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Observing Memories

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EUROM | EUROPEAN OBSERVATORY ON MEMORIES
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Observing *Memories*

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EUROPEAN OBSERVATORY ON MEMORIES

LED BY

Fundació Solidaritat UNIVERSITAT DE BARCELONA

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SUMMARY

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COVER PICTURE

View from the bedroom, Hospedería Santa Cruz, Valley of the Fallen (Cuelgamuros). Silvia Marimon Molas, 2018.

EDITORIAL

A year ago we published the first issue of Observing Memories, a digital magazine that aimed to offer a new space for the debate around memory. A space that would give the readers tools to analyse, compare, understand, take a stance and participate in the different conflicts and debates related to the past surrounding us. The participation of "top experts" in the field of memory studies was a great asset, and the good feedback of the readers encouraged us to publish this second issue, with more content and collaborators.

From the beginning, we wanted to focus on one of the most burning issues, not only within the academy but also in the public arena: the memory of the perpetrators and their legacies. The number of studies about perpetrators and guilty parties is constantly increasing, as well as the resignification of memory places that refer to repression. This memory is in itself conflictive. It brings us into very contemporary dilemmas about the political memory of nostalgia, the negative commemoration and the need to reflect on democratic pedagogy. Many uncomfortable memories arise when we deal with the memory of the dictators, their disciples or the important State crimes they committed. There arises a prosecution of memory, an interpretative danger, negationism or revisionism. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore those crimes and avoid studying them, as some would prefer. Therefore, we have contacted international experts and prepared a new issue of our e-magazine.

The experts Valentina Salvi and Leigh A. Payne have written, from very different perspectives, two sharp, thoughtful and incisive articles about the figure of the repressor in Argentina. Salvi describes the evolution of the discourse of the State violence committed by the military institution: the transformation of the "nation saviour" into a "victim of terrorism", trying to adjust to the socially accepted stereotype of the victim to dilute its responsibility in the crimes committed against humanity. On the other hand, Payne analyses the elements shaping the processes of public confession of violence of the revolutionary left, and how these can have a social impact and a very different result depending on the timing or political moment. We have asked Enzo Traverso about the state of the studies on the memory of the perpetrators. He is one of the most experienced experts in the causes and effects of the political and ideological conflicts of memory. We could not help asking him, among other things, about the memory policies developed in Europe, and what should be done with the legacy of dictatorships. We also wanted to give EUROM's point of view presenting two projects in which we have been recently involved: the transformation of the Valley of the Fallen in Madrid and the Monument to the Fallen of Pamplona. Similarly, as an example of a symbolic place of dictatorship reshaped during democracy, Kirsten John Stucke explains the experience of the Wewelsburg Memorial Museum. The way this exceptional museum was conceived represents a turning point in the worldview of the SS.

In this second issue of Observing Memories we also wanted to introduce a new section dedicated to the memory policies in Europe. In a provocative article, the historian Georges Mink warns us of the growing interventionism of the States through new legal frameworks and government measures to create stories about the past. The historian Markus J. Prutsch clearly talks about the memory policies developed by the European Union and the challenges of this regulation. In this sense, we also publish an interview with Gilles Pelayo, head of unit of the Europe for Citizens's programme at the Education, Audiovisual & Culture Executive Agency (EACEA), in which he explains how the programme will evolve in the near future.

In addition, we have also included articles by different experts such as the political scientist Ana Miloševic, who questions the success of memorials in overcoming wounds caused by social traumas, or the historian Fernando Hernández Holgado, who discusses the complex debate that arose after the initiative of the City Council of Madrid to build a memorial at the cemetery of Almudena with all the names of those executed by Franco's regime. One of our constant elements is the relation between art and memory, and we wanted to reflect it with an article by one of the most renowned artists in this field, Horst Hoheisel, who explains different aspects of some of his most prominent projects. We also included the audio-visual work of the artist Kristina Norman, "Festive Spaces", exhibited at Art Hall in Tallinn, in which she explores the link between art and the different political regimes experienced in Estonia. Furthermore, the corresponding reviews of books, exhibitions, and museums can be found between the pages of this second issue of Observing Memories.

We hope you enjoy a good and interesting reading.

Jordi Guixé
Director of the European Observatory on Memories

DEEP VIEW

Once victors, now victims.
How do the Argentine military remember their recent past?

Valentina Salvi
CIS-CONICET / IDES, University Tres de Febrero

During the military dictatorship (1976-1983), the Argentine armed forces implemented a repressive policy of clandestine and illegal type throughout the country, previously tested by the Army in the province of Tucumán in 1975. With the aim to eliminate the groups and people classified as "subversive" (armed organization members, trade unionists, political activists, student or professional union members, artists among others who might be labelled as suspicious), the armed forces imposed a policy of terror that involved kidnapping, torture, illegal arrests, disappearance of people, abduction of boys and girls born during their mothers' captivity resulting in tens of thousands persons disappeared, murdered or exiled.

Despite the silence and concealment that surrounded this systematic policy of disappearance of persons in Argentina, both the Army and its retired and active cadres remember the years of repression; that is to say, they construct and reproduce versions of that past. An unstable balance between memory and oblivion, evocation and negation, selection and vindication is established in these versions. This irregular balance discloses that the military memories around the illegal repression reflects the weight of the shared traditions and identities as well as the persistence of certain narrative frameworks in addition to the ups and downs of the political and legal situations or the tensions existing with other competing memories.

Indeed, the military institution and its officials play an active role in building memories around the recent past. Looking inside the military community, tensions and conflicts around what to remember and how to remember result in the construction of an edifying memory that reinforces the sense of belonging and self-assessment of the cadres, while boosting the intergenerational transmission with a solid emotional bond. Looking outside, the memories of the army come into conflict with the memory of the disappeared

1.Operativo Independencia to dismantle the ERP. Tucumán, Argentina (1975) | Public domain

2. Final session of the Trial of the Juntas, 1985. Video available on www.euorpeanmemories.en/magazine

3. Ernesto Sábato delivers to President Raúl Alfonsin the report on the Disappeared, known as 'Nunca mas'. AGN_DDF / Inv: 346314. September 20, 1984 | Archivo General de la Nación

and with the message of the human right institutions with which they compete for the sense and truth about the recent past. At the same time, these memories swing between the demands to the state to be acknowledged and the search of support and legitimacy in a civil society that, depending on the political and memorial situation, tends to reproduce the legacy of the last military dictatorship, while mainly rejecting and questioning it.

During the 1980s, in the early years after the dictatorship, the new army authorities refused to reposition their place within the democratic life by questioning the legacy of the recent past and, in particular, the fact that they had "defeated the subversion". On the contrary, far from taking distance from the past, the present of the institution was a result from it. The armed forces clung to notions such as "war", "subversion" and "anti-subversive war", since they were categories of practice referred to the experience, training and ideology of a generation of officers who had been involved in the "fight against subversion". In turn, they worked as political and moral categories that made a radical difference between them as the "saviours of the fatherland" and their enemies: the "subversives". At that time, the illegal repression was publicly considered by the military through a tone of triumphalism and denial. In other words, the denied the clandestine and systematic nature of the disappearance of persons and the very existence of the disappeared, while they reinforced an interpretation in terms of war and under the prerogatives of the victors.

Within the military bodies, the military continued to identify the figure of the combatant of the "fight against subversion" with the ideal of the soldier to be followed in the speeches given by the senior officers to the junior cadres at military events. The "combatants" of the "fight against subversion" and also their majors - who were held accountable in the trial of the juntas (1985) during that time - were honoured and constituted the *proper actor* proposed as a model for the assertion of the vocation and the soldier's agenda for the new generations of officers (Guber: 2007). The war narratives referring to the "fight against subversion" were a source of exemplary events worthy of being transmitted and imitated between generations of soldiers. On the

Campo de Mayo - Buenos Aires, 2006 | Juan Manuel Gienini - Wikimedia Commons

Ramón Díaz Bessone, Argentine military, November 1976 | Magazine Panorama no 6 November 1976 Author Unknown - Wikimedia Commons

other hand, out of the military bodies, there was a definitive disagreement between the victorious story told by the military about their actions as "victors" of the "fight against subversion" and the sense of challenge and rejection that the civil society attributed to the violence perpetrated by the armed forces during the military dictatorship. For the military, those who were definitely recognised as *disappeared* by the middle of the 1980's in Argentina, that is, as human persons who had been kidnapped and tortured in clandestine detention centres, were considered "subversives", and what was socially called State terrorism was defined by them as "war against subversion".

The 80's was a context where the military view was more and more adversely interpreted and felt. The military version regarding the "war" and the "victors" was finally eroded as a result of the claims made by the relatives of the illegal repression victims, the strengthening of the human right perspective among the public, the increasing importance within the society given to the victims' words, the symbolic importance of the report drafted by the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP) (1984), and the sentence of the trial of the juntas (1985). Thus, the armed forces had to do something that was definitely against their interests: the demonization of their actions and the humanization of their victims. As soon as

"New executions of Peronists, a few days of the massacre of La Plata. Beckerman, 19 years old, is dismissed by his colleagues from the Union of Secondary Students (UES) | Diario Noticias, Year I number 263. Buenos Aires, Saturday, August 24, 1974.

Monument to Colonel Don Argentino del Valle Larrabure during a tribute ceremony | V. Salvi

the war discourse lost its social value, only victims and perpetrators were left behind, and the violence perpetrated ended up being perceived socially as a deviation from all legal, moral and cultural codes.

In this context, it became widespread the so-called "theory of the two demons", whose two-fold rhetoric opposing and equating the violence exercised by the armed organisations with the state terror carried out by the armed forces, and this would also have implications for the future reconfiguration of the military narrative. This interpretation of the facts was rejected by the military forces, who did not agree to be equated with those they had fought against and defeated (the "subversive criminals"), nor to have their commanders judged and their responsibilities equated with those of the guerrilla armed forces leaders. Notwithstanding this stance, the bipolarization of violence and the equalization derived from it will permeate the military narrative, attributing a new significance to the notion of war and giving it a new base for the fights for memory.

The figure of the "victors of the subversive war" that defended the careers of the former Commander of the Junta or the middle cadres who had participated in the repression was central to the military memories during the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. However, there were many reasons for the military memories to turn to the figure of the "victims of terrorism". Nevertheless, it should be made clear that the figure of the "killed by their subversion" is not new, it dates from the wakes and burials of the officers killed during the first half of the 1970s (Garaño and Pontoriero, 2018), from the propagandist activity in support of the military regime (Lorenz, 2005), and especially from the masses that FAMUS convened in connection with the CONADEP investigation and the military court cases of the 1980s (Salvi, 2012). However, in those years, the military victims were not the emblematic figure from which to frame the memory and defend the "fight against subversion".

Around 1995, two events occurred that were markedly significant for the memories of the armed forces and their cadres. In March, the lieutenant commander (R), Adolfo Scilingo, and the former junior staff officer in the Army, Víctor Ibáñez, reported on television that the so-called "death flights" were throwing into the sea alive people who were being held hostage in the clandestine detention centres of the Escuela de Mecánica de la Armada (ESMA) and Campo de Mayo. A month later, in April 1995, the Army chief, General Martín Balza, also gave a speech before the television cameras in which he admitted the torture and murder executed by men from the Army without giving further details about the responsibilities of the institution.

Oath of Jorge Rafael Videla as President of Argentina. 29 March 1976 | Author unknown, Wikimedia Commons

Pedro Eugenio Aramburu visiting Oberá in 1965 | "Reseña histórica de Oberá". Gualdoni Vigo, Enrique. Municipalidad de Oberá, 1987. Wikimedia Commons

The personal account of two direct perpetrators and the institutional recognition of the violence perpetrated by the Army understood from these public statements definitely left the military without any chance to present themselves before the public opinion as the ***"saviours of the fatherland from the Marxist thread"*** or as the ***"victors of a fair war against the subversive enemy"*** *(Badaró, 2009: 311).*

Paradoxically, the generation of officers contemporary to the illegal repression, gathered in the Military Circle were the main promoters of the shift towards the memory of the military victims. Among them, the former head of the Second Army Corps and former Minister of Military Regime Planning, Major General (R) Ramón Díaz Bessone, became the main promoters of this memory with the publication of the book *In Memoriam*, considered by the military as the counterpart of the *Nunca Más* (Never more) published by CONADEP in 1984. His three volumes describe the circumstances in which members of the armed and security forces, their relatives and civilians were killed by armed organizations during the 1970s, but above all it provides a narrative from which to re-interpret the past and take up a stance regarding the debates and questionings of the present.

Indeed, the book lays the foundation for a new narrative about the past to be strengthened: *The Complete Memory*. This is a mirroring and reactive memory opposed to as much as reflected in the memory of the disappeared and the socially legitimated category of victim of State terrorism. On the one hand, this shift towards the memory of the victims can be understood as a symptom of an era in which the foundation of a collective identity in a traumatic event represents a sufficient basis for promoting claims and disputing different meanings in the public arena; and, on the other hand, as part of a mournful memory resulting in an active effect of unity and adhesion based on a common painful memory. However, it can also be understood as an expression of the little space found by the victims of the guerrilla in the memory of the activists and the human rights organizations, and for the State.



Roberto Viola | Revista Panorama nro 4 septiembre 1976. Wikimedia Commons

Cover page of the first issue of the magazine B1 "Vitamin for the memory of the war in the '70s", 2006 | V. Salvi

The book describes how the payroll of the officers and their relatives murdered by the armed forces was published and it begun with the murder of a 4 years old girl, Guillermina Cabrera, an army captain's daughter, which took place in March 1960. The fact that a little girl is the protagonist of the kidnapping and assassination of General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu in 1970 carried out by the Montoneros organization, which had always occupied the leading position in the memory of the military, proves that the rewriting of the military memory around the figure of the victim seeks to conform to the socially accepted and recognized stereotype of the innocent victim. Aramburu's career is too contradictory; on the one hand, it is strongly affected by the disputes between Peronists and anti-Peronists; and on the other hand, it is closely linked to the army's coup d'etat and anti-democratic image to still be considered the first and foremost "victim of terrorism". In turn, Aramburu represented a problematic figure in the construction of the respectable and virtuous image of the army officers who "died for the fatherland and fighting against subversion".

However, which are the criteria defining the quality of "victim of terrorism"? Although, both the civilians and the military who were killed by terrorist attacks, attacks on the army barracks as well as in confrontations, were considered victims, the paradigmatic figure of the "terrorist victim" is the officer murdered after months of kidnapping executed by armed organizations. Placing the focus on the kidnapped military is not a coincidence and responds, on the one hand, to the need to compete with the figure of the "detainee-disappeared" and, on the other hand, to the intention of making the image of the armed forces officers sacred. Major Julio Argentino del Valle Larrabure and Lieutenant Colonel Jorge Ibarzábal who were killed after months of kidnapping, allow us to build a figure of "ideal victim of terrorism". These officers were remembered as martyrs who "died defending their fatherland" and have also replaced the generals of the National Reorganisation Process as memorable soldiers such as Jorge Videla, Roberto Viola, Leopoldo Galtieri or Luciano Menéndez, who were a symbolic obstacle to the construction of the army as a victim of the "subversive terrorist" violence. The crystallisation of the military memory in the figure of the victims places the focus on certain features of the officers while keeping silent other features with the aim to strengthen the idea that the military do not kill to "save the fatherland - but die for it" (Portelli, 2003).

The consequences of this shift towards the figure of military victims are many and conflicting, especially since the reactivation, in 2006, of the trials for crimes against humanity. With this new discourse, the Army intended to get out of the closed space involved by the corporate memory to go into the public arena with a realistic discourse and compete for the meanings of the past that were

materialised around the memory of the disappeared. However, the Army also intended to renew their damaged image with new justifications and reasoning about the actions carried out with the aim to suggest a strengthening of the military memory. By focusing on the figure of the officers killed by the armed organizations, we can construct a selection of facts, persons and periods and also hide, minimize and disguise others, particularly, we can erase from the horizon of their memories the events and the officers who carried out the coup d'etat on March 24, 1976 and the crimes committed during the illegal repression.

Although the *Complete Memory* does not deny the existence of disappeared persons nor the actions of the army during the illegal repression, there is an equation effect similar to the so-called "two-demon theory". It, therefore, equates officers killed by armed organizations with those who have disappeared and also equates insurgent actions committed by the armed organizations with the illegal and clandestine violence perpetrated by the State during the military dictatorship.

The ***Complete Memory*** replaces the triumphalist and glorifying account of the ***"victory in the anti-subversive war"*** with a dramatic account of the suffering and pain of the officers and their families as victims of a ***"fratricidal war"***.

With notions such as "internal war", "fratricidal war" or "war between Argentines", the *Complete Memory* seeks to introduce an argumentative line that equates all victims and makes up for the suffering and violence. Unlike the claiming speech widespread in the early years of democracy that intended to differentiate the "victors of the anti-subversive war" from the "subversives", the *Complete Memory* places the focus on the human losses, unifying all the victims around its "common denominator", that is suffering.

The *Complete Memory* erases from the memories of the military the actions carried out by the officers and the institution during the illegal repression, concealing and fading away the legal, political and moral responsibilities that are incumbent on the officers and the armed and security forces for the illegal repression. Therefore, it takes place a kind of transition in which the rule of "everybody" is replaced by the rule of "nobody". In the words of Arendt (2007: 151) the saying of collective guilt that holds "where everybody is guilty, nobody is guilty" is superseded by another equally exculpatory one claiming: "where everybody is victim, nobody is guilty". While the figure of guilt conceals the responsibilities by attributing universal complicity (Arendt, 2007), the collective victimization arouses feelings of solidarity and compassion with the aim of equalizing suffering as well as behaviour. Both help to exonerate officers at a moral and legal level, and the armed institutions at a political level.

Having said that, the *Complete Memory* bases its argument on traumatic events that, while documented and of true value, do not achieve any social or state recognition. Nevertheless, how is a memory that presents itself as "complete" and "overcoming" regarding other memories accused of being "partial and sectarian"? Memory is "complete" when it is based on the idea that "we are all victims". In other words, it is connected to all Argentines through a common pain, to the dead, but also to their mothers, children, grandchildren, grandparents and siblings "from one side or the other", confronted in the past for the violence, while currently confronted for political ideologies. The setting-up of a national community of victims is possible as long as the bonds of consanguinity between those "killed by the subversion" and their relatives are extended to the "other" victims and their relatives and, in this way, the "other" victims

are also recognised with the purpose of being acknowledged by other competing memories. Nevertheless, in accordance with the *Complete Memory* view, the distinguishing element between the two competing memories is the political actions carried out by the human rights organizations and their search for criminal prosecution of the military and police accused by the commission of crimes against humanity. The *Complete Memory* is placed beyond divisions, biases or disputes, i.e. beyond the politics and fights for memory, to bring all Argentines together in a "complete" memory of the recent past around "all victims".

