest Countries.

Therefore since the Benefits we reap from our vast Exportations of Provisions, Apparel, and other British Manufactures thither, and the great Sums of Money and necessary Goods we receive in return from those Plantations, depend intirely upon a constant Supply of Negroes carry'd into those Parts, there is nothing more conducing to the Interest of *Great Britain*, than rightly to consider of the best Methods for the preserving and Improvement of the Plantation Trade, and wisely to avoid all manner of Grants, Overights, and Compliances, that may occasion any Decay therein, or give Impediment thereto; and that such an Exclusive Establishment as the Company now wants, and is so very solicitous to obtain, will inevitably hazard the Prosperity of our Colonies abroad, as well as in a great mea-

measure impair a considerable Branch of our British Merchandice at home, I shall attempt to render evident after the following manner.

In order hereunto I must first remind you of what I have already laid down as an undeniable Position, *viz.* that our *American* Colonies, especially all our Islands in the *West Indies* intirely depend upon the *African* Trade for a Supply of Negroes, there being no Possibility of their being recruited with Slaves any other way.

So that what I am about to offer, will consist chiefly of these following Heads :

First, To make a reasonable Computation of what Supplies of Negroes our Foreign Plantations may annually require.

Secondly, To shew how poorly our Plantations were recruited by the *African* Company, when they enjoy'd the Benefit of an Exclusive Trade.

Thirdly, What Supplies of Negroes the Company have sent into the aforesaid Parts, since the *African* Trade has been laid open.

Fourthly, What Supplies of Slaves our Foreign Colonies have receiv'd from the Separate Traders since the Commencement of the Act for Ten per Cent. Duty, by which we shall see who has been the best Benefactors to our *American* Plantations, the private Merchants or the Company.

Lastly, That an Exclusive Trade granted to the *African* Company, must endanger the Prosperity of our *West-India* Colonies, and hazard the Ruin of our Plantation Trade.

As to what Supplies of Negroes are needful for the Additional Prosperity of our Colonies abroad, it is impossible to determine, the Islands being all capable of such a further Improvement, especially *Jamaica*, that the vast Number they might be able to imploy to that end, is beyond the reach of Imagination. But the Negroes at present in *Barbadoes* are computed to amount to Seventy nine Thousand, and annually requires a Supply of Four Thousand to support the Trade of the Island in its immediate Condition. And as to *Jamaica*, which is abundantly larger, and nothing near so populous in proportion to its Bigness, or so well improv'd, it cannot require less than a yearly Supply of Ten Thousand Negroes to maintain and uphold it in its present Prosperity, and to carry on the Trade they have with the *Spaniard*. And as for *Antego*, *Montserrat*, and the rest of the *Leeward Islands*, we may reasonably allow, under their present Circumstances, they may require together a yearly Supply of Six Thousand; and to our Colonies upon the Continent of *America*, I shall allow six Thousand also, there being no occasion for an exact Computation of their several Supplies, my Design being only to let the Reader see who have been the best Benefactors to, and Supporters of our Plantation-Trade, the Separate-Traders or the *African* Company.

Supplies of Negroes requir'd per Annum by

<i>Barbadoes</i>	—	—	—	4000
<i>Jamaica</i>	—	—	—	10000
<i>Leeward Islands</i>	—	—	—	6000
<i>The Colonies on the Continent</i>	—	—	—	6000

In all 26000 *Negroes.*

The Number of Negroes imported by the Company in nine Years time of Peace into our *West-Indies* Islands, between the Year of our Lord 1680 and 1688, when they enjoy'd the Benefit of an Exclusive Trade, as the Account appear'd by the Report of the Lords Commissioners of Trade, amounted to no more than

Which, if equally divided by the Number of Years, amounts, *Negroes.*
per An. to 46396

The Number imported to the Plantations aforesaid by the Company, from the time of the Commencement of the Act of Ten per Cent. Duty, *An. Dom.* 1698. to the Year 1707. as confess'd by themselves, and appear'd by the Report of the Lords Commissioners of Trade, laid before Her Majesty, amounted to no more than

Which, if equally divided by the Number of Years, only amounts per An. to 17760
1973

Which was so poor a Supply, and so far short of twenty six Thousand Negroes yearly, that our Plantations must have been ruin'd by the Mismanagement of the Company, had they not been reliev'd by the Benefit of an Open Trade to *Africa*, and supported by the Care and Industry of the Separate Traders; who, as it plainly appear'd by the aforesaid Report of the Lords Commissioners, imported into three Colonies only, viz. *Barbadoes*, *Jamaica*, and *Antegoa*, within the same time aforesaid, besides what they carry'd into other Plantations of *America*, the Number of

Which, if divided by Nine, being the Number of Years, will amount, per Annum, to 71268
7918

As it appears by the Report of the said Lords Commissioners, besides a Certificate from *Antegoa*, when their Account was sent over of seven Ships of the Separate Traders, laden with Negroes; Number unknown.

It

It being very observable by the same Account, in the Years 1700, 1701, 1702. that there were imported only into *Barbadoes*, *Jamaica*, and *Antigua*, 42000 and odd Negroes, whereof not above 4000 by the *African* Company, the rest by the Separate Traders. By which it appears, that the private Merchants imported near as many Negroes, in three Years, to three of our Plantations, as the Company deliver'd to all the Colonies in *America*, during the time they had an Exclusive Trade in Peace, when the Seas were free from a rapacious Enemy; which sufficiently demonstrates the great Advantages our Plantations abroad, as well as those at home who have a Dependance thereon, have receiv'd from the Improvement of the *African* Trade by the Separate Merchants, since it has been happily laid open by the Act of Parliament, and is an undeniable Proof, that the private Traders have been greater Benefactors to our *West-India* Colonies, and more industrious Promoters of both the *African* and Plantation-Trades, than an Exclusive Company; and could such Care be taken, that the Ten per Cent. Duty was strictly apply'd to those Uses as the Act directs, and that the Separate Traders enjoy'd truly, as they ought to do, that Protection and Encouragement for which they pay so liberally, they would be enabled thereby to give further Improvements to the Trade of *Africa*, and that of the *West-Indies*, than the Company, tho established upon their own Terms, could ever pretend to.

Besides the Benefits that the afore-mention'd Islands have enjoy'd by the opening of the *African* Trade, it is plain, that our Colonies upon the *American* Continent have receiv'd also very great Advantages; for Colonel *Darnel* of *Maryland*, a Gentleman of admirable Understanding, and known Worth and Integrity, was pleas'd to affirm at the Bar of the House of Commons, the last Sessions of Parliament, viz. That since the Trade to *Africa* had been laid open by the Act of Ten per Cent. Duty, the Separate Traders had imported into *Maryland* upwards of six Thousand Negroes, the Company never having sent one thither since they were a Joint-Stock; and that by the additional Assistance of which Number of Slaves, they continu'd annually to make 24000 Hogsheds of Tobacco more than formerly, which are sufficient Lading for Forty Sail of stout Ships per Annum to import the same into *Britain*; which, in the first place, is so great an Advantage to the Planters abroad; secondly, such a considerable Encouragement to our Navigation and Merchants at home; and thirdly, brings so vast an Income into Her Majesty's Exchequer, that they are Benefits worthy of a Parliamentary Consideration.

Besides, if we enquire into *Virginia*, which is so precious a Jewel in the *British* Crown, we shall find upwards of Fifteen Thousand Negroes in that Colony also; and I defy the *African* Company to prove, that ever they have imported so many as two thousand into that particular Province, since they have been a Joint-Body.

Therefore I think the Company's Allegation of their having been the continual Support of our Plantations abroad, is sufficiently prov'd to be a groundless Insinuation, and that the Supplies they us'd to send, even in the Zenith of their Prosperity, were so far short of what our Colonies requir'd, that had not the *African* Trade been timely laid open, our Plantations must have been ruin'd for want of Negroes, which indeed has been wholly prevented by the Separate Traders, who have not only deliver'd large Supplies to the Places aforementioned, but to all our other Colonies of *America* in like Proportion, the Particulars of which would be too tedious to enumerate.

So that it is evidently plain from the foregoing Computation, that the Separate Traders have been greater Benefactors to her Majesty's Revenues, her Plantations abroad, and our Trade and Commerce at home, than the Company can pretend to be. All which Advantages to *Great Britain* have a considerable Dependence upon the further enlarging and encouraging of the *African* Trade, instead of suffering the same to be monopoliz'd by a Company.

To render the many Advantages the Crown and Nation of *Great Britain* annually receive by means of the Separate Traders, the more conspicuous, let us but consider first the Freight, and, secondly, the Customs of the 24000 Hogsheads of Tobacco, made in *Maryland* by the *African* Negroes, deliver'd by private Ships more than they rais'd in that particular Colony when the Company were exclusive.

As to the Freight, the Proprietors, during the War, have paid three Pounds ten Shillings, and sometimes four Pounds per Hoghead; so that, at the lowest Computation, the Freight of 24000 Hogsheads of Tobacco amounts to in Sterling Money ——— 84000 l.

Which Sum ought to be consider'd as clear Profit to the *British* Nation.

The Contents of a Hoghead of Tobacco consist most commonly from six to seven Hundred Weight neat: But if we compute a Hoghead at no more than four Hundred neat, each Pound paying six Pence Custom to Her Majesty, the Duty of every such Hoghead amounts to Ten Pounds; so that the Custom of 24000 Hogheads made now in *Maryland* more than formerly,

Adds, <i>per Annum</i> , to the Revenues of the Govern-	
ment, the Sum of ——— ——— ———	240000 l.

Therefore since this particular Improvement of the Plantation-Trade was manifestly made appear by a worthy Gentleman at the Bar of the House of Commons the last Sessions of Parliament, to be directly owing to the Slaves deliver'd by the Separate Traders; and since they annually supply several other Colonies with a far greater Number of Negroes than they do *Maryland*, what unspeakable Advantages must consequently accrue to the

the *British* Nation in general, as well as our *American* Plantations, by keeping open, and enlarging the *African* Trade, which cannot be ingrossed by an Incorporate Company, and manag'd by a Joint-Stock, without endangering the Prosperity of our *West-India* Colonies, impairing the Revenues of Her Majesty's Customs, doing much Damage to our Navigation, and wounding *Britain* in general in a very sensible Part; for the Trade of our Plantations can never sicken or decay, but the Disease will presently reach the Port of *London*, and the Contagion soon spread it self over all the Kingdom.

But the Company may perhaps object, that most of the *Maryland* Tobacco is what we call *Oroonoka*, which is most of it exported into other Countries, under a Draw-back of the Duties, and therefore cannot add such an Increase to the Revenue, as I have here computed.

In answer to this, all Merchants will allow, that whatever we export of our Plantation-Growth is of much more Advantage to the Nation in general, than what we consume within our Selves, and brings in such vast Returns of other Goods, whose Customs perhaps may be an Equivalent to the Draw-back, and much more to the Interest of the whole Kingdom.

So that there remains nothing now, but to shew the Reader wherein the Danger lies, and how the *African* Company, by an Exclusive Act, will be enabled to impose what Hardships they please, not only upon many Traders at home, but our Colonies abroad, to the great Discouragement of our Plantation-Trade, *viz.*

In the first Place, The Company by such a Grant, tho they consist of a Number, yet in their Operation, they are to be consider'd no other than as a single Person, and would thereby become, to the great Hardship of many Traders in *Britain*, the sole Buyers of Woollen, Iron, and many other Manufactures of this Nation, which they export to *Africa*; so that having none to oppose them in that Trade, they will be able to beat down the Commodities to what Price they please, to the great Discouragement of many Thousands of Families, who entirely depend upon our *British* Manufactures; which could not be done if the Trade to *Africa* was free, because the Number of Buyers, who would then trade upon their separate Stocks, would keep up the Manufactures they were oblig'd to deal in at a living Price, to the great Benefit of Her Majesty's Subjects.

Secondly, The Employments of many Thousands of Families, who depend upon Shipping and Navigation, as Builders, Ship-Chandlers, Sail-Cloth-Makers, Basket-Bakers, Brewers, Mariners, &c. would depend purely on the Caprice, as it were, of a single Person: When, if the Trade to *Africa* be continu'd open, such Tradersmen and Mariners who depend thereon, would be free from the Impositions that are always practis'd by the Managers of a Monopoly.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, If the *African* Trade be carry'd on by a Joint-Stock, there will be but one Importer of Slaves into our *American* Colonies: the Hardships of which were so very conspicuous, when the Company were Exclusive, that most of our Plantations were almost ruin'd thereby, and made such frequent Complaints of their growing Calamities, for want of Negroes, and the heavy Impositions that were put upon them in the Price thereof, that the querulous Applications to the Government here, were the chief Motives that induc'd the Parliament to open the *African* Trade in such manner as it remains at present. For when the Importation of Slaves was monopoliz'd by the Company, they had an absolute Power of imposing what Price they pleas'd upon the industrious Planter, and took care to supply them so very sparingly, that whatever Negroes were carry'd into our Plantations, they were under a Necessity of purchasing, tho upon Terms unreasonable.

Fourthly, That whoever ingrosses the Importation of Slaves, will infallibly purchase above a Moiety of the Produce of those Plantations they supply with Negroes; for the fewer they deliver, the less Goods are made in that Colony; and the more they deliver, the more Goods are taken in return by the Importer; and whoever commands above half the Growth of any Country, must have the Balance of Trade in their Hands, and will be thereby enabled to set what Price they please on the Manufactures and Commodities of that Place, and in a little time make the Inhabitants thereof but servile Drudges to the Interest of the Monopolists.

But here the Company will object, and say, That they will oblige themselves to sell their Negroes at a certain Price, and that much cheaper than our Colonies have bought them at this many Years, which will be much to the Advantage of our *American* Plantations.

I am sensible they will make abundance of fair Promises, in hopes to gain their Ends; but when that's obtain'd, they will find as many ways to evade any Penalty that shall be a Stumbling-block to their Interest, as a cunning Miser will feign'd Excuses against a charitable Donation.

Fifthly, Suppose the Parliament should grant the *African* Company an Exclusive Trade, upon condition they should import their Negroes into our Colonies abroad at 16 l. a Head, according to their Offer made the last Session, which, by the way, is much cheaper than they buy 'em; for by their own Accounts it appears, that every Slave stands them in above 20 l. before he comes into *America*: However, when the Company are thus establish'd, they transmit Orders to their Agents in *Africa*, to dispatch such a Number of Slaves to the Island of *Jamaica*, *Barbadoes*, or any other Colony, and consign the same to A. B. their publick and known Agent their residing, who is commission'd by the Company to sell them as the Act of Parliament directs: To which he feigningly complies, by a counterfeit Sale to C. D. or E. F. or more of the Company's private Agents,
and

and they hold 'em up at an extravagant Price. The Planters are under a Necessity of complying with their Demands, tho never so unreasonable, because they have no other way of being supply'd with Slaves but by the *African* Monopolists, who like other Exclusive Companies, will find out Ways and Means cunningly to evade the Restrictions, let the Penalties on their Delinquency be never so great, or the Danger of breaking loose be never so threatening:

Sixthly, But granting the Company (had they an Exclusive Trade) should prove so honest (which we have little reason to believe) as to sell their Negroes, without any Stratagem or Evasion, at 16 l. a Head into our *West-India* Colonies, they would still make themselves amends, by imposing greater Hardships upon the Planters, after another manner, and lower the Price of Sugars, as they did formerly, to 5 s. a Hundred, which are now at 12 s. or thereabouts, and reduce all other Plantation-Commodities to a proportionable Value: so that a Planter shall be oblig'd to give 7 or 8 Hogsheads of Sugar for a Slave, as they us'd to do, when the Company were Exclusive: Whereas now the Trade to *Africa* is open, a Planter may buy an able Negro for one Hogshead and an half, or two at most. The Reason is plain, for a private Merchant, that ventures upon his own Stock, will be glad to deal at 40 per Cent. notwithstanding the Hazard of the Seas; when it is very frequent for a Company that's a Monopoly to exact 200 per Cent. nor will they be contented, except in particular Cases, to trade for less, having many private Ways of making wonderful Advantages of their Stock at home without the least hazard; for were it not for the subtil Artifices of the crafty Managers of such Societies, the fraudulent Practice of pernicious Stock-jobbing had never come in play, and been so greatly encourag'd, to the Injury of the Publick:

Seventhly, Since whoever are made Ingrossers of the *African* Trade must soon become Masters of our Plantation-Trade also, the Effects consequently of such a double Monopoly must bring great Hardships upon the *British* Nation in general, as well as our Colonies abroad; for when there is in a manner but one Importer [the Company] of Plantation Commodities into these Kingdoms, it is reasonable to believe, when they are ingrossed into the Hands of but one Seller, that they will not fail to advance all such Goods, so universally useful, to an extravagant Price, which is the constant Practice of all Monopolies: so that in a little time, if the Company gain their Ends, we may hope to have Sugar, and other *West-India* Products and Manufactures, as dear in *Britain* as Butter and Cheese in *Jamaica*, which is often sold at 2 s. 6 d. a Pound; and so be oblig'd, as well as our Plantations, to submit to the Impositions of an exorbitant Company, who, if they had but Power, would soon find out Ways and Means to lay heavier Taxes upon her Majesty's Subjects than all our Wars have occasion'd.

Eightly, It is presumed our late united Brethren of *North-Britain* have by the

the Union-Act a right to all the Branches of our foreign Trade (not hitherto granted to Exclusive Companies) under equal Protection of her Majesty's Government with the rest of her Subjects who are Adventurers abroad; therefore how far our Northern Friends, as well as the Merchants of *South Britain*, may think themselves injur'd by such a Monopoly as the Company are aiming at, or in what measure so extensive a Grant, may undermine that solemn Foundation upon which our happy Reconciliation now stands, may be thought at present a little too bold in me to undertake a Determination of.

But perhaps the Company, in answer to this Objection, will say, they are willing to take the Gentlemen of *North-Britain* into their Stock, that they may equally share all the Advantages thereof. Why truly this, to some Persons, may seemingly carry with it a promising Face of Justice: But then the Merchants of *North-Britain* must still lie under the Hardship of having great Sums of Money to lie dead in a Company, when their distant Habitations will not permit 'em to have a Share in the Management.


Besides, we ought to consider they are but just entering upon Trade, and have not such great Stocks as the Merchants of *South-Britain*, and consequently cannot, out of their private Commerce, spare such large Sums as their Neighbours, to lie sleeping under the Management of a Parcel of crafty Directors.

A Gentleman may deal for 1000*l. per An.* when he is not qualify'd to deal for 1000*l.* therefore the only Encouragement we can give to our new Brethren, is to allow them Time to trade freely on their own Separate Stocks, that they may improve the same, till they are capable of sharing with us all Advantages that accrue in general by our foreign Traffick.

But these things, with the rest of what I have here offer'd, I most humbly submit to the wise Consideration of that August Assembly, who have always shewn themselves faithful Subjects to her Majesty, generous Patriots of their Country, hearty Opposers of the publick Enemy, and zealous Preservers of the Liberties of *Europe*.

Note, That when I speak of the Misconducts of the Company, I only mean the principal Managers thereof; for I am sensible, there are abundance of worthy Gentlemen concern'd therein who have an utter Abhorrence to all unfair Practices; and therefore as they had no Share in the Mismanagements, they have none in the Reflections.

F I N I S.



מחלוקת בין חכמי התורה
בבית המדרש



The Case of the Royal African Company of England (London, Sam. Aris, 1730)

This anonymous pamphlet explains the rise of the Royal African Company's trade by reference to the broad context of European commercial endeavours in west Africa. Special attention is accorded to international rivalries among mercantilist powers over such trade. The sporadic commercial contacts that the English maintained with west Africa before 1660 are contrasted with the extensive inroads into African trade made by the Dutch in the same period. Before 1672 the English trade with Africa suffered from lack of funds. With the raising of £110,000 by public subscription, however, the Royal African Company set about enlarging existing forts and constructing new ones to compete with Dutch and Danish castles in Africa. The company soon constructed five new forts and rebuilt another one on the Gold Coast, and increased the capacity of its flagship fort Cape Coast Castle six times. It purchased Fredericksburg fort (near Cape Coast) from the Danes and erected another fort at Whydah. These developments occurred while the Royal African Company held its royal monopoly despite continuing Dutch rivalry.

French ambitions for trade with Africa introduced another European rival to English endeavours in west Africa, especially after France granted trading rights to the Senegal Company and the Guinea Company in the 1680s. The latter company was not very successful save for the years 1702–13 when it held the *asiento*, the exclusive right to deliver slaves to the Spanish American colonies. The War of the League of Augsburg (1689–97) led to French attacks on British ships and forts in Africa. By the end of the war, many of the Royal African Company's fortifications on the Gold Coast were razed to the ground. Parliament responded to these troubles by deciding to open the trade to Africa to private traders and to impose a 10 per cent duty on them to help pay the upkeep of the company's African forts. This tax was collected from 1698 until 1712.

This contextual discussion is provided to emphasise the pamphlet's main burden: that in the seventeen years since the expiration of the 10 per cent levy, the sole responsibility for maintaining English forts in Africa (estimated at £250,000) has fallen upon the Royal African Company. At the same time prices for slaves in Africa have risen, the gold trade has decayed,

and the company's profits have suffered. The pamphlet asks the question: should the English castles in west Africa be maintained, and who should pay for them? The case for maintaining the forts is made by reference to the policies of several European trading powers in claiming foreign lands and commodities for their own economic benefit, and by noting how the forts protect English commercial interests from those of their rivals.

The pamphlet accepts that there should be a free trade to Africa and that the upkeep of the forts must be paid either by the Royal African Company alone, by the company in conjunction with private traders, or by the English public. The company has probably expended £851,000 on the forts since receiving its charter, but it is unfair that it should be expected to bear sole responsibility for the costs now that the trade is free and open. The pamphlet rejects arguments for a duty upon traders for this end, because profits in the trade are not as easily accrued as they were in the later seventeenth century. Instead, it argues for the central role of the slave trade in promoting the plantations, commerce and wealth of the mother country, and concludes that the African forts should be financially supported by the public.

THE
CASE
OF THE
Royal African Company
OF
ENGLAND.



Non minor est virtus, quam quarere, partem tueri.

L O N D O N :

Printed by SAM. ARIS, in *Creed-Lane*.

M. DCC. XXX.



THE
C A S E
OF THE
Royal African Company
OF
E N G L A N D.



THE *Portuguese*, being the first that discovered the Coast of *Africa*, they built one Fort on the Island of *Arguin*, on the *North Coast*, another call'd *St. George del Mina* on the *Gold Coast*, and a third at a Place called *Loango St. Pauls* on the Coast of *Angola*, to the Southward of the Equinoctial Line; by virtue of which Possessions they not only claimed, and for many Years en-

joyed the Right in and to all the said Lands and Countries, but likewise seized and confiscated the Ships of all other Nations, as often as they found any of them trading on any Part of the said Coast.

ABOUT the latter End of the Reign of King *Edward VI.* some *London* Merchants fitted out the first *English* Ships that ever traded to *Guinea*; and in the Reign of Queen *Mary*, and for the first ten or twelve Years of Queen *Elizabeth*, sundry other private Ships were fitted out for the same Parts: But the *English* not having as yet any *Settlements* or *Plantations* in the *West Indies*, and consequently no Occasion for Negroes, such Ships traded only for *Gold*, *Elephants Teeth*, and *Malaguetta*, and all such Voyages were undertaken and performed at the Hazard of losing the Ships and Cargoes, if they fell into the Hands of the *Portuguese*, without the least Ground to hope for any Redress or Satisfaction for the same.

QUEEN *Elizabeth*, in the Thirtieth Year of her Reign, being then at War with *Spain* and *Portugal*, erected a Company, for the better discovering and carrying on a Trade from the Northermost Part of the River *Senegal*, and from and within that River, all along that Coast, unto the Southermost Part of the River *Gambia*, and within the same; and gave and granted unto them the whole and sole Trade, in, to, and from the said Rivers and Countries, for a certain Term of Years; with Prohibition to all others her Subjects to trade to the same Places, on Pain of Forfeiture of Ships and Goods: And these

these were the first *English* Merchants that ever traded to the Coast of *Guinea*, by and under the Authority and Protection of the Crown of *England*.

IN the Reigns of *James I.* and *Charles I.* and during the Time of the Usurpation, sundry Persons were encouraged by publick Authority to trade to other Parts of *Africa*, and to take such Measures for the better carrying on and improving the same as they should judge most proper. In pursuance whereof, they built one Fort, at a Place called *Cormantine*, on the *Gold Coast*, and another in the River *Gambia*, on the North Coast; and these were the only Places of any Consequence which the *English* were in Possession of at the Restauration.

THE States General of the United Provinces observing, as we may imagine, the Measures taken in *England* for encouraging of a Trade to *Africa*, did also, about the Year 1621, erect and establish a Company, which they called the *West-India Company*; and, for their Encouragement, gave and granted unto them all the Lands and Countries which they could conquer or gain Possession of in *Africa*, from the *Tropick of Cancer* to the *Cape of Good Hope*; and in *America*, from the Southermost Part of *Newfoundland* to the Streights of *Magellan* and *La Maire* on the East Side, and from those Streights to the Streights of *Anian* on the West Side, with the whole and sole Trade, and Liberty and Right of trading into and from all such Lands and Countries; and also

also with Prohibition to all others their Subjects to trade to or frequent them, or any of them, under the severest Penalties. Whereupon the said Company applied themselves to the making of sundry great and important Conquests in *Brasil* and *Africa*: And such Success attended their Arms, especially in *Africa*, that in the Year 1637. they took the strong Fortrefs of *St. George del Mina*, on the *Gold Coast*; and in a Year or two more, all the other *Portuguese* Forts and Settlements on the same Coast; all which Places were afterwards yielded to them by the Treaty of Truce and Navigation concluded, *Anno* 1641. between the Crown of *Portugal* and the States.

FROM this Time, and in vertue of these Possessions, thus taken from and yielded by the *Portuguese*, the *Dutch West-India* Company took upon themselves to claim the sole Right and Property in and to all the Lands and Countries in *Africa*, from *Cape Palmas* to *Cape Lopez*, comprehending all the *Gold Coast*, and *Whydah*, and sundry other great and populous Countries on each Side of them. And although the *English* had built a Fort at *Cormantine*, and settled Factories at sundry other Places on the *Gold Coast* before the *Dutch* had made the said Conquests, and had therefore as good a Right and Title as themselves to a free Trade at all Places on the same Coast, not in their actual Possession or Occupation, yet nevertheless from this Time forward the said *Dutch West-India* Company always kept one or two Cruizers on the said Coast, whose
chief

chief Business was to watch all such *English* Ships as came to trade there, and to follow them from Place to Place, and either to lie between them and the Shore, and *intercept* their Trade with the Natives, or to *frighten* them off the Coast, and ruin their Voyages,¹ or to *seize* and *carry* them to *St. George del Mina*; and this not only when such Ships were found trading on the *Gold Coast*, and at Places near any of the said *Dutch* Company's Forts and Settlements, but also at Places several Hundreds of Miles distant from them.

KING *Charles II.* soon after his Restauration, being made acquainted with the *dangerous* and *precarious State and Condition*, to which the Trade of his Subjects in those Parts was thus reduced, and having likewise received many *Complaints* touching the *Interruptions* given to, and *Depredations* committed upon the *Ships* of this Nation by the *Dutch West-India* Company on the Coast of *Africa*, it became necessary to consider not only of a proper Method for protecting and securing the said Trade for the future, but likewise how and in what Manner *Reparation* might be obtained for such *Damages* and *Depredations*.

FOR the first, it being now evident that the single and separate Endcavours of private *English* Merchants were by no means sufficient to contend with the united Power and Interest of the said *Dutch West-India* Company in those Parts of the World, and the *English* having found by former Experience in the *East Indies* what little Strefs was to be laid

on

on any Treaty that might be concluded between the two Nations in *Europe*, for the Security of such a distant Branch of our Trade, The only Choice which his Majesty had left for maintaining and defending the *Right* of his Subjects to a *free* and *unmolested Trade* in *Africa*, against the *Pretensions* and *Encroachments* of such a *Rival*, was to *incorporate* and *unite* such of his own Subjects as should be willing to engage in the said Trade into one Body, and to give and grant unto them such Powers, Privileges, and Encouragements, as the Circumstances of the Trade at that Time required; which was accordingly done by Letters Patents under the Great Seal of *England*, bearing Date the Tenth Day of *January*, 1662. and the said united Body of *English* Merchants was called *the Company of Royal Adventurers of England trading into Africa*.

As to the Second, his Majesty was pleased to cause a particular Account of the Damages complained of to be drawn up, and transmitted to his Envoy at the *Hague*, with Orders to demand and insist upon full Reparation for the same. And, for the better *protecting* of the *New Company*, it was likewise judged necessary to fit out a Man of War to the Coast of *Africa*, under the Command of Captain *Holmes*. But neither the one nor the other of these Steps had the desired Effect: For in *Holland* the States started so many Difficulties, and made such Delays, that no Satisfaction could be obtained for any past Injuries. And as to Affairs in *Africa*, as soon as they had Advice that Captain
Holmes

Holmes had by Assault taken, and possessed himself of a *Fort* near *Cape de Verde*, belonging to their *West-India Company*, they made all imaginable Preparations to fit out a *Squadron* for the *Coast of Africa*, to retake the said *Fort* by Force of Arms, notwithstanding his Majesty assured them, that he had given no Commission or Order to Captain *Holmes* for that Purpose, nor did know upon what Grounds he had proceeded to that Act of Hostility; that he expected him shortly at home, and that he would then proceed in a very strict Examination of his Proceedings, and would cause exemplary Justice to be done, as well in the redelivering the *Fort*, as in punishing the Person, if his Carriage and Demeanor deserved it: Which having no better Luck than the former Messages, in relation to Reparation for about TWENTY SHIPS taken from his Subjects on the *Coast of Guinea*; and the *Dutch* Ambassador telling his Majesty in plain Terms, That they had given Instructions to the Admiral of their Fleet, that was then going for *Guinea*, to take their *Fort* near *Cape Verde* by Force, and to take any English which had had a Hand in doing them Injury, his Majesty then found himself under a Necessity of fitting out a strong Squadron likewise for the same Parts, under the Command of Prince *Rupert*; which the States no sooner had notice of, but they alter'd their Language, and for avoiding the Effusion of Christian Blood, as they pretended, proposed that the Fleets on either Side might be detained within the Harbours, and not suffered to put to Sea, and that some

B Expedients

King Charles's
Narrative to
both Houses of
Parliament,
Nov. 24. 1664

Expedients might be found out by Treaty for each other's Satisfaction : But in the mean Time that they were making this *plausible Offer*, they sent *secret Orders to their Fleet in the Streights, under the Command of De Ruyter, to make all possible Haste to Guinea, to execute all those Instructions, which they had given to their Fleet at home ; which Orders* he executed so rigorously, that he not only retook the *Fort near Cape de Verde*, and seized and confiscated all the English Ships that he could meet with, but also by the Assistance of the Natives of one of the adjacent Countries, who had been bribed by the *Dutch General at Elmina* for that purpose, he attacked and took the English Fort at Corman-tine, and put a Dutch Garrison into the same.

SOME Time before this the PARLIAMENT had made an Enquiry into the *Obstructions and Incroachments* of the *Hollanders* upon our Trade, and into the *Losses* which our Merchants had sustain'd thereby, which they found to amount to the Value of *Seven or Eight hundred thousand Pounds* : And April 21, 1664. thereupon Both Houses came to this Resolution ; That the Wrongs, Dishonours, and Indignities, done to his Majesty by the Subjects of the United Provinces, by invading his RIGHTS in INDIA, AFRICA, and elsewhere, and the Damages, Affronts, and Injuries, done by them to our Merchants, were the greatest Obstructions of our Foreign Trade ; and that the same be humbly and speedily presented to His Majesty, and that he be most humbly moved to take some speedy and effectual Course for Redress thereof,

thereof, and all other of the like Nature, and for Prevention of the like in future, and that, in Prosecution thereof, they would, with their Lives and Fortunes, assist his Majesty against all Oppositions whatsoever.

THIS Resolution being presented to his Majesty the Twenty seventh of *April*, 1664. he was thereupon pleased to renew his Instances with the States for the Satisfaction so long demanded, with more Vigour than ever; insomuch, that in an Audience of the Twenty fifth of *June* following, he told the *Dutch* Ambassador, *That it was not to be suffer'd, that the Dutch West-India Company, only by the means of a few Forts, and three or four Ships, should pretend to render the Coasts of Africa inaccessible to all others, by blocking up the Havens against their Commerce, and keeping them off, and driving them from every Place.* But the States turned a deaf Ear to all these Remonstrances: The Losses of our Merchants amounted to too great a Sum to be easily reimbursed, and the Advantages of the Trade to *Africa*, could they have wholly engross'd and secured the same to themselves, were too great and important to be willingly parted with: And therefore, instead of shewing any Inclination to give the requisite Satisfaction on either of those Heads, they chose to renew their *Attacks* upon the *English* in *Africa* with *more Resolution* than ever, under the Conduct of their Admiral *DeRuyter*, as aforesaid. And on the other hand, the King having tried all other Methods in vain, found himself obliged, upon the

first Notice of *De Ruyter's* Proceedings in *Africa*, to comply with the *Desires* of his *Parliament*, and with the *Voice* of his *People*; and accordingly, on the Twenty second Day of *February*, 1664-5. his Majesty declared *War* in Form against the *States General* of the *United Provinces*.

NOTHING is more evident, than that the chief View of the *Dutch* at this Time, and for some Years before, had been to exclude the English entirely from the Trade to *Africa*, and to engross the same wholly to themselves: And it is equally apparent, that the Value which they then set upon this Trade was such, that rather than consent that the English should enjoy a Share thereof peaceably and quietly, they made it their Choice to stand all the Hazards, and to bear all the Inconveniencies of a War with *England*. But however, Providence so order'd it, that the Event did not answer their Expectations: For in spite of all the Efforts of the *Dutch*, the English Company kept their Footing in *Africa*; and, by the Third Article of the Treaty of Peace concluded at *Breda*, Anno 1667. it was mutually agreed, that each Party should keep and enjoy all such Lands, Islands, Towns, Fortresses, Places, and Colonies, as during that War, or before, the one had by Force of Arms, or otherwise, taken from the other. And in virtue of this Article, the *Dutch West-India* Company kept Possession of the English Fort at *Cormantine*, and the *Royal African Company* kept Possession of the Castle at *Cabo Corso*, which they had (by the Assistance of Captain *Holmes*) retaken from

from the *Dutch* before the War began, and to which they had *an undoubted Right*.

BUT the Stipulations in this Treaty, in favour of the said *English Company*, were by no means sufficient to enable them to bear up against the *many Difficulties* they had to struggle with. They had found it extremely difficult to persuade People to come in at first, and be concerned with them in *so precarious and hazardous a Trade*; by which means their *Stock* was much too small for such an Undertaking: They had been obliged to be at great Charges in *Africa*, and they had met with many severe *Losses* by *Captures*, and *otherwise at Sea*, during the *War*; and, for Want of a sufficient *Stock* to begin with, they had contracted a large Debt at home: And under these Circumstances they were so far from being able to carry on and improve their *Trade*, or to make any new *Acquisitions*, that it was with the utmost Difficulty that they could keep and preserve those Places which they had still in their Possession. For extricating themselves therefore out of these and the like Difficulties, as well as for opening a Way for others to undertake the *Care, Management, and Improvement* of *so valuable a Trade* with more Success, they consented and agreed, for and in consideration of a certain Sum of Money, which was to be paid unto them by another *new Company*, then intended to be established, to *surrender their Charter* to the *Crown*, and to assign and transfer all their *Estate, Property, Interest, and Effects* in *Africa*, and *elsewhere*, unto the said *new Company*.

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HIS Majesty likewise approving of this, as the most proper Expedient, as well for doing Justice to the *Company of Royal Adventurers*, as for the better preserving and enlarging the Trade to Africa, was thereupon pleased to accept of the said *Surrender*, and by his *Letters Patents* under the Great Seal of England, bearing Date the 27th Day of September, 1672. to establish and incorporate the present ROYAL AFRICAN COMPANY OF ENGLAND; and to give and grant unto them, all and singular, the *Lands, Countries, Havens, Roads, Rivers, and other Places in Africa*, from the *Port of Sally*, in *South Barbary*, to the *Cape of Good-Hope*, for and during the Term of *One thousand Years*, with the sole, intire, and only Trade and Traffick into and from the said Countries and Places, with Prohibition to all others his Subjects, to visit or frequent the same, without the Licence and Consent of the said Company: And also, with such other Powers and Priviledges, as were then judg'd proper and necessary, for enabling and encouraging them to undertake and accomplish so hazardous and chargeable a Work.

HEREUPON the New Company provided proper Books to take Subscriptions in, and kept them open for near Twelve Months, and invited all his Majesty's Subjects that pleased to become *Adventurers* with them, and to subscribe for what Sums they thought fit, towards raising a sufficient Joint-Stock for retrieving the said Trade out of the dangerous and precarious Condition it was then in, and for
the

the better securing and enlarging the same for the future. But so backward and fearful were *Merchants* and *others*, at this Time, to be concern'd therein, that all the *Subscriptions* they could get from *all Parts of the Kingdom* amounted only to the Sum of 111,100 *l.*

WITH this Stock however, *small as it was*, *this Company* apply'd themselves with all possible Vigour, to pursue the Ends of their Establishment. At this Time the *Dutch West-India Company* were in Possession of the strong Fortrefs of *St. GEORGE DEL MINA*, and of the *English Fort* at *Cormantine*, then called *Fort Amsterdam* ; and they had likewise another, called *Fort St. Anthony* at *Axim* ; another, called *Fort St. Sebastian* on the River *Chamah* ; a *Fifth*, called *Fort Nassau*, at a Place called *Mouree*, about two Leagues to the Leeward of *Cape-Coast* ; a *Sixth*, called *Creveceur*, at *Acra* ; and a *Seventh*, called *Fort Conraadsburg*, at *St. Jago*, within Cannon-Shot of *St. George Del Mina* ; all on the *Gold Coast*, and lying very commodious to succour and assist one another in any Case of Need : The *Danes* were in Possession of one small, but *impregnable Fort*, (since called *Fort Royal*,) on the Top of a Hill, within Gun-Shot of *Cape Coast* ; and of another at *Acra*, to the Eastward of the *Dutch Fort* at the same Place. The *Electör of Brandenburg* (now *King of Prussia*) had one good *Fort*, at *Cape Three-Points*, and two smaller ones at some little Distance to the Eastward of the same : And the

the *New English Company* were in Possession of one small Fort at *Cabo Corso*, that being the only Fort on all this Coast, which the Dutch had not dispossess'd the former Company of, during the late War. The first Thing therefore, which this Company found most necessary to be done was, to endeavour by all lawful ways and means to strengthen themselves, as much as possible, on this Coast, as other Nations, and especially the Dutch, had done before them. And for this Purpose, they enlarged Cape-Coast Castle, and made it six Times larger, stronger, and more commodious than before : They built one Fort at *Acra*, another at *Dixcove*, a Third at *Winnebah*, a Fourth at *Succundee*, a Fifth at *Commenda*, and rebuilt a Sixth at *Anamaboe*, all on the Gold Coast, and three of them within Musket-Shot of Dutch Forts ; and they likewise purchased *Fredericksburg*, now FORT-ROYAL, of the *Danes*, without which Cape-Coast Castle could not be safe : And they also built another Fort from the Ground at *Whydah*, for the Security of the *Negro* Trade at that Place. And although in the Prosecution of these Works, the said Company met with all possible Opposition from the Dutch West-India Company on the Gold Coast, which often broke out into open Hostilities, and many Times ended not without Blood-shed on both Sides ; and the Company were put to an incredible Charge and Expence in purchasing the Consent and Assistance of the Natives, for making such Settlements, as well as for Transporting, from Time to Time, the necessary Supplies
of

of *Soldiers, Artificers, Provisions*, and all other *Necessaries* and *Materials* from *England* for such *Buildings*; all which were render'd still more difficult, chargeable, and hazardous, by the *long War* which ensued with *France*: Yet nevertheless the said *Company* never ceased their Care and Endeavours for the *Service of their Country*, till they had compleatly finish'd their said Undertakings, and thereby put the *English Interest, on this Part of the Coast of Africa, on an equal Foot with the Dutch, and much superior to that of any other Nation whatsoever*. All which they effected during the *short Time* that they were permitted to enjoy the *Privileges* granted them by their *Charter*.

ON the *North Coast*, where it was natural to think the *Company* should have met with less Opposition, and more Success, Matters did not succeed altogether to their Wishes. The *Dutch West-India Company* were in Possession of the *Forts of Arguin* and *Goree*; the *French Senegal Company* (which was established *Anno 1673.*) were in Possession of a *small Fort* on an *Island* within the Bar, in the *River Senegal*; and the *Royal African Company of England* had one *small Fort* in the *River Gambia*, and another Settlement in the *River Sierraleon*. And in this Situation Affairs continued 'till about the Year 1677. and the *Companies of each Nation traded freely to all Places on the open Coast*, (not in the actual Possession of any of the others,) from *Cape Blanco* to *Cape Mount*.

IN the Year 1677, and 1678. the *French* took the *Dutch Forts* on the Islands of *Arguin* and *Goree*, which soon after were yielded to *France* by the *Treaty of Nemiguen*: And in the Year 1685 the *French* King, judging the Grant to the *Senegal Company*, which extended from *Cape Blanco* to the *Cape of Good-Hope*, too large, restrained that Company to that Part of the Coast, which extends from *Cape Blanco* to the River *Sierraleon*, and erected another Company, which was called the *Guinea Company*, and gave and granted unto them, the sole Trade to and from all that Part of the Coast, which extends from the River *Sierraleon* to the *Cape of Good-Hope*. And from this Time the *French* Trade to *Africa* was managed and carried on by those *two distinct Companies*.

THE last of these Companies made no great Progress in their Trade, 'till about the Year 1702. that the *French* King gave them the *Contract*, which he had made with *Spain*, for introducing a certain Number of Negroes yearly into the *Spanish West-Indies*. But that *Contract* being afterwards transferred to *Great Britain*, by the *Treaty of Utrecht*, the said Company was soon after abolish'd, and the Trade to *Africa*, within their *Limits*, laid open to all the Subjects of *France*; in which Condition it continued from the Year 1716, to 1720. and no longer.

As for the *Senegal Company*, they were scarcely warm in their new Possessions, before they set up a Claim to all that Part of the Coast, which extends from *Cape Blanco* to the River *Gambia*, comprehending

ing above *five hundred Miles* in Length. In the Year 1681. they would fain have *hinder'd the Royal African Company of England's Ships from trading all along that Coast*; But not being as yet in a Condition to contest that Point with them, they dropp'd their Pretentions against them for that Time. In the Years 1683, 1684, and 1685. they *seiz'd and confiscated* several Ships belonging to the *Portuguese, Dutch, and Prussians*. And in the last of those Years, they renew'd their Claim against the *Royal African Company*: From which Time they continued to give them frequent Interruptions in their Trade, 'till at last a War broke out between the two Nations, which, together with the Difficulties the Company fell under at Home soon after, put it in a manner wholly out of their Power to assert and maintain their *own* and their *Country's Rights* against such *Encroachments*, as otherwise they might and would undoubtedly have done.

THE Losses and Damages which the Company sustained, during the Course of this War, were more and greater than can be easily imagin'd. But one of the chiefest was the Loss of their *Fort* in the River *Gambia*, Anno 1695. which by the Negligence of their Servants, making no Defence, was taken and plunder'd by a Squadron of *French Men* of War, and all the Fortifications demolish'd and razed to the Ground. And, as a farther Addition to this Misfortune, when the Company came to take Possession thereof again, after the Peace, they found

the *French* settled in the River, and claiming an equal Share of the Trade thereof with themselves.

IN the Year 1697. the *Parliament* having taken the Trade to *Africa* into their Consideration, thought fit, as a further Means of enlarging and improving the same, to lay the said Trade open to all his Majesty's Subjects for *Thirteen Years*, and from thence to the End of the next Session of *Parliament*; and in regard that the *Royal African Company of England* had been at the Charge of building and maintaining a considerable Number of *Forts* and *Castles* on the said Coast, which the *Parliament* likewise judged necessary to be kept up and maintain'd in future, for the Preservation and better carrying on the said Trade, they were further pleased to impose a *Duty* of *Ten per Cent. ad Valorem*, on all Goods and Merchandize exported to *Africa*, during the said Term, to be answer'd and paid to the said Company for enabling them to keep and maintain their said *Forts* and *Castles*.

THIS Act continued in Force from the 24th of *June* 1698. to the 24th of *June* 1712. in which Time the Charges which the Company were at, in maintaining their said *Forts* and *Castles* amounted, at a Medium, to about 20,000 *l. per Annum*; and in fourteen Years to 280,000 *l.* in the Whole. The *Duty* which the *separate Traders* paid in the same Time, amounted in the whole to 73,785 *l.* 10 *s.* 6 *d.* $\frac{1}{2}$, and no more; and *Ten per Cent.* upon the Company's own Exports for the same Time, amounted to the Sum
of

of 36,387 *l.* 13 *s.* 1 *d.* $\frac{1}{2}$. From whence it appears, that even while that Act continued in Force, the *Total* of the *Ten per Cent.* Duty, came very much short of half the Charges and Expences, which the Company were at in keeping and maintaining their said *Forts* and *Castles*.

SINCE the Expiration of this Act, in 1712. to this Day, which is seventeen Years and upwards, all others his Majesty's Subjects have traded as *freely* and *openly* to all Parts of *Africa*, as they did or might do, under the Authority of the said Act; and the said Company have, at *their own sole Cost and Charge*, born and defrayed the Charges and Expences of keeping and maintaining their said *Forts* and *Castles*, which, at a very moderate Computation, has amounted to above 250,000 *l.* By which means, and by the extravagant Rise in the Prices of Negroes at *Anamaboe*, and other Places on the Coast, and by the *Decay* of the *Gold Trade* which has ensued thereupon, the Proprietors of the Company here at home, have for many Years past been obliged, either to raise sundry great Sums of Money, for keeping and maintaining their said *Forts* and *Castles*, without receiving any Profit from the Trade in return for the same, or to run the Risque not only of losing all the Money, which they have from Time to Time raised and expended for supporting their own *Property*, but of becoming *Accessaries* to the *intire Loss* of the *Trade to Africa*, and consequently to the *utter Ruin* of all our Colonies and *Plantations* in *America*, by *relinquishing and abandoning*

doning their said Forts and Castles, to be seized and possessed by such Foreign Nations, as have been long watching for an Opportunity to get them into their Hands.

THIS being the Case with regard to the *Company*, and it being the *Sense* of the *Nation*, that the *Trade* to *Africa* should continue *free* and *open* to all his Majesty's Subjects, the only Thing that remains to be consider'd, is, *Whether, or no, Forts and Castles are necessary to be kept up and maintained, for the Preservation of the said Trade to this Kingdom? And if they are necessary to be kept up and maintained for that Purpose, who, upon the Foot of an open Trade, ought in Justice and Reason to bear and defray the Charges of them?*

THAT *it is absolutely necessary, that Forts and Castles should be kept up and maintained in Africa, the Company apprehend will appear from these Considerations :*

FOR two hundred and fifty Years past, it has been the *constant POLICY* of all such *European Nations*, as have been so fortunate as to make any *new Discoveries*, and to gain any *establish'd Power* and *Authority* in *remote and Barbarous Countries*, to build and maintain *Forts and Castles*; and in virtue of such *Possessions*, to *claim a Right to whole Kingdoms*, and to *Tractions of Land* of a vast Extent, and to *EXCLUDE* all other *Nations* from trading in, to, or from them.

By this Method, the *Portuguese* long enjoyed the *whole Trade to Africa*, and to the *East Indies*.

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By this Method, the *Spaniards* for many Years *claimed* and *engrossed* almost the whole Continent of *America*, and most of the *Islands* near adjacent thereto, to themselves.

By this Method, the *Hollanders* have render'd themselves absolute Masters of all those *Islands* in the *East*, which produce *Cinnamon*, *Gloves*, *Nutmegs*, and *Mace*, and from them supply the *whole World* with those Commodities, by such *Quantities*, and at such *Prices* as they think fit.

By this Method, the *same People*, for some Time before and after the Year 1660, attempted to *gain* the *whole* and *intire Possession* of the most *valuable* Parts of the Coast of *Africa*, and to *EXCLUDE* this *Nation* from any Part, Share, or Interest therein; and thereby brought upon themselves a War with this Kingdom in 1664.

BEFORE the *Royal African Company* had built a *sufficient Number* of *Forts* and *Castles* on the *Gold Coast*, the *Dutch* interrupted our *Trade*, and *seized* and *confiscated* our *Ships* on the said *Coast*, and within its *Dependencies*, which, as they pretend, extend from *Cape Palmas* to *Cape Lopez*, and contains a Tract of Land of above 1200 Miles. Since the *Royal African Company* have built and maintained a *sufficient Number* of *Forts* and *Castles* on the *Gold Coast*, the said Company, and all other *British Ships* and *Vessels*, have traded *freely* to the said Coast, and to *all Places* dependent thereon; without the least *Interruption* or *Molestation* from the *Dutch*, or any other Nation.

BEFORE

BEEFORE the *French* got Possession of the *Forts* in the *River Senegal*, and on the *Islands of Arguin* and *Goree*, on the *North Coast*, the *English* traded freely and openly to all Places on the said *Coast*, without any *Let* or *Molestation*. Since the *French* have been in Possession of those *Forts*, they have taken upon themselves to EXCLUDE the *British Nation* from those Parts, and do now actually take and confiscate all such *British Ships and Vessels* as venture to go thither.

IN those Places where the *Royal African Company* have *Forts*, as in the *River Gambia*, the *British* separate *Traders* trade freely with the *Natives*. In those Places where other *Nations* have *Forts* and *Castles*, and the *Royal African Company* have none, there all *British private Traders* are either absolutely denied the *Liberty of Trading*, or their *Ships* are actually taken and confiscated.

