THE SOCIAL FUTURE OF AUSTRALIA

The **50th Anniversary Symposium** of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia

Edited by
Kevin McConkey and Chris Hatherly

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Contributors

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Mark Western FASSA is Research Director for The Queensland Commitment and Professor of Sociology at The University of Queensland (UQ). The Queensland Commitment is a ten-year initiative by the University to address financial, geographic, and structural barriers to access, participation and attainment at the University. Previously (2008-2022), Mark was Founding Director of UQ's Institute for Social Science Research. Mark has published on topics including inequality, families, education, health, social class, quantitative methods, and the public value of social sciences. He also has a track record of research and policy and program evaluation with and for government and non-government organisations. Mark is an appointed member of the National Research Infrastructure Advisory Group and Chair of the Group of Eight's Equity Working Group. He chaired the Steering Committee for ASSA's State of the Social Sciences 2021 Report. Professor Western was elected a Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia in 2011.

John Maynard FASSA is Professor of Indigenous Studies and Director of the Wollotuka Institute of Aboriginal Studies at the University of Newcastle. He is also Deputy Chairperson of the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies (AIATSIS). His research has concentrated on the intersections of Aboriginal political and social history and made significant contributions to the research fields of Aboriginal, race relations and sports history both nationally and internationally. He was the recipient of the Aboriginal History (Australian National University) Stanner Fellowship 1996, the New South Wales Premiers Indigenous History Fellow 2003, Australian Research Council Postdoctoral Fellow 2004, University of Newcastle Researcher of the Year 2008 and 2012 and Australian National University Allan Martin History Lecturer 2010. Professor Maynard was elected as a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in 2014.

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Thomas Mayor is a Torres Strait Islander man who lives on Larrakia Country in Darwin, A father of five children, he is a wharfie and union official for the Maritime Union of Australia. He has tirelessly advocated for the proposals in the Uluru Statement from the Heart and is the author of four

bestselling books. His First book, *Finding the Heart of the Nation: The journey of the Uluru Statement towards Voice, Treaty and Truth*, tells his story, the story of the Uluru Statement, and the stories of the remarkable people he met on his campaign journey. Thomas has also published numerous articles and essays with *The Guardian, Griffith Review, Crikey* and *The Sydney Morning Herald*.

Bhiamie Williamson is a Research Fellow at Monash University with Fire to Flourish, a significant $50 million research initiative partnering with communities across NSW and Victoria affected by the 2019-20 bushfires. He is leading the 'National Indigenous Disaster Resilience Project', embedding Indigenous knowledge and insights into disaster responses and recovery and fostering resilient Indigenous communities. Bhiamie is currently undertaking a PhD at the Australian National University which investigates Indigenous men and masculinities. In 2021, he was awarded the Dorothy R Taylor Award for the Best Paper from an Australian Geographer for his co-authorship of '*Cultural Burning and public sector practice in the Australian Capital Territory'.*

Klaus Neumann FASSA is an independent historian and honorary professor at Deakin University. He has held teaching and research positions in Australia and New Zealand. He has written extensively about public memories in post-war Germany, colonial history and memory in Papua New Guinea, immigration, refugee and asylum seeker policies, civilian internment, the eruption of the Rabaul volcano, and New Zealand forestry, among other topics. He was elected as a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia in 2017. His most recent project has been a history of local public and policy responses to refugees and asylum seekers in Germany, which has been funded by the Hamburg Foundation for the Advancement of Research and Culture (a German philanthropic trust) and will be published in 2024 as Blumen und Brandsätze: Eine deutsche Geschichte 1989-2023.

Hugh White AO FASSA is Emeritus Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University. His work focuses primarily on Australian strategic and defence policy, Asia-Pacific security issues, and global strategic affairs especially as they influence Australia and the Asia-Pacific. He has served as an intelligence analyst with the Office of National Assessments, as a journalist with the *Sydney Morning Herald*, as a senior adviser on the staffs of Defence Minister Kim Beazley and Prime Minister Bob Hawke, and as a senior official in the Department of Defence, where from 1995 to 2000 he was Deputy Secretary for Strategy and Intelligence, and as the first Director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). In 2014, Emeritus Professor White was made an Officer of the Order of Australia for "distinguished service to international affairs, through strategic defence studies as an analyst, academic and adviser to government, and to public administration". He was elected as a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia in 2020.

Renée Jefferey FASSA is a Professor of International Relations in the School of Government and International Relations and the Griffith Asia Institute. She is an Australian Research Council Future Fellow. She has conducted fieldwork in and/or published on the specific cases of Cambodia, Nepal, Aceh, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea (Bougainville), the Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Japan, China, the Philippines, and Taiwan, with current projects taking her to Sri Lanka and Myanmar in the near future. Since 2009 she has been awarded five Australian Research Council Grants, including a Future Fellowship (2020-2024) for a project on 'National Human Rights Institutions and Transitional Justice in Asia'. She is currently the co-editor of the Australian Journal of Political Science and, from 2020, a senior editor of the Journal of Global Security Studies. Professor Jefferey was elected as a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia in 2019.

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Barry McGaw AO FASSA is a Fellow of the Australian Psychological Society, The Australian College of Educators and the International Academy of Education. He has been President of the Australian Association for Research in Education, the Australian Psychological Society, the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia, the Australian College of Educators and the International Association for Educational Assessment. Professor McGaw is an Honorary Professorial Fellow in the Melbourne Graduate School of Education at the University of Melbourne and was the Foundation Chair of the Board of the Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority. Professor McGaw received a Centenary Medal in 2001, was appointed an Officer in the Order of Australia in 2004 and elected a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia in 1984.

Richard A Bryant AC FASSA FAA FAHMS FAPS is the world-leading authority in early psychological responses to trauma. He has identified the core biological and psychological factors that occur immediately after trauma and that influence the long-term trajectories of mental health. His diagnostic and treatment protocols have been translated into over 15 languages and are the gold standard protocols used in most countries following traumatic events. Bryant is the most published and cited clinical psychologist in Australia and he consults widely with international agencies on mental health. He wrote the major texts on early psychological response to trauma that have set the international research agenda in this field. Professor Bryant was appointed a Companion in the Order of Australia in 2016 and was elected a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia in 2006.

Karen Fisher FASSA is one of the few international disability policy academics collaborating with Chinese colleagues to include people with disability in social policy methodology, known as inclusive research. Her research in Australia and China facilitates inclusive methods in research, where the people with disability affected by policy participate in the research design and conduct. Professor Fisher was elected a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia in 2020.

Peri O'Shea is a Lived Experience Researcher at the UNSW Social Policy and Research Centre, specialising in participatory, qualitative research working with people with mental health challenges, drawing on her lived experience as both a consumer and carer and her significant experience in consumer-led mental health policy reform, to action and facilitate co-designed and peer-led research and evaluation. Dr O'Shea is a recognised leader in the mental health sector, holding the position of Chief Executive Officer at Being, the NSW Consumer Advisory Group from 2010 to 2017 and as an expert delegate on State and National committees improving mental health services. Prior to this Dr O'Shea was the Research Program Coordinator at the Social Justice and Social Change Research Centre at Western Sydney University. Dr O'Shea's work and personal histories have given prominence to social justice, social inclusion and participation.

Stephen Duckett AM FASSA FAHMS has held senior health care leadership positions in Australia and Canada, including as Secretary of what is now the Commonwealth Department of Health, and Director of Acute Health in the Victorian public service. He was Director of the Health Program at the Grattan Institute until 2022. Professor Duckett is currently Chair of the Board of Eastern Melbourne Primary Health Network and a member of the Board of the Brotherhood of St Laurence. In the 2023 Australia Day Honours he was appointed a Member of the Order of Australia for "significant service to public health policy and management, and to tertiary education". Professor Duckett is a Fellow of the Australian Academy of Health and Medical Sciences and was elected a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia in 2004.

John Quiggin FASSA is Vice Chancellor's Senior Fellow and Professor of Economics at the University of Queensland. He is prominent both as a research economist and as a commentator on Australian economic policy. He is a Fellow of the Econometric Society, the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia and many other learned societies and institutions. He has produced over 1500 publications, including six books and over 200 refereed journal articles, in fields including decision theory, environmental economics, production economics, and the theory of economic growth. He has also written on policy topics including climate change, micro-economic reform, privatisation, employment policy and the management of the Murray-Darling river system. Professor Quiggin was elected a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia in 1996.

Marian Baird AO FASSA is Professor of Gender and Employment Relations and Co-Director of the Women, Work and Policy Research Group at the University of Sydney Business School. She is also an Expert Panel Member of the Fair Work Commission, appointed in March 2023. In 2016 Professor Baird was appointed an Officer in the Order of Australia for outstanding services to improving the quality of women's working lives and for contributions to tertiary education. In 2009 she became the first female professor in industrial relations at the University of Sydney. Professor Baird was elected a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia in 2015.

Sarah Pink FASSA is a world leading Design Anthropologist, known for her development of innovative digital, visual and sensory research and dissemination methodologies, which she engages in interdisciplinary projects with design, engineering and creative practice disciplines to engage with contemporary issues and challenges. She is Professor and founding Director of the Emerging Technologies Research Lab at Monash University and has an international reputation for her work as an interdisciplinary anthropologist, and holds visiting Professorships in Loughborough University, UK, and Halmstad University, Sweden. Professor Pink was elected a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia in 2019.

Mark Griffin FASSA is Director of the Future of Work Institute at Curtin University, Western Australia. Mark's research examines the link between individual and organisational capability in areas such as safety, leadership, well-being, and productivity. He has conducted large-scale collaborative projects with a range of industries including transport, health, education, energy, mining, and finance. He is a Fellow of the US Society for Industrial/Organizational Psychology, Past Chair of the Research Methods Division of the US Academy of Management, and past recipient of an Australian Research Council Future Fellowship. Professor Griffin was elected as a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia in 2019.

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Janeen Baxter FASSA is Director of the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for Children and Families over the Life Course in the Institute for Social Science Research at the University of Queensland. She has served on several editorial boards for national and international journals and has been a member and Chair of the College of Experts for the Australian Research Council. Professor Baxter's research focuses on family dynamics and social disadvantage, gender inequality in families and households and the links between paid and unpaid work. She has been a Hallsworth Visiting Fellow at the University of Manchester, a Visiting Fellow at the University of Wisconsin and a former member and Chair of the External Reference Group for the Households, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) project. Professor Baxter was elected a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia in 2009.

Lee Godden FASSA FAAL was previously the Director of the Centre for Resources, Energy and Environmental Law, Melbourne Law School. Currently she is the Dean, Faculty of Law, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand and a Professorial Fellow at Melbourne Law School. Her research interests include environmental law, climate law, water law, property law and Indigenous peoples' land rights. The impact of her work extends beyond Australia with comparative research in countries as diverse as Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, South Africa and the Asia-Pacific. From 2013 to 2015, Professor Godden was an Australian Law Reform Commissioner. She was elected a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia in 2017.

Preface

It was a privilege and a challenge to serve as President when the Academy turned 50 years of age. The appointment of a new Chief Executive Officer, a need to update and modernise the National Office, a new Strategic Plan, and a more outwardly focused engagement plan were all underway.

In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and its associated travel restrictions and health risks, the Academy made an early decision to hold its 50th Anniversary Symposium online only. While this did mean we were unable to gather to celebrate as planned, it also provided new opportunities for the Symposium to seek a much broader reach than had typically been possible. More importantly, the Academy decided that the symposium should involve a wide range of topics and presenters, so as to ensure not only that the excellence and relevance of the disciplines of the social sciences would be on display, but also that a range of contemporary topics could be addressed.

This book provides a historical record of the 50th Anniversary Symposium, *Australia's Social Future*, and it also provides other selected information about the Academy in its 50th year. In that year, there were 721 Fellows of the Academy, all recognised as the very best in their disciplines in terms of the quality and impact of their activities. In total, over 1,000 of Australia's leading social scientists have been elected to the Academy over the half-century.

One sad note during that 50th year, that we acknowledged at the symposium, was the passing of Stuart Macintyre, an eminent and prolific historian, a former President of the Academy, and an influential commentator on the nature and value of the social sciences in Australia and internationally.

The nature and value of the social sciences in Australia and internationally was evident in the 50th Anniversary Symposium and is captured again in this book.

There are very many who have contributed, but I wish to acknowledge in particular Kevin McConkey and the Symposium Committee and Chris Hatherly and the National Office team, all of whom worked, under the uncertainties and restrictions of the pandemic, but with the unequivocal support of the Executive Committee, to ensure the success of the symposium.

Jane Hall
Academy President, 2019-2021

Acknowledgments

Thanks to the many participants whose expertise and excellence was on display, to the Academy's Executive Committee for endorsing the conduct of this symposium, to the Symposium Committee for ideas and efforts, and to the National Office staff who used existing skills and developed new skills to ensure the symposium happened. The names of these friends and colleagues are listed in the Appendices.

Thanks to the hundreds of registrants who stepped into and out of the sessions online and contributed with questions and comments over the symposium days of 22-23 November 2021.

This book provides a historical record of the 50th Anniversary Symposium. Particular thanks go to Bonnie Johnson, Cheryl Robinson and Anna Dennis from the Academy's National Office for their assistance in preparing the manuscript for publication.

Among the many professional contributions and highlights of the symposium, there was an essential, if unplanned, contribution, that must be acknowledged. Bhiamie Williamson, a First Nations early career colleague, gave his talk and listened to the talks of others while holding his then three-month old daughter, Burraalga. She appeared to very much enjoy being involved, and her presence reminded all that this symposium was about *The Social Future of Australia*.

The importance of carefully constructing that future cannot be captured better than by being clear about and working toward the society that should be our legacy to Burraalga and all her brothers and sisters.

Introduction and Overview

A brief history of the origins of the Academy

The Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia had its origins in the 1940s, as Australian policy makers were turning their attention to the role of research and education in recovery and reconstruction following World War II. Several members of the Australian National Research Council (a precursor to the current Australian Research Council) proposed the establishment of a body to cover the social sciences.

After exploring a number of options, in 1943 the Australian National Research Council agreed to the establishment of a Provisional Social Science Research Committee within its structure. This Committee had 19 founding members,15 university academics and four public servants, who shared the objective of advancing and promoting social science as a research enterprise and applying social science expertise against the many challenges facing the country.

The Committee operated on a voluntary and unfunded basis for several years, before being assigned responsibility and funding as Australia's coordinating body for social sciences under UNESCO that allowed it to formalise its structures and operations. By 1952, the Committee had expanded sufficiently to incorporate as an autonomous body, the Social Science Research Council. The new Council, with a membership of 44, set guidelines and processes for the election of members, undertook research projects, funded scholarly publication in the disciplines, and engaged in numerous national and international initiatives.

Two decades later, on 7 July 1971 the Council established itself as the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia. In this form, the Academy joined the Australian Academy of Science and the Australian Academy of the Humanities as one of the pre-eminent learned bodies in the country. The remit of the Academy at incorporation was to:

- promote excellence in and encourage the advancement of the social sciences
- act as a co-ordinating group for the promotion of research and teaching in the social sciences
- foster excellence in research and subsidise the publication of studies in the social sciences
- encourage and assist in the formation of other national association or institutions for the promotion of the social sciences or any branch of them
- promote international scholarly cooperation and act as an Australian national member of international organisations concerned with the social sciences
- act as a consultant and adviser in regard to the social sciences; and,
- comment where appropriate on national needs and priorities in the area of the social sciences.

At the time of incorporation, the 96 members of the Council become the first Fellows of the Academy. In the years that followed the new Academy engaged in its mission on many fronts. For instance, it established major programs of research on Aboriginal Australia and on migration. It published significant volumes of work by Fellows, convened many influential workshops and symposia, and published the journal *Dialogue*. Also, the Academy was instrumental in working with UNESCO to establish the Association of Asian Social Science Research Councils.

The Learned Academies collectively were successful in the 1970s in securing ongoing funding from the Federal Government under the same legislation that provided block funding to public universities. This funding, along with growth in revenue from membership fees and other sources, has allowed a steady growth in the skills, capacity and professionalism of the Academy's National Office staff. It has also allowed investment in a range of initiatives, most recently in public outreach and communications.

A time of change for the Academy

Although much could be written about the activities of the Academy and its growth from the original 96 in 1971 to 721 Fellows in 2021 (noting that over 1,000 Fellows have been elected in the 50 years), the 50th Anniversary Symposium happened during a time of change for the Academy.

Within the Academy, there were four intersecting layers of change. First, the conceptual and practical move from an 'Executive Director' to a 'Chief Executive Officer' and from a 'Secretariat' to a 'National Office', as well as the appointment of professional staff along with a commitment to their ongoing professional development, signalled a different way in which the Academy would conduct its business and interact with its Fellows and the broader community.

Second, the development and adoption of a *Strategic Plan 2019-2022* (see the Appendices) brought important transparency to the activities and priorities, as well as ensured rigor in the decision-making and funding allocations, of the Academy.

Third, significant projects were undertaken, some with an external focus such as on climate change, some with an internal focus such as on the membership procedures and committee structure of the Academy, and some that were behind the scenes such as a more sophisticated use of technology to assist the running of the National Office and the interactions of the Academy with Fellows and the broader community.

Fourth, a much greater focus on outward facing activities and influences, including enhanced use of social media and the creation of the *Seriously Social* podcast which involved an experienced journalist and interviewer discussing interesting topics with selected Fellows, and doing so in a way that had broad audience appeal.

In addition to these layers of change, the Academy continued and enhanced its important work in terms of the election of Fellows, the giving of Early Career Awards, the presenting of lectures, the funding of workshops, and the making of submissions, and the interacting with governments, businesses, and the not-for-profit sector.

The history of this particular time of the Academy is yet to be written, of course, but it's worthwhile to note that the 50th Anniversary Symposium occurred in this context of change, growth, and intentional influence of the Academy.

The change in the Academy and the symposium also occurred when climate change was expressing itself in Australia through drought, bush fires, and floods, as well as when the COVID-19 pandemic led not only to many uncertainties and limitations, but also to opportunities to do things differently including using technology and working from home much of the time.

A new approach to the symposium

The 50th Anniversary Symposium, over 22-23 November 2021, involved a new approach, and that approach was one example of how the Academy was adapting, engaging, communicating, and advocating for the social sciences and social scientists in ways that were stronger and different from before.

The symposium was different from previous annual symposia. Some differences reflected and took advantage of the world in which we lived in 2021. For instance, travel restrictions limited a face-to-face event, but technology allowed a broader involvement. Other differences were intentional. There was a wide range of topics and speakers in the symposium. The topics covered many, but of course not all, of the issues to which social science disciplines contribute evidence, interpretation, and policy advice and directions. The speakers were brief and focused in their comments, and all aimed to remember the breadth of the audience.

The speakers included Fellows of the Academy and those whose expertise has been recognised in other ways, people who were relatively early in their careers and those who were somewhat later, colleagues who were focused on theoretical and empirical aspects of evidence and those who were focused on the public reception and policy application of such evidence. The approach aimed to illustrate the breadth, depth, excellence, and relevance of the disciplines of the social sciences.

The symposium also sought to illustrate how many social science disciplines overlap with, and in some cases, are central to, the physical sciences, the technologies, the arts and the humanities. The symposium reflected the fact that the days of hard boundaries have long passed, in part because many of the challenges that we face as individuals and as societies require disciplines to intersect in their understanding of and approach to those challenges. And, the symposium underscored that we need to remember that we–the sentient beings that we are–are at the centre of the human ecology we have created.

The symposium program featured three categories of session, with five moderated panels of speakers, three roundtable sessions, and individual speakers in a keynote and concluding sessions each day. The panel and roundtable sessions provided opportunities for the audience and the speakers to engage with each other, through the online submission of questions and comment.

In part to stimulate thought and subsequent discussion four brief, but perhaps mildly provocative, comments were offered at the beginning of the symposium by Kevin McConkey.

First, he suggested the diversity of the disciplines within the social sciences as both a strength and weakness. One hope, he noted, was that the symposium would help to better understand and appreciate the links among social science disciplines as well as with other disciplines.

Second, the rejection of expertise was a trend that was said to be occurring in many parts of the world, with this trend often being associated with increased authoritarian attitudes and behaviours. Another hope was that this symposium would help to better understand the importance and value of expertise, and to encourage those in the social sciences to communicate expertise more bravely and more broadly.

