MENAS STUDIES IN CONTINUITY & CHANGE

BANDITRY IN ISLAM

Case studies from Morocco, Algeria and the Pakistan North West Frontier

David M. Hart

In 1969, Eric Hobsbawm, the well known Marxist historian, proposed an analysis of banditry that treated the phenomenon as an example of popular protest. Bandits, it appeared, were not simply criminals, preying on rich and poor indiscriminately but were rather individuals whose political protest against prevailing social, political and economic conditions was expressed through a rejection of formal political sanction. Since it was first suggested, this concept has become conventional wisdom in sociological analyses of transitional society.

David Hart, a well known and highly respected structural functional anthropologist, has now applied the 'Hobsbawm thesis' to the Islamic world, to see to what extent the paradigm fits the bandit syndrome there. He has taken examples from Morocco, Algeria and Pakistan, some of them going back to pre-colonial times, in order to see to what extent their activities were in essence primordial political protest. The thesis does not always seem to fit, however, for, although elements of it were often present, there were many other aspects to bandit behaviour.

Menas Studies in Continuity and Change
in the Middle East & North Africa

BANDITRY IN ISLAM

Case Studies from Morocco, Algeria and the Pakistan North West Frontier

by

David Hart

DLE EAST & NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES press I

Published by Middle East & North African Studies
Press Ltd.
Gallipoli House, The Cottons, Outwell, Wisbech,
Cambridgeshire, PE14 8TN, England
1987

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Hart, David, *1927–*
Banditry in Islam : case studies from
Morocco, Algeria and the Pakistan North
West Frontier.—(MENAS studies in
continuity and change)
1. Brigands and robbers—Islamic countries
—History
I. Title
303.6'2 HV6453.I74

ISBN 0-906559-22-7

ISBN 0906 559 22 7

Printed by Whitstable Litho Ltd., Whitstable, Kent

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The idea of writing this study originally came to me in April 1978, during a visit to Morocco and shortly after a five months' field trip in Pakistan and Afghanistan. As the main reason for the Pakistan-Afghanistan trip had been to compare my earlier Moroccan Berber field materials with analogous Pukhtun materials at the other end of the Middle East, it had occurred to me that the question of social banditry - a subject previously uninvestigated in any Islamic context, to my knowledge - might prove to be one fruitful arena of comparison.

I had already amassed considerable incidental information on banditry in Morocco during colonial times, given the nature of my previous research; and there were no problems over acquiring similar information for colonial Algeria. Hence the present monograph, which has been delayed only because of other work already in progress that had prior claims on my time and attention. In this connection, too, I have only one regret: that Eastern Anatolia and Kurdistan, where banditry has also traditionally been rife, could not have been included in this purview, but as I neither speak nor read Turkish (whether Ottoman or Modern) or Kurdish, the relevant archives in Istanbul and Ankara would have remained closed to me.

A few acknowledgments must of course be given for help received along the way. I am indebted both to Dr Ross Dunn of the California State University at San Diego and to Dr Hugh Roberts of the School of Development Studies at the University of East Anglia for informing me about certain valuable source materials which I would otherwise not have been in a position to consult, as well as to Mr Edward Taylor of Tangier, Morocco, for having kindly allowed me to consult, at his house, his copy of Drummond-Hay, **Western Barbary**, published in 1861, particularly useful for the bibliography. My gratitude is also due to Katherine Leclercq who struggled with unfamiliar names and computer equipment to produce the final version of this book. But my biggest debt of gratitude is owed to my wife, Ursula Dorothy Kingsmill Hart, firstly, for having typed up the manuscript and secondly, for having felicitously suggested that as it read easily, it should be published as a monograph or a short book rather than as a long article in some symposium. For these reasons, once again, I dedicate this study to her, with affection and with love.

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

It is now generally recognised that in North Africa in general and in Morocco in particular, transliteration of vernacular terms and names, whether Berber or Arabic, poses real pitfalls for the unwary. In this book I have tried to be as consistent as possible to a standardised form of transliteration in both cases. Official spellings of place names kept on from the French Protectorate period are initially given in parentheses and then, for the most part, abandoned as being inexact in favour of the more correct Berber, Pukhtun or Arabic forms. However, for reasons of expense, no diacritical marks for any consonants save the 'ain, designated by a comma just above and to the left of the vowel which follows it, are used in the text. Those consonants which necessitate macrons underneath them (d, h, s, t and z) are given in their correct form in either the glossary terms and the proper names index. Except for the short i, the three main vowels (a, i, u) are much as in Italian or Spanish, while x, where it occurs (only in some Berber terms) has the value of German ch as in ich. The Arabic hamza has been omitted in all cases.

GLOSSARY

Key
A :Arabic
AA :Algerian Arabic
MA :Moroccan Arabic
RB :Rifian Berber
TB :Tamazight Berber
P :Pakhtu
U :Urdu/Hindi
pl. :plural
sg. :singular

amin (A, AA): village headman (kabylia)
amzttid (TB): paid tribal protector of traveller

banya (U): Hindu merchant
baraka (A, MA): blessing, divine grace, ability to work miracles
bashshar (MA, literally "announcer"): recoverer of stolen livestock
bayya' (MA, pl. **bayya'in**, literally, "seller, betrayer"): spy
ba'a (A,MA): to sell, betray
bu shfar (MA, RB, TB): flintlock rifle

da'ira (A, MA): fine (cf: **haqq**)
diyit (RB, TB, derived from A **diya**): bloodwealth, bloodmoney
draza (MA): armed robbery

fallaq (A, pl. **fallaqa**): bandit
fqih (MA): Qur'anic schoolmaster. cf: **mulla, talib**

ghaba (MA): brushwood, underbrush, forest

haiduk (Balkan) primitive resistance fighter
haqq (MA, RB, literally. "right, reason"): fine for murder. (cf: **da'ira**)
harka (MZ): war party

igharm (TB): fortified village or clan community, or fortified dwelling within it; also, collective storehouse
igurramen (TB, sg. **agurram**): saints, descendants of the Prophet

iqatta'n n-ibriden (RB, TB, sg. **aqatta' n-ubrid**, literally, "road cutter(s)"): bandits, highwaymen

jihad (A, literally "effort"): holy war
jirga (P): clan or tribal council

kamman (MA): receiver of stolen goods, fence, organiser of bandit raids (Jbala)
khalifa (A, MA): adjutant
khassadar (P): paramilitary soldier. (cf: **mkhazni**)

mafrur (P, pl. **mafruran**, derived from A): proclaimed offender or outlaw
makhzan (MA): precolonial Moroccan government
malik (P; der. fr. A. literally "king"): tribal headman, leader. cf: **qaid**
manfi (A): exile
mir l-mumnin (MA, from A. **amir al-mu'minin**, literally "commander of the faithful"): Sultan of Morocco
mishwar (MA): Sultan's audience chamber
mithqal (MA): nineteenth century Moroccan currency
mkhazni (MA): paramilitary soldier. cf: **khassadar**
mulla (P, derived from A. **mawla**): religious teacher, Qur'anic school master. cf: **fqih, talib**
muna (MA): provisions, food allotment
muqaddam (A; MA **mqaddim**): headman of village or local community
murabit (A: MA **mrabit**): saint, not necessarily descended from the Prophet

nisba (A, MA): patronymic

Pukhtunwali (P): Pukhtun behavioural code

qafila (A): caravan
qaid l-mishwar (MA): master of ceremonies, major-domo
qalam (A): reed pen used for writing Qur'anic verses
qat'al-tariq (A, literally "road cutting"): banditry
qatta'al-tariq (A, literally "road cutter"): bandit, highwayman

rami (MA): marksman, sharpshooter
raqqas (MA): runner, messenger

saff (A; AA **suff**): alignment, faction
sammat (MA) intoxicating grape jelly (Jbala)
sarishta (P): fixation of shares of each tribal clan or section in losses or gains
shaykh (A, AA, MA): elder, headman
shkara (MA): leather scrip, money bag
spin giray (P, literally "white beard"): greybeard, tribal elder
tada (TB): lifelong cross-clan or cross-tribal sponsorship
talib (MA, pl. **tulba**): Qur'anic schoolmaster. cf: **fqih, mulla**

tarbil (MA): type of herb
tarbur (P, pl. **tarburan**): father's brother's son, enemy
tor (P, literally "black"): any case involving honour of women

uqiya (MA): nineteenth century Moroccan currency

zahir (A, MA): Sultanic decree
zakah (A): Islamic religious tithe on animals
zattata (MA, derived from RB and TB **tazttat**) temporary protection paid by traveller

'ahd (A, MA): vow, covenant
'ashur (A, MA): Islamic religious tithe on crops
'askari (MA): soldier
'azib (MA): farmstead

MAPS

I THE HOBSBAWM THESIS

1.1 Hobsbawm and Islam

E.J. Hobsbawm's very interesting and original study, **Bandits**, (1969, 1972), which is purportedly global in scope, has attracted considerable attention, controversy and debate over the years since its publication, particularly with respect to Sicily (Blok 1972, 1974) and, in Latin America, to Brazil (Singelmann 1975, Chandler 1978) and Mexico (Vanderwood, 1981, 1982), where it has been claimed that Hobsbawm's case material has been deficient. This may well be true, but it has been much more deficient in the world of Islam, where, although Hobsbawm freely admits the existence in the past of social banditry, he can cite only one clear-cut example, and a fictional one at that, Yashar Kemal's novel **Memed My Hawk** (1981). This novel dealt with a case possibly based on reality in the Anatolian highlands in early republican Turkey, but it corresponds with almost suspicious closeness to Hobsbawm's ideal type.

Now there can be no objections in principle to the use of fictional examples indeed, a few will be considered in the course of this study. Nor should the fact that Hobsbawm could produce only one Islamic example not really be read as pejorative, given his presumed unfamiliarity with the Muslim Middle East and the literature dealing with it. Nonetheless, this essay will join in the chorus of Hobsbawm's critics to the extent of insisting on the very real distinction between fiction and legend on the one hand and proper history on the other, and of showing that the overall model he proposes works only in part for some cases and in all for a very few. In short, it cannot be made or stretched to cover the whole spectrum of social banditry in Islam, any more than it can be made to do so in Spain, Sicily or Latin America.

Hence this essay should be understood as an appreciation of Hobsbawm's pioneer effort in the elaboration of the figure of the social bandit and the context of the world in which he operated - whether peasant, tribal, feudal or even capitalist - and as a critique of the obvious limitations of his model. Both these points must also be seen in the context of a world civilisation, Islam - one which Hobsbawm has largely ignored. Case material will be drawn from two countries at the western North African

(Maghrib) end of the Muslim Middle East - Morocco and Algeria - and a third from its far eastern (Far Mashriq) end - the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan, just across the Durand Line from Afghanistan. These countries and areas have been selected simply because they are the only ones of which the author has sufficient personal and bibliographical knowledge. In addition, these same examples have been considerably abetted by archival and other sources during the colonial period. In terms of time span, the examples given here run from the early nineteenth century - the immediate precolonial period - in Morocco (where colonial occupation officially began only in 1912), through the colonial period in all three countries (Morocco, 1912-56; Algeria, 1830-1962; Pakistan North West Frontier, 1849-1947) to post-colonial and near contemporary situations in the Pakistan Tribal Agency of South Waziristan.

Nonetheless, two general and not entirely unrelated questions must be considered first: Hobsbawm's model and the relevance of his criteria to material considered here (which will come up frequently during the case studies); and the extent to which social banditry in Islam over the last two centuries was a product of colonial domination.

1.2 The Issue of Colonialism

The question of the role played by colonialism in the phenomenon of social banditry is to underscore the often fine line of distinction in reality between the social bandit and the resistance leader. One and the same individual, at different times, in different roles or under differet circumstances, could easily be both. A further consideration, also illustrated here, is that of the bandit becoming a local legend either during his lifetime or only very shortly after his death - and thereby generally making a major contribution to the distortion of history in ensuing anti-colonial ideologies and myths in the process.

It must furthermore be stated unequivocally that in the context of Islam few, if any, social bandits have yet been enshrined through the mass media as have, for instance, Jesse James or Butch Cassidy, or even the lesser known Amerindian outlaw called The Apache Kid, in the American West, Ned Kelly in the Australian outback, Salvatore Giuliano and others in Sicily, Lampiao in north western Brazil, Emiliano Zapata or Pancho Villa in northern Mexico, and Diego Corrientes or Jose Maria in southern Spain (see Bernardo de Quiros ad Ardila, 1978), to name a few outstanding examples selected at random. All these figures have been retouched and glamourised for the mass market through television and the cinema.

However, the earlier Muslim Morisco bandits - known as **maafi-s** or "exiles" - in sixteenth century Andalusia are another story, and indeed part of the Islamic one, as Vincent (1981), who

has his own objections to Hobsbawm's typology, has shown. As such, therefore, they form, quite logically, part of the background to this account. Objections to Vincent's presentation on the part of some North African scholars on the grounds that the **manfi-s** were not bandits at all but the last heroes of the final and spasmodic Muslim Morisco resistance to the **fait accompli** of the Christian reconquest of the Iberian peninsula (cf: Cardaillac 1984) may be symptomatic, in that in the Islamic context generally, resistance to colonialism, or what has been termed primary resistance, with only a few exceptions, almost always and everywhere overshadowed mere banditry, whether social or otherwise. Nonetheless, banditry was still present, even though it was by no means the only factor at work. Consequently, Hobsbawm's model must now be considered in this light and in terms of its relevance to the material presented here and to the analysis to follow from it.

1.3 Critiques of Hobsbawm

Hobsbawm's allegedly worldwide model of social banditry - which he sees as performed almost entirely by disaffected peasantries in pre-industrial settings in the face of encroaching socioindustrial change which their members cannot comprehend - consist, in brief, of three ideal social types, the noble robber, the primitive resistance or guerrilla fighter of which he considers the Balkan **haiduk** as a prototype, and the honor-bringing avenger (Hobsbawm 1969:15). The second feature of the model is that, in order to conform to the first type, the noble robber or what could be labelled - taking Hobsbawm just a bit further - the Robin Hood syndrome, the majority of its nine supportive criteria must be fulfilled (ibid: 35-6). Although only a partial restatement of Hobsbawm's model will be necessary, the criteria are worth recalling. They are:

1) noble robber begins his career as a victim of injustice, and generally does so as an unmarried youth in his late teens or early twenties;
2) the rights wrongs;
3) he takes from the rich to give to the poor;
4) he never kills except in self defense;
5) If he survives his generally brief career of two to three years as a bandit, he returns to his people as an honorable citizen and as a member of a community which he never really left in any case;
6) he is admired, helped and supported by this community;
7) he dies only through treason, as no respectable member of the community would in theory, at least, help the authorities against him;
8) he is, again theoretically, invisible and invulnerable; and
9) he is not the enemy of the king or emperor, who is

the fountainhead of justice, but only of the local nobility or other oppressors.

Despite its supposedly global applicability, Hobsbawm's model as sketched here is patently European in space and patently late medieval or immediate preindustrial in time. Although even Hobsbawm admits that the historical existence of Robin Hood remains to be proven (Hobsbawm 1969: 44, 48, 111), he is equally patently among those who would aver that if Robin Hood had never existed, he would have had to have been invented. That Robin Hood remains his "noble robber" model is equally obvious and it is thus, perhaps, justifiable to refer to this whole complex of traits as the Robin Hood syndrome. Indeed, throughout his study, the concept gets in Hobsbawm's way analytically. This is so largely because Hobsbawm's noble robber typology dominates his guerrilla-resistance fighter type throughout, while his honour-bringing avenger gets short shrift indeed.

Amongst existing critics of Hobsbawm's thesis are those who aver that Hobsbawm's definition is too restrictive and narrow because they claim that all banditry is to a large extent social. This is no doubt true; but it seems that the assertion in question could also be stood on its head through a counter-claim - to the effect that a considerable amount of banditry is in fact anti-social. This of course could also lead to pointless arguments over which aspect came first. Other researchers have questioned Hobsbawm's premise that social bandits must of necessity be preindustrial peasants, arguing that they have also existed in modern, capitalistic and market-oriented settings, as with Jesse James and Ned Kelly. The real point at issue, however, is the assumption that they must necessarily be or have been peasants, for in the Islamic context they may just as easily have been tribesmen. This is so even though Hobsbawm is no doubt correct in excluding from the social bandit category such communities as those of the Bedouins in a general sense, for whom raiding is part of the normal way of life and among whom victims and attackers are strangers and hence enemies (Hobsbawm 1969: 14). Although there is no need to belabour the point here it must be accepted that most of the examples to be discussed here - whether from Morocco, Algeria or the Pakistan North West Frontier - happen themselves to have been essentially tribal, although some of these tribesmen were also and incidentally peasants as well, in the sense that they originated from lineage groups based in sedentary agricultural but nonetheless tribal communities. The underlying point is simply that in the author's view, as in those of other writers, the fact of being a peasant is by no means a **sine qua non** for social banditry.

In the Islamic context of the nineteenth century it is clear that banditry (**qat' al-tariq** in Arabic, literally "road cutting", while "bandit" may be rendered as either **qatta' al-tariq** or as **fallaq**) existed in precolonial times, although where it did so its presence obviously came to be much exacerbated by the

colonial situation. There is at least one case history from precolonial Morocco which exemplifies this point.

II NORTH WESTERN MOROCCO - 'ALI L-BU FRAHI

2.1 The Jbala

The fairly wide ranging if disparate and sometimes scrappy literature on social banditry in Morocco during the immediate precolonial and early colonial period, makes it clear that its incidence can be localised in two regional categories, the Jbala, the hilly mountainous northwestern quadrant of the country located west of the Rif (although the same mountain chain runs through both), being one, and the Atlas, the enormous and much higher range which dominates all of central and southern Morocco, being another. The Arabic speaking Jbalan tribes have traditionally made up an area where banditry has always flourished - far more so, for example, than among the Berber speaking tribes in the Rif to the east, where the bloodfeud and the concomitant buildup, breakdown and retrenching of factional alliances, both within and crosscutting through the segmentary lineage organisation of the region, were the dominant political institutions (Coon 1932; Hart 1976: 313-38).

Because the Jbala also happened to be the part of the country which was most often traversed by Europeans going from Tangier, the diplomatic capital and port of entry, to Fez, the political capital, during the nineteenth century, accounts of banditry in the area (even though its victims were far more often Moroccans than they were Europeans) are quite abundant, far more so than among the Berber speaking groups in the Atlas - where such indications as we have suggest that it was also rife. There social banditry was no respecter of linguistic frontiers, although it may be observed in passing that whatever their views on the subject may have been, the Rifians, in particular, were simply too occupied with internal feuding in the immediate precolonial period to be able to devote much time to banditry - even though some of the coastal tribes (notably the Ibuqquyen) made piratical raids on European vessels during the period in question.

2.2 State and Strongmen

Most modern observers are agreed that precolonial Morocco was -

as postcolonial Morocco still is - not only a monarchy but also, in Weberian terms, a patrimonial bureaucracy; and the state was prebendally structured in terms of tax farming. Governmental positions in the precolonial state, as Munson has noted (1980), were auctioned off to the highest bidder. Hence power and wealth were equated with each other, a fact which meant the emergence of local strongmen, and lots of them over major sections of the country, of which one such was most certainly the Jbala. The essentially segmentary, egalitarian and acephalous "Berber republics" in the mountains of the Rif and the Atlas were to some extent kept apart from this development by their representative tribal councils, but the famous cases of the Big Qaids, the Glawi in particular, in the Western Atlas, and even to some extent the hegemony developed later in the Rif by bin Abd al-Krim - in a wartime and resistance situation, to be sure - show dramatically that these areas were by no means totally immune.