FOR the better supporting of *Forts* and *Castles* in *Africa*, his Most *Christian Majesty* has not only given and granted unto the *India Company of Paris* the whole and sole *Trade* of that *Coast*, from *Cape Blanco* to the *Cape of Good-Hope*, but likewise allows them the following great and extraordinary *Privileges* and *Encouragements*, viz. *An Exemption from all Duties for Merchandize exported to Africa and to the French Islands and Colonies in America: An Exemption from half the Customs of all Goods and Merchandize imported from Africa; and from half the Customs on all Sugars, and other Merchandize, imported from the French Islands and Colonies*

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in America, being the Produce of the Sale of Negroes there : An Exemption from all Tolls of any Kind upon their Goods and Merchandize in France : A Bounty of thirteen Livres to be paid out of his own Revenue for every Negroe carried to the French Islands and Colonies in America : And, lastly, A Bounty of twenty Livres for every eight Ounces of Gold Dust which they shall bring into France.

IN like manner, the *States General* of the *United Provinces*, for the better enabling their *West-India Company* to keep and maintain their *Forts* and *Castles* in *Africa*, have not only given and granted unto the said Company the *whole* and *sole Trade* of *Africa*, from the *Tropick of Cancer* to the *Cape of Good Hope*, but do likewise *pay* and *allow* unto them the following extraordinary *Aids* and *Incomes*, viz. *From the several Provinces* of *North Holland*, *Zeland*, and *Groningen*, a *Subsidy* of 38,000 *Florins* per Annum : *A Duty* of *Three* per Cent. on all Goods and Merchandize exported to, or imported from any Place between *Newfoundland* and *Cape Florida* : *A Duty* of *Two* per Cent. on all Goods and Merchandize exported to, or imported from any Place on the *Continent* of *America*, from *Cape Florida* to the *River Oronoco*, including *Curassio* ; both which are computed to amount to 100,000 *Florins* per Annum : *A Duty* of *five Guilders* per Last on all Ships trading to *Cuba*, *Hispaniola*, *Jamaica*, *Porto Rico*, and other *Caribee Islands*, or to any Place from the *River Oronoco* to the *Streights of Magellan* and *La Maire*, and from thence to the *Streights of Aman*, computed at 3000 *Florins* per

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ANNUUM:

Annum: One third Part of the neat Income of the Colony at Surinam, computed at 10,000 Florins per Annum: The clear Profits of the Colony of Ifacape, computed at 20,000 Florins per Annum; and all the Profits arising from the Captures, and Licences which they are authorized to make upon, or to grant to such Portuguese Ships, as come upon the Coast from Lisbon or Brafil for Negroes, valued at 100,000 Florins per Annum, making in the Whole 271,600 Florins, or about 25,000 l. Sterling per Annum, communibus annis.

Now, as it is evident, that the *Recovery* of this *Trade* out of the *dangerous* and *precarious State* and *Condition* to which it was reduced about the Year 1660, is *wholly* and *solely* owing to the *Care* which the *Company* took, and to the *vast Charge* and *Expence* which they were at for many Years together, in *building* and *maintaining* a proper Number of *Forts* and *Castles* on the Coast of *Africa*, the said *Company* do likewise apprehend that there is no Man, if he will give himself the Trouble to consider these Facts fairly, and to reason justly upon them, but must own, that the *Safety* and *Preservation* of our *Trade* to *Africa*, against the *Pretensions* and *Encroachments* of such Nations, as are strongly settled in those Parts, depends absolutely upon our keeping up and maintaining the said *Company's* *Forts* and *Castles* on the same Coast, in a *defensible Condition*.

THIS Point, therefore, being thus established upon the strongest Evidence that Matters of this Nature are capable of, the next Thing that remains to be consider'd, is; Since *Forts* and *Castles* on the Coast of *Africa*

Africa are *absolutely necessary* for the Preservation of that *Trade* to this Kingdom, and since it is the *Sense* of the *Nation* that the said *Trade* should be left *free* and *open* to all his Majesty's Subjects; who shall or ought to be at the Charge of keeping and maintaining such *Forts* and *Castles* in future? the *Company* alone? the *Company* and the *private Traders* to *Africa* together? or the *Publick*? For if they are to be kept and maintained at all, it is evident that the Charge must be born and defrayed by one or other of these.

WHILE the *Company* enjoyed the whole and sole *Trade* to *Africa*, they purchased, built, and maintain'd their said *Forts* and *Castles* at their own *sole* Cost and Charge, and have thereby acquir'd an undoubted *Right* and *Property* in and to them. The Charges of keeping them from the Year 1672. to the Year 1698. could not be less than 15,000 *l. per Annum*, which in twenty six Years amounts to the Sum of 390,000 *l.* The Charges for the next fourteen Years, *viz.* from 1698, to 1712. at 20,000 *l. per Annum*, (deducting the Amount of the Duty which the *separate Traders* paid in the same Time,) came to about 206,000 *l.* And the Charges, which the *Company* have been at on the same Account for seventeen Years last past, reckoning but 15,000 *l. per Annum*, comes to 255,000 *l.* which three Sums make together the Sum of 851,000 *l.* And so much at least has the *Company* expended in keeping and maintaining their said *Forts* and *Castles* since the *Commencement* of their *Charter*; and that, exclusive of many other necessary Articles of Expence, which might be brought in, if they had a

mind to swell the Account. Now although the *Company* did willingly and chearfully bear the Expence of the *first Period*, because nothing had been done by *publick Authority* in all that Time, to deprive them of any of their Privileges, although they continued to keep and support their said *Forts* and *Castles* for the next succeeding fourteen Years, in hopes that the Duty of *Ten per Cent.* upon their own and the *separate Traders Exports* to *Africa* would have fully defrayed that Charge, as the *Parliament* undoubtedly intended it should; and altho' the *Company*, for the *Preservation* of their own *Property*, as well as for the *Protection* of the *Trade*, have continued to keep up and maintain their said *Forts* and *Castles* for seventeen Years past, at their own *sole Cost and Charge*, whereby they have expended in the Service of their Country above 250,000 *l.* yet surely no Man will pretend to say, That the *Company* should now be *forced* to part with their *Property* in their said *Forts* and *Castles*, without a Consideration suitable and proportionable to those great Sums of Money which they have expended in purchasing, erecting, and maintaining them; or, That while the Trade to *Africa* remains *free* and *open* to all others his Majesty's Subjects, the *Company* should be obliged to keep and maintain the said *Forts* and *Castles* at their own sole Cost and Charge. These are Notions so contrary, so diametrically opposite to the *sovereign and immutable Laws of Justice and Equity*, that whatever some few particular Persons may imagine, the *Company* are sure, they will
never

never meet with the least Encouragement amongst the *honest* and *impartial* Part of *Mankind*.

As for the *Company* and the *separate Traders* contributing to this *Expence*, in proportion to the Value of their severall and respective *Exports* to *Africa*, it must be confessed, that it is a common Maxim, That every Trade ought to bear its own Burden. But the *Company* apprehend, and they believe the *separate Traders*, how much soever they may pretend to differ with them in other Points, will concur with them in this, That this Maxim is not always and universally true, or that it wants a more particular Explanation. When the Trade to *Africa* was laid open, in the Year 1698. the Prices of Negroes on the Coast were incomparably lower, and the Demand for them by other Nations, as well as our own, not near so great as now; And then possibly the Trade might afford to pay a Duty for this Purpose, and those concerned might get a reasonable Profit for themselves: And while the Trade continued upon this Foot, it might well enough bear its own Burden; because there was still sufficient Encouragement left for Merchants to venture their Estates therein. But the Circumstances of this Trade are so much alter'd since, by the great Advance in the Price of Negroes on the Coast, and by the Increase of the Demand for them by this, as well as other Nations, that it is very much to be doubted, whether the most frugal Trader to *Africa* can pretend with any Certainty to clear *Six per Cent.* upon the *Out-Sets* of any *Negroe Voyage*; and therefore
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the *Company* apprehend, that to lay any Duty or Burden on such a Trade, cannot be warranted by the general Maxim; because such a Duty would in Effect amount to a *Prohibition of the Trade*, and consequently would destroy the very *End* for which it was given: Besides, when other Nations are giving all possible Encouragement to their Subjects to furnish their *Plantations* plentifully with *Negroes*, it is not to be imagined that this Nation will consent to lay any *Discouragement* on those, who are to furnish ours with the same Commodity.

BUT if it be considered, that when we say that every Trade ought to bear its own Burden, the true and genuine Meaning thereof can be no other but this; That all those who partake of the Benefits and Advantages of any Trade, ought to contribute to such Charges, as are absolutely necessary for the *Preservation* of the *Whole*; the *Maxim* must be allow'd to carry great Force and Weight with it. But then the *Company* conceive it will only affect *themselves* and the *separate Traders*, as a Part of a *much greater* and more *considerable Body*: For, if it be considered, that the *Safety* and *Preservation* of the *Trade to Africa*, depends upon our keeping up and maintaining a certain Number of *Forts* and *Castles*, in proportion to the *Power* of such other *Rival Nations*, as are *strongly settled* in the same Parts; If the *Preservation* and *Improvement* of all our *Colonies* and *Plantations* in *America* depends upon the *Preservation* of the *Trade to Africa*; as they are supplied with *Negroes* from thence, without which they could

could raise neither *Sugar*, nor *Tobacco*, nor *Indigo*, nor *Rice*, nor *Cotton*, nor *Ginger*, nor any other Commodities of the Growth of those Colonies; If upon the *Preservation* and *Improvement* of the *Trade* to *Africa* and the *West-Indies*, the *Consumption* of above one *Half* of our *Manufactures*, and the *Employment* of above one *Half* of our *Shipping* and *Navigation*, intirely depends; If the *Value* of *Lands* in *Britain* do, and always must rise and fall in proportion as our *Manufactures* and *Navigation* are encouraged or discouraged; And if the *Customs*, and other *Publick Revenues* must increase or decrease, as the *Trade* to *Africa*, and the *Plantations* is better or worse protected and supported; In a Word, if there be any Truth or Weight in these and the like Considerations, it is then evident, that *there is not a Man in this Kingdom, from the highest to the lowest, who does not more or less partake of the Benefits and Advantages of the Royal African Company's FORTS and CASTLES in Africa; and who would not be a Sufferer or Loser, in Proportion to his Rank and Circumstances, should the said FORTS and CASTLES be abandon'd, or come under the Power, or fall into the Hands of any Foreign Nation.* And if so, it is then submitted, Whether, according to the Maxim above mention'd, *the African Company alone, or the Separate Traders alone, or both together, or whether the Publick, that is, the whole Body of the People of this Realm, ought to bear and contribute to the necessary Charges, and Expences of the said Forts and Castles?*

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THE Resolution of these Questions is so plain and obvious, that it were only to mispend Time, to say, which ought to bear this Expence. The only Objection of any Weight that has been made to it, is, that there is no *Precedent* for the *Publick's* making any *Allowance* for the *Support* and *Preservation* of any *Trade*. But the Answer to this is easy: For, were it really so, that there never was a *Precedent* for such an *Allowance* from the *Publick*; it is likewise certain, *that there never was a Case parallel to this of the African Company*: And *new* and *extraordinary Cases* are always allow'd to be *sufficient Warrants* for setting *new* *Precedents* for Posterity. But, if *Precedents* are the only Things wanting to induce the *Publick* to come into such an *Allowance*, it is conceived that *several such* may be easily produced. *Jamaica*, the *Leeward-Islands*, *New-York*, *Bermudas*, and *Providence*, are settled and established Governments; they have Power to *raise Money within themselves* for their own Protection and Defence, and some of them are very able to do it, and yet so good and indulgent *is the Government* to them, that the *Parliament* grants *undry considerable Sums* every Year for their *Encouragement* and *Protection*. The *Garrisons* at *Annapolis Royal* and *Placentia* are kept for the Protection of *New England* and the *Fisheries*; and yet they are kept at the *Publick Charge*, and the *Parliament* grants *Money* every Year for those Services. *Gibraltar* and *Port Mahon* are kept for the Security and Protection of our *Trade* in the *Mediterranean*

diterranean ; and the *Parliament* grants large *Sums* every Year for their Maintenance and Support, without obliging any of the Merchants trading to those Parts to pay or contribute any Thing thereto. If *Precedents* therefore are of any Use in this Case, the *Company* apprehend that these are strong in their Favour : For, if the *Government* thinks fit to be at an Expence for the Protection of several particular Colonies, then much more may the *Company* hope for the like Indulgence, for the Preservation of a Trade, upon which the *Welfare and Prosperity of all his Majesty's Colonies and Plantations in America does in so great a Measure depend*. If the *Parliament* thinks fit to be at a very great annual Expence for keeping *Gibraltar and Port Mahon*, for the Protection of our Trade in the *Mediterranean*, then much more may the *Company* hope to be indulged with a small Allowance, for the Preservation of the Trade to *Africa*, upon which more depends, than upon all the other Branches of our Foreign Trade put together.

To conclude:

THE *Company's Forts and Castles* on the Coast of *Africa*, were either purchased or built with their own Money, and they have been in the quiet Possession of them for a great Number of Years. They have therefore an undoubted Right and Property in them.

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THE Question then is :

ARE *these* FORTS and CASTLES NECESSARY for the Preservation of the Trade to Africa to this KINGDOM? Or, are they NOT?

IF they are NECESSARY, as the PARLIAMENT has declared formerly, and as the Honourable HOUSE OF COMMONS have VOTED more than once, the Company hope they may be intitled to some Relief and Assistance from the PUBLICK, for enabling them to keep and maintain them in a defensible Condition, for the Benefit and Protection of the Trade in general.

BUT, if contrary to all the Reasons and Arguments alledged before, for the NECESSITY of FORTS and CASTLES, it shall be judged, that they are NO LONGER NECESSARY ; and that NO DAMAGE can accrue to the TRADE, or to the PUBLICK, by their not being kept up and maintained, it is then submitted, how, and in what Manner the Company may dispose of them ?

F I N I S.

Charles Hayes, *The Importance of Effectually
Supporting the Royal African Company
of England, Impartially Consider'd . . .*
(London, M. Cooper, 1744)

Charles Hayes was Deputy Governor of the company in the mid-1740s. His pamphlet supports the company in its endeavour to maintain its forts and trade in Africa. If its forts and castles in Africa were given up, Britain's rivals would benefit and her slave trade would suffer. It is argued that the slave traffic 'is the chief and fundamental Support of the British Colonies and Plantations in America' (p. 101), and that the wealth and naval power of Britain owes much to the amount and value of colonial produce imported, the consumption of British manufactures in the colonies, and the employment of shipping and seamen in transatlantic trade. The preservation of the company's forts is necessary to maintain this commercial supremacy and to counteract competition from other European trading powers. The Dutch have attacked British forts and the French have attempted to exclude Britain from trading on certain parts of the African coast. Lately, the French have carried off large numbers of slaves from Anamaboe, within sight of Cape Coast Castle. (This point is made, with examples of the effect on British traders, in PRO, CO 388/43, Charles Hayes to the Secretary of the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, 31 December 1744.) These competitors 'plume themselves on their Superiority of Encouragement from their respective States to what is granted to the company' (p. 107).

Hayes worries that the British will be dispossessed of their forts if the company is not supported by Parliament. To continue trading successfully with Africa the company needs to cultivate relations with African traders there and to overcome foreign competition. This is best effected by maintaining forts and factories rather than by providing stationed ships on the African coast. The company has expended a great deal of money on its African establishments, amounting to nearly £17,000 annually between the end of 1729 and the end of 1741, but the shortfall needs to be made up by public money. A parliamentary allowance of £30,000 per annum for the African trade, it is suggested, would reap great benefits to the nation: that

is far less per year than is expended on the Navy and its strategic bases such as Gibraltar and Port Mahon. If similar measures had been taken to bolster the African trade, 'this Nation might long have since had the whole Negroe-trade in their own Hands' (p. 142). The concluding point made is that the company, the private traders and the nation will benefit from Parliament's financial support for the African trade.

THE
IMPORTANCE
OF
EFFECTUALLY SUPPORTING
THE
ROYAL AFRICAN COMPANY
OF
ENGLAND
IMPARTIALLY CONSIDER'D;

SHEWING,

That a FREE and OPEN TRADE to *Africa*,
and the SUPPORT and PRESERVATION of the
British COLONIES and PLANTATIONS in
America,

DEPEND UPON

Maintaining the FORTS and SETTLEMENTS, RIGHTS and
PRIVILEGES belonging to that CORPORATION, against
the Encroachments of the *French*, and all other *Foreign Rivals*
in that Trade.

With a Map, shewing the Situation of the several *European*
Forts and Settlements in that Country.

In a LETTER to a MEMBER of the HOUSE of COMMONS.

L O N D O N:

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THE
IMPORTANCE
OF
EFFECTUALLY SUPPORTING
THE
ROYAL AFRICAN COMPANY
OF
ENGLAND
Impartially consider'd, &c.

S I R,



T being the Sense of the *Royal African Company of England*, in Conformity to *That* of the Nation in general, that the Trade to the Coast of *Africa* ought always to continue *free and open*, for the Benefit of all his Majesty's Subjects trading to those Parts; and also, that the Trade and Navigation to *Africa* in general should never

B

be

be charged with any Tax, Duty, Burthen or other Incumbrance whatever for the Maintainance and Preservation of the *Forts* and *Settlements*, belonging to the said Company, it is to be presumed that no Well-wisher to his Country, upon these Principles, can object against the Reasonableness and Necessity of the Publick's enabling the Company effectually to support and maintain their *Possessions, Rights* and *Privileges* in *Africa*; in order the more effectually to preserve this invaluable Branch of Trade free and open to all His Majesty's Subjects, against such of our most formidable Rivals, who already possess, or are endeavouring to encrease the Number of their *Forts* and *Settlements* on the same Coast.

Should the Company be under a Necessity to evacuate and abandon the *British Forts, Settlements* and *Castles* in *Africa*, no Man sure will imagine we can preserve the Trade, when we are depriv'd of those Possessions, Rights and Privileges which have hitherto supported it.

May we not with equal Reason say, that if we were complaisant enough to give up *Gibraltar* to the *Spaniards*, or *French*, that our Trade to *Italy* and the *Levant* would be equally secure? Perhaps the effectual Support and Maintainance of our *Settlements* in *Africa* may not be of less Advantage to our Trade and Navigation in *America* than *Gibraltar* may be to that in *Europe*. It is an uncontroverted Maxim, *That the Want of Things most evidently shew the Worth of Them*. This is in nothing more verified than in the *Spaniards*, who could never be so truly sensible of the Value of *Gibraltar*, 'till it came into *British* Hands, and their former Possessions, and Fortifications were turn'd against Them.

Let us but suppose for a Moment, that the *Royal African Company*, were stript of their *Possessions, Forts* and *Castles*

in *Africa*, and they were in the Possession of our most dangerous Rivals, what must be the inevitable Consequence to the Trade and Navigation of these Kingdoms? Will not every *British Planter* in *America*, and every *West-India Merchant* in *England* grant, that the *Negro Trade* on the Coast of *Africa*, is the chief and fundamental Support of the *British Colonies* and *Plantations* in *America*? Should our most formidable Rivals monopolize the whole *African Trade* to Themselves, will they not naturally furnish their *own Colonies* with the *best* of *Negroes*, and suffer *Englishmen* to purchase their *Refuse* only; and that too at an exorbitant Rate?

But when it was wholly in their Power, either to grant or refuse us such Permission, have we any Reason to believe they would be so gracious as to indulge us in such a Privilege? For when they found Themselves in Possession of all the *Forts* and *Settlements* on the Coast, and consequently in full Possession of the whole Trade; when they consider'd that the Wealth and naval Power of *Great-Britain* was, in a great Measure, owing to the extensive Commerce and Navigation to and from our *American Colonies* and *Plantations*; and that these must be totally ruin'd and undone, if unsupplied with *Negroes*, what Reason have we to believe they would suffer us to purchase a single *Negro* on the Coast of *Africa*; or that they would not take every Advantage to distress and impoverish our *British Plantations* in this most vital and essential Point? No Man sure can imagine they will suffer our *Sugar Colonies* to be well supply'd with *Negroes*, when they take every Occasion to rival us in that valuable Trade.

Our Neighbour-Nations wisely consider their *African Trade* in the Light of a *Nursery* to their *Colonies* and *Plantations* in *America*; and as such they studiously cherish and preserve it. And if once they can wholly engross the same to Themselves, how are we secure that they may not be as successful in the *Sugar*, *Tobacco* and *Rice Trades*, as they have already been in the *Indigo*? The Acquisition of one Branch of Trade, will naturally animate an active and enterprizing Nation to make further Encroachments upon their Neighbours; especially when they sensibly must experience an *Encrease* of *Seamen* and *Shipping* on their Side, while they perceive a manifest *Declension* in both on the Side of *Great Britain*.

If the Preservation and Improvement of the *British Colonies* and *Plantations* in *America*, depend upon the Preservation of the Trade to *Africa*, as They are supply'd with *Negro-Servants* only from thence, to cultivate and improve their Plantations with *Sugars*, *Tobacco*, *Rice*, *Rum*, *Cotton*, *Ginger*, &c. &c; if upon the Preservation of the Trade to *Africa* and the *West Indies*, the Consumption, as has been allow'd by the best Judges, of above One half of our Manufactures, and the Employment of above One Half of our Shipping and Navigation depend; if the Value of *Lands* in *Britain*, do, and always must rise and fall in Proportion as our Manufactures and Navigation prosper or decline; and if the *national Revenue* must encrease or diminish, as the Trade to *Africa*, and our *Plantations* is better or worse protected and supported: If there be any Weight in these Considerations, is it not evident, that there is not a Man in this Kingdom, who in Proportion to his Rank in the Community, does not more or less partake of the Benefit

fit and Advantage of the *African Company's Forts and Castles* in *Africa*; and who would not be a Sufferer in Proportion, should their *Forts and Castles* be abandon'd, or fall into the Hands of any other Nation. For,

It will soon appear, Sir, that we have no Reason to think our Trade to the Coast of *Africa* can be preserv'd and supported, without keeping up and maintaining our *Possessions, Forts and Castles* on that Coast.

For near 300 Years past, it has been the constant Policy of all *European Nations*, who have made *New Discoveries*, and gain'd any establish'd Power and Authority in barbarous Countries, to erect and maintain *Forts and Castles*; and in Virtue of such Possessions, to claim a Right to whole Kingdoms, and to EXCLUDE all other Nations from trading in, to, or from Them.

By these Means the *Portuguese* long enjoy'd the whole Trade to *Africa* and the *East-Indies*; the *Spaniards* claim'd and engross'd to themselves almost the whole Continent of *America*, and most of the *Islands* adjacent thereunto. By this Means also, did not the *Hollanders* become absolute Masters of all the *Spice Islands*, and now supply the whole World with them, by such Quantities, and at such Prices as they think fit?

We once shared the Trade to *India* for *Nutmegs, Cloves* and *Spice*, with the *Dutch* and *Portuguese*; but for want of due Regard and Encouragement given to the *Old East-India Company* to preserve that Branch of Trade, the *Dutch* supplanted us both, and have engross'd that valuable Trade to themselves.

About 1660 the *Dutch* also attempted to gain the *entire Possession* of the most valuable Parts of the Coast of *Africa*, and to EXCLUDE *Great-Britain* from any Share or Interest therein as they have done in the *Spice Trade*; and thereby brought

on themselves a War with this Kingdom, in 1664: Such Relentment has the *British* Nation shew'd, when Attempts have been made to deprive them of this important Branch of Commerce.

Before the *Royal African Company* had built a sufficient Number of *Forts* and *Castles* on the *Gold Coast*, the *Dutch*, interrupted our Trade, and seized and confiscated our Ships on that Coast, and within its Dependencies. Since They have built and maintained a sufficient Number of *Forts* and *Castles* on the *Gold Coast*, the Company, and all other *British* Ships and Vessels, have traded *freely* to this Coast, and all Places dependent thereon, without Interruption or Molestation from the *Dutch*, or any other Nation.

Before the *French* got Possession of the *Forts*, in the River *Senegal*, and on the *Islands* of *Arguin* and *Goree*, on the *North Coast*, the *English* traded *freely* and *openly* to all Places on that Coast, without Obstruction. Since the *French* have been in Possession of those *Forts*, they have assum'd the Right and Authority to EXCLUDE the *British* Nation from those Parts; and do now actually take and confiscate all such *British* Ships and Vessels as venture to go thither. And can it be reasonably presum'd, that they would not take the same Liberty to EXCLUDE the *British* Nation from those Parts of the *African Coast*, where they now *freely* trade, had they once got Possession of the *Forts* and *Castles* belonging to the *Royal African Company*?

Such however is the encroaching Insolence of that Nation; and such their ardent Desire to engross the *African Trade* to Themselves, that by Virtue of one Fort in the River *Senegal*, and another a little Distance from the same, in the Island of *Goree*, they not only claim an exclusive
Right

Right to all the Coast from *Cape Blanco* to the River *Gambia*, extending along the Shore about 400 Miles, but carry on a considerable Trade in the River *Gambia*, within Sight of the *British Fort* there; and on the *Gold Coast*, where heretofore they were never permitted or ever presumed to purchase a *Negro*, They have of late Years come in great Numbers, and trade at a Place called *Anamaboe*, within Sight of *Cape Coast Castle*, the principal *British Fort* on that Coast, and carry off yearly from thence Ten times more of the best *Negroes* to their own *Sugar Colonies* in *America*, than goes to the *British Sugar Islands*; to the infinite Encrease of the *French Colonies*, and Detriment of *our own*.

And what encourages this encroaching Rival haughtily to EXCLUDE *British* Subjects from trading within several hundred of Miles of their Forts, and on the other Hand to presume to Trade under the very Nose of our *British Forts* is, the extraordinary Privileges and Encouragement they receive from their Country, while the Encouragement which the *Royal African Company of England* have received from the Publick for 14 Years past, bears no Proportion to the Charges and Expences which it would necessarily require, effectually to secure the *British* Rights and Privileges against such Encroachments.

For the better supporting the *African Trade* to the *French Nation*, his most *Christian Majesty* has not only granted the *India Company of Paris*, the sole Trade of that Coast, from *Cape Blanco* to the *Cape of Good-Hope*, but allows them
 “ an Exemption from all Duties for Merchandize exported
 “ to *Africa*, and to the *French Islands* and *Colonies* in
 “ *America*: An Exemption from half the Custom of all
 “ Goods

“ *Goods* and *Merchandize* imported from *Africa*;
 “ and from half the *Customs* on all *Sugars*, and other
 “ *Merchandize* imported from the *French Islands* and *Colo-*
 “ *nies*, in *America*, being the *Produce* of the *Sale* of
 “ *Negroes* there: An *Exemption* from all *Tolls* of any
 “ *Kind* upon their *Goods* and *Merchandize* in *France*:
 “ A *Bounty* of *Thirteen Livres* to be paid out of his own
 “ *Revenue* for every *Negro* carry’d to the *French Islands*
 “ and *Colonies* in *America*: And a *Bounty* of *Twenty*
 “ *Livres* for every eight *Ounces* of *Gold Dust* brought
 “ into *France*,” Thus we see of what *Importance* the *French*
 think the *African Trade* to be to that *Kingdom*, and what
Encouragement they give to the *Negro*-*Trade*: And is
 this *Branch* of less *Moment* to the *British Nation*?

In like *Manner* the *States General* of the *United Pro-*
vinces, for the better enabling their *West-India Company* to
 maintain their *Forts* and *Castles*, and all their *Rights* and
Privileges in *Africa*, have not only granted that *Com-*
pany many great *Privileges* and *Immunities*, but allow them
 these extraordinary *Aids* and *Incomes*; “ From the several
 “ *Provinces* of *North Holland*, *Zealand*, and *Gronningen*, a
 “ *Subsidy* of 38,000 *Florins per Annum*: A *Duty* of
 “ *Three per Cent.* on all *Goods* and *Merchandize* exported
 “ to, or imported from any *Place* between *Newfoundland*
 “ and *Cape Florida*: A *Duty* of *Two per Cent.* on *Goods*
 “ and *Merchandize* exported to, or imported from any
 “ *Place* on the *Continent* of *America*, from *Cape Florida*
 “ to the *River Oronoco*, including *Curaffo*; both which are
 “ computed to amount to 100,000 *Florins per Annum*. A
 “ *Duty* of *Five Guilders per Last*, on all *Ships* trading to *Cuba*,
 “ *Hispaniola*, *Jamaica*, *Porto Rico*, and other *Caribee Islands*,
 “ or

“ or to any Place from the River *Oronoco* to the Streights
 “ of *Magellen*, and *La Maire*, and from thence to the
 “ Streights of *Anian*, computed at 3,000 Florins *per*
 “ *Annum* : One third part of the near Income of the
 “ Colony at *Surinam*, computed at 10,000 Florins *per*
 “ *Annum* : The clear Profits of the Colony of *Isacape*
 “ computed at 20,000 Florins *per Annum* : And all the
 “ Profits arising from the *Captures* and *Licences*, which
 “ they are authorized to make upon, or grant to such *Por-*
 “ *tuguese* Ships as come upon the Coast, from *Lisbon* or
 “ *Brasil* for *Negroes*, valued at 100,000 Florins *per Annum*,
 “ making in the Whole 271,600 Florins, or about 25,000 *l.*
 “ Sterling *per Annum, communibus annis.*”

These, Sir, are the effectual Measures taken by the *French* and the *Dutch* to maintain and support their *Fort*s and *Castles*, *Claims* and *Possessions* on the *African Coast*; which encourage Them to make Inroads and Encroachments on the *British Settlements*, and interfere with the Trade of the *British Merchant*; while the *Royal African Company* have for many Years past lain under such Discouragements, as have in a great Measure put it out of their Power duly to maintain and assert their own and their Countries Rights and Privileges, in and to the Trade of those Parts where their *Fort*s and *Settlements* are situated.

And if the various Competitors we have to contend with on the *African Coast*, plume themselves on their Superiority of Encouragement from their respective States to what is granted to the *Royal African Company of England*; and in Consequence thereof, take unjustifiable Liberties with *British Subjects*, possess'd of much larger Settlements and much greater Claims than themselves, how can the *African*

Company be expected to maintain the Ballance of Interest, in Support of the *British* Rights of our Merchants without having suitable Encouragement from the Publick ?

That we must be inevitably dispossest'd of our *Forts* and *Settlements* in *Africa*, provided the *Company* is not effectually enabled by the Legislature to maintain and support them in a proper and defensible Manner, will appear from briefly reviewing the past Attempts of our Competitors to wrest this Trade out of our Hands.

When the *Dutch* in 1637 took and possest'd themselves of the strong Fortres of *St. George del Mina*, on the *Gold Coast*, and soon after of all the other *Portuguese Forts* and *Settlements* on the same Coast, they would not suffer a *British* Ship to Trade on the *African Coast*; and this not only on the *Gold Coast*, and at Places near the *Dutch Company's Forts* and *Settlements*, but they seized and confiscated *British* Ships at Places several hundred of Miles distant from them, and carry'd Them to *St. George del Mina*, and there condemn'd them.

King *Charles* the II. being acquainted with the repeated Insults and Depredations committed upon *British* Ships, no less than Twenty having been taken by the *Dutch West-India Company* on the *African Coast*, His Majesty resolv'd to obtain Reparation for past Injuries, and effectually to secure that valuable Branch of Trade to his Subjects in future.

His Majesty therefore order'd his *Envoy* at the *Hague* to insist upon Reparation; and to convince the States he was in Earnest, at the same Time order'd a Man of War to be fitted out to the Coast of *Africa* commanded by

by Captain *Holmes*. But neither had the desir'd Effect; the States started such Difficulties, and made such trifling Prevarications and Delays, that no Satisfaction could be obtain'd for past Injuries. Whereupon Captain *Holmes* possess'd himself of a Fort near *Cape de Verde*, belonging to the *Dutch West-India Company*; which so provok'd the *States*, that they fitted out a Squadron, under the Command of *De Ruyter*, who not only retook the Fort near *Cape de Verde*; and seized and confiscated all *British* Ships he could meet with, but took the *English* Fort at *Cormantine* and put a *Dutch* Garrison into it.

Some time before this Event, the Parliament had made Enquiry into the Obstructions and Encroachments of the *Hollanders* on our Trade, and into the Losses our Merchants had sustained thereby; which they found to amount to no less than near 800,000 *l*. Whereupon both Houses of Parliament came to this Resolution; viz. *That the Wrongs, Dishonours, and Indignities, done to his Majesty by the Subjects of the United Provinces, by invading his Rights in India, Africa, and elsewhere, and the Damages, Affronts and Injuries, done by them to our Merchants, were the greatest Obstructions of our Foreign Trade; and that the same be humbly and speedily presented to his Majesty, and that he be most humbly moved to take some speedy and effectual Course for Redress thereof, and all other of the like Nature, and for Prevention of the like in future; and that in Prosecution thereof, they would, with their Lives and Fortunes, assist His Majesty against all Opposition whatsoever.*

This Resolution being presented to his Majesty the 27th of *April* 1664, he was pleased to renew his Instances with the *States* for Satisfaction so long demanded; and in an

Audience of the 25th of *June* following, He told the *Dutch* Ambassador, *That it was not to be suffer'd that the Dutch West-India Company, only by the Means of a few Forts and three or four Ships, should pretend to render the Coasts of Africa inaccessible to all others, by blocking up the Harbours against their Commerce, and keeping them off, and driving them from every Place.* And what avail'd these Remonstrances? The States turn'd a deaf Ear to them: The Losses of our Merchants amounted to too considerable a Sum to be easily reimburs'd; and the Advantages of the Trade to *Africa*, could they have wholly monopolized and secured the same to themselves, as they aimed at, were too important to be willingly parted with.

Instead therefore of giving the Satisfaction demanded, They made a further Attempt to become absolute Masters of this whole Trade: They renew'd their Insults and Depredations on the *British* Subjects with more Resolution than before, under the Conduct of their Admiral *De Ruyter*. So that His Majesty was under a Necessity, on this Occasion, of declaring War in Form, on the 2^d of *February*, 1664-5, against the *States General of the United Provinces*.

Nothing is more evident than that the chief View of the *Dutch* at this Time, and for some Years preceeding, had been to EXCLUDE the *English* absolutely and entirely from the Trade to *Africa*; and to engross the same wholly to Themselves. Such was the high Estimation they set on this Trade, that rather than consent the *English* should enjoy a Share of it *peaceably*, they chose to run the Hazard, and bear the Inconveniencies of a War with *Great-Britain*.

But

But in Spite of all the Efforts of the *Dutch*, the *British Company* kept their Footing in *Africa*; and by the third Article of the Treaty of Peace, concluded at *Breda*, 1667, it was mutually agreed that each Party should keep and enjoy all such *Lands, Islands, Towns, Fortresses, Places and Colonies*, as well during that War as before, the One had by Force of Arms, or otherwise taken from the other.

However, the Stipulations in this Treaty in Favour of the then Company, were far from being sufficient to enable Them to bear up against the Difficulties they had to contend with. They were under the Necessity of being at a very great Expence, during the War, to support their Forts; and met with no inconsiderable Losses by Captures, and otherwise at Sea during Hostilities; that it was with the utmost Difficulty they could preserve their Possessions.

To extricate themselves from these Difficulties, they agreed, in Consideration of a certain Sum of Money to be paid by another *New Company*, intended to be establish'd, to surrender their *Charter* to the Crown, and transfer all their *Estate, Property, Interest, and Effects* in *Africa*, unto the *New Company*.

Of this His Majesty approv'd, and was thereupon pleas'd to accept of the said Surrender; and by His *Letters Patent*, under the Great Seal of *England*, bearing Date the 27th Day of *September*, 1672, to establish and incorporate the present *Royal African Company* of *England*, and to grant them *all and singular, the Lands, Countries, Havens, Roads, Rivers, and other Places* in *Africa*, from the *Port of Sally* in South Barbary, to the *Cape of Good Hope*, &c. with such Powers and Privileges as were then judg'd absolutely

folutely necessary, for enabling and encouraging of them to retrieve and secure so valuable and important a Branch of Foreign Trade to this Nation.

This *New Company* set out with no larger a Stock than 111,100*l.* with which, small as it was, they apply'd themselves with all possible Vigour and Resolution to pursue the Ends of their Establishment. At this time, it must be observed that the *Dutch West-India Company* were in Possession of the strong Fortrels of *St. George del Mina*; and of the *English* Fort at *Cormantine*, then called *Fort Amsterdam*: They had likewise another, nam'd *Fort St. Anthony* at *Axim*, *Fort St. Sebastian's* on the River *Chamah*, *Fort Nassau* at *Moree*, two Leagues to Leeward of *Cape Coast*, another called *Creveceur* at *Acra*, and another called *Fort Conraadsburg* at *St. Jago*, within Cannon Shot of *St. George del Mina*: All on the *Gold Coast* and commodious to succour each other in case of Need. The *Danes* were in Possession of one small but impregnable Fort (since called *Fort Royal*) within Gun Shot of *Cape Coast*; and another at *Acra*, to the Eastward of the *Dutch* Fort at the same Place. The *Electör of Brandenburg* (late King of *Prussia*) had one good Fort at *Cape-Three-Points*, and two smaller ones at little distance to the Eastward of the same. The *New British* Company possels'd one small Fort at *Cabo Corso*, it being the only Fort on all this Coast, which the *Dutch* had not dispossels'd the former Company of during that War.

At this critical Point of Time, the present *Company* exerted themselves with no little Spirit and Resolution, to preserve the *African* Trade to these Kingdoms. They enlarged *Cape Coast Castle*, and made it ten Times larger

larger, stronger, and more commodious than before. They built one Fort at *Acra*, another at *Dixcove*, a third at *Winnebah*, a fourth at *Succuadee*, a fifth at *Commenda*, and rebuilt a sixth at *Anamaboe*, all on the *Gold Coast*; and three of them within Musket Shot of *Dutch Forts*. They also purchas'd *Fredericksburg*, now *Fort Royal*, of the *Danes*, without which *Cape Coast Castle* could not be so secure. They likewise built another Fort from the Ground at *Whydah*, for the Security of the *Negro Trade* at that Place.

During the Reparation and Erection of these Forts, so exasperated were the *Dutch*, that we should compel them to admit us to share only the Benefits of this Trade with themselves, that their *West-India Company* gave the *Royal African Company* all possible Opposition on the *Gold Coast*, which often broke out into desperate Hostilities; which occasion'd the *British Company* to be put to an incredible Expence in purchasing the Consent and Assistance of the Natives, for making such Settlements; as also for transporting from time to time, the necessary Supplies of *Soldiers*, *Artificers*, *Provisions*, and all other *Materials* from *England* for such Buildings: All which were render'd still more expensive and hazardous by the long War, which ensued with *France*.

Under all these Difficulties the present Company never ceased their Efforts to serve their Country, 'till they had put the *British Interest* on this part of the Coast of *Africa*, on an equal Foot with the *Dutch*, and much superior to that of any other Nation whatever.

On the North Coast where the least Opposition was expected, Matters did not succeed so well to the *British Company's* Desire. The *Dutch West-India Company* possess'd the

the Forts of *Arguin* and *Goree*; the *French Senegal Company*, establish'd in 1673, possess'd a small Fort on an Island within the Bar, in the River *Senegal*; and the *African Company* of England had one small Fort in the River *Gambia*, and another Settlement in the River *Sierraleon*.

In this Situation Affairs continued till 1677, and the Companies of each Nation traded freely to all Places on the open Coast, not in the actual Possession of any of the other, from *Cape Blanco*, to *Cape Mount*.

In 1677, and 1678, the *French* took the *Dutch Forts* on the Isles of *Arguin* and *Goree*, which were yielded to *France* by the Treaty of *Nemiguen*. In 1685, the *French* King judging the Grant to the *Senegal Company* too extensive, from *Cape Blanco*, to *Cape Good Hope*, restrain'd that Company from *Cape Blanco* to the River *Sierraleon*; and erected another Company called the *Guinea Company*, and granted them the sole Trade to and from all that part of the Coast extending from the River *Sierraleon* to the *Cape of Good Hope*. From this time the *French* Trade to *Africa* was carry'd on by those two distinct Companies.

The latter of these made no great Progress in their Trade 'till 1702, when the *French* King encouraged them with the Contract made with *Spain*, to introduce a certain Number of *Negroes* yearly into the *Spanish West-Indies*. At the Treaty of *Utrecht* this Contract being transferr'd to *Great-Britain*, that Company was soon abolish'd, and the Trade to *Africa*, within their Limits, laid open to all the Subjects of *France*: Thus it continued from 1716 to 1720.

The

The *Senegal Company* were scarcely warm in their new Possessions before they claim'd all that Part of the Coast, extending from *Cape Blanco* to the River *Gambia*, about 500 Miles in Length. In 1681, they exerted all their Strength to obstruct the *African Company's* Ships from trading along that Coast: But not being then in a Condition to contest that Point with them, they dropp'd their Pretensions for that Time.

So anxious were the *French* to engross this Trade to themselves, that in 1683, 1684 and 1685, they seized and confiscated the Ships belonging to the *Portuguese*, *Dutch* and *Prussians*. In 1685 they again resolutely renew'd their Claim against the *Royal African Company* of England; from which Time they began to give them frequent Interruptions in their Trade, till at last a War broke out between the two Nations. Thus we find by past Experience that both the *French* and *Dutch*, who have *Forts* and *Settlements* on the Coast of *Africa*, have often hitherto unsuccessfully endeavour'd to extirpare the *English* from their Neighbourhood: And if *Britain* should now tamely give up her *Forts* and *Settlements*, have we any Colour of Reason to believe we can support our Share of the Trade, when we are depriv'd of those Possessions which Experience shews, ever have and only can uphold our Right to it?

That *Forts* and *Settlements* on the Coast of *Africa* are indispensably necessary for the Preservation of that Trade to *British* Merchants in general will further appear by considering the Nature of it, and the Measures reasonable and necessary to be taken in Order to encourage the Natives to maintain an Intercourse of Commerce with this Nation.

The Kings of these Countries being numerous, our Rivals settled on the same Coast, have, by Experience, always found it expedient to make strict Alliances with as many of the *Negroe Princes* as they can; to stipulate and agree to protect them whenever oppress'd by their neighbouring *Negroe Princes*, who may be Allies to the *British* Company, and to supply them, on such Occasions, with Arms and Ammunition: And the Natives in Return on their part, stipulate to bring down and encourage a constant Currency of Trade from the *Inland* Countries to such allied *European* Settlements, in Opposition to other Competitors who have Settlements on the same Coast.

Should *Great-Britain* therefore give up their present Footing on the *African* Coast, and consequently not have it in their Power to take the like Measures as our Rivals do, would not the very Name of an *Englishman* soon not only become contemptible, but absolutely forgot amongst such barbarous People? For, our Rivals being possess'd of all the *Forts, Castles* and *Factories*; and their *Governors, Factors* and *Agents* constantly maintaining their Alliances with the *Inland* Natives, must not this naturally and inevitably prevent all Trade with *British* Shipping, and totally draw the Whole into the Channel of Foreign Settlements, and forever exclude *British* Merchants from having any Trade on the same Coast?

So oft as the Natives are at War amongst themselves, which is commonly the Case of those People, and are not supported by their *European Ally* against the Enemy, will they not naturally seek that Alliance, and carry the whole Trade to that Settlement which is the best able to assist them? The *Negroe-Trade* depending on the effectual Protection of the
neighbouring

neighbouring Princes, can we expect to preserve this Trade without being so situated as to support them who support our Trade? But how can these Friendships and Alliances be effectually made and cemented without the Company's Agents residing on the Spot, constantly associating with the Native-Princes, and establishing Factories many hundred Miles Inland, by the means of Rivers, where none but small *Sloops* and *Canoes* can go to traffick? While our Rivals pursued these Measures, and we neglected Them, is there the least Shadow of Reason to imagine They would suffer an *Englishman* to purchase a *Negro* to carry to the *British Colonies* and *Plantations*, while those Engrossers had a *Plantation* of their own to send them to? Could we ever expect the Re-establishment of an *Assiento Contract*, whereby to supply the *Spanish West-Indies* or the *Brazils* with *Negroes*? Would not an Abolition of the present *African Company*, be an effectual Measure to deprive *Great-Britain* of all Advantages of this Nature, and to throw them for ever into the Hands of other *European Powers*?

Besides; are the *Exports* to the Coast of *Africa*, and *Imports* from thence, considered even abstractedly from the *Negro-Trade* and the Preservation of our *Colonies* in *America*, of no Consideration to *Britain*? Cast your Eye, Sir, only upon part of the Particulars, and then judge whether *British* Manufacturers in general will not be great Sufferers by the Loss of this Branch of Trade, and the *East-India Company* in particular not inconsiderably so? *

D 2

As

EXPORTS.

* *Ambassadors, Arrangos, Rough Amber, Brags of all Sorts, Blankets, Bays, Bells, Amber Beads, Crystal Beads, Coral Beads, all other Beads, Broad Cloth, Boysadoes, Carpets, Cambleit, Copper of all Sorts, Coral, Cotton Stuffs of many Sorts, Worsted Damasks, Dreggen, Durois, Earthen Ware, Fringe,*

As therefore no Man acquainted with the Trade and Navigation of this Kingdom, can doubt the Importance of the *African* Branch, consider'd in its full Latitude and Extent; as we have seen the high Value our Rivals set upon this Trade, and what extraordinary Privileges and Encouragements They give to their respective Companies on this Coast; as Experience has shew'd how our Neighbours have struggled, not only to preserve but enlarge their *Forts* and *Settlements*, and wrest ours out of our Hands; as such is the Nature of this Trade, that no Nation ever has judg'd it practicable to maintain and support their Claim to it without *Forts* and *Settlements* on the Spot, the more effectually to encourage the Natives to bring Trade

Fringe, Flint, Fire Steels, Fuzes, Muskets, Carbines, Blunderbusses, Buccaneers, Fowling Pieces, Trading Guns, Pistols, Gun-powder. Goods from the East-Indies, viz. Attassees, Atchabannies, Alljars, Allibannes, Bawls, Basts, Bejutepauti, Bombay Stuffs, Callicoes, Caridarries, Cherconnees, Chellies, Chilleas, Chints, Captes, Corwies, Chucklaes, Clusblaes, Cuttanees, Elatches, Ginkams, Guinea Cloths, Jamewares, Demy Long-Cloths, Longees Herba, Longees Silks, or Longees Phora, Lemaases, Mustines, Neganepauts, Nillaes, Niconees, Pintadues, Photabs, Pizees, Rmallis, Salampores, Sattis, Seersuckers, Tapseels, Taffaties Herba, Taffaties Silk, Tepes's, Sousees, and many other Silks, and Callicoes, Fine Hairs, Felt Hairs, Handkerchiefs, Hollands, Lion Rars, Wrought Iron, Knives, Lead Bars, and Lead Shot. Arrack, Brandy, Beer, Rum, Spirits, Wine of all Sorts, Long Ells, Looking Glasses, Medicines, Paper, Padlocks, Pewter of all Sorts, Perpetuances or Ranters. Provisions, viz. Beef, Bread, Butter, Cheese, Flower, Pork, Sugar, Vinegar, Oil, Sugar, Raisins, Spices, Tobacco, Shalloos, Silesia Linnen, and all other German, Scotch and Irish Linnens, Sealing-Wax, Swords of all Sorts, Hangers, Symetars, Cutlasses, Soap, Staps, Taliow. Lace, Buttons, Gold and Silver Thread, Mohair-Buttons, Silk, Thread, Ticking, Striped Hollands, and Striped Linnens, Welch Plaies, Coats, Waistcoats, Breaches Drawers, Shirts, Shoes, Slippers, Stockings, Pernkes, Wool Cards, all Coarse Woollen Cloths, &c. &c. &c.

I M P O R T S.

Gold, Bees-Wax, Elephants Teeth, Gums of various Sorts, Cotton Wool, divers Dyng-Woods, and Negroes, or Labourers for the Plantations, &c.

Trade to their particular Factories, and give due Weight to their Alliances with them : As these are Facts incontrollable, sure no Man in the Interest of his Country, will take upon him to say that this Trade can be preserved in future to *Great-Britain*, without the effectual Maintainance of the *Forts* and *Settlements* upon that Coast.

These Facts are now so notorious, that I am perswaded there is not a *British* Trader to the Coast of *Africa* in the Kingdom, but will readily grant that our Trade could not be carried on with any Security to those Parts, were the *British* *Forts* and *Settlements* in Foreign Hands.

But if it should be imagin'd that *Station'd Ships* would effectually support our Trade and Interest with the Natives, the Experiment has, and always must inevitably prove abortive, and the Mistake too late discover'd ; for of what inland Service, on any Emergency, can they be to the Natives ; What Opportunity could they have to cultivate such Good-Understanding and Alliances with them, as the *Governors*, *Factors* and *Agents* of the Company do, by travelling hundreds of Miles inland, daily associating with their *Princes* and *Chiefs*, and doing them constant Offices of Benevolence ?

At our *British* Colonies on the Continent of *America*, where even there are many hundred thousands of *British* Subjects resident, *Station'd Ships* alone, tho' ten times the Number usually kept there, would little avail to support our Footing, and our Trade to those Parts, without cultivating a constant Friendship and Alliance with the *Indian Nations*. Do not the *French* pursue these Measures as a *Barrier* against the *English* ? If they pursue such Policy, and we re-
ject

ject it, how can we expect to maintain the *British* Interest to as good Purpose as our Neighbours do theirs?

The Case is parallel: If the *Dutch* and the *French* do not trust the Support and Protection of their Share in the *African Trade* to *Station'd Ships* only, and we should, how could we maintain an Equality of Power and Interest on that Coast? But this Experiment was actually tried about eight Years ago on the *Gum-Coast*, and found ineffectual; for when the Government sent to that *Coast* two Men of War of superior Force to the *French* to protect the Merchants Ships there, the *French* by Virtue of *one* Fort only, and their Interest with the Natives on Shore, brought the Negroe-Traders under such Subjection, that they did not dare to carry off any Trade to the *English* Shipping; whereby sundry *British* Ships then made such ruinous Voyages, that none of late Years have ventur'd to Trade to those Parts with, or without Convoy.