Third, he noted that technological innovation and change is shaping much individual and social behaviour and experience across the world. Another hope was that the symposium would help to insert social science disciplines more obviously into the human-technology interaction. In addition, it was seen to be important to highlight that a vague appeal to or assumption that technology will

solve human problems, without recognition of the place of human and social structures and enterprises, is naïve at best.

Fourth, the view was expressed that the human tendency to be uncomfortable with ambiguity and to look for certainty is likely to become more problematic as change, and the speed of change, continues to increase. Another hope was that the symposium would help to understand that those of us who have access to good evidence and have the capacity to use clear voices need to better assist society to avoid embracing simple, typically incorrect, slogans of certainty, whether they are personal or political.

Roundtable Sessions and Presentation Sessions

Across the symposium, there were three roundtable sessions that addressed questions such as *Place and function of the social sciences: reflections and directions* (Chaired by Michelle Grattan, and involving John Dewar, Chris Feik, Cathy Foley, Andrew Leigh, Deborah Lupton, and Danielle Wood), *Can the social sciences do more and be seen to do more for this country and for the world?* (Chaired by Misha Ketchell, and involving Emma Campbell, Rosalind Croucher, Alison Pennington, Deborah Terry, Maggie Walter, and Dan Woodman), and *Leadership, actions, and reactions for the social sciences and the Academy* (Chaired by Richard Holden, and involving Glyn Davis, Jane Hall, Dylan Lino, Jane McAdam), as well as a reflection session at the end of the first day by Glenn Withers and at the end of the second day by Kevin McConkey.

The informed, provocative, and dynamic nature of those discussions was consistent with the excellence of the five formal presentation sessions, and the material from those presentation sessions is presented in this book. These presentations have been only lighted edited in order to maintain their dynamic nature and the disciplinary and professional backgrounds of the presenters.

Selected statistics about the symposium

Excluding the participants and staff, 563 individuals registered 791 tickets for the symposium (ticketing included individual sessions, separate days, or the whole program). Sixty-five per cent of these registrants (367 people) attended at least one session for a total audience of 1,084 across all sessions. The majority of registrants were from Australia, with others being from Japan (3), the US (2), Germany (1), Fiji (1), India (1), Bangladesh (1), Philippines (1), Sri Lanka (1), Turkey (1) and the UAE (1). The audience peaked at 190 for the Introduction and the *State of the Social Sciences 2021 Report* and 181 for the *Can Australia achieve meaningful reconciliation with First Nations People?* sessions, reducing to 64 for the final session; the average audience was 140 (SD=41) across the program.

The National Office pitched and posted traditional social and media content. The symposium received or had a commitment for 25 media coverage (including four stories in *The Australian*, three talks published in *Inside Story* and *The Conversation*, and *ABC Big Ideas* agreed in-principle to a broadcast over the summer months of three sessions featuring 11 speakers). The media reach of this coverage was estimated at 19 million people with an 'Advertising Value Equivalent' of $296,500.

On social media, the Academy posted 117 messages either promoting the symposium or 'live-tweeting' the sessions. These gained 97,642 impressions. The Academy also published eight LinkedIn Posts and 10 Facebook Posts. There were 4,192 visits to the symposium web page (exceeding home page visits in November for the first time ever), and the Academy's newsletter and social media

subscriber base grew during that month by 14% (newsletter subscribers), 13% (Facebook), 9% (Twitter) and 30% (LinkedIn).

Forty-three people responded to a post-symposium survey distributed to presenters and registrants immediately; this was a small, but expected, response rate for such post-event surveys. The majority of respondents (53%) identified as academics; 60% had a PhD, and the majority (58%) were aged 55 or over. Several respondents had not been able to attend all they wished to because of scheduling or technical issues (e.g., use of Zoom, the online platform, being barred by employers), but indicated that they were intending to watch the recordings.

Overall, 90% rated the symposium good (40%) or very good (50%), 90% agreed or strongly agreed that speakers and topics were timely and interesting, 88% were happy with pre-event communication, and 86% felt the program was well organised. Around half of the respondents had heard about the symposium through Academy communications (email and social media), and the other half had heard through stakeholder networks, word-of-mouth, or other media.

The respondents reported various reasons for attending, and the indicated highlights included the breadth of topics and speakers, and the convenience of online access. In addition to positive comments on the approach and style of the symposium, respondents offered positive comments on specific talks by, for instance, Hugh White, Marian Baird, Bhiamie Williamson (together with baby Burraalga), Barry McGaw, Sarah Pink, Stephen Duckett, and John Quiggan, as well as the sessions on the *State of the Social Sciences 2021*, *Can Australia achieve meaningful reconciliation with First Nations People?* and *Can Australia better manage international relationships and responsibilities in a changing world?*.

Themes from the symposium

At the end of the symposium, Kevin McConkey pointed to five themes he had seen emerge from the symposium, and also gave illustrative reference to some of the many excellent speakers.

One theme was the importance of strong evidence that is well communicated and used. The symposium involved many presentations reaching to strong evidence, of different types, being used to determine appropriate activities and policies. Although it was noted in some talks that evidence was sometimes ignored by relevant end-users, it was hoped that such could be fixed with focus and determination. Strong evidence was presented that was relevant to many of the issues that society was facing globally, and that evidence needed to be used sensibly, as Richard Bryant demonstrated with his *Coping with COVID* mental health program that is being used in Australia and many countries around the world.

A second theme was the need to work together, not only across the disciplines of the social sciences, but also with the disciplines of the sciences, the technologies, and the humanities. It is trite to say that this is easier said than done, but almost everything in the symposium pointed to a need to take this up with renewed vigour and focus. Chief Scientist Cathy Foley made this point in her comments that success in areas such as dealing with the digital world and transitioning to a new economy will only be achieved if we work together. And, in one of the roundtable sessions, Debbie Terry pointed to many questions that can only be answered by ensuring the social science disciplines are at the table with other disciplines.

Another theme was the need to understand and embrace change. Whether we look at our education or work, the relationships between males and females, our social structures and organisations, or Australia's role in international activities, change appeared to be occurring faster and faster; and, a resistance to and a fear of change was occurring as well. Hugh White's analysis of international relationships threw this into bold and immediate contrast, most pointedly with the People's Republic of China. Change can lead people, societies, and governments to retreat into sloganising a false certainty or to making appeals to some imagined past. It was clear from the presentations and discussions, especially in the session *Can Australia better manage international relationships and responsibilities in a changing world?* that many of our disciplines can and must assist in a conscious and conscientious approach to the future of international activities and relationships.

A fourth theme was the need to be much more future-focused in what was investigated and communicated across our disciplines. As Sarah Pink highlighted in her comments on emerging technologies, we have to focus on the future much more intentionally and we need to do so with a clearer vision and a stronger voice. Also, as Ros Croucher pointed out, this will sometimes mean knocking on doors and offering expertise, rather than sitting back waiting to be asked and then complaining when not asked. And, in a roundtable session, Glyn Davis highlighted how we need to be more focused in getting social science information into the common discourse. Although it can be difficult to take on the role of public intellectual, it is important to do so. Social science disciplines are well placed to ensure that base populism doesn't fill a vacuum created by an absence of appropriate information in the public domain.

A final, and essential, theme of reconciliation with First Nations Peoples was picked up forcefully in the *State of the Social Sciences 2021* report as well as in the session *Can Australia achieve meaningful reconciliation with First Nations People?* Genuine reconciliation needs to start with a reckoning, and a commitment to truth telling and truth seeking, as John Maynard pointed out with power and passion. In this respect it is critical that Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples, and social scientists, work even more together in a true partnership to achieve reconciliation, a point that came out strongly in the comments of Maggie Walter.

One effect from the symposium

Among various effects from the 50th Anniversary Symposium, one that stood out is how the roundtable and presentation sessions informed the Academy's subsequent *2002 Federal Election Statement: Social Priorities for Australia.* This statement is set out here:

> The Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia urges Australia's next government to prioritise policies that promote long-term individual, social, economic and environmental wellbeing, as well as meaningful reconciliation with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples.
>
> Social science approaches and expertise offer unique insights and solutions to these challenges and opportunities, and the Academy stands ready to assist.
>
> The Academy suggests five key areas of focus.
>
> **1.   Recovery and resilience**
> Over the past three years Australians have weathered an unprecedented string of challenges including bushfires, floods, COVID-19, job losses, and international tensions

and instability. These challenges have been experienced unequally and with particular impact by children and young adults, those in insecure or disaster-exposed housing, by First Nations Australians, those in aged care or living alone, and those from migrant backgrounds and communities. These disruptions have also highlighted the exposure of many of our largest industry sectors to global disruptions.

At the same time, the pandemic and Australia's response have shown anew the opportunity and value of bold economic policy measures to reduce inequality and improve lives, with parallels to Australia's post-war reconstruction that laid a foundation for much of our national prosperity and social wellbeing over the subsequent decades.

It is critical that Australia's next government retain the perspective of the pandemic in considering opportunities for major reform and policy initiatives that will help to drive Australia's continued economic recovery and our future resilience for the decades to come.

There is also both scope and need for the next Australian government to work with all relevant parties to ensure improved coordination and funding that assists as directly as possible with the recovery and resilience of individuals.

2. Future-focused diplomacy

Global unrest and volatility pose significant risks to Australia and its neighbours. Along with increased intelligence and defence capabilities, it is vital that Australia make a renewed financial and leadership investment in diplomatic ties with its neighbours and allies. This should include consideration of increased allocations for foreign aid, and increased opportunities for soft-diplomacy, including business, educational and researcher exchange and collaboration; particularly in the Asia-Pacific region.

While recognising the past, the approach that the next Australian government takes should focus much more obviously and positively on the future shape of global relations and the changing nature of Australian society.

3. Ambitious long-term climate change mitigation and adaptation

The Australian public and our business sector are ready for national leadership on climate change, with every climate-related natural disaster and every accelerated closure of a coal-fired power plant emphasising the risks of a piecemeal and reactive response to this global issue.

Australia's next government must respond proactively to the climate emergency by substantially bringing forward Australia's net-zero emission target and implementing the necessary incentives and reforms to allow Australia and Australians to benefit economically and equitably from the required transition.

Significant attention is also required on adaptation, including an upgraded national adaptation strategy based on relevant research evidence to guide the most critical and effective strategies.

4. Future knowledge generation and innovation

The pandemic and concurrent policy changes have placed significant pressure on the research, vocational education and higher education sectors. Impacts have been felt across many fields in the form of job-losses, early and mandated retirements of older and senior staff and reduced hours for highly casualised sessional teaching workforces.

As one component of the tertiary education sector, universities were hit particularly hard by the two-year hiatus on international student arrivals, along with preclusion from the Job-Keeper scheme and changes to funding arrangements. In addition, the apparent shift in public narrative around the purpose of universities as producing 'job-ready graduates' risks losing the fundamental value proposition of our institutions as creators of long-term knowledge and innovation.

While the situation is improving, the impact on existing and prospective future workforce remains. A renewed commitment to both basic and applied research, and to mechanisms to ensure transparency and integrity of research funding and practice is vital. Likewise, continued and coordinated investment in vocational education and higher education as fundamental pillars of Australia's economy would aid in this recovery and ensure Australia's research and post-secondary teaching workforce is able to continue delivering value for Australia.

The Academy urges Australia's next government to renew investment in our universities as innovation and knowledge hubs, resourcing them adequately to provide the new knowledge and innovation needed by our businesses, public services and community organisations, and to provide future students with the critical skills and abilities they will need not just for oft-transient jobs, but for entire, fulfilling and financially rewarding careers.

5. Improved framework for coordination within and across governments

The challenges of the past few years have demonstrated in stark detail how inadequate coordination within and across governments can lead to inefficiencies and mistakes that have real impact on Australian people.

Whether flood-affected residents being 'bounced around' between agencies while seeking emergency relief, vulnerable children or people with disabilities slipping through the gaps of stretched social service and health systems or the continuing and widening inequalities between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians, there is clearly a need to do better.

The National Cabinet established in 2020 was one step toward improving the pandemic response at the top level of government. However, a thorough review of opportunities and mechanisms for improved coordination within and across all levels of government is recommended as an immediate measure for Australia's next government.

Stepping up: Are we ready to deliver meaningful impact in a changing world?

Mark Western

It's my pleasure and privilege to launch the *State of the Social Sciences 2021* report, and I would like to begin also by acknowledging the traditional owners of all the lands on which we are gathered today. I'm on Jagera and Turugal country, and I pay my respects to elders past and present. I also acknowledge any Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander people who are with us today.

The *State of the Social Sciences 2021* was initiated by the Academy in mid-2020. And our objectives were to provide a high-level overview of Australia's social science ecosystem, and to identify priorities and opportunities going forward. We wanted the report to be relevant, to be broadly useful, and to be engaging. And importantly, we want it to be a catalyst for your feedback and involvement as, together, we take the social sciences forward.

We approached the report in a deliberately comprehensive way. We didn't want to make the mistake of presenting social science as if it was something that only happened in universities and through university research and teaching. And so, our approach had a number of characteristics that were designed to meet these objectives. In the first place, it was deeply collaborative. It was consultative across the sector and the components of the social science ecosystem. It involved written submissions, roundtable consultations with a range of representatives of different sectoral representatives, detailed interviews, an open survey that went out broadly, and expert external reviews of draft materials. So, the report is genuinely a collective product.

We wanted the project to be cross-sectoral. We recognized that social science education and research occurs in schools, in the vocational education and training sector, in universities, and in the private sector. So, we focus on all of those areas in the report. We wanted to have a specific focus on research, and we particularly wanted to focus on social science's relationship with First Nations peoples, which we identified as a core issue to be investigated in more detail. And this engagement is one of the key outcomes for this report, and hopefully one of the key platforms in an agenda going forward for the social sciences.

Like this symposium, we wanted the report to be interesting. None of us involved in the committee wanted to produce a text-heavy, data-heavy document that functioned very well as a paperweight, but didn't have much other useful purpose. And so, what we've produced is a report that is highly interactive. It's available online. We have a website that you have all been sent. There are interactive data visualizations. We have opportunities for you to comment, and we will be periodically updating the work that we do. I hope we've achieved our desire for interactivity and engagement.

The audience for the report is deliberately broad, and so, we start with a definition of social science, and we aim to put social science in the context of other disciplines, and to define what's distinctive about our enterprise. The distinction that we focus on is the importance of the social, the events, objects, rules, patents, and other things that arise when humans interact with one another in groups. And for us, the defining core component of the social science disciplines is their emphasis on the social and research and knowledge about society. There are many social science disciplines, but their distinctive similarity is in the focus on the social and the use of systematic methods, approaches and

conceptualizations to describe, predict and influence the world. This is really what distinguishes our disciplines from other disciplines.

The social matters. We know that, not only as social scientists, but also as sentient human beings. One way to think about the history of Australia is to think about a century or more of social milestones. Significant institutional arrangements, policy developments that have defined and continue to shape the way in which we live and the kind of society that Australia has become, and will become into the future. Many of the milestones that we identify reflect the contributions and importance of social science knowledge and research. And the impact on major policies and institutional frameworks is one of the very, very concrete ways that the social sciences in Australia contribute to Australian society. In other words, the formation of Australia, its ongoing formation, and the formation of social science are connected; they proceed together.

The report takes a comprehensive view about where social science is undertaken, through education, research, and practice in schools, the vocational education and training sector, the university sector, and in government, business, and the community. We also examined university research and research in other organizations, and we look at the core kind of conditions for the sustainability and durability of social science going forward. The ecosystem that we're talking about is very, very large. It includes over three million graduates with social science qualifications, over 1.2 million students who are undertaking vocational social science training, and nearly 900,000 university students studying social science in 2021. This is probably the largest single kind of disciplinary constellation in Australia, when we think about the ecosystem as a whole.

The report also identifies grand societal challenges, which these emerged from our consultations. The future for the social sciences, in part, is going to be around engaging with the challenges that are facing Australia and the world, where social science can make a real difference by helping us to explain and understand the challenges and the problems that they bring, and also by contributing to the solutions. These challenges won't be solved or addressed by social scientists working alone. It will require teams and cross-sectoral engagement. But the challenges noted in the report define one top-level agenda for the social sciences into the future, and they come out of our consultative process.

So there are seven that we've identified. And in no particular order, we identified first the threat to democracy and democratic principles. We see this as a grand challenge because we believe that the threats to democracy and democratic principles make it harder to respond to wicked and complex problems like climate change, poverty, or global inequality. They also make it harder to respond to sudden shocks like COVID-19. And we've seen the consequences of the democratic deficit play out around the world in the way that different countries have been able to deal with or not deal with the pandemic. We also recognize that digital and technological disruptions to the ways in which we work, learn, and engage with others pose significant challenges for us. And going forward, the kind of future that we will have is going to depend on the ability of the social sciences, with other disciplines, to engage with the impact of digital transitions and disruptions.

The report points out how the social sciences, along with other disciplines and other sectors, have a significant role to play in developing effective solutions to respond to climate change, and also in managing and fairly distributing the costs of adaptation and transition. And we have seen the contested nature of climate change politics in Australia, around debates around how we share and manage the costs of adaptation and transition. In addition, we think there's an opportunity to use

the recovery from COVID-19 to work towards a more prosperous, equitable and resilient and sustainable Australia, and we frame that as a significant challenge.

The existence of persistent and \ enduring social and economic inequality emerged in the consultation as a key problem facing not just Australia but the world. And again, we see that as an opportunity for the social sciences. And our consultations revealed that the social sciences have a role to play helping to describe and shape the future of work, in response to social, economic and technological changes associated with things like artificial intelligence, robotics, the rise of the gig economy and the platform economy. So these, for us, define an agenda for the social sciences.

We've also looked across schools, vocational education and training, higher education and research to try to see what's working well and what isn't. Now, in the report, we've produced a series of scorecards that capture our assessments of these sectors. There's a lot to be optimistic about. Public recognition of the value of social science is strong. There's strong student demand, and social science graduates enjoy good and strong graduate outcomes. But there are also concerns. The public understanding and awareness of the social sciences is limited, despite the positive recognition, and we believe that social science has a way to go to achieve reconciliation with First Nations people as well as to address racism, discrimination, lack of recognition, and underrepresentation more broadly.

So going forward, the report sets out five key priorities. The first of these we think is genuine reconciliation. The social sciences have to acknowledge and attempt to correct past and ongoing harms with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, and we need to address the underrepresentation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people throughout the social science ecosystem. We also think we need a more connected sector, better integration across the ecosystem between schools, vocational education and training, universities, research organizations, business, government, and not-for-profit sectors, to build the networks and alliances that will strengthen the foundations of social science, and enable its disciplines to respond effectively and robustly to opportunities and challenges.

We need to get better at talking about our public value. We provide the knowledge, skills, evidence that shape professional practice in areas like law, accountancy, management, and teaching. We contribute to the decisions and actions of governments, business, and the not-for-profit sector, and we provide the educational foundations to support millions of Australians. We need to get better at talking about how we contribute in all of these areas. The grand challenges that we identify in the report, like the threats to democracy or digital disruption, can't be answered by social science alone. Complex and longstanding problems require multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary solutions. They require different sectors. They require participatory approaches that involve all the stakeholders who are affected by these things. For social science to have a real impact on substantial, real world problems, we're have to work with others who are not social scientists. We're going to need to work in ways that may be unfamiliar to us, and we will need to understand the various contributions that disciplines and stakeholders all bring to that common enterprise.

And finally, we need to acknowledge COVID-19 and the Job-Ready Graduates Act have had major impacts on the university sector, affecting employment, teaching and research. There's a broad perception in our consultation process that the Job-Ready Graduates Act was intended to target the social sciences, and to make our disciplines less attractive to university students. We need to find ways going forward to sustain and maintain the vitality of the social sciences in university teaching and research. To help with this, in the report we identify 26 sector-specific priorities for different parts of the ecosystem. I'm not going to go through each one of them, but they include concrete

activities to support reconciliation and self-determination for First Nations people in relation to social science, and initiatives that we think will strengthen social science in school, vocational education and training, and in university research.

So, where to from here? The report, *State of the Social Sciences 2021*, is really your report. We see the priorities and challenges as the basis for a future agenda for Australian social science, but the way forward is open. We have suggested some directions, but it's up to the stakeholders for social science in Australia to engage thoughtfully and critically with what we've done, with the findings and the priorities, and to consider what should concretely be done to advance the social sciences in Australia. There'll be further consultation and discussion around this in 2022 from the Academy. The more people who engage with the report and the other materials, then the more valuable and useful the whole project will become.