Over the past 35 years, the Army has experienced both a continue and changing line of thinking in its memory as a result of the negotiations and confrontations between the institution and a claiming view in response to the "fight against subversion" and the questioning of a society that demands answers for the crimes committed. Therefore, the military use the slogan *Complete Memory* and the memory of the officers killed by the armed organizations during the 70s to recall the recent past given the need to find a place in this adverse society, but also to maintain and recover their values and institutional traditions. The virtues of the good officer (the heroic officer) - whose symbolic weight is fundamental to the military ethos - are based on the martyrology of the officers who "died defending the fatherland from the subversion". This shifting from the living to the dead, from the "combatants" to the "military victims", reinforces the image of the Army as a victim of the violence during the 1970s and fades away its responsibility as the perpetrator of state and clandestine violence unparalleled in the history of Argentina. As a legacy for the future, for the military new generations, the act of remembering not only means hiding those responsible and their actions from their memories, but also erasing the responsibilities of the institution from the future interrogations and reflections on the past that they have received.

"Soldier, don't apologize for defending the homeland" | V. Salvi

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DEEP ARTICLE

Left Unsettled
Confessions of Armed Revolutionaries

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What happens when armed left guerrilla or revolutionary fighters confess to past violence? Can they contribute to building stronger democracies or human rights cultures? Are they in any way similar to confessions by perpetrators of state violence?

Some parts of my earlier work on state perpetrators -- Unsettling Accounts – carries through to this new study on Left Unsettled. The revolutionary left and state perpetrators, for example, make confessions that are unsettling in content, specifically terrorist violence against civilians and extreme violence against their own comrades. Like state perpetrators, confessions on the left sometimes break, or unsettle, a silence over left-wing involvement in past atrocities. When the left speaks out – like the right--, they do not settle accounts with the past, but unsettle them. Confessions by the armed left disrupt a narrative that has settled about that past, that is, the left as innocent victims, and not perpetrators, of atrocity. The term 'left' in the title of the new project refers in part to the stated ideology of the revolutionary groups; but it also refers to what is 'left out,' or silenced from memory politics, what remains or is 'left behind,' in the analysis of past violence.

The earlier project suggests that despite the unsettling nature of the confessions and the near impossibility of reconciliation as a result--, engagement of the audience can nonetheless positively benefit democracy and human rights through "contentious coexistence." Dialogic conflict over past violence puts into practice the very values of democracy--participation, expression, and contestation—that sharpens, refines, and promotes widespread support for human rights norms. The earlier book comes to this conclusion by developing a dramaturgical approach. It is not that the confessional



Members of the Ejército Guerrillero del Pueblo in Salta, 1964 | Revista El Sur

text (script) alone can have a positive effect on democracy and human rights. Indeed, certain texts (e.g., heroic or sadistic ones) can have the opposite effect on their own. Instead, other elements of the confessional performance – the perpetrators themselves (actor and acting), the political moment (timing), the space of the confession (stage), and the audience – can turn even these potentially harmful confessions into positive outcomes.

That positive effect is not a typical outcome for armed left confessions, however. Instead, fearful of how the right-wing might exploit these confessions to demonize the left, silencing and not contentious coexistence has resulted. Yet one factor that may contribute to a positive outcome is timing.

This article considers timing as a factor shaping the impact of left confessions on democracy and human rights. It looks at two different historical moments in which the armed left confessed in Argentina. The more recent set of confessions occurred during the presidency of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. Two former members of the armed left made public written confessions, followed up by televised interviews, about their past, condemning the acts of violence in which they had participated. Claudia Hilb was a former student militant who confessed after she had become a professor at the University of Buenos Aires. Ricardo Leis was a Montonero leader who confessed as a Philosophy professor, living in Brazil since his exile there in the 1970s. They both called for a reckoning of the violations of human rights by the left to build a stronger democratic and human rights culture in Argentine politics. They both desired an end to the glorification of violence and the use of violence as a legitimate political tool. They both called for a rejection of human rights violations by whoever engaged in them, regardless of perpetrators' ideology. The response was silencing. The timing or political moment was not propitious for debate about the leftist past. This was a time of heightened political polarization in Argentina, a strong right-wing 'anti-Cristina' mobilization, and an effort by the right to attack the human rights trials underway in the country as one-sided. The confessions were seen as either a call for "justice for all," which would mean putting the left on trial after it had already been decimated through torture, disappearance,

Pictures: Members of the Ejército Guerrillero del Pueblo in Salta, 1964 | Revista El Sur

exile, and extermination during the dictatorship, or "justice for no one," which would undermine the ongoing trials of perpetrators of state violence. The analysis of that particular political moment suggests that confessions on the left cannot achieve the positive role of contributing to democracy and human rights and might even cause setbacks in those processes.

Yet, an earlier confessional moment had a different outcome. They did not engage the right-wing. There were no efforts to silence them. Instead, contentious coexistence emerged among the left in which different individuals, sometimes within the same armed left group, took positions on the past and openly – and sometimes harshly – engaged in a dialogue about the violent past. This debate began at the end of 2004 on the pages of the Córdoba political left magazine (La Intemperie) and was later published in part in a book called No Matar. The dialogue began with an interview of the former member of the Ejército Guerrillero del Pueblo (EGP), Héctor Jouvé. Jouvé explains that he joined the armed left due to an intellectual commitment to end poverty and injustice, and his awareness that mainstream political parties lacked the will to bring about change. He expresses regrets about that past, however. In particular, he has misgivings about

"Another form of silencing occurred with the publication of the book No Matar. The book was meant to present the full contours of the debate triggered by Jouvé's and del Barco's confessions. Certain positions in that debate were excluded from the publication, however."

an acceptance on the armed left of authoritarian leadership and its abuses of power. He uses as examples the executions ordered by the leaders of the movement of two rank and file members (Adofo Rotblat "Pupi" and Bernardo Groswald). Jouvé takes responsibility for witnessing those acts and failing to speak out against them. He thus became, in his view, an accomplice to murder. His confessional text calls for language, speaking out and asking questions, as a political weapon: "culture is a web of conversations... more than defining ourselves, we need to ask good questions...if not, we will continue to repeat the same mistakes."

His words begin a dialogue. Oscar del Barco wrote a letter stating that Jouvé's interview "moved" him to become conscious, albeit very late, of the serious tragedy within the EGP. He says, that "by supporting the activities of this group, I was as responsible as the murderers." He goes on to say, "There is no explanation that makes us innocent." There are not causes or ideas that remove our guilt. He calls on everyone to accept the command "thou shall not kill," to recognize that all human beings are sacred, that no one, no matter what they did, should be killed. He refers to the left around the world (Russia, Romania, Yugoslavia, China, Korea, Cuba), as failing to uphold this command, and, as a result, becoming "serial assassins." He calls for ending the silence about the left's involvement in atrocities, "truth and justice should be for everyone."

Del Barco is not silenced. A deep dialogic conflict erupted instead. For some the issues that Jouvé and del Barco exposed were not new. As one commentator states, "Nothing said is new to me; but it has a particular intensity." For others what emerged was "previously silenced themes and problems." The aim of the magazine, and those who confessed, to generate debate and contention over the past within the left succeeded on the pages of subsequent issues of the same magazine and in other news outlets.

On the positive side, those who supported Jouvé and del Barco mentioned how their confessions played a role in presenting a more nuanced version of the past that fell in between the existing narratives of the left as in the two devils theory or a devils-angels theory. The confessions emphasized the danger when the movements' goals and its actions are disconnected and inconsistent. These supporters further embraced a commitment to the commandment "thou shalt not kill" on the left and the right to end the legacy of violence as a way to do politics. Finally, these supporters identified the value



Report of the National Commission on the Desapeared

of talk, dialogue, speaking out, as the best weapon in the war against political injustice.

Those who criticized these confessional acts, concentrated on del Barco's text. Some agreed that mistakes were made by the left, but they felt that del Barco went too far in demonizing the whole left for those mistakes, particularly in the reference to "serial assassins." A common criticism was the view that del Barco constructed a moral equivalency between the violence on the left and right. In particular, the confessional text emphasized a few terrible events on the left that creates a twisted version of the past ("una moral distorsionada"), more likely to politically polarized society rather than find common ground. The notion of "thou shalt not kill," moreover, is on the surface unimpeachable, but fails to recognize how throughout history violence and counter-violence was required to address gross injustices. The very independence of Latin America from Spain's tyranny depended on a willingness to kill and be killed. To reduce the struggle of the armed left to the act of "serial assassins," furthermore takes away the dignity of those who sacrificed their lives for a better world, turning them instead into "senseless deaths" ("muertes sin sentido").

This contentious debate could be seen as healthy for democracy, putting into practice its essential elements of political participation, expression, and contestation. It could be said that Jouvé and del Barco achieved their goal by stimulating dialogue, the art of doing politics through talk, speaking out, raising difficult questions, critical analysis, and overcoming authoritarian adherence to a single perspective.

Why was contentious debate over the left's violence possible in the past and not in recent years? One of the historians who participated in the debate focused on the political environment in 2004-2005 when the news media focused on these confessions. He argued that the period of time was less threatening than in the years following the transition. The climate was more conducive to open and public debate than in those earlier times. In addition, there was a catalysing moment, a

Maby Picón de Viola on the funeral of her husband, Captain Humberto Antonio Viola, and daughter, Maria Cristina Viola (1974)

triggering event, that those on the left responded to in different ways. In the texts, references are made to a Mariano Grondona television program in which a widow of army captain Viola speaks of the cruelty of the People's Revolutionary Party (ERP) in killing her husband. Grondona evoked – "without any subtlety" -- the image of the two devils. This highly contested view of the past promoted by the authoritarian regime was back in circulation. Rather than simply rejecting it out of hand, in this less polarized moment, those on the armed left who had engaged in or witnessed cruelty by their own forces were willing to take a moral stand against it.

Another part of the debate focused on a different aspect of the political moment. This debate followed the "que se vayan todos" ("throw the bums out") protests in which a majority of Argentines took to the streets against politicians. Argentines were claiming their voice, their citizenship, their right to have rights. In this context, the closed and unresponsive state was challenged. It is in this context that the authoritarian regime of the past

The former Trelew airport, current the Cultural Center for Memory, 2014 | Source: Brian Páez, Wikimedia Commons

is identified as a terrorist state, and not merely a dictatorship. Thinking critically, challenging top-down views, questioning authority, became part of the political climate of the time. A period of democracy in the streets that seemed to have a contagious effect among the left. Some were willing to reflect on the hierarchies within their own movement that had lost touch with the base, the rank and file, and the goals of social justice, where ends justified means.

Despite this propitious political moment, there were still efforts at silencing these unsettling truths about the left. Some suggested that del Barco himself had closed off the possibility of dialogue through his use of "unbridled violent language aimed at all protagonists" on the left. Because of this, some on the left called for censoring del Barco.

Another form of silencing occurred with the publication of the book No Matar. The book was meant to present the full contours of the debate triggered by Jouvé's and del Barco's confessions. Certain positions in that debate were excluded from the publication, however. In particular, those who agreed with Del Barco were left out. One had criticized del Barco's critics, referring to their positions as using "historical contingency" to excuse past violence by the left. Another excluded part of the debate questioned the view of the left's "mistakes." This view contended that "executions are not errors. They tend to follow a long period of planning." Another excluded commentary was one that shamed the left for "hiding in silence" about its use of violence, responding not to their moral duty but their fear of the right's exploitation of these truths.

This brings me to my conclusion. Political timing is important, even crucial, to contentious coexistence. The other elements of the confessional performance did not vary much between the two historical moments. Hilb's and Leis's confessional scripts resembled the earlier ones by exposing unsettling aspects of the armed left's past violence. They were similar kinds of actors, having been members of the armed left who had witnessed atrocity. Their confessional stage was not significantly different. They too had published their texts and were interviewed in the media. The audience – the right and the left – were similar in each set of confessions. The main difference that helps us explain the possibility of an opening up

debate is the timing of the confessions. The earlier period was a safer moment for the left to admit to these atrocities without the same level of fear about backlash.

But even in the most propitious moments, as in the earlier confessional era, there is still too much polarization to freely debate the left's violent past. As one of the commentary states about the confessions, "They unsettled me." Yet one of the most unsettling parts of the confessional performance for him was the failure on the left to hear. As he stated, "We have opted not to listen." Thus, even when a debate is opened up, there is an effort to shut it down. In this, the left has failed to live up to its own ideals and theories, to think critically, to reflect, to condemn those parts of the left's past that deserve condemnation.

If it is the case that even in the best of times, left confessions to violence face silence, what does this mean for contentious coexistence? If even during the periods of broad consensus to reject violence as a way to do politics, the left cannot reflect on its own role in the past, then what are the possibilities of building a strong, democratic, peaceful future that respects human rights? More poignantly, during the current period, as Latin American countries move further away from the left, and the right is empowered, can debates render the kind of contentious coexistence that is positive to democratic dialogue and building a stronger human rights cultures? Or will they provoke a further rollback of rights and the delegitimization of the left? Is there a way in which the left can play a constructive role, in these unpropitious and propitious political environments, in building stronger human rights regimes?

Timing has never done all of the work of turning confessional performances into contentious coexistence and democratic practice. How timing affects audience responses is significant. Until audiences on the left feel it is safe to talk freely about the past – without fuelling political polarization and playing into the right's efforts to demonize the left – it is unlikely that these confessions will have their intended effect of rejecting violence as a political strategy. And yet without broad consensus against the use of violence by the right or the left, it is uncertain whether countries can emerge from the legacies of the past and build democratic and human rights futures.

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EXPERT'S VIEW

Enzo Traverso
About the complexity of the past

Picture: Marco Castro

The historian ***Enzo Traverso***, a professor at the Cornell University (USA), is one of the most distinguished specialists in memory studies. In the following pages he answers a series of questions focusing on the memory of the perpetrators and their legacies, the current rise of new far-right movements and the situation of the European policies of memory. He also refers to his latest books, ***Left-wing melancholia. Marxism, History, and Memory*** (Columbia University Press, 2017) and ***Les nouveaux visages du fascisme*** (Editions Textuel, 2017).

Why are there so few studies about the memory of perpetrators?

There are numerous and sometimes extremely important studies on perpetrators if you think of the works of Christopher Browning and Harald Welzer. The memory of perpetrators has been the object of literary fiction — for instance, Les Bienveillantes (The Kindly Ones) by Jonathan Littell — but the available corpus of testimonies and memoirs is limited. Perpetrators do not like to exhibit or recall their crimes and prefer to conceal them. Instances of "coming out" are rare (for instance, the memoirs of the general Aussaresses on torture during the Algerian war). This is not surprising. The scarcity of memories of perpetrators (and therefore studies concerning them) is the dialectical reversal of the increasing role that the remembrance of victims has taken in our societies and in collective memory.

Do you believe that a policy of memory focused exclusively on the victim and not the perpetrator can provoke a certain blindness towards crimes that are currently committed?

Frankly, I believe that it is necessary to extricate ourselves from this game of mirrors and from a historical consciousness based on mass victims. We should try to accommodate the complexity of the past, which is not reduced to a binary confrontation between perpetrators

and victims. The memory of battles and political commitments to past causes like emancipation has little recognition. The 20th century is not made up exclusively of wars, genocide and totalitarianism. It was also the century of revolutions, decolonisation, the conquest of democracy and great collective struggles. This memory has been delegitimised nowadays, having become hidden and covert. I call it a "Marrano memory," insofar as it is a hidden, underground memory like that of Marranos in the Spanish kingdom at the time of Inquisition. It seems to me that in order to break down the cage of "presentism" — a world locked up in the present with neither utopia nor the capacity to look ahead to the future — it is necessary to accommodate these memories. The remembrance of collective movements takes on an anti-conformist, perhaps subversive dimension to a neoliberal era dominated by individualism and competition.

You speak of "post-fascism" in order to describe the new political and social movements of the far right and to distinguish them from the fascism of the 1930s or the neo-fascism of the end of the 20th century. Could you explain to us what post-fascism entails?

I speak of "post-fascism" because the new far right has taken its distance from fascism, at least in the countries where it has become a major player in political life.

On an ideological level, ***post-fascism*** is very different to traditional fascism in terms of language, organisation and mobilisation. It is no longer fascist but has still not become something completely different and new.

It is a form of transition, which justifies the notion of post-fascism. Its dominant characteristics are nationalism and xenophobia, especially in the form of Islamophobia. Nowadays, it no longer finds its fundamental purpose in anti-communism or anti-Semitism. The focus has changed. Nevertheless, a major economic crisis with the dismantling of the euro and European institutions etc. could bring about a change of direction and a return to traditional fascism. Of course, this can happen also outside of Europe. After the election of Donald Trump in the US, Jair Bolsonaro, a politician who clearly fits all requirements of a fascist leader, has been elected in Brazil. This depicts an international tendency.

Enzo Traverso during the Walter Benjamin Lecture Session at the University of Gerona, 2017 | Source: MUME

What could be some policies of memory that raise awareness of the dangers of the current far right without resorting to trivialising fascism with outdated comparisons?

All establishment politicians stigmatize the far right, but often they legitimize its rhetoric. If we accept the idea that constructing Europe involves adopting austerity policies, that the constraints put in place by the markets are indisputable, that there are too many immigrants and that illegals must be deported instead of being legalised, that Islam is incompatible with Western democracy and that terrorism should be combated by special laws reducing civil liberties — as all our governments have been saying for ten years — then the far right will only prosper. In order to stop its advance, it is necessary to first have a real discussion and tell the truth. Receiving immigrants and refugees is a moral duty, insofar as millions of Europeans emigrated and fled from authoritarian regimes in the past two centuries; and a social necessity, insofar as we need them for both economic and demographic reasons. In a global age, our societies cannot survive as closed, ethnically and culturally homogeneous entities.

In terms of policies of memory, we have to recognise that the fascism of the 21st century is very different from that of the 1930s. The lesson we should infer from history is that democracies are perishable and can be destroyed. In countries that have experienced fascism — I'm thinking of Italy, Germany, Spain and a few others — a democracy that has not assimilated this lesson will be fragile and vulnerable. In this sense, anti-fascist memory seems topical to me.

Dictatorships have left a legacy and some places of remembrance. The treatment of these places by democracies has been controversial, to say the least. What could be done with places like the Valle de los Caídos in Spain?

I don't believe in the myth of ***"reconciliation"*** or ***"shared remembrance"***. A strong democratic society should not fear its enemies and grant them freedom of expression within the limits of the law.