But farther; besides the evident Impossibility of *Stationed Ships*, for answering the Purposes of securing a constant Intercourse of Trade with the Natives on Shore; would the Expence of such Ships to the Nation, by so dangerous an Experiment, bear any Proportion to that which would enable the Company to protect that Trade in general in a much better and more effectual Manner, by Means of their *Forts* and *Settlements*?

So sensible have the Legislature formerly been of the Necessity of *Forts* and *Settlements* for the Preservation of this Trade, that as often as They have taken the State of the same into Consideration, they have made the strongest Declaration thereof.

In

In 1693, the Consideration of the Trade to *Africa* being referred to a Committee, they reported their Opinion "That *Forts and Castles* are necessary for carrying on "the Trade to *Africa, &c.*" In 1694 the Consideration of that Trade being referr'd to a Committee, They likewise reported it as their Opinion to the House, "That " *Forts and Castles* are necessary for carrying on and preserving the Trade to *Africa* to this Nation, *&c.*"

In 1697, when the Trade to *Africa* was laid open by Act of Parliament, the whole Legislature declared; "That " *Forts and Castles* are *undoubtedly necessary* for the Preference and well-carrying on the said Trade."

Upon the Expiration of the said Act, in 1712, it was again resolved, That for the preserving, better carrying on, and improving the Trade to *Africa*, it is necessary that *Forts and Castles* be maintained and *enlarged* on that Coast.

On the 26th of *March*, 1730, the House of Commons came to the following Resolutions, *viz.* 1. "That the " Trade to *Africa* ought always to remain free and open to " all His Majesty's Subjects." 2. "That the Trade and " Navigation to *Africa* ought never to be charged with any " Duty for the Maintainance of the *British Forts and Settlements* belonging to the Company." 3. "That it was " necessary to keep up and maintain the *British Forts and Settlements* on the Coast of *Africa*." 4. "That an " Allowance ought to be made by Parliament to " the Company to maintain and support the said *Forts and Settlements*."

In Pursuance of these Resolutions, it was voted in a Committee of Supply, That the Sum of 10,000 *l.* be granted to His Majesty to be applied towards the Maintainance
of

of the *British Forts and Settlements*, belonging to the *Royal African Company of England on the Coast of Africa*; which said Sum was paid to the Company accordingly: And upon the Company's petitioning the Honourable House of Commons every Year since, they have been pleased to grant the like Sum; which, with several considerable additional Sums, has been from time to time apply'd accordingly.

For, by Accounts taken from the Company's Books, it appears that from *December the 31st 1729, to December the 31st, 1741*, the Expences of maintaining their *Forts and Settlements in Africa*, (exclusive of Commissions, &c. paid to Agents and Factors abroad, and of the Charges of Management, Interest paid for Money, and other Contingent Expences at Home, amounting in 14 Years to upwards of 70,000 *l.*) have been no less than 203,433 *l. 5 s. 10 d.* in Sterling Money; which in an Average, amounts to 16,952 *l. 15 s. 5 d. per Annum*. And that as the Books and Accounts for 1742 and 1743 are not yet come from *Africa*, they cannot exactly ascertain the Expences of these two last Years; but if the same be taken in an Average with the preceeding twelve Years, amounting as above, to 203,433 *l. 5 s. 10 d.* the Proportion for the said two Years will be 33,905 *l. 10 s. 10 d.* more.

But the Company have received of the Publick Mooney only 136,075 *l. 2 s.* and no more clear of Fees, Whereby it appears, that from *December 31st 1729, to December the 31st 1743*, the Company have expended, in support of their *Forts and Settlements* for the general Benefit of the Publick, more than they have received, the Sum of 101,263 *l. 14 s. 8 d.* And whether the Company have not a Right, consistent with the Principles

ciples of Justice and Equity, to have at least the above Deficiency of 101,263 *l.* (which is only the *Principal Sum* exclusive of any Interest for the Surplus Moneys annually expended by them) made Good by the Publick, to enable Them to put their *Forts* and *Settlements* into a good and defenceable Condition, is submitted to your impartial Judgment.

I am willing to flatter myself that You will by this Time think I have said enough in the foregoing Pages to convince every impartial Reader of the Importance of the *British Forts* and *Settlements* on the Coast of *Africa*; and of the Necessity of maintaining and supporting Them, in a better and more effectual Manner than the Company have hitherto been able to do: But as this is a Point that cannot be set in too clear and strong a Light, I hope you will not think it improper if I here take the Liberty to conclude this Subject with an Extract from a *Memorial*, which the Company laid before the *Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations*, so long ago as the Year 1726; setting forth in the Company's own Words, the Nature, Number, Strength, Situation, Value, and Importance of the said *Forts* and *Settlements*.

The said *Memorial* bears Date the 26th of *March*, 1726, and therein the Company represent as follows, *viz.*

“ The *Royal African Company of England* having received
 “ your Commands by a Letter from Your Secretary of the
 “ 25th instant, to lay before *Your Lordships* an Account of
 “ the Nature, Number, Strength and Situation of their *Forts*
 “ and *Settlements* on the Coast of *Africa*; in Obedience
 “ thereto, and in Order to set the *Nature, Value, and Im-*
 E “ *portance*

“ portance of the said Forts in a due Light, They hum-
 “ bly hope Your Lordships will give Them leave in the first
 “ Place to lay before You a short Account of the Num-
 “ ber and Situation of the several *English, French, Dutch,*
 “ *Danish, and Portuguese Forts and Settlement* in the same
 “ Order they lay on that Coast; and Secondly a more
 “ particular Account of the *Nature, Strength, and Situa-*
 “ *tion of the African Company's Forts and Settlements.*

“ First, as to the Number and Situation of the several
 “ *Forts and Settlements* belonging to the *English, French,*
 “ *Dutch, Portuguese and Danes,* They are as follows; *viz.*

“ 1. The Northernmost Settlement is that at ARGUIN
 “ on the *Gum-Coast* in the Latitude of 20 Degrees North,
 “ formerly belonging to the King of *Prussia,* for which in
 “ the late *Queen's* Time, on Occasion of an Overture
 “ made by the said King to dispose of That and another
 “ small Fort at *Cape-Three-Points,* which is afterwards
 “ mentioned, to this Nation, He demanded for Them
 “ 200,000 Crowns; but they have since been purchased
 “ of him by the *Dutch,* (as they have been informed)
 “ for 30,000 *l.* And afterwards taken by the *French* in
 “ 1721, and now in their Possession.

“ 2. The RIVER SENEGAL, in the Latitude of 16
 “ Degrees North, where the *French* have several Settle-
 “ ments and Plantations for a great Way up the River.

“ 3. The ISLAND GORÉE, a little Southward of
 “ *Cape de Verde,* where the *French* are likewise settled and
 “ have a strong Castle.

“ 4. The RIVER GAMBIA, in the Latitude of 13
 “ Degrees 40 m. North, where the *Royal African Company*
 “ have a very good Fort on *James Island,* a little Way
 “ up

“ up from the Mouth of the said River, together with
 “ sundry *Factories* higher up, on each Side of the Same.

“ 5. CUTCHEO and BISSEO, two *Portuguese* Set-
 “ tlements lying in 12 Degrees North Latitude.

“ 6. SIERRALEONE RIVER, in the Latitude of 8
 “ Degrees 30 m. North, where the *Royal African Company*
 “ have a Fort on *Bence Island*, a little Way up from the
 “ Mouth of the said River. *

“ 7. SHERBROE RIVER, in the Latitude of 7 De-
 “ grees North, where the *Royal African Company* had lately
 “ a Fort on *York Island*, near the Mouth of the said River;
 “ but keeps now only a Factory there §

“ 8. ANCOBRA, the first *European* Factory on the
 “ *Gold Coast*, belonging to the *Dutch West-India Company*.

“ 9. AXIM, about one League to the Eastward of
 “ *Ancobra*, a Fort belonging to the *Dutch West-India*
 “ *Company*.

“ 10. FREDERICKSBURG at *Cape-Three-Points*, about
 “ five Leagues to the Eastward of *Axim*, a Fort formerly
 “ belonging to the *King of Prussia*; lately sold by him (to-
 “ gether with that at *Arguin* beforementioned) to the
 “ *Dutch* for 30,000 l; afterwards taken and demolished
 “ by the Natives; and lately recovered out of their Hands
 “ at the Expence of a long and chargeable War; and
 “ now resettling by the *Dutch West-India Company*.

“ 11. DIXCOVE, a Fort belonging to the *Royal African*
 “ *Company*, about eight Leagues Eastward of *Cape-Three-*
 “ *Points*.

E 2

“ 12 BUT-

* The Company have had no Settlement there since 1728.

§ This Factory was withdrawn before the Year 1730.

“ 12. BUTTEROE, a Fort belonging to the *Dutch West-India Company*, about three Leagues Eastward of *Dixcove*.

“ 13. TACQUERADO, a Factory House belonging to the *Dutch West-India Company*, about three Leagues Eastward of *Butteroe*.

“ 14. SUCCUNDEE, a Fort belonging to the *Dutch West-India Company*, about three Leagues Eastward of *Tacquerado*.

“ 15. SUCCUNDEE, a Fort belonging to the *Royal African Company*, within Gun-Shot of the last mention'd *Dutch Fort*.

“ 16. SHUMAH, a Fort belonging to the *Dutch West-India Company*, about four Leagues to the Eastward of *Succundee*.

“ 17. COMMENDA, a Fort belonging to the *Royal African Company*, about five League Eastward of *Shumah*,

“ 18. COMMENDA, a Fort belonging to the *Dutch West-India Company*, within Gun-Shot of the last mentioned *English Fort*.

“ 19. St. GEORGE DEL MINA, the Principal Fort belonging to the *Dutch West India Company* on the *Gold-Coast*, about four Leagues Eastward of *Commenda*.

“ 20. St. IAGO, a Fort on the Top of a Hill, within Gun-Shot of *St. George del Mina*, belonging to the same Company.

“ 21. CAPE-COAST-CASTLE, the principal Fort belonging to the *Royal African Company* on the *Gold Coast*, about three Leagues to the Eastward of *St. George del Mina*.

“ 22. PHIPPS'S

“ 22. PHIPPS’S TOWER, built for the Defence of
“ *Cape-Coast* towards the Land.

“ 23. FORT ROYAL, on the Top of a Hill within
“ Gun-Shot of *Cape Coast-Castle*, belonging to the *Royal*
“ *African Company*.

“ 24. QUEEN ANN’S POINT, a small Fort about a
“ League to the Eastward of *Fort-Royal*, belonging to the
“ *Royal African Company*.

“ 25. MOUREA, a Fort belonging to the *Dutch West-*
“ *India Company*, about two Leagues to the Eastward of
“ *Queen Ann’s Point*.

“ 26. ANNISHAN, a Factory belonging to the *Royal*
“ *African Company*, at present withdrawn, about two
“ Leagues and a half to the Eastward of *Mourea*.

“ 27. ANAMABOE, * a Fort belonging to the *Royal*
“ *African Company*, about two Leagues to the Eastward
“ of *Annishan*

“ 28. AGGA, a Factory belonging to the *Royal African*
“ *Company*, at present withdrawn, about a Mile to the East-
“ ward of *Anamaboe*.

“ 29. CORMANTINE, a Fort built by the *English*,
“ and in the War 1665 taken by the *Dutch*, and now be-
“ longing to the *Dutch West-India Company*, about two
“ Leagues to the Eastward of *Anamaboe*.

“ 30. TANTUMQUERRY, a Fort belonging to the
“ *Royal African Company*, about seven Leagues to the
“ Eastward of *Cormantine*.

“ 31 APONG, a Fort belonging to the *Dutch West-*
“ *India Company*, about three Leagues to the Eastward of
“ *Tantumquerry*.

“ 32. WIN-

* This Fort was relinquish’d before 1730, but is necessary to be resettled again.

“ 32. WINNEBAH, a Fort belonging to the *Royal African Company*, about five Leagues to the Eastward of *Apong*.

“ 33. BARRACOE, a Fort belonging to the *Dutch West-India Company*, about six Leagues to the Eastward of *Winnebah*.

“ 34. SHIDOE, a Factory belonging to the *Royal African Company*, about four Leagues to the Eastward of *Barracoe*, now withdrawn.

“ 35. ACRA, a Fort belonging to the *Royal African Company*, about six Leagues to the Eastward of *Shidoe*.

“ 36. ACRA, a Fort belonging to the *Dutch West-India Company*, within Gun-Shot of the last mentioned *English Fort*.

“ 37. ACRA, a Fort belonging to the King of *Denmark*, about two Miles to the Eastward of the *Dutch Fort*.

“ 38. ALLAMPO, a Factory belonging to the *Royal African Company*, about five Leagues to the Eastward of *Acra*, at present withdrawn. *

“ 39. QUITTAH, a Factory belonging to the *Royal African Company*, about fifteen Leagues to the Eastward of *Allampo*.

“ 40. WHYDAH, a Place where the *English* and *Dutch* only were allow'd to Trade formerly; for which Reason the *Royal African Company* built, and have still kept up and maintain'd a Fort there, called *William's Fort*; but some Years since, the *French* obtained leave to build a Fort at the same Place; and it is now through the Cunning
“ of

* The Company instead of resettling this Factory have lately settled one at *Prampiam* nearer to the River *Volta*.

“ of the Natives made a Free-Port for all Nations to resort to; the Consequence whereof is, that Negroes, which were purchased there when the *African Company* first settled among them, for about fifty Shillings or three Pounds *per Head*, are now advanced to Twenty Pounds *per Head* first Cost. This Place lies about twenty Leagues to the Eastward of *Quittab*.

“ 41. JACQUIN, a Factory belonging to the *Royal African Company*, about three Leagues to the Eastward of *Whydah* Road; at present withdrawn.

“ 42. CABENDA, a Fort on the Coast of *Angoy* in the Latitude of 5 Degrees South, built by the *Royal African Company* in the Year 1721, and taken, plunder'd, and destroy'd by the *Portugueze* in the Month of *October* 1723.

“ 43. LANGO St. PAUL's, in the Latitude of 10 Degrees South, where the *Portugueze* have several Forts and Settlements, and a large City; and thereby carry on a very great and advantageous Inland Trade for some hundreds of Miles.

“ From this general Account, *Your Lordships*, will perceive the high Value other Nations set upon the Trade to *Africa*, and with what Care, Industry and Expence They have laboured to gain and secure to Themselves a Share therein. And that, *Your Lordships*, may be more particularly apprized of the Part which the said *Royal African Company* have likewise taken in this general Struggle; they humbly beg leave in the second Place to lay before you the following more particular Account of the *Royal African Company's* Forts and Settlements on the Coast of *Africa*.

“ I. CAPE-COAST-CASTLE, for which the present Company paid their Predecessors 34,000*l*; situated
“ about

“ about the Middle of the *Gold Coast*. The Fortifications
“ consist of Outworks, Platforms, and Bastions, and have
“ been enlarged with new Buildings, and made regular as
“ well as ten times larger and stronger by the present
“ Company, with Stone, Brick, Tiles, Lime and Terras;
“ and is a Security for all Ships in the Road; was many
“ Years doing; having Apartments for the *Director-General*,
“ *Chief-Merchants*, *Chaplain*, *Factors*, Writers, Surgeons,
“ Artificers and Soldiers; Magazines, Ware-houses, Store-
“ houses, Granaries, Guard Rooms, Two large Tanks
“ or Cisterns, built with Brick and Terras sent from *England*,
“ and holding about 200 Tons, Repositories to lodge
“ one thousand Negroes, and Vaults for Rum, Work-
“ houses for Smiths, Armourers, Coopers and Carpenters;
“ Fifty seven great Guns, Small Arms, Blunderbusses, Buc-
“ caneer Guns, Pistols, Cartouch Boxes, Swords and Cut-
“ tlasses, Ammunition for Great Guns and small Arms,
“ Stores and Tools for Brick-makers, Bricklayers, Smiths,
“ Carpenters, Coopers, Surgeons, Armourers, Gunners,
“ and Gardners; Small Vessels, Pinnaces, Cannoes and
“ Men answerable attending on the Castle and Garrison, and
“ for fetching and carrying Materials for Building, and
“ Stores to and from the Out-Forts. This Castle is situ-
“ ated in *Fetue*, the Residence of the Company's *Director-*
“ *General*, who manages their Trade and Alliances with the
“ several Kingdoms on the *Gold Coast*, and opens a Trade
“ to *Fetue*, *Saboe*, *Calestera*, *Arcania*, *Cuffera*, *Dankera*, and
“ *Aphantee*; And is a Repository of Goods for Supply of
“ all the Factories: with Ponds and Canals of Fresh Water,
“ and Gardens of a large Extent, producing all Necessaries
“ for the Castle and Shipping, as *Plantaines*, *Bonanoes*, *Pine-*
“ *Apples*,

“ Apples, Potatoes, Yams, Corn, Colworts, Peas, Beans,
 “ Cabbages, and all other European Refreshments.

“ II. PHIPP's TOWER, built for the Defence of the
 “ Negroe Town of *Cape Coast* against any Inland Enemy.

“ III. FORT ROYAL, bought of the *Danes* by the
 “ present Company for 4,597 l; and Assistant to the Defence
 “ and Security of *Cape Coast*, and the Ships in the Road.

“ IV. QUEEN ANN's POINT, built for the Security
 “ of *Cape Coast*, and for purchasing Corn, Negroes and Gold.

“ V. ANNAMABOE FORT, built by the present Com-
 “ pany. The Fortification consists of *Flankers*, *Out-works*,
 “ *Lodging Rooms* and *Appartments* for the *Chief Factor*,
 “ *Writers* and *Soldiers*; *Magazines* and *Store houses*, *Ten*
 “ *great Guns*, *Small Arms*, *Blunderbusses* &c. *Ammunition* for
 “ *Great Guns* and *Small Arms*, *Canoes*, &c. attending the
 “ Building and Garrison; a large *Tank* or *Cistern* made with
 “ *Brick* and *Tarras* sent from *England*, with a *Negroe-House*
 “ for 150 *Negroes*. This Fort is situated in the *Fanteen's*
 “ *Country*, and opens a Trade to *Fanteen*, *Braman*, *Acrong*,
 “ *Akim*, *Cabestras* and *Arkania* for *Gold*, *Corn*, *Palm Oil*,
 “ and *Negroes*. *

“ VI. TANTUMQUERRY FORT, built lately § by
 “ the present Company, with *Appartments* for the *Chief-*
 “ *Factors*, *Writers*, and *Soldiers*; a *Magazine*, and *Guard Room*,
 “ a *Tank*, or large *Cistern* made with *Brick* and *Tarras* sent
 “ from *England*, a *Negroe-House* for 50 *Negroes*, six great
 “ *Guns*, *Small Arms*, *Cutlasses* and *Ammunition* for great
 “ *Guns* and *Small Arms*. This Fort stands in the *Acrong*
 “ Country,

* This Fort was relinquish'd before 1730, but is necessary to be refestish'd again, as before observed.

§ This Fort was built before the Year 1726.

“ Country, and opens a Trade to *Fanteen, Akim, and Anguina* for *Gold, Negroes and Corn*.

“ VII. WINNEBAH FORT, built by the present Company. The Fortifications Four *Bastions, Out-Works, Apartments* for the *Chief, Factor, Writers and Soldiers; Magazines and Guard Rooms, a Tank*, made with *Brick and Tarras*, sent from *England*, a *Negroe-House* for 100 *Negroes*, fifteen great Guns, Small Arms, Cutlasses and Ammunition for the great Guns and Small Arms. This Fort stands in the Country of *Anguina*, and opens a Trade to *Akim* for *Gold and Negroes*, and has a River of fresh Water to supply the Ships, also Timber and Oyster-shells for repairing the Forts, and a little to the Westward is a Hill thought to have *Gold-Mines*.

“ VIII. ACRA FORT, built by the present Company. The Castle is four Square, has a *Tower, Bastions, and Outworks, Apartments* for the chief *Factor, Writers and Soldiers; Magazines, Guard Rooms*, and has a *Tank*, made with *Brick and Tarras* sent from *England*, a *Negroe-House* for 150 *Negroes*, 30 great Guns, small Arms, Blunderbusses, and Ammunition for great Guns, and small Arms, and Stores for Artificers. This Fort stands in the Kingdom of *Acra*, and opens a Trade to *Quambo, Akim, and Aquawoa*, for *Gold, Negroes, Elephant's Teeth and Salt*.

“ IX. WILLIAM'S FORT at *Whydah*, built by the present Company, and hath *Plat-Forms, Parades, Outworks, a Moat round*, and Apartments for the *Chief, Factors, Writers, Surgeon, Artificers and Soldiers; Magazines, Store-houses, a Guard Room, a Negroe-house*, 30 great Guns, small Arms and Ammunition for great Guns, and small Arms, and Stores for Artificers; and is situated in the Kingdom of *Whydah*.

“ X. COM-

“ X. COMMENDA FORT, built by the present Company at very great Expence, maugre all the Interest and Opposition of the *Dutch West-India Company*: The Fortification is *four Square*, with four *Bastions* and a *Tower*; and containing Lodging and Apartments for the *Chief, Factors, Writers* and *Soldiers*; *Magazines, Store-houses*, a *Tank*, or large *Cistern* made with *Brick* and *Tarras* sent from *England*; and a *Negroe-house* for 150 *Negroes*; 26 great *Guns*, with small *Arms*, *Stores* and *Ammunition* for great *Guns* and small *Arms*. This Fort stands in the Kingdom of *Aquasoe*, and opens a Trade to the Kingdom of *Cuffero's, Dankaries, Ashantees, Arcania, Acqua*, and *Abrambo*, for *Gold, Negroes, Teeth*, and *Palm Oil*.

“ XI. SUCCUNDEE FORT, built by the present Company in the *Antee* Country, near the *Adooms*, and near a *Dutch Fort*; once taken and destroy'd by *Negroes*, hired by the *Dutch West-India Company*, and the rebuilding thereof afterwards much interrupted by the same Interest. But since rebuilt, fortify'd and made larger and stronger than it was at first; has 20 great *Guns*, small *Arms*, *Stores*, and also lodging *Rooms* and *Apartments* for the *Chief, Factors, Writers*, and *Soldiers*; *Magazines* and *Store-houses* with a *Tank* for *Water*, made with *Brick* and *Tarras* sent from *England*, and a *Negroe-house* for 100 *Negroes*.

“ XII. DIXCOVE FORT, built by the present Company, and is situated in the *Antee* Country; the Fortification being four square, has four *Bastions*, with 19 great *Guns*, small *Arms*, and *Stores*; also *Lodgings* and *Apartments* for the *Chief, Factors, Writers, Soldiers*, and *Artificers*; *Magazines* and *Storehouses*; and opens a Trade to the several Kingdoms of *Axim, Awawee, War-saw, Dawakray*, and *Ashantee*, *Inland Countries*, for

“ *Gold, Elephant’s Teeth, Negroes, and Corn*; and furnishes Timber for the Repair of the other Forts, and Ships, and *Water* for Shipping and *Lime-Stone*, and is a Place for careening small Vessels, has a *Tank* or large Cistern, made with Brick and Tarras sent from *England*, for holding *fresh Water* and a *Negroe-house* to hold 100 *Negroes*.

“ XIII. JAMES FORT AND ISLAND in the River *Gambia*, on the North Coast; the Island walled round, Outworks, great Guns, small Arms, and Stores, formerly mounted with 20, now with 31 great Guns, with several Warehouses, Rooms for the *Governor, Factors, Writers, Officers, Artificers, Soldiers, and Castle Slaves*; Workhouses for Smiths, and other Artificers, Magazines, and Storehouses, and a *Negroe-house* for 200 *Negroes*.

“ XIV. BENICE ISLAND,* and the *Island of Tassa* on the River *Sierraleone*; on the first was a Castle fortify’d, which in the late War was plunder’d by the *French*; but the Company have lately resettled the same; it has 50 great Guns, small Arms, Stores, and also Lodging Rooms and Apartments for the *Chief, Factors, Writers, Soldiers, Artificers, and Castle Slaves*; Magazines and Storehouses, and a *Negroe-house* for 100 *Negroes*.

“ XV. SHERBRO, on *Tork-Island*
on the North Coast

“ ANNISHAM }

“ AGGA }

“ SHIDOE and }

“ ALLAMPO }

“ QUITTAH }

“ JACQUIN }

on the Gold
Coast.

under the Direc-

tion of *Whydah*

Seven Factory-Houses for purchasing *Redwood, Negroes, Gold, and Corn*, which the Company settle or withdraw as They see Occasion.

“ *My*

* The Company have had no Settlement there since 1728:

“ *My Lords,*

“ After so particular a Detail of the *Number, Nature,*
 “ *Strength, and Situation* of the *Royal African Company's*
 “ *Forts and Settlements* on the *Coast of Africa*; *Your*
 “ *Lordships* will easily judge of the extraordinary Charge,
 “ which of Necessity must arise in the erecting and pre-
 “ serving such remote Buildings and Fortifications, by
 “ sending from hence *Bricks, Tiles, Tarras, Lead, Iron-*
 “ *Work, Boards, Timber*; and all other *Stores, Tools* and
 “ *Materials*, and in contracting with, hiring and transport-
 “ ing, *Soldiers, Carpenters, Smiths, Bricklayers, Masons,*
 “ *Armourers, Brick-makers, Coopers, Sawyers*, and various
 “ other *Artificers*; and from time to time supplying and
 “ recruiting the same, as well by Reason of the Insults
 “ and Losses, during the War first with *Holland*; and then
 “ twice with *France*; As also the hiring and Wear and Tear
 “ of Vessels, and often keeping Ships of Force upon De-
 “ murrage, for the Assistance and Protection of such Un-
 “ dertakings; to which may be added the great Cost and
 “ Charges of obtaining Grants and Agreements, and
 “ making and supporting Alliances with the several *Kings,*
 “ *Queens*, and great Men of the Country, as well in order
 “ to make *Settlements* and build *Forts*, as to defend the
 “ Company against the sinister and undermining Designs
 “ of other *European* Competitors in that Country. So
 “ that upon the Whole the said Company humbly hope
 “ *Your Lordships* will agree, if they were to part with their
 “ Right and Property in their said *Forts and Settlements,*
 “ either to the Crown, or any other Society or Body of
 “ Men, and to value Them only according to what they
 “ have

" have actually cost Them, They might justly set a very
" great Price upon them. "

But were these *Forts and Settlements*, Sir, to be estimated according to their Usefulness and Importance to the *British* Nation, who will take upon himself to say, how great the Value may be? Were they to be valued only according to what they have cost the Company from 1697, when the Trade was laid open, to the present Time, the Company can make appear, it will amount to no less a Principal Sum, exclusive of all Money received of the Publick, than 607,505 *l.* 4 *s.* 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ *

But if we take into Consideration, as I am persuaded you will think just and reasonable, the Interest of the *annual Surplus Monies* taken in an Average from 1697 to 1743, being 46 Years, it will amount to a much more considerable Sum. For 607,505 *l.* divided by 46 will give the Sum of 13,206 *l.* *per Annum*; which the Company

Received of the Publick Money.		Expended on Forts and Settlements.	
By Ten-per-Cent. Duty	} 73,758 <i>l.</i> 10 <i>s.</i> 6 <i>d.</i> $\frac{1}{2}$	From 1697 to	} 280,000 <i>l.</i> 0 <i>s.</i> 0 <i>d.</i>
from 1697 to 1712.		1712.	
By Parliamentary Allowance from	} 136,075 <i>l.</i> 2 <i>s.</i> 0 <i>d.</i>	From 1712 to	} 300,000 <i>l.</i> 0 <i>s.</i> 0 <i>d.</i>
1730 to 1743.		1729.	
		From 1729 to	} 237,338 <i>l.</i> 16 <i>s.</i> 8 <i>d.</i>
		1743.	
			817,338 <i>l.</i> 16 <i>s.</i> 8 <i>d.</i>
209,833 <i>l.</i> 12 <i>s.</i> 6 <i>d.</i> $\frac{1}{2}$			
* Balance expended more than received from 1697 to 1743.	} 607,505 <i>l.</i> 4 <i>s.</i> 1 $\frac{1}{2}$		
	817,338 <i>l.</i> 16 <i>s.</i> 8 <i>d.</i>		

pany have actually advanced one Year with another more than They have received, since the *African Trade* has been laid open : And if *Interest* be reckoned on the said *annual Surplus Monies*, at so low a Rate only as that of 4 per Cent. *per Annum*, from 1697, when Money has been of considerably more Value, it will amount to the Sum of 1,675,451 l: Sterling. And this without taking into the Account the Prime Cost, or any Interest thereon, of the *Forts* and *Settlements*, purchased of the Old Company, the Expences of building new Ones and repairing the Old, as in the *Memorial* before taken Notice off.

From the foregoing Account, Sir, You will easily observe the Company have not increased the Number of their *Forts* and *Settlements* in *Africa* wantonly and at Random; but upon mature Deliberation; and in order to keep Pace with other Rivals; and to prevent the Loss of a due Balance of Power and Interest among the Natives in this remote part of the World. This was the first and principal Object of their Care; to accomplish this, they spar'd no Cost or Expences; even before they received any Encouragement from the Publick. And though the Allowance lately made by Parliament bears no Proportion to the Charges and Expences, which the Company have been at in purchasing and erecting so many *Forts* and *Settlements* for the Protection and Security of this Trade against the many Dangers it was expos'd to; though the said Allowance has come far short of what the Company has since expended in keeping and maintaining them; I say, though these are Facts, which can admit of no Dispute; yet so ready and willing have the Company been to admit all their Fellow-Subjects to share with them in the Benefits and Advantages, which they had thus secured to their

their Country; that immediately, upon the first 10,000 *l.*
 being granted, they sent Instructions to all their Servants
 in *Africa* to the Effect following, *viz.* " You are to treat
 " such *British* Traders as may apply to You, with all Friend-
 " ship and Civility; and in Case of their being in any
 " sort of Distress whilst on the Coast, you are to give
 " them all the Assistance, Protection and Relief you can.
 " And if they have any Goods left after they have finished
 " their Trade on the Coast, which They would chuse to
 " leave with you till they return, rather than carry them
 " round about, by the Way of the *West-Indies* and home
 " again, you are to receive them into our Warehouses,
 " and there to keep them safe, and to take the same Care
 " of them, as you do of the Company's Goods *Gratis.*"
 And the like Instructions were again repeated no longer
 ago than the Year 1741, *viz.* " You are to treat all such
 " *British* private Traders as may apply to you with all
 " Friendship and Civility; and in Case of their being
 " in any sort of Distress whilst on the Coast, you are
 " to give them all the Assistance, Protection and Relief
 " you can; and in Case any of them should incline to
 " trade with you for *Negroes*, and to pay for them in
 " such Goods and Merchandize as may be in Demand
 " at that Time on the Coast, and which you may want
 " in order to assort the Company's Warehouses, it is left
 " to you to agree and deal with them upon such Terms
 " as you shall jointly judge most for the Advantage of
 " the Company, *With this express Proviso, That you do*
 " *not take or receive any Goods or Merchandize whatsoever,*
 " *from any Person or Persons whatsoever, but such only as*
 " *you*

“ you shall Pay for in Negroes, before the Departure of such
 “ Person or Persons from the Coast.

It might look too much like Vanity and Ostentation to enumerate at large the many *Letters* and *Certificates*, which the Company have received within the Compas of 14 Years last past, setting forth the several Services which They have done to private Traders on the Coast of *Africa*, by saving their Goods when their Ships have been lost; by protecting them against the Insults and exorbitant Demands of the Natives; and by furnishing them with *Wood, Water, and other Necessaries*, &c. when ever in Distress: As this, I say Sir, would appear ostentatious, and swell this Letter to too great Bulk to obtain your Perusal, I shall content myself with only mentioning a recent Instance: viz. Upon some *Spanish Privateers* coming down last Year upon the *Gold Coast*, the Company's *Agents* at *Cape-Coast-Castle*, not only secured and protected such Ships and private Traders, with their Goods, Merchandize and Negroes as applied to them against those *Privateers*; but likewise took Care of such Ship's Crews, as the *Spaniards* had taken before They came down among the *Forts*, and afterwards turned ashore among the Natives, and fitted out one of the Company's own Vessels with Provisions and all other Necessaries for the Voyage, and then dispatched Her with them directly home to *Great-Britain*.

Having thus laid before You, Sir, the manifest Importance of the *British Forts* and *Settlements* in *Africa* to this trading Nation; and the indispensable Necessity of their being effectually maintained and supported, I shall only beg leave to trespass on your Patience by offering a few Remarks more to your Consideration, and then conclude.

G

As

As to the Expence necessary to maintain the Company's *Fort*s and *Settlements* so as duely to support the *British* Interest in *Africa*, may They not reasonably hope that the Guardians of our Liberties and Trade will make them such an Allowance as shall be equivalent at least to those extraordinary Encouragements and Privileges, we have before seen, our Rivals give to their respective Companies on the same Coast? How can the *African Company* with less Encouragement maintain their Right, and prevent the *French* from trading at *Anamaboe*, and other Parts of the Coast, from whence they furnish their Plantations with Plenty of the choicest *Negroes*? Can it be imagined that so inconsiderable an Allowance, or even double the Sum which has been hitherto given Them, will enable the Company to keep the *French* from trading under the Nose of *Cape Coast Castle* itself, while they will not suffer a *British* Vessel to come within hundreds of Miles of the least of their *Settlements*?

Tho' the Company have expended since 1730, 17,000*l.* per Annum (exclusive of 70,000*l.* more, in 14 Years for other Services, as before intimated;) yet they have not, with all this Expence, been able duely to support and extend this valuable Branch of Trade near to the Degree it is capable off. What Sum therefore ought to be allow'd the Company to answer those desirable Ends, I will not take upon me to suggest; whether *Twenty* or *Thirty Thousand Pounds* a Year; That must be submitted to the Wisdom of Parliament.

But supposing the Parliamentary Allowance was to be *Thirty Thousand Pounds* a Year; what is that in Comparison to the Advantages the Nation will reap by it? Or what is that in Comparison to the large Sums allow'd for the Protection and Defence of other Places of far less Importance to this Nation? Are not the Garrisons of *Annapolis-*
Royal

Royal and Placentia maintained for the Protection of *New-England* and the *Fisheries*? Are not *Gibraltar* and *Port Mahone* supported for the Security and Protection of our Trade to the *Mediterranean*? Tho' *Jamaica*, the *Lee-ward Islands*, *New-York*, *Bermudas* and *Providence* are establish'd Governments, and have Power to raise Money within Themselves for their own Protection and Defence; yet does not the Parliament grant considerable Sums every Year for their Encouragement and Protection?

If then the Parliament thinks it fit and reasonable to be at a considerable Expence for the Protection of several *particular Colonies* and Branches of Trade, may not the Company far more reasonably expect effectual Support to enable them to preserve the *African Trade* on which the very Being of *All our Colonies and Plantations* so greatly depends? And consequently on which more, I may presume to say, depends than upon all the other Branches of our *Foreign Trade* put together.

Permit me then to ask you, Sir, If the Nation in general reaps such immense Benefit and Advantage by the Trade to *Africa*, is it not most reasonable that the Nation in general, and They only should be at the whole Charge of protecting, and transmitting the same secure to Posterity?

If all private Traders to *Africa* ought to be considered in no other Light, but as *Carriers* to our Plantations; and that at the Hazard of their own private Fortunes; would it not be highly unreasonable to think of laying them, when employ'd so much for the general Interest of the Nation, under any Sort of Discouragement whatever?

Should the Company consent to wave their Claim, of being reimburs'd by the Publick the great Sums of Money,

You see, Sir, they have evidently expended since 1697, over and above what they have received, upon Condition only of being enabled by the Publick to maintain and support Them duely and effectually in future, as they ought to be for the general Benefit of the Kingdom: I say, Sir, should the Company consent to this; what can be more condescending on their Side? What Objection could the most inveterate Enemy They have make to it?

But this, Sir, is not all: Be the Sum the Parliament shall grant for this Service as great as it will; I will venture to maintain that, the greater it is, the more will the Nation be Gainers thereby. Have the *French* surprisngly improved and encreased their *Sugar Colonies* of late Years? 'Tis too well known they have. Have they not beat us out of the *Sugar Trade* in almost all the Markets of *Europe*? Nothing is more certain. But how, and by what Means have they, who came so late into this Trade, been so successful, and able not only to rival us therein, but even almost absolutely to beat us quite out of it? Not only, Sir, by their allowing *Bounties* instead of laying *Duties* upon the Products of their Plantations, but chiefly by our great and inexcusable Neglect of the Trade to *Africa* on the one Hand, and the tender Care, we see, they have taken on the other to cherish and encourage it; and thereby to have their Plantations plentifully supply'd with *Negroes*.

Had the Nature and Importance of this Trade been duly enter'd into and consider'd, and proper Measures taken in Time, this Nation might have long since had the whole *Negroe-Trade* in their own Hands; and in Consequence thereof, might not *Great-Britain* easily have

have set what Bounds She pleased to the *French Colonies* and *Plantations*? Would not this have, in a great Measure, prevented the Encrease of their Seamen and Naval Power? And to lay the Axe to the Root of the Tree, what can more effectually answer so desirable an End, as a vigorous Protection of the *African Trade*, and enabling the Company to maintain the *British* Interests, Rights and Privileges against all their Insults and Encroachments?

What has been the true Cause that these Measures have not heretofore taken Place to prevent the Evils we at present labour under? To this I shall ingenuously answer. While the Company vainly contended on the one hand to *exclude* all the Rest of their *Fellow-Subjects* from this Trade; and while the *Private Traders* on the other, in the Heat of their Opposition, stuck at Nothing to run down the Company, no Body amongst us studied to reconcile and harmonize such jarring Interests; and therefore the fatal Consequence has been, as it always will be upon the like Occasions, that the *French*, our common Rival and Enemy, have profited by our *unnatural Divisions*; in so much that from the *Gold Coast* only, where They have no Right to Trade at all, they daily furnish their Plantations with Ten Negroes at least to one that is carried to the *British Plantations*.

And now, Sir, You will naturally enquire what Measures ought *Great-Britain* to take effectually to prevent these Consequences in future? To this I shall give You an Answer that, I humbly conceive, will have due Weight with every candid and impartial Judge.

The Coast of *Africa* is of a very large Extent, and runs many Hundreds of Miles Inland, where there are
many

many rich and populous Countries; and consequently there is Room enough for the *Company*, and for the *Private Traders* too, to enlarge their Trade there, in what Manner, and to what Degree they please.

The *Company*, by the Situation of their *Forts*, and by the Means of navigable Rivers, will naturally have it more in their Power to open and extend the Trade to the remotest *Inland Parts* of *Africa*, and thereby find a Vent and Consumption for larger Quantities of *British* Manufactures than can be easily imagined: And the *Private Traders* are better able to supply our Plantations with *Negroes*; because They can certainly fit out their Ships cheaper than the *Company*; especially from the *Out-Ports*; and as they carry on a constant Intercourse of General Trade with the *British* Plantations, and have settled Correspondence there of Relations, Friends, and Partners, who will be more careful to do Them Justice, as well as more punctual in making Returns than any Agents appointed by the *Company* would be for their Account: As the *Private Traders* are thus better able to prosecute this Branch of the Trade to *Africa*, and the Plantations with greater Advantage than the *Company*, let the *Company* and *Private Traders* go hand in hand; let each Party vigorously apply Themselves to those Branches of the Trade, which suits them best; and let both heartily and unanimously join in all proper Measures for putting a Stop to the Encroachments of all other *Intruders* upon the *British* Rights and Privileges on the Coast of *Africa*: I say, Sir, let all the several Parties concerned, steddily pursue these Measures; and then, I will venture to prophecy, that whatever Sum or Sums of Money the *Parliament*, in their great Wisdom, shall think fit to give the *Company* to enable

enable them effectually to maintain and support their *Forts* and *Settlements*; it will be like the Seed that fell upon good Ground; it may be made to return from Some Places *Fifty*, and from Others an *hundred-fold*.

I am,

S I R,

Your most Obedient,

and most humble Servant.

Malachy Postlethwayt, *The African Trade,
the Great Pillar and Support of the British
Plantation Trade in North America*
(London, J. Robinson, 1745)

Malachy Postlethwayt (c. 1707–67) was an economic writer and wide-ranging pamphleteer on the gravity of the commercial threat posed to Britain by French colonial endeavours. He spent twenty years compiling *The Universal Dictionary of Trade and Commerce* (London, 1751–74). Here he argues that the African trade is inextricably linked to the West Indian trade and to Britain's wealth and naval power. In his opinion, no subject of more commercial importance to the nation could come before the House of Commons. He is concerned that France has now supplanted Britain in colonial commerce, especially in her sugar colonies, and that the latent cause of the problem is that Britain has not emphasised the connection between her African and West Indian trades: the former has been disregarded and allowed 'to moulder and dwindle away almost to Nothing' and the plantation trade has had to 'stand alone without its fundamental prop and support' (pp. 153–4). France, however, has seen the connection between the two branches of trade and has been able to 'raise a magnificent Superstructure of American Commerce and Naval Power on an African Foundation' (p. 154). Postlethwayt stresses the reciprocal nature of the African and West Indian trades: the supply of slaves is necessary to cultivate land better and to produce a better and greater variety of plantation commodities. These arguments are adduced to state that Parliament should give greater support to the Royal African Company to maintain British rights and privileges on the coast of Africa.

Postlethwayt states that the French Senegal Company enjoyed a privilege of trade to Africa 'exclusive of all the other Subjects of France' (p. 158). This gave them better contacts with Africans and better trading opportunities in Africa than the Royal African Company has had since the British trade was opened to all merchants. The French secured slaves for lower prices than the British in Africa. The competition among British private traders and the Royal African Company tended to raise the price of slaves in those parts of Africa where they trade. Postlethwayt enumerates

the competitive advantages on bounties, duties and credit that the French offer to stimulate their African and West Indian trade. He notes that the Dutch also provide support for their slave trade by having a company with an exclusive privilege to trade with Africa. If the entire slave trade was thrown into the hands of Britain's rivals, white labourers could not replace Africans effectively on British Caribbean plantations because they could not be obtained so cheaply and were more costly to maintain. And if white labourers were used, it would drain Britain of their labour.

Postlethwayt regarded the African trade as more valuable to Britain than the East India trade because it was carried on without exporting any money; moreover, it stimulated our manufactures and provided imports. If the Royal African Company were to be dissolved, the *asiento* might pass to the French or the Dutch and they would reap the benefits of supplying slaves to the Spanish colonies. The pamphlet advocates parliamentary allowances to restore the company's finances and to uphold and maintain the British slaving interest in Africa. The French, the Dutch and the Portuguese kept settlements on the west African coast; the Royal African Company needed public support to do likewise. Parliament should encourage the company by granting an annual allowance. The company could then extend its inland trade with Africa and private traders would also benefit for 'Plenty of Negroes, Gold, Ivory, and all African Productions, will be brought down to the Coast for private Traders to take their choice of' (p. 190). Such support would enable the Royal African Company to compete effectively with the French. If these policies were not pursued, the French would gain by engrossing Britain's share in the slave trade; and then any conflict with France would be difficult because they would have the 'riches of Africa and America to support their mighty armies and their naval power' (p. 194).

THE
AFRICAN TRADE,
THE GREAT
PILLAR and SUPPORT
OF THE
British PLANTATION TRADE
In *AMERICA*:

S H E W I N G,

That our Loss, by being beat out of all the Foreign Markets for *Sugar* and *Indigo* by the *French*, has been owing to the Neglect of our *African Trade*; which only, can supply our Colonies with *Negroes*, for the making of Sugars, and all other Plantation Produce :

That the Support and Security of the *Negro-Trade* depends wholly on the due and effectual Support of the *Royal African Company of England*, which has hitherto preserved this invaluable Trade to these Kingdoms :

That the Difficulties and Discouragements which the said Company labours under; threaten the absolute Loss of the *Negro Trade* to this Nation; and consequently the total Ruin of all the *British* Plantations in *America* :

And also, What the *Royal African Company* have a natural Right to hope for *this Session of Parliament* from their Country, in order to enable them to support and maintain the *British* Interest, Rights and Privileges in *Africa* against the *French*, and all other Rivals in the same most valuable Trade.

In a LETTER to the Right Honourable *****

Every one knows, that our African Company is now in a Manner dissolved to the great Joy both of the Dutch and French; and it behoves us, if we are not insatuated, to put it speedily on a better Foot than formerly, and not to let such an important Branch of our Commerce be lopp'd off, to the enriching our Neighbours, and our own Scandal——

——*The Negroe-Trade alone is of a most prodigious Consequence, and capable to render our African Company the most flourishing of any in the Kingdom; and it must be confessed, that it is the most beneficial to this Island, of all the Companies that ever were formed by our Merchants, &c.*—— A Proposal for humbling Spain, &c. 1742.

L O N D O N :

Printed for J. ROBINSON, at the Golden Lion in Ludgate-Street, 1745.

[Price One Shilling.]

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THE
AFRICAN TRADE,
THE GREAT
PILLAR and SUPPORT
OF THE
British PLANTATION TRADE
in General, &c.

S I R,



IS Majesty having been graciously pleased,
in Consequence of an Address from the Ho-
nourable House of Commons, the last Session
of Parliament, to lay his Royal Commands
on the *Lords Commissioners of Trade* to
make their Representation of the State of
the Commerce to *Africa* this Year to Parliament, I flatter
B myself

myself I could not do my Country a more seasonable Service than by endeavouring to set a Matter of this Moment in its true Point of Light.

The Trade to *Africa* involves in it no less than the Consideration of our whole *West-India-Trade* in general; a Trade of such essential and allowed Concernment to the Wealth and Naval Power of *Great Britain*, that it would be as impertinent to take up your Time in expatiating on that Subject as in declaiming on the common Benefits of Air and Sun-shine in general.

Relative to the commercial Interests of these Kingdoms, a Subject of more real Importance cannot come before the House of Commons. It is hoped therefore, it will not be judged a Topick beneath the most serious Regard and Attention of the ablest Minister. I am persuaded, Sir, it will meet with all due Regard from you, who have nothing so much at Heart as the true Interest of your *Prince* and *Country*.

Every Man of any Observation at all, is now thoroughly sensible of the surprizing and even rapid Progress of *France*, in raising her *American Colonies* to the Height we have experienced them to be during the present War; and in Consequence thereof, to have so greatly advanced in NAVAL POWER. We seem however, to have been much at a Loss to know by what kind of Policy it has come to pass, that this Nation, of whom we had so many Years the Start, should have been able to supplant us in the *Sugar, Indigo, Coffee* and *Cocoa Trades*, &c. as they have apparently done: And what is still more extraordinary, to have laid a sure Foundation to supplant us even in our whole *American Commerce* in general; for that, it is presumed, will appear to be the Case before this Letter is concluded, unless speedy

dy and effectual Measures be taken to prevent so melancholly a Catastrophe in this most valuable Branch of our Trade and Navigation.

It would be tedious to enumerate the Variety of *Causes* that have been conjectured to occasion this Prosperity of the *French Sugar-Colonies*, and the dangerous and precarious State and Condition to which *Our own* are at this Time reduced. According to the Judgment form'd of the Cause, suitable Laws and Encouragements have, from Time to Time, been wisely adapted: But as those Laws have not hitherto effectually restored our languishing Trade, may we not reasonably presume there has been, and still continues to be, some *latent Cause* which has proved greatly conducive to the Aggrandizement of the *French Colonies*, while our Disregard of *that Cause*, has tended to the manifest Injury and Detriment of *Our own*.

When a Distemper is got to a great Head before the primary Cause is happily discovered, we are pregnant in Surmises; we are apt to multiply Causes, when one alone will often more naturally solve the Phænomena; we too frequently mistake the Effect for the Cause: Thus, by injudiciously mistaking the true Source of the Malady, we tamper with it by *Palliatives* only, till it grows more and more obstinate, and at length becomes absolutely incurable.

Had not too long Experience proved the contrary, one would think it impossible, that the obvious Connection and Dependency subsisting between our *Plantation* and *Guinea Trades* should be so notoriously disregarded; and remain as much unobserved as if there really were no such Relation between those Branches of our Commerce. Yet this has been the Case; we have suffered our *African Company*, the sole Guardians of our *Guinea Trade*, to moulder

and dwindle away almost to Nothing; and then vainly have expected that our *Plantation Commerce*, not only first founded on that Trade, but still daily upheld thereby, should stand alone without its fundamental Prop and Support!

The Policy of our dangerous Rivals has been quite otherwise. *France* has long seen the essential Dependency between those Trades, and that the *one* cannot subsist or prosper without giving all due Encouragement to the *other*. Wherefore, while this Nation has unaccountably suffered our *African Company* to labour under every Difficulty and Discouragement, (as will appear) *France* has wisely cherished and encouraged *Theirs*; Is it to be wondered therefore, that our Enemies should raise a magnificent Superstructure of *American Commerce* and *Naval Power* on an *African Foundation*, while ours has been for many Years past ——— neglected, and suffered to decline?

That we may not mistake the Sentiments of the *French* upon this Matter, permit me, Sir, to lay before you a small Part only of a *Memorial*, presented by the *Deputies of the Council of Trade in France, to the Royal Council in the Year 1701*, concerning the *Guinea Company*, the *Commerce of the French Colonies in America*, and the then State of the *Islands* which the *French* possess there, &c.

This remarkable *Memorial* is introduced in such Terms as ought never to be forgot by any *Englishman*; and, suffer me to say, Sir, deserves to be imprinted in indelible Characters upon the Mind of every *Minister*, who has the Honour to serve any *Prince* who wears the *British Crown*.

The Words are as follows, *Viz.* “ The Commerce of
 “ *Guinea* has such Relation to that of the *French Islands* in the
 “ *West-Indies*, that the one cannot subsist without the other.
 “ By

“ By those Trades we have deprived our Competitors in
 “ Traffick of the great Profit which they drew from us,
 “ and may put ourselves into a Condition, by their Exam-
 “ ple, to draw Profit in our Turn from them, and ESPE-
 “ CIALLY FROM THE ENGLISH. We may encrease those
 “ Trades considerably, seeing that Nation in their Islands,
 “ with less Advantage than we, in Territories of less Ex-
 “ tent, and in much less Time, have found Means to em-
 “ ploy yearly above 500 Ships, while we do not without
 “ great Difficulty employ 100.