The point is, of course - and here we focus once again upon the Jbala (among whom, indeed, one leading tribe is still known as the Bni Hmid s-Surraq, "the sons of Ahmad the Thief") - that these local strongmen often bought their way into positions of power, and with the support of powerful factions, precisely by using the tactics of extortion and banditry on their own or on neighbouring fellow tribesmen and constituents. The classic case of the bandit-turned-governor, both for the Jbala and for Morocco at large, is that of the sharif (a descendent of the Prophet) Mawlay Ahmad ar-Raysuni, to be discussed below. However, this account of Jbala banditry should perhaps begin with a much earlier and less well known case, that of 'Ali l-Bu Frahi, or "'Ali the Six-Fingered", as reported virtually at first hand by Drummond-Hay (1861: 6-14, 56-59, 63-70, 71-77, 85-94) and derivatively by Bernaldo de Quiros and Ardila (1978: 226-27). It is possible to set Drummond-Hay's account in time as being toward the end of the reign of Sultan Mawlay Sliman (Sulayman) (1792-1822), and thus perhaps a decade before the French invasion of Algeria (1830).

2.3 'Ali l-Bu Frahi

What is of particular interest and importance in Drummond-Hay's portrayal of 'Ali l-Bu Frahi is that in his case Hobsbawm's Robin Hood syndrome clearly emerges as a guide to his behaviour, for he was throughout on the wrong side of the law - whereas in Raysuni's case the Robin Hood syndrome degenerated and was, indeed, totally obliterated in favour of other considerations dictated almost entirely by self interest. In any event, a synopsis of Drummond-Hay's material is now in order. [1] As will become apparent, the account has a great deal of flavour and local colour.

'Ali l-Bu Frahi was held to have been born in the village

of Bin Diban, in the Fahs just south of Tangier, but what Drummond-Hay fails to account for is his **nisba**, the patronymic and tribonymic indicator, so to speak, of his ancestry: the Bni Bu Frah are a largely Arabic-speaking tribe in the Western Rif.[2] His father, Muhammad l-Bu Frahi, was described as an indifferent farmer but a good shot, and as a child 'Ali the Six-Fingered soon became far more adept in the use of the flintlock gun (**bu shfar**) than in that of the reed pen (**qalam**) he was made to employ in his enforced Quranic study under the local **fqih** in the village mosque. He soon became unexcelled at running, wrestling and marksmanship; and at a local wedding the then champion marksman (**r-rami**) of his day predicted that 'Ali would succeed him - unlike the governor of l-Qsar l-Kbir, who instead of hitting the target, an egg placed between the feet of one of his servants, hit the servant instead and only managed to break the egg with his third shot.

But Muhammad l-Bu Frahi then discovered that his son had been stealing grapes from his vineyard. He was ready to hand him over to the local **shaykh** to receive the bastinado, but 'Ali escaped. He turned up six years later in Marrakesh, the story goes, where in a test of strength with cudgels, he managed to defeat and crack the skull of the local champion, a black Bukhari slave, and where he was, as a result, feasted by the sultan (Drummond-Hay 1861: 7-14), receiving a prize of 50 **mithqals** and a safe conduct warrant, or **zattata** (ibid: 56-9).

2.4 The Career of a Bandit

But he escaped once again and was soon back in his old haunts, as a number of robberies occurred in quick succession on the main road between Tangier and Tetuan, in the vicinity of 'Ain Jdida and Dar Shawi, as well as in the woods near l-'Ara'ish (Larache) and in the Ma'mura forest, all of which covers quite a considerable surface area. Well armed caravans or **qafila-s** were despoiled with as much ease as were individual travellers, so it was surmised that by this time 'Ali l-Bu Frahi led a large and well organised band, none of whose members had as yet been caught.

'Ali's next act was to despoil and kill two Jewish pedlars, who had swallowed the gold pieces in their possession. So he stabbed them both and took the gold from their entrails - thus providing us with one instance, at least, in which the well known Moroccan Jewish status of safety in humility was deliberately disregarded (ibid: 63) - hardly the act of a Muslim Robin Hood° However, he repented when he was about to rob an old Jibli **talib** or Qur'anic student - after recalling that the old man was his own **fqih** and that the latter had rapped his six knuckles many times with his stick, he kissed,instead, the hem of the **talib**'s jillaba. When, however, the old **talib** continued to reprimand him

for not having learned the Qur'an properly, he retorted:

> Why should I live in misery and slavery since God has give me the strength of a lion? Whence do Sultans and their soldiery... derive the right of preying on the weak? Thinkest thou that thousands of bearded men kissed the dust the other day in the **mishwar** (Sultan's audience chamber), before him who claims the title **mir l-mumnin** (commander of the faithful), from good will and affection? No... What cause have I for abandoning my mode of subsistence in this world or for fearing punishment in the next, while the defender of the faith breaks the Prophet's law by rapine and extortion, and yet lives at ease with his conscience, so long as he has the power to do wrong with impunity? I am not more of a freebooter than he is; only I practice on a **much** smaller scale (emphasis added by author) ... My prime minister is my good gun and my unerring aim (ibid: 64).

After this outburst, he proceeded to lead the old talib back to his hideout in the woods (**ghaba**), where his Fasi wife Rahma' (or Rahmana), whom he had captured earlier from a passing caravan - and without evidently paying any brideprice for her - prepared them a meal. It seems her father promised to marry her to an old man in Tangier, and while he was at prayer 'Ali appeared, seized the girl and made off with her without a sound. The father fortunately never knew the reason for his daughter's sudden disappearance and thought, logically enough, that the jnun were responsible. Next day 'Ali l-Bu Frahi took his former schoolmaster back to the main road and gave him thirty silver **mithqals.**

2.5 The Authorities Respond

After further robberies in the Ma'mura, a zahir or "sultanic edict" - as Drummond-Hay quaintly puts it - which is to say, in this case, a "contract" in the Mafia sense of the term - went out on 'Ali the Six Fingered, who was to be "terminated with extreme prejudice", as modern intelligence service argot has it. A party of rural Arabs, **'Arubiyin**, lay in wait for him, but he escaped after gunning down three of them (ibid: 63-70).

The next recorded event was the death of 'Ali's horse through overexertion as he was pursued by a troop of **makhzan** or Moroccan government cavalry. So he now heard about a fabulous mare belonging to a shaykh, and was determined to have her. Hence he captured one of the shaykh's followers and sent him to his chief with a message saying he would take the mare by force if she were not delivered to him within a certain time limit. The enraged shaykh then proceeded to give the bearer of this bad news one hundred lashes. So one rainy January night 'Ali the Six

Fingered came to the shaykh's camp near l-Qsar l-Kbir disguised as a runner (**raqqas**), took a sheep from the fold, sacrificed it and cut it up into pieces to feed to the shaykh's guard dogs. He then untied the black mare tethered by the shaykh's tent, yelled out to Shaykh Hammu that he had come for and taken his prize, and galloped off. But the shaykh now shot what he thought in the dark to be the mare Misa'uda, and told his followers to capture 'Ali and tie him up, only to discover that he had shot his own black bull.

The loss of the mare was not known, therefore, until the next day. In the **ghaba** of Bu 'Amar, the local **qaid** and his **khalifa** assembled followers and beaters - each of whom added a silver **uqiya** piece to his cap-and-ball cartridge for good luck - in order to smoke 'Ali l-Bu Frahi out of the woods. What followed was pure Hollywood - for a sheet of flame suddenly arose from the centre of the forest and made straight for the qaid's party, and in its wake rushed 'Ali and Rahma on the black mare, with guns blazing, shooting first at the qaid and then three of his attendants. 'Ali's closest pursuer, as it happens, was a kinsman of the Bukhari he had just killed in Marrakesh, so he shot him through the head (ibid: 71-7).

From Hobsbawm's point of view the Robin Hood syndrome was certainly present in 'Ali's story. 'Ali evidently never molested the poor. Wealthy caravaneers or traders certainly suffered from his depredations, but unless he met with resistance his robberies were bloodless. Indeed, he was on such good terms with the villagers in whose area he operated that he was said to have been provided daily with an abundance of **muna**, of food, to which each village, in standard round-robin fashion, contributed a portion. When weddings took place, he would even appear with a gift for the bridegroom (ibid: 85).

2.6 The End Approaches

But, again as Hobsbawm would have expected, 'Ali's career was short, for the beginning of the end was now at hand; and it was marked by a personal tragedy. A certain Shaykh l-Battiwi now made it known that his son Jilali was to marry Fatima bint l-Qaid Tifti. This was good news for 'Ali, who liked carousing and drinking **sammat** (an intoxicating grape jelly which was evidently standard fare in the precolonial Jbala); and so he left his pregnant wife with provisions and took off for a three day binge. He arrived at the shaykh's house, began drinking **sammat** and passed out. A certain Qaddur the One-Eyed wanted to kill him in order to obtain the reward money put on his head by the Sultan but the counsel of others prevailed, and 'Ali was merely bound hand and foot to be sent in chains to the palace. He was too hung over to resist, so next, on Qaddur's cautionary advice that they were not dealing with any ordinary cattle rustler from

the Bni Msawwar, the skin was flayed from the soles of his feet.

After they had all gone to sleep, 'Ali remembered that there had been a sharp stone slab in the centre of the hut on which the **sammat** jug had been placed. So he proceeded to rub his bound hands against it until the cords gave way, and then took a dagger from a snoring neighbour to cut those binding his feet, which he rubbed with rags soaked in olive oil. He then calmly knifed old Qaddur and escaped, clambering over bushes and rocks, and finally floated downstream where he dressed his feet with the **tarbil** herb.

Eluding his pursuers, he reached home five days later, only to find that his wife Rahma had died in childbirth and that the new-born baby was also dying from lack of nourishment. After long agony and lamentations he buried them both in the woods of the Sahil, where three weeks later, when his feet had recovered, he took their remains for reburial beside a **murabit**, a saint at whose tomb he swore an oath to abandon his life of banditry. As he no longer received any **muna** he lived on acorns and begged bread from passers by.

However, rumours began to spread that someone who resembled the robber had been seen near the Sahil sanctuary, and hence orders came from the qaid of l-'Ara'ish to enquire into the truth of this: if 'Ali the Six Fingered was still alive, he was to be captured at all costs, even at the expense of violating the traditional asylum provided by the shrine. So a troop of 'askari-s surrounded the saint's tomb while 'Ali hurled large stones at them, killing two of them. But then he broke down, saying he was sick of life, as all he had cared for lay in the grave of the sanctuary; and he told them to come and take him. Before they bound him up, he kissed his mare Misa'uda goodbye and said they would only meet again in death. He was now taken in chains to l-'Ara'ish, where most of the population lined up to curse him, though a few silently blessed him.

'Ali was now fettered hand and foot and an iron collar was put around his neck. The Sultan, appraised of his arrest, issued a declaration that he was an outlaw and condemned him, in accordance with the stipulations of Shari'a law, to lose his right hand and left foot, after which he was to be released as a moral lesson for others who would follow in his footsteps. A blacksmith was then summoned to break his manacles, when 'Ali himself snapped them asunder. The executioner seized his right hand, and with three other men tried to force it from the wrist socket before cutting it off, but they could not do so. Therefore 'Ali himself asked permission to cut it off with his left hand, and when he did so, he then plunged it into boiling pitch. His left foot was now amputated in a similar manner. As 'Ali himself took the knife, he observed that if he had wanted to escape death, he would have done so long ago. Two days later 'Ali the Six Fingered, champion outlaw, was found dead, lying on the grave of his wife Rahma. He was said to have gone raving mad

with pain just before he expired, and was buried by charitable passers-by beside his wife's grave (ibid: 85-94).

2.7 'Ali becomes a legend

This is the essence of Drummond-Hay's account of the story of Six Fingered 'Ali l-Bu Frahi; and it goes without saying that independent corrobation of any of the events as recounted by him is quite impossible. It is also abundantly clear that the exploits of 'Ali l-Bu Frahi had already become legendary when Drummond-Hay was told about them, as the account as given can hardly be regarded as unembellished. It is nonetheless interesting, as well as effective, and the saga of 'Ali l-Bu Frahi runs through Drummond-Hay's book like a **leitmotiv** and a unifying thread. The Robin Hood syndrome was certainly present, and if one might object to 'Ali's treatment of Jews, there was also the counterbalancing tendency of Pukhtun bandits in the pre-Independence North West Frontier of India (now Pakistan) to hold up rich Hindus for ransom: they were very low in social status, indeed at the bottom of the scale, and were not coreligionists. In the Jbala, however, as time went on and as colonialism approached ever nearer, what was left of the Robin Hood syndrome, which may in any case have been only as viewed retrospectively, soon evaporated.

Chapter Notes

1. This material is all evidently taken from Drummond-Hay's conversations, in Moroccan Arabic, with a Jibli to whom he refers as "He of the Rat-Tailed Barb" and whom he accompanied on horseback over a long journey. Sir John Drummond-Hay (1816-1893) was for many years the head of the British Legation in Tangier, a doyen of the English community there and a veteran "pigsticker", a hunter of boar (which then infested the old Tangier "Diplomatic Forest") on horseback, assisted by a corps of Rifian and Jibli beaters on foot.

2. For a modern and interesting, if uneven, account of the Bni Bu Frah, see Pascon and van der Wusten 1983. The unevenness is due largely to the basic disparity between the research objectives of work's co-authors, one a sociologist and the other a geographer.

III NORTH WESTERN MOROCCO - THE JBALA GANGS

3.1 Organised Banditry

In addition to Drummond-Hay's scintillating account of 'Ali l-Bu Frahi, there is also an excellent study by Biarnay (1917) dating from early colonial times, which provides a graphic study of the organisation, tactics and techniques of southern Jbalan bandit gangs in the period immediately before the French protectorate was introduced into Morocco. For the northern Jbala in the same period, Ruiz Orsatti (1913 - cited by Bernaldo de Quiros and Ardila 1978: 226-27, who also mention Raysuni in the same reference - has noted the names of Muhammad wuld Sillam Bu Nar (nicknamed Hnini), his kinsman ash-Shrawi, the Ulad (Awlad) Haddad, Muhammad 'Aqaba and Si l-'Arbi bin 'Aisa (nicknamed Msahsah, with the title prefix Si indicating probable literacy in Arabic). All these individuals hailed from the Anjra, Wadras and Bni Msawwar tribes which lie between Tangier, Ceuta and Tetuan and encompass the Funduq of 'Ain Jdida [1], founded by Sultan Mawlay 'Abd ar-Rahman in 1256 AH/1838-39 AD, where there is today an enormous Coca-Cola and soft drinks concession, and where travellers between Tangier and Tetuan once spent the night. But he adds, perhaps wistfully, that none of these latter figures attained the prestige and popular acclaim which attached to Six Fingered 'Ali. Nor did they reach the statute of Raysuni and his former lieutenant Hmidu l-Khriru, who were to be the final manifestation of the bandit phenomenon in the Jbala, as is described below. Nonetheless, the Jbalan outlaw gangs represent a fascinating insight on the social background to banditry in the region.

3.2 The Leadership Role

In the Sbu-Wargha basin (and in the Jbala at large), Biarnay informs us, bandits who acted on their own were rare; and in any given region there was a considerable number of robber bands whose respective members knew each other and could, on

whose respective members knew each other and could, on occasion, cooperate in raids. Each band of thieves was administered, directed and advised by an intelligent and influential man, known as **kamman**, who was a receiver of stolen goods - a fence. His authority maintained agreement within the gang and he coordinated the activities of all its members. It was imperative, too, that he maintain good relations with his neighbours, who respected and feared him, and with the representatives of the **makhzan**, to whom he sent occasional gifts. His role was predominantly organisational: he conceived, decided and directed raiding projects which the members of the band then carried out. As he was the "brains" behind the gang's operations, the major benefits accruing from the latter were for himself (Biarnay 1917:136-7).

The **kamman**'s house was usually near an area of passage and somewhat apart from the rest of the village. It was almost always a two storied affair of adobe with a guest room on the second floor, and there were always ten or fifteen men seated in it drinking tea - men of strikingly mixed origins, elderly and well dressed men and younger poorly dressed ones who both showed the same familiarity with their host. Biarnay observes (**ibid**: p.38) that when he himself came in, the conversation was invariably changed to innocuous topics such as the harvest, but although the guests changed every day, they all still got the same courteous reception. However, on further inspection it would transpire that the site of the **kamman**'s house was chosen because it was effectively on the border of two tribes or clans whose interests were contrary and who were therefore more or less hostile to each other. Accidented terrain would permit men to arrive at the house unseen, while the guestroom was easy of access and the dogs, used to seeing strangers arriving at all hours of the day or night, did not bark. The ground floor acted as a sleeping room for young men who had been out on a raid, some of whom, Biarnay wryly notes, had probably been his fellow guests at tea. It was in the guestroom, if no strangers were present, that further raids were planned and the spoils of completed ones were divided up, while the lower rooms served as shelter for the animals and other stolen goods whose owners might be looking for them.

It is clear that the **kamman** could certainly not afford all the receptions he gave; but his expenses were offset by the fact that most of his revenue came from purchase of "hot" animals or merchandise at a low price, while the notables of the neighbouring tribes came to his house guided by the **bashshar**, an individual who made it his business to know where to find stolen livestock, in order to try to buy the animals back from him. Once the deal was concluded, they took the stolen animals back and returned them to their owners.

The **kamman** thus fulfilled several functions at once: he pointed out prospective targets for raids; he bought stolen animals at half their current market value and then sold them back to

their ex-owners at a price still somewhat below the going rate each time that the **bashshar** could tell the latter who the fence was with whom the animals had been deposited; and finally, if nobody came to reclaim his livestock, the **kamman** could sell it on his own at a market some distance away (ibid: 138-9).[2]

3.3 Raids, and Cooperation

Armed robberies (**draza**) were evidently frequent in the area before French times, and another early authority, Moulieras, makes it abundantly clear that Muslim strangers travelling anywhere through the Jbala, the Ghmara and even, on occasion, the Rif, were very likely to be held up by bandits at gunpoint and robbed just for the clothes on their backs. They were, however, generally left with any food they might have been carrying, for to deprive a man of bread was truly shameful in the sight of God (Moulieras 1895: 102-3; Moulieras 1899: 38-9, 145-52, 248-9, 262-3, 281-4, 319-25, 404-6, esp.p. 262). And both Moulieras (1899: 28-42, 51-2, 76-7, 145-52) and Michaux-Bellaire and Salmon (1905: 120-2) provide detailed descriptions of the kidnapping by Jbala bandits of young girls and, perhaps even more, young boys, overtly for purposes of dancing and entertainment, but basically for sexual ones - for the Jbala has always been a region notorious in Morocco for sodomy, homosexuality and bestiality. In addition, these girls and boys, just like livestock, could fetch good prices in the local markets.

However, as Biarnay points out, if a bandit raid was also motivated by revenge on a personal enemy, so much the better - and Michaux-Bellaire and Salmon comment on the frequency of such raids right in the town of l-Qsar l-Kbir itself (ibid: 120-2). If the object of the raid was simply the pillage of an **'azib** - a farmstead - the **kamman** set spies (**bayya'in**, from the Arabic **ba'a**, "to sell, betray") ahead to estimate the value of the flock and the armament and fighting ability of those in charge of guarding it. The chances of success were greater if the farm were isolated. If it involved a big operation, once he were in possession of the information he needed, the **kamman** might then go to his opposite number in the next tribe. They would then plan it jointly, being able to pool together some twenty or thirty men, a third of whom might be on horseback.

The assembly of the bandits took place on a night decided in advance and at a site generally some ten to fifteen kilometres from the objective of the raid. Once all were at the assembly point, the raiders prepared their arms, after which a few men would go in on foot to check that the village was not on the alert. If all was well, all those on foot now came in and the horsemen formed a semi-circle around the village. The men on foot now moved in in force, killing or tying up any man they found, while the women and children of the village, frightened,

fled, sometimes even accompanied by some of the men. At this point the bandits would drive off all the animals they could find and pillage all the rugs, saddles and arms that they could find. After the raid, they would reassemble, some of them surrounding the flock which was moving away while the others protected the retreat. The job of the horsemen was to smell out any pursuit and to bring back the bodies of their own men, if the villagers had put up a resistance and killed any of them. They would all be back in the **kamman**'s house before dawn.