When it comes to the remembrance of fascism in Italy and Francoism in Spain, it would be better to recognise their existence rather than conceal them. A democratic state can tolerate them, by no means assuming them or integrating them into its own institutions. A democratic state should not establish an official vision of the past (as is the case in dictatorships), but it does have the duty to recognise its own responsibilities. For example, Chirac's recognition of the responsibility of the French State for deporting Jews or Emmanuel Macron's recognition of the torture that took place during the Algerian war are welcome. In Spain, the "Law of Historical Memory" moves in this direction despite its limits.

The question of what to do with the Valle de los Caídos is complex. My view is that of an independent observer who by no means claims to have magical solutions. To my mind, the decision of Pedro Sánchez to exhume the remains of Franco and remove them from the Valle de los Caídos is a good choice. However, it is also necessary to remove the gigantic cross on top of the site in order to "desacralize" it. It could then be transformed into a memorial and museum with a critical presentation of its history. It would become a memorial in the German sense of a Mahnmal (a warning for future generations). I don't believe in the possibility of creating a place of consensual remembrance in which Republicans and those nostalgic for Francoism can gather "fraternally" in the name of national reconciliation. Nor do I believe in a memorial that would be a recollection of all the victims of the civil war, putting them all on the same level and the same place. This would be a hypocritical choice and not the policy of memory of a democratic state. In this case, it would be difficult to avoid exhuming all the remains (equally those of Francoist soldiers and those of deported republicans) to bury them in a different spot, alongside or elsewhere. That being said, I am not aware of all the propositions that have been made and my position is not the result of in-depth study or extensive contemplation of the subject.

How has neoliberalism affected our perception of time? How does it

influence our vision of the past, present and future?

Neoliberalism compresses our lives into an eternal present, a world dominated by acceleration that gives us the impression of permanent change, although the social and economic foundations remain static.

The free-market society promises to satisfy all our desires — our utopias become individual and are "privatised" — within the context of a social and anthropological model that shapes our lives, institutions and social relationships. In a neoliberal society, the past is reified and remembrance transformed into a consumer item shaped and disseminated by the cultural industry. Politics of memory — museums and commemorations — are submitted to the same criteria of reification (profitability, media coverage, adapting to predominant tastes etc). Inventing and especially imposing different timeframes is no easy task. Connecting to the temporality of the past (shooting at clocks of church towers in order to arrest time, according to the famous image of Walter Benjamin) or inventing timeframes that are not submitted to the rules of the free-market society is the major challenge facing all alternative projects. Social movements in the last few years such as 15M, Occupy Wall Street, Nuit Debout etc. have been interesting experiences in this sense.

What is the "melancholy of the left-wing" and how can remembrance become a tool of social transformation?

The melancholy of the left-wing has always existed. It has followed failures of collective movements and the collapse of hopes for revolution. It seeks neither passivity nor resignation and can favour a critical reappraisal of the past capable of preserving its emotional dimension. This means both mourning lost comrades and remembering the joyful and fraternal moments of social transformation through collective action. We need this melancholy powered by remembrance, which is no obstacle to the reactivation of the left-wing.

How would you describe the politics of remembrance that the EU has implemented up until now and what are its main challenges?

The essential mission of the European Union's politics of remembrance has primarily been instrumental and decorative: showing virtue whilst adopting anti-social policies.
On one hand impoverishing Greece, on the other organising commemorations of the Holocaust; on one hand introducing the power of the troika, a supranational power devoid of any democratic legitimacy, on the other proclaiming human rights; on one hand financing museums and commemorations dedicated to the victims of totalitarianism and genocide, on the other meticulously closing borders and refusing to adopt a common policy to welcome refugees. This hypocrisy can only have detrimental consequences. The rise of the far right is proof of this.

EXPERT'S VIEW

Mausoleum of terror. Fallen in Pamplona and Cuelgamuros

Jordi Guixé i Coromines
European Observatory on Memories, University of Barcelona's Solidaity Foundation

The memorials to wars, heroes and victories are symbols that seek to perpetuate the past in our lives. An iconic imposition of the connection between past and present. These types of monuments wanted to implant a kind of memory, a "permanent Napoleon" that evokes the heroism of history as the fruit of our origins.
On the other hand, there is another way to commemorate the past in the present and one's own present: the work of memory. A work that combines the everyday practice with the critical, theoretical and historical analysis of the past that continues among us. It is an interdisciplinary and systematic work that allows us to change the "monumental" and "old-fashioned" visits for a critical and analytical approach to historical journeys.

Instead of commemorating heroic deaths, battles, triumphs of bloody victories of recent/modern wars or obscene and violent dictatorships, we must give a voice to the testimony of the combat in favour of the democratic memory, the abolition of wars, totalitarianisms and conflicts.

At the same time, when the public policy acts in places of memory, this place must

transmit a critical knowledge, as well as the experience of learning through a public and citizen pedagogy inside a society that grows in peace and democracy, but which is not ignorant. It is complex, conflictive and not very consensual to act or address these issues in spaces, monuments or buildings resulting from barbarism, anti-democracy and the concealment of the reality of history. A reality that hides and harbours the discomfort of violence between neighbours and families. A history that removes injustices from a tense and vengeful society, where it was easier killing than surviving. It is not easy to act in such circumstances; however, time, justice, consolidated democracy and political decision must exercise the right to recover the past for the sake of democracy, the present and the future one. For this reason, as experts and a "transnational think-tank" in Spain, the European Observatory on Memories (EUROM) carried out, analysed and even speculated on the future, present and the possible memorial uses of the two largest mausoleums of terror that exist in Europe and Spain: the monument to the Fallen in Pamplona and the great Mausoleum of the Valley of Cuelgamuros -or the Fallen-. The first was built in the 1950s by the Franco government to bury the leaders of the military uprising, Generals Mola and Sanjurjo, along with other "heroes and requetés (Carlist militiaman) from Navarra killed during the holy national crusade" (following Franco's language). The second was designed by the dictator himself to also house the remains of the "Fallen for God and Spain", and ended up burying the same dictator, along with the founder of the Spanish Falange, Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera.

Proposing a democratic campaign on these

The Valley of the Fall (Cuelgamuros) | EUROM

Mausoleums of Terror forces us to a complex and obligatory action to combine dignity, experience and learning. In the following text I offer a very brief summary of the two working documents on these huge mausoleums, one carried out in 2017 and the other in 2018.

The Fallen in Pamplona

The current question is what to do with the monument and this question is presented as a new municipal and urban project after the removal of the bodies of the two general leaders of the coup d'état which took place in July 1936 - these were Mola and Sanjurjo (the third, as we have pointed out was Franco himself).

The monument, unlike Cuelgamuros, is located at the heart of the city of Pamplona; it is articulated as a hierarchical element at a symbolic, social and urban level, making use of recognisable main references (such as Les Invalides of Paris and Saint Peter of the Vatican). A large dome surrounded by porticoes with columns that develops a classic but austere architecture language. Should the society be asked -as we randomly did while we carried out the project- most of the answers would state that the building was -or is- a basilica or church of neoclassical style and more or less from the 19th century. This lack of awareness must be reduced by the project.

The scale of the building stands out, giving rise to an out-of-proportion object with respect to its immediate and periurban environment that imposes itself on the city.

From its original conception, it defines a situation of a full stop (backdrop) of an area with clear limits: the end of the avenue Carlos III el Noble, one of the most important streets of the 2º Ensanche of Pamplona. Its dome, covered with slate, rises to become a singular landmark in the landscape -also by means of its night-time illumination- from considerable distances such as the Plaza del Castillo itself, one kilometre to the Northwest.

The complex is built on an artificial elevation two metres high with respect to the level of the adjacent streets and squares. The aim of this prominence is to raise the complex and turn it into a monumental landmark in the landscape; as well as to host specific underground uses such as the crypt of the monument itself and its access corridors from the side buildings. In this sense, it is worth highlighting the enormous complexity of the architectural programme in terms of the accesses and uses of the different levels of the monument (terrace - dome, balconies, basilica, underground passages and crypt).

The actions carried out by the City Council of Pamplona with respect to such an enormous mausoleum, initially involve the elimination of all Francoist symbols and the movement of bodies in an attempt to resignify the Francoist monument. Therefore, the following actions were taken:

- *the demystification of the Crypt through the exhumation of the remains of Generals Mola, Sanjurjo and the soldiers.*
- *the amendment of the nomenclature not without some conflicts and ambiguities. In 2017, the former Plaza Conde de Rodezno was given the name of Plaza de la Libertad (the two names still coexist in Google maps and other sources consulted).*
- *the symbolism of Franco inside and outside the monument was provisionally covered with the exception of the Catholic and Carlist texts, symbology and iconography.*
- *the attempt to use the space as an Exhibition Hall, currently without programming.*

Our new proposal and the opinion of many victims' associations goes beyond the actions we consider necessary and laudable after 40 years of dictatorship and 40 years of democracy in transition. Don't forget that Franco's regime in Navarre was imposed from July 1936, that is to say, there was no Civil War, but a direct and immediate repression, where almost 4000 people were murdered.

It's not easy to resignify so much barbarism. The bold proposal should create spaces for research, in

terms of history, the victims' dignity, art, culture, and anthropology; in the most positive sense of any democratic memorial of societies.

Proposed action

The monument to the Fallen represents an insult to democracy and to victims' families murdered by the Franco regime. The imposition at a symbolic, architecture and monument level also means an insult to the current society, which somehow tries to make the structure go unnoticed, without success. Nobody knows anything, but the monument for the Fallen has an imposing, indestructible and hierarchical presence in the city. The monument holds an imposing position, which seems to talk, lead and controls the city, and it can be seen from the old town, while having a coffee in the Plaza del Castillo, shopping in the sales term in the expansion district, going to the chemist's, shops, offices and government offices

In a first consideration, it seems logical that such an imposing presence should be demolished. As for substance and form, this presence is annoying and arrogant. This is the reason why the monument was built and there are still obstacles from its initial function. Demystification is a necessary and indispensable concept. The main step was taken: exhuming and moving the remains of the "fallen". However, that is not enough. A whole symbolism survives in the walls, in the construction itself, in the environment and, as we know, in its interior.

The debate is therefore clear, and implies two options: the total destruction and demolition or a commitment with a contemporary cultural and memorial intervention project (which cannot be partial, timid or stony).

The second option implies a double problem that I have considered from the beginning: the memorial intervention must be contemporary and bold, social, civic and versatile, but it must also coexist with a disproportionate, mythical structure and

Project of ideas for a temporary intervention in the Monument to the Fallen on Pamplona, by Nuria Ricart and Jordi Guixé | Photomontage: Núria Ricart

somehow monstrous, which represents a symbol of a terror that sometimes turns to nostalgia, although hopefully for only a few. This is the reason why the intervention must overcome the sacred and nostalgic symbolism that has already taken more years from our democratic present than from our dictatorial past. This intervention cannot be hijacked by all the political-social rumours. It also entails the problem of overcoming the complex clichés that the society from Pamplona and Navarre - generally or particularly- is conservative and "foral-catholic" (relative to the fueros pertaining to the privileges of that region) "per se". The symbol of the turning point, the 21st century, the new ages and socio-political dynamics can and must also be the intervention in the monument to the Fallen. This cannot be understood otherwise from an outside perspective.

In my opinion, the concealment of the physical imposition of the victory and the movement of

the remains can justify the intervention in the monument so that it can become a positive pole of the democratic, cultural and humanist values without having to disappear. We must be radical and build a new, better and more powerful symbol if we want to deactivate them. This will be a complex, perhaps very expensive, and very conflictive action to take, but it will represent a patrimonial benefit for the new and young generations. A future for the past will symbolize the best possible memorial intervention.

To achieve that, different scales and dimensions should be worked on, such as a permanently participative scale with the local society (at the level of Pamplona-Navarra) and another at a national and international level. Likewise, the social and urban myth related to the term "fallen" must be replaced in two levels:

a. *The cultural. The search of a name and a project that goes beyond the current urban disuse and asepsis, while at the same time generically represents a new way of approaching culture and memory.*

b. *The social and anthropological level that affects the popular narrative and the unwritten nomenclature of the site: "Fallen". A reconsideration, for example, of a great "viewpoint" with sight to the two cities: the new and the old, the north and the south, united by this cultural centre newly constructed. A centre that, without the spirit of post modernity, is little by little considered by the new generations and visitors as a new prism, a new lighthouse, a viewpoint that also symbolises a new look at the past with a projection towards the future: a memorial museum of contemporary art and culture.*

c. *The architecture level. A giant "hood" will cover the original monument. The original and historical sites, including the inner dome, the crypt and the symbolism, will be part of an educational and exclusively guided tour. The new surrounding building will be the new Memorial Centre, much more dynamic and open to citizenship. In my opinion, the relationship with the new surrounding building, the monument and the institution of the memorial culture surpasses the military legacy and moves it over time to a new space, a new visual narrative and contents where all of us will feel challenged. Conditions: transparency, free movement through and around its structure. It involves a guided tour around the dome and viewpoint, and a cultural space underground and upper floor.*

Current Process

While writing these lines, it seems that the City Council and the Government of Pamplona have finally decided to hold an international public tender on the monument (October 2018). The civil society and the associations of historical memory that were consulted have changed their mind and have shifted to demolition. Even so, the opportunity to create an international Memorial centre give rise to a reform that will be fully proposed in this public tender. Depending on the time, and the political and budgetary wills, one of the two options will be taken. However, it seems that the path taken is the right one. (The reader can request to consult the two working documents produced by EUROM writing an e-mail to obervatori.memories@ub.edu).



The Valley of Cuelgamuros without the Francoist symbols. The cross would be demolished and turned into stone pieces while the other symbols would be exposed in a museum | Photomontage: Núria Ricart

The Valley of Cuelgamuros

The Dictator

Undoubtedly, the decision to exhume the corpse of the dictator, Francisco Franco , out of the three military rebels, is a powerful action with an immediate impact that put some distance with previous governments. It is also a strategic initiative and, to a certain extent, easy to put into practice as it is an irreversible action - once executed, no democratic government would dare to bury Franco again in the Valley. The focus of the media is only on this decision and not so much on the future of this site, the actions to be taken and the way to respond to the multiple questions left opened by this exhumation: what to do with the 33,847 bodies buried there? what to do with the Benedictine community and the place of worship? what should be explained in this site and how? does the entire monument have to be preserved? how should it be managed? For the moment, the announcement of the dictator's exhumation has placed all attention on this measure. Meanwhile, it is still unknown what the future will bring for the Valley of the Fallen, the largest and most representative Francoist and National Catholic monument of the dictatorship.

Reconciliation is of the most used justifications by those who want to avoid any kind of action in the Valley of the Fallen and who deny that this place was built in honour of the victors of the civil war. Cuelgamuros represents an anti-democratic symbol, a late-Franco myth that has not disappeared in certain circles of the extreme right and the Catholic Church. The decree of April 1, 1940, which would start the monumental project of the Valley, already stated that its purpose was "to perpetuate the memory of those who fell in our glorious Crusade". As is well known, the hardest part of the construction works, such as the excavation of the basilica encrypted in granite, was undertaken by Republican political prisoners. What type of reconciliation could they possibly find in a site they were forced to build by a dictatorial authority? The purpose of the Valley is very clearly stated in the documentation of the age -in the burial order of July 11, 1946, of the decree-law of August 23, 1957 by which the foundation of the Holy Cross of the Valley of the Fallen was created, in the letter written by Franco to José Antonio's brothers so that he could be buried there, etc. "to bury those who fell in the Crusade, in the War of Liberation, in the Uprising, those who fought the Anti-Spain and the Marxist hordes".

Clearly, several memories coexist in the Valley of the Fallen, until now ruled by the shadow of the dictator and under the protection of the most old-fashion National Catholicism, based on the union of the sword and the cross.

Evidently, thousands of dead buried there also deserve respect; however, respect does not involve a dissolution of memories under the same "reconciling" memory. The Valley must become an agora where different memories could coexist, even if they are confronted. This does not involve their unification or mixing up without leading to "happy end" of democratic Spain through a joint memorial, but rather that each memory deserves its space -always from a democratic approach. The priorities must be: explain, periodize, identify, dignify and act. And these must be done by separately identifying and addressing the different memories, victims or soldiers there buried and/or the memorial elements. Undoubtedly, the Valley represents the dictatorship and National Catholicism in all its variants and evaluations.

The thousands of bodies

As quoted in the Report of the Experts Committee (commissioned by the Spanish government in 2010), 33.847 people were buried in the Valley of the Fallen, between 1959 and 1983.

Many families were never aware that the remains of their loved ones, whether Republicans or Francoists, had been moved to Cuelgamuros. Some of these families are currently claiming their exhumation and identification. In fact, the Valley became the largest mass grave in Spain. It has been questioned the fact that bodies buried in the Valley of the Fallen can be recovered due to the bad state of the columns and some crypts, with mortuary boxes destroyed by the humidity and filtrations, which results in mountains

of mixed bones. In any case, the administration has an urgent duty to give a dignified burial to these remains, to attend as much as possible to the families that are looking for their remains, to identify all the people buried there and to build a memorial that remembers them. Among other episodes to be addressed later, an interpretation centre should be built in the Valley with the purpose to explain, among others, who are buried there and the struggle of their families to recover their bodies.

Two Projects: Decent treatment of the victims' bodies and the Monument Project

A) *The victims' bodies identification and recovery project must be undertaken by national and international projects and teams with experience in exhumations and other disciplines. The creation of a new memorial for the bodies and a new Memorial Cemetery should be accompanied by a comprehensive research project, including the creation of a Victims Research Centre of the Valley of the Fallen (or Cuelgamuros) (CIVVC) to constantly and permanently give shape, as the "Clinton's Commission" in Bosnia, the work on the huge necropolis represented by the Valley. This will be a difficult and complex task featuring new DNA methods, family interviews, permanent documentary research, etc. This implies a procedural study that would allow to dignify as much as possible the memory and the reparation of: the victims, the Soldiers of the two armies and the prisoners that perished there. All of them. That work should be undertaken by the State by means of such a new public memorial. The second debate would be a focus on the "where". Is the Valley the ideal place for this "Memorial for the Soldiers Victims of the Spanish Civil War? Or should we look for a more appropriate place where to better interpret the "fallen" in the rebel side and the soldiers of the Republican government during the Spanish Civil War and those dead from the causes derived from the war and who were moved there?*

In our opinion, only the political prisoners should only be buried in the Memorial, provided that this could be accomplished in the Civil Cemetery that exists in the Valley and that this is confirmed and allowed by the new intensive research.

Just as it happens in many other memorials and cemeteries around the world, where bodies of soldiers are treated as soldiers. There are plenty of such examples, as the memorial cemeteries of the allies in Normandy and the German cemeteries, also in battlefields or in their own country.