I've been tremendously proud and privileged to be able to chair the steering committee for this, and I would like to acknowledge it's been a deeply collective effort. I'd like to thank the staff of the National Office in particular for their work and their invaluable contributions. I'd also like to thank all of the stakeholders that we engaged with through the consultation process, and all of the other members of the steering committee for their invaluable contributions to what I think is an exceptional piece of work. We're very proud of what we've produced. On behalf of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia, I'm delighted to launch the report, *State of the Social Sciences 2021*.

Session One: Can Australia achieve meaningful reconciliation with First Nations People?

Chaired by Ian Anderson

Fight for liberty and freedom: Understanding the lessons of history an Aboriginal perspective

John Maynard

Can Australia achieve meaningful reconciliation with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples? I will be blunt. Australia cannot achieve that goal unless we adequately deal with and heal from the past.

African American scholar W.E.B DuBois in 1935 describes our present and ongoing dilemma:

> Nations reel and stagger on their way; they make hideous mistakes; they commit frightful wrongs; they do great and beautiful things. And shall we not best guide humanity by telling the truth about all this, so far as the truth is ascertainable. (Du Bois 1999)

I want to go back nearly 100 years in search of historical truth. In late 1927 an Aboriginal man wrote an impassioned and inspiring letter to a young Aboriginal girl abused within the so-called government operated Aboriginal apprenticeship system. He offered support, encouragement, and comfort, advising the girl she was but one of many Aboriginal girls suffering sexual abuse and maltreatment within the scheme. He asked for details of the man responsible and promised that he would see the perpetrator in court. The man who wrote the letter was my grandfather Fred Maynard. He was the leader of the Australian Aboriginal Progressive Association (AAPA), today recognised as the first united all Aboriginal political organisation to form in this country. In a letter sent to the AAPA's head office in Crown Street, Sydney, my grandfather learned of this girl's plight. The girl at the age of fourteen had been raped by the manager of the station in western NSW where she was placed. On becoming pregnant the NSW Aborigines Protection Board put her on a train to Sydney where she had the baby. The records state that the baby died at birth but remain inconclusive of the baby's true fate. The child may have simply been removed from the young girl. The Protection Board immediately placed her back on a train to the original place of abuse. It was at this point that Maynard received notification. He was clearly shaken by this girl's experience, his anger and anguish readily revealed in the text that survives in the NSW State Archival records:

> My heart is filled with regret and disgust. First because you were taken down by those who were supposed to be your help and guide through life. What a wicked conception, what a fallacy. Under the so-called pretence and administration of the Board, governmental control etc. I say deliberately. The whole damnable thing has got to stop and by God[s] help it shall, make no mistake. No doubt, they are trying to exterminate the Noble and Ancient Race of sunny Australia. Away with the damnable insulting methods. Give us a hand and stand by your own Native Aboriginal Officers and fight for liberty and freedom for yourself and your children. (Maynard 1927b)

Why is this letter so important? Because it is a clear indication of the missing history the country does not know. I came through a school system of the 1950s and 1960s where historically we as Aboriginal people had been conveniently missed, overlooked, forgotten or dare I say erased from the pages of Australian history. We know this. W.E.H Stanner in his landmark 1968 ABC Boyer Lecture alerted the nation that the history of Aboriginal Australia was shrouded within what he called the 'Great Australian Silence'. (Stanner 2009)

Henry Reynolds in 1972 stated that we as Aboriginal people were the 'fringe dwellers of Australian historiography.' (Reynolds 1972) There are many who prefer the comfort of history that was the staple for two-thirds of the twentieth century - the history taught during the 50s and 60s. Captain Cook discovered Australia. He did not. Australia was peacefully settled. It was not. Why are so many challenged by a genuine understanding of the past? Is it guilt, fear, or just plain ignorance?

I hope that the Minister for Education Alan Tudge will come to fully appreciate the move for a balanced and inclusive understanding of the past. Recently the Minister was clearly challenged by the new draft national history curriculum. He stated that he deplored attempts to present 'a miserable negative view of our history' (Sydney Morning Herald, 2021) and was against attempts to 'contest' historical events of national significance. My intention in writing history is not to lay blame or guilt but to deliver a balanced history of the country's past, one that can inspire, inform, educate, and aid the healing process from the past.

Misinformation about Australia's past is the very reason why we as historians need to inform and educate Australians on the importance of understanding history. My grandfather's story as leader of the first united all Aboriginal political organisation established in Sydney is just one of many stories that needs to be told. Many assume that organised Aboriginal political activism had its birth during the turbulent 1960s and 1970s and believe that Aboriginal demands for land rights was a product of that time. People think that the push for Aboriginal self-determination started with the Whitlam Labor government in 1972. Wider recognition of massacres, warfare and that 1788 was an invasion of this country are believed to have surfaced during the 1970s. And that the recent move for an Indigenous *Voice to Parliament* was first expressed through the Uluru Statement from the Heart.

I want to discuss these major points - self-determination, land-rights, invasion, and voice. We need to go back nearly one hundred years to gain an understanding of the ignition point of these issues. My grandfather Fred Maynard was President of the Australian Aboriginal Progressive Association established in Sydney in 1924. In April 1925 at St David's Church and Hall in Surrey Hills they held the first ever Aboriginal civil rights convention staged in this country. Front page Sydney newspaper coverage of the event reveals that over 200 hundred Aboriginal people attended this conference. The newspaper banners read "Aborigines demand Self Determination" and "Self Determination is their aim". (The Daily Guardian 1925) This was fifty years before the Whitlam government are credited with putting up self-determination as a desired Aboriginal policy approach. In 1927 the AAPA published widely through the press a manifesto that was also forwarded to both the State and Federal governments. (NSW Premier's Department 1927) They made several demands including the granting of 40 acres of land for every Aboriginal family in the country. My grandfather added that Aboriginal people had over-riding rights above all others in this respect. This was a clear demand for a national land rights agenda. The AAPA manifesto was dismissed by the Jack Lang Labor government in NSW. This dismissal saw my grandfather write an inspired letter to Jack Lang to better inform him of the history of the continent. He said:

> I wish to make it perfectly clear, on behalf of our people, that we accept no condition
> of inferiority as compared with the European people. Two distinct civilizations are
> represented by the respective races… That the European people by the art of war
> destroyed our more ancient civilization is freely admitted, and that by their vices and
> diseases our people have been decimated is also patent, but neither of these facts are
> evidence of superiority. Quite the contrary is the case… The members of the [AAPA]
> have also noted the strenuous efforts of the Trade Union leaders to attain the

conditions which existed in our country at the time of invasion by Europeans – the men only worked when necessary – we called no man "Master" and we had no king'. (Maynard 1927a)

This letter was written in 1927. Note the use of the word's 'invasion' and 'war'. These concepts are not products of the 1970s.

It is critically important to recognise that the AAPA manifesto also contained a demand that all state Aboriginal Protection Boards be abolished and replaced by an Aboriginal Board to sit under the Commonwealth government. This was clearly the first demand for an Aboriginal voice to parliament. Adding further evidence to this demand an article published in the Sydney *Labor Daily* on Saturday 2 February 1929 revealed that two Aboriginal speakers would put their case forward for Aboriginal policy reform. It said that on the following Tuesday evening at the School of Arts in Chatswood, the president of the Australian Aboriginal Progressive Association Mr. F.G. Maynard accompanied by another Aboriginal speaker would address the members of the Chatswood Willoughby Labor League on Aboriginal matters generally. My grandfather was described as 'a forceful and logical speaker' who would explain 'some of the disadvantages under which his people labour.' It was said that he was striving by 'voice and pen in bringing about much needed reform.' It was further revealed that there was a move to establish an association of white Australians to assist with a push to have an Aboriginal represent his people in Federal Parliament.' Or failing that have an 'Aboriginal ambassador appointed to live in Canberra to watch his people's interests and advise the Federal authorities.' (Labor Daily 1929)

In a newspaper interview my grandfather revealed the threats and intimidation he was facing, stating:

he had been warned on many occasions that the doors of Long Bay [Gaol] were opening for him. He would cheerfully go to gaol for the remainder of his life, he declared, if, by so doing, he could make the people of Australia realise the truly frightful administration of the Aborigines Act. (The Newcastle Sun 1927)

The AAPA disappeared from public view in 1929 through police intimidation on behalf of the NSW Aborigines Protection Board. (The Workers Weekly 1931)

It has been the very erasure of history like that of the Australian Aboriginal Progressive Association that still impacts on our understandings of the past today. The opportunity to understand, recognise and celebrate the long history of the Aboriginal political struggle is not a 'negative' but a truth that can enhance the nation today. That is why history is so important to this country. Sadly, we continue to resist learning from the past and making up for our mistakes. Australia today is not the country of the 1950s and the white Australia policy. We have witnessed since the Second World War massive immigration from Europe, Asia, and Africa and we all crave a far more just and equitable future for Australians of all backgrounds. And that includes delivering a genuine more balanced understanding of the past.

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The land still speaks: Supporting First Nations languages in Australia

Felicity Meakins

Background

Worldwide, language diversity is under greater threat than biodiversity. Of the approximately 7000 languages still spoken, nearly half are considered endangered (Rehg & Campbell, 2008; Sallabank & Austin, 2011). Without intervention, language loss will triple within 40 years, with more than one language lost per month for the rest of this century (Bromham et al., 2021). International attention will be drawn to endangerment hotspots in the UNESCO Decade of Indigenous Languages (2022-2032).

Currently, Australia has the dubious honour of having one of the highest rates of language loss worldwide. Prior to colonisation, Australia was a vibrant linguistic landscape. Over 350 First Nations languages were spoken and multilingualism was the norm. Now only 40 languages are still spoken and just 12 languages are being learnt by children. In their place is a dynamic array of Kriol varieties, unique English dialects and fusions of traditional languages with Kriol and English (Meakins 2014). First Nations communities have also been galvanizing over the past two decades to reclaim and renew their languages.

Current policy and funding environment

There is growing national consensus that First Nations languages are vital to cultural and socioeconomic well-being and health in Australia (Dinku et al., 2020). The National Indigenous Languages Report (2020) gives a snapshot of the current state of Indigenous languages in Australia and details the benefits of learning Indigenous languages. Target 16 of the National Agreement on Closing the Gap (2020) sets explicit targets for "a sustained number and strength of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander languages being spoken" over the next decade.

Some state-based policies also speak to the importance of Indigenous languages. The NSW Aboriginal Languages Act 2017, which commenced in 2020, is the first legislation in Australia to acknowledge the significance of First Languages for the health and well-being of Indigenous peoples. Other states have followed the lead of NSW. The QLD State Government's Many Voices: Queensland Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Languages Policy (2020) sets targets "to build community capacity to research and manage their language preservation, nurturing and maintenance". No such Federal legislation currently exists.

Funding for Indigenous languages in Australia is inadequate. Australia only spends $20.89 annually per capita of the Indigenous population on languages compared with Canada ($69.30) and New Zealand ($296.44). The Federal Government provides just $20M annually to support First Nations languages through the Indigenous Languages and Arts (ILA) program. Compare this amount with the $200M spent annually on 69 non-Indigenous LOTE languages (FLA 2020). Some states also provide extra funding. For example, the NSW Aboriginal Languages Community Investments Grants Program contributes an additional $300,000 to language projects and QLD Indigenous Languages Grants make a further $400,000 available.

First Nations languages in contemporary Australia

First Nations languages fall into three broad types in contemporary Australia:

    i.   languages which have been spoken continuously since colonisation
    ii. languages which are being reclaimed and renewed, and
    iii. new languages born from contact with English.

Most of Australia's original languages which still have child language learners are spoken in remote areas of northern and central Australia which have been less impacted by colonisation. Some languages have been well supported through education programs, for example bilingual schools, such as the Warlpiri Triangle schools, and tertiary level courses such as Yolngu Matha at Charles Darwin University and Pitjantjatjara/Yankunytjatjara at the University of South Australia. Nonetheless changes in policy, such as the Northern Territory decision to abolish bilingual education in 2008, make the vitality of these languages precarious (Disbray, Devlin & Devlin, 2017). English-only education has been shown to have a detrimental effect on the maintenance of Indigenous languages (Bromham et al, 2020).

Although many First Nations languages no longer have first language learners, there has been an inspiring renaissance of languages over the last decades. Many of these programs utilise resources from archives, museums and libraries such as old wordlists, dictionaries and grammatical descriptions. The resurgence of First Nations languages began in the 1990s with Kaurna, the language of Adelaide and the Adelaide Plains (Amery 2016). Since then, the language revitalisation movement in Australia has seen the development of many different education programs from Language Nests, which immerse young children in language, to tertiary-level qualifications for adult learners. For example, it is now possible to learn Kaurna at the University of Adelaide or undertake courses in Gamilaraay at the University of Sydney or ANU.

Language renewal activities are not limited to the classroom. First Nations languages are also finding their place in artistic practices. For example, Sonja and Leecee Carmichael, Quandamooka artists from Minjerribah in QLD, embed their Jandai language in their weaving and cyanotype works. Clint and Kylie Bracknell have dubbed the Bruce Lee Film 'Fist of Fury' (2021) in Noongar, the language of Perth and the surrounding region. Wiradjuri, a language of NSW, forms an important part of Anita Heiss' novel 'Bila Yarrudhanggalangdhuray (River of Dreams)' (2021).

First Nations languages are also a crucial part of many Indigenous ranger programs across Australia. Most fundamentally, Indigenous names are being repatriated to National Parks, for example, the Butchella name K'gari was recently repatriated to Fraser Island in Queensland. The Gurindji language forms an integral part of the work of the Murnkurrumurnkurru rangers at Kalkaringi (NT). One example is the series of plant and animal posters they have created which use the Gurindji language to document cultural knowledge of local flora and fauna.

Other parts of Australia have seen the development of new languages. For example, the main language now spoken in many Indigenous communities across northern Australia is Kriol, a Creole which uses English vocabulary while preserving the sound system, semantics and some grammatical features common to many Indigenous languages (Munro 2000, 2011). This Kriol derives from an English-based Pidgin which developed in the early Sydney colony and was brought north with the pastoral industry (Troy 1990). Yet other Indigenous languages have combined with Kriol or English to create new languages, the best-known examples being Gurindji Kriol and Light Warlpiri (Meakins 2013; O'Shannessy 2005). Many Aboriginal English varieties also still show strong connections with traditional languages through different kinds of mixing strategies which involve the use of

vocabulary, some grammar and other markers of identity (Eades 2013). Some funding agencies such as ILA explicitly refuse to support these new varieties.

Pathways for Indigenous linguists and language practitioners

The maintenance and revitalisation of First Nations languages requires good documentation in the form of dictionaries, reference and learner's grammars, phrase books, audio-visual recordings and text collections. Until recently, most of this work has been undertaken by non-Indigenous linguists, however there are increasing numbers of Indigenous linguists leading this work. Heiss' 'Bila' novel relied heavily on the work of Uncle Stan Grant Snr in remembering and describing Wiradjuri. At the heart of Butchella reclamation work is a dictionary compiled by Jeanie Bell, herself a Butchella person. Recent Noongar projects such as the 'Fist of Fury' are underpinned by the work of Noongar linguist, Clint Bracknell. The Jandai language has had the attention of two Indigenous linguists, Sandra Delaney and Gaja Kerry Charlton, who have in turn relied on the work of their forebear Aunty Margaret Iselin.

Many universities, TAFEs and Aboriginal Corporations are beginning to increase the number of Indigenous linguists by creating pathways and support for Indigenous students. The first stage is attracting high school students, who are often unaware that it is possible to study First Nations languages at universities. Many universities already have camps to provide Indigenous high school students with tertiary tasters, however the focus is often on engineering, health sciences, teaching and business. More work is needed to attract these students into undergraduate Linguistics programs. Further effort is also needed to progress Indigenous undergraduate students through to Honours and into RHD degrees. Summer/Winter Research Programs, such as those at the University of Queensland and ANU, provide paid internships for these students to further develop their linguistic skills beyond the classroom with dedicated support from academics.

In addition to this well-worn path in the Academy, other courses have become available in recent years to provide professional development opportunities to Indigenous language practitioners such as teachers, archivists, rangers and language support staff in various organisations. For example, the University of Sydney offers a Masters in Indigenous Languages Education (MILE) and a Certificate III in Gumbaynggirr Language and Cultural Maintenance is available at the Muurrbay Aboriginal Language and Culture Co-operative on the NSW Central Coast. The University of Queensland has also recently appointed two Indigenous Industry Fellows to develop a Graduate Diploma in Language Reclamation and Renewal.

Concluding remarks

Australia has the world's longest continuous collection of cultures, and Indigenous languages are key for the future survival of these cultures in the aftermath of the devastating effects of colonialism. They are shaped by the minds of individual speakers. They encode the social dynamics of groups over time. They support and transmit cultural practices. These languages are vital for ensuring a brighter future for younger Indigenous people, who face some of the highest suicide rates in the world. The continuity of First Nations languages, whether they survive in their entirety or in more transformed varieties, have demonstrated a resilience to silencing. First Nations languages, old and new, are finding new contexts in the classroom, visual and performing arts-based practices and on-Country programs.

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The Uluru Statement and the priority of a Voice

Thomas Mayor

I have been a member of the trade union movement since I commenced my working life at the port of Darwin at seventeen years old. It is there on the wharves, through the Maritime Union of Australia, that I learnt of the value of using the leverage of unity. I have seen individual workers uniting to make change at the workplace level; I have seen ports and state branches uniting to make change at the state level; and I have seen trade unions themselves, united in very specific campaigns to make major, lasting, national change that is to the benefit of *all* workers.

The union movement has won many a battle for workers and social justice. We have brought our society from one where workers were mere servants, punished for disobeying the master; we have come from a place where children were forced to labour in harsh conditions and First Nations people were slaves, to a society that now enjoys universal health care, weekends, various loadings, allowances and legislated rights. Each of these wins for the union movement and society were maligned by employers and right-wing politicians who warned of impending doom from our success. But their claims of Armageddon, should these changes happen, have been thoroughly proved as selfish fearmongering.

Workers and their communities have progressed so far because unions are organised at many levels, including at the highest political level since the establishment of the Australian Labor party. The working class has progressed because we have built strong and unapologetically representative structures that can influence laws and policies and organise to hold employers and politicians to account.

We are always under attack because of this.

I was a 20-year-old wharfie when Prime Minister John Howard colluded with the National Farmers Federation to silence the voice of maritime workers. In the middle of the night in April 1998, Patricks Stevedores sent balaclava clad mercenaries on to wharves around the country to physically drag us from our workplaces, locking us out of our livelihoods. It was part of the Howard Governments grand plan to silence all workers by destroying their unions.

Howard failed to destroy the MUA. Because of our long-standing structure, discipline, financial resources and the leverage of unity that the union movement had, after several months of battle on the streets and in the courts we victoriously marched back on to the wharves to work. Where Howard failed though, for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people as a collective, he succeeded. He attacked the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, a representative Voice for First Nations people. He used its flaws as a weapon, instead of dealing with its issues and building on its strengths. Since ATSIC was silenced, we have seen the Northern Territory Emergency Response, or Intervention, we have seen hundreds of millions of dollars misdirected away from the communities and services that are needed, and we have seen the gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous citizens widen. Divided, we suffer.

I have briefly described how unions have achieved great progress for workers and society in general because it is one of the ways I understand the significance of establishing a constitutionally enshrined First Nations Voice to Parliament, as called for in the Uluru Statement from the Heart. It is also how I understand that at Uluru, the 250 delegates, from throughout the Australian continent,

that shaped and endorsed the Uluru Statement, made the right decision, prioritising the Voice in our proposed sequence of change.

Before I go on, it is worth briefly recapping on how the Uluru Statement from the Heart came to be, and what has happened since.

The Uluru Statement from the Heart is an unprecedented national Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander consensus that came from the rare opportunity – an opportunity only achieved through relentless advocacy – to conduct a well-resourced and intensive series of dialogues culminating in a national constitutional convention at Uluru. The statement brings together the collective wisdom of over 200 years of struggle.