3.4 Division of the Spoils

The next day would be spent calmly in the guestroom, punctuated by copious repasts, and only the day after that would the division of the spoils be made. This was normally effected in the following proportions: half went to the two **kamman-s** and the remainder was divided up among the bandits, with two shares for a horseman as opposed to one share for a man on foot. If anyone was killed and the raid was unsuccessful, everybody in the gang made a contribution to the tune of about 15 pesetas hasani per man, the amount usually having been established in advance. As the **kamman-s** generally acted as purchasers of the spoils in bulk at less than half price, once they received their lion's share, there was then only a quarter or a fifth of the real value of the loot to be divided up among the rest of the men. It was in this respect that the **kamman-s** emerged as real bandit leaders: in order to organise such assaults, they had to have a real and recognised authority over the members of their bands. This type of raiding - as opposed to simple theft through trickery and without the use of arms, which was also standard practice in the region and which is also discussed in detail by Biarnay (**op.cit.** : 141-7) - necessitated the participation of quite a large number of active outlaws. For this reason total secrecy was rarely maintained. The owner of the farmstead about to be raided was often tipped off or warned in time and would thus be able to put his possessions in a safe place in order to organise the defense of his **'azib** (**ibid**: 139-41).

3.5 Control of Banditry

Biarnay summarises his findings by observing that theft was very well organised in northwestern Morocco and that under the precolonial makhzan, should any tribe have suffered overly much through banditry and pillage, the Sultan, after a suitable period of temporising, would then inflict a very heavy fine or **da'ira** on the wealthiest or most influential men or man of the tribe, who was or were considered to have been the one or ones who had profited the most from the robberies committed in their bailiwick;

and hence a relative degree of order would be re-established for a while. This mode of repression, which in appearance could not have seemed more arbitrary, was in reality a direct reprisal on the principal guilty party. But being essentially contrary to European notions of justice, it was not followed up by the French administration and as a result the French settlers around Petitjean (which after independence in 1956 reverted to its original name of Sidi Qasim, and where Biarnay's article is datelined) had to increase the number of guards on their farms if they were to defend them successfully against marauders.

Biarnay shrewdly notes that if we recall that the **kamman** retained 50 per cent of the value of the stolen livestock for himself and that the rest of the gang only wound up with 15 to 25 per cent, with the remainder going to pay the **da'ira**, the best policy might have been for the French to have hit out at the **kamman** himself, the man who stood to benefit most from the whole affair; and hence the innocent tribal rank-and-file and the collectivity at large would not have been touched. At a later date, he suggests, if any services rendered by the **kamman** to the settler should prove useful - always bearing in mind that good relations between them might make the French settler himself look like a second **kamman** in the eyes of the tribesmen at large - he might then choose from among his old cronies someone to second him, with the bandits of yesterday thus becoming the farm guards of today, and thereby also recalling Gellner's "from wolves to sheepdogs" analogy with respect to the Central Atlas Berbers before "pacification" and during the French protectorate (Gellner 1973, 1962: 365, in Gellner and Micaud 1973).

Chapter Notes

1. According to an inscription found on its gates by the Spanish in 1919. cf: Bernaldo de Quiros and Ardile 1978: 225.
2. According to Biarnay, in the Sbu-Wargha region, the situation of the **kamman** was described as "'**And l-kamman bhal l-marsa**° The fence's place is like a port where you can find everything you want°" (ibid.: 139).



THE JBALA (Morocco)

IV NORTH WESTERN MOROCCO - RAYSUNI & L-KHRIRU

4.1 The Irrelevance of the Hobsbawm paradigm

Biarnay's excellent study is of particular importance because it goes directly counter to two **sine qua non** aspects of the Hobsbawm paradigm of social banditry - that of robbing from the rich, Robin Hood style, to give to the poor, and that of the bandit as a righter of wrongs. To the contrary, Biarnay makes it very plain that the poor were among the **kamman**'s prize targets simply because of their inability to retaliate and because they did not have enough clout to make an issue of trying to recover their stolen livestock. It seems, however, that both Gellner, in another context (Gellner 1969: 198, n.1), and Dejeux (1978), in an important article to be assessed later in connection with social banditry in Algeria, have fallen into one of Hobsbawm's major errors - that of turning the Robin Hood syndrome into what amounts to the linchpin of social banditry.

Indeed, the concept of the universality of the Robin Hood syndrome is more than questionable. Evidence has accrued from many quarters to refute it and this is as true of the Maghrib and the Mashriq as elsewhere. No bandits anywhere have ever been noted for their altruism, and above and beyond the religious requirements and obligations of the **'ashur** tithe on crops and the **zakah** tax on animals as compulsory almsgiving enjoined by the Qur'an, no Jibli or Pukhtun bandit would ever have been willing to turn over his share of the spoils from a raid to the poor. The two Jews murdered by Six Fingered 'Ali were fair game, as seen in this light, as were the rich Hindus captured or murdered in Peshawar or Bannu in the Pakistan North West Frontier by Zakha Khayl Afridi or Mahsud raiders in the first decade of the present century; but there is no record of as much as a dirham or a rupee having ever filtered down to the poor. In short, these are stereotypes which are best avoided.

4.2 Mawlay Ahmad al-Raysuni

But it is curious that Biarnay should make no mention of Raysuni, who, by the time his study appeared, had already gone through his own highly successful career as a social bandit to establish himself solidly as the leading strongman of the northwestern Jbala. His sharif origins certainly helped him in this respect, and in setting up his power base - although he was by no means the first sharif ever to have taken to banditry (as Moulieras' account of Sidi al-Makki al-Wazzani in the southern Jbala tribe of the Fannasa shows, Moulieras 1899: 378-81), as did his ambivalent relationship with Spain.[1]

The career of Mawlay Ahmad al-Raysuni (circa. 1869/71-1925) has been summed elsewhere, from his beginnings outside Tangier through his rapid stardom as a bandit and rise to power as the leading strongman and indeed, warlord, in the northern Jbala, on to his ignominious end as a prisoner of bin 'Abd al-Krim in the Aith Waryaghar heartland of the Central Rif (Hart 1976: 340-3, as well as a superlative contemporary biography by Forbes, 1924, and an unpublished earlier report by her in 1923). Nonetheless, a modified version of an earlier account is necessary here, if only to show that Hobsbawm's Robin Hood ideal-type criteria, if they ever really existed in the first place, have by now and in this case become completely subordinated to matters of pure and simple expediency.

Raysuni was born in the Bni Msawwar tribe, near the Tangier outskirts. He was an Idrisi sharif, a descendant of a patriparallel cousin of Mawlay 'Abd al-Salam bin Mshish, the "pole" of the Jabal 'Alam, in the territory of the Bni' Arus and hence once of the numerous Shurfa 'Alamiyin headquartered in that tribe. Even though, to his disciples, he had much baraka (of which there is abundant evidence provided by Forbes, as well as Raysuni's genealogy in ibid., 1924: 26-8), his was a checkered political career, but one in which power always remained the dominant objective. He started out, of course, in the traditional Jbalan manner as a cattle rustler and a rifle stealer; captured through trickery, he then spent four years languishing in a makhzan jail in s-Sawira (Mogador). After his release, obtained through the good offices of other shurfa, he went back to his home in Zinat in the Fahs, just east of Tangier. It was here that he came to realise that the kidnapping of Europeans - for it will be remembered that Tangier was by the late nineteenth century very much the diplomatic capital of Morocco - could be an extremely lucrative profession. Among his victims were Walter Harris, captured in 1903, London Times correspondent and longtime British resident of Tangier; Ion Perdicaris, a wealthy Greek-American, captured the following year; and the Qaid Sir Harry Maclean, captured in 1907, the leading drill instructor in the army of the Sultan Mawlay 'Abd al-'Aziz who reigned from 1900 to

1908 before his rule was challenged by Mawlay 'Abd al-Hafiz. In 1904 the capture and ransom of Perdicaris alone netted Raysuni 70,000 duros hasani from US President Theodore Roosevelt - as well as Roosevelt's famous telegram, stating "I want Perdicaris alive or Raysuni dead" and a blustering attempt at gunboat diplomacy which never came off.[2] From the Sultan, Raysuni won the following - ten rifles; the destitution of two of his greatest enemies, the Pashas of Tangier amd 'Azaila' (Asila); the liberation of a number of his Jbala friends from jail; and the qaid-ship of four northwestern Jbala tribes, including the Bni Msawwar and the Fahs of Tangier. For the capture of Maclean, he got 20,000 pounds, together with British protection. To our knowledge, none of this money was ever given to the poor.

4.3 Banditry and Political Power

Raysuni's suffering and experience in prison had taught him, to the contrary, that bets properly hedged, with the European powers encroaching on Morocco as well as with the **makhzan**, provided the circumstantial levers toward his ultimate goal - unlimited power in the northwest. To this end, as Rosita Forbes correctly asserts (**ibid.**: X-XI), everything was judged as a suitable means. His career as governor of Tangier having been nipped in the bud by an army of Mawlay 'Abd al-'Aziz - because the Europeans of that city had complained at seeing so many decapitated heads of rebels adorning the gates - he went in 1908 to Fez in order to make an **'ahd** or covenant with the new Sultan, Mawlay 'Abd al-Hafiz (reigned 1908-12), in order to ensure that the latter should never cease protecting Muslim territory and people from the Christians. In so doing, however, he also had to renounce his status as a British protege, renounce likewise his claim to the remainder of the ransom money for the Qaid Maclean and pay the Sultan 300,000 duros, in addition to taking the pledge to fight the Christians to the death (**ibid.**: 96-9); Munson 1980: 146-54).[3]

Raysuni, although no doubt a very sincere Muslim, was dominated both by the profit motive and by a tremendous belief in his own destiny: everything he wanted would fall into his lap if he played his cards right. He was awarded the governorship of Asila and by 1911 he saw that it would be very much to his advantage to cooperate with Spain, which was now emerging as the protector of the northern zone: for, unlike France in the far larger zone to the south, she was "strong enough to help the Arabs but not strong enough to oppress them" (Forbes 1924: 113).

One of his first acts as governor of Asila was to build himself a large palace there, for his days as a pure and unadorned bandit were now over. He had moved on to bigger things, and his ambition, on aiding and abetting the installation of the Spanish protectorate, was no less than to secure for himself the then vacant position, in Tetuan, of **khalifa** of the whole

Spanish zone. In this he was thwarted, however, for the vacancy was awarded to a puppet, Mawlay al-Mahdi, a cousin of the Sultan. The action was possibly a result of pressure from the French, for there was strong mutual distrust between them and Raysuni. The latter regarded this move as an act of betrayal, and he had a series of quarrels with the local Spanish commander (the impetuous Col. Fernandez Silvestre who, later as a general, was to be killed in the beginnings of the Rifian uprising at the Battle of Anwal in 1921), who in any case was revolted by the sights he had seen in Raysuni's dungeon, which was filled to capacity.

4.4 Banditry and Anticolonial Resistance

In 1913, Raysuni took to the hills, and from his new headquarters at Tazrut in the Bni 'Arus, his relations with Spain took on a new form: a series of defensive and offensive military actions interspersed with peace pacts and periods of cooperation. This phase was to last until 1921, when with the rise of bin 'Abd al-Krim and the Rifian victory at Anwal, the Rif assumed the centre of the northern Moroccan stage. During this period Tazrut was twice bombarded and twice evacuated. Raysuni's politicking with the Spanish assumed an almost classic ambivalence, in which, even though he was proclaimed the leader of a jihad, his own self-interest was clearly the dominant factor. His son, Khalid Raysuni, later to become pasha of Larache under the Spanish, was a less impressive carbon copy of his father: with independence in 1956 he had to flee Morocco and take refuge in Spain, for having used his influence to feather his own nest, contrary to the national interest.

By 1922 Raysuni and bin 'Abd al-Krim (who was regarded by Raysuni as the upstart son of a Rifian fqih) epitomized the poles of power in the Moroccan north, but the star of bin 'Abd al-Krim, the younger of the two by at least a decade, was now ascending and that of Raysuni was on the wane. One Spanish writer suggestively contrasts the two personalities in terms of their respective tribes of origin: the Bni 'Arus, "the maximal spiritual expression of the Jbala", as opposed to the Aith Waryaghar (or Bni Waryaghal), "the unleashed violence of the Rif". He states that while the Jbala had always been by a "religious caste", the Rif had always been "governed, or rather, misgoverned" by a "military caste" (Bermudo-Soriano 1941: 26-7). The imagery is suggestive, perhaps, but it is also misleading, for even if Raysuni was viewed by some as a "maximal expression of spirituality", his cruelty and corruption were equally legendary. He saw in the Spanish presence a means to enrich himself, while bin 'Abd al-Krim, whose views were both more modern and less ambiguous on this score, saw the maladministration of an oppressive colonial regime.

4.5 Contacts Between Rif and Jbala

Twice emissaries were sent from bin 'Abd al-Krim's capital of Ajdir in the Aith Waryaghar to Tazrut to try to win Raysuni over to the war of independence for all northern Morocco (1921-6) which was now in full swing. Although the details of what passed between them are not clear, the indications are strong that twice Raysuni hedged. It was then that one of Raysuni's chief lieutenants, a young ex-bandit from the Bni Huzmar, with at least two major raids on Tetuan to his credit, named Hmidu l-Khriru (circa. 1898-1926), disgusted both with his chief's behaviour but, even more, furious over the fact that the latter had consistently refused to award him the **qaid**-ship of his own tribe, went over to 'Abd al-Krim (see Garcia Figueras 1953).

It appears that the spark that set off the Rifian crackdown on Raysuni was an attempted tribal revolt late in 1924 (Garcia Figueras 1930: 209-24, and an anonymous author in Intervenciones Militares 1934: 169-80), probably fomented by an agitator of the Darqawa religious order. It centered in the Jbalan tribe of the l-Khmas, in the Jbil l-Khzana (Jabal al-Khazana) near Shawen (Chaouen), but spread as far east as Targist (Targuist). The l-Khmas had always been allied to Raysuni and did not take kindly to the Aith Waryaghar **harka** commanders and officers of bin 'Abd al-Krim's regular army. After bin 'Abd al-Krim's recapture of Shawen from the Spanish in November 1924 they revolted, ambushing a large regular Rifian army patrol and mutilating the bodies. The Rifians turned on them savagely, killing 41, taking 11 prisoners and imposing a **haqq** fine of 20,000 pesetas (Goded 1932: 92). The incident gave bin 'Abd al-Krim - exasperated beyond endurance not only with Raysuni's behaviour but with the whole complex of beliefs surrounding him, and his constant trafficking with the Christians - the excuse he needed, and provided the impetus for the Rifian march on Tazrut.

4.6 Raysuni becomes a captive

Starting from the Rifian regular army camp at Taghzut in the Bni Hassan, the column that went to get Raysuni under the command of bin Abd al-Krim's younger brother was an impressive one: l-Khriru with 1,200 men in the **harka** of the vanguard; 600 Rifians in the centre, including 300 Aith Waryaghar members of the regular army, with four machine guns, under bin 'Abd al-Krim's **qaid al-mishwar** and near kinsmen from Ajdir, 'Abd al-Krim Haddu n-Si Ziyyan; and a rearguard of 2,500 Ghmara under the **qaids** of the Bni Silman and the Bni Rzin. The forces of l-Khriru drew back when the combat began, after which the Rifians, setting up their machine guns, advanced and took possession of Raysuni's house and **zawiya**. They entered it at nightfall,

after her husband had been killed. Historically, this is Hollywood nonsense: there was indeed a Mrs. Perdicaris, but only her husband was captured by Raysuni and she played no part in the drama. The film's only saving grace was a young Moroccan actor who gave a very lively and most amusing performance as the Sultan Mawlay 'Abd al-'Aziz.

3. As many influential Moroccans in the late nineteenth century were proteges of a European power, the Sultan thus ceased to have effective authority over some of his key subjects, while Munson (ibid: 150) observes that Raysuni's metamorphosis from bandit to qaid to rebel to governor was not at all anomalous, but the rule rather than the exception, as Ghaylan, also a sharif from the tribe of the Bni Gurfat, had undergone the same transformation in the seventeenth century, as had another figure, al-Zaytan from the l-Khmas (al-Akhmas) tribe, in the eighteenth.

4. For full details on bin 'Abd al-Krim's career, see Hart 1976: 369-403, 420-3.

5. For a short but good summary of Bu Hmara's career, see Dunn 1980 (and for his defeat at the hands of the Aith Waryaghar see Hart 1976: 361-8). For details of the Glawi's career, see Maxwell (1966), a work which both historically and sociologically leaves much to be desired. For the sociological context of the Glawi's rise to power, however, an earlier work by Montagne (1930: 326-64) is highly recommended. For details of Ufqir's spectacular career, his colonial training as an officer in the French army in World War II and in Indo-China, his meteoric rise to power after independence and his iron grip on his ministries, his role in the Ben Barka kidnapping and assassination in Paris in 1965, and his own violent and inadequately explained death in 1972 after he was implicated in two successive and unsuccessful plots (1971 and 1972) to kill King Hasan II, see Clement 1974. This is not a scholarly work, any more than Maxwell's biography of the Glawi is, nor is it even a particularly good one on other grounds. At the moment, however, it is all we have, particularly given the fact that, since his death, Ufqir was relegated to the status of a non-person in Morocco. For background data on the Ufqir lineage, from 'Ain Sha'ir in Morocco's extreme southeast, see Dunn 1977: 240-2.

V BANDITRY IN THE MOROCCAN CENTRAL HIGH ATLAS

In the Berber-speaking area of the Central High Atlas, social bandits may have been as common as they were in the Jbala, but there is far less hard information available. This is also the case for the ajoining Bni Mallal region and the Tadla and Sraghna plains (cf: Eickelman 1976: Appendix, 239-54). It is, however, of particular interest to note that the two most famous cases of banditry in the region - that of Zayd u-Hmad of the Ait Murghad tribe (1934-6) and, nearly twenty years later, Sidi Hmad Uhansal (Arabic: al-Ahansali) of the Ihansalen (1952-3) - both occurred after the full scale "pacification" of the region had been achieved by the French in 1933.

5.1 Banditry before "Pacification"

Rene Euloge, in three otherwise excellent collections of short stories about the West-Central Atlas, some of which show a certain degree of overlap but all of which are very entertaining and highly realistic, has brought forth several fictionalised half-portraits of Berber tribal bandits in the Atlas which, though suggestive, remain rather shadowy (Euloge 1951: 113-221, especially 148-9; **idem** 1952: 37-54; and **idem** 1976: 85-106, 167-91). The example in the first work mentioned above is a Hobsbawmian figure who is against rapacious **qaids** and acts as a protector of the poor among his own people;[1] the figure in the second work poses as a simpleton in order to gain the confidence of his enemy the local **qaid**, who was responsible for the murder of his father during the reign of Mawlay al-Hasan I (1873-94); and the man in the third work is a former bandit turned **mkhazni** of the Glawi who in about 1928 enriches himself through blackmailing the council members of a tribe just subjugated by the Glawi, and then even walks off with the tribal **muqaddam**'s daughter. For Hobsbawm, this last instance would not do at all, particularly as the **mkhazni** in question is a local man. At the very least, these



ʿATTA (The Central High Atlas and Pre-Sahara, Morocco)

examples show that not even all fictional social bandits are Robin Hoods, despite implications made by both Hobsbawm and Yashar Kamal.

5.2 Muha u-Jabj

Two more concrete case histories should be added to these examples, that of u-Jabj of the Ihansalen (Hart 1981: 185-6) and that of two individuals from the Ait 'Atta of Talmast, above Zawiya Ahansal, w-'Abbu and u-Khuya (ibid.: 196).

It should be noted that anyone travelling through tribal territory in pre-"pacification" times had to have a paid protector or **amzttid**, (as he was known in Berber) in each tribe through which he passed, changing protectors at each tribal border until the end of his journey. It was only very rarely that an **amzttid** betrayed his trust by killing his protege, but the case of Muha u-Jabj of the Ait Umzrai a lay clan of the Ihansalen, is one such.(2) U-Jabj, who only died about 1964, was a powerful warrior and a crack shot, as well as a onetime companion of w-'Abbu and u-Khuya from the Ait 'Atta of Talmast, of whom more shortly. But he was also totally without scruples, as the following story reveals.