The "skein of victims" must be unravelled through an arduous research work, a modern memorial process, and a greater approach to the history and the characteristics of each case and at a collective level. CIVVC's work and challenge. For all these reasons, the treatment of the Francoist monument, the building and the environment must be done separately from the treatment of the bodies buried and moved there.

B) *The project proposed to be accomplished in the Monument is about the possibility of opening a space of memory. A New Memorial of National-Catholicism in the same Park-Monument. The next step would be a master plan or ambitious action plan on how to create a place of memory, pedagogy, education and citizenship there in the Valley "without the fallen".*

A Valley without the fallen

To begin with, we must make an obligatory reference to the legal aspects not hereby addressed (the abolition of the Foundation or the current Study Centre, the possibility of a new agreement with the Holy See, etc.). An analytical legal document should be drawn up from which new questions can be made and which should be taken into account for a project that considers the resignification and management of the Valley of the Fallen. However, beyond that report, a new project should raise (or rethink) the following sections:

1. The conservation of the place: we support the maintenance of the Valley of the Fallen, including the sculptures group with the aim to explain the atrocity represented by dictatorship and the National Catholic regime. The reinterpretation of the symbols would not mean its elimination, hiding and concealment of Franco's regime, but it would mean a very powerful pedagogical tool. This completely coherent position confronts others who support a partial elimination, either by means of demolition or by means of a natural "wreck" of the place caused by nature and the passing of time. Citizenship and democracy would feel questioned about the guarantee to not repeat it again in case a new significance would be attributed to such a site as the Valley of the Fallen, which would involve a total preservation of the Francoist aesthetic design, but leaving the symbols inside or in a museum. These questions would represent reparation demands towards our society and the relatives of the movement for the recovery of historical memory.

2. These debates should be proposed as a memorial process to include an international tender that would reconsider the space as a whole and that would create a new double memorial around two issues, inherently related although not much mixed: a) the victims of the civil war - place to be determined; and b) the National Catholicism and dictatorship. How to accomplish it? A much wider, executive and detailed project than the present one will address this task.

Enough debates will be held: Should the cross be taken away? Should a "Memento Park" such as that of Budapest be created in the terrace or in the forest complex with all the symbolism of the Valley and the rest of the State?.... Why wouldn't it be possible to create a "Memory Park of the Valley of Cuelgamuros"? There are many options to consider and we believe that a performative and striking action would help to achieve a kind of social catharsis and could result in a new memory of the place for the next generations to come.



Aerial view of the Valley of Cuelgamuros without the cross | Photomontage: Núria Ricart

The international tender should include the following elements:

- *Interdisciplinary*
- *Transnational*
- *Phase of assessment and expert debate*
- *Phase of assessment and social debate -participative-*
- *Performative ideas projects*
- *Collaboration with the CIVVC*
- *Alignment with the reform of the law and with the National Action Plan for Democratic Memory on Francoist symbols and monuments - should there be one.*

To be continued

Should we explain Francoism, National Catholicism and dictatorship to our children? Should democracy create strategies and guarantees to not repeat it again? Can Spanish society face its past and thus be a fairer nation? Can we partly repair the damage and trauma suffered by our ancestors? ... If so, should we act on the monumental and monstrous monuments of the Fallen in Spain? (Fallen of Pamplona and the Valley of the Fallen or Valley of Cuelgamuros). We have noted and collected some ideas and public debates on these commemorative spaces of a dictatorship and a dictator. We therefore propose one or more modern, bold and professional projects to address at a political and public level this subject and act on it. Democracy must propose new places where the nostalgic pilgrimage of fascism is avoided. The present document is only an approach from different prisms and requires a debate and more executive working documents. For this reason our conclusion is a "to be continued...". Our professional position is to act, and act soon in three phases and clear areas:

1. *Stop commemorating the dictator and his associates in monuments created by them to perpetuate their own memory. Democracy cannot honour nor commemorate dictators or dictatorships. Moving the two bodies to the private world is a "sine qua non" condition.*

2. *Dealing the Valley as a necropolis. Study of the issue involves war soldiers being buried and transferred to the Valley, either voluntarily or by force. For this reason, we must professionally address this issue, identify the maximum number of remains and dignify the bodies and their families. This process is not simple, but we have teams of experts on this subject and graves with disappeared in Spain and Europe.*

3. *To create a Memorial Park and two Contemporary Memory Centres in Pamplona and Cuelgamuros explaining the dictatorship and National-Catholicism. These places are terrifying, but hold a unique, iconic and symbolic value. These must be places of pedagogical memory that explain how a regime was imposed with violence, and lasted for almost forty years and that occupied the public and private life of more than three generations. New cultural spaces of memory always in process, modern and with some "antennas" or "sub-places" in connection. Our democracy is capable of doing so, and citizens deserve an exemplary and emblematic public democratic memory. Let's not do it for ourselves, let's do it for our children and the memory of citizens and the capacity to transform the uses of the past into public spaces.*

The international spread of state interventionism in history and historical memory

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European Union countries have been developing new systems for managing conflictual pasts, and new uses of history and representations of historical memory have been manifesting themselves. Public policies for legally and normatively framing historical memory are multiplying across Europe. Policies originating from memory-driven issues and causes at a national level are often elevated to an international frame so as to amplify externalization benefits. In Poland, where the representation of the Second World War constitutes a major internal issue, embassies have even been instructed to file lawsuits against foreign media who, either by negligence or deliberately, speak of Polish concentration camps instead of German camps on Polish soil. "It is our duty to contradict myths that are harmful to Poland. If we do not, we Poles will leave ourselves open to future accusations of all kinds of misconduct without knowing the price [my italics] we will have to pay for them" (1).

But it is in France where this net of legal controls is tightest. Its internal and external effects are many. After the Gaysot Law of July 13, 1990, punishing denial of the Shoah (negationism), the French passed the memory law of January 29, 2001, recognizing the 1915 genocide of the Armenians by the Turks—a decision not without diplomatic consequences. The Taubira Law of the same year recognized slavery and the slave trade as a crime against humanity, opening up a new space for what may be called historicizing actions, including lawsuits, between France and its former colonies. Not to mention the majority decision of French members of the Parliament (MEPs) to inscribe a mention of the beneficial—

Most recent work by the author: La Pologne au Coeur de l'Europe, de 1914 à nos jours, histoire politique et conflits de mémoire, Paris, Buchet Chastel, 2015; expanded translated version in Polish, Cracow, Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2017.

"civilizing"—effects of French colonialism (Law of February 25, 2005, Article 4). In response to this development, professional historians in France organized into more or less activist associations opposed to the abusive use of history and memory or in favor of free historical inquiry and opposed to state interference in academic study. The French also called upon the international history profession for support in the form of a petition drafted by a number of historians at a meeting at Sciences Po on December 10, 2005, in response to the lawsuit filed against French historian Olivier Pétré-Grenouilleau, who, in his book on the African slave trade, refused to call it genocide. This is the problem of the Taubira's lawsuit which considered the slave trade of Africans by Europeans to be a crime against humanity and by this way have included the comparison with Shoah phenomena.

For Olivier Pétré-Grenouilleau the slave trade did not qualify as a genocide, since it did not have as its aim the destruction of slaves. Instead slaves were seen and portrayed as economic goods represented merely in terms of commercial value. He insisted on demonstrating that the Shoah and slave trade were very different processes. A thousand historians signed the petition, which became the founding act of the "Liberté pour l'histoire" Association, presided over by René Rémond until his death and subsequently succeeded by Pierre Nora. As Nora explained it, the aim of amassing historian signatories, was to "recall that history is neither a religion or a type of morality; that it cannot be a slave to current events or be written as memory would dictate; that state policy is not history's policy" (Pierre Nora and Françoise Chandernagor, Liberté pour l'histoire, Paris, CNRS Éditions, 2008, p. 7).

Lyon Armenian Genocide Memorial was erected in 2006 in central Lyon, France. It was designed by Leonardo Basmadyian and includes 36 white concrete pieces supported by stones from Armenia. Poems of Kostan Zarian are written on the concrete pieces | EUROM

Pierre Nora | Picture: LPLT [CC BY-SA 3.0 or GFDL

The internationalization of memory-driven causes goes hand in hand with an increase in the number of institutional arrangements for bringing about reconciliation and rapprochement, and at a more general level, with the development of a grammar of norms and rules for managing post-conflict situations. Arrangements and grammar cannot be dissociated from normative memory-driven issues and policies.

The internationalization of memory-driven causes goes hand in hand with an increase in the number of institutional arrangements for bringing about reconciliation and rapprochement, and at a more general level, with the development of a grammar of norms and rules for managing post-conflict situations. Arrangements and grammar cannot be dissociated from normative memory-driven issues and policies. Their number, and the variety of situations they treat and solutions they propose are well known: for example, how to exit armed conflicts (former Yugoslavia, Northern Ireland), authoritarian and/or segregationist regimes (South Africa, Central America, southern Europe, central and Eastern Europe), or inherited bilateral conflicts (England/Ireland, Germany/Czech Republic, Germany/Poland, Poland/Ukraine, Italy/Slovenia, Greece/Turkey and others). A heterogeneous set of arrangements have been developed to handle these "painful pasts". They range from Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, bilateral historian commissions, Institutes of Memory in post-communist countries, to professional peacekeeping activities and include specific museographic arrangements and interventions in international institutional arenas such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the EU. This institutional density is sometimes interpreted as proof that history and its memory-driven mediations have been dropped in favour of legal

or administrative regulations outside the national framework (2). I would hypothesize instead that what we are seeing is in fact an intensification of partisan memory games in a context where those responsible for violence, in what were once firmly closed national frameworks, are increasingly likely to be called to legal account and criminalized as those frameworks break apart. It is not only in France that historians have felt the need to oppose state moves to define and manage history, though it is in France that they have organized massively in associations to defend the freedom to practice the profession of historian or to monitor political uses of history and memory. The need for such associations also became clear in another case when the Russian powers-that-be decided they could not leave Russian history to Russian historians, but instead had to keep a close eye on the country's image abroad and counter any efforts to debase it themselves. In May 2009, in response to EU and Council of Europe initiatives to establish a kind of official symbolic equivalency between Stalinism (perhaps communism) and Nazism—the European Parliament had decreed August 23 the "European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism"—then-President Dimitri Medvedev declared that history was an attribute of national "sovereignty". Just before the seventieth anniversary of the German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact and the start of the Second World War, which the EU was preparing to commemorate, Medvedev declared, "You cannot call something black something that is white, you cannot accuse a defender of being an aggressor". This remark was swiftly followed by the founding of the Presidential Commission of the Russian Federation to Counter Attempts to Falsify History to the Detriment of Russia's Interests. A considerable number of Russian historians protested against the pressure they expected the new monitoring authority to exert under the pretense of "tracking down and countering erroneous interpretations of history abroad" and how it would officialise arbitrary political censorship. The fact is that in a growing number of societies the state intrudes massively in the field of history.

Stalin and Ribbentrop after the signature of the Soviet-Nazi German pact. August 23, 1939 | ADN-ZB/Archiv

Should states have the right to dictate laws on memory and interfere in the field of history?

Governing powers everywhere choose historical accounts and memory representations that work in their political favour; they have understood the electoral benefits they stand to gain from "using the dead to govern the living". When the Law and Justice Party (PiS) was in power in Poland for the first time (2005-2007), its governments promoted the concept of "history policies" to justify state interventionism in the interpretation of historical facts—even in foreign countries. As I mentioned earlier, they threw out foreign press organizations who, either out of negligence or deliberately, spoke of Polish concentration camps instead of Nazi camps on Polish soil. In that particular case, Polish indignation is legitimate, but the implication of the Polish state opens a new and frightening perspective on history and memory games. The authorities export their version of national history into international arenas to obtain two types of gains: looking like a hyper-patriot at home compared to their political opponents, and consolidating their geopolitical status outside the country. The only reason these actions are undertaken is the implicit or explicit wager that they will reactivate an emotion-driven national community around a single memorial foundation, and so increase the electoral potential of those who impose norms of historical interpretation. All of this clearly undermines the autonomy of the science of history: judges, police, MPs and diplomats have come to think of themselves as experts on history. Meanwhile, in some countries it is the historians themselves who saw off the branch they are sitting on: exceeding their professional prerogatives, using their scientific legitimacy for political ends. Some of the historians in central and eastern Europe with access to the institutions created to guard the archives of communism—commonly known as Institutes of National Memory—have organized leaks of files fabricated by communist police forces before 1989 to compromise their political adversaries, claiming that the former executioners and their accomplices are deliberately sabotaging "transitional justice".

The fact that electoral strategies of "historicization" have been multiplying throughout the world makes it clear that we need to condemn abusive uses of history for political purposes at a much greater scale than the national one. Obviously, it is in no government's interest to obey academic canons; governments are driven by hopes of political gain. The more a reference to history pays off politically, the more politicians will use it. In this context, laws on memory, which their authors say were formulated to protect historical "truth" or repair past

injustices, produce unexpected, perverse effects: they threaten the freed exercise of the profession of historian, but above all they become a political weapon that takes the form of a monopoly on historical interpretation, and hereby change the rules of democracy. Clearly, then, such laws create more problems than they resolve, opening the way—and a wide way it is—to instrumentalize historical facts and memorial representations of them. Meanwhile, the initial question remains unanswered: How can we simultaneously prevent negationism or purge a criminal past—two phenomena that must be regulated—while ensuring that the dead do not govern the living?

In 2016, Poland's history institute declared that seized documents suggest former president and Solidarity hero Lech Walesa was an informer | Picture: Lech Walesa issues signatures during stakings in Poland, August 31, 1980 | Source: Photo collection Anefo (Dutch National Archives), Wikimedia Commons

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[1]Statement by the Polish MEP Wojciech Roszkowski cited in *"O potrzebie polskiej polityki historycznej" [On the need for Polish historical policy]*, in R. Kostra, T. Merta (eds.), Pamiec i odpowiedzialnosc [Memory and responsibility], Center for conservative political thinking, Cracow and Wroclaw, 2005, p. 125.

[2] See, for example, Alain Finkielkraut, *"La nouvelle immortalité"*, in A. Houziaux (ed.), *La mémoire, pour quoi faire?* Les Éditions de l'Atélier, 2006, pp. 105-111.

European Remembrance Policies

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INTRODUCTION

One of the most powerful tools in welding political identity is to create a collective historical memory, whereby we generally understand this to mean a form of collectively remembering or commemorating the past, whatever concrete form that might have.

Revisiting history and taking up memory in political debate is not only recently gaining ground, but has to a certain extent been indispensable for any political system throughout history, since the present is contextualised – and indeed made sense of – with regard to the past. However, there is an immanent danger of misinterpreting or misrepresenting history in the framework of collective historical memory, and of its becoming a pawn on the chess board of politics. In this context, history may even be deliberately misconstrued to achieve a desired political effect. This is not particularly surprising given that "politics of memory" is always more or less explicitly intended to legitimise – or, alternatively, to challenge – a status quo. This in turn underlines the huge responsibility resting on policy makers with regard to not only the way in which they shape the present and the future, but also deal with the past.

The European political sphere is no exception, with collective historical memory being confronted with a singular framework posing particular challenges.

The arguments expressed here can be found in detail in Prutsch, Markus J. European Historical Memory: Politics, Challenges und Perspectives. Brussels: European Parliament, 2015 (2nd edition).

The challenges posed by a *"European historical memory"*

There are basically three alternative ways of approaching a collective "European memory":

I. Acknowledging both the diversity and similarities in national memory cultures, in line with the European Union's motto: United in diversity, with no further aspirations to create one single European remembrance culture.

II. Encouraging a common European historical memory based on general topoi such as "democracy" or "freedom", yet with an overall non-committal nature.

III. Endorsing a collective European memory based on clearly defined historical landmarks, with a commensurate commitment involved.

It is on this last alternative that recent political initiatives in Europe have mainly focused. Ever since the beginning of post-Second-World-War European integration, attempts have been made and are indeed ongoing to supplement existing national collective identities and memories trans-nationally in order to lend additional legitimacy to the "European project". However, while European "cultural heritage" in its widest sense, the Second World War as the zero hour and trigger of European integration, and the achievements of the integration process themselves were traditional reference points, over the last twenty years the Holocaust on the one hand, twentieth-century totalitarianism (especially National Socialism and Stalinism) on the other have moved centre stage in political attempts to foster a European collective memory.

Given the fact that there seems to be a wide degree of common consensus between the European Parliament, the Commission and the Council regarding the actual reference points of European historical memory, it seems legitimate to talk of an at least rudimentary "remembrance policy of the European Union".

An expression of this basic inter-institutional

Plenary hall of European parliament in Strasbourg, April 16, 2013 | Ikars, Shutterstock.com

Damaged statue of Stalin in the Fallen Monument Park, Moscow | Catenca, Shutterstock.com

convergence on European historical memory is, among others, the Europe for Citizens programme. Originally launched in December 2006 (see Decision No 1904/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council) for the period from 2007 to 2013, this programme established the legal framework to support a wide range of activities and events promoting active citizenship in Europe. Among the key objectives of the programme was to "develop a sense of European identity, based on common values, history and culture" (Article 1 para. 2 letter b). Due to the programme's success, a new edition of Europe for Citizens was agreed upon in April 2014 for the timeframe 2014-2020 and with an overall budget of 185.5 million EUR (Council Regulation (EU) No 390/2014). Among other things, this new edition aims to strengthen – also financially – those elements of the programme aimed at the formation of a pan-European historical consciousness. The core objective is to finance projects that "raise awareness of remembrance, the common history and values of the Union and the Union's aim, namely to promote peace, the values of the Union and the well-being of its peoples" (Article 2 letter a).

Despite the political will to foster a collective historical memory at European level not just by words and declarations of intent, but also concrete initiatives, the remembrance policy of the European Union is not lacking in tensions and conflicts, and is faced with a series of immanent dilemmas. These are essentially threefold:

a) Parallelism of partly competing memory frames, namely that of the "uniqueness of the Holocaust", which has shaped Western European Post-War culture, and that of "National Socialism and Stalinism as equally evil", mainly reflecting Eastern European nations' dominant historical experience in the twentieth century and their need to come to terms with their respective communist pasts;

b) Promotion of a teleological-reductionist understanding of history, in that the focus on twentieth-century totalitarianisms is expediting a "negative foundation myth" of the EU that makes European history appear to be essentially a post-1918 phenomenon, hereby neglecting other epochs and experiences such as colonialism and imperialism.

c) Absence of incentives to critically come to terms with the past at the national level, particularly in view of the fact that European political initiatives so far have not necessarily fostered critical debates on commonly held stereotypes and "sacred cows" of national history, and that reconciliation work t at the European level is all too often seen as the task of the "other" rather than a shared collective responsibility .