At that final convention in the heart of the nation, on 26 May 2017, we were 270 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people from throughout this great continent and from many different First Nations. The difficulty, the hard work, the passion of the debate and the achievement on the third and final morning – the achievement of a national consensus – cannot be underestimated for its national significance. The endorsement of the Uluru Statement was a political feat that should be recognised and celebrated. Predictably, the Turnbull Government did the opposite.

The call for a constitutionally enshrined Voice was officially dismissed by Prime Minister Turnbull in October of 2017, misinforming the Australian public that the proposal was for a third chamber in parliament. But this dismissal has been turned around by the weight of numbers – by a majority of Australians who say that if they were to have the opportunity to answer the invitation to walk with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in a referendum for a Voice, they would say YES.

To turn the dismissal around, a mountain of work has been done by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander advocates and our allies. A turn around that is even more remarkable because we have had few resources with which to campaign with; there has been no government support to educate people about the Uluru Statement and the reasons we gave for its proposals, nothing from which to even build a campaigning organisation. We were starting from scratch.

The Uluru Statement itself, the sacred canvas, 1.6 by 1.8m imbued with Anangu Tjukurrpa and the 250 names of representatives, proved to be our most powerful campaign tool. The Maritime Union of Australia, at the request of Aunty Pat Anderson who led the dialogue process to Uluru, seconded me to take the canvas around the country to inspire a peoples movement. For 18 months I hit the road and everywhere the Uluru Statement went, support multiplied.

Another key moment was when Wiradjuri and Wailwan lawyer, Teela Reid, challenged Malcolm Turnbull on national television exposing his ignorance and his lies.

In the Prime Minister's electorate of Wentworth, the grandchildren of the great Gurindji leader, Vincent Lingiari, engaged with voters to explain the bungling of the great opportunity the Uluru Statement provides – the opportunity to write the wrongs of the past in a way that the people who were wronged themselves had chosen.

At the Garma festival, the late John Christopherson, an Elder from Kakadu in Arnhem Land, spoke of the hope that the Uluru Statement gives this country, how there is nothing to lose, and 100,000 years of continuous culture to gain, by enshrining the Voices of First Nations people in the constitution.

A grass roots movement increasingly made it loud and clear that we were not going to take no for an answer to the Uluru Statement.

In 2018, moved by this growing movement of people who had learnt about the Uluru Statements call for a Voice, the government established the bi-partisan Joint Select Committee into the Constitutional Recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. Inevitably, the committee's final report recommended that the Voice is the most desired reform, and that a co-design process begin.

This year, the co-design groups appointed by the Morrison Government have consulted with the public. Over 5000 of the submissions from individuals and organisations, from all different backgrounds and from across the political spectrum, called for the Voice question to go to a referendum. The Voice co-design final report is with Government, and it will be released very soon. Surely, any fair-minded person would think the report will recommend a referendum in the next term of government.

Polling since 2017 has indicated a continuous growth in the numbers of Australians who will vote yes in a Voice referendum. The latest polling by CT Group from August, indicates 59% of voters would support a constitutionally enshrined Indigenous Voice to Parliament in a referendum.

Polling done specifically on Indigenous people has also grown. Support is now at 80%. For Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people who say they will vote yes, what compels them is that a voice is a unifying reform.

Which brings me to my conclusion.

The campaign for a constitutionally enshrined Voice is the most important campaign in our lifetimes. Because whether we are advocating for the revitalising and preserving First Nations languages, or truth-telling about this nations history, whether we are trying to strengthen our land rights, reform the justice system, or simply have more homes built in our remote communities – it all depends on our ability to build leverage and use it in a way that moves the nations ultimate decision makers in Canberra, and then to hold them to account if they fail or ignore us.

A constitutionally protected Voice precedes truth-telling in our priorities, firstly because truth-telling is happening. Great work is being done on truth telling including in this symposium, but most importantly, because truth-telling needs a Voice. What is the truth of the past without the political power to use it for our future?

A constitutionally protected Voice precedes treaty, not exclusively – treaty talks are already happening in the states. A Voice must be established with urgency to support treaty making where First Nations have chosen to do so, because in a federal system, it is the Commonwealth we must reckon with – with the power of the constitution behind us – more importantly than the states.

Finally, I reiterate these words: A constitutionally protected Voice.

We must constitutionally protect a Voice because governments like Howard's will always come along. As a union member I know: when a collective of grass roots people make those in power uncomfortable, they will move to silence them.

ATSIC was one of many Voices we have built to defy a governments mistreatment and cruelty, to bring our voices together in a chorus that cannot be ignored. Brother John Maynard is the grandson Fred Maynard, a fellow wharfie and one of our greatest leaders our people have walked in the footsteps of. He led the Australian Aboriginal Progressive Association in the 1920's, one of the

collective Voices that have been silenced. It's time to unite and build a structure of unity for First Nations that can never be silenced again.

I believe we can win a referendum to protect and empower our Voice. I believe we got it right in the Uluru Statement from the Heart. I believe you will accept the invitation to walk with us. Go to www.fromtheheart.com.au to learn more about how.

Climate change as a transformative opportunity for reconciliation

Bhiamie Williamson

For Indigenous peoples, climate change is a strategic opportunity. Settler-colonial systems, processes and institutions that have invariably led to the dispossession of Indigenous peoples from their lands and waters, and continue to perpetuate their marginalisation and discrimination, are being fundamentally recast in the face of climate change. The urgent need to transition the economies of the world, economies built upon resource extraction, production, and consumption, are undergoing rapid and irreversible change. The question therein is - will the adaptation of global political and economic systems be used as an opportunity to address historical injustices, so that we seek both a sustainable *and* just future? Or will the same systems and political forces that have produced anthropogenic climate change shapeshift (to use an Indigenous allegory) to reproduce institutions of inequality and patterns of exclusion? Both paths now lay before us.

The catastrophic 2019-20 bushfires epitomised what many had feared; that climate change is a present-day reality. A consequence of the bushfires has been an unparalleled interest in Indigenous peoples' cultural land management practices, and in particular, cultural burning. Previously a practice and academic field largely associated with northern and central Australia, due mostly to the legal recognition and return of lands to Indigenous groups, cultural burning as a practice and academic field of inquiry continues to expand into southern temperate Australia. This work has two central tenets beginning with the benefits associated with cultural burning. These include the propagation of native seeds banks, a reduction in invasive weeds and feral animals, safeguarding of landscapes due to reductions in forest litter and debris, connecting people, and in particular children, with their Country and culture, which altogether fosters resilient communities and landscapes. The second tenet has been the development of partnerships between Indigenous groups and external non-Indigenous agencies and organisations, including research institutions. These partnerships are critical to develop more effective and localised land and resource management programs and build relationships, but they offer much more. In an era of climate change, genuine and respectful collaborations offer moments of transformation, where non-Indigenous people and institutions are invited to view the situation with a wide-angle lens, examining the challenges in the context of their historical creation, and being made to see the invisible barriers curtailing adaptive practices.

Exploring a cultural burning program in the ACT, Freeman et al. (2021) highlight underlying factors that have created the conditions for success. They identify respect and justice as the foundations that the success of the program is built upon:

> It is clear to us that the Fire Management Unit (FMU) understands the cultural burning program as part of a justice agenda for the government to show greater respect to Ngunnawal and Ngambri people and is not simply another hazard reduction exercise (p. 122).

Neale et al. (2019) explored the notion of 'walking together' in a cultural burning project between Dja Dja Warrung people and government agencies in central Victoria. They observe:

> The collaboration is materially and structurally redistributing greater control over country into the hands of Aboriginal traditional owners. What is occurring is not decolonisation in the sense of a complete and irreversible transfer of authority, or withdrawal of settler colonial

government, but rather the iterative decolonising renovation of the political and practical dominance of settler agencies (p. 355).

Nursey-Bray et al. (2020) reflected further in their study of climate adaptation by the Arabana people of South Australia. They considered how deep engagement with the knowledges of Arabana people fundamentally recast their project and what they aimed to do:

> The journey we took led us not to a conventional documentation of risks and perceptions about climate change, couched in Western scientific traditions and terminologies, but resulted in an almost immediate re orientation of our ways of seeing and doing, based on reflexive and continual feedback from our Arabana colleagues (p. 147).

These examples demonstrate the depth of opportunity. Engaging with Indigenous peoples through initiatives such as cultural burning, provides the transformative opportunity to both develop more innovative, robust, and effective land management practices, as well as the opportunity to *see* the world differently. Seeing the world through an Indigenous lens prospectively frames, or reframes, the challenges presented by anthropogenic climate change.

Casting an Indigenous lens over many established western institutional conventions problematises and fundamentally recasts the approach. For instance, priorities for emergency management agencies responding to a disaster are, in order of importance - life, property, and environment. Yet from an Indigenous perspective, life and property exist *within* the environment, and so management of the environment is paramount. Additional transformative opportunities exist when engaging with the notion of 'natural' landscapes.

Fletcher et al. (2021) explore the careful construction of 'wilderness' and engage with this from an Indigenous perspective, revealing the western invention of wilderness. Fletcher et al. (2021) point out that all landscapes where humans cohabit are cultural constructions, with the notion of wilderness invented by western academics and policy makers to justify the legal construction and management conventions of protected areas. Ironically, the myth of wilderness remains a key tool in the continued dispossession of Indigenous peoples from their lands and waters.

Though these ideas may be new or considered emerging in western literature, Indigenous peoples have been advocating and agitating for these approaches, and their inclusion in mainstream policies and programs, for generations. One notable example is the creation of the 'Budj Bim Cultural Landscape' in western Victoria. Following formal recognition of the Gunditjmara people as Traditional Owners over the areas formerly known as Mt Eccles National Park, the Gunditjmara people took steps to reclaim their Country both physically, as well as culturally and conceptually. Gunditjmara people, through a Settlement Agreement with the Victorian State Government, successfully negotiated the return of their Country as well as the renaming of Mt Eccles National Park to the Budj Bim Cultural Landscape (Smith et al., 2019). They also led development of an application to the World Heritage Committee to have the region and in particular, the ancient system of Eel Traps developed by their ancestors, recognised as a World Heritage site (Smith et al., 2019). This bid was successful and in 2019 Budj Bim Cultural Landscape, including their Eel Traps, were listed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site, being recognised for its outstanding cultural values (UNESCO, 2019). I suggest that whilst the Budj Bim Cultural Landscape is unique, for Indigenous peoples, the idea is not. I ask that people consider; what would a national park, or system of protected areas, look like from an Indigenous perspective? How might it be conceptually different? And in what ways would its management be unique and distinctive? Whilst these are interesting intellectual questions, they are necessary political conversations.

The thinking and practices that have produced anthropogenic climate change are insufficient and inadequate to addressing it. To realise, or at the very least, try, to do things differently in the face of increasing and more severe climate change-driven disasters, we must consider the ways in which the preconditions for adaptation are enabled or constrained. To return to the example of 'wilderness', we must be willing to reconsider the notion of protected areas and national parks, moving instead to a more pluralistic and pragmatic understanding of cultural landscapes. This requires a willingness to both *think* differently and *do* differently. But canvassing the range of policies and legislation throughout Australia reveals that even if we were willing to think and do differently, we are held back by a legal landscape anchored in colonial fantasies of wilderness. For example, in NSW, our most populace state and the state hardest hit by the 2019-20 bushfires, the overarching legislation that continues to dictate the protection and management of protected areas is the *National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974*. How is it that we can foster adaptive practices when we are constrained by a regulatory environment 47 years old, devised at a time when climate change was almost unheard of, and barely seven years after Indigenous people were recognised as possessing citizenship rights (following the successful 1967 referendum), let alone any consideration of the unique rights of Indigenous people such as native title or land rights. It is clear that the regulatory environment in Australia more generally, but in particular NSW, needs thorough re-examination. This process must be guided by a central question of whether the regulatory environment is facilitating adaptation, or constraining it?

Engaging with Indigenous peoples must move beyond add-ons or enhancements, where Indigenous peoples' knowledge systems and practices are relegated to the past, or only partially capable of being integrated into an already established and immovable western way of life. For instance, despite the gradual increase in cultural burning programs, particularly in southern temperate Australia, it remains viewed as an additional activity, hyper-local in scale, and something of a feel-good project that offers photogenic opportunities for local agencies. It is a practice that continues to be arrested at the point where it can contribute most – the widespread redefining of the notion of a healthy landscape and the role of fire in creating it.

Approaches to cultural burning currently continue to fail in grasping the larger import and thus reinforces pejorative colonial stereotypes. What is missed in these moments is the opportunity to harness Indigenous knowledges to frame the problem itself. This unlearning of established western modalities, and relearning of pluralistic, culturally informed methods and approaches, can only genuinely occur when the self-empowerment Indigenous peoples already possess, is matched with due respect, understanding, and commitment to Indigenous self-determination from non-Indigenous peoples and institutions. In this way, adaptation is being facilitated, and resilience built, through a process of renegotiated power-relations.

Climate change is both an existential threat to humanity, as well as humanity's much needed kick up the ass. It offers a moment to stop, think, question, and make choices about our ways of life. It requires changes in attitudes and values as well as institutions, and it requires these urgently. The tangible vision we need to respond to climate change *must* be stitched together with a vision for a more just and equitable nation. In this way, the ancient wisdom possessed by Indigenous peoples — wisdom which includes knowledges and memory of climate change and successful adaptation on this continent — can form a central part of Australia's response to climate change, and the unrealised vision of a genuine reconciliation may also, finally, be attainable.

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Session Two: Can Australia better manage international relationships and responsibilities in a changing world?

Chaired by James Fox

Rogue Nation? Asylum seekers, climate change, and unproductive claims about Australia's reputation.

Klaus Neumann

In memory of Janna Thompson FASSA FAHA (1942-2022)

"Australia is … making an outsized contribution to the global crisis we face, and our leaders are obstructive in international negotiations," David Ritter, the CEO of Greenpeace Australia Pacific, for example, said in August 2021 (Greenpeace Australia Pacific 2021). "Our country [is] increasingly seen as a rogue state on climate." This is one of many similar claims in recent years, according to which Australia's international reputation has been ruined, either because of the government's indifference towards climate change, or because of Australia's stance on asylum seekers arriving by boat.

If Australia were indeed a rogue state, it would be in select but dubious company. It was the first Clinton administration that designated as rogue states those regimes that were considered to flout international rules and agreements, support terrorism, develop weapons of mass destruction and suppress human rights (Klare 1995; Homolar 2011; Litwak 2012). At the time they included North Korea, Libya, Iraq, Iran and Cuba. Clinton's Republican predecessors Ronald Reagan and George Bush had similarly singled out "renegade" or "outlaw" states. Although the State Department temporarily dropped the designation "rogue state" in favour of "state of concern" in 2000 (O'Sullivan 2000), the idea remained that the behaviour of certain regimes justified the United States' ostracising and punishing them.

The Greenpeace CEO was not the first to turn the term "rogue state" back on the very governments that had taken the moral high ground vis-à-vis the likes of Kim Il-sung, Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milošević. William Blum (2000), for example, described the United States as a "Mecca of hypocrisy" that harbours terrorists, bankrolls human rights violators and pays little heed to international rules and norms. American hypocrisy also inspired books by Noam Chomsky (2000) and Jacques Derrida (2005). Similarly, Viktor Parma and Werner Vontobel (2009) argued that Switzerland ought to be regarded as a rogue state for facilitating tax evasion on a global scale.

Suggestions that Australia is, or is considered to be, a rogue state in relation to its approach to climate change have been made in the context of Australian public debate (for example, Lowe 2000; Bandt 2019; 6513) and by outsiders, such as the Marshall Islands' climate change minister Tony deBrum (Australia Network News 2013). It is, however, in relation to the government's migration policy that the epithet "rogue state" has been most often applied. In 2021, for example, after the deportation of a fifteen-year-old permanent resident of Australia, the New Zealand Greens foreign affairs spokesperson Golriz Ghahraman said Australia was an "outlier" and a "rogue nation" that should be referred to the United Nations (McGowan 2021). In 2014, Alistair Nicholson, the former chief justice of the Family Court, likened the government's plans to send asylum seekers to Cambodia to "behaving, I think, as a rogue nation" (Cannane 2014), and Greg Barns (2014), a former chief of staff of Liberal Party politician and federal finance minister John Fahey, wrote in the Hobart *Mercury* that Australia "is the newest member of the infamous rogue state club" — both on account of the government's asylum seeker policy *and* because of its response to global warming.

When Barns, Nicholson and Ritter said that Australia might be considered a rogue nation or rogue state, they used the term in a loose sense, ignoring some of the specific attributes identified by US State Department officials in the 1990s. They were suggesting that Australia was acting outside internationally agreed rules and norms, and/or that its actions were jeopardising the wellbeing of other nations, if not imperiling the global commons.

Such accusations have been well-founded. International lawyers (for example, McAdam & Chong 2019), Australian and international human rights NGOs such as Amnesty International (for example, AI 2016), various UN rapporteurs and committees (for example, Crépeau 2017) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (for example, UNHCR 2020) have repeatedly and justifiably condemned Australia's response to asylum seekers, including pushbacks, mandatory and potentially indefinite immigration detention, and the deportation of asylum seekers to former colonies.

When it comes to climate change, Australia has long been one of the world's prime greenhouse gas emitters on a per capita basis, as well as a leading exporter of fossil fuels (Yanguas Parra *et al.* 2019; Olivier & Peters 2020: 67; Climate Action Tracker 2021). It has also long been a prominent nay-sayer at a succession of international meetings, and one of those slowing down progress on global action against climate change. Ritter had good reason to sound the alarm in August 2021, a couple of months before the COP26 negotiations. The Australian government committed to a zero emissions target by 2050 but without revealing a roadmap to show how that target could be reached. At the same time it refused to revise its target for 2030, instead lauding the "Australian way" (Morrison 2021), which includes a "gas-fired recovery" (Prime Minister of Australia 2020) and a continuation of coal mining "for decades to come" (Moore 2021).

The point made by Australian critics of government policy, as well as by deBrum, Ghahraman and other outside observers, who suggested that Australia's response to climate change and/or its treatment of asylum seekers could be regarded as befitting that of a rogue nation, usually implied that previously – before the *Tampa* affair and the Howard government's refusal to sign the Kyoto Protocol – Australia's reputation had been untarnished. However, some of Australia's Asian neighbours held highly unfavourable views of Australia during the 1950s and 1960s, well before the term "rogue state" was first officially used, because of the racist White Australia policy (Brawley 1995: 242-251, 297-320). Memories of that policy persisted long after it was officially abandoned in 1973. In the Philippines, for example, echoes of White Australia and the infamous Gamboa case of the late 1940s reverberated in 2005 when it was discovered that Vivian Alvarez Solon, an Australian citizen born in the Philippines, had been unlawfully deported from Australia four years earlier (Neumann 2005; see Comrie 2005). Australia was also criticised in the United Nations in the 1960s because it held on to Papua New Guinea long after most British and French colonies in Africa and Asia had become independent (Pyman 1980: 263-264).

From the 1990s, Australia attracted criticism over Indigenous rights issues, including the government's native title legislation in the wake of the Wik judgement, the Howard government's refusal to apologise to the Stolen Generations, and the disproportionate number of Indigenous people who died in custody, and mandatory sentencing laws that disproportionately affect Indigenous youths.

Australia's self-perception as a model international citizen, on the one hand, and international perceptions of Australia, on the other, have often been at odds. Not everybody outside Australia thinks first of reefs, beaches and the outback, or the Sydney Olympics, when Australia comes up in

conversation. Yet although Australia's reputation may have suffered further because of the government's response to asylum seekers and its approach to climate change, we should not mistake the criticism of international human rights and refugee experts, of climate scientists, and of Indigenous rights, refugee rights and climate change activists, for the response of overseas publics. In fact, as far as I can tell, the overwhelming majority of references to Australia's being considered a rogue nation have originated in Australia. Europeans, for example, tend to be puzzled, rather than outraged, by Australia's response to asylum seekers (see Neumann 2016: 238) and by its stance on climate change.