A man travelling from Wawizaght to Bu Maln n-Dadss had reached the territory of the Ihansalen and needed an **amzttid**. U-Jabj was nominated, the sum to be paid him was agreed upon, and it was also agreed that he would accompany the man to Tizi n-Tighttan (the Pass of the Goats), where an Ait 'Atta **amzttid** would then take him over the pass and accompany him down to Msimrir, on the next leg of his journey. However, u-Jabj noted that his protege was carrying a great deal of money, so without warning he shot him, took his **shkara** or money bag, buried him and went home. He told his fellow Ait Umzrai that he had taken the man to Tizi n-Tighttan as requested and had handed him over. Several weeks passed, and finally the Ait 'Atta man scheduled to have been the next **amzttid** came to Amzrai to enquire where his new client was. On hearing this news, u-Jabj escaped immediately to the Ait Mhand tribe, where he ramained for several months before returning home.

He paid no bloodwealth for the protege he had murdered, as the Ait Umzrai needed him in their fights against the Ait 'Abdi. This was the second cardinal violation of the code of protection which u-Jabj committed: not only did he murder his client, but he then paid no **diyit** or bloodwealth for him. Normally an **amzttid** was totally responsible for his protege while in his charge, and had full and integral responsibility for bloodwealth payment should the client be killed, by fellow tribesmen, bandits or whomsoever, while enjoying his protection.

5.3 Banditry Amongst the Ait 'Atta

There seems to be little evidence for organised banditry among the Ait 'Atta except perhaps among one of their clans, the Ait Khabbash. The French unjustly accused the latter of being large scale "coupeurs de route", but prior to "pacification" the two most feared Ait 'Atta bandits - **iqatta'en n-ibriden** (cutters of roads, highwaymen) - were in fact two men of the Ait Bu Iknifen clan of Talmast named w-'Abbu and u-Khuya. Their story is of considerable interest, especially as in no way do they conform to Hobsbawm's ideal type of the "social bandit" - for they were quite antisocial in every respect. W-'Abbu and u-Khuya had made an **'ahd** covenant through mutual hand-clasping, a vow of mutual trust and non-betrayal, before they launched their career by taking to the hills. All in all, they robbed and murdered thirty to forty men from all the neighbouring tribes, including their own fellow Ait Bu Iknifen from Talmast. They had one distinct advantage over their peers, however, for they were the first to acquire modern repeating rifles at a time when everyone else was still armed only with flintlocks (**bu shfar**).

But they soon met their just desserts. One day they went to the Ait Bu Gmaz - with whom their own fellow clansmen had numerous reciprocal arrangements of lifetime cross-tribal and cross-clan sponsorship, (**tada**) - and killed a man there. W-'Abbu took his money, and then his partner u-Khuya went secretly to the Ait Bu Gmaz to tell them what had happened. He said that if they wanted to share the money with him, they would have to lie in wait for him and his partner early next morning at the high pass over the Ighil n-Wawgulzat peak and that there they should shoot w-'Abbu. This they did, and when, over the corpse of his ex-companion-in-crime, u-Khuya announced that it was now time to divide up the loot, the Ait Bu Gmaz men turned around and shot him down as well - a just reward for anyone who breaks an **'ahd** vow. All Central Atlas Berbers, the Ait 'Atta in particular, spit with disgust when they hear the names of these two men mentioned today.

The above events probably took place in the late 1920s or very early 1930s, for the Ait 'Atta were not "pacified" by the French until the spring of 1933, after a herculean battle in February and March of that year in which the resistants were led by the magnificent 'Assu u-Bu Slam, who was anything but an w-'Abbu and whose story has been told in detail elsewhere (Hart 1977, 1984). But for the purposes of this study, the Ait 'Atta are no longer of interest to us and we turn instead to their traditional enemies, the Ait Murghad tribe of the Ait Yafalman confederation which was founded or welded together in the mid-seventeenth century with, probably, the express aim, with encouragement from the throne, of keeping the then expanding Ait 'Atta in check.

5.4 Zayd u-Hmad's War Against France

The Ait Murghad, as it happens, were themselves not "pacified" until late summer 1933 (for "pacification" as conducted by the French was a piecemeal, tribe-by-tribe operation); but one of their number, Zayd u-Hmad of the Irbiben clan, refused to surrender to France. Like the Arizona Apache Massai and the "Apache Kid", who ran off the reservation after Geronimo surrendered in 1886 to stage one-man wars against the US government, Zayd u-Hmad staged a one-man war against the French which lasted from mid-1934 until March 1936. Zayd u-Hmad and 'Assu u-Ba Slam are both commemorated by having streets in present day Casablanca named after them, but it might be added, the resemblance stops there (Hart 1977: 105).

It is fortunate in that considerable light has recently been shed on the career of Zayd u-Hmad, as a result of the diligent researches of several Moroccan scholars, such as Khettouch (1981) and Taghbalbout (1981) and most particularly those of Jean-Francois Clement (1981), who in the course of his labours on the subject also turned up a fascinating contemporary and unpublished Affaires Indigènes report (classified at the time as confidential) by the late Captain Roger Henry. Zayd u-Hmad may certainly command admiration as a last ditch resistance fighter, far more so than the w-'Abbu-u-Khuya tandem, but as Clement shows, he too fell far short of Hobsbawm's Robin Hood ideals in all but two respects: the shortness of his career and the fact that well before the end of it he was a widower.

It is clear that Zayd u-Hmad did not become a dissident as a result of some imagined personal slight or humiliation, for he was active as a raider well before the French even arrived in his area. In 1928, at the head of some seventy men, he pillaged a caravan near Tinghir, while in 1930 an economic crisis due to water shortage forced him to migrate to the so-called "submitted zone" to the north in the Middle Atlas which had already been conquered by the French. Here he became a mason in a number of different localities, even including Khamisat, after passing through Fez. He was believed dead and his family was about to divide up his share of the inheritance when he reappeared at home in the Ait Murghad **igharm** or fortress village of Iqdman in 1932. The following year, after the French had occupied Msimrir, Zayd began to do small business deals between the submitted and unsubmitted zones. On being surprised by an isolated group of soldiers in the nearby Imdghas, he killed three of them and took four carbines. In August 1933, in the Battle of Baddu, his wife was killed by a French bomb directly in front of him, while he himself was wounded and taken prisoner, and his arms and earnings were confiscated.

Zayd was now freed and went home to recover. He found two abandoned cows in the mountains and sold them to buy ammunition to be resold to a group of last-ditch resistants who

were headed for the Wad Nun. A flourishing wholesale-retail business now began in the Atlas in which rifles were even sent down from Azilal to Bni Mallal to Marrakesh to Wad Nun on official buses; but the submission of the Anti Atlas early in 1934 put an end to all effective arms smuggling, and Zayd u-Hmad lost all he had. As he did not want to sell his land to pay his debts or to go back for work in the submitted zone again, he decided to take up his old trade once more in order to wipe out at one fell swoop all his debts which were considerable. So he had his old Chassepot rifle repaired by a friend and in May he asked the French authorities for a travel authorisation for four months in order to go to the Gharb, and to furnish him with an alibi.

5.5 The War Begins

On June 11 Zayd, accompanied by a young man named u-Murkhush, set up an ambush for Lieutenant Gramailh whom he knew to be coming by car with the payroll of the workers on the Tamtattusht-Tizgi piste. However, as it happened the car carried two legionnaires, neither of whom had any money, as was discovered after they were killed. So the episode had to be staged again, as Zayd was told by another informant that the assistant Affaires Indigènes officer at Asul, Lieutenant Phelippon, left there frequently for Rish by delivery truck in order to obtain construction materials and that on his way there he would be sure to be carrying money. Accordingly, an ambush was set up at Tagunsa at 9.00am on July 25, 1934. But it was the captain who appeared, not the lietenant, and hence the attack did not go off until the next morning, July 26, at 6.00am, when Phelippon was shot by u-Murkhush after getting out of his car to remove a road block of stones. Zayd went through the car and found 400 francs, a burnous and a carbine.

By July 27, the identity of the attackers was known, and Zayd was stuck. He could no longer go home as if nothing had happened, for he was a delinquent in a state now in the process of being fully centralised by the apparatus and administration of a colonial power: it crosschecked and mapped out its territory, counted its inhabitants and kept their activities under surveillance. Gone were the days of the Makhzan when an ambiance of real delinquency would not be said to have existed because power was so irregular and discontinuous that it left major areas of freedom of action open to individuals. Henceforth the web of power was to be both restricting and all-pervasive. A pyramidal administrative hierarchy, controlled by the French military, kept the whole area under surveillance. Its efficiency was such that it would no longer need to resort to torture and ill-treatment to achieve its ends, as the old makhzan had done in its haphazard way.

Clement makes, in this connection, the penetrating observation that Zayd u-Hmad wanted to restore an old model of be-

haviour on a society which politically was now totally new. This contradiction was clearly perceived by several of his companions as well as by numerous notables of the area because the society itself, experiencing an increase in penetration by a money economy, equally began to change to the extent of becoming somewhat more stratified - whereas it had previously been segmentary, tribal and almost completely egalitarian. So Zayd u-Hmad underwent a political transformation and after a crisis of religious belief, sacrificed a sheep to Sidi Bu Ya'qub, the major saint of the Ait Murghad, recited prayers in the latter's name and declared himself to be ready for **jihad.**

5.6 The War Becomes Jihad

Two attacks in mid-August and late September were without victims or concrete results, but on October 10, Zayd waylaid a Moroccan delivery truck at Wi-n-Niwaliyun. The driver was killed, the passengers escaped, but several of Zayd's former companions were arrested and one of them was tortured to death. Group morale was at rock bottom and Zayd therefore had to work up another attack to preserve his image. On December 1 he killed two Moroccan soldiers in a ravine at Aqqa n-Tizgi; and on January 27, 1935, after learning that Sergeant-major Tristani was going to take two prisoners to Tinghir, he killed him with one shot. Shortly afterward he left for the Saghru, but in May he went back north again to Tana. On June 1 he killed Lieutenant Fromentin near Lake Tislit in the territory of the Ait Hadiddu, but found no money at all in the latter's car. Worst of all, the Lieutenant's companion had been able to flee and give warning of the killing.

Zayd fell ill again, but on his recovery, as it was now impossible for him to mount even the smallest operation against the French, he began incessantly to find fault with his own compatriots, accusing them of being responsible for his delinquency - and on several occasions he stole from them. To one of them, astonished by this, he retorted, "You would leave me without resources or subsistence? Can I cultivate my fields like you? It is you, false brothers, band of Christians, who force me to steal in order to live". And from then on the victims of Zayd's jihad would be principally Muslims, a paradox which has run through the whole history of Islam and has led to the creation of draconian conditions for the declaration of the holy war, which is in any case always more a holy war against the self, or oneself, than against the other.

On August 22 Zayd killed the shaykh of the Ait Aritan, whom he suspected of being an informer for the Affaires Indigènes officer at Tinghir. Then, after hiding for a month at Tana, he robbed several merchants on the roads, netting a few duros here, a few there. But this was not enough and he had to

mortgange his fields. So on October 19 he attacked a more prosperous merchant and robbed him of 120 duros. However, complaints now began to come in about Zayd from all over the region, and when the Affaires Indigènes officer at Asul convoked a meeting of the Irbiben clan at Tana, one of them took fright and fled: it was Zayd's only remaining companion Muha u-Hammu. On November 16 the two men attacked the car of a French industrialist, Mr. Bourgouin of the Vacuum Cie., but without result; and two days later they attacked a detachment of the 7th Goums and killed three soldiers. Finally, on December 30, they both attacked the canteen at the post of Tinghir and killed three legionnaires, thus bringing 1935 to a close.

5.7 Zayd's Career Comes to an End

But this was Zayd's last exploit. His companion Muha u-Hammu was weakening, due largely to a pregnant wife. Zayd asked the local Affaires Indigènes officer, Captain Henry himself - through an intermediary, for they were never to meet face to face - for a year's truce to be guaranteed by his word. He realised that he could no longer return to Iqdman as several people were waiting there to strike him down. On January 28, 1936, therefore, the two outlaws met the brother of the shaykh of Agudal, who immediately gave out the alert. Now the final manhunt began. On February 2, the two bandits picked up 'Aisha, the seven months pregnant wife of Muha u-Hammu and on February 7 they reached the igharm of the Ait Sha'ib. From here they went back into the mountains because the word was out about them everywhere and they were hemmed in by pursuers from all sides. A tribal notable denounced them and on March 5, 1936, Zayd u-Hmad was shot down at Tadafalt in 'Ait 'Atta territory by one of his former companions in resistance, a rather simple-minded shepherd, soaked in gasoline and burned (Khettouch 1981: 53). Many years later, in 1978, Father (formerly Captain) Roger Henry died at his altar while celebrating mass.

5.8 Hmad Uhansal

Clement's observations about the French protectorate military and administrative machinery in Morocco being fully in place and active even before the end of the final Berber tribal resistance in the Atlas in 1933-34 are, if anything, doubly applicable to the final recorded and isolated case of banditry in the region twenty years later: that of Hmad Uhansal (Arabic, l-Ahansali) of the Ait Taghya clan of the Ihansalen tribe. Today he is referred to retrospectively as Sidi Hmad Ahansal and given nationalist credentials in the more recent traditions of violent resistance that in modern terms he did not really possess. Violent he certainly was,

but the extent of his nationalism must be decided by the reader, even though his local patriotism was beyond reproach.

The Ait Taghya may be few in number but they have a ferocious local reputation, behaving more like lay bandits and less like prototypical white-robed and saintly **igurramen** than any of the remaining Ihansalen sections, and here Gellner's analysis of them is no doubt correct (Gellner 1969: 215). But Gellner only alludes in passing to Sidi Hmad Uhansal - and, incorrectly, as a Berber Robin Hood - it is left to Julien (1978: 338-9. 528 and photograph 18) to place him in at least an approximation of the proper historical context, even though Julien's own account is skimpy on details.

Hmad Uhansal - like Zayd u-Hmad and many unnamed others before him, including, no doubt, the inimitable w-'Abbu and u-Khuya as well - started life as a shepherd. Then he became servitor to a **qaid** and finally a road worker. Although little if anything is known of his motivation, the author's own field assistant, himself from the Ihansalen, said that it was largely personal: that Hmad Uhansal had been insulted and humiliated by the French forest ranger at Tagzirt because the latter wanted his pretty wife - and so he took his revenge shortly thereafter, by shooting the forest ranger and his **mkhazni** with the latter's own rifle which he had captured by trickery. Thus he was launched on his career. However, this may be a subsequent embroidery of two separate events, for on May 10, 1953, he surprised a **mkhazni** in an isolated post near I-Qsiba, stole his rifle and killed him. This affair produced little reaction, but four days later he committed a second offense by killing a French functionary and his mother, and then a young Frenchman accompanied by his wife or girlfriend on a motorcycle. He also wounded another couple, and by this time he had become famous as "the Tadla killer" - Qasba Tadla, in the plain, being the nearest town of any size to his theatre of operations in the mountains.

By May 15, a manhunt was organised with 10,000 men participating, but in vain, for Hmad Uhansal could not be flushed out, so the authorities posted a reward of one million old francs. A week later, on May 23, three tribesmen captured him, disarmed him, tied him up and took him to Captain Duverger, the Affaires Indigènes officer at I-Qsiba, who put him through an initial interrogation and then presented him to the **Vigie Marocaine** for a press interview, which was published along with his dossier on May 24.

That same day the three tribesmen were given their reward, and Hmad Uhansal was taken to Bni Mallal, where he was interrogated by Philippe Boniface, the most powerful and reactionary French settler **colon** in Morocco as well as Chief of Police for Casablanca. Boniface wanted to prove the responsibility of the then outlawed Istiqlal, the leading Moroccan nationalist party, for the affair. But on the basis of Hmad Uhansal's declarations, he was quite unable to implicate any of the party militants. He

also tried to implicate the resident French Communists in Morocco in the affair, and here too he was unsuccessful: for it was patently obvious that Hmad Uhansal was acting entirely on his own. He was judged, and he declared that he had acted according to God's will. On or shortly after May 25, 1953, the "lion of Tadla" was executed and was regarded locally - and indeed nationally - as a martyr.

5.9 The Wider Context

The wider context of the affair, too, is not without interest, for it took place against the background of the preparations for the Glawi's second attempted Berber **coup d'état.** Marshal Juin, the previous French proconsul, had just returned to Morocco to award the Glawi with the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour on the plateau of Tizi n-Tighttan (Pass of the Goats) in the Middle Atlas where several thousand Berber tribesmen had been convoked. The ceremony took place between the crimes and the arrest of Hmad Uhansal; and the time in question was also that of the collection of signatures from the qaid-s in order to prepare for the deposition of the Sultan Sidi Muhammad bin Yusuf - later King Muhammad V - which was to occur on August 20. Julien also indicates that the affair was the last one in which money-hungry informers consented to turn over a compatriot. They had not understood that Hmad Uhansal was a partisan warrior fighting against foreign domination, even if he was doing so completely on his own (Julien 1978: 339).

So here again bandit and resistance hero merge, even if only very briefly and in what was essentially only a pre-or protonationalist framework. Finally, the attitudes of our Moroccan bandits toward Christian Europeans change over time: the first ones largely ignored them, and 'Ali l-Bu Frahi probably had no contact with them; later, Raysuni captured them; and later still, Zayd u-Hmad and Hmad Uhansal both killed them. This in itself is a measure of differing responses, becoming increasingly uncompromising over time, which were provided by Moroccan Islam to the European and Christian threat.

Chapter Notes

1. A proverb was circulated about this individual, "Salt has no worms, a good sheet does not fill up with water, god does not rust and the 'Inteketto' never misses" (Euloge 1951: 207).

2. For full details on the Ihansalen and their holy and "lay" lineages, see Gellner 1969, **passim.**

VI COLONIAL ALGERIA

6.1 The Frequency of Social Banditry

Unfortunately, there is no record of social banditry in Algeria for the precolonial (Ottoman) period - since this was prior to 1830 and the types of records which would register such events did not exist. The only cases that have been indentified fall not only fully into colonial times, but the earliest of them postdates the beginnings of colonialism there by six decades. By this time, of course, the dispossession of all native Algerians, even the Kabyles after the 1871 insurrection, by the French colons was already complete. There are, no doubt, further cases of banditry in the archives, but only two have so far been identified - a double-header involving an uncle and nephew team from the Eastern Jurjura and Greater Kabylia, dating from the period 1890-5 (Sainte-Marie 1974) and another from the Aures, that of Misa'ud bin Zilmad - Misa'ud the Left-Handed - or Misa'ud Son of the Left-Handed - for the period 1917-21 (Dejeux 1978).

A much later case, also from Greater Kabylia (the Jurjura) during 1945-9, is discussed by Harbi (Harbi 1980:59-67), but this one frankly comes too close to merging with the immediate antecedents of the Algerian Revolution of 1954-62, and hence, like Favret's otherwise suggestive allusions in a very worthwhile article to post-independence banditry in the Aures (Favret 1973, in Gellner and Micaud 1973) is best left outside this discussion, for the Algerian Armée de Liberation Nationale (ALN), whatever else one may say about it, was a remarkably unbanditlike organisation.

As Sainte-Marie makes clear, however (Sainte-Marie 1974:445), after the 1871 uprising, several outlaw bands were formed in the thick forests of Kabylia, such as that of Amzzyan Mansur in the Mizrana forest near Dellys where he was killed in May 1874. The region was then relatively quiet for a few years, but after mid-1890 another recrudescance began in the Upper Siba'u, in the Tigzirt-Azazga-Bijaya (Bougie) triangle, and absconders, fugitives and murderers, often as the result of blood-feuds - very common in Kabylia at the time - reached the forests of Tamgut, I'aqquren and Akfadu all in the commune mixte


ALGIERS
BEJAYA
DELLYS
MIDYA
OSAR AL-BUKHARI
SETIF
ALGIERS
BEJAYA
DELLYS
'AZAFFUN
TIZI UZZU
BLIDA
MIDYA
OSAR AL-BUKHAI
2308
1677
1346
1942
1810
1464
30km
KABYLIA (Algeria)

of 'Azaffun. Among them were the w-'Abdun brothers and their nephew Arizqi u-l-Bashir.