With these dilemmas in mind, what are the prospects for constructing future European remembrance policies?

Prospects of European remembrance policies: from ***"remembrance culture"*** to a ***"culture of remembering"***

There are clearly limits to how much can be achieved in any efforts taken to collectivise historical memory, particularly in the European context. There are difficulties inherent in trying to reduce the plurality of existing remembrance cultures – be they national or regional – to a common denominator. Additionally, there is a divergence between reference points in history such as the Holocaust being declared fixed and quasi universal on the one hand, the shift in dynamics and priorities of remembrance resulting from the alternation of generations on the other. What can be said with certainty is that a remembrance culture that is unable to maintain a link between the experiences of individual citizens and the official interpretation of political institutions is not sustainable long term. This is what future political activities at European level cannot avoid taking into account.

Assuming that ultimately the objective of European remembrance policies is to create an informed and resilient historical memory which is also self-critical, turning away from a rigidly defined "remembrance culture" towards a common "culture of remembering" seems a promising approach. This would basically involve encouraging European states to become actively committed in "coming to terms with" or rather "reworking" their own past: a term better suited to describe an open process of societal and political work on and with rather a final interpretation of the past. While acknowledging the diversity of individual national histories, the cornerstone for such an endeavour could be commonly shared European principles and universalised practices. In other words, it would be less about trying to homogenise different collective memories than to Europeanise attitudes and practices in dealing with most diverse pasts. Or to put it in a nutshell: from content to process.

The common European values such a process could be built upon would be human dignity, tolerance, freedom, equality, solidarity and democracy, that is the existing repertoire of core values that has emerged as the heart of European integration and has also found expression in the treaties. In keeping with such values, setting up open discussion forums and developing a cross-over understanding would be at the centre of moving towards a "culture of remembering", thus preparing the ground for successful bi- and multilateral reconciliation efforts. Such an approach implies rejecting any temptation to name, blame and shame the "other", and instead trying to address unpleasant segments of one's own national histories head on and without reservation. In this regard, promising steps have already been taken, such as the rise of "politics of regret" within Europe and beyond, with national political leaders

shouldering historical accountability for the past actions of their own particular country and publicly bearing testimony to this fact. In addition, tackling history in an unbiased way demands the idea of "historical truth" being renounced as an absolute category. Any one single authoritative definition of "the" historical truth is both futile and dangerous, since any such attempt will invariably polarise and create more problems than it could possibly solve.

At the same time, it is worth acknowledging the potential dangers of any attempt to legislate on the past and its remembrance: even if formalised memory law regimes might be driven by the noblest of motives, potential risks and benefits need to be carefully considered. This should by no means be taken as a plea for "whateverism" in dealing with history. However, there appears to be a more encouraging alternative to legally enforcing a certain view of the past or individual historical events, and sanctioning non-compliance: providing a firm auxiliary framework in order to cultivate a critical public. Education policies corresponding to the "culture of remembrance" outlined above are of particular importance in this regard; a culture which cannot be forced on European citizens, but needs to grow organically from personal insight and understanding. Central tasks of such education policies would be:

- **Sensitising the awareness of pupils and students to European diversity both in the past and in the present;**

- **Setting up the framework conditions for the history of a particular country to be viewed and assessed as objectively as possible and in a wider European and global contexts;**

- **Encouraging young European citizens to actively participate in debate and discussion on history, thereby heightening their historical awareness.**

Due to the lack of corresponding competences and for sheer practical considerations it is impossible for the European Union to take on the task of "reworking" the past of its member states. However, the Union is undoubtedly in a position to actively support national efforts in this regard and in doing so help create a culture of remembering. This would seem to do justice to the manifold historical memories in Europe while providing incentives to re-assess and perhaps challenge them within a trans-national framework.

Here, the European Union is not only able to actively encourage member states to become active, but can also resort to existing funding programmes to this end. Among them is the Europe for Citizens

programme, providing financial support for multi-national projects focusing on historical and collective memory, and the Erasmus+ programme, supporting international exchange and study visits, to name just two.

Critical self-reflection about history and historical responsibility at national level could give rise to a truly European reflexive discourse on the history of this continent, with national collective memories eventually contributing to and merging into a European public sphere.

To date, Europe has been primarily concerned with narrating its past ex negativo. While such a negative foundation might provide a strong sense of purpose and help to legitimise the "European project", it is also an unwritten invitation to be politically passive in the present. Only by tackling the past in a self-assured manner, equally able to acknowledge historical accomplishments and admit mistakes of the past without bias and by accepting accountability, will European societies be able to move into the future more confidently.

German Nazi death camp Auschwitz in Poland, arrival of Hungarian Jews, Summer 1944. The image is part of the Auschwitz Album (see here and here, Yad Vashem.) | Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-N0827-318 / CC-BY-SA 3.0

"Citizens' engagement is at the core of the Europe for Citizens programme"

Picture by Johan François
European Commission EACEA

INTERVIEW to Gilles Pelayo

Head of Unit of the programme Europe for Citizens, Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA)

What is the specific role of the Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency?

The European Commission delegates the management of some EU programmes to Executives Agencies (there are 6 of them, all in Brussels). The Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA) is responsible for the management of certain parts of the EU's funding programmes in the fields of education, culture, audiovisual, sport, citizenship and volunteering, including the Europe for Citizens programme.

Within this structure, what are the main aims of the Europe for Citizens programme?

Under the overall aim of bringing the Union closer to citizens, the two general objectives of the Programme are: first, to contribute to citizens' understanding of the Union, its history and diversity; second, to foster European citizenship and to improve conditions for civic and democratic participation at Union level.

In regard to the current socio-political situation (the immigration crisis, the rise of the extreme-right political parties, etc.) can remembrance policies help strengthen values of freedom, democracy and human rights? How?

Indeed our hope is that thanks to the remembrance projects we support with the programme, more EU citizens understand not only the process of European unification since the end of WWII, but more broadly Europe's contemporary history and how it has shaped who we are. It has shaped each of us as individuals given that most European families have been directly impacted by the often tragic events of the last century. And also as citizens because this history explains the price we had to pay to enjoy our current

democratic and civil rights. Putting some of the issues that are on top of the EU political and policy agenda in this wider historical perspective — understanding where we come from collectively— can only help to strengthen the values of freedom, democracy and human rights.

This year the European Commission is discussing the evolution of the programme after 2020; will the new programme increase its resources for remembrance projects?

The Commission has proposed on 30 May a new 'Justice, Rights and Values Fund' for the period 2021-2027. The proposed new programme groups together two current funding programmes, the Rights, Equality and Citizenship programme and the Europe for Citizens programme, in order to bring simplification, mutual reinforcement and increased effectiveness.

The general objective of this new programme is to protect and promote the rights and values enshrined in the EU Treaties and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. This general objective would be achieved through three specific objectives:promoting equality and rights ('Equality and rights' strand); fighting against all forms of violence ('Daphne' strand); and promoting citizen engagement and participation in the life of the Union ('Citizens' engagement and participation strand'), with the focus on increasing citizens' understanding of the Union, its history, cultural heritage and diversity, and promoting exchange and cooperation between citizens of different countries.

The Commission proposes to allocate € 233 million to the 'Citizens engagement and participation strand' (compared with the € 185 million over 2014-2020 for the Europe for Citizens programme). Remembrance projects will be funded under this strand. 409 million € should be allocated to the Equality and rights strand and the Daphne strand.

Will the new programme broad the timeframe for memorial projects giving way to initiatives devoted to other chronologies, such as the colonial legacies for instance?

Like for the current programme, the Commission proposal doesn't go at this level of detail. It only explains that the Fund should increase 'citizens' understanding of the Union, its history, cultural heritage and diversity.' More detailed priorities are then decided in subsequent work programmes adopted by the Commission.

Some voices say that the Europe for Citizens programme -currently under the Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs- can shift to another DG. In that case, could the programme priorities substantially change?

Let's not mix issues here. What matters ultimately are the programme priorities as proposed by the Commission and eventually co-decided by the two branches of the EU legislative authority i.e. the European Parliament and Council. Under the proposed Rights and Values, citizens' engagement and participation is clearly presented as a specific objective of the programme and should focus on increasing citizens' understanding of the Union, its history, cultural heritage and diversity. Then, how the Commission organises its services to manage the said programme comes second —and I would even say is secondary to the extent that the legitimate political institutions will have defined the programme priorities and its budget.

In what extent the Europe for Citizens program promotes social participation through the projects supported by the Agency?

Social participation, citizens' engagement is really at the core of the programme. It is not a 'top-down' institutional communication programme: on the contrary it supports 'bottom-up' grassroots initiatives and projects. This is true for all our actions, and in particular for the remembrance strand: the programme was not conceived to support academic research on the European History — however important this is. It aims at engaging a large number of European citizens on this history, making them discuss, challenge, and 'own' their history.

"The long shadow of the past" in the short light of present

Horst Hoheisel
Artist

Aleida Assmann, who will be awarded the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade together with her husband Jan Assmann this year (14 October 2018), has chosen one of my works (1) as the title image for her book "Shadows of Trauma: Memory and the Politics of Postwar Identity". On 27 January 1997, the German Holocaust Remembrance Day that marks the anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz concentration camp, I projected ARBEIT MACHT FREI [Work sets you free] onto the Brandenburg Gate. After reunification, the reopened Brandenburg Gate became a national symbol for the German people representing unfractured German identity and historical continuity. However, the German people have lived in the shadow of a rupture in civilisation since Auschwitz. Their identity is broken. Along with the Brandenburg Gate, the Holocaust Memorial does not mark a clean break with history. If the Germans celebrate their Brandenburg Gate as a national symbol, they should never forget the other gateways they have also built – the gateways to the concentration camps. In this lighting display, "Die Tore der Deutschen" [The Gateways of the German People"], both gateways fuse into one single image for a night of remembrance and commemoration.

The light of the present could no longer be separated from the shadow of the past.



Horst Hoheisel, Die Tore der Deutschen, 1997, lighting display on the Brandenburg Gate | Horst Hoheisel

A few years before in 1994/95, I submitted the following concept for the competition to design the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe: destroying the Brandenburg Gate, grinding it to dust and scattering the remains onto the proposed memorial site. The site would be covered with granite plates, as are typical on the pavements of Berlin. Would the German people sacrifice their national symbol to be a Holocaust memorial? Would they bear the void of these two places: instead of a national monument to the victims, simply an empty space; instead of an immense field of stelae, an empty accessible site with the pulverised remains of the Brandenburg Gate, the national symbol of the nation of the perpetrators?

It goes without saying that I was eliminated from the competition in the first round of judging. However, the idea prevailed more and more as a radical alternative to all the suggested new memorial structures and attracted international attention. James E. Young wrote: "Rather than commemorating the destruction of a people with yet another constructed edifice, Hoheisel would mark destruction with destruction. Rather than filling in the void left by a murdered people with a positive form, the artist would carve out an empty space in Berlin by which to recall a now absent people" (2). The idea of grinding the Brandenburg Gate to dust as the Holocaust Memorial has spread like a rumour to reach present-day city tours. Guides in tour buses passing the Brandenburg Gate explain that a "crazy artist" once wanted to demolish it and spread its remains on the site where the Field of Stelae currently stands as the Holocaust Memorial.



Horst Hoheisel, 1993/94, proposal for the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe | Picture: Horst Hoheisel

There is a hierarchy of memorials in Berlin. For instance, the Field of Stelae for the Murdered Jews of Europe by Peter Eisenman, the largest and most expensive memorial. However, the effects of the elements are now breaking up the memorial, because no reinforcement was put in place when casting the dark-grey stelae, which were built hollow with thin walls. It's starting to break up and many stelae are only held together by steel bands.

A Holocaust Memorial that is destroying itself! A symbolic problem of the German people?
Closer to the Reichstag but much smaller than the Field of Stelae lies Dani Karavan's Memorial to the Sinti and Roma Victims of National Socialism, constructed much later. In Tiergarten, not far from the Field of Stelae and closer to a stele in formal terms, Elmgreen & Dragset have created the Memorial to Homosexuals Persecuted Under National Socialism, which is smaller than the memorial for the Sinti and Roma victims. However, there is a group of victims that has been forgotten in this succession of memorials established in the German capital: the first victims of the Holocaust. The Nazis used them to put to the test mass murder carried out with gas. It started at the onset of the war in 1939 in Posen/Poznán, my place of birth, and was carried out in 1940/1941 in secret as what was known as a T4 action in six death camps in Germany. The Holocaust began with the murder of mentally ill and disabled people, who were considered "unfit to live" by race ideology.

Over 300,000 people were initially murdered in the gas chambers, then through medication or starvation. These victims had no advocacy group. They were forgotten, and their murder was often kept secret even in their families. To this day, there is still a taboo surrounding mental illnesses.

The victims of ***"euthanasia"*** are the Holocaust's forgotten victims.

There has only been a memorial for them in Berlin since autumn 2014, marking the site of the former mansion in Tiergartenstraße 4 where the mass murder of mentally ill and disabled people was planned, carried out and organised. After the war, West Berlin built on this exact spot the Berlin Philharmonic concert hall by the famous architect





Images: Horst Hoheisel & Andreas Knitz, 2012, proposal for the Memorial for the Victims of National Socialist "Euthanasia" Killings

Hans Scharoon. The site of the greatest crime against humanity was built over with the most beautiful architecture for classical music directed by the world's most important conductors.

Should music make us forget crime?

Together with Andreas Knitz, with whom I have collaborated for over twenty years, I participated in the competition for the Memorial for the Victims of National Socialist "Euthanasia" Killings with the following proposal.

We didn't want to create a new memorial for the very first victims of the Holocaust. There was already Peter Eisenman's Field of Stelae. We wanted to take six stelae from this memorial, since the Nazis murdered sick and disabled people in gas chambers in six places.

We wanted to mark the empty spaces in the Field of Stelae with the names of these places (Hadamar, Grafeneck, Brandenburg, Pirna-Sonnenstein, Hartheim and Bernburg). We intended to mark the plot of the former mansion at Tiergartenstraße 4 and raise awareness of the overlap of the plots of the T4 mansion and the Philharmonic. One of the stelae would have recalled the site of the killing of the sick in the foyer of the Philharmonic, thereby to some extent dedicating the concerts there to the 300,000 victims of the "euthanasia" killings. Of course though, the Holocaust Memorial is untouchable and the stunning architecture of the Philharmonic is listed as a protected monument. Although we did receive a prize of recognition from the jury, the realisation of the idea was unthinkable. Manfred Schneckenburger, who curated documenta 6 and 8, once said to me regarding my memorial ideas: "Don't be surprised that your works are so often eliminated from competitions. You build repudiation into your own designs!"

However, together with Andreas Knitz I did win

another competition by the Die Weißenau Centre of Psychiatry in Ravensburg a few years earlier (2006) for a memorial to the victims of "euthanasia".

A memorial bus permanently blocks the old gates of the former sanatorium Ravensburg-Weißenau, a departure point for buses to the extermination camp Grafeneck. A second identical grey memorial bus changes its location both along the administrative channels of the "T4 programme" and the historical routes of the "death buses". This work isn't just a memorial to the victims of "euthanasia", but also reflects the act and perpetrators by using the grey buses, the tools of the perpetrators, as a mode of transport of remembrance, to some extent as a vehicle of history. Transporting the 70-tonne buses is transporting suppressed history. Moving the memorial plays an important role here. Similar to our memory, this symbol of remembrance in the form of the grey bus comes and goes; just as in the present, in day-to-day life, issues that are suppressed and made taboo always suddenly reemerge and then disappear. Memory is a process. It creates images, forgets them, changes constantly and is forever in motion. Memory and suppression are also central themes in psychiatry. The bus follows the administrative channels of the "euthanasia" killings, marking places of the deed, of the victims and of the perpetrators, then leaving again. The second remains at its respective site for as long as initiatives and municipalities agree amongst themselves. Transport is financed by donations and public funding. What's crucial is that the memorial remains in motion. It is an open process, at the end of which the question remains: if nobody wishes to borrow the memorial and the grey bus stops where it is, does memory then also stop? The 75-tonne memorial distributed over three flat-bed lorries is still moving from place to place. It has since been at 20 locations and covered almost 8,000 km. One important location was the Philharmonic in Berlin. The Monument of the Grey Buses stood there for a year in 2008 and marked the spot where the memorial for the forgotten first victims of the Holocaust was finally installed in 2014.

I haven't just done artistic work on the German past, but also on the military dictatorships in Latin America and Cambodia, as well as Franco's dictatorship in Spain, where I tried to work more as a catalyst to initiate the process of remembrance. In Spain, I was also asked for advice on how to deal with monuments from Franco's dictatorship. For the Monumento a los Caídos in Pamplona, I suggested breaking it up architectonically and converting it into a museum and place of discussion regarding the Civil War. Indeed, there is still no national museum in Spain about the Civil War. However, it was now decided to completely demolish it.

We can tear down monuments, but history cannot be torn away; we must see the past before our own eyes and within ourselves, since it is part of our life.

The Monument of the Grey Buses stood at the Philarmonic of Berlin (top picture) for a year in 2008 and marked the spot where the memorial for the forgotten first victims of the Holocaust was finally installed in 2014. Bellow: Alte Pforte and Denkmal.| Horst Hoheisel

Daniel Libeskind, Military History Museum Dresden. | Thomas Bachler

Monumento a los Caídos, Pamplona | Horst Hoheisel

In Berlin, politicians have also demolished the Palace of the Republic and rebuilt a backdrop of the old city castle. The "imperial past" is to make us forget the site of the "communist past". Daniel Libeskind's extension to the Military History Museum in Dresden is a good example of how a historical site can be broken up in a contemporary manner.

To conclude, some experiences that I have accumulated during my more than thirty years of work on art and remembrance.

I was born in 1944 and grew up under the "long shadow of the past" with the profound silence of our parents. Through the medium of art, I prised open the family silence. My work more and more powerfully developed from commemorating the victims to confronting the perpetrators. This is the German legacy. Through my work, I hope to emerge from the long shadow of the past into the short light of the present and free myself from the darkness. However, the past still holds me captive. Each generation recreates its own past from its present. The past is an endless stratification of many different images. We only retrieve those that fit with our present. Such is the case with memorials too. They always say more about us and our time, our art and style than exposing the past. This is gone and all the images that we make of the past and form into monuments no longer reach it. Everything that I as an artist do regarding monuments is incorrect. I simply have the chance to do it more or less incorrectly. Would the right thing thus be to no longer make any monuments?

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Can memorials heal the wounds?