In 2020 Austrade published the *Global Sentiment Monitor*, the results of a survey about Australia's reputation in five Asian countries, Britain and the United States. It found that the country's global reputation remains strong. Only when read between the lines, does the survey suggest that there is room for improvement: "To grow our reputation, we need to demonstrate the high quality of our products and services, our clean, green produce, effective climate policies, fair immigration policies, and positive contribution to global issues." (Austrade 2020: 9) While there is no doubt that the government's climate change policies, in particular, have had a negative impact on Australia's international reputation, claims that it "has been shredded" (Dahlstrom 2021; see also Kassam 2021) exaggerate the issue. Most people in East Asia, North America and Europe probably still associate Australia far more closely with an enviable lifestyle than with the poor life expectancy of Indigenous Australians, the incarceration of asylum seekers or the volume of coal shipped from the Port of Newcastle. Even New Zealanders, who tend to know more about their trans-Tasman neighbours than people in faraway Europe, may point to underarm bowling before mentioning the detention and deportation of fellow citizens.

Australians' overestimation of the critical attention their nation attracts has also been at play with regards to the country's asylum seeker policies: both the government and refugee advocates have exaggerated how much these policies repulsed, or appealed to, publics overseas, particularly in Europe, and the extent to which other countries were prepared to emulate them. Such overestimation could also be the result of a misconception about the originality of Australia's rogue behaviour. Australia is not the only country that has ignored calls by scientists to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Canada under prime minister Jean Chrétien, for example, was singled out as a "rogue state" on climate before that term first appeared in the Australian discussion (see Broadhead 2001). And Australia did not invent the extraterritorial processing and detention of asylum seekers; they were already practised by the United States in the Caribbean (Dastyari 2015).

The claim that others regard Australia as a rogue nation might be intended to prompt the government to change tack lest the nation's reputation were tarnished. However, governments that pride themselves on snubbing their international partners, could even consider the information that their actions upset some people overseas, a feather in their cap. Australian governments, which usually pay close attention to how Australia has been perceived overseas (see, for example, Zifcak 2003), usually did not need reminding by members of the public. After all, it was not least critical *international* attention that contributed to the demise of the White Australia policy.

I would like to suggest that a focus on Australia's presumed "rogue" status is unproductive, both overseas and in Australian domestic public debate. In other industrialised countries, a focus on the Morrison government's stance detracts from the fact that most governments are remiss of effectively addressing climate change (Boehm *et al.* 2021; Nascimento *et al.* 2021). In Australia,

statements such as Ritter's appeal to the audience's nationalism (which sometimes manifests as a reverse pride in the nation's flaws). Such an appeal is questionable not least because a focus on the national interest (rather than the flourishing and, indeed, survival of humankind) is at the heart of the predicament that we are currently facing.

It is possible to mount a strong case for an alternative response to asylum seekers: rather than referring to Australia's reputation, or to economic losses or gains for Australia, criticism of the government's policies ought to focus on Australia's capacity to assist people in need of a new home, its responsibility as a regional power, its legal obligations as a member of the international community and, most importantly, the precarious circumstances of the men, women and children who are seeking Australia's protection. At the same time, more attention ought to be paid to the underlying historical reasons for the popularity of a punitive asylum seeker regime; they include not least the nation's settler-colonial past and present (see, for example, Hage 1998).

Similarly, the reasons for Australia's love affair with coal – which include the longstanding outsized political influence of the fossil fuel industry (Hamilton 2007; Wright *et al.* 2021) – also deserve closer scrutiny. And rather than focusing on Australia's reputation or the economic gains involved in a transformation of the Australian economy, we may instead want to foreground arguments that explain why such measures are desirable: because all countries need to deal with climate change to the best of their ability, and because Australia has specific obligations as a wealthy industrialised country that has produced a comparatively large amount of greenhouse gases on a per capita basis.

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Will we go to war with China?

Hugh White

The question no longer seems hypothetical. Last year the Prime Minister compared the dangers today to those of the late 1930s. This year the Defence Minister has repeatedly warned of the risk of war with China over Taiwan. Whether war breaks out is now, he has said, '[a question for the Chinese](.)' That suggests that as far as he is concerned the decision is already made: if China attacks Taiwan, we will follow America to war.

One hopes they are taking their own warnings seriously, because we are indeed in the midst of an acute strategic crisis. The risk of war between America and China over Taiwan is quite high and the implications for Australia are exceptionally grave. The source of that risk goes much deeper than the Taiwan issue itself. That issue is simply the focus of the strategic contest between America and China over which of them will be the primary strategic power in East Asia over the decades ahead. Both see the issue as the test of their relative power and resolve. The one that backs down over Taiwan will concede the contest for regional leadership to the one that prevails.

This contest arises because China, as its wealth and power have grown, has ceased to accept America's long-standing position as the primary power in Asia. It wants to push America out of the region and take its place. This is not surprising: China is doing precisely what rising powers throughout history have done. If it can displace America from its leadership position, China is well-positioned to take its place, so the most likely alternative to the old *status quo* is Chinese primacy over East Asia and the Western Pacific.

China's ambitions raise big, and in some ways unprecedented, questions for Australia about the international setting in which we operate, and about what we can do to shape it. Since 1788 our place in the region has always been framed by the predominant power of our 'Anglo-Saxon' allies - first Britain then America. For the first time now we face a future in which the region's, and indeed the world's, most powerful state is not 'Anglo-Saxon', and is not our ally. It is the biggest shift in Australia's international setting since British settlement, and it makes new demands on our foreign and strategic policy making.

For as long as Australia has had a foreign policy, our first priority and primary focus has been to do whatever we can, in peace and war, to support the regional preponderance of our 'great and powerful friends'. That has been, overall, rather successful for us in the past, and so today our political leaders - on both sides of politics - are seeking to take the same approach. Behind the talk of 'the rules-based order' and 'a free and open Indo-pacific' is a simple, almost primal objective - to resist China's growing power and ambition by encouraging and supporting Washington to defend and perpetuate its regional primacy. If necessary, it seems, by going to war with China.

Of course, no one in Canberra or Washington wants a war, or expects one. They hope and expect that the mere threat of war will make China back off. But China is playing the same game, hoping that their threats of war will make America back off. Both sides assume the other is bluffing. That is a dangerous assumption. Probably neither side is quite sure whether they themselves are bluffing or not, but in an escalating crisis countries often find it harder to admit that they have been bluffing than they expected, and decide that going to war is the less-bad option. Usually this turns out to be

very wrong. This is how wars between great powers have often started in the past, when neither side wanted to fight.

So, we in Australia would be unwise to join this game unless we are clear in our own minds whether we are bluffing or not. We therefore need to ask ourselves whether going to war with China to defend the US-led order in Asia would be the right and prudent thing to do. And just to be clear, the question is not whether we prefer to live in a US-led order or a Chinese-led order. I think it is perfectly clear that we would and should prefer US leadership. But should we be willing to go to war with China for it?

There are different ways to approach this issue, but let's start with the quintessential policymaker's question: will it work? Can Australia secure a stable regional order conducive to our interests and values by going to war with China at America's side? And the first step to answering that question is to ask what kind of war would it be and will we win it?

If it goes beyond a mere skirmish, a war between America and China over Taiwan would be the first between major powers since 1945, and the first between nuclear-armed states. It would be a primarily a maritime war, and until quite recently America would have been sure of a swift, cheap victory because maritime war is America's *forte*. But in the past 25 years China has successfully developed formidable air and naval capabilities specifically to counter US forces in the Western Pacific, so now the most likely outcome is a costly and inclusive stalemate.

The scale of forces on both sides means it would swiftly become the biggest war since 1945. After a few days or weeks both sides would have lost a lot of ships and aircraft and suffered a lot of casualties, but neither side would have inflicted enough damage on the other to force it to concede. Both sides would then consider threatening to use nuclear weapons to break the stalemate, and no one could be sure whether or when those threats might be fulfilled. On balance one would have to say that the chances of the war going nuclear are quite high. The chances of America winning such a war are very low - and whether Australia, or even Japan, joins the fight makes very little difference to this outcome.

That has two implications. First, going to war with China will not work to preserve US leadership in Asia; indeed, it will more likely destroy it. That means we in Australia cannot expect to preserve the regional order we'd prefer by going to war for it. Once war starts that order would probably be utterly destroyed.

Second, America's dwindling chances of winning make its threats to fight less credible in Beijing, which makes it more likely that the Chinese will provoke a crisis to call America's bluff. All this means that threatening war is not a prudent policy, and actually going to war would be a very big policy mistake. The cost of such a war, in both blood and treasure, would be almost unthinkably large. The costs of war would probably be far higher than the costs of living under a new Chinese-led regional order. The policymaker's cost/benefit analysis does not appear to support going to war, but we have not yet begun seriously to debate these questions.

But what of our values? Some would say that the issues we confront go beyond the policymaker's juggling of costs and benefits. A Chinese-led order in Asia would put at risk fundamental moral precepts which many would argue should never be comprised at any cost. It is credible to argue, for example, that Taiwan's robust democracy should not be subjugated to Beijing's increasingly authoritarian rule under any circumstances. But those who see the question this way should be clear

about the scale of the costs involved in acting on that basis. There is a mortal imperative to avoid war, and perhaps especially to avoid nuclear war, which must be balanced against the imperative to support democracy against authoritarianism. We have not yet begun seriously to debate the competing claims of these seemingly incompatible imperatives.

Australia today needs to start debating these questions, which are perhaps comparable to the challenge of climate change in their importance for our future, and may prove to be even more urgent. Things are moving fast, as the recent AUKUS decision shows, and events could force a once-and-for-all decision on our governments literally at any time.

So far, at least, our national political institutions have failed to engage these issues effectively. Both sides of politics have been content to assume that what has worked for Australia in the past will work in future, despite the fundamental change in the distribution of wealth and power which drives today's crisis. So they cannot imagine any policy for Australia except to support whatever Washington decides to do, and they cannot imagine that policy not working. And to be fair, the wider community of advisers, analysts, commentators and yes, even academics have not so far done much to nudge them along or fill the gap.

Our predecessors sometimes did better. When Australia has faced major strategic shifts in the past - the crisis of British power in the decades before 1914, the collapse of the post-World War One order in Europe and Asia over the 1930s, the collapse of European empires in Asia after World War Two, the crisis of alliance confidence in the late 1960s - both political leaders and wider circles of advice and opinion were quick to recognise problems and explore solutions.

Today we seem ill-prepared as a nation to deal with these questions. There may be several reasons for that, but one of them is perhaps our unfamiliarity, compared to those earlier generations, with power politics as a force in national life and international affairs. It is three decades since the end of the Cold War, and fifty years since Nixon's visit to China marked the end of the Cold War in Asia. No one now active in public life as political leader, policy adviser, analyst or commentator has personal lived experience of the way powerful nations shape and reshape the international order. They must rely on what we who study such things can offer to help them understand what is going on and how to respond.

So, what should we be offering, to help Australia handle the current crisis better? Here are four suggestions.

First, a clearer understanding of the fundamental shift in the global distribution of wealth and power which is driving it. Too much of our thinking seems to assume that the rise of China is an anomaly that will soon pass and the West's material and strategic preponderance in Asia and globally will be restored. That is just wishful thinking.

Second, a better understanding of the ways the regional and global orders can and will change as a result of this shift in power, and of what that might mean for us. Too much of our thinking today assumes that the only kind of international order that we can contemplate is one framed and upheld by Western, and especially American, power. We need to understand better what the alternatives are.

Third, we need to explore how Australia can best adapt to the changes which are coming, both by helping to shape whatever new order emerges to suit our values and interest, and by learning how best to work and flourish within whatever new order eventually emerges from the current crisis.

Fourth, we need to help Australia recognize and accept that we will not emerge from this crisis unchanged, any more than we emerged unchanged from earlier crises and challenges. Australia has been shaped in profound ways in response to past shifts in the international order - think of Federation, 'populate or perish', and the end of White Australia. As those examples, show, this need not be something to fear. Certainly, we need not fear change so much that, in a futile attempt to avoid it, we plunge into a major war we cannot win.

Uptight and uncomfortable: Australia's engagement with the global human rights regime

Renée Jeffery

Human rights occupy a curiously uncomfortable place in Australian foreign policy. Like liberal democracies the world over, Australia's foreign policy is built on principles of freedom, equality, respect for democratic values, and the rule of law. It is a foreign policy overtly committed to advancing human rights through multilateral institutions and bilateral dialogues, and which views human rights both as intrinsic goods and as a foundation on which peace and prosperity are built. (Australian Government 2017; p.88-9) It is a foreign policy that has seen Australia campaign for and win election to a coveted seat on the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council (2018-2020), engage as an enthusiastic participant in assessing the human rights performance of member states through its Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process, and emerge as a vocal advocate for a range of issues including gender equality, abolition of the death penalty, freedom of expression, and the establishment of strong national human rights institutions (NHRIs; Maguire, McGaughey & Monaghan 2019; McGaughey 2017).

Yet Australian foreign policy is also marked by a deep reluctance to 'impose values on others,' to take consistent and decisive action against countries that systematically violate their populations' human rights, or to speak up against some of the world's most egregious abuses. (Australian Government 2017) Preferring 'quiet diplomacy' to overt criticism, Australia's self-avowed pragmatism has earned it a reputation for being soft on human rights, for letting economic interests override democratic principles, and for signalling 'tacit acceptance' of repressive regimes that routinely violate human rights. (Pearson 2013) Reflecting these sentiments, it has faced criticism for failing to use its voice on the UN Human Rights Council to challenge the arbitrary detention of around one million Uyghurs in the Chinese province of Xinjiang, to call for investigations into the tens of thousands of extrajudicial killings thought to have taken place during the Philippines' President Rodrigo Duterte's 'war on drugs', or to take the lead on any country-specific issues. (Pearson 2019; MacDonald 2019)

While Foreign Minister Marise Payne raised concerns over the treatment of minorities in Xinjiang, as well as human rights violations in North Korea, Rakhine State in Myanmar, Venezuela, Syria and Yemen, in a speech to the Human Rights Council in September 2020, this came only as Australia's term was drawing to a close. It also came in a context in which Australia was itself facing significant criticism for its own human rights record.

Australia's most recent Universal Periodic Review provided a mixed assessment of its human rights performance. On the positive side, the HRC Working Group on UPR welcomed 'progress made in the realisation of human rights' in Australia since its 2015 review, highlighting its ratification of the Optional Protocol on the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OP-CAT) and legalisation of same-sex marriage in 2017 and, more recently, the development of the National Agreement on Closing the Gap. (United Nations 2021) More critically, however, it also raised concerns over Australia's treatment of refugees and asylum seekers, First Nations peoples, and children. Among its key recommendations were:

i.   ending the mandatory detention and offshore processing of asylum seekers to meet its obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention;

ii.   raising the minimum age of criminal responsibility from 10 to at least 14, in line with the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and

iii.   promoting the rights of Indigenous people, reducing discrimination and inequality, and taking measures to address the high rate of incarceration among First Nations people.

In response, the Australian government accepted many of the Working Group's recommendations 'to reduce the overrepresentation of First Nations people in the criminal justice system' but roundly rejected calls to end mandatory detention of asylum seekers and to prohibit the detention of refugee and asylum seeker children. (Human Rights Watch) It noted that the age of criminal responsibility is an issue on which the states must also have a say, referring to Australia's federal political structure to deflect and defer the matter. It also rejected recommendations for the ratification of several international human rights instruments, including the International Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and their Families, the International Convention on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, and the Optional Protocol on the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. These recommendations had previously been made and rejected during the 2015 UPR process.

Despite its active commitment to monitoring other states' human rights practices through multilateral institutions, Australia has been reluctant to implement recommendations made by those same institutions concerning its own performance. In 2017, the UN Human Rights Committee castigated Australia for its 'chronic non-compliance' with the committee's recommendations and criticised its habit of picking and choosing which international human rights laws and treaties to follow. The Committee's vice-chair, Yuval Shany remarked in this regard that Australia's behaviour is 'incredible for a country that claims to have a leading role in global human rights.' (Doherty 2017)

What explains Australia's at times contradictory, often hypocritical, and perennially uncomfortable engagement with the global human rights regime? Why is Australia so uptight and uncomfortable about human rights?

To answer those questions, I draw on a now-famous trope of former Prime Minister, John Howard. In 1996, Howard revealed his wish for Australians to be comfortable and relaxed about three things: their history, their present, and their future. I argue that where human rights are concerned, Australia is deeply uncomfortable and uptight about all three and, moreover, that it should not be relaxed about its past or present human rights performance. This is not to suggest that Australia has not made many positive contributions to the global human rights regime or that its human rights record has been consistently abominable. But it is to suggest that past and present injustices that Australia fails to acknowledge and fails to address shape its engagement with the international human rights regime and are likely to continue doing so for the foreseeable future. Those injustices have tended to centre on issues of immigration, whether by migrant workers or asylum seekers, and the treatment of Australia's Indigenous population. In this sense, Australia's most recent UPR simply echoes concerns about its human rights practices that have been raised in the international community and at home since the middle of the nineteenth century.

I also argue that the reason for this sense of discomfort can be explained, at least in part, in the over-riding dominance of two key concerns that underpin Australia's understanding of human rights, its engagement with other members of the international community, and with the international human rights regime: unity and prosperity. These concerns emerged in the settler colonial politics and foreign affairs of the 1830s and, although they have at times worked in concert and at others sat in

tension with one another, they continue to mark Australia's foreign policy and engagement with human rights.

Turning to the past, two among several similar issues demonstrate how these dual concerns helped lay the foundations of Australia's engagement with human rights in its foreign affairs: the so-called 'Chinese Question' and the importation of South Sea Islanders to work as indentured labourers, primarily in Queensland's sugar industry. In both cases, basic early ideas of human rights, which centred on liberty, freedom of movement, free will, and benevolence (freedom from harm) came into direct contention with the pursuit of national unity and prosperity. In both cases arguments in favour of immigration restriction centred on fears that increased non-white immigration would be detrimental to white wages and businesses, as well as the idea that social and cultural unity required racial homogeneity. In the Chinese case, supporters of immigration restriction cast aside arguments defending the human rights of Chinese migrants, criticised members of the anti-Chinese movement as 'enemies of human rights' and chastised them for their 'inhumanity and cruelty.' (The Sydney Morning Herald; 6 August 1861, p.2) Yet, even then, the tensions remain. As one article in the *Sydney Morning Herald* proclaimed:

> …we believe the colony is…outraging humanity by its treatment of this race….We believe there are sacred rights which belong to human beings, among them is the right to go anywhere in search of honest subsistence...we wish there were not a Chinese in the colony. (The Sydney Morning Herald; 9 Oct 1960, p.4)

Where the importation of South Sea Islander labourers was concerned, critics of the practice drew explicitly on human rights principles. Replicating arguments used by British abolitionists to campaign against unjust labour practices after the formal abolition of slavery, local and international critics routinely cast the Pacific Island labour trade as a form of 'incipient slavery' due to the prevalence of kidnapping and deception among recruiters, physical abuse suffered by recruited islanders, and disregard for their right to liberty which, as Justice Lutwyche established in one of the few blackbirding cases to be heard in a court of law, 'is inherent in all human beings.' (The Brisbane Courier 1867) Yet, for much of the nineteenth century, the idea that Pacific Islanders held the same universal human rights as the white settler population was swept aside in favour of arguments supporting the practice as a means of ensuring the cheap labour that was necessary to ensure the growing prosperity of the sugar industry.

The sense that universal rights could be conceived to meet the demands of unity and prosperity echoed the earlier argument, articulated during debate over the Chinese Question, which suggested that although individual liberty and rights, such as freedom of movement, were theoretically universal on account of the common humanity of all human being, the exercise of those rights was the exclusive preserve of white settlers. (Lake & Reynolds 2008) It also found form in debate over the 1901 Immigration Restriction Bill, the centrepiece of the White Australia Policy, driven by both economic motivations and national/racial sentiments, with Prime Minister Edmund Barton's claim:

> I do not think either that the doctrine of equality of man was really ever intended to include racial equality. There is no racial equality. There is basic inequality. (House of Representatives 1901)

This understanding of human rights did not only apply to would-be immigrants but was felt most acutely by Australia's First Nations who suffered violence, dispossession, discrimination, and dehumanisation at the hands of the white settler community. The ramifications of those abuses

continue to be felt by successive generations of Indigenous Australians and, as its most recent UPR demonstrates, reverberate in Australia's engagement with the contemporary human rights regime. Along with its past immigration policies and treatment of South Sea Islanders, it forms part of a past that, inadequately acknowledged and redressed, limits Australia's ability to lead on matters of human rights.