6.2 Muhammad u-l-Hajj 'Abdun-Kabylia

The story of Muhammad u-l-Hajj 'Abdun reaches truly epic proportions. In his home village, he had been accused, no doubt falsely, by the rival internal village faction or **suff** of having murdered the president of the council of the Ath Jannad ash-Sharg. As a result, he was condemned to death in 1884 but his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment with hard labour at the infamous Devil's Island off the coast of South America. In 1887 he escaped from Cayenne, in French Guyana, and after picking up an English boat, he took refuge in Panama. As a result of money saved while working on the digging of the Panama Canal, he now moved on to the Antilles and from there, via London and Gibraltar, he arrived in Morocco and headed east to Algeria and Kabylia to pursue his vengeance. Incredible though it may seem, Sainte-Marie notes and documents the fact that w-'Abdun's type of odyssey was infrequent but not exceptional (1974: 445, n.30).

In 1891 w-'Abdun was joined in the **maquis**, by his brother and his nephew, Arizqi u-l-Bashir. After a robbery committed in Algiers, the latter had taken refuge in his tribe of origin, the Ath Ghubri. Here his personal role in French Algerian demonology was completed after it became known that he was personally responsible for four murders and had participated in some twenty others - all, evidently, of other Kabyles. During this period, the newspapers, while campaigning for greater security, succeeded in giving him an epic image, and after January 1891 echoes became more alarmist. The impunity of bandits like him was imputed to the passivity and complicity of the local Kabyle population and to the insufficient gendarmerie network, especially when in 1892 the two bands of 'Abdun and Arizqi, which had hitherto been distinct, merged into one.

By the end of that year, despite the promise of major bounties by the French, no captures had been made. The bandits' relative impunity may be explained by the fact that their activities were very largely restricted to the Kabyle milieu. Arizqi had a reputation for not attacking French settlers and for having quite good relations with the forest rangers, with the teachers in Azazga and even with some members of the administration. The main targets of w-'Abdun and Arizqi were those who denounced them or acted as witnesses against them, and against the village **amins** and the tribal presidents (whose nominations had of course been ratified by the French) who were too zealous in pursuing them.

One example will suffice: the death of the young president of the Ighil n-Zkri who was assisting Louis Sicard, the French

delimitations commissioner, in his boundary delimitations work resulting from the 1873 extension of the 1863 Senatus Consulte decree, which carved up virtually all indigenously owned land in Algeria to the benefit of French settlers. On January 4, 1892, al-Bashir u-l-Hajj 'Abdun, another newphew of Muhammad u-l-Hajj 'Abdun, was killed in an ambush set up by Kabyle policemen recruited by Sicard while on his way to see his mistress in Tabaghust. Among them, one young man proudly claimed to have fired the fatal shot. He was nominated as president of the Ighil n-Zkri and as a result was himself ambushed and killed by Arizqi's band on May 2, 1893.

6.3 The French react

In a series of reports cited by Sainte-Marie (1974: 447, notes 35-7), Sicard stressed the multiplication of armed attacks and murders during 1892 and 1893. The murders of village amin-s who were "devoted" to the French led to fewer and fewer persons seeking that office, and there was also a falloff in the enrollment of police. Refusals to pay taxes and fines became numerous. After the failure of an attempt to clean out the forests of I'aqquren and Tamgut there was even the impression that embryonic revolt had developed even if no Europeans were molested. Sicard went so far as to write off the "arrogance" of the bandits and noted that, either from fear of their reprisals or from admiration of their exploits, a large part of the local population was becoming their accomplices (Sainte-Marie 1974: 448). To this extent the Hobsbawm theory briefly reenters the picture, but harmony between the bandits and the local people was by no means perfect and became less so during the course of 1893. The kinsmen of most of their numerous victims not unnaturally wanted vengeance, and the feud tended to spread - notably around Tabaghust, the site of the ambush of Bashir w-'Abdun.

In December, profiting from the increasing tension between tribesmen and bandits, the French administrators of the several communes mixtes (districts) concerned went over to the offensive against the bandits with the aid of native troops (tirailleurs and spahis) and armed tribesmen. Almost immediately some fifty bandits were arrested or killed. At the end of January 1894 Arizqi was captured by a native police assistant. His trial opened in Algiers a year later, and on January 28, 1895, he was condemned to death, soon to be followed by 'Abdun and eight of their kinsmen. Four were spared, but on May 14, 1895, the six others, including Arizqi and w-'Abdun, were publicly executed at Azazga. On June 25, the last members of the band were captured.

6.4 The Aures

Although Dejeux (1978:38), probably unaware of Sainte-Marie's article, exaggerates the exploits of 'Abdun and Arizqi and their excellent relations, not only with the local people but with the Europeans, in an attempt to boost the Hobsbawm Robin Hood image, he does reiterate (1978:37) one very good general point made by Hobsbawm (Hobsbawm 1969: 14):

> Tribal and kinship societies are familiar with raiding but lack the internal stratification which creates the bandit as figure of social protest and rebellion. However, when such communities, especially those familiar with feuding and raiding such as hunters and pastoralists, develop their own systems of class differentiation,or when they are absorbed into larger economies resting on class conflict, they may supply a disproportionately large number of social bandits.

There is no question but that this view is more applicable to colonial Algeria than to Morocco, where the factors related to larger economic systems and class conflict emerge much later on. In addition, it is even more applicable to the Aures, "the permanent maquis of North Africa", or the **Vendée Barbare des Causes Perdues** (Dejeux 1978:40-1).

The Aures had been the scene of a major insurrection in 1879, and again in 1916 there were troubles in the Batna area. The Constantine region in any case has always been historically one of Algeria's major trouble spots, and within it the Aures can claim the title of **primus inter pares.** During World War I the economic situation of the Algerian Muslims was worse than usual and although people were willing to pay taxes, they were not willing to give their sons to fight in the trenches in France. Desertions were frequent, for the war was not seen as a national issue and, owing to the presence of the Ottomans on the German side, Algerian neutrality was severely tried. The Shawiya inhabitants of the Aures still had a number of Lebel (model 1886) carbines left over from the previous uprising, vengeance and adultery killings were frequent, and although many were settled by **diya** or bloodwealth payments, this was not true of all and in any case, customary law, favoured the **lex talionis.**

The figure of Misa'ud bin Zilmad or Misa'ud, son of the Left-Handed, possibly so called because, in Berber-speaking Morocco at least, left handers or "southpaws" are also believed be be dead shots - can easily be fitted into this context of resistance to authority. Two bands of army deserters and malcontents were soon formed in the area, a northern one under bin Zilmad and and a southern one under a man called Bu Msran.(1)

6.5 Misa'ud bin Zilmad

On May 1, 1915, a shepherd from Zallatu named 'Ali bin Zilmad was condemned **in absentia** to a year in prison by the Batna tribunal for the theft of a mule. As he did not appear at the trial, he was arrested by two of his kinsmen and taken to Arris to be jailed. He escaped, killed the man who denounced him and then took to the maquis. With a band of deserters he holed up in the mountains until October 1917, when one group of insurgents was captured and he himself was found dead a few days later.

His brother, Misa'ud bin Zilmad, then intervened, taking command of the rest of the band and swearing to avenge his dead brother. On the night of October 14-15, 1917, the village of Fum Tub was attacked by some forty bandits: houses were pillaged, women and old men were bound and gagged, and one woman was even raped - a rare event indeed, given the Islamic cultural triple formula of honour, respect and seclusion of women. However, all the ablebodied men of the village had been drafted or were away in the war on the French front. The attack was attributed to Misa'ud bin Zilmad and, thereafter, the French attempts to capture him became almost too numerous to count. Early in the summer of 1918, bin Zilmad went to Kimmal to kill one of the members of the Awlad Sa'd lineage who had killed his brother, swearing an oath to eliminate the ten remaining members of the lineage as well (Sainte-Marie 1974: 41).

By this time, the band of Bu Msran had already been in operation for more than a year and the French authorities now began to try all possible means to reduce both bands - pressures on local chiefs, rewards for capture, **goum** and volunteer patrols, even military operations. Contemporary French views of the situation were clearly that local people wanted to live at peace with the insurgents and wanted to help keep the government forces in check. By the end of 1917 the two bands held the whole of the Aures, and nobody really complained because all crimes committed were ones of personal vengeance on the part of one or other of the brigands. Most important of all, because of **suff** alliance ties, nobody denounced them.

Pressures by the French authorities on local notables and even on members of the bandits' families did not lead to tangible results. Individual bandits were captured and killed, but the two leaders kept on, even to the point of attacking **suq-s** (rural markets) in broad daylight. Anyone who denounced them was punished, either by kidnapping for ransom or by death, according to the gravity of the offense.

Up to 1919, bin Zilmad did not threaten any Europeans, but this state of affairs was not to continue for long. On August 20 of that year the Algerian Governor-General decided to send 400 infantry and 200 cavalry to the area and, on September 7, a threatening letter allegedly signed by bin Zilmad - which later proved to be false - was sent to a Batna businessman, a Mr

Paul, to dissuade him from buying some land belonging to the White Fathers' Catholic religious order at Mdina, near Batna. Despite the fact that the letter was a forgery, the episode provided the government forces with the pretext they needed and operations began on October 20, with 300 infantry and 85 cavalry at Mdina, 30 Algerian tirailleurs at Khanshla and 200 Senegalese tirailleurs at Mshunesh. The deployment of these forces was rendered difficult, however, because of the irriged nature of the terrain - with the result that the operations of the bandits were in no way halted. On February 20, 1920, Qaid Misa'ud of the village of Shalya was murdered by bin Zilmad himself, thus dooming the partial operations to defeat "like a sword stroke in water", as a contemporary report had it.

The result was that the Aures was now covered with numerous troops. To such an extent that on June 9, the inhabitants of the village of Rmila sent a letter to the Governor-General begging him to remove the soldiers who were wrongly threatening them. After the Governor-General admitted that there was no precedent recommending exile, General de Francolini, who was in command of the Batna subdivision, then proposed to exile only bin Zilmad's "tribe of origin" and to put under "heavy occupation" and corvee duty only on those groups which had helped him and whose loyalty was doubtful. The occupation of the Aures was then accordingly reorganised.

In the midst of this bin Zilmad, with some difficulty, slipped further south and in mid-July he joined forces with Bu Msran. Their joint raids and executions then continued. Military columns beat all around the Aures maquis but despite all these military operations, the bandits remained uncaptured. As a result, the tope military echelons in Algiers, provoked by the accumulating reports of military failure and banditry, finally set up a commission of civil and military personnel to study the matter. More rewards for capture were offered as was aid to families victimised by the bandits, dossiers were established as a result of surveillance of the bandits' kinsmen - wives, mothers, sisters, sisters-in-law, as well as the father, another brother and two friends of bin Zilmad. As a result of these measures, it became known, for example, that bin Zilmad himself had observed through binoculars the subprefect giving a talk at Mdina.

On October 12, however, a battle took place near 'Uglat Jnan, in the Biskra annex, in which the southern band was decimated and Bu Msran and his chief lieutenant were both killed. Bin Zilmad himself and one of his companions escaped into the Khanshla, hoping to move from there into Tripolitania, and then escaped yet again after a further engagement in mid-December. But on March 7, 1921, Bin Zilmad was killed at Millagu in the Khanshla region by goum-s who were pursuing him, while his companion, al-Mslimani, was killed at Wulja Shashar the following day.

6.6 The Forgotten Hero

As Dejeux notes in his summary, Bin Zilmad took to the maquis to avenge his brother. He did not kill Europeans - at least, to the extent that they did not pursue or betray him - but addressed himself to those Muslim Algerians who stole from and exploited their coreligionists. He was aided not only by his family and friends but by his whole social environment, his people, among whom he swam like Mao Tse-Tung's celebrated "fish in the sea". Naturally, he was feared but he was also supported through a tacit mixture of complicity, connivance and admiration, perhaps because people could not act otherwise and also, probably more directly through fear of reprisals. In the villages of the Aures it was difficult to support the oppression of occupying troops but, in the long run, it was also difficult to tolerate the presence of bandits (Dejeux 1978: 44-5).

But more significant is the way in which bin Zilmad fits into the wider context of Algerian society under colonialism. Dejeux notes, almost certainly correctly, that bandits d'honneur, such as bin Zilmad, tend to be forgotten with time, for their memory disappears with the death of old peasants and tribesmen. Indeed, it is undeniable that bin Zilmad has not acquired the stature of a national hero in the Algerian collective memory. Nonetheless, there seems little doubt that, if he had lived in 1954, bin Zilmad would have been in the forefront of the Algerian struggle for independence - as, by extrapolation, would w-'Abdun and Arizqi u-l-Bashir.

Once in the maquis he tried to show a concern for justice as he conceived it, in this case by curbing the exploitation of the poor by the rich and by limiting the liberties taken by local power holders, all within the context of the Shawiya society of the Aures. It was not his object to kill or even molest French settlers who, in any case, were not numerous in the region. He was not against France per se but against French justice which to him appeared as injustice in the light of his own Aurasian customary law. He was against colonial notions of law and order within certain limits but this political aspect of his struggle did not lend itself to any revolutionary overtones. His objectives did not go beyond the point of helping the poor obtain justice.

Even though the memory of bin Zilmad may have reached the status of a myth, it has done so only at a lower echelon, for it was not he but the generation which followed him that gained consciousness of wider political and revolutionary dimension of revolt. This was a larger movement which went beyond the particular interests of local populations and which first manifested itself - significantly - through the attack by an embryonic FLN on the Aures town of Arris on November 1, 1954. This event not only began the seven-year Algerian revolutionary war but it also occurred, significantly enough, in bin Zilmad's old stamping grounds (Dejeux 1978:49-50).

Chapter Notes

1. Bu Msran ("Possessor of appendicitis"?) was the nickname of Salah b. Muhammad Amzzyan, from the Shawiya village of Mshunesh. He had been arrested for fighting and wounding people, had escaped in November 1915 and had sworn vengeance on the lineage of the wounded men responsible for his arrest - an event that led to his move into banditry.



THE AURES (Algeria)

VII THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER - THE AFRIDI

7.1 The Tribal Agencies and Areas

In many ways, the North-West Frontier of what was, in British colonial times, India and what has since 1947 been Pakistan is a special case. But it is only special because of the special and virtually autonomous jurisdiction which the British - who annexed the Punjab from the Sikhs in 1849 - later awarded to the Pukhtun Tribal Agencies. This tribal agency formation was gradual, although most of it occurred before the turn of the century - the Khaibar (Khyber) Agency in 1881, the Kurram Agency (controlling potentially explosive elements in the shape of one fully Shi'a tribe, the Turi, and two other partially Shi'a ones, the Bangash and the Orakzai) in 1892, and the Malakand and North and South Waziristan Agencies in 1895-6. These five original agencies predated the actual creation in 1901 of the North-West Frontier Province itself under the proconsulship of Lord Curzon, and they were followed much later - after Pakistani independence - by the creation of two more, the Mohmand in 1951 and the Orakzai in 1973, in response to population pressure and complaints of under- administration by the tribesmen.

Today, their successors, the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA), of Pakistan represent one of the biggest concentrations of tribal populations on earth today. They are also extraordinarily proud of their tribal status and affiliations, and the fact that every male carries a rifle and adheres, in theory at least, to the **Pukhtunwali**, the behavourial code of honour, of all the tribes, bears witness to this. Indeed, as Ahmed has cogently argued, until as recently as the 1970s external government has had no impact on the socio-economic organisation of the tribes in the agencies. In the colonial past, indeed, the generally unrelenting hostility of tribal-government relations tended to reinforce the traditional ethos and way of life expressed in the principles of the **Pukhtunwali** (Ahmed 1981).

7.2 Banditry at the Turn of the Century

Although the popular view of the tribes as predators on the

sedentary agricultural population of the settled districts of the North-West Frontier Province has become something of an exaggerated stereotype, it is nonetheless true that by the turn of the century, the only tribes or tribal sections which carried out raids and acts of banditry with any regularity were the Mahsud of the South Waziristan Agency and the Zakha Khayl Afridi of the Khaibar Agency (Christensen, 1985). They were mainly acts of banditry against the British government, rather than actions for the economic motive of supplementing income. But the latter was certainly an additional factor, as the Zakha Khayl kidnappings of rich Hindus, even from the provincial capital of Peshawar itself, at the beginning of the century were to show. They were mirrored by similar kidnappings of other wealthy Hindus by the Mahsud in South Waziristan, as will be seen later.

7.3 The Zakha Khayl Afridi

It would be impossible to cover in detail the activities of the Zakha Khayl Afridi raiders, in the context of this study. Suffice it to say that the Zakha Khayl at the turn of the century had the reputation of being the most turbulent of all eight of the Afridi clans, (Hart 1985, for details of their socio-political organisation and history). After the generalised and millenial **jihad** of 1897-8 against the British all up and down the frontier - a **jihad** which the Afridi were the last tribe to join but also the last to abandon after a heavy British expeditionary force under General Sir William Lockhart, despite appalling casualties and savage Afridi counter-attacks, had marched through their hitherto impenetrable stronghold in the Tirah uplands southwest of the Khaibar Pass (an area which to this day is forbidden to all save Afridi - all the Afridi clans and sections finally surrendered to the British in April 1898.

However, the surrenders did not include a large number of proclaimed outlaws (Pakhtu **mafruran**, sg. **mafrur**) from various sections of the Zakha Khayl. Indeed, all that a "proclaimed offender" had to do to avoid capture by the British was to slipover. The Durand Line into Afghanistan, where anti-British sentiments ran high and where he was sure to be received with sympathy. The lively trade in contraband arms coming through from the Gulf aided and abetted this overall situation, as did the general proliferation of homemade rifles in the Adam Khayl Afridi factories at Darra, near the Kohat Pass. Significantly, the Zakha Khayl share of the total Afridi indemnity after the 1897-8 uprising had to be borne jointly by the five other clans which had participated in the **jihad**, a point that was stressed by Major G.B. (later Sir George) Roos-Keppel, the Political Agent of the Khaibar Agency at the time.

It is in this context that Zakha Khayl raiders began to show their heads and to use strongarm tactics on wealthy Hindu

merchants again, in order, of course, to show their displeasure with those more powerful infidels, the British. Multan of the Anai Budai Zakha Khayl - among Pukhtun tribes, tribal segments are named in ascending order of segmentation - and 'Usman of the Jamal Khayl Khasrugai Zakha Khayl - who was later murdered in June 1912 by a rival, Malik Yar Muhammad Khan of the Malik Din Khayl (cf. Hart 1985, Chapt. VI) - are but two names among many. In September 1904 a Zakha Khayl gang robbed and murdered a Hindu **banya** in the Kohat district, and given their Martini-Henry rifles and hence superior firepower, they were able to kill five and wound six of the pursuing group.

Between 1905 and 1908, the Zakha Khayl raids, unsupported by any of the other clans, snowballed in number and in scope, reaching to the outskirts of Kohat and Peshawar, while competing groups of Zakha Khayl "outlaws" tried to outdo each other in ambushing troops and police parties and raiding villages. Spain reports that they even tried, unsuccessfully, to kidnap a Hindu Assistant Commissioner from Peshawar (Spain 1963: 190-1). Indeed, in late January 1908, some eighty raiders, disguised as police, broke down the door of a Hindu banker named Chela Ram right in Peshawar city and walked off with 100,000 rupees (al-**akh**).

7.4 The British Reaction

It should be noted that, although the British had been handing out tribal allowances - largely for the purpose of guarding the passes - almost since the beginning of their occupation of the frontier, they considered that the Zakha Khayl Afridi had long since forfeited their rights to theirs and that by 1908 they already owed in fines alone twice the entire amount of the forfeited allowances - including those for the next three years as well. The capture of the Commissioner and the seizure of the lakh of rupees was decided upon after a Zakha Khayl spokesman, Khawas Khan, walked uninvited late in 1907 with his delegation into an allowance distribution - from which they had been excluded - made by Roos-Keppel to all other Afridi clans which had already taken turns chastising them with their **lakhkar-s** or tribal war parties - the Pukhtun equivalent of the Moroccan **harka.** Khawas Khan then produced a written demand that no more allowances be docked from any Afridi clans, his own included, and that henceforth the Zakha Khayl would no longer surrender any prisoners or hand over any raiders from other clans who passed through their territory in the Bazar Valley. This was tantamount to a declaration of independence (Miller 1977:302).