Ana Milošević
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Leuven International and European
Studies (LINES)

In 2014, the Swedish artist Jonas Dahlberg won a competition for a memorial to the victims of the Utøya massacre. The project, called Memory wound, aimed to cut an island into half to symbolise the death of 77 persons killed during the 2011 Norway attacks. But controversy beset Dahlberg's proposal. Environmentally-friendly Norwegians opposed changes in the natural landscape. Local residents — already traumatised by the mass killings, stood against the project. "How we are supposed to heal the profound wounds", they wondered, "with such a constant reminder of the tragedy?"

Perhaps even without knowing it, the Norwegians raised a very important and somehow forgotten question: What is the purpose of memorials? Can memorials help healing of the wounds or do they simply keep them open?

Memorial purpose

For better or for worse, ours is the age of memory.

Over the last three decades, the term "memory" has seen an inflationary dissemination. Some authors even warn of a memorial mania (Doss, 2010) – a sort of pathology of our modern societies. The current upsurge in the (de)construction of memorial sites revolves also around mass production and consumption of memory. On the one hand, we overproduce memory using obsessively memorial language and tools. On the other, we are terrorised by the forgetting (see Rieff, 2016), or better said the absence of memory. Not remembering or wanting to forget is associated with amnesiatic or denial state. Our infatuation with memory and memorials might be the real reason why we do not discuss anymore whether and why to memorialise but rather ponder on how.

How we handle memorialisation often depends on who is directing the process, and importantly what role is assigned to memorials. Differently from the past that celebrated survival, resistance, victories, and heroes, our present is built on monuments that primarily commemorate trauma. The purposes of these memorials are multiple: as a form of symbolic reparations, justice for the victims, acknowledgement, tools for dealing with the past. Memorials are conceived as ethical and political promises of non-recurrence that clearly have a didactic end. They are meant to teach future generations the lessons from the past so that tragedies of the history cannot repeat again.

Bizarrely enough - we know little about memorials as a part of social and personal recovery.

It is unclear whether memorials indeed help to heal the wounds of antagonism and what is their role in the prevention of future violence. The past, after all, has its ways of coming back to life. But what we know for certain is that memorials don't always act as a unifying force for social groups. Sometimes they can also deepen the lines of division and further lacerate the wounds inflicted by tragedy and violence.

Transitional justice experts working in the Balkans, Sri Lanka, Rwanda, or Nepal (just to name some) know this very well. While the global transitional justice fetishizes trials and truth commissions, memorialisation is often used in conflicting ways. To both promote and counter the new knowledge—or truth if you like—about the past. In the post-genocide Rwanda, the government uses the victims as a perpetual public testament to the manner of their death. In Murambi (1) - one of six genocide museums in Rwanda, 848 preserved human corpses remain on view, years after the genocide (see Longman 2017) (1). This macabre testimony of death is not only offensive for the victims, but utterly dehumanising – as it uses the human remains to promote political legitimacy of the current government. More than 20 years after the wars in the Balkans, memorialisation has evolved into an ethno-political instrument for nation-building and virtue signalling – a conspicuous expression of moral values (2). Arguably, it serves to keep the wounds alive rather than to support reconciliation and the healing process (Touquet and Milosevic, 2018).

Grassroot memorial after the Bataclan attacks | Ana Milošević

In these and many other cases, the victims and survivors are used as a political currency. Only rarely do they have a say in the handling of the public memorialisation. As the time goes by the victims and survivors perceive memorialisation as a perpetuation of past conflict and lived trauma. The meanings of their personal tragedies and suffering are appropriated by the collective.

The untold story is that, more often than not, top-down memorialisation fails to meet the expectations of survivors in the aftermath of violence. With their grievances unattended, survivors are often creating alternative memorial spaces that will address their needs. The Monument Quilt, for instance, is one such example. It is a crowd-sourced collection of thousands of stories from survivors of rape and abuse. Using quilts to symbolically stitch their stories together, the victims are creating and using public space to heal after sexual violence. Yet, even when memorialisation is successful – that is accepted, endorsed and practiced by the survivors, it still represents only one segment of a much broader process of addressing their needs (health and care, support, poverty, reparations).

In Western societies, grassroots memorialisation has now become a socially accepted practice of mourning in a public space.

Memorial at the Maelbeek metro station in Brussels | Ana Milošević

Kihei, US Memorials | Ana Milošević

Therapeutic memorials

The proliferation of memorials in recent decades is arguably the result of an impetus to mend history and its aches, to bear witness to the suffering and tragedy. Forgotten or marginalised histories are recovered. Memorials are erected to the victims of the past as a retroactive token of recognition. Yet, not only the tragedies of the past linger in our political present. Terrorist attacks, natural and man-made disasters, are forcing us to rethink how we remember and what purposes we assign to memorials.

In Western societies, grassroots memorialisation has now become a socially accepted practice of mourning in a public space. Grassroots memorials are objects which serve as a focus for memory of something (an event) or someone (a person who has died). Usually they mark an untimely death and can be found in the streets, hospitals, parks, schoolyards. Numerous memorials have been created worldwide to commemorate the terrorist attacks. From 9/11 to the Toronto attacks, society itself has taken the role of a memory actor. Memorialisation is used to express solidarity and closeness, to mourn and grieve. Grassroots memorialisation, therefore, is directed towards survivors and those who perished, but also towards the society itself—seen as a victim of a collective tragedy.

Seen how widespread grassroots memorialisation is, it clearly matters to a lot of people. To the survivors, these memorials and their accompanying commemorative activism provide a certain comfort, as they demonstrate social empathy and solidarity, closeness and understanding. But the main purpose of these memorials is to address therapeutic needs of their makers – individuals and communities. In the aftermath of violence, memorialisation in a public space helps shell shocked populations to process the impact of unexpected loss and violence (see Truc 2018). As such, memorialisation helps to restore shaken bonds in the community and reassures one's sense of security.

Yet, some people find grassroots memorials disturbing, and even false. When the tributes placed at site start deteriorating they are an eyesore for the community. Usually this is one of the main reasons to start the dismantlement of a memorial. In Nice (France) after the lorry attack on Promenade des Anglais some of the mourners used the memorial to express anger and frustration. They were spitting at the place where the attacker was shot. In Brussels, following the attacks in 2016, a small group of anti-immigrant protesters contested the public outpouring of grief. They demolished tributes accusing the mourners of false and unjustified grief—since they didn't know the victims.

The recent terrorist attacks around Europe, however, have shown that grief transcends the sphere of personal and national. The images and stories of these memorials are replayed countless times through media forging communities around crises. Individuals and communities that did not suffer a loss have used memorialisation to express their closeness. It is through solidarity in grief that many grassroots monuments have been created in the cities and countries around the world. To remember the victims of Berlin attacks or London bombings, national landmarks such as Burj Khalifa in UEA or Tour Eiffel lit in colours of Germany and UK. Flowers and candles were left at the doorsteps of the British, Canadian or French embassies.

Graffiti in the street of the Charlie Hebdo office in Paris | PIctures: Ana Milošević

Memorial plaque at the Bataclan theatre | Ana Milošević

Limits of remembrance

What lessons can we take from these cases? Do memorials and memorialisation support personal and societal recovery?

Over the last two years, I have been studying societal reactions in the aftermath of the Brussels terrorist attacks. On 22 March 2016, two separate bombings occurred: one at the airport and other in the Maelbeek metro station. Following the tragedy in Brussels many memorials have emerged to commemorate 32 lost lives, and more than 300 persons that were injured (Milošević 2018).

Differently from grassroots memorials that attract very large numbers of people, permanent memorials and annual commemorations don't have the same emotional resonance. On the first anniversary of the attacks in Paris (2015) officials unveiled small plaques at each of the three bombing sites. One year after the attacks on the London bridge, the Tree of Healing was planted. In Brussels, a permanent memorial was created by the government at the Schuman Square.

In all of these cases, annual commemorative ceremonies followed the same script. Minutes of silence were marked, names of the victims read, wreaths laid. No political speeches were delivered on the day of commemoration, and no references to the causes of violence made. This is understandable seen how polarising and difficult the issue of terrorism and security has been. But the criticism of the victims' families and survivors that emerged in response to top-down memorialisation of the terrorist attacks is also similar across the EU. They see a strong contrast between societal and political remembrance and want to contribute to the process of distilling the meanings and values from the tragic event and shaping the knowledge about the terrorist attacks.

In Belgium, a number of issues have been raised by the victims' families, associations and survivors. On the one hand, the process of determining the memorial in Brussels has proven to be very divisive as it is its resolute, memorial itself. The survivors and the victims' families, as well as some of the associations that represent them, have put forward their own views on the process. They wish to have a proactive role in the overall memorialisation process, from monument making to commemorations organising - instead of being simply the object of remembrance. This message comes across different interviews I have conducted between 2016 and 2018 with survivors from the Zaventem and Maelbeek bombings sites in Brussels.

The planning of a permanent memorial was plagued by conflicts. Massive consultations on remembrance included all levels of Belgium (very complex) government. It resulted with a plan for a memorial for all the victims of terrorist attacks (not only of the attacks in Brussels) to "allow the relatives of the victims, survivors and citizens to gather and remember." A call for proposals was launched already six months after the attacks and a monument ordered for a sum of 100.000 euro. Many survivors and local residents questioned the decisions of the Government, namely the cost and location of the monument. Belgian decision-makers opted to install the monument in the European Quarter, thus far from the actual places of tragedy (Zaventem airport and Maelbeek metro station) and certainly not in the city centre that emerged as a symbol of post-attacks remembrance.

The unveiling of the monument at Schuman Square was another moment of division and delusion for some of the survivors in Brussels. Besides its questionable aesthetics (de gustibus non disputandum est), the survivors were disappointed because the names of the victims were not engraved onto the monument. "It's too neutral, it doesn't communicate and it's clearly not saying what happened and how it happened" – says one of the survivors of the Zaventem bombings. For the victims it is very hard to identify with "impersonal memorial" that offers "no reading of the tragedy." Unveiling of a memorial plaque at the Zaventem Airport and attending the commemoration at the Maelbeek metro were also very emotional moments for the survivors and victims' families. Every return to the site of the crime, even for the reason of commemorating, stirs up very strong feelings that some of the survivors are not ready to relive yet.

Many interviewed survivors don't harbour any illusion that a memorial in Brussels will help the healing process, provide them some closure, or even a sort of relief. Still, they believe that having a memorial is useful to "leave a footprint of these terrible events in history." Yet, overemphasis on memorialisation as a means of symbolic reparation and recognition is overshadowing other more pressing needs and demands of the survivors and victims' families. The issues of reparations, access to medical care and adequate psychological support are some of their key concerns. A young girl that survived the Maelbeek metro attack told me, "commemorations are like a political memorial circus. Everyone is here to remember that day, to hold our hands and take picture. But I have to live with this by the rest of my life. I am reliving that day 365 days per year." The role of politics, in her view, is to acknowledge their tragedy and injustice suffered by providing protection and reparation, taking care of their needs and ensuring security for the community – and to a lesser extent to commemorate.

The monument at Schuman Square in Brussels. The survivors were disappointed because the names of the victims were not engraved onto the monument | Ana Milošević

Do we need memorials or memorials need us?

When an unexpected tragedy strikes individual and communities are shell-shocked. We feel sadness, anger, disbelief and grief – and sometimes all at once. We mourn prematurely severed bond between the dead and the living. The questions about the healing, growth and a path to resilience come only later.

Memorials can provide a place of sanctuary for mourning, but the therapeutic purpose of memorials and remembrance should not be taken for granted. It would seem that, for the survivors of terrorist attacks, memorialisation matters more in the immediate aftermath of a tragedy and violence. It symbolises acknowledgment, societal solidarity, closeness and empathy. It's a sort of a sympathetic hug of a society of strangers. But when candles burn and flowers wither away, political or societal pressure to memorialise must not be forced upon the survivors and their families. Remembrance has its therapeutic limits but in order to succeed it requires that those who are left behind have the ownership of their own grief process.

Whoever suffered a loss or a tragedy, knows well that post-traumatic recovery and coping with loss needs a lot of time. There is no magic formula that can help dealing with the grief and void left by a tragedy. Psychology teaches that a road to healing goes through five stages of grief, the outcome of which is supposed to be acceptance of loss. It means being able to get a hold of the pain and acknowledging the "new" reality in which our dear ones do not reside anymore. Yet, every road to recovery is different: sometimes that road begins with remembrance, and sometimes it will depart from it.

More than a right to remembrance, we must offer to the survivors the right to move forward on the path of healing and recovery.

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The one who sows wind, reaps storms. Validity of the Damnatio memoriae

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Univeristy Complutense of Madrid

A historical note

Madrid was one of the main scenarios of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), which led to one of the longest-running dictatorships of the 20th century (1936-1975), only comparable to that of the Portuguese Salazarist regime (1933-1974). Although the latter lasted even longer, the distinguishing characteristic of the Franco dictatorship is its military character -under the absolute leadership of a General, Francisco Franco - as victors of a war that left a deep mark on the collective popular memory, which still today continues to generate repercussions and a wide impact considerably conflictive.

During the three years and a half that lasted the Spanish Civil War, Madrid presented its own peculiarities: it was the capital of both the front line and of the rear-guard. The city endured the siege of Franco's troops from November 1936 till the end of March 1939, with an extensive battlefront surrounding the Manzanares River and the University City on the north, west and south sides of the capital. Literally, some streets in Madrid ended up in front trenches under the effect of continuous bombings. Madrid was the first European capital city to suffer aerial bombings - already in the summer of 1936 - as an experiment part of the classic "total war" during the 20th century put into practice during the Second World War. The land bombings carried out from the nearby artillery positions of the rebels caused, in addition to a high mortality rate still to be properly quantified, the systematic demolition of its streets and buildings. There were other consequences brought by the war and etched in the memory of the people of Madrid: hunger, hardship, ration books, etc. shattered lives, in short, and the trace of horror and scarcity in the popular memory.

However, Madrid was not only the capital of the front line, the "Heroic Madrid" was praised by the political organizations that participated in the resistance against the rebels who were militarily supported by the German Nazi and Italian fascist regimes, as a consequence of which it won a worldwide repercussion for the anti-fascist cause. Madrid was also the capital of the rear-guard; in this city took place a kind of social "revolution" since the moment different working and anti fascist organisations (trade unions with socialist, communist and libertarian ideologies) obtained important share of the political power in the city through a committed defence during the second half of 1936 and part of 1937. This process was only possible thanks to the particularly dramatic conditions of the summer and, above all, the autumn of 1936, with the enemy at the gates of the city and the Republican government fleeing to Valencia. This revolutionary dynamic lasted well into 1937 and generated a repressive process against all those people who were branded as enemies or "hostile" to the Republic, according to different popular committees with a particularly strong position in the working class districts of the suburbs. As a result, thousands of people were killed according to different models. During the summer of 1936 most of the murders were committed by different popular committees with a relative autonomy; however, between October and December of the same year, a series of committees and parties - with representation in the formal structures of government - designed and executed a secret and never-recognized plan for the murdering of thousands of alleged "hostile" people. This systematic plan of murdering claimed the lives of around two thousand men according to the most rigorous studies, extra-judicially executed around the nearby towns of Aravaca, Paracuellos and Torrejón de Ardoz. The form used and the premeditated nature of the massacre, i.e. prisoners were get out under pretext of their transfer to Valencia and their execution on the edge of the gutter at the outskirts of the capital, also left a deep mark on the popular memory of the city's middle and upper classes, especially in those neighbourhoods in the centre surrounded by the working class suburbs. The "slaughter of Paracuellos" would thus become an important part of the memory built by the victors in 1939 as one of the main atrocities carried out by the "Red Madrid".

Detail: Annual acts of homage to the people shot in the walls of the East Cemetery of Madrid | www.memoriaylibertad.org.



Emergency summarily number 103370.
Historical Archive of Defense.

Apologia memoriae and repression

April 1, 1939, is the official date of the victory over the legally constituted authorities of the Republic, and from this date on, the new military regime was almost obsessively engaged in building a whole "memorial policy" with the aim of justifying and legitimizing the military "uprising" and its triumph after the three years of war, sanctioned, by the way, as a "Crusade" by the Catholic Church. In the case of Madrid, the "victims of the red barbarism" were remembered and praised. Their corpses were exhumed from ditches and ossuaries to be buried in dignified tombs for payment, at the expense of the public funds. As for their names, they have since appeared in witness books, in school textbooks of several generations, in stone monuments, on bronze plaques and on the crosses installed on the walls of so many churches in the Spanish territory, thus physically and symbolically shaping the tenacious account of the "Fallen for God and for Spain".

Furthermore, these names were stamped on the plaques of the streets of thousands of towns and cities for everyone's information, beginning with the capital city where there are still a good number of them.

It is dramatically remarkable that this process of memorial exaltation, particularly speaking of the cemetery in Madrid, took place at the same time that a systematic physical elimination of the defeated in the same space. Between April 1939 and early February 1944, almost three thousand people were executed by firing squad in the vicinity of the Almudena cemetery and buried there in cheap, emergency graves, the so-called "charity graves". In a formally occupied city, and a country in a state of war until 1948, General Franco's military dictatorship tried hundreds of thousands of people throughout the country in court-martials or emergency military summary trials, imposing all kinds of prison sentences and, of course, death by firing squad or "garrote vil",

Fotografía de Valentín Sanz.
www.quieneseran.blogspot.com

the traditional and infamous Spanish death penalty. These court-martials were initiated exclusively by military personnel, on the basis of accusations and denunciations that were largely based only on rumours or on negative reports of conduct drawn up by the victors. The real chances of defence for the accused were slim and there was no judicial guarantee at all during the trials.

As a result, 2,937 people were executed in Madrid during this period. Most of their relatives could not even recover the bodies to bury them in an appropriate tomb: only about four hundred managed to escape the fate of the common ossuary of the cemetery, upon the prescription of the ten years in the charity tomb. Those who succeeded in doing so, after the corresponding request to the military authority, could only perform the religious service and burial "in the strictest privacy", and "without any ostentation nor ceremony". However, this situation only affected the bodies, so... What about the names? In the families of the defeated, the memory of what happened had to survive hidden, when it was not lost in oblivion. More than eighty years after the murder, some families were still unaware that their relative had been executed in the post-war period, and not during the war at the hands of the "red army". Shifting the focus from the family memory to the historical record, during the dictatorship it was not possible to count the number of victims executed in the vicinity of the Madrid cemetery, but this situation persisted during the following decades, even during the democracy. Researches and relatives did not have any access to the documentation, in the custody of the Army also responsible for the courts-martial, until well into the nineties. It was not until 1997 when it was possible to perform the first study on the victims, carried out mainly thanks to the consultation of the cemetery documentation.

