

SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN SUDAN:
A six-month trend analysis

OSINT DIVISION



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WARNING: This report contains descriptions of sexual and other violence.

Sexual Violence in Sudan: A six-month trend analysis

Widespread sexual violence has continued to be a strategic war method in Sudan since the beginning of the civil war in April 2023. Women and girls, in particular, are paying the price for a war they are not even fighting. According to the UN, the civil war has exposed over 12 million people to 'pervasive sexual violence'. The regional director of UN Women, Anna Mutavati, explained the reality of the war that 'women's bodies have turned into a battleground', with 'a [288% increase](#) in demand for life-saving support for rape and sexual violence survivors'. The trend we have witnessed in the last 6 months is no different. As the RSF continue its campaign, it leaves a trail of traumatised sexual violence victims who are unsure what to do now.

Sudan's Anti-Violence Against Women's Unit revealed that there have been [1,138 recorded cases](#) of rape in areas controlled by the RSF between April 2023 and February 2025. The Director General also reported that there were [22 cases](#) of pregnancy among raped women and that the predicted number of rapes would be high due to the lack of reporting and evidence collection due to the societal stigma that surrounds the rape victims. The cases we have seen are alarming and need urgent attention. Children young as six are being raped, women are being held captive and raped for days and some are shot if they resist.

Sexual violence in Sudan has the additional ethnic discrimination factor. The majority of the cases we have seen have been towards non-Arab women, with derogatory and racist slurs said whilst these women are being raped. Rape has been used as a means to further the ethnic cleansing of the likes of the Fur people and there has been instances of [forced pregnancies](#) to 'have Arab children'.

In our report, we found a total of 257 victims of sexual violence. However, sexual violence and rape continue to be underreported due to the stigma attached. The societal shame of reporting puts a burden on the victim. There is also additional stigma for men and boys reporting sexual violence, which our lack of cases with male victims reflects. On another note, reporting has been made more difficult due to frequent displacements and the erosion of healthcare in several parts of the country. Thousands more women could be suffering from sexual violence. The story does not end with the cases of sexual violence. The survivors of sexual violence have little access to medical care and psychological support, and justice against the rapist is a remote possibility. As such, the health of women in Sudan has deteriorated, driving women [to commit suicide](#).

The civil war in the past 6 months has continued to be brutal and has left a dire humanitarian crisis. In the past 6 months, the RSF has lost a significant amount of territory. In January 2025, the Sudanese Army Force (SAF) retook Al-Jazira. In February, the SAF regained control of nearly all of Khartoum North, and in late March, the Presidential Palace, Khartoum Airport and the Central Bank were all captured with Sudan Army Chief Abdel Fattah al-Burham declaring Khartoum [‘free’](#) from the RSF.

1. Methodology

In this investigation, we have used a combination of ACLED Data and Global Weekly sources. All cases are from the six months from October 2024 to March 2025. From this, we have created a series of analyses using Power BI based on perpetrator, location and victim. We utilised Sudanese Arabic translation engines to locate and identify the sources of the sexual violence cases to cross-reference and ensure the reliability and credibility of our data and findings. This allowed us to discover and collate missing data points while also helping us to identify additional cases from reliable news sources that have been obfuscated due to the language barrier.

A limitation of our study is that not all sexual violence cases are reported, which leads to an underestimation of the total number of sexual violence cases. Furthermore, a significant proportion of sexual violence occurs alongside general violence (e.g looting and attacks on villages). As a result, it is hard to ascertain the exact number of sexual violence victims in a given attack on a village. Nevertheless, we are still able to strongly determine trends within the cases of sexual violence we have available.

2. Perpetrators

2.1 Perpetrator Profiles

Rapid Support Force (RSF)

The [Rapid Support Force](#) was officially formed in 2013 and had originally evolved from the 'Janjaweed' militias. These members had fought in the Darfur Region and [helped](#) the government of President Omar al-Bashir put down the rebellion in 2003. Initially, in 2013, the forces were used particularly as border guards. However, in 2015, the RSF also sent troops to fight the war in Yemen. In 2017, the RSF was legally legitimised as an independent security force. The RSF is [commanded by](#) militia leader General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, commonly known as Hemedti. Since 2019, there have been clashes between the military and the pro-democracy movement, which resulted in the 2019 and 2021 coup d'état.