In response, the British decided to invade the Bazar Valley in force, with an Indian Army column under Major General Sir James Willcocks. The invasion took place in February 1908, and when it was over two weeks later, the valley had been pounded

with artillery. However, the really interesting aftermath of the expedition occurred, once the Zakha Khayl settlement had been finally made, for the other Afridi clans now took over where the British had left off. The account of what happened is taken from Roos-Keppel and is eminently worth paraphrasing (India Office Records: l/P&S/10/46, NWF: Zakha Khayl Affairs 1904).

7.5 The Afridi Take Over

A major jirga or council meeting, numbering 600 men from each clan save the Adam Khayl and the Aka Khayl - about 3,000 men all told - was held on February 28, 1908. Its members, fed up with the behaviour of the Zakha Khayl, agreed to hold themselves jointly and severally responsible for the future good behaviour of every section and subsection of the Zakha Khayl. In effect, this was a masterpiece, both of tribal justice and segmentary organisation, and it is worth recording in detail. The jirga in question visited all the Zakha Khayl settlements and finally returned to Fort Jamrud, at the eastern end of the Khaibar Pass some ten kilmetres from Peshawar, on April 3. Except for that particularly notorious Zakha Khayl raider Multan who had underscored his **mafrur** status as a proclaimed offender by taking refuge across the Afghan border in Jalalabad, they brought with them every other Zakha Khayl raider of the day as well as all the loot - rifles, jewellery and money - that they had forced them to disgorge, amounting to 53,039/4/9 rupees.

The fine which had been imposed on the Zakha Khayl for their share in the 1897-8 uprising was 9,000 rupees, which had eventually been paid for them by the other clans, whose members had never recovered any of it. The fact that this was now reversed was in itself an indication of their success on this occasion. The jirga deposited thirteen rifles, valued at 5,000-6,000 rupees with Major Roos-Keppel, as a guarantee that it would not allow Multan to return to the Tirah until he had been properly punished. On April 19, they made a written statement to this effect, again in jirga.

Furthermore - and this is the point of particular interest - at the original jirga of February 28, it was decided that the shared responsibility for future good behaviour on the part of the Zakha Khayl meant that : the Malik Din Khayl Afridi were to be responsible for the Sahib Khayl half of the Anai, the Pa'indai and the Jamal Khayl Khasrugai Zakha Khayl; the Qambar Khayl Afridi were to be responsible for the Shan Khayl Zakha Khayl of Bara and the Tirah; the Kuki Khayl Afridi and the Niki Khayl Pakhai Afridi (the latter evidently Zakha Khayl themselves as well) were to be responsible for the Muhibb Khayl half of the Anai Zakha Khayl; the Sipah Afridi were to be responsible for the Ziya d-Din Zakha Khayl; the Kamar Khayl Afridi were to be responsible for all the Khasrugai Zakha Khayl subsections save the Jamal Khayl;

and the Khaibar Pakhai Zakha Khayl were to be responsible for their brothers, the Bara Pakhai Zakha Khayl.

Apart from indicating that probably two thirds of the Pakhai Zakha Khayl subsections, located in two different areas, were innocent of the charges levelled at the rest of them and the rest of their fellow clansmen, this division of internal tribal responsibility provides an unrivalled example of balance and opposition at work and in action in a highly segmentary system. There is, unfortunately, no indication in Roos-Keppel's report about how long this shared responsibility may have lasted; but it was probably unique in the annals of frontier history.

Roos-Keppel also notes that there was a deposit of 53 rifles due according to the Zakha Khayl jirga's petition and that these had to be extracted from them, "a tedious exercise, as each person was most anxious that his brother's rifle, and not his own, be given up, while efforts were also made to induce the British to accept arms of local manufacture, with a very small market value" (IOR: L/P&S/10/46: **Zakha Khayl Affairs 1904**, No. B-37, Roos-Keppel to Mullaly, March 3, 1908). He concludes his report on the proud but paternalistic note that during the expedition not a man of the Khaibar Rifles force - organised originally by his predecessor Colonel Sir Robert Warburton: (Warburton, 1900) - deserted, even though brother may have been fighting brother.

Unlike the great conflagration of 1897-8, however, this was hardly a millenial uprising, and if any **mulla-s** were involved, they were far from centre stage. It was, rather, a totally secular exercise in chastisement, fully approved by the other clans, as the active participation in it of all of them save the Adam Khayl and the Aka Khayl (who are both too far away to have been affected) shows. They felt they had a legitimate grievance against the Zakha Khayl because the latter had wriggled out of paying their share of the collective fine accrued from the 1897-98 uprising, and that they had been left holding the Zakha Khayl baby.

Here the matter might be said to have ended. Certainly the Kiplingesque references in the colonial literature and archives to the Zakha Khayl propensity for theft and raiding drop sharply and in the post-colonial period they have died out completely. Today, any individual Zakha Khayl may even be regarded as just one more Pakistani going about his business. However, as Howell has noted, during World War I it was the Qambar Khayl Afridi brothers, Mir Dast and Mir Mast, who assumed the centre of the military stage. Mir Dast, in a British Indian regiment, was awarded the Victoria Cross for Gallantry in action, while his brother, Mir Mast, after deserting to the Germans, was evidently awarded the Iron Cross, first class, by them under similar circumstances in reverse. (Howell 1979: 67, no.1).

7.6 The Ellis Case

However, the most famous Afridi raiders of all were another pair of brothers, not from the Zakha Khayl clan but from that of the rifle-making Adam Khayl near Kohat. They were 'Ajab Khan and his younger brother Shahzada, and were involved in the famous Ellis case of 1923 and its aftermath.

In the autumn of 1920, raiders from the Adam Khayl knifed Colonel Foulkes and his wife while they were asleep in their quarters inside the Kohat military cantonment. However, as Miller has observed (1977: 335), this was just a dress rehearsal for the much more famous Ellis case, the most noteworthy single incident of the whole decade, which was to come three years later, again inside the Kohat cantonment.

In February 1923, 46 Enfield .303 rifles (of British manufacture, of course, not the local Afridi factory model from Darra°) were stolen from the cantonment and the theft was attributed to a certain 'Ajab Khan, of the Musa Khayl segment of the Busti Khayl section of the Gallai sub-clan of the Adam Khayl, whose village was located just within the tribal area on the flank of the Kohat Pass. On March 5, the Frontier Constabulary under E.C. Handyside (killed at the pass by other Adam Khayl outlaws in April 1926), together with regular troops, surrounded 'Ajab's village while he was absent on another raid, and searched it. They recovered 33 of the missing weapons as well as certain articles of uniform which established in the clearest way the complicity of 'Ajab in the Foulkes double murder (**Administration Report NWFP**, 1922-1923, 1924: iii). But, more important, the rumour also circulated that some of the tribeswomen were subject to body searching and insulting remarks.

'Ajab and his younger brother, Shahzada, a former sepoy in a Baluchi regiment, spent some weeks figuring out how best to avenge this case of tor and its slur upon the honour of their women (Spain 1963: 154-6). Urged on by the injured women, they again raided Kohat Cantonment before dawn on April 14, shooting Col Archibald Ellis, knifing Mrs Ellis and carrying off their seventeen-year old daughter Mollie into captivity in the Tirah. As Spain notes, British public opinion in India and at home ran from indignation to outrage and finally to violence. As the event occurred just after a newly aggressive British policy line toward the tribes was underlined by the erection of a new fort at Razmak in Waziristan and while work on the Khaibar railroad was in progress, the gulf between Britons and Pukhtuns, already wide, became completely unbridgeable - whatever political agents might have felt about how well "our chaps" did in an engagement with British troops, referring of course to "their" tribesmen.

After an unsuccessful chase and a series of very convoluted negotiations, the young Ellis girl was returned unharmed. She subsequently commented, indeed, on how well she had been

treated by her captors (as confirmed by Mohammad Ali 1966: 49) - thanks to the efforts of two Afridi political officers, Risaldar Mughal Baz Khan and Khan Bahadur Quli Khan, and of Mrs. Lilian A. Starr of an English medical mission in Peshawar, who provided the most graphic of the contemporary accounts of the rescue (Starr 1924: 161-247).

7.7 The Perpetrators Escape

Despite the rescue, the story itself was far from finished. Indeed, it had only just begun. What followed now was a first class example of justice and its administration on the frontier. 'Ajab Khan, his brother Shahzada and their kinsmen Sultan Mir, his son Gul Akbar, and a Punjabi outlaw from Attock named Haidar Shah escaped through the hills and finally took refuge with friendly Shinwari tribesmen just across the Afghan border. At this point, on May 13, 1923, when further threats by Sir John Maffey - who had succeeded Roos-Keppel as chief commissioner - of blockade and withholding of tribal subsidies, the jirga of all the Afridi and Orakzai clans declared the members of the "Kohat gang" to be mafruran, proclaimed offenders whom they would hand over to the government should these men ever set foot in Afridiland again.

Nonetheless, in November of the same year, while all and sundry were on the lookout for them, they brazenly recrossed the border and the murder of Captain Watts and his wife at Parat-shinar (Parachinar) the following month gave every indication of being their handiwork (NWFP) (India), 1928: 5, cited by Spain 1963: 155, no.21). Pursuit was intensified and so the "Kohat gang" slipped back into Afghanistan, where, in January 1924, 'Ajab turned himself in to the governor of Jalalabad. He and his kinsmen and their families were then taken on to Kabul in spite of thunderous British demands for his extradition and despite talk in the Peshawar Officers' Club of bringing him back from Jalalabad dead or alive without recourse to accepted international procedures. In Afghanistan, on the other hand, the members of the "Kohat gang" were regarded as heroes and public opinion alone would have prevented Amir Aman Allah (1919-29) from turning them over to the British, even if he had wanted to - which he did not. However, as early as September 18, 1923, the question of internment for 'Ajab Khan, Shahzada and Haidar Shah was discussed by the British Resident in Kabul (Sir Francis Humphrys, a humourless and unrelenting colonialist) with the Afghan foreign minister (Mahmud Beg Tarzi, a shrewd and intelligent nationalist). They agreed that Mazar-i-Sharif, beyond the Hindu Kush and out of Pukhtun country, should be the place to instal them (IOR: L/P&S/12/1544, Afghanistan: **Extradition of Tribal Offenders**, 1932).

7.8 The End of the Gang

However, Sultan Mir and his son Gul Akbar were not among those who went to Mazar-i-Sharif. Probably acting under Afghan orders, they clandestinely crossed the border again and moved into the Tirah - where, of course, the British could not touch them - while through the whole of 1925-7 the British colonial bloodhounds were baying on their trail. According to Spain (1963: 186), Gul Akbar was finally captured and hanged in Peshawar on May 29, 1928, although archival sources (IOR: L/P&S/12/1544, op.cit., 1932) list the date as a year earlier, May 1927. His father, Sultan Mir, continued to evade his would-be captors and finally dropped out of sight among one of the many Sunni Orakzai clans, probably the Dawlatzai - for either of the two large Shi'a clans would almost certainly have handed him, bound and gagged, over to the British.

'Ajab's Busti Khayl section of the Gallai Adam Khayl was collectively fined 42,000 rupees in cash and arms as a result of the Ellis case, and his own lands, evaluated at 8,000 rupees, were confiscated. His village was blown up and, according to the locals, the site was ploughed in with salt - a highly symbolic gesture to render it completely infertile in future. And the Dawlatzai and other Orakzai clans wer then made to pay 19,500 rupees for failing to adhere to their agreement to hand over the outlaws to British justice.

Meanwhile, in Afghanistan, Shahzada was wounded in September 1930 in action against Ibrahim Beg, a Muslim freedom fighter and counter-revolutionary from across the Soviet border in the Uzbakistan SSR - and referred to, of course, by the Russians as a **basmatchi** or "bandit", exactly as the French were later to refer to the members of the Algerian ALN, in 1954-62, as **fallaqa**, with just the same meaning. Ibrahim Beg embarrassed the Afghans, however, and managed to create some difficulties for them before they drove him across the Russian border again, when the Soviets captured and executed him in April 1931 (Dupree 1973: 460-1). For this rather dubious gesture, Shahzada was brought to Kabul and commended by the new Amir, Nadir Shah (1929-33), after which he was sent back to Mazarai-Sharif with a land deed in his pocket (IOR: L/P&S 12/1544, **op.cit.**, 1931, Maconachie to Secretary, Political Department, India Office). This action by the Afghan government was regarded by the British as a breach of the written understanding dated May 10, 1924, during the reign of Aman Allah, even though 'Ajab Khan, Shahzada and their families were kept under Afghan government surveillance.

Finally, Spain observes (1963: 156) that 'Ajab himself, now a respected **spin giray** or greybeard, died in Mazar-i-Sharif in 1961, although Mohammad 'Ali, at the end of his account of the kidnapping (Mohammad Ali 1966: 39-49), dates his death at 1959.

He and the little Afridi colony in the Afghan town beyond the Hindu Kush, the site of the great blue and pigeon-infested mosque of Hadhrat 'Ali were of considerable help to the government in Kabul in controlling the local Uzbak villagers.

They were also deeply involved in the "Pukhtunistan" movement after the indpendence of Pakistan in 1947. Indeed, late in 1952, Shahzada returned in secret to his native Busti Khayl to prepare the groundwork for a raid by "Pukhtunistan" forces. But it never materialised, and he himself died in Mazar-i-Sharif in 1970 - after reportedly coming back to Pakistan once more and making a tape recording of his autobiography. This information was gleaned during fieldwork in 1977 in a wealthy Kuki Khayl Afridi guesthouse at Malik 'Ali Manshah village near Jamrud, where Shahzada's photograph also hung prominently among those in the Afridi "Hall of Fame" portrait gallery on the guesthouse wall. Thus, it would seem that, sixty years after the initial event, the famous Ellis case - or perhaps more accurately, the famous 'Ajab Khan-Shahzada Case - involving as its chief actors two brothers who had started out as Hobsbawmian social bandits - though certainly with no apparent Robin Hood overtones - in one country and became residents of a neighbouring one - may finally be regarded as closed.



NORTH WEST FRONTIER (Pakistan)

VIII THE NORTH WEST FRONTIER - THE MAHSUD

8.1 A major Threat to British Rule

Only the Mahsud of the South Waziristan Agency represented as great a threat as the Afridi. The Mahsud, the biggest of all of Miller's frontier problems (Miller, 1977), caused the British far more trouble even than the Afridi, and indeed more than any other Pukhtun tribe in the North West Frontier, as their chronicler Sir Evelyn Howell (1931, 1979) makes abundantly clear. In 1904, 1905, 1914 and 1946 they murdered no less than four of their British Political Agents, while the Mahsud campaigns of 1919-22, in the wake of World War I and Third Anglo-Afghan War of 1919, were among the costliest and least successful ever undertaken by the British on the frontier (well portrayed by Wallace Breem in a splendid novel, **The Leopard and the Cliff**, 1978). From January 6 to January 14, 1920, for example, the Mahsud almost decimated a major British force in the fearful Ahnai Tangi gorge, with 2,000 British Indian troops killed and wounded, including 23 officers - a figure higher even than that of British losses during the frontier wide uprising of 1897-8, in which the Mahsud were not directly involved.

There was later to be a repeat performance in April 1937, in another gorge, the Shahur Tangi (Elliott 1968; Ahmed 1977: 5). This time the scenario was enacted by the Wazir in North Waziristan under the guidance of Mirza 'Ali Khan, the Faqir of Ipi, from the Tori Khayl subclan of the 'Utmanzai Wazir, who, from mid-1936 to early 1939, was to be the biggest single headache the British ever had on the frontier. During this period well over half the entire British Indian Army was in Waziristan, garrisoned at Razmak, on the Wazir-Mahsud tribal border, and the RAF took an active part in bombing Wazir villages. The Mahsud, whose hatred of the Wazir is intense and stems from the fact that their respective tribal ancestors are held to have been patriparallel cousins (**tarburan**, sg. **tarbur**), were, as it happens, not involved in this particular episode either, but they were not totally quiescent. After independence, in his espousal for an independent "Pukhtunistan", the Faqir of Ipi was, before his death in 1960, to be almost as much of a headache to the Pakistanis.

But that is another story entirely.

8.2 Jaggar 'Abd ar-Rahman Khayl

In short, the **jihad** against the British in both North (Wazir), and South (Mahsud) Waziristan was so intense at its peaks and raider, outlaw and **mafrur** gangs were so numerous that the names and exploits of individual Mahsud raiders have been left largely unrecorded, even by Howell. Nonetheless, he does cite the name of Jaggar as an important raider of the 'Abd ar-Rahman Khayl lineage of the Nana Khayl subclan of the Bahlulzai clan of the Mahsud during the period of 1894-5 (Howell 1979: 46, 96, 109-10). Jaggar subsequently died in Afghanistan as an outlaw, and his son never returned across the border. Howell's conversation with him with respect to the Mahsud character is worth quoting in some detail (Howell 1979: 95-6 - though it must be remembered that he was writing in 1931):

> ... Whether it is the proximity of sanctuary in Afghanistan or the difficult nature of his country and its lack of resources or his own strong right arm and virile qualities which have so far preserved the Mahsud from subjugation, or the combination of all these causes, the fact remains that he has not yet come under the yoke. The Mahsud has not yet been disarmed. His country is not administered and he pays no taxes. On the contrary he is better armed than he has ever been before. He receives handsome allowances and immense sums for **khassadar** service (D.M. Hart: as paramilitary tribal police). For the regulation of his private affairs he follows no law save his own queer crooked notions of honour and his grim rule of reprisals...
>
> The Mahsud being still unsubjugated, it falls next to consider the other reasons which make him no less difficult to deal with on planes other than that of force than he is to conquer in the field. First, there are the same questions which make him formidable as a fighter - his ingenuity and his persistence, backed by amazing plausibility in argument, such as would excite the envy of an Athenan demagogue. Next - and it is remarkable that this quality should be combined alike with discipline in the field and with the strong feeling which lies behind the tribal **sarishta** (the immutable or slowly changing law which fixes the share of each section in all tribal loss and gain, as well as (D.M. Hart) the executive arm of the **jirga** or tribal council) - there is that complex of mental attributes which results or may at any time result in utter recklessness of the consequences of individual action and consequent complete lack of tribal cohesion. The famous Jaggar, 'Abd ar-Rahman Khayl, once said to me, "Let it be 'field' (i.e., active

service) and blow us all up with cannon, or make all eighteen thousand of us nawabs" (the figure refers to the traditional number of Mahsud fighting men, which Howell reckoned in 1931 to be about two-thirds of the right number, i.e., 27,000, at the time). What he had in mind was the **liberum veto** which any young hothead could exercise by the use of his rifle, as has indeed so often and so disastrously happened.

Year	Serious offences	Persons killed	Persons wounded	Persons kidnapped	Value lakhs
1914-15	81	28	24	9	...
1915-16	99	100	70	93	...
1916-17	74	75	70	132	...
1917-18	31	227	163	27	...
1918-19	14	5	2	20	...
1919-20	324	149	227	197	12.76
1920-21	233	106	125	188	1.66
1921-22	129	50	56	108	0.81
1922-23	73	33	36	42	0.42
1923-24	44	21	16	6	0.34
1924-25	25	7	2	18	0.06

Source: Howell, 1979: 75, 87

The unrest amongst the Mahsud was so great that there is little point in attempting to chronicle the innumerable raids they made into the settled districts of the frontier, as the table above makes clear. If nothing else, these figures bear out graphically the fact that the peak period of Mahsud violence were the three years between 1919 and 1922, even though they may not do justice to the drama of the contexts in which most of them undoubtedly occurred.