Validity of the Damnatio memoriae

Only in 2018, on the initiative of the Office on Human Rights and Memory of the Madrid City Council, which commissioned a list of victims to a team of historians by consulting the records of the cemetery - which was closed again to researchers since the end of the 1990s-, it has been possible to publish an exhaustive list of the people executed in Madrid during the immediate post-war period: the 2,937 persons mentioned, including 80 women (1). The ultimate goal of this list from the beginning was to build a memorial monument in the cemetery area "in memory of the victims of Franco's violence", where all the names would be included (2). It would be easy to think that this was a praiseworthy legitimation, immune to any questioning, especially in view of the "deficit" of memory regarding the Franco repression that has characterised the municipality of Madrid for decades. A city which still has to fight against political forces and even judges to assert its decision to rename its streets. Let's not forget that the names of well-known generals of the 1936 uprising are now displayed in many streets of the capital.

And yet, even today, some relevant voices have a position against the memorial to include the names of those 2,937 people even when they are part for example of the Historical Memory Commissioner created nearly a year ago by the Madrid City Council. Their recommendation was based on the fact that this list allegedly included the names of agents of the political violence committed during the civil war in Madrid, calling them "chequistas": a name that is as inaccurate as infamous and constantly used during the dictatorship. In mid-June 2018, the Commissioner concluded his advisory work with the City Council in terms of policy memory, but not before some of its members - i.e. The writer Andrés Trapiello, proposed by the regional political party Ciudadanos, expressed their criticism on the decision, approved in the plenary session (3), to include all the names of the people executed in the projected memorial monument of the cemetery (4). The argument used by Ciudadanos and the Popular Party is that sectarianism has prevailed over dialogue, suggesting their position would be the most objective and equidistant, as an opinion sanctioned by the historians present at the Commissioner, who, more or less tacitly, would have shared it.

In fact, as noted elsewhere in the heat of the controversy (5), the presence of these names in the memorial was a result of two situations: the decision approved months ago by that same Commissioner (somewhat forgetful of what approved by himself) and a flawless logic about the recognition of a group of victims homogeneous and perfectly differentiated from the historical point of view: the people executed after the trials which took place during the post-war in the Franco's dictatorship. An evaluation of the reasons that brought to each execution would have been like submitting them to a new trial by supporting and therefore validating a few irregular procedures given the lack of any legal guarantee whatsoever in their military processes. The solution suggested by some of the members of the Commissioner when proposing an anonymous memorial would have resulted in an anonymous memorial instead of a place to remember, by keeping in the oblivion the whole group of victims of the immediate post-war period, something that would be impossible at a technical level. A memorial without names for these victims would have an effect opposed to a memorial, a forgetful memorial of the victims of the Franco's regime in the city of Madrid.

This hypothetical memorial of erased names would also have been an affront to the relatives of those victims, who for almost twenty years have been fighting for the recognition of this episode through the group Memoria y Libertad, and for the full names of their relatives to be engraved in stone or bronze. At a practical level, it would have implied a new twist to the policy of damnatio memoriae prevailing in the dictatorship, also representing

an affront regarding the other victims' names – those resulted from the Republican violence of 1936 constantly reproduced and engraved on monuments, plaques and streets. Some attitudes have not changed, and insisting on a large time span ranging from the Franco regime to the democracy of 2018, keep judging and erasing, instead of understanding or honouring. All of this highlights once again the current political conflicts and the attribution of new significances in the world of politics of memory.

Expediente procesal de Celestino García Moreno

Natural de Morata Tajuña provincia de Madrid
vecino de morata provincia de id
hijo de Celestino y de Pilar
edad 27 profesión labrador
instrucción no tiene religión C
estado s hijos — núm. de ellos
antecedentes no ingresa por vez
Domiciliado Cuevas de la cuesta Arganda, 26 - Morata

SEÑAS PARTICULARES
COLOR DE
Iris (ojos)
Cabello
Piel
Cejas
Nariz
Boca
Barba
Cara
Talla

Fórmula dactiloscópica —

SEÑAS PARTICULARES
17/96

Pulgar derecho

The penitentiary file of Celestino García Moreno, peasant of Morata de Tajuña, shot on June 14, 1939, in the walls of the East Madrid cemetery | quieneseran.blogspot.com

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(1) The list can be found at https://www.madrid.es/portales/munimadrid/es/Inicio/Actualidad/Actividades-y-eventos/Listado-cronologico-de-ejecuciones-en-el-Madrid-de-la-posguerra-1939-1944-?vgnextfmt=default&vgnextoid=480c22bc756f1610VgnVCM1000001d4a900aRCRD&vgnextchannel=ca9671ee4a9eb410VgnVCM100000171f5a0aRCRD

(2) "Los represaliados por Franco tendrán un memorial en la Almudena". EL PAÍS, 13/02/2018.

(3) "El Comisionado de la Memoria Histórica se marcha tras el ninguneo de Carmena y Valiente". ABC, 16/06/2018. The decision to raise a memorial with all the names was approved in the municipal plenary session.

(4) The plenary session of 28th February 2018 hold in City Council of Madrid rejected the proposal made by the Popular Party submitted in March to exclude the names of the alleged "chequistas". Nuevatribuna.es, 2/03/2018. www.memoriaylibertad.org.

(5) The plenary session of 28th February 2018 hold in City Council of Madrid rejected the proposal made by the Popular Party submitted in March to exclude the names of the alleged "chequistas".

(6) Nueva Tribuna, 2/03/2018. https://www.nuevatribuna.es/opinion/fernando-hernandez-holgado/carta-abierta-concejal-pedro-corral-historiadores-comisionado-memoria-historica-madrid/20180301204337149190.html

REVIEW

VIDEO

Festives Spaces, 2016

Kristina Norman
Artist

The video Festive Spaces was originally commissioned by Annely Porri for the exhibition Silence. Darkness. – If we know what was, do we know what will come? The show was on display at Tallinn Art Hall in autumn 2016. In the video, I explore how art can be subjected and reassigned by different political regimes.

Festive Spaces(1) is a documentation of a dramatized lecture-performance which I structured around the notion of a festive space and presented as a series of imagination exercises. There are three ceremonial halls that I connect in the piece and which are representative of different ideological regimes of Estonian history. All the three rooms are the most festive spaces in the institutional buildings where they are located, but only two of them are decorated with art. The first one is the main hall of the Estonian History Museum, situated in the historical Maarjamäe castle. As its decoration, it has the largest mural ever painted in Estonia – The Friendship of Nations by Evald Okas (2), one of the most renowned Estonian painters of the Soviet time. Okas painted the mural at the decline of the Soviet era, in 1987. The second room scrutinized in the video is the White Hall in Toompea castle which is the home to Riigikogu, the Parliament of Estonia. There you have two lunette paintings from 1937 - The Triumph of Estonia and Industry and Agriculture by August Jansen (3), an artist on familiar terms with the authoritarian government of the pre-WWII sovereign Estonia . The last of the three rooms I am discussing in the piece is the ceremonial hall of a Russian-language school in Lasnamäe district of Tallinn (4) . As already mentioned, regardless that the hall is supposed to be the most festive space of the institution, it appears to have no decoration at all. In my lecture, I try to bring into view the political significance of these aesthetic circumstances of the three halls.

Frames of Festive Spaces. Single-channel video with sound, 30'. Courtesy of the artist. Video available at vimeo.com/181850865

As the material for this media-critical work I use two pieces of news aired on the national TV, one involves the mural by Okas and the other one the lunette paintings by Jansen. The „picture scandal" (pildiskandaal) broke out in autumn 2014, and concerned a class photograph taken in the hall of the History Museum, as part of an inauguration ritual of first-graders of the Russian-language school of Lasnamäe. According to the National Broadcasting, taking pictures against the background of The Friendship of Nations has an anti-Estonian undertone, as its iconography depicts Soviet symbols and subjects. The second piece of TV-news is from 2013, and is about the decision to restore and put on public display in the Parliament building the two Jansen's paintings representative of the authoritarian regime of the 1930s.

Besides that my artwork is an endeavour in exploring how ideological art takes up new meanings and functions in different historical contexts, it also tries to highlight the inconsistencies in the official historical narrative today, when it comes to the condemnation of the undemocratic regimes that ruled the Estonian nation in the last century. In addition, Festive Spaces is an attempt to show what lies at the other end of the official identity policy, which aims to deny agency to the largest ethnic minority to choose places where to carry out collective rituals that help them to connect with a centuries-long history of the presence of Russian culture in Estonia (5).

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(1) Festive Spaces is based on a site-specific live performance titled Star-Bright Hour (Tähetund) which I gave in the Estonian History Museum in August 2015. The piece was produced by SAAL Biennaal performance art festival. Anneli Porri's curatorial text for Silence. Darkness... can be found here: http://www.kunstihoone.ee/en/events/silence-darkness/

(2) Evald Okas, 1915 – 2011.

(3) August Jansen, 1881 – 1957.

(4) Lasnamäe is a Soviet-era residential area of Tallinn with the largest Russian-speaking community of Estonia.

(5) Long before the castle of Maarjamäe became the History Museum and before Evald Okas painted Soviet symbols on its walls, it was a summer residence of Russian count Orlov-Davydov, 1837-1905.

REVIEW

BOOKS

The Social Life of Memory: Violence, Trauma, and Testimony in Lebanon and Morocco

Tsjalling Wierdsma
University of Amsterdam, Master Student. Fellow at EUROM (2018).

Hariri Memorial | Picture: upyernoz, uploaded by Albert Herring [CC BY 2.0], via Wikimedia Commons



Nikro, Norman Saadi; Hegasy, Sonja (Eds.)

PALGRAVE, 2017

The Social Life of Memory: Violence, Trauma, and Testimony in Lebanon and Morocco, edited by Norman Saadi Nikro and Sonja Hegasy, is part of the larger Palgrave Studies in Cultural Heritage and Conflict Series, which focuses on themes such as heritage and memory of war and conflict, contested heritage, and competing memories. Contributors to the book include Joey Ayoub, Pamela Chrabieh, Brahim El Guabli, Ali Hamdan, Norah Karrouche, and Laura Menin. While the book focuses on the specific contexts of Lebanon and Morocco, in this short review I would like to reflect on some broader memory and heritage issues addressed in the book, while still keeping the particular contexts to which they refer and in which they were addressed in mind.

One of the main thematic parameters of the book concerns the interaction between, and "transformation of private memories into publicly shared memories, according to efforts claiming public acknowledgment and public redress" (2-3). Memory, in the process of this exchange, according to the authors of the book, "is acted on as a transformational site, a milieu, whereby social and political engagement takes place, situating memory as a public event" (3). The book points to an interaction and tension between Nora's famous concept of memory as lieu, as a memorial or other form of formal commemoration, and memory as a milieu. By addressing memory as milieu the book enables a focus on overlooked processes of memory that otherwise might not be classified as such. An example of this is given in Laura Menin's chapter, in which she focuses on the process of waiting experienced by the families of victims of political violence that disappeared during the Years of Lead. Instead of viewing waiting as a purely passive process, she instead views it as a "multifaceted temporality that entails both passivity and proactive engagement" (27). Menin describes how waiting in this context is perceived as an additional state-imposed source of pain, trauma, and loss of agency, but simultaneously brings with it novel political subjectivities

and specific modes of activism where personal memories of violence are re-socialized, made public, and act towards specific political and transformative goals (27).

Chapters such as Ali Nehme Hamdan's, which focuses on the Hariri mosque in Martyrs Square Beirut as a site of memory, highlight the usefulness of the concept milieu for engaging with the everyday "messy stuff of contention" (146). It further allows for a focus on the simultaneously conflicting and collective cultures of memory, without "assuming the centrality of the nation-state to their production" (146), which is necessary in a context such as Lebanon, but also more generally enables a focus that highlights the multiple actors and the ways in which they engage, negotiate, and create sites and spaces of memory. It allows for an engagement with the "many cultures of memory that coexist at any one time" (147), and not just at the level of the nation state. Pamela Chrabieh's chapter, focusing on the war stories of university students in Lebanon belonging to the 1990's generation, adds a generational component to these cultures of memory, and problematizes Hirsch's notion of post-memory, stating that "many memories that were transmitted not only constitute the memories or are part of the *ressouvenir* processes of the new generations in their own right, but also intermingle with other memories to the point of not having clear boundaries" (189). Chrabieh employs Rothberg's concept of multidirectional memory, to enable a generational conception of a malleable discursive space in which groups, their memories, and their positions come into being through dialogical interaction. Similarly, Norah Karrouche's chapter, detailing how local memories of war and violence in the Northern Riff region of Morocco have shaped the agencies and identities of several generations of Berber activists in both Morocco and its diaspora, shows how newer generations of activists can attempt to inscribe themselves into and simultaneously construct larger mythological and symbolic histories of activism. Like Charbieh, Karrouche shows how multiple episodes of violence interact. Karrouche further discusses how these histories of activism can act as mythomoteurs, grand narratives about the specificity of a place in historical and (trans)-national narratives (232-233).

In combination the two chapters however also highlight the large contextual differences in the generational transmission of memories. The interaction and the contradictions between the different chapters is one of the book's largest strengths. Instead of taking away from the individual arguments, these contradictions work to show the many nuances and contradictions attached to institutions, spaces, and milieus of memory, when approached from different levels of analysis and with different focus points.



Law and Memory: Towards Legal Governance of History

Belavusau, Uladzislau; Aleksandra Gliszczyńska-Grabias (Eds.). (2017)

The volume Law and Memory: Towards Legal Governance of History (2017), edited by Uladzislau Belavusau and Aleksandra Gliszczyńska-Grabias, integrates various accounts by both lawyers and non-lawyers and approaches memory laws as a phenomenon of global law and transitional justice. The volume hereby aims to offer an alternative to legal approaches to memory laws, which as the editors contend, often focus on geographically limited laws and judgements. The global approach is further reflected in the four parts of the book, which focus on International Law, European Law (Council of Europe and the European Union), National Perspectives within the European Union, and Perspectives beyond the European Union.

This broad scope of perspectives enables the volume to focus on the ways international, supranational, and national memory laws intersect and interact with each other. Chapters by Klymenko and Carrasco, for example, draw attention to the invocation of European Holocaust denial legislation by legislators in Ukraine and Peru as a means of legitimizing their own, often fundamentally divergent, memory laws. These examples stress not merely the importance of studying memory laws beyond a national perspective, but also the (authoritative) narratives of previous memory laws. Concerning the transnational character of these memory laws, Kahn's chapter titled Banning Genocide Denial – Should Geography Matter? is particularly eye-opening. Kahn questions the nexus argument applied by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the Perinçek case, where the Swiss ban on the denial of the Armenian Genocide was seen as violating the protection of freedom of expression in article 10. The ECHR maintained that there was only a tenuous connection between Switzerland and the Armenian genocide and thus differed from Holocaust bans in states that were involved in the commission of the Nazi horrors. Kahn questions these arguments and asks if it is logical to require a nexus between the state enacting the ban and the historical ban being denied?

These are questions we should consider when discussing the form memory laws should take, especially when taking into account the many misgivings surrounding the concept of memory laws and the various critical questions surrounding their relationship with freedom of expression, academic freedom, and their potential imposition of "truths" on both the past and present. These concerns are highlighted by Cajani, who discusses the objections of historians to the European Union's adoption of the Framework Decision on Combating Certain Forms and Expressions of Racism and Xenophobia by Criminal Law as restricting freedom of expression and academic research, Aksenova who focuses on the performative role played by the International Criminal Tribunal as communicating a certain narrative of historical "truth" and making value judgements about history, and Přibáň who states that Czech memory laws inhibited, instead of opened up, public discussion about the totalitarian past, its impact, and the responsibility of its perpetrators.

All in all, the volume does not argue for the abolishment of memory laws, but raises questions, urging for the necessity to be critical of memory laws and especially their form. By pointing to various non-regulatory measures, the volume at moments begs the question if the punitive format is necessary or even productive, and highlights the necessity to, depending on context, consider alternatives.

PALGRAVE, 2017

REVIEW

EXHIBITION

Travelling memory of the Holocaust "Auschwitz: Not long ago. Not far away"

David González Vázquez,
University of Barcelona, European Observatory on Memories (EUROM)

September 2018, Madrid. The second extension of the Exhibition "Auschwitz: Not long ago. Not far away" becomes official. Originally programmed to be shown from December 2017 to June 2018, it has been extended first until October 2018 and finally until February 2019. Designed by Musealia, a company dedicated to the creation of travelling exhibitions based in Donostia (País Vasco), the exhibition has received 450,000 visitors so far, a remarkable figure.

This is not a typical travelling exhibition because of its subject matter, its size, the specificity of the materials on display, and above all because this is the first time that hundreds of original elements have travelled out of the Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial and Museum to be shown in an exhibition site away from its original place. The Centro de Exposiciones Arte Canal (Canal Art Exhibition Centre), a large space managed by the Regional Government of the Community of Madrid, has been the first site to host the exhibition, from where it should travel to different international cities over the next seven years.

The project execution has requested a strong commitment, with a large investment of resources and the management of a complex international co-production with the participation of several agents across its different phases. A total of 600 original objects, 400 images and 100 stories make up the cast of elements on which is built the museum framework of "Auschwitz: Not long ago. Not far away" Together with the Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial and Museum, other major institutions such as Yad Vashem, the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington and the Wiener Library in London have collaborated, as well as other private collections.

An exhibition that aspires to spread the history of a place as cruelly unique as Auschwitz | Picture: Auschwitz: Not long ago. Not far away

The 2,500 square meters of Arte Canal allow a versatile launching of such an impressive project. More than 25 different areas are part of the exhibition, for which it is recommended to spend between two and three hours on a standard visit. The 25 areas are divided into 4 different storylines: The encounter, Before Auschwitz, Auschwitz, and After of Auschwitz; a structure that allows the visitor to face a journey taking into account all those details needed to globally understand the Holocaust or Shoah.

The museum strategy designs an impressive, well-documented and illustrated exhibition which offers both rigour and emotion with the aim to engage the visitor's empathy. Perhaps, the audio guide is the best way to capture this connection with the visitor and, at the same time, reinforce the relationship between rigour and emotion. In addition to the sound added to the 10 videos shown and the voice of several survivors of the Holocaust that can be heard, the narrative proposed by this classic interpretative tool makes it possible for this exhibition to go beyond its informative reach. In "Auschwitz: Not long ago. Not far away" is not enough to be reliable at a historical and set design level, since the ultimate goal is to also engage the visitors with their deepest feelings. Thus, beyond any historical consideration, the audio guide includes constant references to the stories and memories that are hidden behind each exhibit: a shoe, glasses, a notebook, etc. All of them are no longer inert pieces but imaginary windows that take us back to the tragic reality of the Holocaust.