[Since 2023](#), the RSF and the Sudanese Army have clashed regarding RSF integration into the military (which the RSF are reluctant to do), resulting in the current civil war. Recently, in February 2025, the RSF announced its plans to create its [own parallel government](#) titled the Government of Peace and Unity. As of March 2025, despite recently losing Khartoum, the RSF holds Darfur and parts of Kordofan. The RSF holds the majority of the major urban centres, excluding El-Fasher. RSF's [war tactics](#) involve a lot of street fighting and guerrilla warfare. To counter the Sudanese Army Force's air strikes, the RSF engages in [intensive anti-aircraft](#) fire (which has included [capturing airports](#) and destroying runways) and hit-and-run attacks on SAF bases.

The RSF have been committing [ethnic-cleansing](#) towards non-Arabic ethnicities in Darfur (in particular the Fur, Massalit and Zaghawa people - this has not only involved genocide but the use of rape as means to further the Arab ethnicity supremacy. Furthermore, activists from the civilian pro-democracy movements have been systematically targeted through arrests, assaults and deaths. Beyond this, the RSF has excessively targeted civilians of all ages (including children) through attacking hospitals, displacement camps and whole villages.

Darfur Communal Militia

Global Weekly contacted ACLED directly to obtain details about this group beyond what is available online. According to ACLED, which kindly provided this information to Global Weekly via email, the Darfur Communal Militia are generally unidentified armed groups. They are often

described as operating on camels, motorbikes, or in small convoys of one or two four-wheel drives. Their tactics involve looting. Within this subgroup are ethnic militias. As such, such attacks from the DCM are significantly ethnically motivated. This reflects the ongoing ethnic division (due to previous conflicts, primarily over land disputes) in Darfur. These small militias are sometimes used as proxies for larger groups such as the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the RSF.

Darfur Arab Militia

According to ACLED, via email, the Darfur Arab Militias are a group of Arab ethnic militias. It emerged as an attempt to organise the Arab ethnic militias whom the RSF initially mobilised to fight against the SAF. They are relatively new actors in the current civil war, and the tribes aligned with the RSF due to kinship ties with RSF commanders and personnel. In July 2023, the leaders of these tribes [declared their support](#) for the RSF and urged people in the army to join the RSF instead.

The key tribes are: Rizeigat, Misseriya, Beni Halba, Habbaniya and Salamat. These tribes are all from the Baggara people. The majority of Baggara Arabs live in Chad and Sudan. Within Sudan, they largely live in the southern parts of Darfur and Kordofan. The Rizeigat, Beni Halba, Habbaniya and Salamat tribes are all situated in Darfur. The Misseriya, as well as parts of the Habbaniya tribe, are situated in Kordofan. The Rizeigat and Misseriya are the two largest tribes of the Baggara group. Hemedti himself is from the Mahariya branch of the Rizeigat tribe. The Rizeigat and Misseriya tribes comprise a significant proportion of the RSF, specifically its leadership. The Beni Halba tribe is also one of the major Baggara groups in Darfur, largely situated in South Darfur. They have a history of ethnic violence, particularly in attacking Fur people, especially during the formation of the Janjaweed in 1987.

Despite their united support for the RSF, the tribes have clashed amongst themselves, including during the current civil war. The Rizeigat and Misseriya have historically clashed, most recently in late 2024. The two tribes disputed over land ownership and fought along the border between West Kordofan and East Darfur. Similarly, the Beni Halba tribe and the Salamat tribe were at war (despite historically being very peaceful and coexisting together) from late 2023 to 2024. The Salamat tribe also [clashed](#) with the Habbaniya tribe in October 2023. A key reason was that the Salamat tribe had not officially declared its support for the RSF in July, despite some of its members already fighting alongside the RSF. This has caused significant divisions within the local communities of South Darfur.

Many of these tribes were part of the Janjaweed. Initially, Janjaweed activity involved battles against Darfur's sedentary population over grazing lands. However, they were used by the Sudanese government to fight against the Sudan Liberation Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement rebels in Darfur. The Janjaweed were responsible for genocide in Darfur which included rape and deportation of many African tribes in Darfur. As such, these tribes have a strong Arab Supremacy ideology, which is reflected in their severe ethnic violence and propels their actions during sexual violence.

Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N)


The SPLM-N is a rebel group situated in the Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan and parts of [Blue Nile](#). It originates from South Sudanese members of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement who remained in Sudan following South Sudan's independence in 2011. SPLM-N's key ideology revolves around secularism and the establishment of a Western-style democracy. SPLM-N's aim of secularism devolves from the contrast between Sudan's central government being largely run by Arab elites in comparison to the ethnic background of the Nuba, who are primarily Black and African. In 2017, the SPLM-N split between a faction led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu and another by Malik Agar due to disagreements over the SPLM-N's negotiations with the al-Bashir government. SPLM-N (al-Hilu) insisted on the secularisation of Sudan as a requirement for the peace deal.

Due to the civil war between RSF and SAF, the SPLM-N (al-Hilu) [have been able](#) to capture more territory in South Kordofan. It has cut off supplies to Kadugli, the capital city of South Kordofan. The territory captured has been coined as 'New Sudan' by the SPLM-N (al-Hilu), with the town of Kauda named the capital. The SPLM-N (al-Hilu) runs its own schools where instructions are in English rather than Arabic and issues birth certificates and driving licences.


The SPLM-N (al-Hilu) signed the RSF's charter establishing the rival government in February 2025. Some of the reported weaponry tactics include shelling, landmines and rocket launchers. Largely, SPLM-N's main tactic has been the control of main transportation routes in South Kordofan, which has had serious repercussions on the transport of humanitarian aid to the region, which has suffered [significantly](#) from famine. By contrast, the Agar's faction of the SPLM-N has sided closely with the Sudanese army, with many of his forces integrated with the army.

2.2 Analysis of Perpetrators

From our analysis, we have found that RSF committed 84.6% of known sexual violence cases, the Darfur Communal Militia committed 13.3%, and the remaining cases were by a variety of perpetrators, such as the Darfur Arab Militia and Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North.




Despite Darfur Communal Militia making up for over 13% of the cases, there have been no sexual violence cases committed by the rebel group since January 2025. In fact, since January 2025, the RSF have been the only perpetrator committing sexual violence.




Another key distinction is the differentiation of perpetrators depending on location. In the areas surrounding Khartoum and Al Jazira, all sexual violence cases are exclusively committed by the RSF (with the exception of one 'unidentified' case). Conversely, all the Darfur Communal Militia's sexual violence activity has only been concentrated in Darfur. The spread of sexual


violence cases from the RSF is much wider, with a significant proportion of sexual violence cases in Darfur also committed by the RSF. RSF sexual activity in Darfur can be assumed to be committed with the intention of Arab supremacy and ethnic cleansing. This is evident in cases of RSF rapists [telling women](#) they will make them 'give birth to Arab children'.



Another consideration is which perpetrators committed mass attacks (defined as five or more sexual victims per incident reported). Mass attacks are often seen when a whole village is attacked, and so sexual violence becomes one of many wartime tactics. The RSF contributed to 91% of mass attacks.



The RSF and the Darfur Communal Militia are the only two perpetrators whose sexual violence has resulted in fatalities. As evident below, the RSF have been responsible for nearly all fatalities (94.74%) which had resulted from sexual violence.



As such, to conclude, the RSF have been the worst perpetrator. Not only because they make up for over 80% of all sexual violence cases, but also because the spread of their attacks is greater, and they are the only group to continue to commit acts of sexual violence to the current date. Furthermore, they are responsible for the majority of the fatalities and mass attacks. Not only this, given the profile of the other perpetrators, they themselves are often RSF-affiliated, meaning that the influence of the RSF on all cases of sexual violence is greater than it seems.


3. Victims

3.1 Victim Data

Victims by Gender


Of the 60 reported cases, four were from individual men and 56 were from women. Two of the reported cases of sexual violence included young boys alongside women and young girls. A critical point of comparison is that the number of victims by their gender overwhelmingly shows that women are the target of this type of attack. The number of victims who are women is 253 in total, whereas the number of victims who are men is only 4. This split paints a stark picture of the reality of women living in RSF territory, whereby in six months of violence, over 253 women and their families have had their lives terrorised by rebel militias.

Sexual Violence by Gender




Victims by age

An increasingly worrisome pattern that has emerged is the alarming number of sexual violence incidents involving children under the age of 18. Out of the 60 cases, 15 of them include boys and girls barely under the age of 18, the highest number of cases for one age group is three separate incidents involving children aged 6.



The number of victims by age, regardless of gender, shows that the victims of sexual violence with the highest number of incidents by age are six-year-olds, which makes up 11. There are six sixteen-year-old victims, six fifteen-year-old victims, five eleven-year-old victims, two seventeen-year-old victims, and two eighteen-year-old victims. Victims aged 1, 5, 8, 12, 13 and 19 had one reported incident each. The total number of victims under the age of eighteen years is 36, which means out of 257 total victims of sexual violence, 14% of them are children. Only three have been young boys, which means 33 young girls have been targeted.