If we turn now to the present, we can find plenty of evidence of the continued relevance that the pursuit of unity and prosperity play in Australia's engagement with the international human rights regime. One obvious place we find it is in the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper. Across a range of issue areas, the White Paper mentions prosperity a staggering 87 times. While prosperity is often viewed as an end in and of itself, it is also coupled with other foreign policy objectives, including security, peace, and human rights. Human rights, we are told, 'underpin peace and prosperity', while Australia's engagement with the Pacific Islands, Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste is '[a] shared agenda for security and prosperity.' (Australian Government 2017; pp 86 & 99) Unity is viewed through a slightly different lens than in the past. The term itself has been replaced by the idea of social cohesion and coupled with multiculturalism in place of earlier views on race now deemed unacceptable. What has not changed is its close relationship with prosperity. The *White Paper* tell us that '[b]y generating more and better paying jobs, a strong and flexible economy reinforces the social cohesion and resilience of Australian society.' (Australian Government 2017; p 13) They also continue to inform Australia's approach to issues of migration and criticisms of its treatment of asylum seekers: 'Without a well-managed migration program, the cohesion of our society could be damaged and community support for our humanitarian program would be unsustainable.' (Australian Government 2017) This argument was replicated in Australia's response to the 2020 Universal Periodic Review.

So, what of the future? What can Australia do?

i. Confront its past: without acknowledging and redressing the injustices of our own past, it is very difficult for Australia to be a credible leader in the international human rights regime. This is not to say that only the 'perfect' can comment on rights violations. Rather, it is to point out that when a state like Australia professes to take on a leadership role in the global human rights regime while doggedly refusing to address the egregious injustices of its past or present, it undermines its own credibility.

ii. Stop picking and choosing which human rights agreements to uphold

iii. Take a really hard look at the core underlying principles that direct our engagement with the international human rights regime. Is prosperity really our core interest? Should it be? And does social cohesion require the sorts of policies it is said to justify? Would the humane treatment of asylum seekers in accordance with our international obligations really be damaging to social cohesion? And is that a society we actually want to be part of?

In short, improving Australia's engagement with the international human rights regime means, first and foremost, taking a hard look at ourselves, at our past and our present, at who we are, what we value, and what sort of society we want to be.

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Existential threats, shared responsibility, and Australia's role in "coalitions of the obligated."[1]

Toni Erskine

We live precariously, and often complacently, in the company of existential threats: catastrophic hazards that severely imperil human flourishing and survival. After more than seventy-five years of co-existing with nuclear weapons, current tensions with China remind us, again, of the ever-present possibility of nuclear war. New technologies, particularly artificial intelligence, are deemed by some to be emerging existential threats.[2] Anthropogenic climate change, the devastating impact of which was brought home to Australians by the 2019-2020 'Black Summer' bushfires, threatens global disaster in the absence of radical changes to how we inhabit the earth and use its resources. And COVID-19 embodies yet another, newly arrived, existential challenge. Last year, in a draft resolution, the ten non-permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council described COVID-19 as nothing less than 'a threat to *humanity*'.[3] The pandemic has now killed more than 5 million people worldwide.[4]

In the face of this current proliferation of existential threats, Australia must recognise a particular type of responsibility – one that requires prior steps of coordination and cooperation with other actors in order to discharge. In short, Australia must embrace the idea of *shared responsibility* in international politics. I want to address, briefly, what shared responsibility means for Australia – and its international relationships – in relation to the final two potential global catastrophic harms just outlined: climate chaos and COVID-19.

Existential Threats and Australia's Remedial Moral Responsibilities

Existential threats boast significant common features that accompany their danger to human flourishing and survival. The peril they pose is impervious to borders. Moreover, they cannot be expelled from one state alone – however powerful, prosperous, or seemingly protected that state may be. The elimination of COVID-19 from Australia would not (indeed did not) preclude the virus posing a serious threat to those within its borders. The virus running rampant anywhere in the world can give rise to new variants that pose an increased risk everywhere. As for climate change, it boldly eschews any equivalence between the worst emitters of so-called 'greenhouse gases' and those that become the most stricken victims of the resulting chaos. It is important to acknowledge that the incremental harm produced by both crises exacerbates existing disparities in global – and domestic –

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[2] One might recall Stephen Hawking's (2014) stark warning that 'the development of full artificial intelligence could spell the end of the human race'. See also Bostrom 2014: 115-126.
[3] Cited in Brunnée 2020. Emphasis mine.
[4] As of 17 Nov. 2021, the pandemic had killed 5 112 461 people worldwide (WHO 2021).

distributions of resources, wealth, and life chances. Yet, the extreme vulnerability that accompanies existential threats is ultimately, and inescapably, universal in scope.

So, what does this mean for how we understand Australia's responsibilities? First, I want to clarify that I am referring to Australia's *moral* responsibilities – what Australia ought to do, or refrain from doing, in terms of what is considered good, or right, or just in a particular context. I take it as given that most states, including Australia, are moral agents, or bearers of moral responsibilities.[1] In practice, judgements of moral responsibility represent powerful motivating and constraining forces in international politics. As for how moral responsibilities are grounded or justified, accounts are multiple and often contested. Yet, there are broad areas of agreement, particularly when we are talking about moral responsibilities to prevent or mitigate great harm.

When it comes to individual human actors like you and me, there is a compelling argument that an agent's *capacity* to avert or remedy a serious harm to another agent or agents generates a duty to do so.[2] A well-known philosophical thought experiment describes a small child drowning in a pond, with an adult passer-by able to rescue the child at the cost of merely muddying their clothes (Singer, 1972; p.231). The intuition thought to be evoked by this hypothetical scenario is that if the passer-by is able to save the child (at a cost not disproportionate to the harm avoided), they ought to do so. The same imperative can be applied to states, such as Australia. States are also understood to have duties to act to prevent or mitigate grave harm to others as long as the cost of acting is not prohibitive. The widely-accepted moral responsibility to protect vulnerable populations from mass atrocity crimes, when their own states are unwilling or unable to do so, is a good example here – and was, of course, endorsed by every member state of the UN in 2005.[3]

For those sceptical of the idea that Australia's moral responsibilities can or should be argued in such other-regarding, cosmopolitan terms, it is possible, alternatively, to justify remedial action in response to existential threats in the language of national self-preservation. Commenting in the wake of the Australian bushfires last year, Ross Garnaut, author of the strikingly prescient 2008 *Garnaut Climate Change Review,*[4] stated that '[i]t's in the interest of the *whole of humanity* that we move promptly towards zero net emissions.' He also noted that 'Australia has a stronger interest in [such a move] than any other developed country because we are the most vulnerable of all developed countries' (cited in Baker, 2020). One might ground a moral responsibility to act in terms of either observation. A duty to counter crises such as climate change and COVID-19 might be understood as owed to our fellow human beings. Alternatively, it might be understood in terms of an imperative to protect our fellow citizens. (I do not think that it is controversial to suggest that defending the national interest can be conceived in moral terms).[5] There is no need to adjudicate between these perspectives here. A defining feature of existential threats is that they effectively erase the distinction between the global common good and Australia's national interest. My

[1] I defend this position in, *inter alia,* Erskine, 2001 and 2014.
[2] I am using 'moral responsibilities' and 'duties' interchangeably here.
[3] United Nations General Assembly, 2005, paras 138-9.
[4] The final report (Garnaut 2008) stated plainly that, in the future, '…fire seasons will start earlier, end slightly later, and generally be more intense'. The report noted that '[t]his effect increases over time, but should be directly observable by 2020.' And directly observable it was.
[5] Indeed, such a defense can be found in prominent classical realist positions within the discipline of International Relations (IR).

suggestion is simply that Australia has remedial moral responsibilities (however grounded and motivated) in the face of such existential threats.

Overwhelming Threats, Limited Capacities – and a Moral Loophole?

Yet, there is a potential problem. A particular moral agent – whether an individual human being or a state – cannot be expected to discharge a duty if it is not able to perform the necessary action. And here the disanalogy between Australia's position in relation to existential threats and a passer-by who is easily able to wade into a pond to rescue a child is particularly apparent. Australia can neither significantly mitigate climate change nor halt the current global pandemic. Both are large-scale, complex emergencies that Australia cannot individually redress. One might conclude that Australia's limited capacities to solve these problems unilaterally lead to radically circumscribed responsibilities for remedial action – as well as diminished culpability for harm when no, or inadequate, action is taken.

Seeming to adopt exactly this posture, Prime Minister Scott Morrison noted in an address at the National Press Club in late January 2020 that 'we know that Australia, on its own, cannot control the world's climate.' 'We also know,' he added, 'that no fire event can be attributed to the actions of any one country on emissions reduction.' (Morrison, 2020). The implication was clear. As Australia's capacity to affect such a huge problem is limited, our expectations of what Australia should do must also be modest. And, likewise, blame for even foreseeable harms (such as those set out in the *Garnaut Climate Change Review)* cannot be placed on the metaphorical shoulders of a state that is only one of many. According to this line of reasoning, Australia is largely off the moral hook in terms of remedial responses to existential threats.

Of course, the purpose of intergovernmental organisations such as the UN and the World Health Organisation (WHO) is precisely to provide the formal structure and decision-making through which states can act collectively to tackle such problems.[1] Ideally, responsibilities to mitigate and prevent existential threats would also be borne by such bodies themselves.[2] Yet, when these organisations are weak and dysfunctional – hampered by decision-making stalemates, under-resourcing, and limited enforcement capabilities – they are also woefully incapable of effective remedial action. The recent tendency of some states to move away from multilateralism and jealously guard a narrow conception of their own sovereignty and national interest contributes tragically to disempowering the very institutions that would best allow them to protect their citizens.

If there is an absence of an overarching intergovernmental organisation able to act effectively in the face of existential threats, and Australia (like other states) lacks the capacities to halt these crises on its own, does this mean that there can be no moral imperative for remedial action?

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[1] One might note that some IR scholars cite existential threats such as nuclear war and climate change as reasons to aspire beyond intergovernmental organisations to a world state. See, for example, Craig, 2003, 2008; Morgenthau, 1960, 1961; Wendt, 2003. See also, outside IR, Einstein, 1956. The feasibility of this proposed solution will not be addressed here. However, even if this were a viable and attractive alternative, the necessarily long-term nature of such an endeavour would not preclude the immediate steps proposed here.

[2] On intergovernmental organisations as transient bearers of moral responsibilities, see Erskine 2004 and 2020.

The Moral Significance of Joint Action

Perhaps we need to look at the problem differently. Moral and political philosophy give us a rich literature on what is variously referred to as 'joint' or 'collective action' and 'shared agency' (e.g., May, 1987, 1992; Gilbert, 1989; Searle, 1990; Kutz, 2000 & Bratman, 2014). A crucial insight that follows from this body of work is that agents who come together to work towards a shared goal are able to achieve things (by deliberating and coordinating their efforts) that they would not be able to achieve acting independently. Philosophers who study the phenomenon of joint action tend to focus on individual human agents engaged in small-scale activities.[1] However, it is also possible to consider what it would mean to talk about joint action when the relevant participants are states. Insights from this work can be recruited to help us rethink what moral responsibilities Australia might have in responding to existential threats including (but not limited to) climate change and COVID-19.

To effectively respond to climate change and COVID-19, the actions of multiple states – each individually reducing its own carbon emissions or endeavouring to eradicate the virus from within its borders – is not enough. We need more than an aggregate of individual responses. The complexity of these crises demands sophisticated forms of joint action involving, for example, international deliberation over what constitutes an appropriate response (and an equitable distributions of costs), shared research and resources, negotiated and agreed common aims; and carefully co-ordinated actions so these aims can be realized (in a way that would be impossible if the states were acting independently). Such sophisticated forms of joint action require, in turn, a particular constellation of states (and potentially other actors). This need not entail states situated within the formal structure of an intergovernmental organisation. However, to be capable of sophisticated forms of joint action, states must at least be part of an association in which members have compatible interests, an accompanying willingness to cooperate, and a relationship conducive to informal decision-making that can lead to coordinated action (involving, for example, negotiation, bargaining, and consensus building; Erskine, 2014; p.134). In such a configuration, states acquire *enhanced capacities* in terms of what they are able to achieve as part of a collective endeavour. This means that states in such informal associations – or with the potential to contribute to forming them – *can* be expected to discharge robust remedial responsibilities in the face of climate change and COVID-19.

What I am proposing here is a conception of *shared* responsibility – or responsibility that is borne by each agent amongst a collection of agents for outcomes that can only be achieved when they act in concert (Erskine, 2014; p.134). When faced with a crisis that demands a response, in a situation where Australia is unable to respond effectively on its own, and where there is no formal, overarching intergovernmental organization able to act effectively, Australia has a moral responsibility to contribute to forming, and then to act as part of what is sometimes colloquially called a 'coalition of the willing'.[2] Yet, something about this label inadequately captures one aspect

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[1] For example, they look at individual human agents taking a walk (Gilbert 1989), painting a house (Bratman 2014), or performing in a small jazz ensemble (May 1987).

[2] A 'coalition of the willing' is a self-selected constellation of states (and sometimes nonstate and intergovernmental actors) that come together to respond to a specific crisis and, in responding, act outside the control of any formal, overarching organization to which they might also belong. The members of a 'coalition of the willing' are thereby temporarily united in pursuit of a common purpose, but the coalition itself lacks an established organizational and decision-making structure. The label is most often used for associations formed

of the informal associations that I am envisaging here. In such situations of profound crisis, where states each have a moral responsibility to come together to act in concert, the resulting bodies are more accurately labelled *coalitions of the obligated*.[1]

Australia's Role in 'Coalitions of the Obligated'

The ideal agents of our collective security and well-being remain those intergovernmental organisations established for this purpose. States such as Australia have on-going responsibilities to support, strengthen, and *reform* formal organisations like the UN and the WHO, so that they can fulfil their mandates and prevent or mitigate future crises. Nevertheless, in the short-term, when they falter, or (in their current incarnations) are unfit for purpose, an alternative must be sought. So, what would climate change and COVID-19 coalitions of the obligated look like?

In the wake of the recent Glasgow climate change negotiations, a 'climate change coalition of the obligated' is needed to continue to pursue two goals not achieved at COP26: the collective renewal and strengthening of emissions targets for 2030 so that a 1.5°C limit to the increase in global average temperatures (above pre-industrial levels) remains conceivable; and a commitment to phasing out (and not merely 'phasing down') coal. In a recent speech, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson referred to the 1.5°C target as a 'shared aim' (Johnson, 2021). This is an apt description. It is only meaningful as a collective target, (genuinely) jointly pursued, through a process of international deliberation, cooperation (including providing financial and technical support to developing countries), and shared accountability. And here, Australia's record to date has been worrying. Australia's manifest vulnerability to climate change, and that of its neighbours, places Australia in an ideal position to *lead* a 'climate change coalitions of the obligated'. Yet, criticism that Australia has obstructed collective processes and tried to manipulate its emissions figures to its own (ostensible) advantage, in a way that has allowed it to avoid meaningful reductions is, sadly, warranted.[2] Australia's shared responsibility to respond to climate change requires action that fosters rather than undermines trust in global negotiations, and strengthens the collaborative international relationships needed for effective joint pursuits.

As for COVID-19, an imperfect, but significant, 'coalition of the obligated' exists in the promisingly labelled 'Global Collaboration to Accelerate the Development, Production and Equitable Access to new COVID-19 Diagnostics, Therapeutics and Vaccines', or the 'Access to COVID-19 Tools

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in cases of military intervention (with or without UN authorization), and frequently on proposed humanitarian grounds, but it is also applied in the context of single-issue campaigns involving norm promotion (Erskine 2014: 121). The label has also been employed with reference to climate change. For example, the former executive secretary of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, Yvo de Boer, called for a climate change 'coalition of the willing' to confront global warming in the absence of a formal international agreement (reported in Leake and Webster 2010). See also Christoff 2006; Hale 2011; Butler 2019; Jayaram 2020; Majkut and Tsafos 2021.

[1] I first coined this term in the context of states' shared responsibilities to respond to mass atrocity crimes. See, for example, Erskine 2016: 180 and 2019: 80.

[2] Not only is Australia ranked last among wealthy developed countries for its emissions performance and pledges and equal last among wealthy developed countries for its extraction and use of fossil fuels, but Australia is vulnerable to the charge that its emissions targets under the Kyoto Protocol were negotiated in bad faith and has been justifiably criticized for being in violation of the spirit (and, based on how the data is construed, also the substance) of the Paris Agreement (Climate Council, 2021). Moreover, Australia's net zero target for 2050 is arguably implausible given it is not backed by any legislative or substantive commitments and Australia's approvals of fossil fuel projects are likely to contribute to a further increasing of emissions (Verschuer, 2021).

Accelerator'. A joint initiative between many organisations, including the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), the WHO, and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI), the 'ACT-Accelerator' was established in response to a call from G20 leaders in March 2020. It is described as a 'framework for collaboration…not a new organization or decision-making body'.[1] One of its four pillars, the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access, or COVAX, brings together the resources of intergovernmental organisations, states, and private organisations to coordinate the research, diagnostics, and vaccine distribution for COVID-19. The goal has been that '[a]ll participating countries, regardless of income levels, will have equal access to these vaccines once they are developed' (Berkely, 2020). This includes both 'self-financing countries' such as Australia, which have contributed funds to COVAX, and low-income 'funded countries'.

This is a laudable endeavour, and COVAX has had some success, but it has also been hampered by high-income states sidestepping a collective approach and reverting to 'vaccine nationalism'. This has prevented COVAX from being able to provide doses as quickly and efficiently as planned (Paun, 2021). Indeed, the head of the WHO has lamented that wealthy states dominating vaccine supplies has brought us to 'the brink of a catastrophic moral failure' (Schemm & Hassan, 2021). In contributing financially to COVAX, Australia has acknowledged, and begun to discharge, a shared responsibility to combat COVID-19; however, arguably, it should do more.[2] Australia has a responsibility to continue to contribute to, and bolster, such genuinely collective endeavours, which have the best chance of tackling the virus globally and equitably.

Conclusion

Australia does not have the capacity to act effectively on its own in response to global existential threats. Yet this cannot be an excuse for inaction, for half-hearted commitments to mitigate harm, or for strictly inward-looking, isolationist attempts at self-protection. Australia has demanding remedial responsibilities to respond to both climate change and COVID-19 because the capacities necessary to affect meaningful change can be *created* through collaboration with other states.

It is true that Australia cannot be blamed for failing to single-handedly mitigate the severe global risks of the enduring, and accelerating, crisis of climate change or the current pandemic. It *can,*

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[1] WHO. 'What is the ACT Accelerator'.
[2] While Australia has contributed financially to COVAX, when it comes to sharing vaccines, it has opted to assist countries in its own region directly through bilateral vaccine donations to neighbours in the Pacific and in South East Asia. (Notably, it has done this in consultation with other organisations, including COVAX, in order to ensure that assistance is coordinated.) My position is that a well-functioning multilateral process is preferable to these bilateral arrangements in that it has a greater potential for the genuine universal coverage necessary to effectively address such an existential threat. However, my position is not that Australia is necessarily abrogating its responsibilities (as it is in the climate change case discussed above) by providing aid to states within its own region and engaging in bilateral endeavours. This is not 'vaccine nationalism'. Indeed, Australia could be described as adhering to a regional 'assigned responsibility model' (Goodin 1988) with respect to sharing COVID vaccines – which could even be compatible with cosmopolitan commitments in an ideal world in which every region globally had such a donor. However, in our non-ideal world, this approach becomes problematic *if* it either undermines necessary multilateral efforts by replacing rather than supplementing them with regional initiatives, or is politicised in a way that prevents its effective implementation. In sum, such regional, bilateral endeavours can neither satisfy nor displace what I am arguing is Australia's moral responsibility to engage in multilateral, cooperative endeavours with the potential for geographically universal coverage. I am very grateful to Adam Kamradt-Scott for extremely valuable discussions and for pushing me on these points.

however, be blamed for failing to take the crucial steps of helping to establish, and strengthen, and *lead* the informal associations necessary for robust remedial action in what is an imperfect global system. It can also be blamed for failing to cooperate with other states within such groupings to plan, to coordinate actions, and to realize effective global responses to climate change and COVID-19.

In closing, it is worth acknowledging that the drowning-child example is also disanalogous to the cases at hand in another respect. Australia is not merely a *witness* to those facing harms wrought by climate change and COVID-19, contemplating from a safe distance whether to muddy its clothes and provide assistance. These are inescapable and proximate harms – however much we would like to assume otherwise. *We are also drowning* (or burning – multiple metaphors are appropriate, and, indeed, risk becoming literal for many states in relation to climate chaos). Australia, like every other state, is both the victim and a rescuer.[1] And rescue is only possible if states act in concert.