Although what makes "Auschwitz: Not long ago. Not far away" a unique exhibition is its aspiration to spread the history of a place as cruelly unique as Auschwitz, and to do so, in addition, so many kilometres away from the original place of memory and with a travelling intention. A convincing challenge to which no one has ever aspired to this level before, and which offers a very interesting comparative reading.

Obviously, a travelling exhibition, away from its original place, does not have the authenticity factor of the original place, which does not mean that this initial disadvantage cannot become a real opportunity for improvement. What is lost in authenticity is gained in context, didactic capacity and dignity of the victims to a certain extent. At the Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial and Museum, we know the victims through their absence, being represented by what accompanied them prior to their disappearance. In a way, their memory is reduced to his death. On the other hand, "Auschwitz: Not long ago. Not far away" is free to present the memory of the Holocaust victims in a much broader way. The remains and objects point to death in the original place of memory, while here it is easier to address a discourse of contextualization to help understand as a whole the phenomenon of the Holocaust. In Auschwitz, the objects are presented as evidence of what happened, while in El Canal, in addition to the evidence, there are the elements that make it possible to follow strategies aimed to educate on the Holocaust.

As stated by James Young (1993), nowadays a exhibition in a Holocaust Museum shows the creators' view in alignment with the social and political contexts of the moment. However, this does not mean that the visitor's perception will be neutral, quite the contrary. What we perceive as visitors will also largely rely on who we are at an individual and collective level, and what our priorities are in a particular political, social, cultural or even memorial context.

In this sense, the general perception of the visitor is positive and in line with the approach pursued by the creators of the exhibition. Disseminate to know, and

Pictures: Auschwitz: Not long ago. Not far away

know to understand. Even though there is widespread consensus among visitors about the harshness and discomfort generated by the visit, this is considered as a necessary evil. Piotr Cywinski (2017: 16), director of the Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial and Museum, also points this out when he states that it is healthy the existence of a certain sense of unease when approaching the knowledge of the Holocaust, otherwise it could endanger the conscience of anyone who hopes for a peaceful world.

On the other hand, "Auschwitz: Not long ago. Not far away" aims to bring an improvement of the present through the knowledge of the past. Memory is the contemporary image a society has from its past, consequently, the dissemination of the origins, causes, consequences along with the social, political and cultural influence of the Holocaust can only be considered a useful tool of social pedagogy in the present. The exhibits tell us about stories but also about memories, they tell us about the past but also about the bonds of that past with our present. A generic message is conveyed to the public that places the duty to remember as the existential axis of a democratic society that promotes and respects human rights, something the public perceives as such.

Therefore, by disclosing the past, the exhibition in Madrid has been an exhibition seeking to make an impact on the present, forcing a collective reflection on a horrible event that may not be 100% replicated again, but whose origins were forged in a seed of hatred and intolerance that unfortunately is still very much present today. We must never forget -and this is how the exhibition reminds us- that the Holocaust did not begin with mass murder but with the consolidation of a rhetoric of hatred that ended up being assimilated into that political and social normality within a cultured and advanced society.

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REVIEW

MUSEUM

History museums in the Caucasus. Between soviet nostalgia and current regional disputes

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The region known as the South Caucasus comprises the former Soviet republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. All of them became independent states in 1991 with the fall of the USSR. This territory, stretching south of the Caucasus mountains, represents an important geo-strategic enclave between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, and the powers of Russia, Turkey and Iran. Thus, throughout history, the region has undergone constant invasions that have led to violent conflicts, multiple shifts in borders, and population flows that continue to the present day; episodes that are reflected in the history museums and memorials of these countries.

If we categorise these museums as observers, we could divide them into two groups: those that were created during the Soviet era (with exhibitions updated to a greater or lesser extent), and those of new creation, often with an uninhibited nationalistic discourse. The first group undoubtedly includes the Stalin Museum in Gori (Georgia), his hometown. It was inaugurated in 1957, four years after the Soviet leader's death, and is an imposing two-storey white stone building at the top of a large avenue also bearing the name of Stalin. Just in front of the main entrance is the humble birthplace of the former First Secretary of the Communist Party of the USSR, crowned by a neoclassical structure that ennobles it and protects it from the inclement weather. Inside the museum, the permanent exhibition has remained virtually intact since its creation and is articulated as a complete tribute to Gori's most "illustrious" son, including paintings dedicated to his figure, personal photographs, a vast collection of gifts from leaders of other countries, and even his funeral mask. A tiny room has recently been opened in the gap beneath the main staircases, where a simple art installation refers to Stalin's purges and pays tribute to the victims of the Gulag. According to the English guide, which during the visit also mentions the darkest face of the Stalin, the Georgian Ministry of Culture has a project to reform the museum, although a clear

execution date has not yet been established. The visit ends in the luxurious train carriage in which Stalin travelled to the Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, which was integrated into the museum in 1985. By the way, in the small shop in the hall, you can buy all kinds of objects with Stalin's image: busts, cups, magnets, keyrings, liquor bottles, etc.

On the other hand, in the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, there is the Georgian History Museum, renowned for its important archaeological collection dating from the 3rd century BC onwards. On the fourth floor of the building we can visit the permanent exhibition called "Soviet Occupation", which was opened in 2006 and focuses on the period 1921-1991. As the title suggests, the exhibition offers a critical view of the time when the country was part of the USSR. In the first room, there is a train carriage with numerous bullet holes in which dozens of Georgians who rebelled against the communist regime in 1924 were shot, and hundreds of names of other people who were executed on the orders of Moscow fill de room walls. Other large-format objects, such as prison cell doors, and an extensive collection of archival documents, relate a clear discourse on the "political and cultural oppression during the Soviet era" that the country lived through until independence in 1991 with an important mention of clandestine resistance. At the end of the exhibition there is a large screen with images of the 2008 war between Georgia and Russia for the control of South Ossetia, the region in Georgian territory that self-proclaimed its independence when the USSR disappeared, and now enjoys Moscow's support.

In neighbouring Azerbaijan, we also find museums of the two categories. In Baku, for example, we can visit the National Museum of History, located in a wonderful nineteenth-century mansion in the heart of the Azeri capital. It was first opened in 1920 as the Museum of the History of the Azerbaijani Soviet Republic and is now home to an extensive collection depicting every stage of the country's history. The exhibition has been partially renovated in a humble way, it does not incorporate modern museographic artefacts, but it



The Stalin Museum in his hometown, Gori (Georgia), was inaugurated in 1957, four years after the Soviet leader's death | Picture: Oriol López, EUROM

The Heydar Aliyev Centre, signed by Iraq architect Zaha Hadid, houses the brand-new Heydar Aliyev Museum, in memory of the former leader of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan during the Soviet era, and member of the Politburo of the USSR | Pictures: Oriol López, EUROM

does have texts in Russian and English. Although the story does not show nostalgia for communism, it does not express an open criticism towards Moscow, and the bitterest discourse is reserved for explanations regarding territorial clashes with its Armenian neighbours throughout the 20th century. The museum uses (to the surprise of many foreign visitors, I assume) the term "genocide" to refer to the thousands of Azeri deaths at the hands of the Armenian Soviets between 1918 and 1920 when they occupied Baku. A "genocide" that, according to this exhibition account, would be repeated in 1992 with more deaths among the civilian population of Nagorno-Karabakh, a still disputed territory between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Also in Baku, but at the opposite end in terms of museum facilities, we find the Heydar Aliyev Centre, a true jewel of contemporary architecture signed by Iraq Zaha Hadid. Part of this huge complex houses the brand-new Heydar Aliyev Museum, in memory of the former leader of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan during the Soviet era, and member of the Politburo of the USSR who, above all, is remembered as the national leader of the post-Soviet Azerbaijan, judging by the numerous statues and photographs of him that are all over the country. The permanent exhibition, distributed over three floors, shows Aliyev's life with all kinds of audiovisual resources of the latest generation and follows a completely personalistic discourse. Aliyev is depicted as the leader who led the country to its maximum growth thanks to an economy sustained by trading the oil extracted from the Caspian Sea. Aliyev, declared president in 1993, did not quit the presidency until his death in 2003; he was succeeded by his son Ilham Aliyev in an election that did not meet the necessary transparency according to some international observers, although all this is not mentioned in the exhibition.

We end this trip through the history museums' of the South Caucasus in Yerevan, where the Armenian Genocide Museum and Memorial is located. Nestled on the hill of Tsitsernakaberd, the complex is a mixture of old and new; it has a memorial space opened in 1967 amid the Soviet era, and a museum that was launched in 1995 and renovated in 2015, coinciding with the centenary of the genocide. The permanent exhibition begins with a legalistic definition of the concept "genocide", and goes on to explain the antecedents, development and consequences of the crimes committed at the beginning of the 20th century against the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire by the Young Turks regime. A modern museography, sometimes perhaps too dark, containing undoubtedly crude images of the killing of children and adults, leads the visitor to a state of mourning that may deeply affect his/her spirits. Outside, separated by a wide asphalted promenade, we find the memorial designed in the 1960s, created upon the request of Armenian historians and leaders

to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR. Said request was supported by the demonstrations of thousands of citizens in the streets of Yerevan. Its nucleus is formed by a round base containing an eternal flame where visitors lay flowers, surrounded by twelve slabs of dark stone that symbolise the twelve "lost" provinces of Greater Armenia that are now part of Turkey. The ensemble is crowned by a 40-metre high pinnacle symbolising the rebirth of the Armenian nation; in the background there is the Ararat, the sacred mountain of the Armenian people, which are now also in Turkish territory. Once again, in the Caucasus region, as in so many others, the memory of the conflict transcends the walls of the museum and is projected to the present day.

The Armenian Genocide Museum and Memorial in Yerevan (Armenia) has a memorial space opened in 1967 amid the Soviet era, and a museum that opened in 1995 and was renovated in 2015 | Pictures: Oriol López, EUROM

"Ideology and Terror of the SS" An exhibition about the perpetrators, victims and bystanders in the memorial museum of Wewelsburg

Kirsten John-Stucke
Director of the Kreismuseum Wewelsburg

The Wewelsburg is a Renaissance castle that was built at the beginning of the 17th century on behalf of the Prince Bishops of Paderborn, located 20 km south-west of Paderborn (North Rhine-Westphalia). The castle, in the trusteeship of the district of Paderborn, houses a district museum with two historical departments: the "Historical Museum of the Prince-Bishopric of Paderborn" which presents the history of the region from the beginnings of human settlement to the end of the Prince-Bishopric of Paderborn at the beginning of the 19th century and the "Wewelsburg Remembrance and Memorial Museum 1933-1945," with its permanent exhibition "Ideology and Terror of the SS". This exhibition was redesigned in 2010 and provides extensive information on both the local activities of the Schutzstaffel (SS) in Wewelsburg and the general history of the Schutzstaffel within the NSDAP. Simultaneously, the victims of SS violence in Wewelsburg are commemorated at the location. Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler leased Wewelsburg in 1934 and planned to extend the castle by adding a huge complex of buildings to transform it into a centre of ideology and a location for the SS order's sense of elitist self-affirmation. For the construction work he used prisoners from the concentration camp set up in the village especially for this purpose. Of the approximately 3,900 inmates, at least 1,285 died as a result of inhumane living conditions and abuse by the SS.

Due to its history, Wewelsburg Castle is regarded as being particularly suited for presenting not only the crimes of the SS, but also the varied facets of the ideology and worldview as well as the historical narrative of the criminal organisation of National Socialism. The historic location of Wewelsburg is of particular importance in this regard - historical culture and its mediation cannot be imagined without fixed spatial points. At a time when virtual networks seem to bring places and events in the world closer together, people search

The crypt diplays reconstructions of the memorial cycle by Josef Glahé , first shown in in 1950, and incorporates Expressionist motifs depicting the horrors of war | M. Groppe, 2010, Kreismuseum Wewelsburg

intuitively for such fixed points and a genuine visit to an "authentic" historical site is perceived as being unique. The past becomes both tangible and perceivable at these "original" locations. The historical site of Wewelsburg, circumscribed by the totalitarianism and territory of the SS, is therefore more strongly integrated than before into both the exhibition design and its didactic communication.

The new exhibition was intentionally installed in the underground levels of the listed, former SS guard building on the forecourt of Wewelsburg Castle as this is where the architectural traces of the SS project are particularly prominent. Architecturally-related panels explain the history of this location in the exhibition. Along the castle, outdoor columns in the castle's moat reference the structural modifications carried out by the SS. Visitors reach the North Tower along this route with its "SS Obergruppenführer Hall" and the "Crypt". These are two rooms that were architecturally remodelled by the SS but never put to use. They remained unharmed at the end of the war although the SS carried out extensive detonations. Since the 1990s they have increasingly become a magnet for right-wing extremists and right-wing esoterics who wish to visit Wewelsburg due to its importance as a central meeting place of the SS. Numerous legends and myths are linked to the castle complex as a "sacred" fortress or supposedly secret place of worship. The North Tower therefore needed a special design to prevent any possible element of fascination in connection with this dominant architecture. In the "Crypt", which had been converted by the SS into an enormous Greek domed hall, reconstructions of the memorial cycle of the artist Josef Glahé are displayed, first shown in the crypt in 1950 and incorporating Expressionist motifs depicting the horrors of war. In this way the formerly solemn and highly mythical atmosphere is modified. The SS Obergruppenführer Hall is equipped with colourful bean bags to break up the focus of the architecture from the sunwheel mosaic centrally embedded in the floor. The visitors, sinking into the beanbags, adopt an unfamiliar posture and experience new perspectives. Since the 1990s this specific sunwheel motif has been referred to as the "Black Sun" and functions in right-wing esoteric milieus and extremely right-wing political

"A special feature of this exhibition is the museum concept of largely dispensing with reconstructions and presenting original objects" | Picture: M. Groppe, 2010, Kreismuseum Wewelsburg

circles as a symbol of salvation and recognition, even as a substitute for the forbidden swastika. Here, too, the presumed aura of a supposed cult space had to be eliminated. The exhibition concept is based on the theory that the historical awareness of today's generations of visitors to museums is influenced by the social upheavals and processes of our contemporary globalised world. In more and more areas of life, modern individuals must decide for themselves how they wish to shape their existences and how they desire to confront society and history. The exhibition therefore strives for an open presentation of historical developments and universal values, such as self-determination and human rights, and encourages visitors towards self-reflection. The focus is no longer on a historical narrative but on the micro level, on the diversity of experiences and personal perspectives. This approach attempts to emphasise the fragmentary nature of historical tradition. One principle of the exhibition is multiperspectivity, and this can be particularly experienced in the exhibition's biographical material. Whilst the biographies of members of the SS are presented at the beginning of the exhibition tour, former concentration camp inmates subsequently become the focus of the exhibition. At the same time, the subjective perceptions of the village population of Wewelsburg are documented; it becomes clear that the story is composed of narratives remembered and experienced in different ways. The display exponents and drawer cabinets themselves are also multifunctional: they function as carriers of the exhibition texts and the photo and document reproductions as well as places of storage for the original objects and documents. The exhibits in the first exhibition space are arranged in strict formation but are presented in the following rooms according to a modular principle and their specific themes. The network of information does not provide a complete picture of history but encourages visitors to interpret the story themselves.

A special feature of this exhibition is the museum concept of largely dispensing with reconstructions and presenting original objects. In addition to objects from the living environment of concentration camp victims, real objects from the SS milieu are being increasingly shown for the first time. Most of these exhibits are ideologically charged and so-called "affirmative" objects with which the SS symbolised its internal communitisation and elitist position. In order to avoid a fascination with and exaggeration of the objects, a responsible sense of contextualisation is required. This can be seen for example with the display of the 'Julleuchter'. Himmler presented this ceramic candlestick with runic symbols to married SS men. Candles were lit on the Yule, the surrogate celebration for the Christian Christmas. The candlestick is thus an example of the creation of a substitute religion. In the exhibition, the intended use of the candlesticks is put in relation to their production. They were made by prisoners from the Dachau and Neuengamme concentration camps. The seemingly harmless appearance of the object is thus placed in the context of SS crimes, here the exploitation of concentration camp prisoners. Sober and neutral presentation strategies such as the arrangement of the repository and mass presentation are intended to remove any presumed sense of magic and mystery from the objects. The showcases can be viewed from several sides and provide various views of the objects; there is as such no fixed, predetermined view of the exhibits, just as there is no predetermined view of the history of the SS. In contrast to the sober presentation of "affirmative" objects from the world of the SS, genuine objects from the realm of concentration camps are intentionally exhibited in such a way that the "aesthetic language" of these original objects should bear impact on the visitors. The showcases surround the objects as protective enclosures and accent lighting highlights their special features. Quotations and reminiscences of contemporary witnesses and villagers

The SS Obergruppenführer Hall | Picture: M. Groppe, 2010, Kreismuseum Wewelsburg

The castlle of Wewelsburg | Picture: Kreismuseum Wewelsburg

can be called up at media terminals. Survivors of the Niederhagen concentration camp relate their personal interpretations and memories in intensive, biographical interviews. The interview excerpts are not intended to clarify historical facts but rather to support the better understanding of events from the perspective of the concentration camp victims. This empathetic, personal aspect of the exhibition is deliberately not granted to members of the SS, and their reminiscences cannot be called up via the terminals.

The "Wewelsburg Commemorative and Memorial Centre 1933 – 1945" sees itself, since its foundation in 1982, as an extracurricular place of learning offering extensive didactic, historical-political seminar programmes for groups of young people and adults. Special projects also address issues such as discrimination and moral courage. The uncovering of the SS shooting range, filled up after the war, is regularly driven forward as part of work camps. Special exhibitions, readings and lectures about National-Socialist history and for the prevention of right-wing extremism and racism form part of the permanent programme. More than 50,000 people visit the memorial every year, whilst the proportion of visitors recognisable as right-wing extremists is marginal. The concern that the number of neo-Nazis might increase due to the presentation of "affirmative" objects in the exhibition from the SS environment has remained unfounded. On the internet it is more a case of finding angry statements about what they consider to be the "disrespectful treatment" of the North Tower, their "place of consecration". In addition to historical-political educational work and information about Nazi perpetrators, the commemoration of concentration camp victims is of high importance. Contacts are maintained to concentration camp survivors and their relatives but also to relatives of SS members who wish to learn more about their fathers and grandfathers. In this regard the memorial fulfils its task as a research centre for the history of the SS and the Niederhagen concentration camp. Visitors have access to an archival collection, a media library with an extensive collection of contemporary witness interviews with survivors and village residents, and a specialist library.

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