UNICEF have highlighted alarming reports of grave violations against children, including killing, sexual violence and being forced into armed groups. [Catherine Russell](#), the Executive Director of UNICEF, recounted the testimonies of rape that she had heard from the victims, warning that an estimated 12.1 million women and girls - and increasingly including men and boys, are currently at risk of sexual violence - an 80% increase from last year's figures. She stated that 'the data only gives us a glimpse into what we know is a far larger, more devastating crisis'.

The graphical visualisation of the cases of sexual violence below, comparing the underage victims' dispersion to victims over the age of 18, reveals several important observations that can be utilised to distil analysis.

Firstly, West, Central, East and North Darfur states have 13 incidents of sexual violence against Victims over the age of 18, and there are 10 incidents of sexual violence against victims under the age of 18. The majority of these sexual incidents had taken place outside of major cities, in small countryside towns such as Sayyah, Mellit, Kutum, Zalingei and Kebkabiya.


Secondly, the cities of Omdurman and Bahri (in the state of Khartoum) had nine incidents of sexual violence against victims over 18 years of age and only four incidents of sexual violence against victims under the age of 18.

Thirdly, in Al Jazirah, the capital Wad Madani had two incidents of sexual violence against victims under 18 and 1 incident of sexual violence against victims over the age of 18. In the wider and less populous areas of Al Jazirah State, there were seven incidents of sexual violence against victims over 18 years of age and only one incident of sexual violence against victims under the age of 18.




Incidents by fatalities

In terms of incidents of sexual violence resulting in the fatalities of the victims: out of 60 cases, 34 of them did not result in the death of the victims whereas 24 of them do, with 17 of the cases resulting in at least one fatality, two of them resulting in 2 fatalities, three of them resulting in 10 fatalities, and one each of them resulting in 12 and 15 fatalities.




When looking at the number of fatalities by the number of victims, it is clear that there have been 68 victims of sexual violence that had lost their lives at the hands of their attackers. 29 of the incidents resulted in at least one fatality, 3 incidents resulted in at least two fatalities, 12 incidents resulted in 10 fatalities, and 24 incidents resulted in 12 fatalities. This means that in the case of sexual violence committed by the RSF or any other group, out of the 257, 26.46% of those victims died.



3.2 Who are the victims?

This section will explore who the victims are, which tribes are most affected by the sexual violence, as well as who the victims are in terms of their role or identity. The RSF has primarily targeted 34 Refugee and IDP (Internally Displaced People) women in Wad Babu, Abu Karaynka (East Darfur), Cap Al Jidad (Al Jazirah State), Um Dressaya (Dar As Salam, North Darfur), Dalo (Shamal Jabal Marrah, Central Darfur) and Kalma IDP camp (Beliel, South Darfur).



The Health Workers and Aid Workers

One of the victims, Dr. Mohamed Zakaria, [was killed](#) on the 19th November 2025 when he was assassinated by the RSF when they attempted to rape his daughters. On the 26th December 2024, the RSF attacked doctors and patients in a hospital in Kebkabiya, Northern Darfur and raped a woman. From the cases extracted from the ACLED data, there have been four cases of violent attacks targeting hospitals, health workers and aid workers in Khartoum, Al Jazirah and North Darfur.

In each of these instances, there is widespread looting of hospital property and staff, with widespread sexual violence against predominantly women and young girls. In one case, 37 women and young girls were sexually assaulted; this case was in retaliation due to an RSF

Jazirah command defecting to the Sudanese Armed Forces on the 19th October. Sadly, in every recorded instance of sexual violence against health workers, there has been a death as a result of the sexual violence.

The Fur Ethnic Group

The Fur ethnic group are the nomadic people of the Darfur region who rely on sedentary farming, largely millet cultivation. Darfur [itself means](#) 'home of the Fur' in Arabic. They are Muslim with an Arab adoption of cultures, names and cultural clothes. The Fur people were the [ruling ethnic group](#) in the Darfur region until 1916. In the 1980s, the Fur attempted to occupy land in the central Jebel Marra mountain range, resulting in the destruction of entire villages and thousands of lives lost on both sides.