“ Every Body is sensible of the Benefit of Navigation, and
 “ that the Happiness and Glory of a State very much de-
 “ pend upon it: There can be no Commerce without it;
 “ it governs the Fortunes of the Merchants; it maintains a
 “ great Number of Subjects, Seamen and Mechanicks.
 “ No one is ignorant that the Navigation of *France* owes
 “ all its *Encrease* and *Splendor* to the *Commerce* of its
 “ *Islands*, and that it cannot be kept up and enlarged other-
 “ wise than by *this Commerce*.

“ It is beyond all Doubt, that this Commerce is more
 “ beneficial to the State than all others (of LONG VOYAGES)
 “ that are driven by the *French*; because it is carried on
 “ *without exporting any Money*”, &c.

Thus we see how strong and express the Maxims of
France are with Respect to the necessary Connection and
 Dependency between the *Plantation* and *African Trades*, and
 that the one cannot subsist without the other. And have not
 the *French* steadily reduced these their Maxims into Prac-
 tice, to their great Profit, and our no small Injury?

Whoever will take upon him to suggest that the same re-
 ciprocal Connection, the same mutual Dependency does not
 subsist in as essential a Manner between the *British Planta-*
 tions

tion and *British Guinea Trades*, as between these Trades belonging to *France*, let him discriminate, and shew wherein the Difference consists.

But is it not notorious to the whole World, that the Business of *Planting* in our *British Colonies*, as well as in the *French*, is carried on by the Labour of *Negroes*, imported thither from *Africa*? Are we not indebted to those valuable People, the *Africans*, for our *Sugars*, *Tobaccoes*, *Rice*, *Rum*, and all other *Plantation Produce*? And the greater the Number of *Negroes* imported into our *Colonies*, from *Africa*, will not the Exportation of *British* Manufactures among the *Africans* be in Proportion; they being paid for in such Commodities only? The more likewise our Plantations abound in *Negroes*, will not more Land become cultivated, and both *better* and greater *Variety* of *Plantation Commodities* be produced? As those Trades are subservient to the Well Being and Prosperity of each other; so the more either flourishes or declines, the other must be necessarily affected; and the general Trade and Navigation of their *Mother Country*, will be proportionably benefited or injured. May we not therefore say, with equal Truth, as the *French* do in their before cited *Memorial*, that the general NAVIGATION of *Great Britain* owes all its *Encrease* and *Splendor* to the Commerce of its *American* and *African Colonies*; and that it cannot be maintained and enlarged otherwise than from the constant Prosperity of both those Branches, *whose Interests are mutual and inseparable*?

Whatever other Causes may have conspired to enable the *French* to beat us out of all the Markets in *Europe* in the *Sugar* and *Indigo Trades*, &c. the great and extraordinary Care they have taken to cherish and encourage their *African Company*,

Company, to the End that their *Plantations* might be cheaply and plentifully stocked with Negroe Husbandmen, is amply sufficient of itself to account for the Effect; for this Policy, they wisely judged, would enable them to produce those Commodities cheaper than we, who have suffered the *British* Interest to decline in *Africa*, as that of the *French* has advanced; and when they could produce the Commodities cheaper, is it at all to be admired that they have underfold us at all the foreign Markets in *Europe*, and thereby got that most beneficial Part of our Trade into their own Hands?

As their great Care and our great Neglect of the *African Trade*, has for many Years past given *France* the Advantage over us in *Planting*; so while the same Cause continues, Is it not impossible, in the Nature of Things, that the Effect should cease, and our Trade return to its former flourishing State? All other Measures, as they hitherto have, so always will prove only *temporary Expedients*, not *effectual Restoratives*: They have none of them struck at the Root of the Evil; nor is it possible to work a thorough Cure any other way, but by enabling the *African Company* effectually, to maintain and support the *British* Rights and Privileges on the Coast of *Africa* against the Encroachments of the *French*, and all other Rivals; and in Consequence thereof, by stocking our own Plantations with greater Plenty of *Negroes*, and at *cheaper Rates* than our Rivals would, in such Case, be able to do.

That it has been many Years out of our Power to do this, is a Fact known to all well acquainted with those Trades, as they have been carried on by both Nations. By what Means this has come to pass, doth not seem to be so well understood as could be wished: I will therefore endeavour farther

farther to clear this Matter up by an Induction of Particulars which will speak for themselves.

And, though in drawing the Comparison between the Encouragements and the Advantages the *French African* and *Plantation Trades* have received, to what ours have, for above these *Forty* past, I shall for Truth Sake be under the Necessity of enumerating the peculiar *Privileges* and *Immunities* their *Guinea Trade* has received beyond what ours has done ; yet I would not be understood to aim at the Adoption of the identical Measures *France* has fallen into : Nothing more being intended than to exhibit the different States of the *African Trade*, as it has been long exercised, and still continues to be, by both Nations ; without which, it is apprehended, no right Judgment can be made of the Measures requisite to be taken by this Nation to retrieve OUR languishing Trade, and reap those desirable Advantages which this valuable Commerce may be certainly made to afford us.

The *French Senegal Company*, who have *Fort*s and *Settlements* in *Africa*, as well as our Company, to secure their *Guinea Trade*, enjoy a Privilege of Trade to *Africa*, exclusive of all the other Subjects of *France* ; which gives them a much greater Weight and Superiority of Interest among the *Africans* than our *British* Company have had since the Trade has been laid open to all his Majesty's Subjects : This not only enables the *French* to contract more advantageous Alliances with the *Negro*e Princes, and *Great Men*, whereby they enlarge and extend their Inland Trade for *Negroes* ; but, in Consequence of the Power derived from this their superior Privilege, they have many Years taken upon them to trade as freely within the Limits of the
British

British Company's Charter as of their own; while our Company have for many Years lain under such Discouragements, that they have not been able to repell their shameful Encroachments. Nay, so great is the Weight of Power the *French African Company* have obtained from their *Privileges*, that they will not suffer any *British* Vessel to come within many Leagues of their Settlements, without making Prize of them. So that, if we expect to carry on the Trade to *Africa* upon the Foot of a free and open Trade (which I hope it ever will be) to as great Advantage as *France* does, the Company must have some *Equivalent* for the Privilege they have parted with, and the *French Company* possess, to put it in their Power to support the *British* Rights, Privileges, and Interest, in such remote Parts, against all other Nations, in their fullest Extent.

By Virtue also of the Privilege the *French Company* enjoys, they, of Course, become the only Purchasers of *Negroes* within the Limits of their own *Charter*; and consequently, having no Bidders against them, do, as it were, make their own Market. The Case is quite otherwise on those Parts of the Coast where the *British Company* have Settlements; for the *British* Share in the Trade to *Africa*, being free and open to all his *Majesty's* Subjects, naturally brings a great Concourse of *separate* Purchasers upon our Parts of the Coast, who bid against each other, as well as against the Company. This naturally raises the Price of *Negroes* to separate *English* Traders in general, while, as before observed, the *French* set their own Price, and are enabled thereby to supply their *Colonies* above 50 *per Cent.* cheaper than we can do ours.

As the Demand of the *French* for *Negroes* in their Plantations has increased, so they have encroached, and traded

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without

without Molestation, as is before observed, within the *British* Company's Rights and Privileges, and purchased the choicest *Negroes*, within Sight of the Company's *Forts* and *Castles*. This still more and more contributes to enhance the Price to *British* Traders and Planters, by increasing the Number of Purchasers beyond the Quantity brought to Market in those Places. Yet this is no Disadvantage to the *French Company*; for what with the constant low Price of *Negroes* on those Parts of the Coast which the *French* now usurp, to the entire Exclusion of the *English*, together with a *Bounty*, and several other Immunities which they allow upon all *Negroes* imported into the *French Colonies*, they can well afford to raise the Price on our Coast upon the *British* Purchaser, and consequently to the *British Planter* in *America*; and yet very little enhance it to the *French Planter*.

Still further to encourage the cheap and plentiful Importation of *Negroes* into the *French Colonies*, *France* has exempted their *African Company* from *one half of the Duty* on all such Goods of the Produce of their *Sugar Colonies* as are made in Return for *Negroes*; which is so very extraordinary and prodigious an *Encouragement* to induce to a cheap and plentiful Supply of their Plantations, that it is not at all to be admired they should, by such Policy, beat us out of the *Sugar* and *Indigo Trades*, and lay a Foundation, by Dint of *Negro-Labour*, to beat us out of our whole Plantation Trade in general.

The *French* likewise grant their Company an Exemption from all Duties whatsoever on Goods imported into *France*, and afterwards re-exported to *Africa*, wherewith to purchase *Negroes*,

Negroes to stock their Plantations at a cheaper Rate than without such great Encouragements, they could possibly do.

As these Advantages accrue from the Importation of *Negroes* into their Colonies, beyond what do into ours, they naturally draw with them *another* of no little Benefit to the *French Planter*, which the *British* also are deprived of; for such *Bounties*, *Immunities* and *Privileges*, attending the *Negro Trade*, 'tis for the Interest of the *French Company* never to let the *Planters* want a Supply of *Negroes* — This induces the Company to give large Credit to the *French Planters*, for the sake of the subsequent Advantages that are inseparably annexed to the *Negro Trade*; for sure those Advantages are very considerable, tho' their Gain upon first Importation should but be small, which is yet known to be otherwise.

That the *French* may want no Encouragement to beat all other Powers out of the *African Trade*, their Company is likewise allowed a *Bounty* of Eighty Livres for every *Mark Weight* of *Gold Dust* imported from *Africa* into *France*, which added to the other Profits of that Trade, we need not wonder to hear of the *French Guinea Ships* being so rich in *Gold*, as several of them have *proved* during the present War.

So great, we see, are the Advantages given by *France* to their *African Trade*, that this Consideration alone is sufficient to account for the surprizing Success of the *French Sugar Colonies*, without looking into any other Cause that may have contributed thereto. For what is the natural Consequence of this greater Cheapness of *Negroes*? Does it not occasion the *French Plantations* to be more plentifully stocked than ours? And has not this put them daily upon

cultivating more and more Land, in order to accomplish the End aimed at. They find by Experience, as all Nations ever may, that the general Culture of Land occasions a general Plenty of the *Necessaries* and *Conveniences* of Life in their Colonies — This general Plenty, of course, occasions a general Cheapness; and thus they are sensible that they can maintain *Negroes* considerably cheaper than the *British Planters* can do, as well as purchase them cheaper at first Hand.

So considerably dearer an Importation of *Negroes* into the *British* Colonies, naturally occasions a proportionable Scarcity of them to what the *French* have; consequently, less Quantity of Land becomes cultivated, and therefore the common Necessaries of Life dearer than in the *French Colonies*, the Interest of Money higher, and the Maintainance of *white* Servants, as well as the *Blacks*, far more expensive. For the Standard of the Charge of *Negro-Labour*, as well as that of *white* Men, is the Price of the common Necessaries of Life. Herein the *French* in their Colonies have an infinite Advantage over us; and all owing to the beforementioned great Encouragements of their *African Trade*.

By these simple, yet profound and judicious Measures, *France* soon experienced they could produce *Sugars* cheaper than we could do in the *British Colonies*. This animated them to try the Experiment of supplanting us at foreign Markets; and fairly, by dint of Cheapness, and as good a Commodity, they gain'd their Point. From the same Principles, they succeeded also in the *Indigo* and *Coffee Trades*; and will doubtless, if not stopt in their Career, be as successful in all other Plantation Produce; so that in a few Years we must expect to be reduced to the Necessity of taking *Sugars*,
Tobacco,

Tobacco, Rice, &c. as we now do *Indigo* of them, for our Home Consumption.

The *Dutch* also, whose *American Colonies* bear little Proportion either to ours, or those of *France*, allow their *African Company* very great Encouragements to support their Interests in *Africa*, by *Forts* and *Settlements*; and besides this, an exclusive Privilege of Trade also. They set a due Value on the cheap Labour of *Negroes*, which they know will ever beat that of all *White Men* whatsoever, and that nothing can be done in *America* without those valuable *Africans*. And tho' their Colonies do not require any Thing like the Quantity of *Negroes* that ours, or those of *France* do; yet they are not less solicitous to maintain their Interest and Footing in *Africa*; and that for these plain Reasons: First, From the Advantages they reap from the direct Trade to *Africa*, by the Barter of their Merchandize for *Gold, Ivory, Gums, Dying Woods, &c.* Secondly, From Their Traffic in *Negroes*, to sell them to the *Spaniards*, and under that Pretext to introduce their Manufactures into the *Spanish Indies*; which is a Commerce of such Advantage alone, that the States of *Holland* will never part with their Settlements in *Africa*, or suffer that Trade to lie under any Discouragements. Thirdly, From a View they may naturally be presumed to have, some Time or other, to obtain an *Assiento* with *Spain* for *Negroes*.

As *Negro Labour* hitherto has, so that only can support our *British Colonies*, as it has done those of other Nations. It is *that* also will keep them in a due Subserviency to the Interest of their *Mother-Country*; for while our Plantations depend only on Planting by *Negroes*, and that of such Produce as interferes only with the Interests of our Rivals, not
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of their *Mother-Country*, our Colonies can never prove injurious to *British* Manufactures, never become independent of these Kingdoms, but remain a perpetual Support to our *European* Interest, by preserving to us a Superiority of Trade and Naval Power.

But if the whole *Negro Trade* be thrown into the Hands of our Rivals, and our Colonies are to depend on the Labour of the *White Men* to supply their Place, they will either soon be undone, or shake off their Dependency on the Crown of *England*. For *White Men* cannot be obtained near so cheap, or the Labour of a sufficient Number be had for the Expence of their Maintenance only, as we have of the *Africans*. Has not long Experience also shewn that *White Men* are not constitutionally qualified to sustain the Toil of Planting in the Climates of our *Island Colonies* like the Blacks ?

Were it possible however, for *White Men* to answer the End of *Negroes* in Planting, must we not drain our own Country of *Husbandmen*, *Mechanicks*, and *Manufacturers* too ? Might not the latter be the Cause of our Colonies interfering with the Manufactures of these Kingdoms, as the *Palatines* attempted in *Pensilvania* ? * In such Case indeed, we might have just Reason to dread the Prosperity of our Colonies ; but while we can be well supplied with *Negroes*, we can be under no such Apprehensions ; their Labour will confine the Plantations to *Planting* only ; which will render our *Colonies* more beneficial to these Kingdoms than the *Mines* of *Peru* and *Mexico* are to the *Spaniards*.

* *Vide* a Representation of the Lords Commissioners of Trade laid before the House of Commons, 1732.

Doctor

Doctor Davenant tells us, that in the Time of King CHARLES II. our *Merchants*, interested in the *American Trade*, made a Representation to that King, setting forth, that by a just Medium, they made it appear, that the Labour of an hundred *Negroes* was, at that Time of Day, 1600 *l. per Annum* Profit to this Nation, deducting therefrom the Amount of the Value of what we consume in Plantation Produce. It was then estimated there were no more than 100,000 *Negroes* in *America*; but the most experienced Judges now do not rate them at less than 300,000: So that if we reckon them of no more Worth to *Great Britain* now than at that Time, and estimate the Value of our Home Consumption of Plantation Commodities at the highest Rate, the annual Gain of the Nation by *Negroe Labour* will fall little short of Three Millions *per Annum*: And it is to be hoped we shall not sacrifice such an Annuity rather than give all just and reasonable Encouragement for the due Support of our *African Company*, which has been the FOUNDATION of such Profit to these Kingdoms!

Such who have well considered how Plantations may be still rendered more beneficial to this Nation, have pointed out various Improvements that might easily be made therein by the Labour of *Negroes*.

It is certain that *Logwood* has been raised in the moist Lands of the *Bahama Islands*; and it might easily be propagated there (and probably in some other of our Colonies likewise) so as to raise not only sufficient Quantities to serve our own Exigencies, but also for Exportation to foreign Markets: And, certainly, such laudable Attempts are well worth our Encouragement; more especially so, since this Trade has proved such a Bone of Contention between *Spain* and *Us*,
and

and cost so many *British* Lives to obtain it in the Bays of *Campeachy* and *Honduras*. As this Commodity is not only an essential Ingredient in the Dying of our Cloth, but is of so bulky a Nature as to conduce much to the Encrease of *Shipping*, it cannot be bad Policy sure to quicken the Genius of our *Planters*, by giving them all proper Encouragement to attempt an Experiment that appears rational and practicable, and so manifestly tends to the Improvement of our Commerce. And the principal Encouragement certainly will be, to put the *African Trade* on such an Establishment that they may have *Negroes* as cheap, at least, as our Rivals.

It has been allowed also, that we might, with little Difficulty, extend the Planting of *Coffee*, *Cocoa*, *Indigo*, and *Cocheneal* sufficient, at least, to supply ourselves. The sowing of *Hemp* and *Flax*, making *Pot-ash*, *Pitch* and *Tar*, we know, may be carried almost to what Height we please in our Colonies. We have experienced the Danger and Difficulty of depending wholly on the *East Countries* for *Naval Stores* *: And *Negroes*, certainly, may as easily be bred to those Things as they ever were to *Sugar*, *Tobacco*, and *Rice Planting*; the Cheapness of their Labour will surmount all Difficulties in any kind of Planting, provided they can be purchased cheap at the first Hand.

While *France* spares no Expence and Encouragement to bring their Settlements on the *Mississippi* to Perfection, for the Planting of *Tobacco*, and that upon the very back of

* *Vide* Doctor *Robinson's* Letter, the late Queen's Envoy at the Court of *Sweden*, on the Subject of *Naval Stores*, to Sir *Charles Hedges* Secretary of State, *August* 4th, 1703.

our Colonies of *Carolina*, *Virginia* and *Maryland*, and down the River *St. Lawrence* to *Cape Breton*, and also at *Hispaniola*; while *France* is not content with having supplanted us in the *Sugar* and *Indigo Trades*, but are strenuously attempting to vie with us in the *Tobacco* and *Rice*, &c. and this wholly from the Dependence they make on the Labour of *Negroes*; certainly a *British* Legislature will not think this a Time of Day to make our dangerous Rivals the Compliment of our *African Settlements*, to put it more and more into their Power to raise new Colonies, while we are rendered incapable of supporting our *old Ones*.

We seem to have forgot the Times wherein our Plantations were first settled. Had we a lively Idea of the Spirit, Resolution and indefatigable Endeavours of our industrious Ancestors to establish them; did we consider how many Years they were arduously employed to accomplish so great a Work; what immense Sums of Money were expended out of this Kingdom for clearing of Lands, erecting *Sugar Works*, and purchasing *Negroes* at their first Establishment: Did we seriously weigh the invaluable Benefits *Britain* has received from her *American Colonies*, none but the greatest Enemy to his Country would suffer them to labour under any Sort of Discouragement whatever, consistent with their Dependency on the Crown of *England*; much less to sacrifice and give them up to Competitors. Yet this must be their Fate, provided we are once deprived of the Labour of *Africans* to support them.

Our *African Trade* had its Being before we had any Plantations in the *West Indies*: From the Reign of *Queen Elizabeth* our Merchants separately, or in joint Stocks, prosecuted this Trade till the Commencement of the present Compa-

ny. Nor have the Struggles, Difficulties, Hazards, and Expences of this present Corporation, first to establish their Trade on a good Footing, and since, to preserve and maintain it to Posterity, been any way inferior to the first Adventurers in our *American Settlements*: But to put this Matter in its true Light, would take a Volume by itself.

There is no Reason can be assigned for the Existence of any Trading Company in this Kingdom, but the same will equally hold good with Regard to the Necessity of supporting that of our present *African Company**; with this Difference, in Favour of the latter, that our Plantation Trade not only owes its Rise to it, but its constant Support and Preservation to the present Time.

However important the *East India Trade* may be judged to the Nation, yet it was never put in Competition with our *African* and *Plantation Trades*. The Manufactures of *England, Scotland* and *Ireland* will supply all the Wants of the latter: but the *India Company* itself receives no inconsiderable Advantage from those *Trades* in general, by the large Quantities of *East India* Commodities these Branches take off annually; And the *African Trade* alone, is capable of taking off *Ten Times* the Quantity it ever has done, was it once settled upon a desirable Footing.

But, though the Benefits of Re-exportation of *India* Commodities, and the Advantages of Navigation arising therefrom, are considerable, yet are they not any way equal to those others we receive from the Consequences of

* *Vide Sir Josiah Child.*

the Trade to *Africa*. A Cargo rightly sorted for *Africa*, consists of about Seven-Eighths *British* Manufactures and Produce; and they return us no inconsiderable Profit; and that not only in *Gold, Ivory, Bees-Wax, Dying Woods, Gums, &c.* (none of which we can do without) but *Negroes*, whom we have experienced to be of more Value to this Nation than any Advantages that ever were, or ever can be presumed to arise from the *East India Company*, which exports our Silver, and imports many Things, which to be sure, we might well do without.

With Respect to the Advantages derived from the *African* and *Indian* Trades, the *French* Memorial before cited, shews the Difference in few Words, *Viz.* "The *Guinea* and *American* Trades are, beyond all doubt, "more beneficial to the State than all others of LONG "VOYAGES that are driven, because they are carried on "without exporting any *Money, &c.*"

However beneficial to the Nation the Exports of the *South-Sea Company* to the *Spanish West Indies* may have proved, yet neither that Company, nor the Nation, could have received those Advantages, but by Virtue of introducing *Negroes* into *New Spain*, to work the *Mines* of *Peru* and *Mexico*. But how could this Company have ever had it in their Power to have complied with the *Assiento* for *Negroes*, had the *African Company* no Being to have preserved to us the *Negro Trade*? That Company have experienced the Difficulties they have been reduced to, during the declining State of the *African Company*, to carry their Contract with the Crown of *Spain* into Execution. Should

the *African* Company therefore be dissolved, what Pretence could the *South-Sea* ever have to obtain the Re-establishment of an *Affiento* again, when it could never be in their Power to comply with their Engagements ?

Upon Supposition of the Annihilation of our *African* Company, must not the *Affiento* go into *French* or *Dutch* Hands, who are too wise to part with their Footing in *Africa*, or to let their *African* Companies labour under any Discouragements ; and will not they, of Course, receive the Benefits of the *Spanish West India Trade* arising therefrom, as *France* did before the Peace of *Utrecht* ? The *French* have not cherished their *Guinea Trade* with a View only to the Ruin of the *British Colonies*, but to exclude *Englishmen*, for ever, from the next valuable Branch of Trade belonging to the *British* Empire. For if, by Vertue of another *Affiento* with *Spain*, *France* can so effectually establish their Manufactures in the *Spanish West Indies*, that the *British* will become quite indifferent to them, have we any Reason long to expect the least Share in the Trade of the *Galleons* and *Flotilla* ; especially since *France* has got two Thirds of that Trade into her Hands already ? Our *Spanish Merchants* have too much experienced the Success of that Nation in this Branch of Trade, not to be sensibly affected, should the *Spanish Affiento* revert again into their Hands.

Since the Nature of my Subject has naturally led me to touch upon the *Affiento*, it may not be amiss to take a little further Notice of it, so far as it concerns the Interest of our
African

African and Plantation Trades in general, as well as that of our *African Corporation* in particular.

In this Contract there are two Circumstances that seem to deserve our Attention; *Viz.* The Time when it was first obtained; and the Preamble to it.

The *Assiento* was signed by his Catholick Majesty at *Madrid*, upon the 26th Day of *March*, 1713; and is intitled, *ASSIENTO, a justado entre las dos Magestades Catholica, y Britanica, sobre encargarse LA COMPANIA DE INGLETERRA de la Introducion de Esclavos Negros en la America Esppannola, &c.* Or, The CONTRACT agreed upon between their *Britannick* and *Catholick* Majesties, for the *ENGLISH COMPANY'S* obliging themselves to supply the *Spanish West Indies* with black Slaves, &c.

With Regard to the Date, it should never be forgot that in the very preceding Year 1712, the Act which granted 10 *per Cent.* to the *African Company* on all Exports, &c. expired; and this without any Manner of Equivalent given to them in Lieu of the Privileges and Immunities which induced them to lay out so large a Capital, in building Forts, and making Settlements in *Africa*.

This Company, thus left destitute of every Privilege and Encouragement, upon which they had been induced to sink an immense Property in *Africa*, by the Erection of *Forts, Castles, and Factories*; and thereby brought under the Necessity either of abandoning their Property, or maintaining it at their sole Expence, for the public Benefit! — A Company thus circumstanced, and yet the great Support of the *Plantation Trade*, one would imagine, should have drawn the Eyes of our *Statesmen* at that Time of Day. Had they pointed out to her late Majesty, the proper Object on whom to have bestowed an *Assiento* for *Negroes*,
none

none, sure, could have been more naturally pitched upon than an *African Company*, to have supplied the *Spaniards* with *Africans*; more especially so, when the Nation, at that Point of Time, were under the strongest Ties and Obligations to have made the Company some Compensation for being deprived of those Privileges which first induced the Adventurers to advance their Money. Had this been done, when all Circumstances concurred to it, it is not at all unreasonable to presume, that we might, by such Measures, have prevented the *French* from gaining the Ascendant over us in the *Sugar* and *Indigo Trades*; and thereby have saved this Nation many Millions of Money.

The Advantages of this Contract would have enabled the Company so to have supported the *British* Interest in *Africa*, as to have prevented the *French* from drawing such great Currency of Trade, and, consequently, Quantity of *Negroes* to their Colonies.

This would also have prevented their overbearing Encroachments on our Parts of the *Gold-Coast*, had the Company remained in a Condition to have opposed them. By Vertue of the Company's *Forts* and *Factories* in the *River Gambia*, they would also have drawn a great Part of the *River Senegal* Trade to the *British* Factories, and might easily have united the Inland Parts of the *Gold Coast Trade* with that of *Gambia River*; which, as it would have furnished an ample Supply of *Negroes*, both for our *Colonies* and the *Assiento*, so nothing could have been a greater Check to the *French* *Negro* Trade in general.

This would have had the desirable Effect, as before shewn, to have produced a universal Plenty, and consequently,

quently, Cheapness of all the Necessaries of Life in our Plantations; as, on the contrary, Want of Hands would have raised them in the *French Colonies*. May we not therefore very reasonably believe, that had the Company continued in a flourishing State, by Vertue of this *Assiento*, we might easily have stopped the Career of the *French*, from carrying their *Sugar* and *Indigo Trades* to greater Lengths than the Supply of their own Consumption? And is it not high Time to retrieve, and make amends for former Errors, by all Means in our Power?

After the Number of *Negroes*, stipulated by the *Assiento*, so introduced into *New-Spain*, the sixth Article of that Contract, tolerating also the Importation of as many more there, for the Service of his *Catholick Majesty*, and whatever more his Subjects should require, we might, very probably, have doubled our Importation into *Spanish America*, had we been capable of so doing, instead of not complying on our Part with the Contract; for the Wants of the *Spaniards* have been always very considerably more than we have supplied. This would have proved a great additional Advantage to the Nation; especially, as the Duty on the Importation of any *surplus Negroes* would have been only 16 $\frac{1}{2}$ Pieces of Eight *per Head*, instead of 33 $\frac{1}{2}$, as in the Conditions of the other Part of the *Assiento*. And since all *Negroes* are mostly paid for in *Africa* with *British Manufactures*, this would have proportionably augmented our *Exports* thither: So that the Advantage the Nation would have obtained by this Contract having been given to our *African Company*, is easier conceived than represented.

And

And indeed, by the Preamble to the *Affiento*, it is not impossible but the *Spaniards* meant and intended *no other Company*, however they might be duped by an After-Explication; for it is expressly called, The Contract agreed upon between their *Britannick* and *Catholick Majesties*, for the *ENGLISH COMPANY* obliging itself to supply the *Spanish West Indies* with Black Slaves, &c.

Now, what *English Company* could be supposed to be meant by the *Court of Spain*, but that *English Company*, which dealt in *Negroes*? that *English Company* who were established in *Africa*, as the *French* and *Portuguese African Companies* were, with whom the *Spaniards* had before made the like *Affientos*? Such a Company only, the *Spaniards* doubtless imagined could supply them much cheaper, and carry the Contract into Execution more effectually, than any other Company that should be under the Necessity of purchasing *Negroes* either of the *English African Company*, or of *English* private Traders.

As the Connection between this Branch of the *Spanish West India Trade* and that of *Africa*, is honestly represented in a late Tract, not long since published,* I beg Leave, Sir, to transcribe a Passage extremely pertinent to the present Occasion.

“ I think, says the judicious Proposer, it is very obvious
 “ to every common Eye, that if we can settle ourselves at
 “ *Buenos Ayres*, the *Spaniards* will lie under an absolute
 “ Necessity to open a Trade with us; Nay, it is not in

* A Proposal for humbling *Spain*, by a Person of Distinction, printed for *Roberts*, 1742.

“ our

“ our Power to impose what Terms we please upon them,
 “ but if we had no other Way to obtain it than the af-
 “ fording our Goods as cheap again, as they can furnish
 “ themselves with the other Way, even that, with a little
 “ Patience, would infallibly produce it. But without
 “ trusting to that, we should have them in a Manner at
 “ our Mercy, by having the Herb of *Paragua* * in our
 “ Hands.

“ But we have still another Lure for the *Spaniards*, as
 “ powerful and as proper to produce the desired Effect,
 “ as any yet mentioned; which is, the supplying them
 “ with *Negroes* in sufficient Numbers, and cheaper than
 “ formerly. This is the great Inconveniency which the
 “ *Spaniards* have laboured under this last Age; for having
 “ in a Manner utterly destroy’d the natural Inhabitants,
 “ they are obliged now to perform the Work by *Negroes*,
 “ of which they could never get the Number they
 “ wanted; and it is certain, if they were fully supplied,
 “ they would get yearly above twice the Quantity of Silver
 “ they now do. It must be confessed, they used all Means
 “ imaginable to obtain them. The *Genoese* undertook to
 “ supply them at a concerted Price betwixt them, for
 “ which End they form’d a Company called the *Affiento*,
 “ who had their *Factors* at *Jamaica*, *Curaçoa*, and *Brazil*,
 “ and pray consider what a prodigious Tour they made be-
 “ fore they got to the *Mines*, first from *Guinea* to *Jamaica*,
 “ from thence to *Porto Bello*, and then to *Panama*, where

* This Herb is a sovereign Remedy for the Diseases incident to the *Negroes* in working the *Spanish Silver Mines*; without which, it is said, they never could be work’d at all.

“ they are re-ship’d on board the Fleet when returning
 “ to *Callao*; which is a Voyage of four Months at least,
 “ for they have the Wind in their Teeth every League of
 “ this Voyage. After staying some little Time at this
 “ mentioned Port, they are put on Ship-board again, and
 “ sent to *Arica*, which is a Voyage of a Month, or there-
 “ abouts; and when landed they cannot have less than 150
 “ Miles to the *Mines*: From whence, I think, it is plain,
 “ that not above one *Negro* in Three arrives at *Potosi*, or
 “ the adjacent *Mines*, of those that were originally bought
 “ by their Factors for that End. Whereas the *Negroes*
 “ that might be sent from *Buenos Ayres*, would be liable
 “ to none of the Inconveniencies, that the other poor
 “ Wretches suffered, as passing thro’ so many unhealthy
 “ Climates, and so many tedious Voyages by Sea, enough
 “ to wear out Bodies of Steel, especially, considering how
 “ they are accommodated all the Time both with Lodging
 “ and Diet: But this Way I propose they would have One
 “ short Voyage by Sea; for from the Coast of *Guinea* to
 “ *Buenos Ayres* they would sail four Parts in five of the
 “ Voyage before the Wind; and when landed, pass thro’
 “ one of the most plentiful and healthiest Countries in the
 “ World, even in a Manner to the *Mine’s* Mouth; so that
 “ one may venture to affirm, that with careful Manage-
 “ ment they would not lose One in Ten. This Article
 “ alone is of a more prodigious Consequence, and capable
 “ to render our *African Company* the most flourishing of any
 “ in the Kingdom; and it must be confessed, that it is the
 “ most beneficial to this Island of all the Companies that ever
 “ was formed by our Merchants: For a Cargo rightly sorted
 “ for *Guinea*, consists of fourscore different Commodities
 “ at

“ at least, of which Seventy are of the Manufacture and
 “ Product of this Country ; and they return us *Gold, Slaves,*
 “ *Ivory,* and *Woods* for Dying ; whereas other Companies
 “ export our *Silver,* and import us Things we might better
 “ be without.

“ Every one knows, that our *African Company* is now
 “ in a Manner dissolved, to the great Joy both of the
 “ *Dutch* and *French* ; and it behoves us, if we are not in-
 “ fatuated, to put it speedily on a better Footing than for-
 “ merly, and not to let such an important Branch of our
 “ Commerce to be lopped off, to the enriching our Neigh-
 “ bours, and our own Scandal.” So far our Author.

The first Attempts to make *Foreign Settlements* among uncivilized Nations cannot be undertaken, but at considerable Expence and Hazard ; and the first Adventurers in all Trading Countries have always received Encouragements suitable to the Risk and Contingency of their Engagements. This first gave Birth to *exclusive Grants* and *Privileges*, and the Incorporation of Trading Societies ; who in a Body, with a *Joint-Stock*, were induced to engage in such commercial Enterprizes, as no private Traders would ever attempt.

But when States have judged it eligible for the Interest of the Publick in general, to take away the *original Privileges* and *Immunities*, that induced first Adventurers to hazard their Properties, they have ever thought it just and equitable to give them ample Compensation : And this certainly will ever be judged consistent with the common Laws of national Justice.

Would not the Proprietors of *Maryland, Pennsylvania, &c.* think it the greatest Grievance, the greatest Hardship and Oppression, if when their Ancestors had, at an immense Expence and Hazard, establish'd remote Colonies, and brought them to a flourishing Condition, that they should have been arbitrarily deprived of their Patrimony without receiving an equitable Equivalent? Wherein consists the Difference between *Them* and *African Adventurers*? Were not the latter the original Parent of the *African* Branch of Commerce, as the former were of our *American* Colonies?

How the Company has laboured to support this Trade for the Interest of the Nation is now apparent. The Honourable House of Commons were pleased, the last Session, to appoint a Committee to inquire into the State of the Trade to *Africa*; and if I am rightly informed, of which You Your Self *Sir* are the best Judge, the said Committee, after the strictest Inquiry, made a very particular Report, by which it appears, that the said Company had expended on the Preservation of the Trade upwards of 100,000 *l.* in 14 Years preceding *December 31, 1743*, above what they had received for that Service.

This *Hundred Thousand Pounds* is not all the Company have disbursed for the Service of the Nation, on Account of maintaining their Forts and Settlements for the Publick Interest: I am also informed, *Sir*, that their Expences for that Service, from the Year 1712 to 1730, have not amounted to so little as 300,000 *l.* more; for in this long Period, they advanced the whole Money for their Support. But, as I am not so clearly satisfied, whether the Company may, or may not, have an Equitable Right to some Compensation from the Publick for this 300,000 *l.* for the
Maintenance

Maintenance and Support of their *Forts and Settlements* since 1712.

The Company suffered enough by the Trade being laid open to all His Majesty's Subjects without receiving an Equivalent; but for them to bear the Expence of their Settlements to serve the Publick, and ruin themselves, is what can never be expected of any Person or Corporation; and what the Laws of national Justice are diametrically opposite to. Wherefore, when their Case comes to be duely considered by Parliament, doubtless the Wisdom and Equity of the Legislature will grant the Company such effectual Relief, as the Justice of their Cause requires.

It will easily be admitted, that any parliamentary Allowance granted them, from Year to Year, sufficient only for the due Support of their Settlements for the publick Benefit, can be no Kind of Relief to *African Proprietors* for the Money they have already advanced upon this Occasion. That is no more than constituting the Company to be *Trustees* for such future parliamentary Allowance, annually accountable for the same, and is no Redress of their Grievances.

Should it be said, that the primary Motive to the Company to bear the Expences of the *Forts and Settlements* was the Preservation of their own Property from falling into foreign Hands; yet, as this was for the National Interest, and has hitherto sav'd to us the Being of the Trade, and the Company's Property is of no more Worth to the Proprietors than from the Advantages they could make of it by Virtue of their Trade; and since also they have by those Expences been almost disabled from Trading, sure that will not authorize their being stripped of their Capital too,

too ! This would favour so barefacedly of the Tyranny and Oppression of the most slavish Countries, that no true *Englishman*, I am persuaded, can countenance any such Kind of Measures.

I would suppose for a Moment, that the *East-India Company* were deprived of their exclusive Privilege of Trade, as the *African Company* have been ; and that this Corporation were under the Necessity, either of giving up their *Forts* and *Settlements* to the *Dutch*, or the *French*, or to preserve them, were obliged to maintain them at their own Expence for the Profit and Safety of *every Briton*, who should please to take the Benefit thereof ; would not this Company, in few Years, bury their whole Trading Capital, and the Profits of their Trade too, in *India*, from the great Expence of their *Forts*, and Diminution of their Trade, in Consequence of its being laid open ? Would not the Proprietors of *India Stock* justly think it the greatest Hardship and Oppression, that after they had advanced their Money in the Service of the Publick, they should receive no Justice from them ?

African Stockholders advanced their Money to erect *Forts* and *Settlements* to carry on their Trade with Security, upon the same Motives that *India Stockholders* have theirs. As the Nation therefore has thought fit to take away the Privilege that induced People to hazard their Property, does not the good Faith and Justice of the Nation stand obliged to make them Amends in some Shape or other to prevent their being totally ruined ?

If the Subjects of *Great-Britain* advanced their Money upon the Appropriation of any effectual *Fund* in the *Revenue* for the due Payment of *Interest*, till the Redemption
of

of the *Principal Debt*; and if such *appropriated Fund*, was, before the Repayment of the Principal, either annihilated, or otherwise alienated, without the Consent of the *Publick Creditors*, would not this be a great Injustice to the Proprietors? Wherein is the Difference between *African Stockholders*, who advanced their Money first upon an *exclusive Privilege*, and those who should advance it upon an *appropriated national Fund*? If they should be both alike deprived of their Security, would not the one as much discourage Adventurers from hazarding their Money upon any Exigency of State, as the other will discourage Adventurers from hazarding their Property in any Foreign Undertaking, in Order to open New Branches of Trade upon such *temporary and precarious Privileges*?

But when such a Body of Traders have advanced their Money, if they are then deprived of their peculiar Privilege, and have supported so beneficial a Trade for the general Interest of the Kingdom, have they not at least a Right to be reimbursed *that Money*; especially when, as I apprehend, They might doubt of their Power to dispose of their Property to any Foreign Nation? May not *African Stockholders* therefore be justly considered in the Light of *Publick Creditors*? They have ever depended on National Justice, and what else have other Publick Creditors to depend on? If they have hazarded their Property for the Publick Interest, without any other Security than an absolute Dependence upon the Justice of the Nation, have they ever the less Right to Justice? Does the Confidence they have reposed in the Publick render them the less meritorious?

The Services their Money has done to the Nation are real and substantial; the Company, we have seen, have
been

been the Guardians and Preservers of the most valuable Trade belonging to these Kingdoms; and the Amends they deserve ought to be the utmost publick Encouragement that the Nature of their Case requires, consistent with that general Freedom and Liberty of Trade, which all his Majesty's Subjects now enjoy.

How, and in what Manner, the Trade in General, and the Company in Particular, may be justly provided for, in a Manner the least burthenfome to the Nation, must be humbly submitted to the Wisdom of the Legislature. However, Sir, since It is the peculiar Privilege of a *British* Subject to be indulged in offering his Sentiments with Decency to Persons in Authority, I would beg Leave, with Submission, to suggest a few plain Propositions, agreeable to the Nature of the Case; and which seem to me to be the least that ought to be done, consistently with Justice and good Policy.

But I will first premise, that although the Company paid out of their own Pockets so large a Sum as 300,000 *l.* in 18 Years, from 1712 to 1730, for the Use of the Publick, as is before mentioned, and for which they very well deserve all Manner of Favour, Encouragement, and even an adequate Recompence, yet, as They have not, so far as I know, produced any liquidated Account thereof, nor possibly made any proper Claim for the same: I apprehend they must sit down by their Loss, and I shall not now offer any Thing on that Head, nor any other, farther back than the last 14 Years.

In the first Place I hope it will be always declared, That the Trade to *Africa* ought always to remain free and open to all His Majesty's Subjects: and That no Duty, or other
Discouragement

Discouragement whatsoever, should ever be laid on that Part of our Foreign Trade.

Secondly. That whatever Sum or Sums of Money have been made appear to have been expended by the Company in the last 14 Years, from the Year 1730, more than They have received of the Publick Money, be provided for, this Session of Parliament.

Thirdly. That the future parliamentary Allowance, which shall be granted for the Support of the Company's Forts and Settlements, be sufficient to uphold and maintain the *British* Interest in *Africa*, and effectually to secure this valuable Trade to all his Majesty's Subjects.

Fourthly. That such parliamentary Allowance, as shall be so granted for the Purposes aforesaid, be secured to the Company for a *Term of Years*, by such an effectual appropriated Fund, as the Legislature shall judge proper for the due Payment of such Annuity.

Fifthly. That the Company shall be yearly accountable for the same, in such Manner as shall be directed by Parliament.

It will never be said, sure, that the Nation cannot afford to do this Company Justice; or that the Calls for Moneys other Ways are so extraordinary, that Justice to the Company, and for the due Support and Preservation of so important and valuable a Trade, must be still longer and longer postponed! Can any Affair come under Consideration more worthy of immediate Care? So great have been the Hardships, Difficulties and Discouragements *They* have already laboured under; that it is out of their Power to bear up under them any longer: But if *Gentlemen*, who have the Honour to serve the Crown, will not believe

this untill they see the fatal Catastrophe, the Company cannot be blamed; they have done their Duty; and if they are to lose their Property, the Measures they have taken to secure this invaluable Commerce to these Kingdoms hitherto, will prevent their *losing their Reputations with Posterity*.

But does not the publick Revenue depend on Trade? As so very considerable a Part of our Commerce absolutely depends on the Well-Being of this Company, can he be a true Friend to his Country, who will oppose the giving just Relief to so National a Corporation? If we have no *Negroes*, we can have no *Sugars, Tobaccos, Rice, Rum, &c.* nor further Improvements in Plantation Commodities; consequently, the *Publick Revenue*, arising from the Importation of *Plantation-Produce*, must be annihilated: And will not this turn many hundred Thousands of *British Manufacturers* a Begging, as well as Numbers of our *Publick Creditors*, whose Securities depend upon the Appropriation of those very Revenues, if our *African* and *American* Trades are undone?

While the Company enjoy'd the sole Trade to *Africa*, as the *India Company*, at present, does that to *Asia*, They purchased, built, and maintained their *Forts* and *Settlements* at their own Expence. But when publick Authority interposed, and thought proper to lay the Trade open, sure every reasonable Man will say, They were, in common Justice, rather entitled to some publick Equivalent, instead of being reduced to the hard Necessity of bearing the future Burthen of their Forts and Settlements for the Publick Advantage. To deny them due Recompence,
and

and future Assistance, would be so contrary, so diametrically opposite to the sovereign and immutable Laws of Justice and Equity, that it can never be apprehended, that a *Parliament of Great-Britain* will encourage such an unparalleled Instance of Oppression. On the contrary, they have ever testified the most tender Regard to publick Sufferers; and, since the Nation has received such *Benefits* from the *Sufferings* of this Trading Corporation. I cannot but confidently persuade myself, they will experience that Justice and Redress, that the Peculiarity of their Case so manifestly requires. Should this be the Case, we are likely to reap still much greater Advantages by the *African Trade* than hitherto we ever have done.

For if the Trade to the *Spanish Indies* and the *Brazils* is so inviting, it is equally certain, that the *Inland Trade*, duely extended upon the Continent of *Africa* (which can only be effectuated by Means of the Company's Forts and Settlements) may be rendered little inferior to either, if not equal to the united Advantages of them both.— The Continent of *Africa* is of great Extent, the Country extremely populous, and this Commerce, by Reason of its Discouragements hitherto, but yet in its Infancy.— The Trade to the Coast of *Africa* is now well known, easy, and not hazardous. And if the Company are enabled by publick Encouragement to extend the *Inland Trade*, the *Coast Trade* must increase in the like Proportion; and all the Subjects of *England* will partake of the Advantages, as the Company shall become prosperous in propagating *British* Manufactures into the Heart of *Africa*.— As the Trade is free and open to all *British* Subjects, the Inter-

rest of private Traders, and that of the Company, will go Hand in Hand. We shall experience the Truth of a Proposition that this Nation has never yet been truly sensible of; viz. *That the Interest of a Corporation, and that of separate Traders is so far from being incompatible, that they may be made mutually subservient to each other.*

How impossible it is for private *British* Traders to reap any Advantage by this Trade, without the Company is duely supported, will more fully appear from the following Considerations.

The *French*, by Virtue of their Settlements in the *River Senegal*, and on the Island of *Goree*, claim to themselves the sole Trade of those Parts for near 300 Leagues; and have ever taken and condemned such *British* Ships as they find trading on any Part of that Coast, or within many Leagues of the same: Whereas they have of late Years encroached upon the Trade of our Company, and all private *British* Traders, with Impunity, to the great Injury of our *British* Planters and *West-India* Merchants, by the exorbitant Rise in the Price of *Negroes*.

The *Dutch* also pretend, by Virtue of Conquest from the *Portuguese*, and several old Grants and Donations from the Kings of the Country, to an absolute Right and Property, not only to the *Gold Coast*, where our Company's Forts and Settlements are chiefly situated; but likewise to all other Parts from *Cape Palmas* to *Cape Lopez*.

The *Portuguese* too have several strong Settlements at and near *Loango St. Paul's* on the Coast of *Angola*, and also claim a Right to the sole Trade of all that Part of *Africa* to the Southward of *Cape Lopez*.

Nothing

Nothing therefore, Sir, can appear more evident, than that it has been owing to the *Royal African Company*, and the great Expence and Charge they have been at in erecting and supporting a Fort on *James Island* in the *River Gambia*, that the *French* have not long since wholly engrossed the Trade of that River to Themselves, as well as that of all the several Parts and Countries to the Northward of the same.

It is likewise as unquestionably owing to the *Royal African Company's* Forts and Settlements on the *Gold Coast*, that the *Dutch* have not got Possession of all the Coast and Parts adjacent; and that they have not long before now excluded the *English*, as well as all other Nations, from any Share in that Trade, as much as from the *Spice Islands* in the *East-Indies*. And it is beyond all Doubt, that some, or all the Nations, who have Forts and Settlements on the *African Coast*, will finally and totally exclude the *British* Nation from every Part thereof, whether in actual Possession of those Nations or not, if ever that fatal Time should come, that the *British* Power and Interest should sink there; and their Forts and Settlements be abandoned or lost.

'Tis exceedingly surprising therefore, that any Person, who pretends to the least Knowledge in this Trade, should not easily discern the indispensable Necessity of effectually supporting the Forts and Settlements of the *African Company*, for the Security and Benefit of this Trade to all the Subjects of *Great-Britain*; since it has always been the well known Sense and Practice of all such Foreign Nations, as carry on any Trade to these Parts; is confirmed by all the Reasons

sons and Motives of many successive *British* Princes; and consistent with the declaratory Part of an express Act of Parliament, as well as with all subsequent Votes and Resolutions of the Representative Body of this Kingdom.

Such appears to be the Nature and uncommon Circumstances of this Trade and Company, the Danger and Inconveniencies they are exposed to from foreign Nations, and the Natives of these Countries; such is the Hazard the *British* Trade would be ever liable to, should the Company's Forts be either lost, or not duely supported, that not only the *absolute Loss of this Branch* must ensue, but the *inevitable Ruin and Destruction of our Plantation Trade must be the necessary and unavoidable Consequence.*

Without this Trade therefore, Sir, is duely supported by a *Constitutional Security*, it can never be preserved at all to these Kingdoms; nor can the great Advantages it promises, beyond what it ever has done, be reaped. What private Traders will prosecute this Trade, when the Company's Forts and Settlements are in Foreign Hands, and they every Moment liable to become a Sacrifice to our Rivals, and persecuted and imprisoned in Dungeons, as was the Case before this Company was established? Who will become Proprietors in this Company to raise such a Joint Trading Stock, as the Extent of this Commerce, we see, will easily admit of; and this only upon the precarious Security of an Allowance from the Publick from Year to Year only? To settle this Company therefore upon a desirable Footing, so as to raise and preserve its Credit with the Publick in future, the annual Allowance granted by Parliament must, in my humble Opinion, not only be amply

ply adequate to the Purposes for which it is granted; but must be secured for a certain Term upon Parliamentary Faith. Nothing less can transmit this Trade safe to Posterity, nor be a satisfactory Encouragement to future Adventurers to carry on this Trade to the Extent it is capable of.

If the Wisdom of Parliament should not judge the Merit of this Company to deserve future Encouragement, sure they have not only a Right to be paid for the past *Hire* and *Use* of their *Forts* and *Settlements*, but to have the Liberty of disposing of them to such Foreign Nations who will give the Company the most for them; for if the *Forts* and *Settlements* are no longer of any Worth to this Nation; and the Company can no longer maintain them upon the small Encouragement they have hitherto received, doubtless they will be allowed to sell what they can no longer keep, and what is no longer judged useful. It is not at all to be doubted, but the Company will find Purchasers enough, who would think they were worth an immense Sum to them, tho' they should be thought worth nothing to us. But the Consequences of such Reflections are of so melancholy a Nature to every Man who has the least Regard to the Interest of his *Prince* and *Country*, that we will drop these gloomy Apprehensions, and rather please ourselves with the agreeable Idea of seeing such a glorious Spirit appear in a *British* Parliament for the Support of this most important Commerce and Navigation, as will transmit our *African* and *Plantation Trades* with Security to latest Posterity.

In

In what Manner soever some may be pleased to think of and receive those Propositions, which have been made, in order to settle this Company upon a lasting Foundation; yet, as they appear to the Proposer to be founded on the plain Principles of National Justice, Interest, and Honour; it is to be hoped an honest Zeal to serve a Cause, wherein the Prosperity of the Nation is so nearly concerned, will be judged of with Candour.