This means that any retreat to unilateralism in the context of existential threats such as climate change and COVID-19 not only evades our moral responsibilities (however grounded) but also misunderstands self-interest. Remaining fiercely inward-looking would be irrational and self-defeating. We need a renewed commitment to multilateralism. We need to allow ourselves to be held collectively accountable for what must be *shared* aims and *coordinated* courses of action – toward what will inevitably be a *common* fate. In short, Australia must take a central role within international *'coalitions of the obligated'*.

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[1] One might add that another potential point of disanalogy – particularly with respect to climate change – is that Australia cannot be compared to an innocent bystander, but rather takes on the persona of a culpable perpetrator of harm – at least from the point that the effects of CO_2 emissions were widely known. Historical contribution, culpability, and stage of development, as well as relative capacities, all come into debates about how remedial responsibilities to tackle climate change should be distributed between states. These are points for another time. Here, my focus has been simply on countering the objection that individual states lack the threshold capacities to bear robust remedial responsibilities in the first place.

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Session Three:
How can Australia improve education and health in a constantly changing world?

Chaired by Patrick McGorry

Quality and equity in education: simultaneous pursuits or trade-offs?

Barry McGaw

Quality in Australian education: and international perspective

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) introduced its first internationally comparable measures of the quality of educational outcomes in 2000 with its measures of the achievements of 15-year-olds in reading, mathematics and science through its Program for International Student Assessment (PISA). In the PISA 2000 collection, the main domain of assessment was reading, with mathematics and science being minor domains with less time spent on their assessment (OECD, 2001). PISA has continued with triennial data collections with the main domains on a nine-year cycle; mathematics for the first time in 2003 (OECD, 2004) and science in 2006 (OECD, 2007). The most recently published results are those for PISA 2018 in which reading was the main domain for the third time (OECD, 2019c). The PISA assessments do not test whether students can recall what their curriculum has covered but rather on whether and how they can use what they have learned. (See, for example, the assessment frameworks for each of the 2018 domains in OECD, 2019a.)

In PISA 2000, Australian students performed very well in reading as shown in Figure 1. In this figure, the horizontal line in the middle of the box for each country locates the mean for its sample of 15-year-olds. The boxes locate the range within which the countries' population means for 15-year-olds are most likely to lie. The Australian mean was significantly behind only that of Finland, not different from those of eight other countries and significantly ahead of the remaining 32 countries that participated (OECD, 2001, p.53). In mathematics, Australia was significantly behind only Japan and equal with seven others, including Finland (OECD, 2001, p.79). In science, Australia was significantly behind only Korea and Japan and equal with six others, including Finland (OECD, 2001, p.88).


Figure 1: Mean PISA 2000 reading results

Since reading has been the main domain of testing in PISA in 2000, 2009 and 2018, there is a good picture of national trends over the 18-year period, as shown in Figure 2 for four countries, together with the OECD mean. Sufficient items are repeated between tests to locate all results on a common scale meaning that the shifts shown in Figure 2 for the countries are absolute not just relative. The means for Finland, Canada and Australia have also declined while those for Poland have risen markedly. The OECD mean was fixed at 500 in 2000 but it has since declined predominantly because of the addition of new countries. Of the eight, six have means below the OECD mean.

Figure 2: Trends in PISA reading means

In 2000, Australia was significantly below Finland, not different from Canada and significantly above the OECD mean and Poland (OECD, 2001, p.79). By 2018, Australia was still significantly above the OECD overall mean but significantly behind Finland, Canada and Poland (OECD, 2018, p.57). Poland's case is remarkable for the extent of its improvement. In 2000, it was significantly behind Finland, Canada, Australia and the OECD mean. By 2018, it was significantly ahead of the OECD mean and Australia and not different from Finland or Canada.

Behind the improvements in Poland's results lay a substantial policy change. In 2000, secondary students were streamed on the basis on prior performance into schools of different types. In PISA 2000, Poland was among the countries with substantial variation in student performance between schools as shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Variation in student performance in reading in PISA 2000

Secondary schools in Poland were subsequently made comprehensive. The PISA 2003 data reveal the impact of the change, shown in Figure 4 for mathematics, the main domain for that collection. The policy change had already, by 2003, reduced the differences between schools to a level comparable to those in the Scandinavian countries. Countries in the mid-range on this measure, like Australia, have smaller differences among schools than in those countries on the left in Figure 3 and Figure 4 that actively select students into differentiated schools. Their differentiation among schools in the mid-range is due to demographic characteristics of school catchments and public and private provision with fees for private schools being an informal selection process.

Figure 4: Variation in performance in mathematics in PISA 2003

An important feature of the move to comprehensive secondary schooling in Poland was to raise the performance levels of low performers who were no longer consigned to the exclusive company of other low performers. The initial reading scale in PISA 2000 was divided into five levels of achievement, with Level 1 being defined as below a minimum acceptable of reading literacy for 15-year-olds. To accommodate the numbers of students with very low levels of literacy, a category 'Below Level 1' was introduced. The percentages of students at each of these levels for the four countries are shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Percentage of students by reading proficiency level

In 2000, Poland had more 23.3 per cent of its students at Level 1 or below. Finland had only 6.9 per cent, Canada 9.6 per cent and Australia 12.4 per cent. There were corresponding differences in percentages of students at Levels 4 and 5: 50.1 per cent in Finland, 44.5 per cent in Canada, 42.9 per cent in Australia and only 24.5 per cent in Poland (OECD, 2001, p.246).

By 2009, Poland had lifted the distribution of its students' achievements in reading to match Australia's (OECD, 2010, Table I.2.1), reflecting the shift in means for the two countries shown in Figure 2. Poland still had fewer students at Levels 4 and 5 (29.5 per cent compared with 36.8 per cent) but it had fewer students below the minimum literacy level and so in Level 1 or below (7.1 per cent compared with Australia's 8.7 per cent).

By 2018, Poland's distribution was close to matching those of Finland and Canada and well ahead of Australia's. The move to comprehensive schools had an impact on all students, not just the lower performing ones for whom expectations were first raised by the change.

Equity in Australian education: and international perspective

The OECD PISA surveys gather information on students' social backgrounds as well as their achievements. The overall distribution for the quarter of a million 15-year-olds is shown in Figure 6, together with the social gradients for four countries (OECD, 2000, p.308). Steeper lines indicate less equitable outcomes, with differences in social background associated with larger differences in educational achievement, in this case reading. Weakening the relationship between social background and educational achievements is a commitment Australian Ministers for Education have made in their four major statements on national goals for school education (Australian Education Council, 1989; Ministerial Council, 1999, 2008; Education Council, 2019).

Figure 6: Social gradients for some countries (PISA 2000)

It would be too difficult to discern the pattern for all countries that participated in PISA 2000 if a full set of national regression lines were imposed in Figure 6. The display in Figure 7 achieves this (OECD, 2001, p.308). The vertical axis is mean national reading results. The horizontal axis is the difference between national social gradients and the overall gradient for OECD. This is calculated as (OECD gradient-country gradient) yielding positive results for countries with gradients less steep that the OECD's and negative results for countries with gradients steeper than the OECD's. Where the country's gradient is significantly less steep than the OECD's, the country name is shown in blue in Figure 7. Where it is significantly steeper than the OECD's the country name in shown in red. This

display makes clear that there are countries that achieve high quality and high equity simultaneously, including Finland and Canada. Australia's data located it among countries that achieve high quality but low equity.

Figure 7: Social gradients v reading means (PISA 2000)

Trends in equity by this measure are shown in Figure 8 in which, compared with Figure 7, the axes have been truncated to show just enough of the top right to capture the locations of all four countries in PISA 2000, PISA 2009 and PISA 2018 (OECD, 2001, p.308; OECD, 2010, Figure II.B; OECD, 2019b, Table II.B1.2.3). The locations of the countries are highlighted in yellow for 2000, green for 2009 and tan for 2018. As before the country names and markers are shown in blue if the country is significantly more equitable than the OECD as a whole, in red if the country is significantly less equitable than the OECD as a whole and in grey if its level of equity is not different from that of the OECD as a whole.

Figure 8: Trends in social gradients 2000 to 2018

Canada was more equitable than the OECD as a whole on all three occasions. The three locations for Finland mark its decline in quality and equity over the 18-year period. Having been significantly more equitable than the OECD in 2000 and in 2009, its level of equity had declined to the OECD average by

2018. Australia was significantly less equitable than the OECD in 2000 and even less so in 2009 but, in 2018, its equity level had improved to the OECD average.

Policy implications

The organisation of school education in each country reflects its history, culture and policy choices. The policy choices are not readily transferrable, but they can be suggestive of options for others. Countries' achievements can lift aspirations in other countries. Canada's consistent simultaneous achievement of high quality and high equity outcomes for students can shake a longstanding assumption in Australian education that attention to equity will result in a trade-off against quality. Poland's dramatic improvement in quality following the abandonment of streaming and the introduction of comprehensive secondary schools can challenge Australia to examine the impact of the marked differentiation among its schools in resources and governance models.

Canada has strong, separate public and Catholic school systems, but they are all funded at an equivalent level within jurisdictions from taxes. A key further difference from Australia is that governance of the Canadian public schools through local school districts generates a stronger local ownership than the centralised state and territory governance through more remote provincial authorities. The creation of Independent Public Schools in Western Australia with local school boards is an attempt to achieve a level of local ownership in the context of a state-level system. An early evaluation reported positive outcomes (Centre for Program Evaluation, 2013).

A more fundamental question for all education systems is how schools might best contribute to social cohesion. In preparation for an OECD Education Ministers' meeting in 2004, OECD convened a meeting of the heads of the education ministries in member countries in 2003 to identify major policy concerns. A common observation was that, with many of the shared experiences in earlier generations diminished or gone, school often remained as the one common experience. The point, however, is that it is schooling, not school, that is shared. The question is then how a highly differentiated school system can provide a shared experience through schooling. To help the OECD Ministers address this question, Robert Putnam was invited to present his work on social capital. Schools are well placed to develop bonding social capital, especially when they serve a relatively homogeneous community. It is bonding social capital built through links with other communities that it is more difficult for schools to build Putnam (2004).

One notable Australian attempt to break down barriers between schools involved co-location. The initial development, stimulated by Delfin Pty Ltd in Adelaide, involved the co-operation of school sectors in the creation of schools in Golden Grove, a large new suburban development in the 1980s. There were four primary school sites, each with a government and a non-government school, and one secondary school site with three schools: government, Catholic and joint Anglican-Uniting Church. The schools had separate entrances and the students wore distinctive uniforms but the schools shared high-quality expensive resources for science and design. They also shared hospitality facilities with the community.

That model was applied elsewhere in Adelaide and it was exported to Melbourne and Brisbane. While the established facilities continue, further development appears to have stopped and there has been no systematic evaluation of the outcomes. It does remain as a noble attempt to make key aspects of schooling a shared experience in a country in which schools are highly differentiated.

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Ensuring good mental health during the pandemic and beyond

Richard A. Bryant

Recent years have seen Australia experience many environmental challenges that have the potential to undermine many people's psychological wellbeing. The pervasive effects of climate change, natural disasters, pandemic, technological changes, economic recessions, unemployment, and increasing longevity have created ever-changing pressures on people. These events have the potential to cause diverse and severe problems for individuals and societies, including poor emotional wellbeing, family break-ups, violence, lost productivity, impaired school and academic performance, and cost governments billions of dollars. The economic costs of poor mental health is a massive burden on the Australian economy, with the Productivity Commission report estimating that psychological problems cost Australia $220 billion per year (Productivity Commission 2020), much of which can be attributed to the burden incurred by adversity. For example, the economic costs arising from the Australian Queensland floods alone were estimated at $5.9 billion (Deloitte Access Economics 2016). Further, the social and economic costs of the COVID pandemic are yet to be fully realised. Considering these factors, mitigating the psychological costs of environmental adversities is a crucial issue for Australia's future.

The Psychological Effects of Adversity

Much evidence attests to the psychological disorders that arise from the stressors faced by Australians. Stress and trauma are among the leading causes of common mental disorders worldwide, including anxiety, depression, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and suicidality (Charlon et al. 2019). Approximately 20% (4.8 million Australians) experienced a mental or behavioural condition in 2017-2018, an increase of 4 million since 2014-2015 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2019). Exposure to stress and trauma is a major contributor to this problem; for example, the Australian National Survey of Mental Health and Wellbeing found exposure to traumatic events significantly increased suicidal risk (Afzali et al. 2017). Even chronic stress, such as work stress, has been found to account for up to 14% of new cases of depression and anxiety (Harvey et al 2018). Recent disasters have highlighted the specific challenges posed by climate change-related events. Bushfires are a seasonal challenge for Australia, as evidenced by the protracted 2019/2020 bushfire event. A longitudinal study of the Victorian Black Saturday fires of 2009 found that ten years after the fires, one in five people from the affected areas of Victoria still had a probable psychological disorder (Bryant et al. 2021). Arguably the most challenging experience for most Australians in recent times has been the COVID-19 pandemic, which has undermined the psychological wellbeing of many Australians. Meta-analyses that include 100's of studies from many countries indicate that at least one-quarter of people are experiencing anxiety or depression during the pandemic (Liu et al 2021). Similar patterns have been reported in Australia. Information collected by the Australian Bureau of Statistics revealed that in June 2021 approximately 20% of adults were reporting high or very psychological distress (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2021). Highlighting this trend, Lifeline received 3,345 crisis calls on August 2, 2021 - the most in a single day in its 58-year history of assisting people in Australia (Lifeline 2021). Despite this trend, it is always important to remember that most people are resilient in the face of the pandemic, as well as other types of adversity.

Strategies to Improve Mental Health

One of the great public health challenges is how to improve people's mental health. Most people with a psychological disorder do not receive the help they need. Although this problem is most evident in poorly resourced countries, it is also the case for developed nations such as Australia where many people do not access the help they need. This situation has led to a major shift in recent years of moving away from traditional mental health services delivered by specialists in psychiatry or psychology because of the scarcity of these professions in most countries around the world. This task-shifting approach presumes that key skills can be briefly and affordably taught to providers with a range of skills. Further, this approach tends not to focus on a specific psychological disorder because of overwhelming evidence that many of the psychological problems that exist after adversity is common to many disorders. In this sense, the problems of anxiety, depression, worry, suicidality, sleep difficulties, and other issues are regarded as 'transdiagnostic'. The approach of using non-specialists to deliver transdiagnostic interventions has been used widely in low-and-middle-income countries, and have been shown to be effective in reducing common mental health problems (Daisy et al. 2017).

Central to a sound science of scalable interventions for mental health problems is identifying the core mechanisms that contribute to maintenance of the problem. Psychological science has made enormous contributions to how we understand why some people experience mental health problems. The identified mechanisms include a very wide range of genetic, neural, cognitive, social, and behavioural factors (Bryant 2019). To manage stress reactions more effectively, however, there is a need to focus on modifiable factors that can be readily altered by shifting factors that can directly or indirectly improve people's wellbeing. For example, maintaining activity and positive events wards off depression (Cuijpers et al 2007). We also know that how people appraise or interpret events they have been through, the likelihood of future harm, and how they think about themselves is one of the key processes that impacts on how people react to life's challenges (Cuijpers et al 2013). By focusing on these and other mechanisms that are common to many psychological disorders, we can harness these to promote greater resilience.

One of the simplest, but most powerful, factors that has been shown to mitigate the effects of life stressors is social connections. Promoting proximity to supportive social networks has always been a fundamental survival strategy for our species. Supporting this claim is much evidence that engaging with supportive others has direct benefits for brain, behavioural, cognitive, and emotional functioning (Mikulincer & Shaver 2016). For example, laboratory studies have shown that the presence of attachment figures reduces negative mood (Campa et al. 2009), blood pressure (Gump et al 2001), and brain response to pain reactivity to threat (Coan et al. 2006). Even thinking of social supports ameliorates core physiological stress responses (Bryant & Chan 2015), reduces how much people are preoccuped with threats (Mikulincer, Gillath & Shaver 2002), develop intrusive memories about negative events (Bryant & Datta 2019), and are anxious after stressors (Toumbelekis, Liddell & Bryant 2017). Underscoring the importance of social factors is evidence that social interactions play a key role in psychological responses after natural disasters. One study assessed children immediately after the Ash Wednesday fires in 1983, and subsequently followed them for nearly 30 years (Bryant et al. 2017). This study found that children who were separated from their parents when the fires swept through the region grew up to have poor abilities to form close attachments with others, and this was related to worse PTSD 30 years after the fires. More recently, in the aftermath of the Black Saturday fires in 2009 a major epidemiological study was undertaken that also conducted a social

network analysis (Bryant et al. 2017). In this approach, over 500 people from affected regions completed measures of mental health as well as nominating up to 10 people who they closely engaged with; this methodology allows the examination of how mental health reactions influence, and are influenced by, the way they engage with others. This study found that PTSD was increased when people were part of social networks that were fractured and not cohesive; this underscores the potential for enhancing mental health after adversity by facilitating social supports for people.

This review points to the conclusion that developing scalable mental health programs relies on being able to implement these strategies in ways that engage these fundamental mechanisms in ways that promote optimal benefit for people. Building on this science, the World Health Organization recently initiated a suite of brief mental health programs, the first of which was Problem Management Plus (PM+; WHO 2016), which is a 5-session program that adopts a common elements approach to reduce common mental disorders by teaching skills in arousal reduction, problem solving, behavioural activation, and accessing social support (Dawson et al. 2015). This program has been validated in large trials in individually-delivered PM+ programs in Kenya, Pakistan, and Nepal (Rahman et al 2016; Bryant et al 2017; Jordans et al 2021). Rather than focusing on a particular disorder, this program has built on the evidence from psychological science to focus on the major strategies that can have the greatest impact on people with minimal input. This approach is critical because governments around the world require mental health initiatives that are cost-effective. Further, economic modelling indicates that there is a 3.3-5.7 to 1 benefit to cost ratio of investing in mental health programs (Chisholm et al 2016).

In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Problem Management Plus Ha been modified to address the mental health needs of people during the pandemic. Specifically, the program was adapted to be a 6-session program that included strategies on how (a) to manage pandemic-related worries, (b) compensate for limited access to activities that typically support mood and wellbeing, and (c) access social supports during lockdown. Further, the program was delivered to small groups (4 people per group) to facilitate greater efficiencies in delivery, and utilized videoconferencing to overcome restrictions imposed by lockdown and social isolation rules and to ensure that it was scalable across diverse locations. In an initial trial of 240 people with anxiety or depression from across Australia, this program resulted in marked reductions in anxiety depression, and pandemic-related worries six months after the program (Bryant et al. in press). This program highlights the potential benefits of scalable mental health programs that go beyond traditional mental health delivery formats and makes evidence-based strategies more accessible to the people who need them.

Policy Implications

The overwhelming evidence points to the need for governments to re-think the approaches adopted for managing mental health. Traditional approaches employed for many decades have used a model that has relied on people attending hospitals or clinics, consulting a specialist, receiving a specific diagnosis, and being provided with a set program of treatment that matches a diagnosis. The evidence reviewed above indicates that science has evolved to the point that if the mental health of populations is to be increased, especially in the wake of the many adversities that people face, there is a need for a novel approach to assessing and delivering mental health services. The advances in detecting phenotypes that drive poor mental health, aided by technological advances and machine learning approaches, allow us to develop more nuanced ways to identify people who may be in need of mental health services. How we deliver mental health services also needs to be considered

differently as most people now turn to internet-based resources for much of their help. This tendency is fraught with the potential for people to be exposed to false information and mental health advice that is not driven by science. Controlled trials conducted in the real-world are needed to validate both the efficacy and cost-effectiveness of different modes of mental health delivery, including mental health delivered via apps, telehealth, and videoconferencing. These approaches are not yet mainstream for governments around the world, however the increasing evidence points to the much greater reach and potential cost-savings in adopting these approaches.

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Valuing diversity as strength in how we build social equality.

Karen Fisher and Peri O'Shea

The process of how we do social policy has changed considerably over the last two decades and will continue to do so. The changes are in response to the type of social questions we are asking and our expectations about how we ask them. Two major changes have arisen in the way we prepare policy for our future society. The first is the centrality of human rights frameworks to understand social policy questions. The second is the adoption of inclusive policy processes that engage with the people affected by the questions and policies.