In the mid-1980s, racial prejudices interwoven with the violence from the previous conflicts resulted in the [formation](#) of an alliance of the aforementioned 27 Arab nomadic 'Janjaweed militias', declaring war against the black and non-Arab groups of the Darfur region. In response, the Fur formed their militias, resulting in the deaths of 5,000 Fur and Arabs, tens of thousands of civilians displaced, and over 40,000 homes destroyed in the violence.

The Sudanese government and the Janjaweed [targeted](#) the Fur and the other African farming groups, [killing](#) thousands and [displacing](#) millions. In October 2005, the predominantly Fur and Masalit Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) split into the Fur faction led by their original leader, Abdel Wahid al Nur and another group led by Minni Arko Minawi, supported by his Zaghawa tribe. [In May 2006](#), the African Union brokered a peace agreement for the regional conflict in Darfur and signed it in Abuja, Nigeria. However, only Minawi's faction signed while the two other main rebel groups refused to sign. Without the agreement of said factions and being encouraged by the ruling party in Khartoum, violence escalated in the weeks following the agreement.

During the conflict, the government and Janjaweed forces [particularly targeted](#) Fur civilians, with the most poignant violent incident happening in Kailek. The Arab militias besieged the town with the collusion of the local authorities. The town was home to displaced civilians from the surrounding areas. [In 2004](#), when humanitarian workers gained access to the town, they discovered many people had been starved to death or succumbed to the disease; the town had effectively turned into a prison camp.

The Human Rights Watch recorded that during the siege of Kailek, women [were repeatedly](#) raped in front of their children and husbands, while children had been abducted or thrown into the fires. The Human Rights Watch [recounted](#) many other atrocities tantamount to crimes against humanity. This incident was one of the [first instances](#) of rape as a weapon of war in Sudan, the Sudanese government having been accused of indiscriminate violence against civilians in the form of bombing, destruction of villages and water supplies as well as the use of chemical weapons in Darfur. A 15-year-old girl who [was raped](#) by five men for more than a week recounted her horrors - 'when the Janjaweed were not raping me, they tied my arms and legs together so I could not run away'.


In conclusion, from the evidence and analysis provided, the data showcase the reality that women and children are at the greatest risk of 'pervasive' sexual violence from the RSF and related militias. Of the 257 victims, 253 are women, and almost 15.63% are children under the age of 18. This pattern suggests that these militias are deliberately utilising sexual violence as a weapon to break communities apart. Rural areas in the Darfur and Kordofan states have especially high numbers of sexual violence of this kind.

Furthermore, fatalities are also significantly common, with more than 40% of victims dying from these attacks. Health and aid workers are also targeted in the violence, diminishing the efforts for humanitarian crisis relief exponentially. The current violence reflects a long history of systematic attacks against civilians and minority groups, such as the Fur Ethnic community.


4. Locations

As seen on the map, sexual violence cases have been primarily concentrated in three key regions: the states of Darfur (35.7% altogether), Khartoum (21.43%) and Al Jazira (35%).


In particular, Sharg Al-Jazirah, the city of Khartoum, Bahri and Al-Fasher have experienced very high concentrations of cases of sexual violence.



Currently, Khartoum remains the only region still experiencing cases of sexual violence, as of April 2025. This corresponds with the fact that the RSF continue to be the only perpetrator of sexual violence, and their key area of attack is Khartoum.



Another significant thing is that we can conclude, based on the causes of sexual violence over time, that the timeline of sexual violence cases per location often reflects RSF activity/significant civil war events in that given location. For instance, the reason why Al-Jazira had an extremely high number of sexual violence cases in October is that it occurred during the RSF's massacre of villages in Al-Jazira state, which led to at least 124 people being killed and farms being burnt. According to ACLED, from 5 October to 8 November 2024, 1010 fatalities were recorded. As such, sexual violence was just one of many atrocities the RSF committed during the attacks. Building on this, from January, cases of sexual violence were largely in Khartoum. This correlates with the fact that post-January, only the RSF has committed sexual violence.




Darfur

In particular, in the Darfur region, 46.15% of its cases have occurred in North Darfur. North Darfur alone makes up for 17.14% of all sexual violence cases in Sudan. Zooming into North Darfur, Al-Fashir makes up 70.8% of the cases in North Darfur. This is expected given Al Fasher remains a hotspot for the civil war, with the siege still ongoing after a year. However, there have been a significant number of cases in all regions of Darfur, particularly South and Central Darfur.