The Prosperity of this Company, Sir, must terminate in that of our *British Planters* and *West-India Merchants* in general; for, as the Company shall be enabled to enlarge and extend the *Inland Parts* of the *African Trade*, which can no Way interfere with the Interest of private Traders, the greater Plenty of *Negroes, Gold, Ivory*, and 'all *African Productions*, will be brought down to the Coast for private Traders to take their Choice of; and consequently, in Proportion to the Plenty beyond the Demand, the Price of *Negroes, Gold, Ivory*, and every Thing else, will necessarily fall.

When the Company are in a Condition to put a Stop to the Encroachments of our Rivals on the *African Coast*, this will prevent the Encrease of Buyers, and consequently have a natural Tendency still to fall the Price: And if a perpetual Union, Harmony, and good Understanding be cemented between separate Traders and the Company, which I heartily wish may always be the Case, they will soon curb the over-bearing Encroachments of the *French*, and not only effectually stop their Progress, but sap the very Foundation of their *Guinea and Plantation Trades*.--- Thus we shall naturally reduce the Price of *Negroes*, and consequently

se frequently encrease their Importation into our own Colonies, while we diminish that of the *French* into theirs. — This will enable us to make *Sugars* and *Indigo*, &c. cheaper than the *French*; and not only to retrieve our languishing Trade, but to put it in the Power of our *British Planters* to make all such Improvements in Planting in general, by the Labour of *Negroes*, as the Soil will admit of: And as this will tend to the Encrease and Prosperity of the *British* Interest in *America*, so that, in its Turn, will, of Course, become a greater Bulwark to our Interest in *Europe*, by extending the general TRADE and NAVIGATION of these Kingdoms.

As the Company likewise extend their *Inland Trade* upon the Continent, so, in Proportion, will the Exportation of our *British* Manufactures Increase; and the Price of *Gold*, and all other Produce of *Africa*, as well as *Negroes*, become cheaper as they become more plentiful, by finding out and establishing *New Inland Channels* of Commerce, with these populous and wealthy People. And since they certainly stand in as great need of *European Commodities*, as we do of their *Negroes*, their *Gold*, their *Ivory*, *Gums*, *Dying Woods*, *Bees-Wax*, &c. it certainly is our own Fault, if we do not render the *African Trade* as valuable to *Great Britain*, as the *Mines* of *Peru*, *Mexico*, and the *Brazils* are to the *Spaniards* and *Portuguese*: And this too, with far greater Certainty and Security to this Nation, than any of those are to their respective Nations, or any *Europeans* who are interested in those Branches of foreign Trade.

Upon the happy Settlement of this Company, Sir, there will be no Comparison in Point of Profit to the *British* Nation, between the *Spanish West India* or *Brazil Trades*, and that to *Africa*. The former undergo the weighty Incumbrance of *Indultoos*, both on the *Outset* and *Returns*, and are liable to such Interruptions from the Crowns of *Spain* and *Portugal*, as have rendered this Nation too much dependent on the Friendship of those Kingdoms ; whereas the *African Settlements*, being duly supported at the Publick Expence, and the Company enabled to extend the *Inland Trade*, will be liable to no Manner of Incumbrance, Insecurity, or Stagnation whatsoever. The *Spanish West-India* and the *Brazil Trades*, are not only liable to great Hazards, but are so tedious in their *Returns*, that Traders of moderate Capitals cannot, with Prudence, engage in them ; nor those of considerable Ones, with any *Security*, like what our *Plantation* and *African Trades* will afford them, if duely cherished, to the Extent they appear capable of being carried. But the *African Trade* alone, when established upon a desirable Foundation, can be liable to no Hazard any way comparable to the others ; every Trader in the Kingdom will have it in his Power to engage in it, such Part of his Fortune as he shall chuse to employ therein, either as a *Member* of the *African Corporation*, or as a *Separate Trader* : And this without the Precariousness of such *long Voyages* and *tedious Returns* as have ruined many in the *Spanish West-India* and *Brazil Trades*.

Though *all other Branches* of our foreign Trade should *fail* us, or the *Ballance* go against us, and thereby impoverish instead of enriching us ; yet while we shall encourage and extend our *Plantation* and *African Trades*, to the Pitch they

they are manifestly capable of being carried, we shall not, perhaps, experience any great Diminution in NAVAL POWER. However, as other Branches of foreign Commerce depend upon the Humour and Caprice of other Nations, and therefore liable to such sudden Changes and Alterations, as have proved not only ruinous to private Adventurers, but diminutive of the *National Revenue*, it is certainly the best Policy to cherish and support, to the utmost of our Power, the *African* and *Plantation Trades*, which may be properly called *Our Own Foreign Trades*, as being absolutely under our own Steerage and Controul; as much under the Government and Direction of *Great Britain*, as the Trades of *Ireland* and *Scotland* are; and consequently their Prosperity depends upon OURSELVES.

And of what Advantage our *American Colonies* may be rendered to these Kingdoms, by the Labour of *Negroes*, has been set in a clear Light, by the *Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations**; and it is not to be doubted, but as they have had *all necessary Information* in Relation to the Nature and Importance of the *African Trade*, their *Report*, which is expected to be laid before the *House of Commons*, will *most fully and particularly* set forth the indispensable Necessity of effectually enabling the Company to support the Trade, which they have themselves, heretofore, represented to be the great Support of our Plantation Trade in general.

But, if this Company are, any longer, to labour under the unparallel'd Hardships and Difficulties they at present do, and no effectual Relief be given them, their Forts and Settlements must be abandoned to the Mercy of our Rivals and

* *Vide* the Representation, of the Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations to the Right Honourable the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, in Parliament assembled *January* 14th, 1734-5.

Enemies: The *French* will engross our Share in the Trade to *Africa*, and more vigorously pursue the Prosperity of their *American Colonies*, while ours will become wretched and contemptible.—They will hereby encrease in *Seamen* and *Naval Power*, while we shall be daily declining in both.—They will obtain another *Affiento* with *Spain*, and introduce their Manufactures all over the *Spanish West-Indies*, while *British Subjects* will be *for ever excluded* from that Branch of our foreign Trade. The *African* and *Plantation Trades* will prove an inexhaustible Source of Treasure to *France*, to carry on their destructive Schemes of *universal Empire in Trade*, and thereby *in Power*. And what will then avail drawing the Sword against a Nation, who will have the Riches of *Africa* and *America*, to support their *mighty ARMIES* and their *NAVAL POWER*?

To conclude, Sir, I think it is not in my Power to propose any Thing more likely to conduce to Your true Honour and Glory, than to become the Patron and Promoter of such Measures as may secure and preserve the *African Trade* from being swallowed up by the *French* and other Nations. So that the *Company*, the *Plantations*, *Your Country*, may have Reason ever to celebrate Your Care, Vigilance, Honour and Justice in procuring such farther effectual Provision for the Support and Preservation of this most essential Branch of our Trade, as the Nature and Importance thereof manifestly requires.

I am,

With the most profound Veneration,

S I R,

Your most Humble,

And most Obedient Servant,

LONDON,
Decemb. 11, 1744.

A BRITISH MERCHANT.

Malachy Postlethwayt, *The National and Private
Advantages of the African Trade Considered*
(London, P. Knapton, 1746)

This treatise begins with a statement of the importance of the slave trade to Britain. This is seen as residing in the provision of enslaved labourers to maintain the plantation system in Britain's New World colonies, thereby providing 'an inexhaustible Fund of Wealth and Naval Power to this Nation' (p. 202). The acquisition of slaves was paid for by the export of British manufactures to Africa; there was no drain of specie or bullion in the trade. Moreover, the dependency of British plantations on enslaved African labour meant that Britain would never be depopulated by supplying labourers to cultivate tropical produce. The discussion emphasises the riches of Africa, not merely the human resources but the gold mines and extraction of saltpetre. For these reasons, the slave trade is of considerable national advantage to Britain. Postlethwayt adds that slaves in the colonies are better looked after than they would be if left to remain in Africa, where they might be captured in war by African princes and tortured.

In common with other writers, Postlethwayt underscores the importance of the African trade to Britain's prosperity by emphasising the need to maintain the forts, factories and castles belonging to the Royal African Company. Not only were these establishments important in showing the company's willingness to defend parts of west Africa against rival encroachers; they also assisted private traders in acquiring slaves. Other European trading powers, notably France, continued to support their forts in Africa and Britain should do likewise. A detailed summary of individual forts and establishments is presented to make a case for a parliamentary allowance to support the Royal African Company in Africa. The subsidies, bounties and exemptions from duties that the French and Dutch have in place to support their trade with Africa are estimated in order to buttress the case for financial assistance for the company.

The fact that this treatise was published during the conflict with France as part of the War of the Austrian Succession suggests that support for the Royal African Company's forts was important when her rivals were encroaching on her trade. 'If it is in the Interest and Desire of the British

Nation so to reduce the Power of France', Postlethwayt argues, 'as to disable them from supplanting us in the Trade of America, or encreasing their Naval Power upon the Ruin of ours, Now is the Time, or, perhaps, Never' (p. 281). Some of the material presented in the middle of the treatise summarises passages already published by Charles Hayes in *The Importance of Effectually Supporting the Royal African Company of England impartially consider'd* (London, 1744). It is argued that the £10,000 that the Royal African Company has received annually since 1730 was 'a temporary Reprieve' (p. 296) for its financial problems. The expence of maintaining forts and factories has led the company to spend £100,000 more than it has received from public money in the period between 1729 and 1743. The view is put forward that the company should be better supported, and that this would benefit the private traders, British planters, and the nation. Postlethwayt argues that parliamentary support for the Royal African Company should be not less than £30,000 per annum. Without this support, the forts would fall into greater states of disrepair; Britain would be out-competed by the French in the slave and West India trades; and the interlocking network of British transatlantic trade and slavery would be badly dented.

T H E
National and Private
ADVANTAGES
OF THE
AFRICAN TRADE
CONSIDERED :
BEING AN
E N Q U I R Y,
How far it concerns the
TRADING INTEREST of *Great Britain*,
Effectually to Support and Maintain
The FORTS and SETTLEMENTS
in *AFRICA* ;
BELONGING TO THE
ROYAL *AFRICAN* COMPANY
of *ENGLAND* :

Shewing also

*What Support and Encouragement the Dutch and the French give to their respective African Companies ; and that nothing less than 30,000*l.* per Annum, granted by Parliament to the present Company, for a Term of Years certain can enable them to support d Competition with our Rivals in that Trade: with a Proposition so render the Interest of private Traders, and that of the Company mutually beneficial to each other.*

With a new and correct MAP of the Coast of *AFRICA*, and all the *European* Settlements.

Humbly inscribed to the R^t. Hon^{ble}. HENRY PELHAM, Esq;
First Lord Commissioner of his Majesty's Treasury, and
Chancellor of the Exchequer.

L O N D O N :

Printed for JOHN and PAUL KNAPTON, at the *Crown*
in *Ludgate-Street*. MDCCXLVI, (Price 2*s.*)

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T H E

E R R A T A.

Page 23, line 10. for *Ports*, read *Fort*s. p. 72. l. 4. for *Three per Cent.* read *Two*. p. 82. l. 12. for *what Treatment*, read *what future Treatment*.

T H E
A D V A N T A G E S
O F T H E
A F R I C A N T R A D E.

C H A P. I.

Of the National and private Advantages of the Trade to *Africa*.

THE most approved Judges of the commerical Interests of these Kingdoms have ever been of Opinion, that our *West-India* and *African Trades* are the most nationally beneficial of any we carry on. It is also allowed on all Hands, that the Trade to *Africa* is the Branch which renders our *American Colonies* and *Plantations* so advantageous to *Great-Britain*; that Traffic only affording our *Planters* a constant Supply of *Negro-Servants*

B for

*African
Trade alone
supplies our
Colonies
with Ne-
groes for
Sugar,
Tobacco,
Rice, Cot-
ton, &c.
&c.*

for the Culture of their Lands in the Pro-
duce of *Sugars, Tobacco, Rice, Rum, Con-
ton, Fustick, Pimento*, and all other our
Plantation-Produced: So that the extensive
Employment of our Shipping in, to, and
from *America*, the great Brood of Seamen
consequent thereupon, and the daily Bread
of the most considerable Part of our *Bri-
tish Manufacturers*, are owing primarily to
the Labour of *Negroes*; who, as they
were the first happy Instruments of rais-
ing our Plantations; so their Labour only
can support and preserve them, and render
them still more and more profitable to their
Mother-Kingdom.

*Africa
supplies
Spanish-
West-Ind-
ies with
Negroes.*

The *Negro-Trade* therefore, and the
natural Consequences resulting from it,
may be justly esteemed an inexhaustible
Fund of Wealth and Naval Power to this
Nation. And by the Overplus of *Negroes*
above what have served our own Planta-
tions, we have drawn likewise no incon-
siderable Quantities of Treasure from the
Spaniards, who are settled on the Conti-
nent of *America*; not only for *Negroes*
furnished them from *Jamaica*, but by the
late *Asiento Contract* with the Crown of
Spain; which may probably again be re-
vived, upon a Peace being concluded with
that Kingdom,

What

What renders the *Negroe-Trade* still more estimable and important, is, that near Nine-tenths of those *Negroes* are paid for in *Africa* with *British Produce* and *Manufactures* only ; and the Remainder with *East-India* Commodities. We send no Specie or Bullion to pay for the Products of *Africa*, but, 'tis certain, we bring from thence very large Quantities of *Gold* ; and not only that but *Wax* and *Ivory* ; the one serves for a foreign Export without the least Detriment to our own Product ; the other is manufactured at Home, and afterwards carried to foreign Markets, to no little Advantage both to the Nation and the Traders. From which *Facts*, the Trade to *Africa* may very truly be said to be, as it were, all Profit to the Nation ; the *direct* Trade thither affords a considerable national Ballance in our Favour, and is apparently attended with such a Series of advantageous Consequences, that no other Branch whatever of our foreign Traffic admits of.

And it may be worth Consideration, that while our Plantations depend only on Planting by *Negroe-Servants*, they will neither depopulate our own Country, become independent of her Dominion, or any way interfere with the Interests of the

Negroes will preserve the Dependency of our Colonies in Great-Britain. *British Manufacturer, Merchant, or Landed Gentleman*: Whereas were we under the Necessity of supplying our Colonies with *White-Men* instead of *Blacks*, they could not fail being in a Capacity to interfere with the Manufactures of this Nation, in Time to shake off their Dependency thereon, and prove as injurious to the *Landed, and Trading-Interests* as ever they have hitherto been beneficial.

Many are prepossessed against this Trade, thinking it *a barbarous, inhuman, and unlawful Traffic for a Christian Country to Trade in Blacks*; to which I would beg leave to observe; that though the odious Appellation of *Slaves* is annexed to this Trade, it being called by some the *Slave-Trade*, yet it does not appear from the best Enquiry I have been able to make, that the State of those People is changed for the worse, by being Servants to our *British Planters* in *America*; they are certainly treated with great Lenity and Humanity: And as the Improvement of the Planter's Estates depends upon due Care being taken of their Healths and Lives, I cannot but think their Condition is much bettered to what it was in their own Country.

Negroes Trade justifiable. Besides, the *Negro-Princes* in *Africa*, 'tis well known, are in perpetual War with

with each other; and since before they had this Method of disposing of their Prisoners of War to Christian Merchants, they were wont not only to be applied to inhuman Sacrifices, but to extream Torture and Barbarity, their Transplantation must certainly be a Melioration of their Condition; provided living in a civilized Christian Country, is better than living among Savages: Nay, if Life be preferable to Torment and cruel Death, their State cannot, with any Colour of Reason, be presumed to be worsted.

But I never heard it said that the Lives of *Negroes* in the Servitude of our Planters were less tolerable than those of *Colliers* and *Miners* in all *Christian* Countries. However, while our Rivals in Trade receive great national Emolument by the Labour of these People, this Objection will be of little Weight with those who have the Interest of their Country at Heart; or indeed the Welfare of the *Negroes*.

But to resume the Subject. As the present Prosperity and Splendor of the *British Colonies* have been owing to *Negro-Labour*; so not only their future Advancement, but even their very Being depends upon our pursuing the same Measures in this Respect as our Competitors do.

That

That our Colonies are capable of very great Improvements, by the proper Application of the Labour of Blacks, has been urged by the most experienced Judges of Commerce. And if it be good Policy to purchase as little from, and sell as much to foreign Nations of our own Produce and Manufactures, 'tis certainly very unwise and impolitic in us not to encourage our Plantations to the extent they are capable of; in order to supply ourselves at least from thence with what we can't do without; and take from other Nations such Essentials only, as neither our own Country, or our Plantations will afford us.

Negroes
only can
improve as
well as
preserve
British
Planta-
tions.

From these Considerations it has been wisely proposed to extend the Planting of *Coffee, Cocoa, Indigo, Cochneal, Logwood, Hemp, Flax, Naval Stores*, and making of *Potash*, and variety of other Products, which those Lands admit of. Whereby, instead of being under the disadvantageous Necessity of purchasing such valuable and useful Merchandize of other Nations, we might easily become capable, not only of supplying ourselves, but exporting to others considerable Quantities of our Plantation-
Produce. This would turn the ballance of Trade in our Favour, with Countries where 'tis now against us; and enable our Colonies to encrease their demand for *British*
Manu-

Effects of
improving
our Colo-
nies.

Manufactures, in Proportion to our Demand for their Produce.

But all Improvements proposed to be made in our Plantations, have always presupposed the Well-Being and Prosperity of our *African-Trade*; to the End that they might not be destitute of a constant Supply of *Negroes* for those Purposes: Without which, instead of Improvement, nothing but Distress and Poverty could ensue in all the *British Colonies*, while *France*, by wiser Measures, would render their Colonies still more opulent, and consequently a more formidable Nursery of Naval Power.

And however mean an Idea some may entertain of the Advantages arising from the *direct Trade* to *Africa*, it can proceed from nothing but want of being duly acquainted therewith. Was all the *Gold* that has, or easily might have been brought from thence, coined at the *Tower*, with some Impression to distinguish it from all other *Gold*, as was formerly done, we should soon be sensible, that we need be little beholding to any other Nation for that valuable Metal; for were we to extend our Commerce into *Africa*, to the Pitch it will admit of, we must certainly export thither, of the *British* Produce and Manufacture,

nufacture, considerably more than we do to any one Country in the whole World.

Returns
from *Af-*
rica not
interfere
with *Bri-*
tish or
Plantation
Produce.

The Continent of *Africa* is of great Magnitude, the Country extremely populous, and the Trade and Navigation now well known, easy, and not hazardous. As the Natives in general stand in great Need of *European* Commodities, so they have valuable Returns to make us; and such too, that do in no respect interfere either with the Produce and Manufactures of these Kingdoms, or her *American* Plantations; which ought never to be forgot, it being the State of no other Branch of Trade carried on by the whole *British* Empire.

The
Riches of
Africa.

To what a Degree this Country abounds in *Gold*, we have not only the Testimony of the *Portuguese*, the *Dutch*, and the *French*, who have Settlements on the Continent of *Africa* as well as we, but we have numberless living Witnesses now among our own Nation, and the Vouchers of the most authentic Historians; whose Accounts, one would imagine, should rouse and animate us to push this Traffic to the utmost Degree and Profit we are capable: For at present it is but in its Infancy, which is no less true than extraordinary, notwithstanding we have been in Possession of this Trade ever since the Reign of *Queen Elizabeth*,

zabeth. But the Reason hereof will appear through the Course of these Papers.

There are no Countries in the World, says the celebrated Historian, *Leo Africanus*, richer in *Gold and Silver*, than the Kingdoms in *Africa*; as those of *Mandingo*, *Ethiopia*, *Congo*, *Angola*, *Butua*, *Quiticui*, *Monomotapa*, *Casati*, and *Mebe-nemugi*. By the means of *Settlements* of strength, adds he, upon the Continent of *Africa*; *Europeans* may traffic with the bordering People of *Guinea*, and *Libia*; and get into their Hands the *Gold* of *Mandingo*, and its adjacent Territories; among which are those of the King of *Congo*, whose Kingdom is one of the most flourishing and plentiful Countries in *Ethiopia*.

From this Country we might also easily have Communication with that of *Prete-Janny*, which abounds with *Elephants*, and such Provisions and Necessaries as would give singular Ease and Conveniency to facilitate such Intercourses of Commerce. Upon the Confines of the Kingdom of *Congo* lies *Angola*, with the King of which *Paulo Dias*, a *Portuguese Captain* waged War; the principal Reason whereof, was, certain *Silver Mines* that the *Captain* discovered in the Mountains of *Cambabe*, no way inferior to those of *Potexi*, in the *Spanish West-Indies*.

C

The

The same Historian, speaking of the River *Gambia* *, observes, that by the Exchange of *European* Merchandize with the Natives, we may easily draw to us the Gold of all those Countries : And about ninety Leagues up this River, there is a Place called the *Island of Elephants*, in Regard to the prodigious Number of those Creatures ; which also affords a very advantageous Branch of Traffic.

But it would be endless to transcribe all the Passages in this Historian, relating to the rich *Mines* both of *Gold* and *Silver*, wherewith the *Africans* abound ; and how easy a Matter it is for *Europeans* to carry on a very extensive and very beneficial Commerce with those People.

Ghana, or *Guinea*, says another eminent Historian †, is the greatest City in all the Countries of *Negroland*, the most populous and the most abounding with Merchandize : And not only very wealthy Merchants travel thither from all the neighbouring Parts,

* *The Royal African Company of England* have JAMES FORT and ISLAND, in the River *Gambia*, on the North Coast ; with various Factories, many Leagues up the River, formerly mounted 90, now 31 *Great Guns*, contains also *Small Arms* and *Stores*, several *Warehouses* for Merchandize, and a *Negroe-house* for 200 *Negres*, and Apartments for the Governor, Factors, Writers, Officers, Artificers, Soldiers, and *Casile-Slaves*.

† Vide *Geographia Nubienses &c a Gabrielo Stonita Syriacorum & Arabicarum Literarum Professore*, 1619. p. 10.

but

but also from the most remote Corners of the West. This Country borders upon the Land of *Vancara*, very famous for the Plenty and Excellency of its *Gold-Mines*, Gold The *King* hath a grand Palace near the ^{Mines of} Banks of the *Niger*; and a Mass of *Gold* ^{Africa.} therein of Thirty Pounds Weight, as it was naturally produced in the Mines; but what is extraordinary, is, that this Mass of Gold is completely pure and malleable, without being at all Smelted by the ordinary Arts of Refining and Separation: It is also so extremely fine and soft, as naturally produced, to admit of being hammered out as a spacious Canopy for the Prince's Royal Throne: To so great Perfection hath Nature brought Gold Ore in many Parts of *Africa*.

A modern Historian *, whose Credit I never heard impeached, hath also confirmed the great Treasures in this Part of the World, and hath descended to a very minute Specification of great Variety of their rich *Mines*.

The greatest Part of the Lands, says our Author, where the *Mines* are, produces *Gold* in such Plenty, that it is quite unnecessary to dig for it; 'tis needful only to

* *Nouvelle Relation de L'Afrique occidentale, par le Pere Jean Baptiste Labat.*

take the Superficies of the Earth, and wash it in a Bowl, to come at the *Gold-Dust*, and very often Pieces of Gold of pretty good Weight *, &c. ——— The Earth, says he again, which produces it is not very hard, or difficult to dig ; it is generally of the clayey Kind, of various Colours, and mixed with some sandy Kind of Ore ; so that Ten Men in *Africa* may do more Work generally than Two Hundred can in the richest Mines of *Peru*.

The *Negroes*, proceeds he, are totally ignorant of the peculiar Nature of Lands that yield *Gold* ; they have no Art or Methods of judging which do, or do not afford that Metal : They have a general Idea, that there is Plenty of *Gold-Mines* almost every where, and the dryer the Earth is, and more unkindly in the Production of Vegetables, the more Reason they imagine there is to believe such Places yield *Gold* : Wherefore They scratch and dig almost every where indiscriminately ; and when by their rambling Searches they happen to discover Plenty in one Place, they continue to work there so long only as a Diminution of the first Plenty does not discontinue, and this without any Workman-like Skill in sinking any Depth, or discovering

Method of
Negroes
working
the Gold-
Mines.

* *Nouvelle Relation de L'Afrique occidentale, par le Pere Jean Baptiste Labat, Vol. IV. p. 39.*

the Course of the Vein : And so soon as the *Mine* remarkably diminishes from its first Plenty, they immediately forsake that Place, and go in Quest of a fresh one, without searching there any further*.

When they find the *Mine* rich, and that they can, without much Trouble, obtain a considerable Quantity of *Gold*; they sometimes vouchsafe to remain digging at the same Place, even six, or perhaps seven Feet deep ; but that Extent generally determines their Search ; not because the *Mine* ceases to be less plentiful (for they confess the deeper they sink, the greater Quantity of *Gold* they find) but because they have no Invention of Shafts, nor any other Knowledge in the Nature and Methods of Mineing, to prevent the Earth from falling in upon them †.

Ignorance
of Negroes
in Mine-
ing.

After this general Account of the Riches of *Africa*, our Author gives us a Detail of Variety of rich *Mines* ; the Truth of which appears, by his Representation, to be well attested. As 1. A *Gold* and *Silver Mine* at *Fourquarenne*. 2. Another at *Sambanoura*, where, he says, the *Negroes* find *Gold* only by meer washing of the Earth, without digging at all ; they only

* *Nouvelle Relation de L'Afrique occidentale, par le Pere Jean Baptiste Labat, Vol. IV. p. 40, 41.*

† *Labat, Vol IV. p 46, 47.*

Gold
Mines.

rake it together with their Hands from the Surface of the Earth. 3. A Mine at *Sagolla*, where also they find Gold upon the Surface of the Earth, by simple washing of it, without sinking at all. This Gold is extremely pure, and very easy of Fusibility. It may be presumed, he says, that those *metallic Earths* would afford considerably more Gold than what is found upon the bare Superficies. 4. *Guinguia-Faranna* is a Place, quite sowed, as it were, with *Gold-Mines*; where, take the Earth almost indifferently, and wash it, you will find pure Gold, which melts with great Ease*.

Of Rivu-
lets from
the Mines.

What indicates the Riches of the Land here still more, is, that the very Rivulets of Water that arise from it, and run into the River *Falleme*, carry with them so much Gold, that the neighbouring *Negroes*, when the *Mines* are not washed by the Permission of their Prince, come to these Rivulets, and employ themselves with washing the Sand, and find there considerable Quantities of *Gold*. Nor is this Practice forbid them: And if the *Negroes* were not so indolent, they might greatly enrich themselves, even by this peddling Work†. 5. The Mountains about *Guinguia-Faranna* are of a soft Earth, strewed

* *Labet*, p 47.

† *Ditto*, p. 47, 48.

with

with Gold Sand, which yields well in fine Gold ; as also there are *golden Marchasites*, which have proved of considerable Value *.

The *Mines* also at *Niasanbona* are very rich, and easy to be work'd ; but this *Ore* should be pounded, and smelted. This requiring more Art in Refining than the *Negrões* are Masters of, it would be easy to get Possession thereof †. 6. The most considerable Mine that is at present open, and which the *Negroes* work with more Care, is that between the Village of *Tambaoura* and *Nettico* about thirty Leagues East of the River *Faleme*, in the Center of the Country of *Bambouco*. This is surprisingly rich, and produces a very fine Gold : and for fifteen or twenty Leagues round about here is so great Plenty of *Mines*, that they cannot be well represented on the Map, by Reason that so great a Quantity would create Confusion ; it may be said, with great Truth, that the Mines in this Place are superior to all others in those Parts of *Africa* ‡.

The Want of almost all the Conveniencies of Life here, have put the *Negroes* under the Necessity of working their *Mines*

* *Labat*, Vol. IV. p. 47.

† *Ditto*, p. 50.

‡ *Ditto*, p. 51.

Negroes stand in need of *European* Necessaries of Life. with something of more Industry than is usual amongst them. They have sunk here even Ten Feet deep, which is very extraordinary with Them, and a Matter of great Difficulty to accomplish ; they wanting both Materials and Experience for Matters of this Nature.

They find however at this Depth *Gold* in much greater Abundance than by merely searching the Superficies of the Earth, or by a little shallow digging, as they do in all other Places. It happens sometimes that the Veins they meet with are mix'd with a Kind of Sand, or some more congealed Earth ; and long Experience hath taught them to pound and wash this *Ore* to separate the *Gold* from it ; which then they find very plentiful, and very pure. But if they were well acquainted with the Arts of Smelting and Refining of *Ore's*, they would produce considerably more ; but they have no Knowledge thereof ; *nor have they ever yet come to the main Vein of any of their Mines* *.

8. There are two *Gold-Mines* at *Naye*. That which is on the Brink of the River has been a long Time left off working, only because it is subject to be overflowed. But they have opened another a little Di-

* *Lobat*, Vol. IV. p 52.

stance from this, upon the Right of the River, which is not liable to be overflowed; and therefore may be work'd at all Times *.

9. About twenty Leagues above *Cainoura*, to the left of the River, there is a *Gold-Mine* in the Land of *Tomane Niaca-len*, which is very rich, and of a very pure Metal. 'Tis very easy to work, and yet the *Negroes* have left it upon an idle Superstition that prevails among them †.

10. There are an infinite Number of other Places with evident Signatures of *Mines of Gold*. Among others, there are many about seventeen Leagues from the Mouth of the River *Faleme* in the *Niger*, which are no way inferior in Value to those before-mentioned in the Mountains of *Nettico* and *Tamba-oura* ‡.

There are also as large Quantities of ^{Salt Petre} *Salt-Petre* as can be desired; a valuable in *Africa*. Commodity at all Times. And there will be a wide difference in Point of Expence in bringing it from *Africa* rather than the *East-Indies* §.

It would be endless to produce Authorities of the immense Treasures wherewith *Africa* abounds. I cannot but think we

* *Labat*, Vol. IV. p. 54.

† *Ditto*, p. 55.

‡ *Ditto*, p. 54, 55.

§ *Ditto*, p. 58.

have a standing Testimony thereof in this Nation, without Need of having our Memories refresh'd at this Time of Day, upon the Occasion: I mean that of a certain Piece of *Gold Coin*, that has been long current in this Kingdom, called a *Guinea*; a Denomination derived from the *Gold* brought from that Coast. That Traffic which once supply'd us with the Bulk of our *Gold* before the *Brazil Mines* were discover'd, would amply supply us at present; and that to a far greater Profit, both to the Nation and Adventurers, than either the *Spanish West-India*, or the *Brazil-Trades* do in Times of Peace.

Origin of
a Guinea
from Af-
rican
Trade.

Besides; these latter Branches of Trade are loaded with the heavy Imposition and Incumbrance of *Indultoes* in *Spain* and *Portugal*, both on the *Outset*, and on the *Returns*; whereas the Trade to *Africa* is exempt from all such Kind of Clogs, and is free and open to every Subject of *Great Britain*: Nor is this Trade liable to those Hazards and Interruptions the other Branches are from the Crowns of *Spain* and *Portugal*, upon any Rupture or Misunderstanding with those Potentates; and which too many of our Merchants have not long since fatally experienced.

African
Trade
preferable
to the
Spanish or
Portugal.

As the Trading World is at present circumstanced, and Commerce liable to incessant

cessant Fluctuation and Interruption, to the great Injury of our *Merchants* and *Manufacturers*, as well as a Detriment to the *Public Revenue* ; and as we, at this Crisis, remarkably experience, that our Dependence must be upon our own naval and military Power, however readily and chearfully we have interested our selves in the Safety of other Nations, does it not behove this Kingdom vigorously to apply herself to become as independent, as it were, in Traffic, as She is by Nature in Situation ? Our *African* and *Plantation-Trades* may not improperly be called our own *Foreign-Trades* ; and no Measures, perhaps, that this Kingdom can pursue, will render us less dependent in extending Trade upon other Nations, both in Times of Peace and War, than extending to the utmost those our own most valuable and important Branches of Traffic.

C H A P. II.

A Short View of the *African* Trade;
Shewing, That its future Security and Preservation, as well as its first Establishment, must depend upon the Forts, Castles, and Factories belonging to the *Royal African Company*.

THE *Portuguese* being once the most considerable Navigators in *Europe*, were the first Discoverers of the Coast of *Africa*; soon experiencing that no Commerce could be securely carry'd on with the Natives, but by the Means of Settlements of Strength being erected upon the Continent, to awe the Natives to Fidelity in their Traffic and Alliances with them, they accordingly built one *Fort* on the Island of *Zigbee* on the North Coast; another call'd *St. George Del Mina* on the *Gold Coast*, as also a Third at *Luango St. Paul's*, on the Coast of *Angola*, to the Southward of the Equinoctial.

Portuguese
first discover'd
the Coast
of *Africa*.

By the Strength and Authority of these Settlements they establish'd and claim'd not only

only a Right to all the Lands and Countries within the Limits of the before-mentioned Places, but seized and confiscated all Ships of other Nations, when they met with them trading on any Part of those Coasts.

Seized and
confiscated
Ships of
all other
Nations.

These *Settlements* of the *Portuguese* animated some Merchants of the City of *London* to attempt this Commerce; but the *English*, as yet, having no *Forts* there, such Voyages were undertaken at the Hazard of the Loss of Ships and Cargo by the *Portuguese*, without Hope of Redress.

First At-
tempts of
London
Merchants
to trade to
Africa.

But *England* engaging in a War with *Spain* and *Portugal*, and our Merchants envying the *Portuguese* the sole Enjoyment of the Trade to *Africa*, created a Company for the better discovering, and carrying on a Trade from the most northern Part of the River *Senegal*, to the most southward Part of the River *Gambia*; and for their Encouragement to bear them through in so hazardous and expensive an Enterprize, they were granted by Authority for a Term of Years the *sole Trade* in, to, and from those Countries and Rivers; with Prohibition to all other the Subjects of *England* from trafficking to any of the same Places, on Forfeiture of Ship and Cargo.

First In-
corporation
of
English
Merchants
to trade
to *Africa*.

In

In the Reigns of *James* and *Charles the First*, and during the Usurpation, a few Persons were encouraged by Authority likewise to trade to other Parts of *Africa*. But from the Experience of what their Predecessors had suffered, they judg'd it too hazardous to engage without *Forts* and *Settlements* of Strength being erected in *Africa*, to protect them as well from the Insults of the Natives as their Competitors.

Of the
first Forts
of the
English in
Africa.

Whereupon they wisely erected one Fort at a Place called *Cormantine*, on the *Gold-Coast*, another on the River *Gambia*, on the North Coast. These were the only Places of Strength the *English* possess'd at the Restoration.

Dutch
establish
the Trade
to *Africa*
by an ex-
clusive
Company.

The *States-General* of the *United Provinces* observing the Efforts made by the *English* to obtain a Share in the Trade to *Africa* with the *Portuguese*, made the like Attempt; and in 1621, establish'd a Company for that Purpose, called the *West-India Company*: And to the End that They might be upon a Footing with the other Powers, granted them all the Lands and Countries which they could possess themselves of in *Africa*, from the Tropick of *Cancer* to the *Cape of Good-Hope*; as also in *America*, from the most southern Part of *Newfoundland* to the *Streights of Magellan* and *La Maire* on the East Side; and likewise from those

those Streights to those of *Annian* on the West, together with the *sole Right* of Trading to all those Countries; with absolute Prohibition to all other their Subjects from trading thither, under the severest Penalties.

So successful were the *Dutch* in this Commerce, that in 1637, they possess'd themselves of the strong Fortrefs of *St. George del Mina* on the *Gold-Coast*; and soon after of all the other *Portuguese Ports* ^{Progress of the} *and Settlements* on that Coast; which Places ^{Dutch in} were afterwards added to them by the *Treaty* ^{Africa.} of 1641, between the *States-General* and the Crown of *Portugal*.

By Virtue of this Treaty the *Dutch West-India Company* claim'd the *sole Right* to all the Lands and Countries in *Africa*, from *Cape Palmas* to *Cape Lopez*, comprehending the *Gold Coast* and *Whydah*.

And although the *English* had erected a *Fort* at *Cormantine*, and settled *Factories* at various other Places on the *Gold-Coast* before the *Dutch* had made those Conquests, and had a prior Right to a free ^{Insults of} Trade, at all Places on the same Coast, not ^{the Dutch} in their Possession; notwithstanding this, ^{on our} the *Dutch West-India Company* always kept ^{African} Cruizers on the Coast to interrupt the Trade ^{Company.} of the *English* with the Natives, and to seize their Ships and Cargoes, and carry them to *St. George Del Mina*; and this not only

only near the *Dutch Company's Forts and Settlements*, but at all other Places several hundred Leagues distant from them.

To what a Degree the *Dutch* carry'd their Insults and Depredations at this Time upon our Merchants trading to *Africa*, it will be necessary to state the *Facts* as irresistible Evidence; for the Experience of past Times best shew what kind of Treatment our Merchants must expect in future, provided our *Forts and Settlements* at present in *Africa*, should, by Neglect, fall into the Hands of any other Potentate.

The Account I shall give, is an Extract from a Discourse published by Sir George Downing, who was *Envoy Extraordinary* to the *States-General* upon this very Occasion: The List of Ships taken, Sir George says, underwent the strictest Examination of *Parliament*, and was made out upon so clear and undeniable Proofs, that it was impossible to add any thing, either to the Solemnity of the Debate, or to the Weight of Evidence *.

The Ship, *St. John Baptist, Emanuel Hart*, Commander, who had taken on board *Negroes* on the Coast of *Guinea*,

* *Vide* A Reply of Sir George Downing, Bart. Envoy Extraordinary from His Majesty of Great-Britain, to the Remarks of the Deputies of the *States-General*, upon his Memorial of December 20, 1664. O. S. Printed in 1665.
and

and bartered them for Sugars, and other Commodities, at *Bavia* in *Brazil*, was seized in his Return, in *June*, 1661, by a *Zealand Man of War*, called the *Golden Port of Middleburgh*, *Cornelius Trumcap*, Commander, belonging to the *Dutch African Company*.

The *Merchant's Delight*, belonging to *John Young*, and *Company of English Merchants*, *John Bonner*, Commander, having set sail from *Dover*, was seized near *Cape Corso*, in *Guinea*, about *August*, 1661, by a Ship called the *Amsterdam*, belonging to the *Dutch African Company*.

The Depredations of the Dutch on our African Traders.

The *Paragon*, belonging to *Bernard Sparke*, *John Cooke*, and *Company of English Merchants*, *John Bariford*, Commander, laden at *Exeter*, and bound for *Guinea*, was seized, *October* 15, 1661, by two Ships belonging to the *Dutch African Company*; the one called the *Amsterdammer*, of *Amsterdam*, *Aaron Couzens*, Commander, the other called the *Arnis of Amsterdam*, *Nicholas Yole*, Commander.

The *Daniel*, belonging to *John Knight*, *Thomas Knight*, *Henry Oakes*, and *Company of English Merchants*, commanded by the said *Henry Oakes*; set sail from *London* about *May*, 1661, from the Coast of *Guinea*; was seized by the Ship *Amsterdam*,

dam, belonging to the *Dutch African Company*, *Aaron Couzens*, Commander.

The *Brotherhood*, of *London*, belonging to *Peter Caulier*, *Bartholomew Caulier*, *Abraham Caulier*, *John Beverley*, and *Company of English Merchants*; was seized on the Coast of *Guinea* in *February*, 1665, by a Frigate, called, *Gat*, — *Cox*, Commander, and one *Japoone*, Commander of a Ship called the *Kaler*; both commissioned by the *Dutch African Company*.

The *Rappa Hanneck*, belonging to *John Jeffrys*, and *Company of English Merchants*, laden at *London*, bound for the Coast of *Guinea*, was seized near *Cape Lopez*, about the 11th of *September*, 1656, by two *Dutch African Company's Ships*; the one the *Mary*, of *Amsterdam*, the other the *Unicorn*, of *Middleburgh*, *John Serael*, of *Munckedam*, Commander.

The *Sarah*, belonging to *Anne Lewellin*, Administratrix of *Robert Lewellin Merchant*, *Humphry Beane* and *Company of English Merchants*, *Arthur Perkins*, Commander, was seized on the Coast of *Guinea*, *August*, 1656, near *Cape Lopez*, by two *Dutch Ships*, the *Mary* of *Amsterdam*, and the *Unicorn* of *Middleburgh*, commanded by the forementioned *Serael*, of *Munckedam*.

The

The *Fortune*, belonging to *Constane Silvester*, and *Company of English Merchants*, was seized about *August*, 1656, near *Cape Lopez*, on the Coast of *Guinea*, by the said *Mary* of *Amsterdam*, and the *Unicorn* of *Middleburgh*, *John Serael* of *Munekedam*, Commander.

The *Black-Boy* of *Dover*, belonging to *Arnold Breames*, and *Company of English Merchants*, *Ralph Wood*, Commander, was seized *April* 13, 1661, near to *Commenda Fort*, on the Coast of *Guinea*, by a *Dutch Ship*, called the *Grafenna*; which came from the *Dutch Castle* of *Del Mina*, and carry'd the said Ship into that Fort.

The *St. John*, *Cornelius Van Ringen*, Master, belonging to *Vincent de la Barre*, and *Company of English Merchants*, bought by their Order, at *Middleburgh*, *April*, 1658, and there laden to *Callibar* for *Negroes*, was taken near *Port Callibar*, by a Ship belonging to the *Dutch African Company*, and confiscated at *Callibar*, although the *Dutch Company* had granted Permission for the said Ship to go thither.

The *Ethiopian*, belonging to *John Allen* and *Matthew Babb*, *English Merchants*, *Peter Blak*, Commander, consigned to *Bobuee*, on the Coast of *Guinea*, for *Negroes*, was seized in *January*, 1661, by a Ship belonging to the *Dutch African Company*,

Company, called the *Post-Horse*, and carried her to the Castle of *Del Mina*.

The *Lyon Providence*, of *London*, belonging to *Sir William Thompson*, and *Company of English Merchants*, laden at *London*, for *Guinea*, was seized in *August*, 1656, near *Cape Lopez*, in *Guinea*, by two Ships belonging to the *Dutch African Company*; the one called the *Mary*, of *Amsterdam*, the other the *Unicorn*, of *Middleburgh*, *John Serael*, Commander.

The *Bazil Frigate*, of *London*, belonging to *John Buskell*, *Edward Buskell*, and *Company of English Merchants*, was seized between *Angola* and *Fernambuco*, in 1675, by a Ship from *Flushing*, called the *Sluce* — *Quaerts*, Commander.

The *Content*, of *London*, *William Jordan*, Commander, set sail from the *Downs* in *October*, 1661, to trade on the Coast of *Guinea*, was seized there, by a Ship belonging to the *Dutch African Company*, called the *Holy Barbara*, and carried to the Island of *Gene*.

The *Charles*, belonging to *James Barkin*, and *Company of English Merchants*, *John Blackler*, Commander, laden for the Coast of *Guinea*, was seized on the said Coast in *August*, 1661, by a Ship belonging to the *Dutch African Company*, call'd the *Amsterdammer*, of *Amsterdam*, *Aaron Couzens*,
Com-

Commander, and carry'd to their Castle *Del Mina* in *Africa*.

The *Constant Mary*, belonging to *Francis Bellars, Thomas Fowke, Richard Glove*, and *Company of English Merchants*, *Daniel Lester*, Master, laden at *London*, bound for *Guinea*, was seized on the 8th of *May*, 1654, twenty Leagues from *Cape St. Vincent*, by a *Dutch Man of War*, called the *Holy Cicilia*, *Hause Alburge*, Commander, belonging to the *Dutch African Company*.

The *Leopard*, belonging to *Nicholas Bouchart*, of *London*, and *Company of English Merchants*, was seized near *Cape Blanco*, in *October*, 1656, by the *Chaloup*, a *Dutch Man of War*, belonging to the *Dutch African Company*, and carry'd to the Castle of *Arengeny* in *Africa*, at *Cape Blanco*.

King *Charles* the Second, being acquainted, that the Nation rung with the Outcries of our suffering Merchants, against the *Dutch African Company*, judg'd it full Time to think of effectual Measures to protect this Trade for the future, and to obtain Reparation for Depredations committed.

With Regard to Depredations, his Majesty caused an Account of them to be transmitted to *Sir George Downing*, then
his

his *Envoy* at the *Hague*, with Orders to insist upon Satisfaction ; but none could be obtained : Whereupon, *April 1, 1664*, both Houses of Parliament came to a Resolution, *viz. That the Wrongs, Dishonours, and Indignities, done by the Subjects of the United Provinces, by invading his Rights in Africa, &c, and the Damages, Affronts and Injuries done by them to our Merchants, were the greatest Obstructions of our foreign Trade ; and that the same be humbly and speedily presented to his Majesty ; and that he be most humbly moved to take some speedy and effectual Course for Redress thereof, &c.*

Resolu-
tion of
the House
of Com-
mons
about the
Depreda-
tions.

Pacifick
Remon-
strances
ineffectual.

Upon this Resolution of Parliament, his Majesty renewed his Instances with the *States* for Satisfaction to our injured Merchants ; but their Remonstrances were treated with Contempt : The Losses of our Merchants were too considerable to be easily reimbursed ; and the Benefits of the *African Trade*, could they have monopolized the Whole to themselves, as they aimed at, were too important to be willingly parted with. Wherefore, instead of giving us Satisfaction for the Injuries sustained, they renewed their Depredations in *Africa*, with greater Violence than before, under the Conduct of their *Admiral De Ruyter* ; so that the Injuries of our Mer-

chants, upon the whole, amounted to between 6 and 700,000 *l. Sterling*.

The King having tried all other Methods in vain found himself at length under the necessity, upon first notice of *De Ruyter's Hostilities in Africa*, of complying with the Sense of his Parliament, and the general Voice of the People; and accordingly on the 22d of *February*, 1664-5. He declared War in Form against the *States General of the United Provinces*: of such high Estimation and Concern to the Nation was the Trade to *Africa* then adjudged.

Declaration of War against Holland for Depredations committed on the African Trade.

Nothing is more evident than that the chief View of the *Dutch*, at this time, and for some years before, had been totally to exclude the *English* from the Trade to *Africa*, and to engross the same wholly into their own Hands. Rather than suffer this Nation to enjoy a Share of it peaceably with them, though they were their Predecessors therein, and had a prior Right thereto, they chose to bear all the Hazards and Inconveniencies of a War with *England*.

Dutch aimed at engrossing the Trade to *Africa*.

However, they were happily disappointed; Our *African* Company maintained their Footing in *Africa*, by the Treaty of Peace concluded at *Breda*, 1667.

But

But the Stipulations in Favour of the *English Company*, were very insufficient to enable them to bear up against the long Series of Difficulties they had struggled with. They had been at an immense Expence in *Africa*, in supporting the *British Interest*; and during the War, as well as before, we have seen, they met with very heavy Losses by Captures.

The
Struggles
of the *African*
Company
to support
this Trade.

To extricate themselves out of these Difficulties, they agreed, in consideration of a certain Sum of Money to be paid them by another *New Company*, then intended to be established, to surrender their *Charter* to the Crown, and transfer all their *Estate, Property, Interest, and Effects* in *Africa*, and elsewhere, to the *New Company*.

His Majesty approved hereof, judging it the best Expedient, as well for doing Justice to the old Company of *Royal Adventurers*, as for the better preserving and enlarging this Trade in general; and was pleased to accept the same, and by *Letters Patents* under the *Great Seal* of *England*, bearing Date, *September 1672*, to establish and incorporate the present *Royal African Company of England*; and grant them all and singular the *Lands, Countries, Havens, Roads, Rivers, and other Places* in *Africa*, from the Port of *Sally*,

Of the In-
corporati-
on of the
present
Royal
African
Company.

Sally, in South-Barbary, to the Cape of Good-Hope; for and during the Term of ONE THOUSAND YEARS, &c.

At this Time the *Dutch African Company* were possessed of the strong Forts of *St. George del Mina*; and of the *English Fort* at *Cormantine*, called *Fort Amsterdam*: They had also another, called *Fort St. Anthony*, at *Axim*, another called *Fort St. Sebastian*, on the River *Chamab*, a 5th called *Fort Nassau*, at *Mourec*, about two Leagues to Leeward of *Cape Coast Castle*, a 6th called *Grèveceur*, at *Acra*, and a 7th called *Fort Conraads-* ^{Of the} *burg*; at *St. Jago*, within Cannon Shot ^{Dutch} ^{of the} *St. George del Mina*; all on the *Gold Coast*, and lying very commodious to suc- ^{Castles at} ^{this Time,} cour each other in Case of Need.

The *Danes* also at this Time were in Possession of one small but impregnable ^{The Danes} *Fort*, (since called *Fert Royal*) on the Top of a Hill, within Gunshot of *Cape Coast*; and of another at *Acra*, to the Eastward of the *Dutch Fort* at the same Place.

The Elector of *Brandenburgh*, late King of *Prussia*, had one good Fort at ^{Elector of} *Cape-Three-Points*, and two smaller ones ^{Branden-} ^{burgh.} at some little distance to the Eastward of the same. And the *New English Company* possessed one small Fort at *Cabo Cor-*

so, the only Fort on all this Coast, which the *Dutch* had not dispossessed the former Company of, during the late War.

Our *Royal African Company*, at this Time, apply'd themselves with all possible Vigour to increase the *British Interest* in *Africa*, and establish the same on a footing superior to that of any other Nation. Accordingly they enlarged CAPE COAST CASTLE, and made it ten times larger, stronger, and more commodious than before: They built also a new Fort at ACRA, another at DIXCOVE, a 3d at WINNEBAH, a 4th at SUCCUNDEE, a 5th at COMMENDA, and rebuilt a 6th at ANNAMBOE; all on the GOLD COAST, and three of them within Musker-Shot of *Dutch Forts*. They also purchased *Fredericksburg*, now FORT-ROYAL, of the *Danes*, for the greater Security of CAPE COAST CASTLE: They built another Fort from the Ground at WHYDAH, to secure the *Negro Trade* at that Place also. In this manner did the present *African Company* spare no Expence to preserve this Trade to these Kingdoms, against the Insults, Depredations and Barbarities of Enemies and Rivals, as we have before seen.