8.3 Modern Bandits

Since the creation of Pakistan, the Mahsud have very largely calmed down and become integrated into the modern nation state. However, this integration was not, it seems, entire, and although there seems to be little evidence of a Robin Hood syndrome in any of the foregoing material, Ahmed, in an excellent study of contemporary Waziristan, documents the surrender to the Pakistan government in 1979 of a Mahsud bandit named Ma'is Khan (Ahmed 1983: 118-20). A recapitulation of his findings therefore seems a suitable way to conclude this study.

Following in his father's footsteps, Ma'is Khan kidnapped

people from Bannu, on the northern edge of Waziristan, and held them up for ransom. His bold personality, success, assistance to and concern for the poor created a Robin Hood reputation for him in the South Waziristan Agency, and several attempts to capture him had already been failed by his daring and superior intelligence. Ahmed, as an anthropologist doubling as Political Agent, established contact with him in the spring of 1979, and emphasised that times were changing and that if Ma'is were to surrender to him he would be treated with respect and honour. So he finally agreed to surrender subject to certain conditions, principally that his past record be ignored. These conditions were met, and Ahmed even promised to make him an Agency **malik**. On his surrender he felt initially ill at ease without his gun and his knife, Ahmed noted; but he was in the process of coming to terms with Pakistan. This included the air of rustic innocence and wonder which Ahmed attributes to him when he first visited Pakistan after his surrender. Shortly after his appointment as **malik**, when his cousin, Sifat Khan, captured three men from Bannu and after a **jirga** of elders had failed to get them released, he proved himself in his new position by attacking Sifat's settlement. Machine gun fire was exchanged for a few days until the kidnapped individuals were released.

In the following year - 1980 - Ahmed also engineered the surrender of another outlaw, Sappar Khan, a Pukhtun originally from and operating in Baluchistan (Ahmed 1983: 126-30). This was a considerably more intricate affair, as both a neighbouring province (Baluchistan) and a neighbouring country (Afghanistan) were involved. Indeed, the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979 forced many tribal outlaws and advocates of "Pukhtunistan" to consider future prospects. Most of them surrendered. The cry for **jihad** against the Soviet invaders was in the air, and to be seen as a bandit indifferent to the Islamic cause could easily be read as identification with the Russians and their Afghan yes-man Karmal. Stories of death and rape gained currency, and tribal honour was at stake on various levels.

Ahmed made Sappar realise that he could not stay indefinitely in Afghanistan with five adult daughters in his camp, for honour and **tor** were involved. In short, Sappar Khan surrendered to Pakistan in January 1980, less than a month after the Russian invasion began. His surrender took place at Tank, the winter capital of the South Waziristan Agency, in the midst of a large **jirga** consisting of both the Agency's constituent tribal groups, Mahsud and Wazir.

IX CONCLUSION

Enough hard evidence has been marshalled in the three Islamic regional and national arenas described here to show that the universatility of Hobsbawm's formulations about social banditry rests on very thin foundations indeed. The only really clearcut and unambiguous example of a Robin Hood - and one not entirely unflawed - is the early nineteenth century Moroccan, Six-fingered 'Ali l-Bu Frahi. Yet the account of his career as handed down by Drummond-Hay patently carries considerably more myth and legend than it does history. Hence 'Ali l-Bu Frahi remains substantially a much more shadowy figure than his successors - in Morocco as elsewhere in Islam - for whom the evidence is better. The point is simply that legend and history, like oil and water, do not mix, despite what the image makers of the mass media would have us believe. Most of the men whose careers are described in the foregoing pages may show one or two traits that fit into the overall Robin Hood syndrome, but these are simply not enough to make them into Robin Hoods.

Mythologically speaking, it may require only a certain sleight-of-hand (and blindness of eye) for a film or television producer to turn the "hood" of yesterday into the hero of today - particularly if he is struggling, in a revolutionary context, against injustice. Nonetheless, in the case of 'Ali l-Bu Frahi again, Drummond-Hay makes it clear that the Sultan of Morocco eventually sided with the oppressors and against him. Historically speaking, however, this is simply not possible. Myth is myth and history is history, and, to paraphrase Kipling, never the twain shall meet. Despite Hobsbawm's laudable and pioneering efforts to pull bandits, social or otherwise, out of the limbo of cheap novels and comic books and to provide them with a certain academic respectability, it seems, nonetheless that his model always founders on this crucial question, for he is patently as concerned with the analysis of bandits by today's mass media as he is with the historical realities known of them.

As Chandler (1971: 241) has noted, a major problem with Hobsbawm's definition of a social bandit is that it is inverted. "It rests not so much on the actual deeds of the bandits as on

what people thought them to be, or, more precariously, how they were reported by balladeers and other storytellers 'even generations later" (ibid). He notes that as Blok (1979: 494-503; 974: 102) has observed, popular conceptions of bandits may be an important field for study, but they are not reliable reflections of reality. And Chandler adds, "Indeed, if the definition is turned right side up, thus placing the burden of proof on fact instead of myth, there would seem to be so few noble robbers in history as to cast a shadow of doubt on the type as a significant pattern of human behaviour" (Chandler 1979: 241-2).

But, as Chandler also says, by inverting Hobsbawm's definition, we of course lose sight of his main point: for he is avowedly as much interested in the myths about bandits as in the bandits themselves:

> He believes that the tendency of peasants to attribute characteristics such as justice to their bandit hero (also their admiration for his success in battling the oppressors) represents a rejection by the peasants of the unjust societies in which they live. Such a bandit need not really possess the traits said to be his; what is important is the kind of stories the peasants tell about him (ibid: 243).

This may be true enough, and it may, for example, even foreshadow the portrait of the Algerian bin Zilmad as passed on by Dejeux. But even so, the gulf between legend and history is far too wide for facile attempts to bridge the gap, as essentially, Hobsbawm tries to do.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Unpublished:

Public Records Office, Kew: R.G. Finlayson to G.H. Villiers, War Office, Whitehall, Enclosure M.I. 3/5542, dated October 17, 1923, containing report, classified secret, by Rosita Forbes McGrath to Maj. Paget, dated September 27, 1923, 19pp., and stamped w-8513, October 22, 1923.

CHEAM Paris: Capt. Roger **Henry**, Chef du Bureau des A.I. at Asul to M. le Chef de Bataillon, Chef du Cercle des Ait Murghad at Gulmima, Territoire de Tafilelt, Confidential Report dated July 4, 1936, 28pp.

India Office Records, London: 1/P&S/10/46: Political and Secret Department Separate Files, No. 1776, Part 2: NWF: **Zakha Khayl Affairs 1904**, No. 249, Roos-Keppel PA Khyber, to Willcocks. Report on Completion of Zakha Khayl Settlement made at Walai on February 28, 1904. Also ibid., No. B-37, Roos-Keppel to Mullaly, March 3, 1908.

Collection No.3, File I: **Afghanistan: Extradition of Tribal Offenders**, Norwef, Peshawar to Foreign Secretary, New Delhi, No. 1645 P.S., Peshawar, November 12, 1932. Also ibid., P.7 7913, 1931, Sir Richard Maconachie, Kabul, to Secretary, Political Department, India Office, No. 164, November 24, 1931.

Published:

Administrative Report on the North-West Frontier Province for 1922-1923, Peshawar: North-West Frontier Government Press, 1924.

Ahmed, Akbar S., **Social and Economic Change in the Tribal Areas, 1972-1976**, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1977.

....., **Pukhtun Economy and Society**, London: Routledge and Keegan

Paul Ltd., 1980.

....., **Religion and Politics in Muslim Society: Order and Conflict in Pakistan**, Cambridge, London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Ali, Mohammad, **...And then the Pathan Murders**, Peshawar, University Book Agency, Khyber Bazar, 1966.

Barbour, Nevill, **Morocco**, London: Thames and Hudson, 1965.

Bermudo-Soriano, **El Raisuni: Caudillo de Yebala**, Madrid: Grafica Literaria Francisco G. Vicente, 1941.

Bernaldo de Quiros, Constancio, and Ardila, Luis, **El Bandolerisono Andaluz**, 2nd. Ed., Madrid: Ediciones Turner, S.A. 1978.

Biarnay, E., "Voleurs, Receleurs et Complices dans les Vallées Inférieures du Sebou et l'Ouargha", **Les Archives Berbères**, ii, 2 Rabat 1917: 135-48.

Blok, Anton "The Peasant and the Brigand: Social Banditry Reconsidered", **Comparative Studies in Society and History**, XIV, 4 (September 1972): 494-503.

....., **The Mafia of a Sicilian Village. 1860-1960: A Study of Violent Peasant Entrepreneurs**, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974.

Breem, Wallace, **The Leopard and the Cliff**, London: Magnum Books, Methuen Paperbacks, Ltd., 1978.

Cardaillac, Louis, Ed., **Les Morisques et leur Temps**, Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1984.

Chandler, Billy Jaynes, **The Bandit King: Lampiao of Brazil**, College Station, Texas, and London: Texas A&M University Press, 1978.

Christensen, R.O. "Tribesmen, Government and Political Economy on the North-West Frontier", Forthcoming (1985).

Clement, Claude, **Oufkir**, Paris: Jean Dullis Editeur, 1974.

Clement, Jean-Francois, "Zaid u-Ahmad, Heros Meconnu de l'Histoire Marocaine", **Lamalif**, No. 130, Casablanca, November-December 1981: 42-5.

Coon, Carleton S., **Flesh of the Wild Ox: A Riffian Chronicle of High Valleys and Long Rifles**, New York: William Morrow, 1932.

Dejeux, Jean, "Un Bandit d'Honneur dans l'Aures de 1917 a 1921: Messaoud ben Zelmad", **Revue de l'Occident Musulman et de la Méditerranée (ROMM)**, XXVI, 2, 1978: 35-54.

Drummond-Hay, John H., **Morocco and the Moors - Western Barbary: Its Wild Tribes and Savage Animals**, 2nd. Ed., London: John Murray 1861.

Dunn, Ross E., **Resistance in the Desert: Moroccan Responses to French Imperialism, 1881-1912**, Madison and London: University of Wisconsin Press and Croom Helm, Ltd., 1977.

....., "Bu Hmara's European Connexion: The Commercial Relations of a Moroccan Warlord", **Journal of African History**, 21, 1980: 235-53.

Dupree, Louis, **Afghanistan**, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973, 1980.

Eickelman, Dale F., **Moroccan Islam: Tradition and Society in a Pilgrimage Center**, Modern Middle East Series No.1, Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1976.

Elliot, (Maj. Gen.) James G. **The Frontier 1839-1947: The Story of the North-West Frontier of India**, London: Cassell, 1968.

Euloge, Rene, **Silhouettes du Pays Chleuh**, Marrakech: Editions de la Tighermt, 1951.

....., **Les Derniers Fils de l'Ombre**, Marrakech: Editions de la Tighermt, 1952.

....., **Ceux des Hautes Vallées**, Marrakech, Editions de la Tighermt, 1976

Forbes, Rosita, **The Sultan of the Mountains: The Life Story of Raisuli** New York: Henry Holt, 1924.

Garcia Figueras, Tomas, **Del Marruecos Feudel: Episodios de la Vida del Cherif Raisuni**, Madrid, Barcelona and Buenos Aires: Compania Ibero-Americana de Publicaciones, 1930.

....., "Un Cabecilla de Yebala: Ahmed ben Mohammed el Hosmari (a) El Jeriro", in same author, **Miscelanea de Estudios Varios Sobre Marruecos**, vol., III, Tetuan: Editora Marroqui, 1953.

Gellner, Ernest, **Saints of the Atlas**, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1969.

....., "Patterns of Rural Rebellion in Morocco During the Early

Years of Independence", in Gellner, Ernest, and Micaud, Charles, Eds., **Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa**, London: Duckworth 1973: 361-74.

Goded, (Gen.) Manuel, **Marruecos: Las Etapas de la Pacificacion**, Madrid, Barcelona and Buenos Aires: Compania Ibero - Americana de Publicaciones, 1932.

Harbi, Mohammed, **Le FLN: Mirage et Réalité**, Paris: Editions Jeune Afrique, 1980.

Hart, David M., **The Aith Waryaghar of the Moroccan Rif: An Ethnography and History**, Viking Fund publications in Anthropology No.55, Tucson. University of Arizona Press, 1976.

....., "'Assu u-Ba Slam (1890-1960): De la Résistance à la Pacification au Maroc (Essai d'Anthropologie Sociale)", in Julien, Charles-Andre, Morsy, Magali and Person, Yves, Eds., **Les Africains**, Vol. V, Paris: Editions Jeune Afrique, 1977: 75-105.

....., **Dadda 'Atta and his Forty Grandsons: The Socio-Political Organisation of the Ait 'Atta of Southern Morocco**, Outwell, Wisbech, Cambridgeshire: Menas Press Ltd., 1981.

....., **The Ait 'Atta of Southern Morocco: Daily Life and Recent History**, Outwell, Wisbech, Cambridgeshire: Menas Press Ltd., 1985 (a).

....., **Guardians of the Khaibar Pass: The Social Organisation and History of the Afridis of Pakistan**, Lahore, Vanguard Books, Ltd. 1985 (b).

Hobsbawm, Eric J., **Bandits**, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1969 (Penguin paperback Edition 1972).

Howell, (Sir) Evelyn, **Mizh: A Monograph on Government's Relations with the Mahsud Tribe** (originally published by Government of India Press, Simla 1931), Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1979.

Intervenciones Militares de la Región de Yebala Central, **Memoria Relativa a las Kabilas Que Integran Esta Regional**, Tetuan: Casa Gomariz, 1934.

Julien, Charles-André, **Le Maroc Face aux Imperialismes, 1415-1956**, Paris: Editions Jeune Afrique 1978.

Kemal, Yashar, **Memed My Hawk**, (translated from Turkish by Edouard Roditi), 2nd Ed., London: Writers and Readers, 1981.

Khettouch, Moha, "Zaid ou Hmad, Un Heros de l'Atlas", **Lamalif** No. 128, Casablanca, September 1981: 50-3.

Michaux-Bellaire, Edouard, and Salmon, Georges, "El Qsar el-Kbir: Une Ville de Province au Maroc Septentrional, "**Archives Marocaines**, II, 2, Paris 1905: 1-228.

Miller, Charles, **Khyber - British India's North-West Frontier: The Story of an Imperial Migraine**, London: Macdonald and Jane's, 1977.

Montagne, Robert, **Les Berbères et le Makhzen dans le Sud de Maroc: Essai sur la Transformation Politique des Berbères Séden-taires (Groupe Chleuh)**, Paris: Felix Alcan, 1930.

Moulieras, Auguste, **Le Maroc Inconnu (Maroc Séptentrional)**, 2 vols., (vol. I: **Exploration du Rif**, Paris: Librairie Colonial et Africaine (Joseph Andre), December 1895; vol. II: **Exploration des Djebala**, Paris: Augustin Challamal, 1899), 1895-99.

Munson, Henry, Jr. **Islam and Inequality in Northwestern Morocco**, Ph.D. Dissertation, Anthropology Department, University of Chicago, 1980.

North-West Frontier Province (India), **Report on the Administration of the Border of the North-West Frontier Province, 1922-3**, Peshawar: Government Press, 1928.

Pascon, Paul and Van Der Wusten, Herman, **Les Beni Bou Frah: Essai d'Ecologie Sociale d'une Vallée Rifaine, (Maroc)**, Rabat: In-stitut Universitaire de la Recherche Scientifique and Institut Agronomique et Veterinaire Hassan II, and Amsterdam: Faculté de Géographie Sociale de l Université d'Amsterdam, 1983.

Ruiz Orsatti, Ricardo, "La Kabila de Ouadras", **Boletin Oficial de la Zona de Influencia Espanola en Marruecos**, May 10 and 25, 1913.

Sainte-Marie, A., "La Commune d'Azeffoun à la Fin du XIX Siècle", **Revue Algérienne des Sciences Juridiques, Economiques et Politiques**, IX, 2, 1974: 439-59.

Singelmann, Peter, "Political Structure and Social Banditry in Northeast Brazil", **Journal of Latin American Studies, VII**, 1 (May 1975: 59-83.

Spain, (Hon.) James W., **The Pathan Borderland**, The Hague: Mouton et Cie., 1963.

Starr, Lilian A., **Tales of Tirah and Lesser-Tibet**, London: Hodder

and Stoughton, 1924.

Taghbalbout, Haddou, "A Propos de Zaid ou Hmad", **Lamalif**, Casablanca, No. 130, November-December 1981: 41-2.

Vanderwood, Paul J., **Disorder and Progress: Police and Mexican Development**, Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1981.

....., "Social Banditry", **Biblioteca Americana**, I, 2 (November 1982): 1-27.

Vincent, Bernard, "El Bandolerismo Morisco en Andalucia (Siglo XIV)", **Awraq: Revista Editada por el Instituto Hispano-Arabe de Cultura**, No.4, 1981: 167-78.

Warburton, (Col. Sir) Robert, **Eighteen Years in the Khyber**, London: John Murray, 1900.

Woolman, David S., **Rebels in the Rif: Abd el-Krim and the Rif Rebellion**, Stanford University Press, 1968.

APPENDIX

Thieves, fences and accomplices

in the lower valleys of the Wargha and Sbu rivers

In this short note, we propose to describe the circumstances in which highwaymen, burglars and rustlers of domesticated animals used to operate before the French intervention took place. We shall describe some of the customs which are beginning to disappear today and we shall indicate the new forms which theft and banditry have now taken on as a result of their adaption to the new economic and social conditions created by our arrival.

Local people classify theft in two ways: (1) those carried with the help of arms and called **daraza, darba** or **harka**; (2) those performed simply as the result of trickery and called **talbiya.** Any of these forms can be applied to thefts of animals, personal possessions, goods or any other commodity.

In Northern Morocco, theft was always commonplace and, as we shall see, all social classes participated more less directly. The role played by theft in rural life is well exemplified by the comment of a distinguished Moroccan chief who, having just passed judgement on a thief, exclaimed to us one day in 1911, "U shkun lli mna ma ikun shi shiffar?" - Where is he amongst us who has not been, on occasion, a thief? Local people have not attributed - nor do they yet attribute - the same importance to this offence as we do. Theft was a way of avenging oneself on an enemy, to pay a good trick on someone or to humiliate him in the eyes of his dependents. To some degree, theft was considered a lucrative sport.

The removal of an animal belonging to someone with influence was always considered a good joke. The animal in question was then returned to its owner against the payment of a small sum of money, or even against the promise of a good meal. Normally, theft did not involve any kind of reprisal. The reputation of a clever thief was viewed with envy and, if he were known also to double on occasion as a paid murderer, he was respected and feared. In effect, theft was only really a threat to the poor devil who was unable to speak up for himself, or to get someone else to do so. In reality, for someone in that position there was a general assumption that he did not deserve to hold on to animals. The traveller passing through the region was equally open to theft designed to deprive him permanently of his

possessions.

The organisation of theft

Thieves who operated on their own were quite rare and the most usual pattern was for them to form a series of 'associations' of robbers in any particular region, where the members of each association already knew each other and those of other associations. These associations could, when the occasion required, cooperate in large scale incidents. Each group or association of thieves was administered, directed and advised by a local personage of influence and intelligence, whose authority ensured agreement amongst all those involved and provided the necessary coordinations. This personage, who was also an active and farsighted individual, maintained good relations with his neighbours, who, in turn, respected and feared him, as well as with representatives of the **makhzan** - with whom he was always polite, attentive and pleasant and to whom he well understood the value of sending a useful present at appropriate moments.

This man of influence was known as the **kamman**, or **khararji**. In the organisation of thefts, his was the dominant role, for it was he who proposed, decided and directed, the thieves being no more than his assistants. It was also he who obtained the major benefit from the operaqtions which he had himself prepared.

Such a singular personality deserves to be studied from close to, so we should try to imagine what a visit to an active **kamman** would be like. His house is usually situated close to a road or track, beside some break in the terrain (wad or ravine), or by a marsh or a wood (tamarisk, cactus hedge or orchard). It is located a little apart from the group of tents, or **nuwala** which forms the **duwwar**. He nearly always owns a house made from mud brick and crowned with an upper storey - a **msariya**, or reception room. Behind it, in the courtyard, there are several more delapidated structures to be seen - these are rooms where the sole opening to the outside is closed by a stout door. It is notable that, in houses such as this, there are few dogs and those that there are are of a very pacific character - they do not even bark.