Khartoum

Within the Khartoum State, a very high concentration of sexual violence has occurred in southern Khartoum. In particular, the city of Khartoum, with some cases in the neighbouring cities of Omdurman and Bahri.

In particular, within Khartoum, the Al Diyum East neighbourhood has experienced a significant number of cases. This is because the area was particularly [vulnerable](#) due to evacuations in March following RSF attacks in that area.




Al Jazira

Within the Al Jazira State, a particular trend is that a significant portion of its sexual violence cases occurred in towns on the bank of the Blue Nile River, with the remaining areas of sexual violence occurring in the northeast of the state, near Khartoum. In particular, Sharg Al-Jazira has a significant number of sexual violence cases. This was due to the commander Abu Aqla Kiki [switching allegiance](#) from the RSF to the Sudanese Army in late October 2024.

As a response, the RSF [launched retaliatory attacks](#) and killed 1237 people in villages east and north of the state. In particular, 359 people were killed in the town of Al-Hilaliya and 300 in Tamboul. As part of their war strategy, after expelling the residents in the villages, the RSF detained dozens of women in the villages and also abducted them and took them to unknown


locations. This explains why, in November, Al-Jazira state (and specifically Sharg Al-Jazira) had the highest number of cases.

Cases of Sexual Violence in Sudan in Al Jazira



Fatalities


Despite North Darfur making up a relatively smaller proportion of sexual violence cases (17%), it makes up a considerable proportion (42.31%) of fatalities from sexual violence. As expected, Al Jazirah made up a large proportion of fatalities as well.




Mass Attacks

Similarly, from the perspective of mass attacks, only the areas of Khartoum, Al-Jazirah, and South Darfur have experienced mass attacks. Khartoum makes up for over half of the mass attacks.

What is particularly interesting is the proportion of cases per location which were mass attacks. As seen on the graph below, over half of the cases of sexual violence in Khartoum were mass attacks. In comparison, despite North Darfur making up a significant proportion of cases of sexual violence in general, none of the attacks were mass attacks. In South Darfur, there were only mass attacks of sexual violence.



This latter pattern occurs because the cases in South Darfur occurred in the Kalma IDP Camp. A total of 30 women were sexually assaulted in that camp within the six-month period. In general, a lot of the sexual violence cases in IDP camps occurred when the women were out to get provisions (for example, in the marketplace). In Al-Jazira, the mass attacks were mostly part of village attacks, with an exception to when the RSF attacked Rufaa Hospital and 37 women were raped.



To conclude, Khartoum, Al-Jazira and North Darfur experienced the highest level of sexual violence. Khartoum has the highest number of mass attacks. The locations of sexual violence corroborate with the idea of sexual violence mirroring RSF activity in the area.

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

In conclusion, this report clearly identifies that sexual violence is being used as a [strategic and systematic](#) weapon of war in Sudan to physically and mentally crush the victims of war, which has been a consistent trend since 2004. Women and children suffer the most, making up nearly all the 257 victims recorded. Over 40% of these victims died as a result of the sexual violence. Most of the attacks were committed by the RSF (84.6%), whose actions target specific ethnic groups, such as the Fur, to promote Arab dominance. Khartoum, Al-Jazirah and North Darfur had the highest numbers of sexual violence, directly reflecting the RSF activity in these areas. Reporting remains difficult, and many more cases are likely to go unreported due to the stigma and fear. Survivors receive insignificant amounts of medical or psychological help, making their situation even more difficult.

Immediate international action is needed to protect victims, provide critical aid and hold perpetrators accountable. Without quick intervention, sexual violence will continue to ravage and devastate Sudanese communities. This report is not aimed at identifying the individuals committing these atrocities, nor will it bring them to justice. However, this report offers vital insight into the scale and depth of the violence, which should raise awareness of the issue.

From a grander perspective, the ongoing civil war is the cause of the significant surge of sexual violence, used as a weapon itself. Measures to encourage peace, or at least a ceasefire, would reduce the number of victims. However, it is extremely likely that sexual violence would persist even after the civil war, as seen in the previous civil wars. Ethnic discrimination remains rooted in Sudan, and women will continue to pay the price for it even without a war.

The trends we have discovered provide potential for predictions. We could estimate where new surges of sexual violence could occur by monitoring, including monitoring RSF activity. This would be beneficial as it could enable humanitarian aid to be proactive. As such, victims can receive immediate help and support, and hopefully protect potential victims. Additionally, it could improve reporting on sexual violence, enabling greater accuracy, thus further targeted and proactive support.

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