So exasperated were the *Dutch* to find the *English African Company* take such vigorous

The Spirit
of the *African*
Company
to cope
with the
Dutch in
the *African*
Trade.

vigorous Measures for the Security of their Trade, that they threw every obstacle in their way; the *Dutch* Company gave them all possible Opposition on the GOLD COAST, which oft broke out into open Hostilities; and our *English* Company were put to an incredible Charge and Expence in purchasing the Consent and Assistance of the Native *Princes* and *Great Men* for making such Settlements; as well as for transporting, from time to time, the necessary Supplies of *Soldiers*, *Artificers*, *Provisions*, and all other *Requisites* and *Materials* from *England* to complete their *Forts and Settlements*; all which were rendered still more difficult, chargeable and hazardous by the long war, which ensued with *France*. Yet, under all these Hardships, Difficulties and Discouragements, the Company never ceased their Endeavours for the *Service of their Country*, 'till they put the Interest of this Nation, on this part of the Coast of *Africa*, on an equal Foot with that of the *Dutch*, and much superiour to that of any other Nation whatsoever.

From undoubted Experience therefore it appears beyond contradiction, that the first Establishment, and the constant Security and Preservation of the Trade to *Africa*, and consequently the supplying the

Repeated
Insults
and Hosti-
lities of
the *Dutch*
to our *African*
Company,
on the
Gold
Coast.

British Plantations with *Negroes* from thence, has been solely owing to the *Forts and Settlements* of our *African Company*; without which the *Dutch* would most certainly have long since engrossed the principal Part, if not the Whole of this valuable Trade to themselves.

Nor have the Struggles of this Company with the *French*, to save *Great Britain* a Share in the *African Trade*, been less than with the *Dutch*. For on the North Coast, where it was natural to think the Company should have met with less Opposition, and more Success; yet it fell out otherwise. The *Dutch West India Company* were in possession of the *Forts of Arguin and Goree*, the *French Senegal Company*, which was established *Anno 1673*; were in possession of a *small Fort* on an *Island* within the *Bar* in the *River Senegal*; and our *English African Company* had *one small Fort* in the *River Gambie*, and another *Settlement* in the *River Sierraleon*. In this Situation Affairs continued till about the Year *1677*; and the *Companies of each Nation* traded freely to all *Places* on the open Coast, not in the actual possession of any of the others, from *Cape Blanco* to *Cape Mount*.

The Progress of the French in this Trade.

In

In the Year 1677, and 1678, the *French* took the *Dutch Forts* on the Islands of *Arguin*, and *Goree*, which were soon after yielded to *France* by the Treaty of *Nimiguen* : And in the Year 1685, the *French King*, judging the Grant to the *Senegal Company*, which extended from *Cape Blanco* to the *Cape of Good-Hope*, too large, re-
 strained that Company to that Part of the Coast which extends from *Cape Blanco* to the River *Sierraleon*, and erected another Company, which was called the *Guinea Company* ; and granted them the *sole Trade* to and from that Part of the Coast which extends from the River *Sierraleon* to the *Cape of Good-Hope*. From this Time the *French Trade* to *Africa* was carried on by those two distinct Companies.

The last of these Companies made no great Progress in their Trade till about the Year 1702, that the *French King* gave them the Contract, which he had made with *Spain*, for introducing Negroes yearly into the *Spanish West-Indies*. But that Contract being afterwards transferred to *Great-Britain*, by the Treaty of *Utrecht*, this Company was soon after abolished.

The *Senegal Company* were scarcely warm in their new Possessions, before they set up a Claim to all that Part of the Coast, which extends from *Cape Blanco* to the River *Gambia*,

Gambia, comprehending above five hundred Miles in Length. In the Year 1681, they attempted to hinder the *Royal African Company's* Ships from trading along that Coast: But not being as yet in a Condition to contest that Point with them, they dropp'd their Pretensions against them for that Time. In the Years 1683, 1684, and 1685, they *seized* and *confiscated* several Ships belonging to the *Portuguese*, *Dutch*, and *Prussians*. And in the last of those Years, they renewed their Claim against the *English African Company*: From which Time they continued to give them frequent Interruptions in their Trade; 'till at last a War broke out between the two Nations.

The Losses and Injuries which the Company sustained, during the Course of this War, were greater than can be easily imagined. But one of the chiefest was the Loss of their *Fort* in the River *Gambia*, *Anno* 1695, which was taken and plundered by a Squadron of *French* Men of War, and all the Fortifications demolished and razed to the Ground. And, as a farther Addition to this Misfortune, when the Company came to take Possession thereof again, after the Peace, they found the *French* settled in the River, and claiming an

Insults of
the *French*
to our
African
Company.

The Losses of the
English
African
Company
by the
French.

an equal Share in the Trade thereof with themselves.

However, the Company, by Means of a strong Fort on *James Island* in the River *Gambia*, and divers *Factories*, some hundred Miles up that River on each Side, have maintained the Right of *Great-Britain* to the Trade hereof, in Opposition to all the Attempts of the *French* to root us out. How the Company have supported the Trade against the French.

So that it must appear unexceptionably evident, from this short History of our Trade to *Africa*, that it could never have been preserved to these Kingdoms without *Forts and Castles* being kept up and maintained in *Africa*, as all other Nations do, who enjoy any Share in this valuable Commerce. But this will appear still more fully in the next Chapter.

C H A P.

C H A P. III.

The Forts and Settlements in *Africa*, and those under the Government of a *Trading Company*, are absolutely necessary to preserve our Trade to *Africa*; with an Answer to all Objections.

AS the Impracticability of supporting the Trade to *Africa* without *Forts and Settlements* hath fully appeared from incontestible *Facts* and *Experience*; so, it is presumed, the same will still farther appear from the plainest Reason, by considering the Nature and peculiar Circumstances of this Commerce.

Private
English
Merchants
trade to
Africa by
Virtue of
the Com-
pany's
Forts and
Settle-
ments.

The *Negro-Princes* and *Chiefs* in *Africa* are generally at War with each other on the Continent; and the Prisoners of War, instead of being slain, or applied to inhuman Sacrifices, are carefully preserved, and sold to those *Europeans* only, who have an establish'd Interest and Power among the Natives, by the Means of *Forts and Settlements*; or to such who are admitted to traffick with the Natives, by Virtue, and under the Sanction and Protection

tection of such *European Settlements*; which is the Case of all the *British* Merchants who trade to *Africa* at present; at full Liberty, under the Authority, and Protection of our *Royal African Company's* Rights and Privileges, Interest and Power among the Natives; but this is the Case of no other private Merchants in *Europe*; for all foreign Trading *African Corporations* enjoy the *sole Privilege* of this Commerce to themselves.

By Reason of these perpetual Hostilities ^{Wars 2-} among the *Negro-Princes*; 'tis their con-stant Maxim to cultivate Alliances; and ^{mong the} cement Friendships with the Possessors of such *European Forts and Settlements* among them as are best able to assist and protect them in Time of Need, both from their *native* Enemies, and those *Europeans*; who are in Alliance with them: The Natives; on their Part, stipulating and agreeing with the *Governors, Factors, and Agents* of such *Settlements*, to bring down and encourage a constant Intercourse and Currency of Trade from the *Inland* Countries, to such *Friends and Allies*, in Opposition to all other *European Settlements*, their Competitors.

This being the plain State of the Case; nothing can be more evident, than if our Rivals in this Trade have an establish'd

All Na-
tions
trading
to Africa
have Forts
and
Castles.

Footings and Interest among the Natives ; and *Great-Britain* has no such Advantage in Point of Situation, that we cannot cultivate the like Friendships and Alliances with the Natives for mutual Defence and Security of our Trade, as our Rivals may : And consequently our Rivals, by their Weight of Power, Influence and Authority over the Natives, would bring them under such Terms of Agreement, such Awe and Subjection, that no Power, who had not the same Advantages, could pretend to have the least Share in this Commerce, but by Permission from such *Settlements*. Such was the Fact, when the *Portuguese* were the only Possessors of *Forts and Settlements* ; who never suffer'd any Nation to trade there but at the Hazard of Ship and Cargo. And were the Possessions of our present *African Company* given up, what *Englishman* would be so rash as to venture his Fortune in so precarious a Trade ? Who would take upon himself to secure *British* Merchants from the like Insults, Depredations, and Barbarities of the *Dutch*, our Rivals, if we had no Settlements, as they heretofore committed, when even we had some ?

But if the *Dutch* should chance to be more gracious to us in future than heretofore, what Treatment could we reasonably expect from our good Friends the *French* ?
No

No Man of the plainest Understanding can be so weak as to imagine, that if they had once got the *whole Power* into their Hands, they would not be so wise as to keep the *whole Trade* to themselves; since the constant Prosperity of the *French Colonies*, would depend thereupon, and the total Ruin and Destruction of the *British Colonies* must ensue. Can they have greater Motives to attempt a Monopoly of this whole Trade, or we have greater to prevent it?

But should the *French* have any *Surplus of Negroes* beyond what would supply their own *Colonies* (which can scarce be supposed, since they have found their Account so much already in raising of new ones) would they not rather dispose of them to the *Spaniards* and *Portuguese*, whose *Colonies* do not interfere with the Interest of their's, than sell them, or any of them, to the *British Colonies*, which do?

Besides; as the Profits of the *Spanish West-India* and *Brazil-Trades* would be far more considerable to them than selling of their Surplus *Negroes* to the *British Colonies* could be, there is not the least Shadow of Reason to believe, that a *British Merchant* or *Planter*, would be suffer'd to purchase a single *Negro* for the *British Plantations*, while they could dispose of them to much

better Advantage, and without Detriment to their own *Colonies*.

Foreign
Trade in
all Barba-
rous Coun-
tries first
settled by
Forts and
Castles,
and con-
tinued by
the same
Means.

For two hundred and fifty Years past, it has been the constant Policy of all such *European Nations* which have been so fortunate as to make any new Discoveries for foreign Trade, and to gain any establish'd Power and Authority in remote and barbarous Countries, to build and maintain *Forts and Castles*; and by Virtue of such Possessions, to claim a Right to whole Kingdoms, and to Tracts of Land of a vast Extent, and to EXCLUDE all other Nations from trading in, to, or from them.

By such Measures, did not the *Portuguese* long enjoy the whole Trade to *Africa*, and to the *East-Indies*? Did not the *Spaniards* also for many Years *claim* and *engross* almost the whole Continent of *America* to themselves, and most of the *Islands* adjacent thereunto? By the like Policy too; have not the *Hollanders* render'd themselves Masters of all those *Islands* in the *East*, which produce *Cinnamon*, *Cloves*, *Nutmegs*, and *Mace*, &c. and from them supply the *whole World* with those Commodities, by such *Quantities*, and at such *Prices* as they think fit? And have we not seen, that these *same* People, for some Time before and after the Year 1660, attempted to gain the *whole* and *entire* Possession of the most valuable

valuable Parts of the Coast of *Africa*, and to *Exclude* this Nation from any Part, Share, or Interest therein ; and thereby brought upon themselves a War with this Kingdom in 1664 ?

Before the *Royal African Company* had built a *sufficient* Number of *Forts and Castles* on the *Gold Coast*, the *Dutch* interrupted our Trade, and *seized* and *confiscated* our Ships on the said Coast, and within its Dependencies ; which, as they pretend, extends from *Cape Palmas* to *Cape Lopez*, and contains a Tract of Land of above 1200 Miles. Since the *African Company* have built and maintained a sufficient Number of *Forts and Castles* on the *Gold Coast*, the said Company, and all other *British* Ships and Vessels, have traded freely to that Coast, and to all Places dependent thereon, without Insults and Depredations from the *Dutch*, or any other Nation. But must we not be infatuated, to imagine, that if we part with our Power there, we can be secure in our Trade ?

Before the *French* got Possession of the *Forts* in the River *Senegal*, and on the *Islands* of *Arguin* and *Goree*, on the North Coast, the *English* traded freely and openly to all Places on *that Coast*, without Molestation : Since the *French* have been in Possession of these *Forts*, they have, many
Years,

Years, taken upon themselves, in Times of Peace, to EXCLUDE the *British Nation* from those Parts, and, before the present War, did actually take and confiscate all such *British Ships* and *Vessels* as ventur'd to trade thither.

In those Places where our *African Company* have Forts, as in the River *Gambia*, &c. the *British* private Merchants trade freely with the Natives under their Sanction. In those Places where other Nations have *Forts and Castles*, and the Royal *African Company* have none, there all *British* private Traders, are either absolutely denied the Liberty of Trading, or their Ships are actually taken and confiscated. What greater conviction therefore can any reasonable Man require of the absolute and indispensable Necessity of *Great Britain's* maintaining *Forts and Settlements*, in *Africa*, while our Rivals in that Trade do the same? When they give up their *Forts and Settlements*, then indeed we might venture to follow their Example perhaps, because we should be upon a footing with them. But whoever advises *His Majesty* to such Measures before, will he not be judged, by all honest Men, a Traytor to his Country's Interest?

Was

Was it at all needful to urge the Reasonableness of this Matter further, it might be asked; whether *Forts* and *Castles* are not maintained in all our Colonies in *America*, as well those on the Continent as the *Island* ones? With what View is this done but to protect the latter from foreign Enemies, and the former from both foreign and Inland Native Ones?

Of Forts and Castles in our American Colonies.

If then, such Places of Strength are judg'd absolutely necessary for the Protection of our Colonies, where they are peopled chiefly with *White-Men*, our native Subjects, and they also obliged to be formed into *well-disciplined Militia*, for their Safeguard, does it not follow still far more strongly, that there is a much greater Necessity for the *Fortifications* in *Africa*, where we have no *British* Inhabitants, either for our Protection against the Insults of native Barbarians, or against our *European* Rivals in this Trade?

I am not insensible that it has been pretended by some, that *Men of War* alone, properly stationed, and duely and regularly relieved by others, would be sufficient to protect the Trade of all his Majesty's Subjects on the Coast of *Africa*. To which I answer: First, If neither the *English*, nor *Dutch*, nor *French*, nor any other *European* Nation, had any

Stationed Men of War sufficient for the Security of the African Trade.

Forts and Settlements in Africa, I admit that Men of War might in the main be sufficient to protect the Trade on that Coast. Secondly, I do likewise admit that even now that the *English, Dutch, and French* have *Forts and Settlements in Africa*, that Men of War are necessary, for scouring the Seas, annoying the Enemy, protecting our Ships, and upon some Occasions assisting the Forts with supernumerary Supplies of Men, and other Helps which they may sometimes want. But, Thirdly, No Man, I am perswaded, that understands the Nature and present Circumstances of this Trade, will say that Men of War, *alone*, would be sufficient to protect our Trade there. We have a Proof in Point to the contrary thereof, on that Part of the North Coast extending about four or five hundred Miles from *Cape Blanco* to the North of the River *Gambia*, on which the *French* have Forts only at *two* Places, (and we *none*) and yet, by Virtue of them alone, and in consequence of the Influence which they give them over the Natives, we have entirely lost the Trade of all that Coast; and until such Time as I can see the same recovered again, and a free and open Trade with the Natives re-established, and carried on under the Protection of Men
of

of War only, I shall conclude the same Fate would attend our Trade on every other Part of the Coast of *Africa*, were we to abandon any of our Forts and Settlements, while other Nations are labouring not only to keep up, but to encrease the Number of theirs.

But such who imagine there is any weight in the Sufficiency of Stationed Ships alone for the Protection of this Trade, must either want Knowledge and Experience in the Nature and Circumstances thereof, or intend to impose on others. For of what Inland Service, on an Emergency, could Ships be to the Natives to protect them by Land from their *Negroes*, or *European* Enemies? How could Ships of War cultivate Trading Alliances with the Natives, as the Governors, Factors and Agents of this Trading Company do, by travelling for that Purpose Inland, daily conversing with the *Negro-Kings* and *Great Men*, and doing them constant Offices of Friendship and Benevolence?

One would think the Measures constantly pursued by our Northern Colonies, on the Continent of *America*, should at once shew the Insufficiency of Stationed Men of War, to answer the Purposes of an *Inland-Commerce*, and of Security

city from the Insults and Oppressions of the native Enemies, and foreign Rivals: for there; where we have above an hundred Thousand *British* Subjects resident, Stationed Ships of War alone, though ten Times the Number usually kept would little avail to support our Footing, and our Commerce to those Parts, without maintaining constant Friendships and Alliances with the *Indian Nations* in North *America*. Do not the *French* vigilantly pursue these Measures as a *Barrier* against the *English*, and the Natives, who are not attached to their Interests? Were they to pursue such Measures, and we to despise and neglect the like, and depend on Stationed Men of War only, must we not be infatuated to expect the Interest of *Great Britain* can be maintained to as good Purpose as the *French* do theirs?

This Case is directly parallel; for if the *Dutch* and the *French* do not trust the Protection of their Share in the Trade to *Africa*, to Stationed Ships of War only, and we should be so weak as to do it, with what reason could we hope to support an Equality of Power, and Ballance of Interest with our Rivals in *Africa*, and among the Natives?

But if after all, any One should be still weak enough to imagine that Stationed
Ships

Ships alone would answer the great End of securing our Commerce, why is the Nation at the great yearly Expence of maintaining *Gibraltar* and *Port Mabon* for the Protection of our *Mediterranean* Trade, which bears no Comparison with the national and private Advantages derived from our *African* and Plantation Trades; which are mutually and inseparably dependent on each other?

For, what Commodities do those Fortresses produce? What Trade do they carry on? Why do we not constantly send Stationed Ships for that End, and save the Expence of a *Military Government* there?

'Tis very true that constant Experience hath shewn us, that *Ships of War* are occasionally absolutely necessary to protect every Branch of our Foreign Trade, as well as our Fortifications abroad for that Purpose: But if any one will say, that because Ships of War are necessary to secure us from Injuncts at Sea, that all Fortifications are useless and unnecessary for securing us at Land; I answer, down with all Fortresses in our Colonies and Plantations; evacuate *Gibraltar* and *Port Mabon*, &c. &c. &c. This cannot be said by any without Laughter and Contempt. What is it Men mean then, when they talk of

Ships of War alone protecting the *African* Trade? If they mean, that in Times of *War*, *Depredations* or *Piracies*, Ships of War ought to be sent to the Coast of *Africa* to protect that Trade, as well as any other, who differs in Sentiments from these Gentlemen? I never heard of any one that does. The *African* Company have always made timely Application for Men of War to be properly stationed in all Times of Danger: But if it be said and meant, that any Number of Ships of War, at never so great an Expence, lying at all Times upon the Coast, can cultivate, and preserve that Trade, with the Natives on Shore, without *British* Forts and Settlements, where other Nations have the like, the only Answer to such is *Risum teneatis?*

It has been further said by some; that though Forts and Settlements may be necessary for the support of the Trade to *Africa*; yet they ought to be put solely under a *Military Establishment*; that being more naturally adapted for the Purpose than a *Trading Company*.

Let *Gentlemen* who make this Objection to the Management of a Trading Company inform themselves of the *East India Company*, how effectually a *meer Military Government* would support their

Trade with the Natives in *India*.—Long Experience, in *India*, hath proved, that a considerable *Military Government*, dependent thereupon, may be conducted by a Trading Company, for the Purposes and Benefits of Trade; but what Instance have we of a Trading Company being conducted by a *Military Government*, independent thereon? They are quite incompatible, unless united under one and the same Head: and since the End in *Africa* is merely the Advantages of Trade with the Natives, and not a large Colony of christian Inhabitants, Trade certainly should be at the Head, and have the sole Government and Direction of a *Trading Military Force*, if I may be allow'd such an Expression.

No mere
Military
Establish-
ment in *A-*
frica will
secure this
Trade.

Can it be supposed that the *Merchants* of *England*, who merit the utmost Regard from the Nation and the Government, would submit to have the *African Trade* under the Controul, Direction and Management of a meer Military rather than a Trading Power, with a military subservient thereunto? Merchants are best acquainted how to treat Merchants in their trafficable Concerns; And though no one can entertain an higher Regard for *Gentlemen* of the Army than myself, yet I am perswaded they would

would never desire to interfere with the Commercial Province. Yet so greatly might a meer military Establishment in *Africa* be abused, that our Trade with the Natives would be as soon destroyed under such a *Constitution*, as if the Forts and Settlements were demolished. So sensible are the *French* and *Dutch* of this, that they entrust the Protection of Trading Forts, Settlements, and Factories, to the sole Management of their Trading Companies, allow them suitable Encouragements for a proper Military Force in their own Way, and they are left to adapt it to the peculiar Circumstances of the Trade ; but they never suffer an independent Military Power to interfere therein.

And as our Rivals in this very Trade act upon these Principles, should we not be very weak and impolitick to introduce any Innovation in this respect ; an Innovation founded only on the Conjectures of those who are unacquainted with the Nature and Circumstances of this Trade, in Opposition to the Experience of Time immemorial ? While we are upon the same Footing, in the *African* Trade, with our Competitors, we need be under no Apprehension of Danger from them, or the

the Natives ; but if we change our ancient practicable System, and establish a new-fangled imaginary one in its room, who can answer for the Event ? Are *Soldiers* Judges of *Trading Alliances* with the Natives ? Would not they, for their private Interest endeavour to interfere with the Trade of our Merchants here ; and at length, perhaps, make a *Military Monopoly* of what little of that Trade we should have left, under their Management only ?

But would there not be a wide difference in point of Expence to the Nation ? The Company have always made their *Governors Factors* and *Agents*, The act as *Military Officers* occasionally as ^{cheapest} well as Merchants ; and the *French* and ^{and safest} *Dutch* do the same ; their Common ^{way to secure this} Servants act also as *Soldiers* and *Sailors* ^{Trade to the Nation} too in their trading Sloops, to check the Insults of the Natives, when Occasion requires. ——— But were these Forts and Settlements under the Direction of an established Military Government, the Expence to the Nation is allowed by the best Judges of Affairs of this Nature, to be above three Times more than if the Company have the Protection of them, and
we

we run the Risque of loosing the whole Trade too.

Gentlemen are too apt to run into a very great Mistake upon this Occasion. They judge of the *African Forts and Settlements* as they do of *Gibraltar* and *Port-Mahon*; but the case is widely different: for what *Inland Trade* do we draw from those Places? None at all, as we do by Virtue of the *African Settlements*. Wherefore a meer Military Establishment may answer the Purposes of *one*, but a Trading Constitution, with a Military Power dependent thereon, can only answer the End of the *other*.

No Inland
Trade
from Gib-
raltar or
Port Ma-
hon as in
Africa.

C H A P.

C H A P. IV.

Of the Parliamentary Allowance that may be necessary to the *African* Company for the effectual Support and Maintenance of the Forts and Settlements in *Africa*.

TO determine this Point in the plainest and most satisfactory Manner, it will be requisite, in order to enable us to form a right Judgment hereof, to consider of the Strength of the other Powers upon the Coast of *Africa*, who are interested in this Trade ; which can be no otherwise done than by giving a Detail of their respective Forts and Settlements.

The Number and Situation of the several Forts and Settlements belonging to the *French, Dutch, and Portuguese, &c.* are as follows ; *viz.*

1. The Northermost Settlement is that of the at ARGUIN, on the *Gum-Coast*, in the Latitude of 20 Degrees North, formerly belonging to the King of *Prussia*, for which, in the late Queen's Time, on Occasion of

Of the Forts and Settlements in *Africa* of other Nations.

an Overture made by the said King to dispose of That and another small Fort at *Cape Three-Points*, which is afterwards mentioned, to this Nation, He demanded for Them 200,000 Crowns; but they have since been purchased of him by the *Dutch*, for 30,000 *l. Sterling*. And afterwards taken by the *French*, in 1721, and now in their Possession.

2. The *River Senegal*, in the Latitude of 16 Degrees, North, where the *French* have several very considerable *Forts*, *Settlements*, and *Plantations*, for a great many Miles up the River.

3. The *Island Goree*, a little Southward of *Cape de Verde*, where the *French* are likewise settled, and have a very strong Castle.

4. *CUTCHEO* and *BISSEO*, two *Portuguese* Settlements, lying in 12 Degrees, North Latitude.

5. *ANCOBRA*, the first *European* Factory on the *Gold-Coast*, belonging to the *Dutch West-India Company*.

6. *AXIM*, about one League to the Eastward of *Ancobra*, a Fort belonging to the *Dutch West-India Company*.

7. *FREDERICKSBURG*, at *Cape Three-Points*, about five Leagues to the Eastward of *Axim*, a Fort formerly belonging to the King of *Prussia*; lately sold by him; together

gether with that at *Arguin*, before-mentioned, to the *Dutch*, for 30,000 *l.* afterwards taken and demolished by the Natives ; and lately recovered out of their Hands, at the Expence of a long and chargeable War ; and now resettled by the *Dutch West-India Company*.

8. *BUTTEROE*, a Fort belonging to the *Dutch West-India Company*, about eleven Leagues Eastward of *Cape Three-Points*.

9. *TACQUERADO*, a Factory-House, belonging to the *Dutch West-India Company*, about three Leagues Eastward of *Butteroe*.

10. *SUCCUNDEE*, a Fort belonging to the *Dutch West-India Company*, about three Leagues Eastward of *Tacquerado*.

11. *SHUMAH*, a Fort belonging to the *Dutch West-India Company*, about four Leagues to the Eastward of *Succundee*.

12. *COMMENDA*, a Fort belonging to the said Company, about five Leagues Eastward of *Shumah*, and within Gun-shot of an *English Fort*.

13. *ST. GEORGE DEL MINA*, the principal Fort belonging to the *Dutch West-India Company*, on the *Gold-Ccass*, about four Leagues Eastward of *Commenda*.

14. *ST. JAGO*, a Fort on the Top of a Hill, within Gun-shot of *St. George Del Mina*, belonging to the same Company.

15. MOUREA, a Fort belonging to the *Dutch West-India Company*, about four Leagues to the Eastward of *St. George Del Mina*.

16. CORMANTINE, a Fort built by the *English*, and in the War in 1665, taken by the *Dutch*, and now belonging to the *Dutch West-India Company*, about five Leagues to the Eastward of *Mourea*.

17. APONG, a Fort belonging to the *Dutch West-India Company*, about ten Leagues to the Eastward of *Cormantine*.

18. BARRACOF, a Fort belonging to the *Dutch West-India Company*, about eleven Leagues to the Eastward of *Apong*.

19. ACRA, a Fort belonging to the King of *Denmark*, about two Miles to the Eastward of the *Dutch-Fort*.

20. ST. LOANGO ST. PAUL'S, in the Latitude of 10 Degrees, South, where the *Portuguese* have several Forts and Settlements, and a large City; and thereby carry on a very great and advantagious *Inland Trade* for some hundreds of Miles.

By this Account of the Forts and Settlements of other Nations, we cannot doubt a Moment of the high Value they set upon the Trade to *Africa*, and with what Care, Industry and Expence they have laboured to gain and secure to themselves a Share therein. And, that we may be well apprized

prized of the Part which the *Royal African Company of England* have taken in this general Struggle, for the Security and Preservation of this Trade to these Kingdoms, it will be necessary now to give the Reader a particular Account of our own Company's *Forts and Settlements* on the Coast of *Africa*; which they have erected and maintain'd, to ballance that great Weight of Power of other Nations; which are as follows, *viz.*

I. CAPE-COAST-CASTLE, about three Leagues to the Eastward of the *Dutch Castle of St. George Del Mina*; for which the present Company paid their Predecessors 34,000 *l.* situated about the Middle of the *Gold-Coast*. The Fortifications consist of Outworks, Platforms, and Bastions, and have been enlarged with new Buildings, and made regular, as well as ten times larger and stronger, by the present Company, with *Stone, Brick, Tiles, Lime, and Terras*; and is a Security for all Ships in the Road; was many Years doing; having Apartments for the Company's *Director-General, Chief Merchants, Chaplain, Factors, Writers, Surgeons, Artificers, and Soldiers; Magazines, Ware-houses, Store-houses, Granaries, Guard-Rooms, two large Tanks or Cisterns, built with Brick and Terras, sent from England, and holding about 200 Tons, Repositories to lodge one*

The Forts and Castles belonging to the Royal African Company of England.

tensousand

thousand Negroes, and Vaults for Rum, Work-bouſes for Smiths, Armourers, Coopers, and Carpenters ; fifty-seven Great-Guns, Small-Arms, Blunderbuſſes, Buccaneer-Guns, Piſtols, Cartouch-Boxes, Swords and Cutlaſſes, Ammunition for Great-Guns and Small-Arms, Stores and Tools for Brickmakers, Bricklayers, Smiths, Carpenters, Coopers, Surgeons, Armourers, Gunners, and Gardiners, ſmall Veſſels, Pinnaces, Canoes, and Men answerable, attending on the Caſtle and Garriſon, and fetching Stores to and from the Out-Forts.

This Caſtle is ſituated in *Fetu*, the Reſidence of the Company's Director-General, who manages their Trade and Alliances with the ſeveral Kingdoms on the *Gold-Coaſt*, and opens a Trade to *Fetu*, *Saboe*, *Cabeſſera*, *Arcaina*, *Caffera*, *Dankera*, and *Aſſantee* ; and is a *Repository* of *Merchandise* for ſupply of all the *Factories* ; with Ponds and Canals of Freſh Water, and Gardens of a large Extent, producing all Neceſſaries for the Caſtle and Shipping, as *Plantaines*, *Bonanoes*, *Pine-Apples*, *Potatoes*, *Yams*, *Corn*, *Colworts*, *Peas*, *Beans*, *Cabbages*, and all other *European* Refreshments.

II. PHIPP'S TOWER, built for the Defence of the *Negro Town* of *Cape-Coaſt*, againſt any *Inland Enemy*.

III. FORT-

III. FORT-ROYAL, on the Top of a Hill ; bought of the *Danes* by the present Company, for 4,597 *l.* and Assistant to the Defence and Security of *Cape-Coast*, and the Ships in the Road.

IV. QUEEN ANN'S POINT, built for the Security of *Cape-Coast-Castle*, and for purchasing *Corn*, *Negroes*, and *Gold*.

V. ANNAMABOE FORT, built by the present Company. The Fortification consists of Flankers, Outworks, Lodging-Rooms, and Apartments for the *Chief*, *Factors*, *Writers*, and *Soldiers*; *Magazines* and *Store-houses*, ten *Great Guns*, *Small-Arms*, *Blunderbusses*, &c. Ammunition for *Great Guns* and *Small Arms*, *Canoes*, &c. attending the Building and Garrison ; a large *Tank* or Cistern, made with Brick and Tarras, sent from *England*, with a *Negroe-House* for 150 *Negroes*. This Fort is situated in the *Fanteen's* Country, and opens a Trade to *Fanteen*, *Braman*, *Acrong*, *Akim*, *Cabestras*, and *Arcania*, for *Gold*, *Corn*, *Palm-Oil*, and *Negroes* *.

VI. TANTUMQUERRY FORT, built by the present Company, with Apartments for the *Chief*, *Factors*, *Writers*, and *Soldiers* ; a *Magazine*, and *Guard-Room*, a *Tank*, or

* This Fort was relinquish'd before 1730, but is necessary to be resettled again.

large Cistern made with Brick and Terras, sent from *England*; a *Negroe-House* for 50 *Negroes*, six Great Guns and Small-Cutlasses, and Ammunition for Great Guns and Small Arms. This Fort stands in the *Acrong* Country, and opens a Trade to *Fanteen*, *Akim*, and *Anguina* for *Gold*, *Negroes*, and *Corn*.

VII. WINNEBAH FORT, built by the present Company. The Fortifications, four Bastions, Outworks, Apartments for the Chief, Factors, Writers, and Soldiers; Magazines, and Guard-Rooms; a Tank, made with Brick and Terras, sent from *England*, a *Negroe-House* for 100 *Negroes*, fifteen Great Guns, Small Arms, Cutlasses, and Ammunition for the Great Guns and Small Arms. This Fort stands in the Country of *Anguina*, and opens a Trade to *Akim* for *Gold* and *Negroes*, and has a River of Fresh Water, to supply the Ships, also Timber and Fish-Shells for repairing some Parts of the Forts, and a little to the Westward, is a Hill thought to have *Gold Mines*.

VIII. ACRA FORT, built by the present Company. The Castle is four-square, has a Tower, Bastions and Outworks, Apartments for the Chief, Factors, Writers, and Soldiers; Magazines, Guard-Rooms, and has a Tank, made with Brick and Terras,
sent

sent from *England*, a *Negroe-House* for 150 *Negroes*, 30 *Great Guns*, *Small Arms*, *Blunderbusses*, and *Ammunition* for *Great-Guns* and *Small Arms*, and *Stores* for *Artificers*. This Fort stands in the Kingdom of *Acra*, and opens a Trade to *Quambo*, *Akim*, and *Aquarwoa*, for *Gold*, *Negroes*, *Elephant's-Teeth*, and *Salt*.

IX. WILLIAM'S FORT at *Whydah*, built by the present Company, and hath *Flat-Forms*, *Parades*, *Out-works*, a *Moat* round, and *Apartments* for the *Chief*, *Factors*, *Writers*, *Surgeons*, *Artificers*, and *Soldiers*; *Magazines*, *Store-houses*, a *Guard-Room*, a *Negroe-House*, 30 *Great Guns*, *Small Arms* and *Ammunition* for *Great Guns* and *Small Arms*, and *Stores* for *Artificers*, and is situated in the Kingdom of *Whydah*.

X. COMMENDA FORT, about five Leagues Eastward of the Dutch Fort *Shumab*, built by the present Company, at very great Expence, maugre all the Interest and Opposition of the *Dutch West-India Company*: The Fortification is *four-square*, with four *Bastions* and a *Tower*; containing Lodging and *Apartments* for the *Chief*, *Factors*, *Writers*, and *Soldiers*; *Magazines*, *Store-houses*, a *Tank*, or large Cistern, made with Brick and Tarras, sent from *England*; and a *Negroe-House* for 150 *Negroes*; 26 *Great Guns*, with *Small Arms*, *Stores*

and Ammunition for Great Guns and Small Arms. This Fort stands in the Kingdom of *Aquafoe*, and opens a Trade to the Kingdom of *Cafferoes*, *Dankaries*, *Ashantees*, *Arkania*, *Acqua*, and *Abrambo*, for Gold, *Negroes*, *Teeth*, and *Palm-Oil*.

XI. SUCCUNDEE FORT, within Gun-shot of the *Dutch Fort Succundee*, built by the present Company, in the *Antee-Country*, near the *Adooms*; once taken and destroy'd by *Negroes*, hired by the *Dutch West-India Company*, and the building thereof afterwards interrupted by the same Interest. But since rebuilt, fortified, and made larger and stronger than it was at first; has 20 Great Guns, Small Arms, Stores, and also Lodging-Rooms and Apartments for the *Chief*, *Factors*, *Writers* and *Soldiers*; *Magazines* and *Store-houses*, with a *Tank* for Water, built with Brick and Tarras, sent from *England*, and a *Negroe-House* for 100 *Negroes*.

XII. DIXCOVE FORT, about eight Leagues Eastward of the *Dutch Fort*, at *Cape Three-Points*, built by the present Company, and is situated in the *Antee Country*; the Fortification being four-square, has four Bastions, with 19 Great Guns, Small Arms, and Stores; also Lodging-Rooms, and Apartments for the *Chief*, *Factors*, *Writers*, *Soldiers*, and *Artificers*;
Maga-

Magazines, and Store-houses; and opens a Trade to the several Kingdoms of *Axim, Awarree, Warsaw, Dawakray, and Ashantee, Inland-Countries*, for *Gold, Elephant's-Teeth, Negroes, and Corn*; and furnishes Timber, for the Repair of the other Forts, and Ships, and Water for Shipping and Limestones; is a commodious Place for careening small Vessels, has a *Tank*, or large Cistern, made with Brick and Tarras, sent from *England*, for holding Fresh Water, and a *Negroe-House* for 100 *Negroes*.

XIII. JAMES FORT and ISLAND, in the River *Gambia*, on the North Coast; the whole *Island* walled round, *Out-works, Great Guns, Small Arms, and Stores*, formerly mounted with 90, now with 31 *Great Guns*, with several *Ware-houses, Rooms* for the Governor, *Factors, Writers, Officers, Soldiers, and Castle-Slaves*; *Work-houses* for *Smiths*, and other *Artificers*; *Magazines and Store-houses*, and a *Negroe-House* for 200 *Negroes*.

For near 800 Miles up this River, the Company have also the following *Factories*; viz. *Geugia, Tancrowall, Joar, Yanamarew, Casau, Bruco, Cuttelar, Sany, Wally, Yamyamacunda, Faleodo, Baracunda*; which last is within about 200 Miles of the *Gold-Mines*.

XIV. BENGE ISLAND *, and the *Island of Tassa* on the River *Sierraleone* : On the first was a Castle fortified, which in the late War was plundered by the *French* ; but the Company have lately resettled the same ; it has 50 Great Guns, Small Arms, Stores, and also Lodging-Rooms and Apartments for the *Chief, Factors, Writers, Soldiers, Artificers, and Castle-Slaves ; Magazines and Store-houses, and a Negroe-House* for 100 *Negroes*.

SHERBRO,	{ On <i>Yerk-Island</i> on the North Coast.	These are seven <i>Factory- Houses</i> for purchasing <i>Red- wood, Negroes, Gold, and Corn</i> , which the Company settle, or withdraw, as They see Occasion.
ANNISHAM,		
AGGA,	{ On the <i>Gold- Coast</i> .	
SHIDOE, and		
ALLAMPO,		
QUITTAH,	{ Under the Direc- tion of <i>Whydah</i> .	
JACQUIN,		

From this View of the State of the Forts and Settlements of other Nations, and that of our own Company, the short Question is, *What Parliamentary Allowance is absolutely necessary to enable the Royal African Company to support and maintain these Forts and Settlements, so as effectually to secure this valuable Trade to these Kingdoms, against our Competitors, and the Native Enemies they*

* The Company have had no Settlement there since 1723.

may

may raise against us, as, we see, they have heretofore done?

To give proper Light into this Matter, it will be necessary to enquire what publick Support the *Dutch* and the *French* give to their *African Companies*; and then we shall be at no Loss to determine this Point, without Difficulty, or Perplexity.

The *Dutch*, as appears by a Memorial given by their *African Company* to the *States General* in the Year 1714, allow them the following Encouragements to enable them to support and maintain their Forts and Settlements, in *Africa*.

1. From the several Provinces of *North-Holland*, *Zealand*, and *Groningen*, a Subsidy of —

2. A Duty of 3 per Cent. on all Goods and Merchandize exported to, or imported from any place between *Newfoundland* and *Cape Florida*; a Duty also of 2 per Cent. on all Goods and Merchandize exported to, or imported from any Place on the Continent of *America*, from *Cape Florida* to the *River Oronoco*, including *Curassoe*; both which
are

Florins per Annum.	What Encouragement the <i>Dutch</i> allow their <i>African</i> Company.
38,600	

	Florins per Ann.
Brought over	38,600
are very moderately computed to amount at least to	100,000
3. A Duty of Five Florins per last on all Ships trading to <i>Cuba, Hispaniola, Jamaica, Por- to Rico</i> , and other <i>Carribbee</i> Islands; or to any place from the River <i>Oroncco</i> , to the Streights of <i>Magellan</i> and <i>La Maire</i> , and from thence to the Streights of <i>Annian</i> , computed at	3,000
4. One third of the neat In- come of the Colony of <i>Suri- nam</i> , computed at	10,000
5. The clear Profits of the Colony of <i>Isacape</i> , computed at	20,000
6. All the Profits arising from <i>Captures</i> and <i>Duties</i> exacted from the <i>Portuguese</i> , for Leave to Trade on the Coast of <i>Afri- ca</i> , estimated at	100,000
	271,600
The Total of which reduced to Sterling Money, at Eleven Florins for one Pound Sterling, amounts to	l. Sterl. 24,700
	And

And what is still far superior to all these Encouragements to support the Power and Interest of the *Dutch Company*, in *Africa*, is the *Sole Privilege* of all this Trade to themselves; all the Profits upon *Negroes*, *Gold*, *Ivory*, *Gums*, &c. which gives that Company such a Weight of Power and Influence in *Africa*, that we find they have made the *Portuguese* Tributary to them, on those Parts of the Coast which were formerly possessed by the *Portuguese* themselves.

An Account of the *Bounties*, *Exemptions*, *Privileges*, and *Encouragements* given by the *French* to their *African Company*, taken from a *Memorial* of the *Deputies of the Council of Trade* in *France* to the *Royal Council of Commerce* there.

1. An *Exemption* from all local and provincial Inland Duties of any Kind, upon their Goods and Merchandize in *France*, as also from all *Duties* for Merchandize exported to *Africa*, wherewith to purchase *Negroes*, *Gold*, *Ivory*, &c. which, considering the *Number* of Ships they employ in this Trade, cannot be computed at near so small

What Encouragement the *French* give their *African Company*

small a Sum as 150,000 *l.*
 Sterling per *Annum*; nor the
 whole Exemption at so small a ^{per Ann. Sterl.}
 Rate as 3 *per Cent.* thereon, 3000 *l.*

2. An *Exemption* from *half*
 the Customs on all *Sugars*, and
 other Merchandize imported
 from the *French Islands* and
Colonies in *America*, being the
 Produce of the Sale of *Negroes*
 there; the Amount of which
 will appear by the following
 moderate Computation. *viz.*

Suppose 15000 *Negroes* only,
 (whereas good Judges reckon
 them not less than double that
 Number) are imported into
 the *French Sugar Islands*
 annually; and that 10000 of
 that Number should be sold
 for *Sugar* to be returned to
France at the Rate of For-
 ty Hundred Weight of *Su-*
gar only *per Head*.

The *Duty* on Importation of
Sugar into *France* is 3 *per*
Cent. on about Two-thirds of
 the Value; which is at the
 Rate of 2 *per Cent.* And
 there

Brought over ————— ^{per Ann. Sterl} 3000*l*.

there is also an *Inland Duty* of three Livres, or 2*s.* 9*d.* Sterling *per* Hundred Weight.

Suppose the Price of such *Sugars* is computed at no more than 25*s.* *per* hundred; which, upon 10,000 *Nègroes*, makes 400,000 Weight of Sugar; and this, at One *per Cent.* being One Half of the Duty upon Importation, amounts to ————— 5000*l*.

400,000 Hundred Weight of Sugar at 1*s.* 4*d.* $\frac{1}{2}$ *per* Hundred, being Half of the above *Inland Duty* of Three Livres, or 2*s.* 9*d.* Sterling *per* Hundred Weight, is ————— 27,500*l*.

—————
32,500*l*.

3. A *Bounty* of Ten Livres, or 9*s.* 2*d.* Sterling, to be paid out of the King's Revenue, for every *Negro* carried to the *French Islands and Colonies in America*; which upon the said 15000 *Nègroes* only, amounts to ————— 6875*l*.

4. A *Bounty* of 9*s.* 2*d.* for every Ounce of Gold Dust that
L Carried over ————— 42,375*l*.

per Ann. Sterl.
Brought over, ——— 42,375^l.

shall be imported from *Africa*
into *France*.

Suppose only 5000 Ounces of
Gold imported from *Africa* into
France, which is quite trifling
and inconsiderable, when we
recollect how rich their Ships
in the *Guinea Trade* are in *Gold*,
as hath appeared by some late
Captures, is ——— 2296^l.

The Total is per *Annum* in ———
Sterling Money — — — 44,671^l.

N.B. The *Exemption* of Duties on
what the other five thousand *Negroes* pro-
duce in *Coffee*, *Indigo*, *Cotton*, *Cocoa*, &c.
is left out in this Account, lest any Exag-
geration should appear; and in every
other Article, Things are extremely un-
derated, which every one at all acquaint-
ed with the Extent of the *French Trade*
to *Africa* and *America*, need not be ap-
prized of.

But what gives the *French*, as it does
the *Dutch*, still a greater Weight of In-
terest, Power and Authority in *Africa*
than the Advantage of all these Encour-
agements, is the Company's *Sole Privi-
lege*

lege of this Trade, exclusive of all the other Subjects of *France*.

Now, since it is the constant Rule of all wise Governments to support either of Themselves, or by Alliances such a Degree of Strength and Power as shall prevent their Trade from being ruined, or their State swallowed up by neighbouring Potentates; and since under every wise Administration of Government in the *British* Empire, it has been the constant Maxim to proportion the Strength of our *Naval* and *Military* Force in general, both at home and abroad to those of our Rivals in Trade, for the Security and Protection of our own Commerce and Navigation; what Reason can be assigned, why any Exception should be made in this particular Case of the *African Trade*? If the *States General* of the *United Provinces* allow their *African* Company above 25,000 *l. per annum*; together with a Privilege of Trade, exclusive of all the other Subjects of *Holland*, (which is more than equivalent to double that Sum besides, from the Weight of Power, Dominion, and Authority it gives their Company with the Natives in *Africa*): As the *Dutch African Company* have this publick Support for

Our Encouragements to the *African* Company must be equal to those of our Rivals, our Interest being as much concerned in the Security of the *African* Trade.

their Forts and Settlements, must not every Man of Sense be at a loss to conceive, why *Great Britain* should not be at an *equal Expence* to support the *British Forts and Settlements in Africa*? for is it possible for our *National Company* to maintain an *equal Degree* of Strength and Power for 10,000*l.* per *Annum*, without an *exclusive Privilege* of Trade, as the *Dutch* do for 25,000*l.* with an *exclusive Privilege*?

Nor will it be said, that the Interest of *Great Britain*, is not as essentially concerned to support the Trade to *Africa*, as that of the *Dutch* is to support theirs. For, has it not been made appear; and indeed is it not allowed by all who are Judges, that the *fundamental Support* of the *British Colonies and Plantations in America*, is owing to *Negroes*; wherewith they can be supplied no where else but from *Africa*?

Now, as the *Dutch Colonies in America* for Trade and Importance to the *States General*, bear no manner of Comparison to the *British*, for their Trade and Importance to these Kingdoms, does it not follow from the plain Rule of Proportion, that the Support of the *African Trade* concerns us so much more essentially than it can do the *Dutch*, as our Interest in *America*

merica is more considerably concerned there than *Theirs* is? Was this Rule of Proportion then to take Place in our publick Measures, instead of our *African Company* having a national Support of 10,000*l. per Annum* only, without an Exclusive Privilege, and the *Dutch Company* a Support of 25,000*l. per Annum*, with an Exclusive Privilege; our Royal Company would have a Support in Proportion as the Superiority of our Weight of Interest in *America* exceeds that of *Holland*; and what that is, may be very easily determined from the Premises, but must be submitted to the great Wisdom of the Legislature.

Moreover, *Great Britain* has another Interest in preserving the *African Trade* besides that of her Plantations, which is not to be contemned, though there happens a Cessation thereof at present by the War: I mean an Interest in supplying the *Spanish West-Indies* with *Negroes*, by a fresh *Affiento*, upon a Pacification with that Crown. For the Advantages thereof have not only proved very beneficial to the Proprietors of the *South Sea Company*, and 'tis to be hoped will do so considerably more hereafter, but also to the Nation in general, by a very great Encrease in the Exports of our *British* Manu-

The Dutch have not such an Interest to preserve this Trade, yet allow above as much more for its Safety.

Manufactures to *Spanish America*, by Means of that *Affiento*.

And altho' the *Portuguese* have *Forts and Settlements* in *Africa*, yet they are not able to supply their *Brazil Colonies* with *Negroes* sufficiently, but have applied to the *English* for that Purpose: all which Considerations still render the Trade to *Africa* of more Importance to this Nation; and therefore does it not merit Support in Proportion to all Advantages in Expectancy, as well as present?

With Regard to the national Support given by *France* to their *African Company*, we have seen, by the most moderate Computation, it amounts to no less than 44,671 *l. Sterling per Annum*; together also with a Privilege of Trade exclusive of all the Subjects of *France*; which gives them, as it does the *Dutch*, no inconsiderable Influence and Authority among the Natives in *Africa*: and have not the *French* found their Account by these Measures, in raising of their *Sugar*, and other *Colonies* to the Pitch we now experience them to be, to the no small Injury of the *British* Plantations?

The Interest of *France* in their Plantations in *America*, being considerably more

The Interest of *France* not more concerned in the *African* Trade than ours; yet allow their *African* Company above four times more than we do ours.

more than that of the *States-General*; and consequently their Dependence upon the *African Trade*, more in Proportion, we find their national Support of this Trade is near double what it is in *Holland*. So that the *French* are wise enough to proportion the Expence to the Importance of the national Service. And since the *British Interest* in *America* may at present be said to be superior to that of *France*, certainly our Support of this Trade ought not to be at all inferior to theirs.

But, since extraordinary Success hath attended his Majesty's Arms in *America*, by doing such remarkable Injury to the *French Sugar Trade*, does it not behove us to follow our Blow against such a formidable Enemy, and totally ruin their *Sugar* and other *Colonies*; or at least to do them all the Detriment that is in our Power? But what Measures can *Great-Britain* take more effectually to this great and desirable End, than to cut off their Resource of *Negroes*, by whose Labour they have raised and still preserve their *American Colonies* in general? And will not enabling our *African Company* to exert themselves there, and retrieve that Trade the *French* have wrested from us, be the most natural way to answer that desirable End?

By

By Virtue of the superior *National Allowance* and *Privilege*, the *French* have many Years taken upon them to Trade as freely within the Limits of the *British* Company's Charter, as of their own ; while our Company have for many Years labour'd under such Discouragements, that they have not been able to repel their insolent and shameful Encroachments : Nay, so great is the Weight of Power the *French* Company have obtained in *Africa* by their superior Encouragements, that they will not suffer a *British* Vessel to come in Time of Peace within many Leagues of their Settlements, without making Prize thereof. So that if we expect to carry on the Trade to *Africa* upon the Foot of a free and open Trade, to as great Advantage as *France* does, must not the *British* Company have an Equality of Support with the *French* ; and some Equivalent for the Privilege they have parted with, and the *French* possess, to put it in their Power to support the *British* Rights, Privileges, and Interest, in such remote Parts, against all other Nations, in their fullest Extent ?