If, without standing on ceremony, we were to enter the **kamman**-s abode we would be very well received. The master of the house would receive us with a smile and would invite us into the reception room, where we would find between ten and fifteen persons already there. Not surprisingly, the **babur** and the **siniya** will be busy and glasses of mint tea will be circulating. The most immediately striking feature will be the presence of people of very varied backgrounds and origins in the group - relatively old well dressed strangers taking the places of honour, rough looking young men, wearing more casual clothes and being more familiar with the host.

Of course, when we arrived, the conversation that had been taking place was interrupted; instead people began talking of the harvest, the price of cereals, agricultural work, and so on ... We shall be offered tea and some excellent **twajin** which, since we came unexpected, will certainly not have been prepared for us. Nonetheless, we shall be welcomed and there will be no trouble in finding food for us. If we were to call again the following day, we would note that, although the company would have changed, the welcome would be the same - or, at least, that is what the unaware visitor would see any day at the **kamman**'s home.

If we were to penetrate a little further into rural Moroccan life, we would realise that the **kamman**'s home had been deliberately located close to a stopping place on the road, which itself was located close to the boundary - sometimes merely customary, but sometimes a formal administrative divide between two tribes or groups who perceived that their interests were in conflict and thus behaved as enemies towards each other to a greater or lesser degree. The irregularity in the terrain, or the wood that we had noted earlier provides a means of approaching the **kamman**'s house without being observed Furthermore, access to the house is easy and the dogs, which have become used to seeing strangers arriving day and night no longer bother to signal their arrival. The ground floor area of the **msariya** will serve as a sleeping area for young men returning from a nocturnal foray. The most determined leaders of the band will have become effectively permanent guests of the **kamman** and it would have been these young, generally gay companions, with whom we would have just dined. Together with their host, they will have prepared future expeditions paying considerable attention to detailed planning, or they will have been involved in sharing out the booty. As far as the sealed low buildings in the courtyard are concerned, they serve as temporary shelters for the animals and goods that have been stolen, while their owners might be engaged in looking for them.

The financial situation of our **kammam** - at least, as far as those normal revenues to which he can normally admit are concerned - would not allow him provide the continual hospitality that he actually offers. It is thus necessary to enquire into those mysterious affairs that provide him with a suffficient income to sustain such a lifestyle. Discreet enquiries would soon show that the most obvious elements of the **kamman**-s income is made up from the purchase of stolen animals and commodities at low prices - frequently as a result of his own proposals.

Notables from neighbouring tribes, such as the ones we would have met in the **kamman**'s house, go there, guided by the **bashshar**, to discuss the re-purchase of stolen animals that are handled by him. They are known as the **umana al-batil.** Once an arrangement has been made, the latter take possession of the animals that had been rustled and return them to their owners.

The **kamman** thus gathers together several functions into his person. He suggests possible thefts. He buys the produce of theft at a price equal to half its real value. He resells stolen animals to the original proprietor at a price below its actual value, provided a **bashshar** can lea the latter to the fence to whom the animal in question has been sold (this agreement to sell back the animal at a low price is called **marfqa**). Finally, if nobody comes to reclaim the items stolen, the **kamman** has them sold, on his own behalf, in some distant market. The situation of the **kamman** is well described by the rural Moroccan in a vivid way, "and al-kamman bhal al-marsa" - You'll find everything you need at the **kamman's** just like in a port.

The theft itself

(1) Armed theft

Armed theft was common between tribes before the occupation took place. The Bni Mastara still sometimes use this method against their neighbours, the **Gharbawa.**

Not all **kamman-s** would take the initiative in a **daraza,** for an energetic man not prone to remorse is needed - **ᶜarim** or even **qasih.** Most usually, the desire for veneance against a personal enemy is added to the lure of the theft itself. Once a proposal for the pillaging of an **ᶜazib** has been decided upon, the **kamman** sends spies - **bayyaᶜin** - to study the location, evaluate what the herd is worth and jude the valour and armament of those charged to guard the **ᶜazib.** The attack would have an increased chance of success, the more remote is the location to be attacked.

Once all the necessary information has been gathered, the **kamman** visits a neighbouring tribe, one which is on poor terms with his own, to visit a personage similar to himself. He tells him, "Tqa'idna al mudhaᶜu ᶜarfnaha barda u sahla." - We have studied the location and we find that the affair will be easy to carry out. The two **kamman-s** now bring together the thieves of their choice and suggest the theft to them, explaining its benefits to them so as to get the use of 20 to 30 men, of whom ten to fifteen will be horsemen.

The bandits gather together on the appointed day at a site usually ten to fifteen kilometres away from the place where the raid is to occur. Each man is given his allotted task and the group set off at between eight and nine in the evening. The footmen look after themselves by hitching a ride with the horsemen. When they get close to the village which is to be raided the group halts. Each man puts his arms in order for combat and then several footmen advance quietly alone, taking care to make sure that the inhabitants of the **duwwar** or the **ᶜazib** are not on the watch and have not taken up defensive positions. If there is nothing abnormal, all the footmen in the group move up, then a signal calls up the horsemen who form a

semi-circle so as to surround the **duwwar.**

The footmen then remove the boughs which obstruct the entrance to the enclosure. Those who have been made responsible for preventing the guards from defending the site move in first and carry out their task by killing or tying up anyone they can catch. The terrified women and children flee shrieking with fear, and are often followed by the men. Meanwhile, the bandits gather up the animals as quickly as possible and grab whatever objects they can - carpets, saddles, arms - **iqshtu l-khaia:** they pillage the tent.

Once the attack is over, the bandits regroup, with one group collecting up the herd of animals and driving them off, while the others cover their retreat. The horsemen have the job of putting any pursuers off the scent and of gathering up the bodies of any of their own men who might have been killed.

Before day breaks, all those involved have returned to the house of the **kamman** accomplice. The following day will pass in tranquillity and calm, broken only by large meals. The following day, or some days later, the produce of the raid is divided up, usually on the following basis: 50 per cent goes to the two **kamman-s,** while the rest is divided amongst the thieves in the ratios of two parts for a horseman, as against one part for a footman. If anyone was killed, his family was compensated with two parts. If someone had been killed and the attack yielded little, his accomplices clubbed together to provide a **farda.** The contribution level for this is usually fixed in advance at 15 pesetas for each member of the group. The total collected throuh this subscription is given to the children and the widow of the dead man. Since the **kamman-s** usually act as purchasers of the booty in bulk at less than half price, all that is left to be divided amongst the thieves - once the lion's share due to the **kamman-s** appear as the true chiefs of the band, for, in order to be able to organise raids like this, they have to be able to exercise an authority which is recognised by the thieves associations. This type of theft requires the cooperation of a large number of active members and, as a result, total secrecy is rarely maintained. The proprietor of an **ᶜazib** that is to be raided is often warned in time and can thus put his possessions in a secure place or organise the defence of his **ᶜazib.**

(2) **Theft perpetrated by means of trickery**

Theft described as **as-sarqa at-talibiya** differs from the type of theft described above in that it is carried out by one or more unarmed men who intend to use only trickery for their ends.

Three or four thieves, often with their wits sharpened by need or by a thirst for adventure, operate either on their own initiative or as a result of orders given by a **kamman.** They go out dressed in grey jillabas which are gathered around their bodies with palm leaf ropes in the evening after dinner on a dark night, shrouded in mist, wind or rain, when there is no moon. Their

accomplice, aware of their intentions, sends them off with his wishes, "Siru, Allah ijibkum rrzaq". then, once they have gone, "Ya Rabbi jib lihum rrzaq. Allah isillathum ᶜala min kan ᶜas-hshar u la isddiq".

The group tries not to get lost during the night and, if nobody knows the territory, they take the precaution of employing a guide, since they fear that they may miss their way in the darkness - "khufna idrabna hmar al-lil". "We fear that we may suffer from hallucinations", they say.

As the group approaches its target, two members move off separately to ensure that there is nothing abnormal happening in the surroundings and that everyone is asleep. An opening is quietly made in the **zariba**. Crawling stealthily, one of the thieves enters the enclosure, getting into the animals so as to choose the prize beast and to get it to the opening in the enclosure before the dogs give the alarm. If the operation is successful, the group returns to the **kamman** who values the animal and hides it from all inquisitive eyes by shutting it in one of the closed rooms in his house.

The thief lets the **kamman** know where the animal came from and the value of the animal increase to the dgree to which it belongs to a poor man who will be able to defend himself and to claim his own property. If the **kamman** realises that the origin of the animal will create difficulties, he avoids making any immediate payment; if he is anxious not to compromise himself, he will even refuse to fence the animal in question and the animal itself will become a major embarrassment to the thief.

Members of the **Gharb** tribes, of the **Bni Hsan** and the **Sharard**a use guns to defend themselves against incursions by thieves. Every night each ᶜ**azib** and each **duwwar** looks after its own security, with several of the men mounting a silent guard over the animals. Certain people who are gifted with a degree of acuteness of vision which allows them to distinguish objects - even on the darkest of nights to some degree - rest during the day and guard throuhout almost all of the night.

The **Garwan**, the **Zimmur**, the **Bni Mtir** and the **Bni Mgild**, together with the Arab tribes of the Sais habitually shout to scare off thieves or lay ambushes to capture them. Any thief who is caught is the resonsibility of whoever caught him and says to him, "Ya bin ash-shiffar, l-akhur haslik Rbbi". Although he might beat him a little, in the end he will protect him since he does not want him to be too maltreated by other members of the **duwwar**. The prisoner will plead for mercy, "ana fi ᶜarik". His captor calms him, takes him home, bandages his wounds if he is injured and prepares food for him. The meal takes place in a lighthearted atmosphere, with the thief and his host conversing the learning of mutual friends. Then they go to bed and sleep until morning. The night visitor is then set at liberty and, thanking his hosts, says, "Relax, I have eaten with you, I shall not come again to steal from you" - and often he holds to his

promise.

It is not very long ago that the qaid in the **Gharb** and the **ni Hsan** would consult his entourage after an important theft. They would tell him very quickly who was really responsible. The accused would be immediately called before the qaid and would admit his larceny without any attempt at dissembling, describing how the theft took place and describing the benefits that he had obtained. He would immediately pay the **da'ira**, or fine, which the old Berber custom placed on a thief. The fine went directly into the qaid's coffers, which, on this occasion, replaced the coffers of the tribe.

The size of the fine was generally set at half the sum realised by the thief - 15 duros for a bull worth normally 60 duros. After having paid, the thief could withdraw with a calm certitude that he had nothing to fear and that he would now enjoy impunity. Should the injured owner manage to recognise the thief, he would make him appear before the qaid and explain what had happened in detail, also providing proofs of what he said. The qaid would then ensure that the delinquent was imprisoned, stating at the same time in the hearing of all that this evildoer would never emerge again from prison. He would threaten him with the **bastinado** and then, some days later, he would release him against the payment of a further ransom.

Our arrival in Morocco did not cause significant modifications in this process of simultaneously exploiting the theif and his victim. Nowadays, if the owner of a stolen animal dare return to a local leader and let him know that a condemned theif had been released, the qaid will escape from the problem by replying that the French authorities had advised him not to punish an innocent, that it was not his duty to establish who was in the wrong - that was the duty of a **qadi**, for thieves and their victims should seek recourse from the **shar^{c}**. The owner has lost his animal and the unpunished thief is expected to be able to discuss the matter with him.

If the owner really wishes to recover his animal, he will not make his intentions public; he certainly will not ocmplain to the Information Office. Without losing any time, he will turn towards an influential local personage, if possible a relation of the tribal chief, bringing with him a fine present - two sheep, 8 or 10 duros, or six or seven sugar loaves. He will tell him about the theft and will ask him to provide an experienced man to help him in his search. A **bashshar** will be sent for and the owner who has lost his property will come to terms with him. The fee will be settled by agreement, but the owner will have to be generous and not bargain. Otherwise his search will be unsuccessful. He would even be advised to provide a payment on account.

The **bashshar** leaves for the country and, usually, after several days, he manages to find the animal. He purchases it at a price below its real value as **marfqa** and then takes it back to

the notable who will return it to its proper owner when the latter calls to ask him politely about the matter - in other words, calls with a present of sufficient size. The friend of the notable, who serves as intermediary between the injured owner and the **kamman** is the innocent **bashshar**. The animal is found again - but to get it back, its woner has had to pay more than three quarters of its true value.

We can only make a few comments over specialist thieves who break shackles with crowbars and pincers - the **harras** - or those who make use of counterfeit keys - the **fakkak**. Such persons usually operate in plain daylight in the fields, as night falls or by moonlight. They are usually accompanied by two horsemen who defend them if they are surprised and make it possible for them to escape through rapid flight by letting them ride pillion.

The **qashqash** is the name given to someone who penetrates into the interiors of dwellings. He approaches tents on dark nights, climbs down into the **sas**, gets completely undressed and covers his arms and legs with grease to make them slippery. He crawls up to the tent which he then slits open. He enters and gropes for whatever he can find - guns, jewels, clothes or saddles. Between his teeth he carries a knife with a pointed, fixed blade, so that, if by chance a hand should grab one of his arms or legs, he can jab it with his makeshift dagger. He would only murder in extreme circumstances, as when his life or liberty were threatened. The **qashqash** really belongs to the category known as the **farqasha**, or pickpockets, who work the **suq-s**. As a result of their crimes, these pickpockets are chased out of the villages from which they come and gather together in **fraqsha** (pl. of **farqasha**). One good example of this sort of gathering is to be found at Mishra^{c} bil -Qsiri and a smaller one is located in the valley of the Wargha river. These gatherings, or associations, really set the scene for their crimes in the markets very carefully, so that they can, for example, whisk off an animal, a well-filled bag, or a valuable garment belonging to a naive or trusting bedouin.

Changes in the pattern of theft

The surveillance now exercised on thieves by the Administration has certainly reduced the total numbers, but it also acted as a means of selection in terms of quality. Incompetent thieves, who were caught redhanded too often, have been forced to completely stop their activities, or have to make do with crime only on the most favourable of occasions. They have become go-betweens and dealers who hang around markets on the lookout for opportunities that involve little risk and will provide an immediate reward.

Others, who were cleverer or luckier, the **zighubiyin**, have continued as thieves, but the level of cost involved in their activities has risen, as has the amount of risk. This is both because the fear of prison has made the **kamman-s** more careful

than they used to be and because the latter now purchase the produce of theft at even lower prices since they claim that their risks have also increased. Thieves are thus forced to increase the number of crimes they commit. They have to make ever greater efforts for ever smaller returns from a particular crime, if they wish to achieve their desired ends.

If a thief, having been captured and properly shown to have committed a crime, is then severely punished but escapes and leaves the region, he becomes a 'dissident'. If, on the other hand, he serves out his term of punishment, he is labelled a dangerous brigand. However, practically all investigations of thefts do not result in positive results or are not even undertaken. This is because, on the other hand, effective control is extremely difficult to exercise in such vast and densely populated areas as are found in Northern Morocco and, on the other, because the officers of the Bureaux des Renseignements - the local administrative and information centres - are so inundated under a mass of political, administrative and financial duties and do not have proper investigative facilities available to them. Although our Administration has sufficient facilities to forestall most thefts, it is not adequately equipped to guarantee to catch those responsible, once a crime has ben committed.

The most successful approach would be for the settler - the **colon** - to maintain good relations with any neighbouring **kamman**. Such good relations would certainly provide him with ample protection, but, nonetheless, we do not feel able to argue for this approach since the **kamman**, fortified by the knowledge of the services that he would have rendered, would soon be likely to try to get use of stables in any isolated farm, so as to stable their animals of an uncertain origin. If our farmer were to be living in a Berber area, he could even try to arrange cold buffets for his nocturnal guests. We could not, therefore, argue for such procedures which would result in the **colon** himself acquiring all the characteristics of a fence.

Suppression of theft

As we have seen above, theft is extremely well organised in Northern Morocco. We shall now turn to the question of the resources available to the forces of law and order to combat it.

Under the old **makhzan**, if a tribe suffered excessively from theft and pillage, the sultan would, after a certain delay, impose a very severe fine on the most influential and rich patronage in the tribe. The assumption beind this action was that such a personage was also the individual who would have benefitted the most from all the thefts carried out in the region. This would restore a relative degree of order for a certain period. This type of repression - which appears to be completely arbitrary - in reality allowed for an immediate and direct punishment of the most guilty party. One may assume that miscarriages of justice

were rare.

However, as far as our Administration is concerned, similar procedures could not be followed and more formal means of suppression must be sought. The obligatory regrouping of tents in **duwwar-s** (**gur-s**) by the Service des Renseignements has had excellent results and has partially sheltered the animals of poor people from the depredations of thieves. However, the same procedure cannot be applied to the **colon** who, even if he increases the number of guards on his farm, is still at the mercy of thieves.

If we recall that the **kamman** retains 50 per cent of the value of the stolen animal and that the group of thieves, who really do the dirty work, only receive at best between 15 to 25 per cent - the rest being used to pay the **da'ira** - would seem reasonable that the best approach would be to attack directlly those who benefit most from theft - the **kamman-s** themselves. All that is necessary is to identify them - hardly an insurmountable dfficulty. With a little care and patience a map could be drawn up showing the exact locations of all the **kammans** in a particular region. Each could then be made responsible for all thefts in a specific zone. He would be obliged to pay the Administration a sum of money for all animals stolen and not recovered by him, the sum being less than the value of the animal but more than benefits he would have gained if he himself had organised the theft. Such an approach would have the advantage that the mass of innocent people would not be affected.

Later, if the services provided by the **kamman** proved to be of value, why not give him some minor post? Why not give him the opportunity to choose an aide from amongst his old accomplices? Such a move would lead towards the creation of anti-theft agencies in which we would see the thieves becoming our guards, so that we would be in security and at peace. Such an idea may seem odd to those who do not live in the "**bled**", but what would be risked by giving it a discreet trial?

E. Biarnay
colon at Petitjean (Sidi Sliman)

Translated from E. BIARNAY, "Voleurs, Receleurs et Complices dans les Vallees Inférieures de Sebou et de l'Ouargha", **Les Archives Berbères**, II, 2, Rabat 1917, pp. 135-148.

INDEX

MENAS STUDIES IN CONTINUITY & CHANGE

NEW TITLE FOR 1987

BANDITRY IN ISLAM
Case Studies from Morocco, Algeria and the Pakistan North West Frontier
by David M. Hart,
96pp., 4 maps, Index, 148 x 210 mm, Paper, 1987.
ISBN 0 906559 22 7. Price £8.50

David Hart, a respected anthropologist of Islamic societies, examines the extent to which banditry in the Islamic world was a form of primordial political protest.

TITLES PUBLISHED IN 1986

PLANNING & AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN IRAN
by Nima Nattagh,
105pp., 15 maps and 20 diagrams, Index
148 x 210 mm, Paper, 1986. ISBN 0 906559 26 X
Price £6.50

A recent study of the paradoxes of agricultural underdevelopment in an oil economy dedicated to its own forms of regional planning.

EVOLUTION OF THE SHATT AL-'ARAB BOUNDARY DISPUTE
by Richard N. Schofield,
120pp., Index, 12 maps, 148 x 210 mm,
Paper, 1986. ISBN 0 906559 25 1. Price £6.50

This volume analyses the characteristics of the Shatt Al-'Arab and the problems of conflicting claims by Iran and Iraq in this zone of protracted and bloody warfare.

TITLE PUBLISHED IN 1984

IRAN: THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE FOR POWER
by Hugo Gurdon,
88pp., 148 x 210 mm, Paper, 1984.
ISBN 0 906559 17 0. Price £6.25

Hugo Gurdon seeks to answer the critical issues at stake in the Iranian political system and their potential effects on current and future stability for Iran, the Gulf region and the Middle East.

Available from:
Menas Press Ltd., Gallipoli House, Outwell, Wisbech,
Cambs. PE14 8TN, England