Upon the Whole, therefore ; what national Support is indispensably necessary for our *African* Company to enable them to maintain a Ballance of Interest in *Africa*, can no longer be a Doubt : The requisite
Facts

Facts and Materials, whereby to direct our Judgment herein, are plainly and honestly exhibited, according to the best Information I have been able to obtain. So far from exaggerating the Encouragements given by *France* and *Holland*, they will readily be allow'd to be considerably more, by every one who will give himself the Trouble to consider the Computations. Wherefore, I cannot but be of Opinion, that the *Estimate* deliver'd into the *Honourable House of Commons* by the *Royal African Company* for Support of their *Forts and Settlements*, is extremely modest; and, I am afraid, unless the Power of *France* is considerably reduced, that will not, even with the greatest Frugality and Oeconomy, be sufficient for the good Purposes intended.

But if it is the Interest and Desire of the *British Nation* so to reduce the Power of *France*, as to disable them from supplanting us in the Trade of *America*, or encreasing their *Naval Power* upon the Ruin of ours, *Now is the Time*, or, perhaps, *Never*. Let the Hands of the *African Company* be so strengthen'd as to destroy the *French Interest* in *Africa*, and their *Sugar* and other *Colonies* will soon be undone; their *Naval Strength* be so reduced as never again to have it in their Power

M

to

to insult us with Invasions, and threaten us with the Subversion of our happy Constitution. Let no Man boast of his being a Friend to the Interest of the Trade and Navigation of *Great-Britain*, or to the Interest of the present happy Establishment in his Majesty's august House, who shall oppose a Measure, that appears, even to Demonstration, so just, so reasonable, and so national in itself, as the effectual Support of the *Royal African Company of England*. But what Treatment and Regard this Company deserves from the Nation, will still further appear, by taking a short Review of the Treatment they have received.

C H A P.

C H A P. V.

Of the Means by which the present *Royal African Company* has been reduced to the State they are at present in, and what Consideration They merit from the Publick.

MANY who are unacquainted with the Progress of this Company, are apt to entertain an Opinion, that their present Condition has been owing to some Mismanagement, and Male-administration in those who have had the Conduct of the Company's Affairs: And, indeed, I was once of the same Opinion myself. Nor is it at all unnatural to be led into this Way of judging; for this Trade being so apparently beneficial; and the Company having the Advantage of Forts and Settlements happily situated for the beneficial Cultivation of this Commerce, People are easily led to believe, that a Company thus circumstanced, as being, in the very Center, as it were, of all the Treasures in *Africa*, cannot be reduced to the State the present Company is, without some sinister, corrupt, or fraudulent

dulent Management, some-where or other.
 This having been too much the Case
 among great Societies and Corporations,
 these Suspensions are very naturally raised
 in the Minds of Men : And when such In-
 sinuations are heighthen'd and exaggerated
 by those who have been call'd to Account
 by the Company for abusing the Trust re-
 posed in them ; and by others who have
 weakly imagined, that the Prosperity of
 this Company is incompatible with their
 private Interest, and therefore have en-
 deavour'd its Ruin : This being the Case,
 how should the Publick be otherwise than
 liable to be misled and imposed upon, with
 Regard to the Conduct of this Company's
 Affairs ? And therefore it has become ne-
 cessary to disabuse those who have been
 groundlessly prepossessed, either against the
 Merit or Managers of this Corporation, lest
 the Publick Interests, as well as those of
 the Company, should sustain an irrepara-
 ble Loss.

How Pre-
 judices
 have been
 rais'd a-
 gainst the
African
 Company.

And this I shall do from the plain State
 of the Facts, as they fall before me in the
 Order of Time ; for they will speak for
 themselves ; nor do they need any false
 Colouring, 'was I that way dispos'd.

Expence
 of the
 Compa-
 ny's Forts
 and Set-
 tlements,

From the Detail before given of the
 Number, Nature, Strength, and Situation,
 of the Company's Forts and Settlements

on

on the Coast of *Africa* ; every one will easily judge of the extraordinary Charge, which of Necessity must arise in the erecting and preserving such remote Buildings and Fortifications, by sending from hence *Bricks, Tiles, Tarras, Lead, Iron-Work, Boards, Timber* ; and all other *Stores, Tools* and *Materials* requisite for the same, and in contracting with, hiring and transporting *Soldiers, Carpenters, Smiths, Bricklayers, Masons, Armourers, Brick-makers, Coopers, Sawyers*, and Variety of other necessary Artificers ; and what still added more to this great Charge and Expence, was the *Paying* and *Maintaining* them in *Africa*, and from Time to Time supplying and recruiting the same, for many Years together, as well by Reason of the Insults and Losses, during the War, first with *Holland*, and afterwards twice with *France*, before the Company could establish the Trade : As also the Hiring, and Wear and Tear of Shipping, and being under the Necessity of keeping Vessels of considerable Force in *Africa*, upon Demurrage, for the Assistance and Protection of such considerable Undertakings, in Opposition to all the Efforts of our Rivals, to prevent the Company's Success. To which may be added, the extraordinary Charge and Expence in obtaining Grants and Agreements,

and making and supporting Alliances with the several *Kings, Queens, and Great Men* of the Country; as well in order to *make Settlements, and build Forts*, as to contribute to *defend* the Company against the sinister and undermining Designs of other *European* Competitors in that Country.

An Exclu- And, what can we imagine could in-
sive Privi- duce this Company to sink so immense an
lege their Expence in *Africa*? Certainly nothing less
Induce- than the secure and inviolable Possession, as
ment. they imagin'd, of this Trade to themselves,
exclusive of all other Subjects of *England*,
for a Term of Years suitable to the Ex-
pence and Hazard of the Undertaking.
For, are not the first Attempts to make
foreign Settlements among barbarous and
uncivilized Nations, always attended with
very great Hazard and Expence? And is it
not the Policy of all Trading Nations in
Europe, to grant the first Adventurers such
Privileges, Immunities and Encouragements
as are suitable to the Risque and Contingency
of their Engagements? Was not this the Rise
of *Exclusive Grants and Privileges* to incor-
porated Trading Societies; who, with a
Joint-Stock, were induced to engage in
such foreign, commercial Enterprizes, as
no private Traders would ever attempt?
Did not such-like Encouragements give Birth
to our *East-India* and
South-

South-Sea Trades ? Have not encouraging Grants from the Crown also caused the Establishment of *Maryland, Pensilvania*, and all other our Colonies ? By these Means likewise, has not all foreign Trade in barbarous and distant Countries been settled by all Nations who are considerable for their Commerce ?

Well ; the *African Company* undertook, and happily accomplish'd the Establishment of this Trade ; and they did it from the same reasonable Views and Motives as other prudent Bodies of Traders have acted, in this, and all other Trading Countries. The present *Royal African Company*, we have seen, was incorporated by King *Charles II.* by *Letters Patents* under the *Great-Seal of England*, bearing Date the 27th Day of *September, 1672* ; which granted them *all, and singular the Lands, Countries, Havens, Roads, Rivers, and other Places in Africa, from the Port of Sally, in South-Barbary, to the Cape of Good-Hope ; for, and during the Term of One Thousand Years ; with the sole, entire, and only Trade and Traffick in, to, and from the said Countries and Places ; with Prohibition to all other his Subjects, to visit or frequent the same, without the Licence and Consent of the said Company : And also with such other Powers and Privileges, as*

The Com
pany's
Charter.
were

were then judg'd proper and necessary for enabling and encouraging them to undertake and accomplish so *bazardous and chargeable a Work*.

Upon this Foundation the present Company undertook the Establishment of the Trade, at an immense Expence, as we have already seen : And would not any one believe, that this was a very secure Foundation for the Company to build upon ?

But by Reason of the War, first with *Holland*, and afterwards twice with *France*, we may easily believe it took up many Years to establish this Trade, to build such a Number of *Forts and Settlements*, as described, and make proper Alliances with the native *Barbarians*, before the Company were in a Capacity to reap any great Advantages by the Trade.

However ; so early as in the Year 1697, which was but twenty-five Years after the above said *Grant* in 1672, private Traders began to have a Relish for the Sweets of this Commerce, and envying the Company the sole Possession of it, began, as is usual on these Occasions, to raise a Clamour against *Monopolies* in general, in Order to break into the Company's Privilege, and share with them in the Profits of a Trade they had never advanced one Shilling to raise : And the Outcry prevail'd to such a Degree,

Their Exclusive Privilege suspended, and Profits of the Company annu-

Degree, that at length the Parliament took the Trade to *Africa* into their Consideration, and laid it at once open to all the Subjects of *England* for *thirteen Years*, and from thence to the End of the next Session of Parliament; but in Regard that the *Royal African Company of England* had been at the great Expence of building and maintaining a considerable Number of *Forts, Castles, and Factories*, on the Coast of *Africa*; and which the Parliament likewise judg'd necessary to be kept up and maintain'd in future, for the Preservation, and better carrying on this Trade, they were further pleased to impose a *Duty of Ten per Cent. ad Valorem*, on all Goods and Merchandize exported to *Africa*, during the said Term of *Thirteen Years*, &c. to be answer'd and paid to the Company for enabling them to keep and maintain their *Forts and Castles*.

This Act continued in Force from the 24th of *June*, 1698, to the 24th of *June*, 1712; in which Time the Charges which the Company were at in maintaining their *Forts and Castles* amounted, at a Medium, to 20,000 *l. per Annum*; and in fourteen Years to 280,000 *l.* in the Whole.

The Duty which the separate Traders paid in the same Time, amounted, in the Whole, to 73,785 *l.* 10 *s.* 6 *d.* $\frac{1}{2}$,
N and

and no more. From whence it appears, that, even while that Act continued in Force, the Total of the *Ten per Cent Duty*, came much short of one third Part of the Charge and Expence which the Company were at in maintaining the Forts and Castles for the Publick Benefit.

From the Expiration of the said Act, in 1712, to the Year 1730, all other his Majesty's Subjects have traded as freely and openly to all Parts of *Africa*, as they did under the Authority of the said Act; and the Company have, at their own sole Cost and Charge, been under the Necessity of defraying the whole Expence of maintaining their Forts and Castles, or becoming *Accessaries to the entire Loss of the Trade to Africa, and consequently to the utter Ruin of all our Colonies and Plantations in America, by relinquishing and abandoning their Forts and Castles, to be seized and possessed by such Foreign Nations as have been long watching for an Opportunity to get them into their Hands.*

On the 26th of *March*, 1730, the House of Commons came to the following Resolutions; *viz*, “ 1. That the Trade
“ to *Africa* ought always to remain free
“ and open to all His Majesty's Subjects.”
“ 2. That the Trade and Navigation to
“ *Africa* ought never to be charged with
“ any

“ any Duty for the Maintenance of the
 “ *British Forts and Settlements* belonging
 “ to the Company.” “ 3. That it was
 “ necessary to keep up and maintain the
 “ *British Forts and Settlements* on the Coast
 “ of *Africa*.” “ 4. That an Allowance
 “ ought to be made by Parliament to the
 “ Company, to maintain and support the
 “ said *Forts and Settlements*.”

In Pursuance of these Resolutions, it was voted, in a Committee of Supply, That the Sum of 10,000 *l.* be granted to His Majesty, to be applied towards the Maintenance of the *British Forts and Settlements*, belonging to the *Royal African Company of England* on the Coast of *Africa*; which said Sum was paid to the Company accordingly: And, upon the Company's petitioning the Honourable House of Commons every Year since, excepting the Year 1744, they have been pleased to grant the like Sum; which, with several considerable additional Sums, has been, from Time to Time apply'd accordingly.

In the Year 1744, the Company petitioned the Parliament, setting forth the Necessity they were under of having a further additional Support for the Maintenance of their *Forts and Settlements*; and praying, provided the Parliament should not please to grant their humble Request, that they would be pleased to take the *Forts and Set-*

lements into their own Hands ; and grant the Company a valuable Consideration for the same, &c.

Whereupon the Honourable House of Commons was pleased to appoint a Committee to enquire into the State of the Trade to *Africa* ; and, if I am rightly inform'd, the said Committee, after the most strict and mature Enquiry into the State of the Company's Affairs, made a very particular Report, whereby it appear'd, that the said Company had expended on the Preservation of the Trade, upwards of 100,000 *l.* in fourteen Years, preceding *December* 31, 1743, above what they had received of the Parliament for that Service. Upon which, in a Committee of the whole House of Commons, the Parliament were pleas'd to grant the Company 20,000 *l.* for the Current Service. And for the last Year they were pleased to address his Majesty to allow them 10,000 *l.* only, the *Committee of Supply* having unaccountably been closed, before any Provision was made for them.

From this the *domestic* State and Progress of the *African Company*, joined in Consideration with their State and Progress in *Africa*, from the Treatment of the *French* and the *Dutch*, how was it possible for this Company to enjoy any tolerable Series of
Prof-

Prosperity? On the contrary, have we not great Reason to be surprized, that this Company should, at this time-of-day, have ^{A wonder} the Shadow of a *Being* at all? or that we ^{the Com-} have any Remains of the Trade to *Africa* ^{pamy ex-} left; and consequently, that our Colonies ^{ists at all.} and Plantations have not been absolutely ruin'd and undone, and those of the *French* in a much greater State of Prosperity than they were before the present War?

This Company, we have seen, was establish'd by a *Royal Charter*, under the *Great-Seal of England*, for no less than *One Thousand Years*, with a Privilege of Trade, exclusive of all other the Subjects of *England*: And this Encouragement by Authority induced them to expend above a Million of Money in Fortifications. But how long did they enjoy the Benefits of this *Royal Charter*? Why, truly, *Twenty-five Years only*; and *Twenty* of these were spent chiefly in laying out their Money! Now, if there is no Validity in *Royal Charters* of this Kind; if the King had not, by Law, a Power to grant the Trade to some Persons, exclusive of others, was it not a very great Hardship upon this Company, that they were so early deprived of their Exclusive Privilege? It was not possible in so short a Compass of Years, for the Adventurers to reap any reasonable Compensation for
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the great Expence of their first Undertaking and Adventures; and therefore nothing can be more repugnant to the eternal Laws of Equity, Justice, and national Faith, than to suspend the Company's Privilege without making them a reasonable Compensation; since they had not time to obtain it by the Benefits of the Trade. It was certainly upon *the publick Faith*, at least tacitly given, that the Adventurers subscribed a large Part of their Substance to support this Trade, during three hazardous Wars for the Honour of *England*, for the Encrease of Navigation, and the Advance of Commerce. If it was for the general Interest of the Nation, that the Trade to *Africa* should be laid open before its first Settlers could gain a penny by it, did not, and does not to this present day, the good Faith and Honour of the Nation stand obliged to make the Company some just and reasonable Compensation? But as they have never yet had any, is not this Cause sufficient to account for their present Condition?

Have still
a Right to
a publick
Compensation
for
Suspension
of their
Royal
Charter.

Of the
Ten per
cent. Duty
on Exports
allowed
the Com-
pany.

The *Duty of Ten per Cent.* was not given the Company as a national Compensation for the Suspension of their *Royal Charter*; it was given them for the *future Support and Maintenance of their Forts and Castles*, for the publick Advan-
tage;

tage ; and have we not seen that this fell far short of answering the Purposes for which it was given ; and yet those Deficiencies were never made good to the Company.

Besides, this *Duty* was collected by the Officers of the Crown ; and however careful and vigilant they may be in the Collection of the Crown Revenue, they were far otherways with Regard to the Company's ; the Frauds and Collusions between private Traders, and the Officers of the publick Revenue were of no little Injury to the Company in this Respect.

However, to make the Company Amends for their long Series of Calamities, what was their next publick Encouragement ? Why truly at the Expiration of the Act, which granted the Company this *Duty* of *Ten per Cent*, would not any one very naturally imagine that *Something* should have been given them at least by way of Equivalent in Lieu of this *Duty* ! Can any *Englishman* scarce believe, or will Posterity credit it, that on the contrary, the *Company* were left quite destitute of all manner of publick Encouragement from the Year 1712. to 1730, being Eighteen Years ? They were under the Necessity, during this whole Period of Time, of supporting their

The Company without any publick Support for fourteen Years.

their Fortifications in *Africa* at their own sole Expence, for the Benefit of all private Traders, or must have abandoned them to our Rivals on that Coast, thereby added to their Strength, and quite lost our own !

At length, quite wearied out with public Neglect; and the Expence of their Forts devouring more than the Profits of their Trade; the Company thus abandoned and discouraged, ready to fall to pieces, and become quite annihilated; yet having steady and honest Men to support them to the last Extremity, they came to a Resolution to make one Effort more, as they had made many to the Publick in Vain, before they would come to a Determination to relinquish the Trade to our Enemies.

Accordingly, upon their Petition in 1730. to the Honourable House of Commons, they obtained 10,000*l.* to enable them to support their *Forts and Settlements*; which as observed upon petitioning the Parliament every Year since has been continued to them to the Year 1743. as before mentioned.

Thus the Company received a Kind of temporary Reprieve; for it has proved no better. For what avails 10,000*l. per Annum* to support Forts and Settlements; which since that, have cost them
near

near Seventeen thousand Pounds a Year, as hath appeared before a Committee of the House of Commons; and yet they have been maintained but in a very poor and mean Way, for how far will Forty or even Fifty Thousand Pounds a Year go in maintaining Fortifications in distant Countries that mount above Two hundred and fifty Pieces of Cannon; and might do considerably more, were they supported as they ought to be?

Since then the Company have expended, in Support of their Forts and Settlements for the general Benefit of the Publick, from *December* the 31st, 1729. to *December* the 31st, 1743, above 100,000*l.* The Expence of the Company more than they have received of the Publick Money, what is the Company the better for 10,000*l. per Annum*? Has it had any other Effect than to encourage them to run more and more in Debt, to be ruined by Piece-Meal, and the whole Trade too by gradual and imperceptible Degrees? For as the Company has been in a lingering consumptive Condition; so has this Trade in general: which will appear from the following *Facts*.

1. Twenty Years ago, the *French* were not permitted nor did they pretend to stop and trade at all on any Part of the

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How the
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Gold Coast where the Company's *Forts and Settlements* lye. But for many years past, they have traded very freely all along this Part of the Coast, and more particularly at *Anamboe*, within Sight of *Cape Coast Castle*; from whence they have carried off yearly more than 10,000 of the *choicest Negroes* to their *Sugar Colonies* in *America*; whereas all the *English* private Traders put together, have not, in any one of those Years. supplied our Plantations, from thence, with the tenth Part of that Number.

2. I am well informed, that about twenty Years ago, the separate Traders of *London*, *Bristol*, and *Liverpool*, produced before the *Board of Trade*, Lists of the *Shipping* then employed by them in this Trade; from which it appeared, that each of those Places had then above *seventy Sail* employed therein, whereas now it is certainly known, and admitted on all Hands, that neither *Bristol*, nor *Liverpool* have at present above *thirty five Sail* in the Trade; and that the Trade of this great Metropolis of the Kingdom to that Coast is dwindled from *seventy* to less than *ten Sail*: and it is also as well known, that most of the Ships employed in this Trade are now beat out of the *Gold Coast* and *Whydah* Trade by the *French*, where the best

best and most serviceable *Negroes* are only to be got; and are forced to seek for what Trade they can get in the *Pight, Calebar*, and other comparatively obscure *Holes* and *Corners*. These are *Facets* publickly and notoriously known to all the *Trading World*; and the Company have omitted no Opportunity to apprize the Publick of the same: But with what *Candour* and *Regard* such Advices have been received, is so well known, and so flagrant, that I shall rather chuse to be silent than to add any Thing to the *Blaze*.

And now I leave every candid and impartial *Englishman* to judge of the real Grievances, Hardships and Discouragements this valuable Company have undergone: Every Man of the plainest Understanding may now easily judge, whether the present State of this Company has been owing to the Misconduct of *Gentlemen* who have had the Direction of the Company's Affairs, or to Publick Neglect and Discouragement. Where, upon whom, the Fault is to be laid, I leave to others to determine; But we have this Consolation; that still the Company *exists*: and the Time seems to be come, that a Concurrence of happy Circumstances, conspires to the Re-establish-

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ment of this Company; and of the Commerce in general. We have a *Ministry* now from whose Ability and Integrity, the Nation has great Expectation; and if our Trade to *Africa* and *America* is not to be put upon a prosperous Footing *now*, we can never hope for it hereafter. Now is the Time to strike the fatal Blow to the *French* Trade in *Africa* and *America*; now the Time to raise our Trade to *Africa* for *Negroes*. *Gold*, &c. and for ever to establish our *Sugar* and other *Colonies*, that *France* may never more have it in Her Power to raise their Naval Force upon the Ruin of these our most valuable Trades; thereby insult the *British* Coasts, and threaten us with Invasions to subvert the best constituted Government in the whole World.

By what Means this Trade and Company may be effectually restored to the Honour and Interest of the Nation, I shall beg leave to give my Opinion under the next Head, which is humbly submitted to the great Wisdom of that august Assembly, who I am persuaded are as willing as able to redress all our Grievances, when they are made truly sensible of Them.

C H A P.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Foundation of the Trade of the *Royal African Company*, and of the Value of their Forts and Settlements in *Africa*.

IT cannot be expected that any *Proposition* whatever to secure, revive and establish this Trade and Company, will meet with the Approbation and Encouragement of the Publick, unless it appears that this *Trading Corporation* have really and truly a good and solid Foundation, upon which *Adventurers* may, with Security, advance their Money, and that to a reasonable Advantage.

The first and principal Consideration therefore with *New Subscribers* will be the Relation which this Trade and Company stand in to the Publick Interests; because they will be capable thereby of judging of the Stability and Duration of the Trade and Company, and consequently of the natural Ebbs and Flows to which the Value of their Property may be presumed to be liable.

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With Respect to this Point, it may be necessary to observe, that the Nature and Constitution of this Company is quite *national*; the Trade being founded on the lasting Interest of the Nation, cannot be given up without the Ruin of the Nation.

How the Nation is interested in duly supporting this Trade and Company.

How far this Trade and Company can be said to be *national*, may be considered under the following Heads; *viz.*

I.—Because the Trade to *Africa only*, furnishes the *British Colonies and Plantations in America* with *Negroes*, for the Production of *Sugar, Tobacco, Rice, Rum, Molasses, Indigo, Coffee, Cotton, Pimento, Fuslian, Ginger*, and all other Kind of Plantation Commodities.

Therefore this *Trade* is *national*, as it tends to preserve the very *Being* as well as the *constant* Prosperity of the *British Plantations* in general.

II.—Because the Trade to *Africa only* can enable *Great Britain* to vie in Plantation Commerce with our Rivals therein, prevent their Superiority of Trade and Navigation in *America*, and consequently their becoming

coming superior in Wealth and Naval Power.

Therefore this Trade is *national* as it will prevent our Loss of the Empire and Dominion of the Seas.

III.—Because the Trade to *Africa only* can impower *Great Britain* to supply the *Spanish West-Indies* with *Negroes* to work their Mines in *America*; without which they can have very little Treasure from their *Spanish Colonies*.

Therefore the *Negro Trade* is *national*, with Regard to *Spain*, being likely to afford the Nation considerable Profit thereby in future, as it hath heretofore done.

IV.—Because, by Means of the *African Trade only*, we have it in our Power to supply the Necessities of the *Portuguese* for *Negroes* wherewith to work their *Brazil Mines* *.

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* Tho' the *Portuguese* have some Settlements in *Africa*, yet since the *Dutch* have so greatly got the upper-hand of them, they have very little cultivated this Trade; and therefore stand in need of being supply'd with the most considerable Part of their *Negroes* for the *Brazils*; and we are the best able to supply them. And although our supplying both the *Spanish* and *Portuguese Colonies* in *America* with *Negroes* is justifiable, because they do not make use of

Therefore the *Negroe-Trade* is *national* with Regard to *Portugal*.

V.—Because the *direct* Trade to *Africa* takes off very large Quantities of the *British Manufactures*, and does not put us under the Necessity of taking any *Manufactures* whatever from thence in Return ; so that this Trade in no Respect interferes with the Industry of *British Artificers* and *Manufacturers* of any Kind, but always has, and always will afford *Great-Britain* a Ballance of Trade in *Gold*, in Proportion to the Degree and Extent, we shall be enabled to carry it on.

Therefore this *direct* Trade is more profitable to the *Nation* as well as *Adventurers*, than any other Branch belonging to the *British Empire*.

The INTEREST of the Nation in general being so nearly and essentially connected with the Trade to *Africa* ; and this Trade being insupportable without *Forts and Settlements*, no Company in this, or

of their Labour to interfere with the Produce of the *British Plantations* ; yet it is very unjustifiable, as being highly injurious to the Interest of our Colonies, to suffer the *French* to have a single *Negro*, either by way of our Plantations, or from our *African Settlements*.

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any other State, can have a better Foundation for lasting Prosperity than the *Royal African Company of England*, has. And certainly this ought, and will be the primary Consideration with *Adventurers*; for if this Trade exported our *Specie*, or *Bullion*, instead of bringing home the latter; or if it imported foreign Manufactures that drained the Nation of its *Cash*, and deprived our *British Artificers* and *Manufacturers* of their daily Bread; or if this Trade over-run the Kingdom with Baubles and Superfluities that depend on meer Caprice and Humour, temporary Mode and Fashion: If this Trade tended to impoverish instead of enriching and aggrandizing the Nation, it would be right to let it sink; it would deserve neither the least Encouragement from the *Publick*, or *Adventurers*: But as the contrary of all this is self-evident, this Company has the greatest Reason to expect Encouragement from *both*.

Since then the Trade of this Corporation is apparently *national*, the Value of their Property in *Africa* ought to be consider'd in a *national* Light; and if so, let us endeavour in some Degree to ascertain its Value.

To this End, let us suppose for a Moment; and it is a Supposition pleasing
P enough

The Value of the Company's Forts and Settlements consider'd in a national Light.

enough in Idea, that all the *French Colonies and Plantations* in *America*, were soon to change Hands, and fall into those of any Protestant Potentate, either into those of the *Dane* or the *Swede*, &c. who would gladly accept the same under Guarantee of the *Maritimé Powers* : Let us suppose either of these Powers in Treaty with *France* for the Sale of their *African Forts and Settlements*, in order to supply their new Possessions with *Negroes*, what may we reasonably presume *France* would urge upon such a Negotiation ?

The Value
France sets
on their
African
Forts and
Settle-
ments.

Would they not set a Value upon those *Settlements* something proportionate to the Advantage they would be of to the proposing Purchaser ? To this End, would not *France* urge the Benefits the *Negro-Trade* had been of to them, not only in raising, but in constantly preserving their *Sugar Colonies* ? Would they not make it appear, that a few Years ago, *France* was under the Necessity of taking *Sugars* from the *English*, but that so considerably had been their Encrease of Commerce in this Article, by Means of their *African Trade*, that they now not only supply'd themselves with that Commodity, but had supplanted the *English* in all foreign Markets in the *Sugar* and *Indigo* Trades ; and that they were in a fair Way to supply *Great-Britain* itself

itself with *Sugar*, as it did at present with *Indigo*? Could they not demonstrate, in Consequence hereof, how this Encrease of the *Sugar Colonies* had encreas'd their Navigation thither from less than 100 Sail of Shipping to above 800 Sail; whereby an Advantage accrued to *France* of little less than *Three Millions Sterling per Annum*, to the great Detriment of *Britain*, and the great Encrease of their Wealth, and their naval and military Power?

Nor is this all that *France* might and would plead upon such an Occasion: They would also shew to what a Degree of Perfection, by the Labour of *Negroes*, they had brought their *Tobacco Colonies* on the *Mississippi*; and that upon the very Back of the *British Colonies* of *Carolina*, *Virginia*, and *Maryland*, and down the *River St. Lawrence* to *Cape Breton*, as likewise at *Hispaniola*. And would they not urge the Reasons of their Likelihood of being equally successful in these Plantations as in their *Sugar ones*? In a word, would not *France* make it appear, as they had long before prophecy'd *, *That the Navigation of that Kingdom would owe all*

* *Vide* the famous Memorial drawn up in 1701, called, *A Memorial from the Deputies of the French Commerce, to the Royal Council of France.*

its Encrease and Splendor to the Commerce of its Islands in America, and that it could not have been kept up and enlarged otherwise than by the Means of their Trade to Africa ; this Trade having such Relation to that of the French Islands in the West-Indies, that the one could not have subsisted without the other ?

Nor can we suppose that *France* would forget to urge the Benefits they had received from the *Gold Trade* to *Africa*, the Vent of their Manufactures there, and the Advantages they had reaped, before the Peace of *Utrecht*, by supplying the *Spanish Indies* with *Negroes*. And could the other Party gainsay what was notorious to the whole World? On the contrary, would they not chearfully give a Price for the *French African Settlements*, suitable to the national Benefits that would arise from their Purchase?

Notwithstanding the Value *France* might very justly set upon her *African Settlements*; yet in such a reduced State, as suppos'd, Advantage would certainly be taken of her Necessity. But in the present flourishing State of *France*, could we but know what a Value the *grand Monarque* would put upon those *Settlements*, it would not a little surprize us, that they should esteem *their's* at so high a Rate, and some
Englisht.

Engliffmen our's at fo low a one, tho' at prefent we have not lefs depending upon them than *France* have upon their's. But was any thing of a moderate Computation made of the Worth of the *Britiffh Forts and Settlements*, belonging to the *Royal African Company*, to this Nation's in her prefent State and Condition, it would amount to fo very large a Sum, confider'd in a national Light, that I rather chufe the Reader fould judge for himfelf, than to give my own Sentiments on the Occafion.

Again; Let us fuppofe alfo, that the Court of *Spain*, upon a Peace with *Great-Britain*, fould be difpofed to treat with us for Sale of the *Britiffh Forts and Settlements*, belonging to our Company, in order to enable them to fupply the *Spaniffh* *West-Indies* with *Blacks* for the working of their *Mines* in *Peru* and *Mexico*, what may we prefume they would give the Company for them?

The King of *Spain* being a Party interefted in the Profits of the late *Affiento*, cannot be totally unacquainted with the Advantages to be made by having it in his Power to fupply his own Dominions with *Black Slaves*, without being under the Neceffity, as this Crown always has been, of contracting for that purpofe with other Nations. Were we to judge of this Mat-

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What Value African Forts and Settlements would be to Spain.

ter from the Face of the *Affiento* itself, the Profits arising to *Spain* could not be inconsiderable. The Importation of 4800 *Negroes per Annum*, as stipulated by that Contract, into the *Spanish Indies* directly from their own Settlements in *Africa*, would save this Kingdom above 150,000 *l. Sterling per Annum* in that Article: And as *Spain* would then supply their own Subjects at what Rate they pleased, this would be no little Addition to their Gain—— Did they import no more upon this Account than 2000 *Slaves* annually, and gain'd but 20 *l. Sterling per Head*; this would add 40,000 *l. Sterling per Annum* more to their Advantage.

But if to these we also add the *Saving* to the Crown of *Spain* of all *Duties* and *Indultoes* upon Merchandize imported into *New Spain*, by the *annual South-Sea Ship*; which by the *Affiento* were Duty-free, and likewise the *Duties* of all Merchandize imported into the *Spanish Indies* under the Cover of selling them *Slaves*, by private Traders, they will amount to a considerable Advantage more to that Crown. That a Computation upon this Head may appear extremely moderate, let the *annual Ship* be reckon'd at no greater Value than 500,000 *l. Sterling*; and that the whole *Duties* and *Indultoes* on the *Outset* and
Returns

Returns of such a Cargo, by way of *Old Spain* to *New*, and back again, were estimated at the Rate of 20 *l. per Cent.* and that only on the 500,000 *l.* this would make a further additional Saving to *Spain* of 100,000 *l. Sterling per Annum*, without reckoning any thing to the Account of private Trade.

But if we consider, that when the *Genoese*, the *French*, and the *English*, have supplied *Spain* with *Negroes*, by an *Assiento*, the *Spanish Indies* were never so amply supplied as the *Spaniards* desired; or as they would supply themselves, was it in their Power. That they would do so is not to be doubted, because the more *Negroes* are imported into the *Spanish Indies*, the more are the *Mines* there wrought; and consequently the more Treasure would be carry'd from thence into *Old Spain*. To what a Pitch this might arise is not easy to say, but this we may say with Certainty, that in a Matter so easy and practicable, *Spain* would not be neglectful of her Interests.

Besides, was it in their Power to furnish themselves with *Negroes*, there is no saying what Lengths they might go in all manner of Plantation Produce. However, if we value all these accumulated Advantages at no larger an *Annuity* than 400,000 *l. Sterling*.

Sterling; and that at twenty Years Purchase, such *African Settlements* to *Spain* would be worth in Purchase-Money *Eight Millions, Sterling*.

The Value Great Britain ought to set on her African Forts and Settlements.

Since then it appears beyond Contradiction, that *African Forts and Settlements* are really of such immense Estimation to *France*, and would likewise be so to *Spain*, or any Nation whose Plantations stood in need of *Negroes* for their Support and Preservation; And since also nothing can be more certain and indisputable, than that the Advantages arising to *Great Britain* from our *African Establishments*, are, or may, easily be rendered, no way inferior to those of *France*, can the *Property* of our *African Company* be looked upon in a mean and contemptible Light, and not worth supporting, or the Trade worth Encouragement? Will any body pretend to say, that a Company who enjoy such valuable Possessions is a *Bankrupt Company* as some have insinuated? It is true, they owe a large Sum of Money, which has been contracted by doing more for the Service of their Country than in Prudence they ought to have done; and they are not in a Condition at present to pay it: But they have *Forts and Settlements* which have cost them immense Sums of Money, and they have

have an *undoubted Right and Property* in them, and by the Constitution of *England*, they cannot *legally* be taken from them without a *full and valuable Consideration*; and therefore since they are of such great Value to the Nation, and if the Publick should be desirous of taking them into their own Management, they cannot refuse to pay the Company to the *utmost Penny of what they are worth*; or, The Company no Bankrupt. if they should be esteemed of no Value to this Nation, nor worth the Keeping; then, surely the Company cannot be denied the Liberty of selling them to any other Nation for what they can get for them: And in either Case the Company will have sufficient to pay their Creditors to the utmost Farthing; besides a very ample Estate left to themselves.

But the Company's whole Debts do not amount to above *One hundred thousand Pounds*; and that bears but a small Proportion to the Value of their Possessions; and therefore this Company have a very solid and substantial Foundation whercon to raise an advantageous Superstructure of The Company's Foundation for a large Inland Traffick. Commerce; advantageous to the Nation in general, and considerably so likewise to the *Adventurers*. For these *Forts* mount for the Security of the Trade, in all above *Two* hundred

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hundred and fifty Pieces of *Cannon*, and may do considerably more; contain great Quantities of *Small Arms* of every Kind; have *Repositories* to lodge above Three thousand *Negroes*, large *Warehouses* and *Magazines* for *Merchandize*, and are better situated to carry on an extensive *Inland Trade* for *Negroes*, *Gold*, *Ivory*, *Wax*, &c. than all the Settlements in *Africa* of all other *European* Nations put together; and that into the Kingdoms of *Yabow*, *Adom*, *Kufero*, *Tufero*, *Warsaw*, *Abrambos*, *Dankera*, *Ashante*, *Fanteen*, *Castera*, *Arcania*, *Acoran*, *Akim*, *Quambo*, *Acra*, *Benin*, *Callebar*, *Fetue*, *Saboe*, *Cabesteras*, *Anguin*, *Dawkera*, &c. &c. &c.

Besides, by Means of *James's Fort* and *Island* in the *River Gambia*, the Company might easily unite the *Inland Trade* of this River with that of the *Gold Coast* to no little Advantage. They have also various *Factories* for about Eight hundred Miles up the River, for the Purposes of a large Trade, when their *Trading Capital* will admit of it; as viz. the *Factories* of *Geugia*, *Tancrowall*, *Joar*, *Yanamarew*, *Cafau*, *Bruco*, *Cuttelar*, *Samy*, *Wally*, *Yamyamacunda*, *Falleoda*, *Baracunda*; which last is within Two hundred Miles of the *Gold Mines*. So that

to

to carry on this Trade to its due Extent and Profit, and prevent the *French* from their Encroachment on the *Gold* and the *Gum* Coasts, nothing is required but that the Company's *Forts and Settlements* be effectually maintained and supported by Parliament for that Purpose; which being done, and that by Encouragement; adequate to what the *French* allow their *African Company*, we cannot fail of engrossing, as it were, the Bulk of the *Negroë* Trade into our own Hands; and in such Case we may set what Bounds we please to the *French Plantations* in *America*. And what will not a little contribute to effectuate this, is the Allowance of a *Bounty* to all *separate* Traders of so much *per head*, upon all *Negroes* imported into the *British Colonies*, with strict Prohibition; by Law both to the Company and Private Traders not to sell a single *Negroë* to the *French* on the Pain of *Forfeiture* of Ship and Cargoe, &c.

The Company's *Forts and Settlements* being duly supported in a defensible Condition, the Prosperity of the Company; Advantages of restoring this Company to British Planters and separate Traders of *separate African* Traders, and of our *British Planters* in *America*, will be all rendered mutually subservient to each other; and that at the Expence of neither, but only at the Expence and Detriment

triment of our grand Rival and Enemy, the *French* : all Bickerings and Heart-burnings between *separate Traders, Planters*, and the *Company* will be at an End, and they unanimously conspire the the Ruin of the *French Sugar* and other Colonies, and the constant Prosperity of our own.

By excluding the *French* from the *British* Coast in *Africa*.

That this will certainly be the Case, will appear from the following Considerations.

1. By strengthening the Hands of the Company they will be rendered capable of restraining the *French* within the Limits of their own Charter; whereby we shall retrieve the Trade of the *Gold Coast*, and drive them away from *Anamaboe*, from whence they have supplied their Colonies with *Ten thousand* of the choicest, most robust, and ablest *Negroes* on all the Coast, to *One thousand* that have been carried by all the separate *British* Traders to our own Plantations. We shall also be capable of rooting them out of the Trade at *Whydah*, which they have also usurped; and from whence likewise they have carried very considerable Numbers of *Negroes* no way inferior to those of *Anamaboe*; and regain the Trade of that part of the North Coast extend-

extending about Four or Five hundred Miles from *Cape Blanco* to the North of the River *Gambia*; from which the *French* have within these nine Years absolutely excluded the *English*.

2. The Trade on the Coast of *Africa* being thus restored, under the Power, and Authority of the Company, separate *British* Traders would no longer be under the Necessity of skulking in such comparatively obscure Holes and Corners as the *Pight* and *Callibar* for their Lading; and contenting themselves with less serviceable *Negroes*, while our Rivals engross the Bulk of the *best*.

3. By thus excluding the *French* from Trading within the limits of our Royal Company's CHARTER, there will of course be a greater Plenty of the choicest *Negroes* left for *British* Traders; and the Number of Purchasers being lessened upon the Coast, the Company and separate Traders will purchase the *best* *Negroes* cheaper as the Demand is lessened; for as nothing has so much contributed to raise their Price to the great Height at present is, as the Encroachments of the *French*; so nothing can help more to its Abatement than extirpating them from

tion, that all *separate* Traders purchased *Negroes* of the Company; for then the Company would by Consent, be constituted, as it were *Factors*, to separate Traders; and if they did not raise their Commission too high, the Trade would continue to be carried on through their hands; but if the Company grew exorbitant, separate Traders would become their own Factors again, and the Trade return to its old Course, which would be Check sufficient upon the Company: And all this may be easily concerted between the *Company*, and *separate Traders* without Application for *Parliamentary Restrictions* on either Side.

That the *British Planters* also will find their Account, by this happy Establishment of the Company is not less certain. For the *French* being totally excluded from the Purchase of the *best Negroes*, they will be left for the *British Plantations*; and from Reduction of their Price in general, by the Measures proposed, the *Planters* doubtless, will obtain them cheap in proportion. Thus will our *British Colonies* become cheaply and plentifully stocked with the *choicest Negroes*, the Culture of more Land naturally take Place, more Plantation Commodities be produced,

ced, and cheaper, by the Price of all the Necessaries and Conveniencies of Life, for the Maintenance of both *Blacks* and *Whites*, abating in Proportion to the greater Plenty : And will not the Interest of Money fall, and the general Prosperity of all the *British Plantations*, naturally follow ? These Measures depriving *France* of the Supply they at present have of the choicest *Negroes* from the *British Coast* of *Africa*, their *Sugar Colonies* will soon be reduced to the State of supplying themselves only with *Sugars*, while our *British Planters*, by this and other suitable Encouragements, happily retrieve the lost Trade of supplying foreign Markets with that Commodity ; and prevent the future Advances of *France* in her Trade and Navigation in *America*.

C H A P. VII.

That the Parliamentary Aid for the due Support of the *Royal African Company* cannot be less than 30,000 *l. per Annum*; and that to be secured to the Company, by *Act of Parliament*, for the Term of Fourteen Years, out of the *Sinking Fund*.

I.—**B**ECAUSE the *French* allow their *African Company* above *Forty Thousand Pounds Sterling per Annum*, together with an *Exclusive Privilege* of Trade; and therefore it is impossible for the *British African Company* to support any thing of a Competition with the *French*, without 30,000 *l. per Annum* at least; especially as they have no such *Exclusive Privilege* as the *French Company* have.

II.—Because the *States-General of the United Provinces* grant their *African Company* to the Amount of 25,000 *l. Sterling per Annum*, together with an *Exclusive Privilege*

Privilege of that Trade also, tho' their *Colonies* in *America*, supported by *Negroes*, bear no Proportion to those of *Great-Britain*.

III.—Because the *French* have encroached upon, and usurped the best Part of the *British* Trade in *Africa*; to the great Prosperity of their Colonies and Injury of our's; and it can never be in the Power of our *African Company* to retrieve our lost Trade without supporting an equal Degree of Influence and Authority in *Africa*, that the *French* do.

IV.—Because this Company being so singularly circumstanced as to be the Guardians and Protectors of a *free and open Trade*, that no *Adventurers* will hazard their Money in the Trade of the Company, without the *Forts and Settlements* are duly provided for by Parliament for a *Term of Years* certain, lest their Money should be applied to support what the Publick ought to do.

V.—Because, unless the Company are enabled fairly to beat the *French* in Point of Traffic in *Africa*, they can never be restrained from encroaching on the *British* Trade there, within the Limits of the Company's Charter; and without the *Forts*

and Settlements are supported for a Term of Years certain, new *Subscribers* will not raise a *Trading Stock* to carry on the Trade with Vigor; and without that, our destroying the *French Trade* to *Africa* upon the *British Coast*, will little avail, unless the Company is enabled to embrace what they lose, or nothing will prevent the *Negroes* from Trading with the *French*: So that a *military Power* without a Trading one, cannot possibly answer the End intended.

VI.—Because our *African Company's Exclusive Privilege* having been suspended so soon as *twenty-five Years* after it was granted, it was not possible for them, in so short a Period of Time, to reap any reasonable Compensation for sinking above a *Million of Money* in *Africa*, in erecting of *Fortifications* for the first Establishment, and constant Security of the Trade; and, therefore in point of national Justice and Equity, the Company have a reasonable Claim upon the Publick for the certain Support of their Fortresses for such a reasonable Term of Years, as may enable them to carry on the Trade, so as to make themselves some Amends for the Suspension of their Privilege, without an Equivalent being granted them,

VII.—

VII.—Because from the Year 1712, to the Year 1730, the Company maintained their *Forts and Settlements* for the *publick* Benefit; and never received one Penny of the Publick Money during that Eighteen Years; tho' for that Purpose they expended above 280,000 *l.*; and which, together with the Loss of their Privilege, annihilated their Trading Stock in the Publick Service.

VIII.—Because from the Year 1730, to 1743, they have expended above 100,000 *l.* more upon the Support of their *Fortifications* than they have received of the *Publick Money*; and for which the Company have been under the Necessity of contracting *Publick Debts*, rather than suffer their Forts and Settlements to fall into the Hands of our greatest Rival and Enemy, the *French*.

IX.—Because the Experience of *fifteen Years* has proved, that a *Parliamentary Aid* granted to the Company *from Year to Year*, will not encourage Adventurers to hazard their Money in the Company; especially as so poor and precarious an Aid on our Part, has encouraged the *French Trade in Africa*, ruin'd above half the
British

British Trade from Bristol and Liverpool, and not left London above one seventh Part of what it had.

X.—Because so soon as the Parliament shall be pleased to grant the Company an Aid of 30,000 *l. per Annum* for *fourteen Years certain*, such a *Constitutional Security* for the Support of the *Forts and Settlements* will immediately induce Adventurers to enable the Company to discharge their Debts, and to raise a Capital sufficient to carry on the Trade with such Vigor and Spirit as to revive the Commerce in general, and prevent the *French* from Trading any where within the Limits of the *British* Charter. And lastly ;

Because the *Sinking Fund* is now applied to the Current Service of the Year ; and it being necessary that the Company should have *constant* Support, it is humbly proposed, that a Part of that *Fund* cannot be applied for a *Term of Years* more to the general Interest of the Nation, than to the Support and Maintenance of the *British Settlements in Africa*. This *Fund* being constituted of the Surplusses of the *Aggregate Fund*, the *South-Sea Fund*, and the *General Fund* ; and these *Funds* arising originally from the Duties on Trade, it
is

is also humbly presumed, that the Support of Trade has the most natural Right to *that Fund*; and especially a Branch that has been demonstrated to be the most *national* of any belonging to the Kingdom of *Great-Britain*.

Should the *African Forts and Settlements* be thus provided for by a *Parliamentary Security*, no Apprehensions can be justly entertain'd, that any Part of the *Publick Money* will be applied to the Payment of any of the Company's Creditors, and not to the Maintenance of their Forts and Settlements in *Africa*. For the Company have consulted with several eminent *Merchants, Planters, and Money'd-Men*, about Ways and Means for discharging the Company's Debts, and reviving and improving the Trade in general, without applying any part of the Publick Money for such Service; and therefore they agreed upon a Scheme or Plan the last Year, which was not kept secret, till the Parliament should be up, in order to enrich themselves, but was submitted in the most publick Manner to the Consideration of the Town; which candid and upright Way of Proceeding, on the Part of the Company, cannot fail of giving ample Satisfaction to every Body, as to that Particular.

Yet

Yet this fair, honest, and disinterested Conduct, on the Part of the Company, gave Birth to some groundless *Fears and Jealousies*. Some affected to be under strong Apprehensions for want of being thoroughly acquainted with the Foundation of this Company, that it would open a Door for *Stock-Jobbing*, as if the raising a Trading-Stock of 2, or 300,000 *l.* by the Company, could affect a Credit of 50, or 60,000,000.

But it having been clearly demonstrated, that the Foundation of this Company is truly solid and substantial; as solid and substantial as that of any Trading Company in this, or any other Nation whatever, all Apprehensions of chimerical *Stock-Jobbing* from so small a Capital, which one Branch of the Trade will easily admit of, and pay a very handsome Profit, must be quite out of the Question; for the lasting Interest of these Kingdoms is essentially and inseparably connected with that of this *national* Company; as also the Interest, as we have seen, of all *separate British Traders*, and *British Planters*, will flourish in the same Degree as that of the Company does.

F I N I S.

ENDNOTES

The main sources used to supply information in the notes are: Robin Law (ed.), *The English in West Africa 1681-1683: The Local Correspondence of the Royal African Company of England, 1681-1699, Part 1* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997); Robin Law (ed.), *The English in West Africa 1685-1688: The Local Correspondence of the Royal African Company of England, 1681-1699, Part 2* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001); Junius P. Rodriguez (ed.), *The Historical Encyclopedia of World Slavery* (2 vols, Santa Barbara, CA, ABC-CLIO, 1997); K. G. Davies, *The Royal African Company* (London, Longman, 1957); A. W. Lawrence, *Fortified Trade-Posts: The English in West Africa 1645-1822* (London, Cape, 1969); Robert L. Stein, *The French Slave Trade in the Eighteenth Century: An Old Regime Business* (Madison, WI, University of Wisconsin Press, 1979); Kwame Yeboah Daaku, *Trade and Politics on the Gold Coast, 1600-1720: A Study of the African Reaction to European Trade* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1970); Ray A. Kea, *Settlements, Trade and Politics in the Seventeenth-Century Gold Coast* (Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982); Philip D. Curtin (ed.), *Africa Remembered: Narratives by West Africans from the Era of the Slave Trade* (Madison, WI, University of Wisconsin Press, 1967); Albert Van Dantzig, *Forts and Castles of Ghana* (Accra, Sedco Publishing Ltd., 1980); David P. Gamble and P. E. H. Hair (eds), *The Discovery of River Gambia by Richard Jobson 1623* (London, Hakluyt Society, series III, 1999), vol. 2.

The following abbreviations are used in the notes: RAC for Royal African Company; EIC for the English East India Company.

Certain Considerations Relating to the Royal African Company of England (1680)

- p. 6, ll. 2-3: *Royal African, East-India, Turkey, I Hamburg, Eastland and Muscovia Companies*: The Muscovia (or Muscovy) Company received its charter in 1555. It lasted as a joint-stock company until 1669. The Eastland Company was founded in 1579 to make use of trading advantages granted by the small Baltic port of Elbing. The EIC received its charter in 1600. The RAC's charter was dated 1672. William Robert Scott, *The Constitution and Finance of English,*

Scottish and Irish Joint-Stock Companies to 1720 (3 vols, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1910–12), vol. 3, pp. 462–4, 472; E. Lipson, *The Economic History of England*, vol. 11: *The Age of Mercantilism*, 6th edn. (London, A. & C. Black, 1956), pp. 184–370. For the history of these joint-stock companies, see R. W. K. Hinton, *The Eastland Trade and the Common Weal in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1959); K. G. Davies, *The Royal African Company* (London, Longman, 1957); and T. S. Willan, *The Early History of the Russia Company, 1553–1603* (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1956).

- p. 6, ll. 7–8: An Act Declaratory concerning Bankrupts: this statute (13 & 14 Car. II c. 24) stipulated that no investors in the East India and Guinea (i.e. Royal African) companies or the fishing trade could be recognised as traders or merchants if they had been declared bankrupt. *The Statutes at Large from Magna Carta to the Union of the Kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland* (London, 1811), vol. 5, pp. 161–2.
- p. 7, l. 3: *first Charter relating to the Guinea trade*: granted by James I in 1618 to a new company named the Governor and Company of Adventurers of London trading to ‘Gynney and Bynney’, i.e. to Guinea and Benin. This was the first English company incorporated in the African trade. It originally had thirty-seven members and was granted a monopoly over the trade to west Africa. It lasted until 1660. J. W. Blake, ‘The English Guinea Company, 1618–1660: An Early Example of the Chartered Company in Colonial Development’, *Proceedings of the Belfast Natural History and Philosophical Society*, 3 (1945–6), pp. 14–27, and ‘The Farm of the Guinea Trade in 1631’ in H. A. Cronne, T. W. Moody and D. B. Quinn (eds), *Essays in British and Irish History in Honour of James Eadie Todd* (London, Frederick Muller, 1949), pp. 86–106.
- p. 7, ll. 9–10: *Charter to Humphrey Slaney, Nicholas Crisp and others*: In 1631 Charles I granted a charter to trade with Africa to a syndicate of London traders. Although the wording of the charter implied that those concerned were an entirely new company, in fact they were people (including Crispe) who already controlled the company founded in 1618 referred to in the above note. They received an exclusive right among English merchants to trade with Guinea, Benin and Angola for thirty-one years. Slaney, Crispe and the other directors of the company were all attached to Charles I’s court. Robert Porter, ‘The Crispe Family and the African Trade in the Seventeenth Century’, *Journal of African History*, 9 (1968), pp. 57–77.
- p. 7, l. 12: Rowland Wilson: a prominent merchant in the African trade.
- p. 7, ll. 16–18: *the Dutch and Danes ... increased their Number of strong Forts, Factories and Ships of War on the Coast of Guiney*: The Dutch maintained between ten and twelve forts on the Gold Coast in the early seventeenth century. The Danes had three forts on the same coast before 1661.
- p. 7, ll. 24–6: *His Majesty was graciously pleased in the year 1662 to invite all his Subjects to the Subscription of a new Stock*: Charles II granted a charter in January 1662/3 to an organisation known as the Company of Royal Adventurers Trading into Africa. The capital eventually subscribed to this company amounted to £120,000.

- p. 7, l. 28: *the Dutch War*: Commercial rivalry between the English and the Dutch had emerged in the early 1660s and later became open war. This was the second of three Anglo-Dutch wars of the mid-seventeenth century; it lasted from February 1665 until July 1667. It began partly as a result of a private expedition mounted by the RAC against Dutch ships and forts on the Guinea coast.
- p. 7, ll. 32–3: *Admiral De Ruyter*: Michel Adriaenzoon de Ruyter commanded the Dutch fleet during the second Anglo-Dutch war (1665–7).
- p. 8, ll. 12–15: *His Majesty in the Year 1672 was Graciously pleased Publickly to invite all his Subjects ... to subscribe ... in the said New Stock*: Charles II granted a charter to the RAC on 27 September 1672. The RAC superseded the Company of Royal Adventurers Trading into Africa. It was granted the right to trade between Cape Blanco and Cape de Bona Speranza for a term of one thousand years.
- p. 10, l. 27: *Castle of Cormantine*: originally an English trading post from 1631, Kormantin was the earliest English fort constructed on the Gold Coast and, indeed, the only one between c. 1638 and 1661.
- p. 11, l. 25: *Joint-Stock*: a collective investment by numerous individuals in a business enterprise carried on in their names by a company organisation.
- p. 12, ll. 6–7: *The like happened before to the East-India Trade from the Year 53 to 57*: in these years the EIC faced heavy administrative costs that resulted partly from maintaining too many factories in Asia. The company's monopoly was also attacked in the republican years under Oliver Cromwell. Between 1651 and 1659 there was a Dutch embargo against Bantam, in Java, the most important EIC factory in its southern sphere of trade. The level of the EIC's overall trade in 1660 was no higher than it had been in the first half of the seventeenth century. K. N. Chaudhuri, *The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company, 1660-1760* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 44, 47, 53, 82.
- p. 13, ll. 15–16: *by way of Company and Joint-Stock, both to the East-Indies and Guiney*: The Dutch West India Company, founded in 1621, had a monopoly of Dutch trade and navigation in Africa south of the Tropic of Cancer, in the Atlantic islands, and in the Americas. It went bankrupt in 1674 but was reconstituted quickly. It dominated the Dutch transatlantic slave trade until 1738 and continued in existence until 1791. The Dutch East India Company (the Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie) was chartered in 1602 and held a monopoly of Dutch trade and navigation east of the Cape of Good Hope and west of the Strait of Magellan. It became established in the East African slave trade by the 1630s. Johannes Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade 1600-1815* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990).
- p. 13, ll. 21–2: *The King of Denmark also hath done the like in point of Company and Joint-Stock*: In 1671 the Danish West Indian Company (Vestindisk kompagni) received a charter for colonising St Thomas in the Caribbean. The company entered the slave trade on a small scale in 1697 but began to withdraw from it in the early 1730s. Ole Feldbæk, 'The Danish Trading Companies of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries', *Scandinavian Economic History Review*, 34 (1986), pp. 209–11.

- p. 13, ll. 25-7: *the French King ... is Erecting a Company for management of a Guiney Trade by a Joint-Stock*: According to a decree of 6 January 1685 the Compagnie du Sénégal, founded in 1672, received exclusive rights for French trade in west Africa between Cape Blanco and the Sierra Leone River. The Compagnie de Guinée was founded in 1685 specifically to trade in slaves.

A True State of the Present Difference between the Royal African Company and the Separate Traders (1710)

- p. 19, ll. 6-7: *an Act to exclude all others*: this Whig-initiated legislation was a response to the Board of Trade's recommendations to settle a free trade to Africa. The act was halted in April 1710 when Queen Anne dissolved Parliament. Tim Keim, 'Monopoly, Economic Thought, and the Royal African Company' in John Brewer and Susan Staves (eds), *Early Modern Conceptions of Property* (London, Routledge, 1995), p. 436.
- p. 19, ll. 24-5: *the Printed Papers which have pass'd pro and con upon this Occasion between the Company and their Opponents*: this occurred at the height of a propaganda battle between supporters of the RAC's monopoly and advocates of freer trade to Africa. Many petitions and counter-petitions from interested parties were circulated during a period of intense debate on the future of the African trade. L. F. Stock (ed.), *Proceedings and Debates in the British Parliament Respecting North America* (4 vols, Washington, D.C., Carnegie Institute of Washington Publications no. 338, 1924-41), vol. 3, pp. 202-9.
- p. 20, ll. 2-4: *by virtue of an Act of Parliament imposing Ten per Cent upon all Goods exported to any Part of Africa, and Five Pounds per cent upon all imported from Africa into Britain*: A statute relating to the slave trade in 1698 (9 & 10 Will. 3 c.26) opened the trade to Africa to private traders, who until 1712 were required to pay a 10 per cent tax to the Collector of Customs at the port from which their vessel cleared. The levy was based on the value of all goods imported into and exported from Africa, apart from redwood, which paid 5 per cent, and gold, silver and slaves, which were free. The act is reprinted in Elizabeth Donnan (ed.), *Documents Illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade to America* (4 vols, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1930-5), vol. 1, pp. 421-9.
- p. 21, l. 9: *the Company's Fort on the River Gamboa*: built on James Island, on the Gambia River, in 1652 by Baltic Germans for a company founded by the Duke of Courland, who ruled a territory corresponding to modern Latvia. From 1661 the fort was under the control of the Company of Royal Adventurers Trading into Africa.
- p. 26, l. 11: *Bars, the Nominal Money of that Country*: Iron, copper and brass bars were used as monetary units on different parts of the west African coast. Business with these monies of account was transacted on the basis of commodity currency. Africans and Europeans established a price in bars or other units of account for export goods and then agreed how many of those units were equivalent to one slave or a unit of ivory, gold, redwood or other commodities.
- p. 27, l. 1: *Barra*: a kingdom on the north bank of the River Gambia.
- p. 28, ll. 23-6: *In the Year 1704 by a private Negotiation between the Royal African Company of Great Britain ... and the French Senegal Company ... an amicable*

- Treaty was clandestinely procur'd*: the result of an attempt to reduce the hostility between the two companies over trade on the west African coast. Articles of neutrality were signed in June 1705 by the directors of both companies. J. M. Gray, *A History of the Gambia* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1940), p. 144.
- p. 28, l. 35: *the Young Margaret*: this vessel sailed from London, picked up slaves in Senegambia in March 1707, and disembarked 265 slaves in Maryland in August 1707. David Eltis, Stephen D. Behrendt, David Richardson and Herbert S. Klein, *The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade: A Database on CD-ROM* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999), voyage id no. 20806.
- p. 29, l. 43: *Goree*: a small island measuring c. 65 acres located in the Atlantic Ocean two miles west of Senegal's capital city, Dakar. Goree had various European owners. The Dutch claimed it for the longest period, from 1602 to 1779.
- p. 34, l. 2: *Serrelion and Sherbro*: both of these places had RAC settlements. In 1672 the RAC built a weak fort at Bance (sometimes 'Bunce' or 'Bence') Island, near the mouth of the Sierra Leone River but this was taken and wrecked by the French in 1704. The RAC abandoned the site in 1728 after an Afro-Portuguese trader drove out the agent, set fire to the magazine, and burned down the fort. There was an English establishment at Sherbro, which consisted of just a stone house inside an earthwork; but this was in ruins by 1726. No forts stood within 700 miles of Sherbro to the south and east.
- p. 36, l. 3: *Dicky's Cove*: the English began to settle at Dixcove in late 1684 and built their fort there between 1692 and 1698.
- p. 36, l. 7: *Succande*: *Succundee* (Sekondi) was the westernmost RAC factory on the Gold Coast in the 1680s, re-established after a period of abandonment in 1683. It was rebuilt and from the mid-1680s was known as a fort. It mainly traded in gold, though it also took some slaves.
- p. 36, l. 10: *Commenda*: The first English trading post at Komenda was founded in 1663. It was a ruin by 1686 and was then reconstructed by the English. By the 1720s it was the largest and strongest English fort in Africa, except for Cape Coast Castle.
- p. 36, l. 16: *Cabo Corsoe*: named after the Portuguese phrase for 'short cape', this fort was originally built by the Swedish Africa Company in 1652 and named Fort Carolusburg. The fort changed ownership many times before 1664 when a joint Anglo-Danish force captured it from the Dutch. The British rebuilt the fort and renamed it Cape Coast Castle. From 1674 it served as the headquarters of the RAC in Africa and remained continuously in British hands.
- p. 36, l. 34: *Fort Royal, or Dean's Hill*: originally the Danish fort Fredriksborg, near Cape Coast Castle. This was in ruins when the English bought it from the Danes in 1688.
- p. 36, l. 40: *Winebah*: The RAC had a factory at Winneba the mid-1670s but it was destroyed in 1679. It was mainly important as a source of slaves rather than gold.
- p. 36, l. 41: *Annamabo*: the Swedes, Dutch, Danes and English competed for this site from 1640 onwards after the collapse of the Portuguese monopoly. Anomabu became the principal factory of the RAC on the Gold Coast after Cape Coast Castle. Situated in the state of Fante, it was fortified in the early 1680s and

- known by the name of Charles Fort. It mainly traded in gold but also supplied slaves and corn for slave ships.
- p. 37, l. 1: Accra: James Fort, Accra, on the eastern Gold Coast, was occupied by the RAC from the 1670s onwards.
- p. 37, l. 7: Annashan: A small RAC factory at Anashan was abandoned in 1682, briefly reoccupied during 1684–5, and abandoned again by the start of 1686. It supplied gold and corn for provisioning slave vessels.
- p. 37, l. 13: Aaga: or Agga (Egya) east of Anomabu, in Fante.
- p. 37, l. 20: *Queen Ann's Point*: a distant outpost of Cape Coast Castle.
- p. 37, l. 31: Quedah: or Akwida, a port on Cape Three Points.
- p. 45, l. 25: *Dutch Interlopers*: No European power held any legal title to land in west Africa and so interloping ships seeking slaves, gold and other commodities were a common feature of trade there.
- p. 45, l. 42–p. 46, l. 1: *the Gentleman who appear'd on the behalf of the Royal African Company at the Bar of the House of Commons last Sessions of Parliament*: Between 1708 and 1712 the RAC turned to Parliament for assistance with its financial problems and for a restoration of its monopoly in the face of vigorous competition from private traders.
- p. 49, ll. 27–8: *Negroes at present in Barbadoes are computed to amount to Seventy nine Thousand*: this is considerably higher than another contemporary estimate of 41,970 slaves in Barbados in 1712. F. W. Pitman, *The Development of the British West Indies, 1700-1763* (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1917), p. 372.
- p. 51, ll. 1–3: *in the Years 1700, 1701, 1702 ... there were imported only into Barbadoes, Jamaica, and Antegoa, 42000 and odd Negroes*: this appears to be an accurate estimate. The most recent cumulation of the imputed number of slaves disembarked in these Caribbean islands for 1770, 1701 and 1702 adds up to 17,397 for Barbados, 18,405 for Jamaica, and 5,974 for Antigua (i.e. 41,776 slaves). Eltis *et al*, *The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade*.
- p. 51, ll. 28–31: *the Separate Traders had imported into Maryland upwards of six thousand Negroes, the Company never having sent one thither since they were a Joint-Stock*: a circular return from the Governor of Maryland agreed that no slaves had been imported to that colony by the RAC between 1698 and 25 December 1707, but stated that in the same period the separate traders had disembarked 2,290 slaves in Maryland. Cecil Headlam (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies, June 1708-1709 Preserved in the Public Record Office* (London, H.M.S.O., 1922), no. 197, p. 151.
- p. 53, l. 11: Oroonoka: Oronoco was a dark-leafed tobacco, seldom stripped and generally poor in quality. It was grown throughout the Chesapeake, but particularly in Maryland and backcountry areas of Virginia, and was suitable for consumption in continental Europe.
- p. 55, l. 43: *our late united Brethren of North Britain*: a reference to the formal Anglo-Scottish Union of 1707 that established Great Britain. North Britain is Scotland.

The Case of the Royal African Company of England (1730)

- p. 63, l. 9–10: *fort on the Island of Arguin*: this unimportant settlement was the first Portuguese trading post in Africa, on the Saharan island of Arguin.
- p. 63, l. 11: *St. George del Mina*: The second Portuguese fort constructed in Africa was Elmina Castle on the Gold Coast, named after St George, the patron saint of Portugal. Founded in 1482, this was the largest fortified structure in Africa. It was a coastal town with strategic trade connections. P. E. H. Hair, *The Founding of the Castelo de São Jorge da Mina* (Madison, WI, University of Wisconsin, 1994).
- p. 63, l. 12: *Loango St. Pauls*: a focal point for Portuguese slave-trading on the Loango coast of Angola.
- p. 64, ll. 6–7: *London Merchants fitted out the first English Ships that ever traded to Guinea*: The earliest documented English voyages to Guinea, made in the 1530s, were apparently voyages to Brazil that only touched Africa *en route*. The first well-documented English voyage to West Africa was in 1553. Similar voyages, trading for gold, ivory or pepper, occurred into the early years of Elizabeth I's reign. Sir John Hawkins made the earliest-known English slave voyages to Africa between 1564 and 1569 (see Volume 1, this series).
- p. 64, ll. 20–2: *Queen Elizabeth ... erected a Company*: Elizabeth I established a company in 1587/8 to trade with Senegal and Gambia: a charter was issued to the Senegal Adventurers, which originally had only eight members. The charter gave these businessmen a monopoly over trade between the rivers Senegal and Gambia for a period of ten years.
- p. 65, l. 12: *Cormantine*: see note above: p. 10, l. 27.
- p. 65, ll. 12–13: *another in the River Gambia*: see note above: p. 21, l. 9.
- p. 65, l. 21: *the West-India Company*: see note above: p. 13, ll. 15–16.
- p. 65, ll. 27–9: *the Streights of Magellan ... to the Streights of Anian*: situated at the southern tip of Argentina just above Tierra del Fuego and discovered by the explorer Ferdinand Magellan in 1520.
- p. 66, ll. 7–11: *in the Year 1637 they took the strong Fortress of St. George del Mina ... and in a Year or two more, all the other Portuguese Forts and Settlements*: The Dutch and the Portuguese competed for gold and slaves in west Africa at this time. In 1637 the Dutch captured St George's castle, Elmina from the Portuguese. This was carried out by a naval force sent by Prince Johan Maurits, the governor-general of Brazil. This marked the end of an era, for the Portuguese had been at Elmina for 160 years.
- p. 66, ll. 12–13: *the Treaty of Truce and Navigation concluded, Anno 1641*: a temporary peace in the conflict between the Dutch Republic and Portugal. It amounted to a ten-year truce secured on 12 June 1641 (though it was not implemented in Brazil until 1642 or in the Far East until 1644).
- p. 66, l. 21: *Whydah*: modern Ouidah, in the Bight of Benin. The RAC had a factory there from 1682 onwards. This establishment was mainly important for slaves.
- p. 68, ll. 16–17: *the Company of Royal Adventurers of England trading into Africa*: see note above: p. 7, ll. 24–6.

- p. 68, ll. 25–6: *under the Command of Captain Holmes*: During the second Anglo-Dutch war an English fleet under Robert Holmes took most of the Dutch settlements on the Gold Coast except Elmina; but these were soon recovered by the Dutch.
- p. 69, l. 26: *Prince Rupert*: (1619–82), a nephew of Charles I, who was commander of the Royalist cavalry during the English Civil War. He was appointed general of the Royalist army in November 1644. He retired to Germany between 1652 and 1660 but then returned to England and was appointed to King Charles II's Privy Council. Between 1673 and 1679 Prince Rupert was First Lord of the Admiralty.
- p. 70, l. 5: *De Ruyter*: see note above: p. 7, ll. 32–3.
- p. 72, ll. 4–5: *on the Twenty second Day of February, 1664–5, his Majesty declared War*: see note above: p. 7, l. 28.
- p. 72, l. 22: *Breda*: Charles II concluded a peace with the Dutch at the Treaty of Breda on 31 July 1667 after two-and-a-half years of the second Anglo-Dutch war of the mid-seventeenth century. The English retained their one main conquest of the war – New Amsterdam, renamed New York – while the Dutch gained concessions to trading rights in English possessions.
- p. 72, l. 30: *Cabo Corso*: see note above: p. 36, l. 16.
- p. 74, ll. 8–9: *incorporate the present ROYAL AFRICAN COMPANY*: see note above: p. 8, ll. 12–15.
- p. 75, l. 12: *Cormantine*: see note above: p. 10, l. 27.
- p. 75, l. 14: *Fort St. Anthony*: originally a Portuguese fort (Fort São Antonio) at Axim. It was a ruin when the Dutch captured it in c. 1642.
- p. 75, l. 15: *Fort St. Sebastian*: originally a Portuguese fort at Shama, built c. 1550. It was a ruin when the Dutch captured it. In 1664 the English wrested it from the Dutch.
- p. 75, l. 16: *Fort Nassau*: situated at Mouri, in Fante country, this was the first Dutch fort to be built on the Gold Coast. It was constructed in 1612 and taken over in 1621 by the Dutch West India Company from the state and renamed after the Stadholders 'Nassau'. The Dutch reconditioned the fort in the mid-1660s.
- p. 75, l. 18: *Creveceur*: the Dutch lodge of 'Little Accra' was transformed into a fort in 1649 and named after a famous fortress at Bois-le-Duc, Crèvecoeur. The fort was strengthened by the Dutch in the mid-1660s. It is nowadays known as Ussher Fort.
- p. 75, l. 19: *Fort Conraadsburg*: a strong fort built on St Jago Hill in the 1660s next to the site of Elmina. It only had military quarters and was the only major coastal fort in west Africa constructed for military purposes.
- p. 75, l. 24: *Fort Royal*: see note above: p. 36, l. 34.
- p. 75, l. 26: *Acra*: see note above: p. 37, l. 1.
- p. 75, ll. 27–9: *The Elector of Brandenburg ... had one good Fort, at Cape Three-Points, and two smaller ones*: Brandenburg was the last European state to enter the slave trade in the seventeenth century. A Brandenburg African Company was formed in 1682, with headquarters at Emden. The main Brandenburg forts on the Gold Coast were Gross-Friedrichsburg, Akwida, Takoradi and Takrama. Akwida and Takoradi were formerly occupied by the Dutch West India Com-

- pany. The Dutch recaptured them in 1687; the former was returned to the Brandenburgers in 1690, but Takoradi remained in Dutch hands. From 1687 the Brandenburgers also occupied Arguin, an island in modern northwestern Mauritania, previously occupied by the Portuguese and the Dutch. Adam Jones, *Brandenburg Sources for West African History 1680-1700*, Studien zur Kulturkunde 77 (Stuttgart, F. Steiner-Verlag-Wiesbaden, 1985), pp. 1-4, 7-8.
- p. 77, ll. 4-5: long War *which ensued with France*: the War of the League of Augsburg (1689-97), sometimes referred to as the Nine Years' War or King William's War. The war involved military conflict in Europe, the Americas and the high seas. Louis XIV's France was pitted against the allies that made up the League of Augsburg, formed in 1686: England and Scotland, the United Provinces and Austria.
- p. 78, ll. 3-4: Treaty of Nemiguen: the Treaty of Nijmegen (1678) concluded war between France and the Dutch Republic, a conflict that began when France invaded Holland in 1672.
- p. 78, l. 5: *the Senegal Company*: see note above: p. 13, ll. 25-7.
- p. 78, l. 10: *the Guinea Company*: see note above: p. 13, ll. 25-7.
- p. 78, l. 19: *the French King gave them the Contract*: refers to the *asiento*, granted by the King of Spain to France in 1702 to deliver slaves to Spanish colonies. The Spanish did not commit their own shipping to carrying slaves. France held the *asiento* until 1713. They agreed to supply 4,000 slaves per annum to Spanish America but were unable to meet this target.
- p. 78, ll. 22-3: *that Contract being afterwards transferred to Great Britain*: At the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), which concluded the War of the Spanish Succession, Britain won the right to this contract (*asiento*) to supply slaves to the Spanish American colonies. The South Sea Company, founded in London in 1711, acquired this right by paying the British government £7,500,000. The contract allowed the company to deliver a maximum of 4,700 slaves annually to Spanish America. The arrangement lasted until 1748 but was inactive when Britain and Spain were in conflict, notably between 1739 and 1748. Between 1714 and 1739 the South Sea Company delivered almost 75,000 slaves to various ports in Cuba and South America. Colin A. Palmer, *Human Cargoes: The British Slave Trade to Spanish America, 1700-1739* (Champaign-Urbana, IL, University of Illinois Press, 1981), pp. 9, 11, 110-11; Elizabeth Donnan, 'The Early Days of the South Sea Company, 1711-1718', *Journal of Economic and Business History*, 2 (1930), pp. 419-50; Jean O. McLachlan, *Trade and Peace with Old Spain 1667-1750: A Study of the Influence of Commerce on Anglo-Spanish Diplomacy in the first half of the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1940), pp. 59, 61.
- p. 79, ll. 24-5: *the Loss of their Fort in the River Gambia*: James Fort surrendered to a French naval squadron in 1695 even though it had plenty of food, water and ammunition. The French exploded the fort with mines.
- p. 80, ll. 15-16: *a Duty of Ten per cent ad Valorem*: see note above: p. 20, ll. 2-4.
- p. 81, l. 19: *Decay of the Gold Trade*: Contemporary reports suggest that the gold trade along the Gold Coast declined by as much as 50 per cent between 1700 and 1720. J. K. Fynn, *Asante and its Neighbours 1700-1807* (London, Longman, 1971), pp. 14-15.

- p. 83, ll. 16–17: *brought upon themselves a War with this Kingdom in 1664*: see note above: p. 7, l. 28.
- p. 82, ll. 25–6: *Garrisons at Annapolis Royal and Placentia*: Annapolis Royal was a garrison in Nova Scotia. Britain did not have a substantial seaport and military establishment on Nova Scotia until the founding of Halifax in 1749. Until 1713 Placentia, in Newfoundland, was a French military and fishing establishment. It transferred to British hands with the British acquisition of Newfoundland at the Treaty of Utrecht (1713).
- p. 92, l. 30: *Gibraltar and Port Mahon*: The naval bases at Gibraltar and Port Mahon, Minorca were captured by Britain during the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–13) and confirmed as British possessions at the Treaty of Utrecht. They became the foci of British naval squadrons in the western Mediterranean for much of the eighteenth century.

Charles Hayes, *The Importance of Effectually Supporting the Royal African Company of England Impartially Consider'd* (1744)

- p. 104, l. 1: *a War with this Kingdom, in 1664*: see note above: p. 7, l. 28.
- p. 104, l. 15: *Islands of Arguin and Goree*: see notes above: p. 63, ll. 9–10; p. 29, l. 43.
- p. 105, ll. 6–8: *They have of late Years come in great Numbers, and trade at a Place called Anamaboe*: see note above: p. 36, l. 41. In the period 1741–5 an imputed 11,149 captives from the Gold Coast were loaded aboard French vessels whereas only 3,082 slaves from the same region were taken by British ships. Eltis *et al*, *The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade*.
- p. 105, l. 8: *Cape Coast Castle*: see note above: p. 36, l. 16.
- p. 105, l. 27: *the India Company of Paris*: the Compagnie des Indes, founded by John Law in 1717, was supported by Parisian bankers and financiers. This firm enjoyed a monopoly over French slaving from 1722 to 1725 and sent out over 100 slaving vessels before the War of the Austrian Succession. The Compagnie des Indes ceased slaving in 1748.
- p. 108, ll. 11–12: *When the Dutch in 1637 took and possess'd themselves of the strong fortress of St. George del Mina*: see note above: p. 63, l. 11.
- p. 108, l. 30–p. 109, l. 1: *a Man of War to be fitted out to the Coast of Africa commanded by Captain Holmes*: see note above: p. 68, ll. 25–6.
- p. 109, ll. 7–8: *under the command of De Ruyter*: Admiral de Ruyter despoiled an English factory on the Sierra Leone River after getting the RAC to surrender Cape Verde to him in October 1664. George Frederick Zook, *The Company of Royal Adventurers Trading into Africa* (Lancaster, PA, Press of the New Era Printing Co., 1919), p. 65.
- p. 109, ll. 10–11: *took the English fort at Cormantine and put a Dutch Garrison into it*: In 1665 the English surrendered the fort at Kormantin to the Dutch, who changed the name to Fort Amsterdam.
- p. 111, l. 3: *Treaty of Peace, concluded at Breda, 1667*: see note above: p. 72, l. 22.
- p. 112, ll. 11–12: *Fort St. Anthony*: see note above: p. 75, l. 14.
- p. 112, l. 12: *Fort St. Sebastian's*: see note above: p. 75, l. 15.
- p. 112, l. 13: *Fort Nassau*: see note above: p. 75, l. 16.

- p. 112, l. 14: Creveceur: see note above: p. 75, l. 18.
- p. 112, l. 15: Fort Conraadsburg: see note above: p. 75, l. 19.
- p. 112, l. 19: Fort Royal: see note above: p. 36, l. 34.
- p. 112, l. 20: Acra: see note above: p. 37, l. 1.
- p. 112, l. 22: *Fort at Cape Three-Points*: Gross-Friedrichsburg: see note above: p. 75, ll. 27–9.
- p. 112, ll. 24–5: *Fort at Cabo Corso*: see note above: p. 36, l. 16.
- p. 113, l. 2: Dixcove: see note above: p. 36, l. 3.
- p. 113, l. 3: Winnebah: see note above: p. 36, l. 40.
- p. 113, l. 3: Succundee: see note above: p. 36, l. 7.
- p. 113, l. 3: Commenda: see note above: p. 36, l. 10.
- p. 113, l. 6: Fredericksburg: see note above: p. 36, l. 34.
- p. 113, l. 8: *Built another Fort from the Ground at Whydah*: see note above: p. 66, l. 21.
- p. 114, ll. 2–3: *a small Fort on an Island, within the Bar, in the River Senegal*: Fort Saint-Louis, a large, poorly designed fortress that was captured by the English in 1693 and regained by France in 1697.
- p. 114, ll. 4–5: *one small Fort in the River Gambia, and another Settlement in the River Sierraleon*: see notes above: p. 21, l. 9; p. 34, l. 2.
- p. 114, l. 12: *Treaty of Nemiguen*: see note above: p. 78, ll. 3–4.
- p. 114, l. 13: *the Senegal Company*: see note above: p. 13, ll. 25–7.
- p. 114, l. 16: *the Guinea Company*: see note above: p. 13, ll. 25–7.
- p. 114, l. 23: *the Contract made with Spain*: see note above: p. 78, ll. 22–3.
- p. 114, l. 25: *Treaty of Utrecht*: see note above: p. 78, ll. 22–3.
- p. 115, ll. 15–16: *a War broke out between the two Nations*: the War of the League of Augsburg, which began in 1689: see note above: p. 77, ll. 4–5.
- p. 117, ll. 13–14: Assiento Contract: see note above: p. 78, l. 19.
- p. 121, ll. 17–18: *the House of Commons came to the following Resolutions*: it was agreed by the government that a subsidy of £10,000 should be given to the RAC to help keep its west African forts in a defensible position. The same sum was granted annually until 1743.
- p. 124, ll. 24–5: *the French have several Settlements and Plantations for a great Way up the River*: situated along a hundred-mile inland stretch of the River Sénégal, most of these French ports (such as Podor) and forts (such as Saint-Joseph) belonged to French privileged trading companies. Slaves from these areas were often shipped downriver to Saint-Louis.
- p. 124, l. 31: *Fort on James Island*: see note above: p. 21, l. 9.
- p. 125, l. 7: *Fort on Bence Island*: In 1748, after years of neglect, Bance Island (see note above: p. 34, l. 2) became the African rendezvous of a London-based slave-trading syndicate: see David Hancock, *Citizens of the World: London Merchants and the Integration of the British Atlantic Community, 1735–1785* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 172–220, and idem, 'Scots in the Slave Trade' in Ned C. Landsman (ed.), *Nation and Province in the First British Empire: Scotland and the Americas, 1600–1800* (Lewisburg, PA, Bucknell University Press, 2001), pp. 60–93.
- p. 125, l. 11: *Fort on York Island*: near the mouth of the Sherbro River: see note above: p. 34, l. 2.

- p. 125, l. 13: Ancobra: The Dutch had a lodge on top of Mount Ankobra, overlooking the mouth of the river of that name. The lodge was abandoned in 1711.
- p. 126, l. 1: *BUTTEROE*: Butri was a Dutch fort between Dixcove and Takoradi.
- p. 126, l. 4: *TACQUERADO*: The Dutch had a fort at Takoradi which they renamed Batenstein.
- p. 126, l. 13: *SHUMAH*: or Shama, a Portuguese fort on the Gold Coast, built around 1550, and captured by the Dutch c. 1642.
- p. 127, l. 1: *PHIPP'S TOWER*: an outpost of Cape Coast Castle, dating from 1721.
- p. 127, l. 9: *MOUREA*: see note above: p. 75, l. 16.
- p. 127, l. 12: *ANNISHAN*: see note above: p. 37, l. 7.
- p. 127, l. 29: *ANAMABOE*: see note above: p. 36, l. 41.
- p. 127, l. 32: *AGGA*: see note above: p. 37, l. 13.
- p. 127, l. 39: *TANTUMQUERRY*: An English fort was constructed at Tantumkweri between 1699 and 1702 and extended in 1721.
- p. 127, l. 42: *APONG*: or Apam, a Dutch fort between Anomabu and Winneba.
- p. 128, l. 4: *BARRACOE*: or Beraku, a Dutch fort on the Gold Coast between Winneba and Shido.
- p. 128, l. 7: *SHIDOE*: an English lodge on the Gold Coast.
- p. 128, l. 10: *ACRA*: see note above: p. 37, l. 1.
- p. 128, l. 12: *ACRA*: see note above: p. 75, l. 18.
- p. 128, l. 14: *ALLAMPO*: i.e. Adangme, the ethnic group occupying this section of the coast. The factory was at modern Lekpongou on the coast to the east of Accra.
- p. 128, l. 17: *QUITTAH*: Keta was an English factory to the east of the River Volta.
- p. 129, l. 8: *JACQUIN*: Jakin (modern Golomey), on the Slave Coast between Whydah and Offra.
- p. 129, l. 11: *CABENDA*: Cabinda, on the Loango Coast, Angola.
- p. 130, ll. 26–8: *opens a Trade to Fetue, Saboe, Cabestera, Arcania, Cuffera, Dankera, and Ashantee*: all kingdoms on the Gold Coast. Fetu was an eastern neighbour of Eguafo, in whose vicinity lay Cape Coast Castle. Saboe (Asebu) lay between Fetu and Fante. Cabestera (Kabestera) was an independent state inland from Fante that was absorbed into Fante in the early eighteenth century. Arcania (Akani) was in the interior and known for its gold traders. Cuffera refers to Twifo, a kingdom inland from Komenda. Dankera (Denkyira) became a powerful nation in wars fought in the late seventeenth century. It also built up its power through gold mines, revenue from trade, taxes and tolls. Ashantee (Asante) was a powerful kingdom that c. 1700 had conquered the majority of earlier states and had turned its attention to controlling trade routes to the coast. Some of these kingdoms are shown on a map of the Gold Coast dated 1629: see Kwame Yeboah Daaku, *Trade and Politics on the Gold Coast 1600-1720* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 199.
- p. 131, ll. 18–19: *the Fanteen's Country*: a coastal state on the Gold Coast that became powerful in the early eighteenth century. In 1700 its population totalled c. 200,000.

- p. 132, l. 1: Akim: Akyem was situated in the interior of the Gold Coast, to the north-east of Fante.
- p. 132, l. 2: Anguina: or Agona, to the east of Fante on the Gold Coast.
- p. 132, l. 23: Quambo: or Akwamu, which controlled Accra until it was defeated and overthrown in 1730.
- p. 132, l. 24: Aquawoa: probably Kwawu, inland from Akyem/Akwamu.
- p. 133, l. 13: Abrambo: or Abrem, an Akan state north-east of Twifo.
- p. 133, l. 15: Antee *Country*: Ahanta, in which Sekondi is situated.
- p. 133, l. 31: Awawee: presumably Aowin, inland north-west of Ahanta.
- p. 133, ll. 31–2: Warsaw: Wasa, inland from Ahanta.
- p. 133, l. 32: Dawakray: probably Denkyira, see note above: p. 130, ll. 26–8.
- p. 140, l. 32: Annapolis-Royal: see note above: p. 82, ll. 25–6.
- p. 141, l. 1: Placentia: see note above: p. 82, ll. 25–6.
- p. 141, ll. 2–3: Gibraltar *and* Port Mahone: see note above: p. 92, l. 30.

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- p. 151, l. 13: Lords Commissioners of Trade: i.e. the Board of Trade, established in 1696.
- p. 158, l. 19: *The French Senegal Company*: see note above: p. 13, ll. 25–7.
- p. 164, ll. 21–2: *the Palatines*: Large numbers of immigrants from the Palatine area of the German states, notably along the River Rhine, emigrated to Pennsylvania in the 1720s. Attracted by religious toleration and economic opportunity, they comprised the core of the Pennsylvania Dutch (i.e. Deutsch) population.
- p. 165, l. 1: Doctor Davenant: Charles Davenant (1656–1714) was MP for St Ives, Cornwall (1685) and for Great Bodmin (1690 and 1700). He was Commissioner of the Excise, 1678–89, and Inspector General of Exports and Imports from 1705 until his death. He wrote extensively on politics and economics from a mercantilist perspective. His works include *Reflections upon the Constitution and Management of the Trade to Africa, through the whole course and progress thereof, from the beginning of the last century, to this time* (London, John Morphew, 1709). D. Waddell, 'Charles Davenant (1665–1714) – a biographical sketch', *Economic History Review*, 2nd series, 7 (1958), pp. 279–88; Basil Duke Henning (ed.), *The History of Parliament: The House of Commons 1660–1690* (3 vols, London, Secker & Warburg, 1983), vol. 2, p. 196.
- p. 168, l. 28: Sir Josiah Child: an English merchant, economist and governor of the East India Company (c. 1630–99). He was MP for Petersfield (1659), Dartmouth (1673–8) and Ludlow (1685–7) and was made a baronet in 1678. He made various proposals for improving British trade by following the Dutch example. William Letwin, *Sir Josiah Child, Merchant Economist. With a reprint of Brief Observations concerning Trade, and Interest of money, 1668* (Boston, MA, Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, 1959); Henning (ed.), *History of Parliament*, vol. 2, pp. 57–9.
- p. 169, ll. 8–9: East India Company: see note above: p. 6, ll. 2–3.
- p. 169, l. 19: South-Sea Company: see note above: p. 78, ll. 22–3.
- p. 169, l. 24: *the Assiento*: see note above: p. 78, l. 19.

- p. 170, l. 11: *Peace of Utrecht*: see note above: p. 78, ll. 22–3.
- p. 171, ll. 16–18: *the Act which granted 10 per Cent ... expired*: see note above: p. 20, ll. 2–4.
- p. 173, l. 12: New-Spain: i.e. colonial Mexico. The vice-royalty of New Spain was a sixteenth-century creation.
- p. 173, l. 23: *Pieces of Eight*: Spanish silver coins also known as pesos. This was the main coin used in the Atlantic world of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It was first minted in 1497 and eventually became the dollar that formed the unit of that denomination in the monetary system of the United States. John J. McCusker, *Money and Exchange in Europe and America, 1600-1775* (London, Macmillan, 1978), p. 7.
- p. 176, l. 9: *Potosí*: Fabulously rich silver deposits were discovered at Potosí (in modern Bolivia) in 1545.
- p. 187, l. 4: *Fort on James Island*: see note above: p. 21, l. 9.

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- p. 209, ll. 4–5: Leo Africanus: born in Granada in 1485 of Moorish extraction and died in Tunis in 1554. He was commissioned by Pope Leo X to write, in Italian, a detailed survey of Africa. Completed in 1526, it is the most authoritative source for the political and human geography of the Barbary Coast and Sudanic Africa until the beginning of European exploration and expansion. Pekka Masonen, 'Leo Africanus: The Man with Many Names', *Al-Andalus-Magreb. Revista de estudios árabe islámicos*, 7–9 (2002), pp. 115–43; Robert Brown (ed.), *The History and Description of Africa and of the Notable Things therein contained, written by Al-Hassan Ibn-Mohammed Al-Wezaz Al-Fasi, A Moor, baptised as Giovanni Leone, but better known as Leo Africanus. Done into English in the Year 1600, by John Pory* (Hakluyt Society, 1st series 11, vols 92–4, London, 1895–6).
- p. 209, ll. 19–20: Prete-Janny: i.e. Prester John, a mythical potentate that Europeans in the fifteenth century vaguely referred to as the ruler of a powerful realm in the 'Indies' (a term that included Asia as well as Africa).
- p. 209, l. 30: Potozi: see note above: p. 176, l. 9.
- p. 211, l. 3: Vancara: presumably Wangara, the semi-mythical land in the interior believed to be the source of west African gold (the gold of Palolus).
- p. 211, ll. 29–30: Jean Baptiste Labat: a Dominican missionary (1664–1738) who visited the French West Indies and wrote a six-volume history of that region entitled *Nouveau Voyage aux isles Françaises de l'Amérique* (Paris, 1722). He had a wide reputation as a mathematician and was also known as a naturalist and scientist. The descriptions of the African gold mines in this section of Postlethwayt's work (pp. 213–17) are taken from Labat's *Nouvelle Relation de l'Afrique occidentale* (Paris, 1728), vol. 4, the first of two well-known books on Africa by the French missionary.
- p. 220, l. 19: Arguin: see note above: p. 63, l. 9–10.
- p. 220, l. 12: St. George Del Mina: see note above: p. 63, l. 11.
- p. 220, l. 13: Luango St. Paul's: see note above: p. 63, l. 12.
- p. 222, l. 12: Cormantine: see note above: p. 10, l. 27.

- p. 222, l. 13: *another on the River Gambia*: see note above: p. 21, l. 9.
- p. 224, ll. 15–16: *Sir George Downing*: a wealthy English diplomat (1623–84) who received a baronetcy in 1663. He was ambassador to Holland under Oliver Cromwell and Charles II. He was also Secretary of the Treasury Commission between 1667 and 1671. He owned Downing Street, London, which is named after him.
- pp. 225–9: Details of these ships seized by the Dutch can be found in Eltis *et al*, *The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade*.
- p. 231, l. 6: *De Ruyter's Hostilities in Africa*: see note above: p. 109, ll. 7–8.
- p. 231, ll. 30–1: *Treaty of Peace concluded at Breda, 1667*: see note above: p. 72, l. 22.
- p. 233, ll. 7–8: *Fort Amsterdam*: see note above: p. 109, ll. 10–11.
- p. 233, l. 9: *Fort St. Anthony*: see note above: p. 75, l. 14.
- p. 233, p. 10: *Fort St. Sebastian*: see note above: p. 75, l. 15.
- p. 233, l. 11: *Fort Nassau*: see note above: p. 75, l. 16.
- p. 233, l. 13: *Cape Coast Castle*: see note above: p. 36, l. 16.
- p. 233, l. 13: *Creveceur*: see note above: p. 75, l. 18.
- p. 233, ll. 14–15: *Fort Conradsburg*: see note above: p. 75, l. 19.
- p. 233, l. 21: *Fort Royal*: see note above: p. 36, l. 34.
- p. 233, l. 23: *Acra*: see note above: p. 37, l. 1.
- p. 233, l. 28: *Cape Three-Points*: see note above: p. 75, ll. 27–9.
- p. 233, ll. 31–2: *Cabo Corso*: see note above: p. 36, l. 16.
- p. 234, l. 13: *DIXCOVE*: see note above: p. 36, l. 3.
- p. 234, l. 14: *WINNEBAH*: see note above: p. 36, l. 40.
- p. 234, ll. 14–15: *SUCCUNDEE*: see note above: p. 36, l. 7.
- p. 234, l. 15: *COMMENDA*: see note above: p. 36, l. 10.
- p. 234, l. 17: *ANNAMBOE*: see note above: p. 36, l. 41.
- p. 234, ll. 20–1: *Fredericksburg, now FORT-ROYAL*: see note above: p. 36, l. 34.
- p. 234, l. 24: *WHYDAH*: see note above: p. 66, l. 21.
- p. 237, ll. 1–3: *the French took the Dutch Forts on the Islands of Arguin, and Goree*: see notes above: p. 63, l. 9–10; p. 29, l. 43.
- p. 237, ll. 4–5: *Treaty of Nimiguen*: see note above: p. 78, ll. 3–4.
- p. 237, ll. 6–7: *the Senegal Company*: see note above: p. 13, ll. 25–7.
- p. 237, ll. 12–13: *the Guinea Company*: see note above: p. 13, ll. 25–7.
- p. 237, ll. 21–2: *the French King gave them the Contract*: see note above: p. 78, l. 19.
- p. 237, ll. 24–5: *that Contract being afterwards transferred to Great-Britain*: see note above: p. 78, ll. 22–3.
- p. 238, ll. 21–2: *Loss of their Fort in the River Gambia*: see note above: p. 79, ll. 24–5.
- p. 245, ll. 4–5: *a War with this Kingdom in 1664*: see note above: p. 7, l. 28.
- p. 251, l. 4: *maintaining Gibraltar and Port Mahon*: see note above: p. 92, l. 30.
- p. 252, l. 19: *Risum teneatis*: carry on laughing.
- p. 258, l. 19: *CUTCHEO and BISSEO*: i.e. Cacheu and Bissau, both south-east of the River Gambia. The Portuguese built a fort at Cacheu in 1587–8. In 1641 it was strongly fortified. The Portuguese erected a fort at Bissau in 1766.
- p. 258, l. 22: *ANCOBRA*: see note above: p. 125, l. 13.

- p. 258, l. 25: *AXIM*: Fort St Anthony: see note above: p. 75, l. 14.
- p. 259, l. 8: *BUTTEROE*: see note above: p. 126, l. 1.
- p. 259, l. 11: *TACQUERADO*: see note above: p. 126, l. 4.
- p. 259, l. 17: *SHUMAH*: see note above: p. 126, l. 13.
- p. 259, l. 28: *ST. JAGO*: Fort Conraadsburg: see note above: p. 75, l. 19.
- p. 260, l. 1: *MOUREA*: see note above: p. 75, l. 16.
- p. 260, l. 10: *APONG*: see note above: p. 127, l. 42.
- p. 260, l. 13: *BARRACOE*: see note above: p. 128, l. 4.
- p. 262, ll. 18–20: *opens a Trade to* Fetu, Saboe, Cabestera, Arcaina, Caffera, Dankera, and Ashantee: see note above: p. 130, ll. 26–8.
- p. 262, l. 29: *PHIPP'S TOWER*: see note above: p. 127, l. 1.
- p. 263, l. 6: *QUEEN ANN'S POINT*: see note above: p. 37, l. 20.
- p. 263, l. 9: *ANNAMABOE FORT*: see note above: p. 36, l. 41.
- p. 263, l. 21: *Fanteen's Country*: see note above: p. 131, ll. 18–19.
- p. 263, l. 25: *TANTUMQUERRY FORT*: see note above: p. 127, l. 39.
- p. 264, l. 7: *Akim*: see note above: p. 132, l. 1.
- p. 264, l. 7: *Anguina*: see note above: p. 132, l. 2.
- p. 265, l. 6: *Quambo*: see note above: p. 132, l. 23.
- p. 265, l. 7: *Aguawon*: see note above: p. 132, l. 24.
- p. 265, l. 9: *WILLIAM'S FORT* at Whydah: see note above: p. 66, l. 21.
- p. 266, ll. 4–5: *Kingdom of* Cafferoes, Dankaries, Ashantees, Arcania, Acqua, and Abrambo: Acqua is inland from Fante on the Gold Coast. For the other states see notes above: p. 130, ll. 26–8; p. 133, l. 13.
- p. 267, l. 3: *Awawee*: see note above: p. 133, l. 31.
- p. 267, l. 3: *Warsaw*: see note above: p. 133, ll. 31–2.
- p. 267, l. 3: *Dawakray*: probably Denkyira: see note above: p. 130, ll. 26–8.
- p. 267, l. 13: *JAMES FORT and ISLAND*: see note above: p. 37, l. 1.
- p. 267, l. 26: *Tancrowall*: modern Tankular, inland from the Gambian coast.
- p. 267, l. 26: *Joar*: inland from the Gambian coast.
- p. 267, ll. 26–7: *Yanamarew*: now Niani-Moro, twenty-five miles upstream from Joar, an inland settlement in the hinterland of James Fort, Gambia.
- p. 267, l. 27: *Casau*: i.e. Kasang.
- p. 267, l. 27: *Bruco*: Bruco rocks were upriver from Kasang.
- p. 267, l. 27: *Cuttelar*: Cuttejar near present-day Karantabaa, in the middle of the Gambia River.
- p. 267, l. 27: *Samy*: Sami or Sama Port, near the River Gambia.
- p. 267, l. 27: *Wally*: i.e. Wuli, a kingdom north of the Gambia River.
- p. 267, l. 28: *Yamyamacunda*: the RAC had a warehouse there on the Gambia River.
- p. 267, l. 28: *Baracunda*: i.e. Baarakunda, some 330 miles upstream from the mouth of the River Gambia.
- p. 268, l. 1: *Bence Island*: see note above: p. 34, l. 2.
- p. 268, l. 12: *Sherbro*: see note above: p. 34, l. 2.
- p. 268, l. 13: *ANNISHAM*: i.e. Anashan: see note above: p. 37, l. 7.
- p. 268, l. 14: *AGGA*: see note above: p. 37, l. 13.
- p. 268, l. 15: *SHIDOE*: see note above: p. 128, l. 7.
- p. 268, l. 16: *ALLAMPO*: see note above: p. 128, l. 14.

- p. 268, l. 17: *QUITTAH*: see note above: p. 128, l. 17.
- p. 268, l. 18: *JACQUIN*: see note above: p. 129, l. 8.
- p. 269, l. 29: Curasso: i.e., Curaçao, a small Dutch Caribbean island situated off the Venezuelan coast.
- p. 277, ll. 27–8: South Sea Company: see note above: p. 78, ll. 22–3.
- p. 289, ll. 15–16: a Duty of Ten per Cent ad Valorem: see note above: p. 20, ll. 2–4.
- p. 291, l. 25–6: *In the Year 1744, the Company petitioned the Parliament*: An RAC petition requesting further parliamentary support for the upkeep of their African forts was presented to the House of Commons on 31 January 1743/4. The petition was referred to a parliamentary committee for consideration. The report received detailed consideration in the Commons on 23 April 1744. *Journals of the House of Commons*, 24 (1741–5), pp. 534, 662–8.
- p. 298, ll. 29–31: *most of the Ships employed in this Trade are now beat out of the Gold Coast and Whydah Trade by the French*: for the French slave trade from the Gold Coast in this period see note above: p. 105, ll. 6–8. Between 1741 and 1745 inclusive, France embarked an imputed 18,399 slaves from the Bight of Benin (which included Whydah) whereas Britain only embarked an imputed 639 African captives from the same region. Eltis *et al*, *The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade*.
- p. 310, ll. 3–4: *The Importation of 4800 Negroes per Annum*: The London-based South Sea Company, which operated the *asiento* after 1713 (see note above: p. 78, ll. 22–3), was required to carry c. 4,800 slaves annually to the Spanish colonies for thirty years.
- p. 310, l. 31: *Indultoos*: fines paid by Spanish colonists on slaves bought illegally. Failure to pay the fine could lead to seizure of the slaves by the Spanish colonial authorities.
- p. 322, l. 9: *Sinking Fund*: a surplus fund set aside to reduce or ‘sink’ the principal of a debt or debts.
- p. 328, l. 8: *Stock-Jobbing*: often used unfavourably as a term denoting dealing in financial transactions for personal gain.

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