Applying human rights frameworks to social policy questions

Applying a human rights framework to understand social questions is an intuitive and legal concept that crosses the social sciences. Whereas social policy was once understood through charity or welfare lenses, more recently the public and policy makers are more confident to also make claims to human rights as imperatives in policy responses. This change means that policy claims for equity and justice about social questions can take account of personal, social and structural disadvantages experienced by the people affected by the social question.

Human rights frameworks

Conceptually, human rights frameworks have sometimes sat uncomfortably in social sciences (Dean 2015). A simplistic reading of human rights dismisses it as an atomistic, individual concept. More contemporary understandings of human rights incorporate the recognition of rights as relative and inter-relational in the social context of the person, group or community making the claim – our claims to rights are relative to the people around us, in our community and our society. This social understanding of human rights means that the expression of rights incorporates collective relationships and responsibilities in the social context, which vary by time and place. It also resonates well with basic social science ideas about the social experience and social construction.

At a practical policy level, human rights are also articulated in law, internationally and locally. United Nations Conventions, Bills of Rights and discrimination legislation each have legal and symbolic utility for people making rights claims. While human rights laws are criticised as often unenforceable due to process and access, they still set expected standards for claims to appeal to. This combination of an intuitive idea and a legal mandate makes human rights a useful framework for future policy.

Mental health policy examples

In our area of policy research, the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2006 gave the government and the disability and mental health communities a language to explain and justify rights and equity. Instead of only relying on policy arguments about personal wellbeing, community stability and economic returns, the public, policy makers and researchers are now also able to supplement these earlier arguments with evidence about the consequences of inequality and inequity by applying a human rights framework.

For example, our work with Julian Trollor includes thorough analysis of health datasets and demonstrates the dire consequences of inadequate access to health care on the lifespan and incidence of illness of people with intellectual disability and mental health. The work is framed directly from human rights concepts of right to life, right to health and right to health services. These

concepts are also easily translatable to ideas of fairness and equity, which are understandable to the public and government. It is a plain argument that it is not fair that our health service system is organised in such a way that someone with intellectual disability is more likely to die 27 years earlier than other people (Trollor et al 2017). What is new here is that applying the human rights framework to the project helps us clearly identify and argue that the inequity is due to the policy and system failure to address the person's social and structural circumstances.

Another example of the success of adopting a human rights approach to change policy is about restrictive practices in mental health services. The National Mental Health Consumer and Carer Forum argued in 2009 that these practices were a breach of human rights as outlined in the UN Convention against Torture 1987 (Basnayake & McSherry 2010; Watson et al 2014). The government assigned the National Mental Health Commission to lead an initiative in 2011 to reduce restrictive practices. The reform continues, but most States and Territories have responded to the direct rights framing, supported by related research and evidence. It is now largely accepted that restrictive practises should be minimised in mental health and other settings. However, successful human rights arguments at the policy level are not enough to overcome resistance to implementation. Changing cultures that rely on restrictive practice to manage behaviour has required other drivers, such as citing the traumatic effects of restrictive practices (RANZCP 2021).

Implications of human rights frameworks for future policy
Adopting human rights frameworks as a way to understand social questions has implications for how future social policies will change. Framing the questions, the process to answer the questions and the opportunities for intervention are all points that offer new pathways. An encouraging sign of this change is the rhetoric of government. The public is using the language which demands a service system that fulfils their rights relative to others. The structures of government are changing too, as national inquiries and strategies are framed around international treaty obligations.

What largely remains unchallenged is for service systems to be sufficiently responsive to addressing the inequities within their structures and the ways policies are implemented. Implementing alternatives to restrictive practices are an example of this. Redesigning service systems so that they address the needs of our diverse population, instead of the imaginary average person, is a challenging task that relies on a strong human rights approach that recognises everyone's rights.

Inclusive policy and research methods
Including people affected by social questions and policies designed to address them is the second change in the way we prepare for future policy changes. Participation in policy is consistent with the turn towards human rights frameworks, which mandate participation as a fundamental human right (*Article 25* of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR]).

Inclusive processes recognise that knowledge and expertise come from a range of experiences. Complex social questions require that we structure policy processes to harness these knowledges. Fifty years ago, the recognition of the value of diverse knowledges was evident in employment practices that included women, First Nations peoples, cultural diversity and more recently, disability. These early steps towards inclusion are far from achieved, but we no longer struggle with the concept of employment diversity. As the process of government has changed, the benefits of engaging with diverse groups affected by, but not employed in, the public service has also become more urgent. Codesign acknowledges that the only way to address complex questions is to involve

the lived experience expertise of highly disadvantaged people and groups. Involvement can be as an employee, contractor, advisor and partnering with community organisations (Robinson et al 2014).

Buzzwords abound to describe this policy process change: codesign, coproduction, lived experience, participatory and inclusive methods (Palmer 2020). While the words might have already descended into the status of jargon, meaning everything and nothing to all people, the concepts are vitally important if we are to prepare effective policy for our future of complex, unpredictable social change. Moving beyond these words and concepts to actual inclusive processes remains a major challenge in our policy and research processes. They represent as yet unrealised shifts in power and control over who asks the questions and who decides the answers. Future policy processes that are actually inclusive of the people affected, are not ones where it is the politicians who stand alone to claim what is sensible and common sense.

In some social policy areas we have long seen change. Few policy makers and researchers would question that policies that affect women, must have women involved. Or policies that affect First Nations communities. Some policy makers and researchers continue to resist handing over control, even for these groups. There is continued tension as to how to action inclusive research and policy with questions like: What does involvement mean? Who makes the decisions? How do we know when we are facilitating genuine participation?

Even more contested is applying inclusive practices to social questions that affect people who might be seen to have diminished capacity, such as children, people with cognitive disability, people with severe mental illness and people in the criminal justice system.

Mental health policy example

Over many years we have refined the way our disability mental health research team involves people in policy research. Most government tenders now expect and require inclusive methods (Commonwealth of Australia 2017), whereas 20 years ago we might have had to argue why this research approach was most effective to inform policy change. Now we employ academic researchers with relevant lived experience, who manage people with lived experience specific to a policy question. Our projects about intellectual disability and mental health employ people with both experiences. This process has changed the design, conduct and analysis in the research (Giuntoli et al 2019). Their involvement in complex policy and research activities also demonstrates to the government and service providers the value and processes to meaningfully engage people in ways that benefit policy change. It illustrates to them how little effort and cost is required to adjust processes, so that inclusion informs new ways of addressing seemingly intractable policy questions. Governments pay and support other people with relevant experiences to advise on the policy and implementation.

Implications of inclusive processes for future policy

The benefit of inclusive process is the impact on policy change. When people with lived experience are involved they ask questions differently, they suggest different ways of solving problems and they hold different priorities. The demonstration of the benefits of inclusion to the quality of policy making abound in the simple changes that occur when people with relevant experience are in the room. Language and concepts that are respectful to people and communities are more likely when they are sitting right there. Their presence often translates into new ways of thinking about people with lived experience. Academics, policy makers and practitioners can begin to question the myths, stereotypes and fears they may have held (Byrne et al 2019; Roper et al 2014). Hearing people's

priorities and acting on small changes that affect people now can be the inexpensive options that make immeasurable difference – not just in terms of the benefits received but also the respect that the process demonstrates.

Changing policy is never easy. Changing the way policy is made is even harder. Sharing power and decision making is difficult for the policy makers who currently hold that power and the inertia is the sticking problem for future policy making and particularly the policy implementation. The participation of people with lived experience is an effective way to change attitudes, culture and practice. We would argue that witnessing the benefits and understanding the potential of combining the application of human rights frameworks and inclusive policy processes is the key to successful future policies.

Equally, in this ASSA forum that includes members of the public, government and researchers, we all have a long way to go until this apparently obvious conclusion contributes to how we all make better policy. Our universities, just as our governments, have yet to build systems where people's direct experience is recognised as of equal value for social change as educational expertise. Our vision is that in the future more people with direct expertise will initiate and led the social policy change we need.

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Looking back and looking forward: Are the health and health care problems of yesterday doomed to be still the problems of tomorrow?

Stephen Duckett

Australia has a major review of its health system about every decade, and I will use two of these reviews to measure progress on addressing identified problems.

The Commission of Inquiry into the Efficiency and Administration of Hospitals report, completed in December 1980 (Commission of Inquiry into the Efficiency and Administration of Hospital (Chair: J.H. Jamison) 1981), although not perfect by any standard (Duckett and Ellen 1983), was a comprehensive review of hospitals. It identified seven key issues that needed resolution:

- The role of the Commonwealth Government as a provider of funds, and with overall responsibility for making available facilities which will promote the good health of the people of Australia, must be clearly defined. In providing funds, the Commonwealth must lay down conditions which are to be met if funding is to continue.
- The provision of efficient health services must be the responsibility of the states. The states must take steps to see the hospitals and institutions under their control are cost effective, while maintaining the high quality of care ...
- The procedures for providing funds from the Commonwealth to the states and from the states to the hospitals and institutions and services must be changed to ensure that funds are spent according to need.
- Management cost information must be (better) developed....
- Providers of health services must be seen by parliaments and the public to be responsible and accountable.
- All citizens who are able to do so must contribute towards their health care, but provision must be made for pensioners, eligible veterans, and the disadvantaged in a way that is easily understood.
- A sound health insurance plan must be available to help those who are required to or wish to pay for health care.

Most of these are no longer problems today – although it took 30 years for these identified problems of yesterday to be addressed. In those 30 years, research transformed our ability to measure hospital activity, and then use it for funding in accountability (Fetter et al. 1980, Fetter 1991).
Other problems identified in the Jamison review related to health insurance – addressed a few years later with the introduction of Medicare, an innovation underpinned by the social science research of John Deeble and Dick Scotton (Deeble and Scotton 1968).

Fast-forward to 2009 and the report of the National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission (National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission 2009), which also identified a litany of problems summarised as:

> While the Australian health system has many strengths, it is a system under growing pressure, particularly as the health needs of our population change. We face significant

challenges, including large increases in demand for and expenditure on health care, unacceptable inequities in health outcomes and access to services, growing concerns about safety and quality, workforce shortages, and inefficiency.

Further, we have a fragmented health system with a complex division of funding responsibilities and performance accountabilities between different levels of government.

It is ill-equipped to respond to these challenges.

Here the success rate is not so good, although the assessment is only 10 years after the Report's submission.

So my answer is that we are not necessarily doomed to experience the problems of yesterday, but we often do.

Barriers to change

There are four key factors that help explain the lack of success.

Firstly, stakeholders in the health sector are incredibly powerful. They persuade the public that their self-interested pronouncements are actually about the public interest – what I call the stakeholder magic: successfully disguising grabs for more income and power as selfless, or successfully shifting costs to poorer, less-powerful groups (Duckett 2021).

Because healthcare does not function as a market, it is ripe for rent seeking. Governments are responsible for 70 per cent of healthcare spending. This is necessary if we are to have equitable access, but it has the downsides of creating a monopsonystic purchaser and concentrating in the hands of government the opportunities to give rewards. The accounting identity – that every dollar of health expenditure is a dollar of provider income (Evans 1997, Reinhardt 2012) – means that rent seeking is rife and damaging. Provider organisations have a vested interest in maximising their income flows, which makes reallocation or spending control fraught.

Secondly, Australia is a federation with unclear boundaries between what is a Commonwealth Government responsibility and what falls within the role of state governments. Health professionals regularly lament that this Commonwealth-state division stymies good planning and management of care.

The federation reality is significant, of course, but the fact that it is so often cast as the problem is naïve: it is fairer to say that the problem is about lack of sophistication and confidence in managing within such an environment. That is, the reality that Australia is a federation is not an excuse for inaction, rather the task of health industry leaders and bureaucrats is to work out how to manage within these constraints.

Thirdly, politics matters. In particular, some ministers are oriented to policy reform and some are not. Good policy-oriented ministers have shown they are able to achieve significant reform, but these ministers are more likely to achieve change if they are skilled in politics as well. Some ministers are highly skilled in politics, but use that for political advantage, not policy reform.

Two of the people who have served as Health Minister in the current Federal Government, Peter Dutton and Greg Hunt, provide an interesting contrast.

Peter Dutton was Health Minister from 2013 to 2014, and was responsible for the significant changes to health care proposed in the 2014 Budget. Although I thought these were changes in the wrong direction, especially the change to introduce a compulsory co-payment, he clearly had a vision for system change. What failed was his ability to manage the politics.

The contrast with the current health Minister Greg Hunt, who has served in the role since 2017, is striking. Hunt is a politics-oriented minister who has been adept at ringing every ounce of political benefit from the health portfolio – including politicisation of the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme decision-making process as well as the priority setting and decisions of the Medical Research Future Fund. He is not a policy-oriented minister and has led no significant policy reform. He will probably be remembered for a massive strategic failure – the bungled vaccine procurement and rollout.

Fourthly, policy reform is often wrongly equated with 'big bang' reform – where large-scale change happens quickly. Large-scale change can happen slowly too. This is what Tuohy (2018) calls blueprint change – if there is a bipartisan consensus on policy direction, or longevity of government. Neal Blewett's long tenure as Labor health minister from 1983 to 1990 showed the benefit of that stability. By focusing only on big-bang change, the threshold for achieving change increases, and opportunities for significant change might be lost.

Lowering the barriers

So what might be done to ensure that the problems of yesterday don't remain the problems of tomorrow?

Firstly, we must address the accounting identity – expose the rent seeking and name it for what it is. Australian academics have a key role here – identifying what the facts are, what policy options work and what do not, and highlighting the distribution of payments. In the absence of good investigative journalism, this is also an important role for independent think tanks such as Grattan Institute.

Secondly, although there are risks in pursuing blueprint change, discussed below, external policy advocates invest too much in once-and-for-all, set-and-forget, big-bang change. Getting big-bang change adopted is hard, as Daley showed in his review of policy change in the past decade or so (Daley 2021), but breaking policy change into bite-size chunks, to be implemented, say, over a decade, can facilitate policy implementation. But this requires structures to carry change forward, or incentives which provide the 'grit in the oyster' that might provide a policy pearl in due course.

There was a dramatic change in the aged care policy landscape over the period 1981 to 2001, when the number of residential aged care places dropped from 111 beds per thousand people aged 70 and older, to 82 beds per thousand people aged 70 and older. This was driven by a single policy change, but the pace of implementation was slow, so this was more blueprint than big-bang.

Unfortunately, in a highly partisan landscape, reform implemented by one party – or even one minister – can be unwound or not given priority by a subsequent party or minister. The Abbott government unwound many of the structures established as part of the Gillard-Roxon health reforms which would have driven change over the long term; subsequent changes also unwound the activity-based funding (ABF) incentive, designed to place a financial incentive on the Commonwealth Government to use its primary care levers to reduce public hospital admissions.

Blueprint change often requires consistency of tenure within bureaucracies, to ensure that the antecedents of policies and their intent are understood. This is weakened by deskilling

bureaucracies, the development of the 'consultocracy' (Howlett and Migone 2018), and the nomadisation of the public service, especially in the Commonwealth public service where content knowledge is deemphasised in favour of preference in promotion for those who have served in more than one portfolio.

Blueprint change can also be facilitated by baby steps in improving the skills of bureaucrats and health sector leaders relating to how to work in a Federation. This means skilling-up health sector leaders and Commonwealth and state bureaucrats about how to use the potential of ABF to achieve sector reform (Duckett 2018), and how to use the potential of meso-level primary care organisations, the Primary Health Networks, as a neutral system for Commonwealth-state cooperation (Duckett, Swerissen, and Moran 2017, Swerissen, Duckett, and Moran 2018).

Finally, sector reform also means encouraging good ministers – helping them to make their mark – and constraining bad ministers. This is a job for people outside the bureaucracy – people working with shadow ministers, for example – and for bureaucrats who can brief on the risks of short-termism.

Conclusion

So, I conclude as an optimist. I am not one who believes change is impossible and we are doomed to a Sisyphian challenge, with the problems of tomorrow being the same as the problems of yesterday. If this were to occur it would be an indictment of all of us – those in parliamentary politics, those in the bureaucracy, and those outside – as failings of imagination and skill. But I am a realistic optimist – we have to remember that change takes time, and be prepared to advocate for necessary change over the long haul.

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Session Four: Productivity and innovation in the future

Chaired by Sarah Wheeler

How is the labour market changing: how does it need to change?

John Quiggin

Introduction

The experience of the pandemic has both dramatized and accelerated a transformation of work, from producing goods and providing services to managing, exchanging and distributing information. The transformation began in the late 20th century, with the rise of information and communications technology, culminating in the emergence of the Internet in the 1990s. At the same time, the post-1945 expansion of education produced a growing class of knowledge workers.

The idea of a post-industrial economy was put forward by Bell (1976) and in a more popular form by Toffler (1981) and Jones (1982). However, these writers paid insufficient attention to the growth of in-person services, which was initially more significant than that of the pure information economy.

Reich (1992) noted that information workers (he used the term 'symbolic analysts') generally benefitted from the freedom of movement associated with globalisation, while goods producers and in-person service workers did not.

Despite these early observations, most discussion of economic structures focused on the industrial economy that had reached its peak in the mid-century United States. To the extent that information workers were discussed at all, it was part of a larger service sector, much of which was associated with transporting, distributing and selling physical goods.

This view of the world is obsolete. The growth of the information economy requires new ways of thinking about production, work and jobs. Longstanding assumptions such as the idea of 'workplaces' require reconsideration.

The experience of the pandemic brought this fact home. Workers in the information economy adapted rapidly to the imposition of lockdowns. With the extra time available in the absence of commuting, many became more, not less productive, even with the added burden of remote schooling for children. By contrast, workers in the goods and services economy either lost their jobs or continued working under hazardous conditions, requiring close contact with others.

Different kinds of work imply different forms of relationship between workers and employers. Most recently, the transition from an industrial to a service economy was accompanied by a decline in union membership and in the wage share of national income.

The way in which labour relations will work in an information economy remains unclear. There are positive opportunities for workers, independently and collectively, but also dangers.

Economic transformation

A variety of periodisations of economic systems have been put forward, beginning with the Marxian idea of successive modes of production. In this paper, a model involving four fundamental transformations will be used.

The first, a few thousand years ago, was the shift from hunting and gathering to agriculture. The second, beginning in the 18th century was the rise of the industrial economy. The third, in the

second half of 20th century was the transition from goods to services. The fourth transition, going on now, is the rise of an information economy.

Transitions of this kind typically involve an S-shaped curve. Initially the transition is led by small numbers of early adopters. In the case of agriculture, this early adoption happened in fertile river valleys in the Middle East and, around the same time in East Asia. This is followed by accelerating adoption as the new model displaces the old one, sometimes peacefully and sometimes violently. As the new approach becomes dominant, the adoption curve flattens out, with the number of holdouts gradually declining towards zero.

In Australia, the first phase of this process occurred rapidly and violently in the century following European conquest, as the indigenous owners of the land were expropriated and crops and livestock replaced hunting and gathering. The economy was initially based on the production of food, fibre and raw materials for export to England, but industrialised over the period 1850 to 1950.

The transformation was described by the deliberatively provocative title of Arndt's (1970) *A Small Rich Industrial Society* which debunked the image many Australians still held of a predominantly agricultural and pastoral economy, 'riding on the sheep's back'. But by the time Ardnt published his book the share of manufacturing employment had already peaked. By the 21st century the share of manufacturing in total employment had declined to less than 10 per cent.

Moreover, most manufacturing activity consisted of lightly processed agricultural and mineral inputs, yielding products familiar from pre-industrial times: metals smelted from ore and food products like bread, meat and wine. The number of Australians engaged in producing 'elaborately transformed manufactures', like machinery and scientific equipment is comparable to those in agriculture.

In the early phase of the transformation to a service economy, most services were connected more-or-less directly to the goods economy, as with transport, wholesale and retail trade and 'business services' like accounting and finance. This gave rise to the 'three-sector' model of the economy (primary, secondary and tertiary) In this interpretation, the growth of the tertiary sector could be seen as the 'tail wagging the dog' of the productive (primary and secondary) sectors.

Lumping all the services together made sense in an industrial economy, where the crucial distinction was between the producers of primary resources and the industrial manufacturing sector. But the great majority of workers are now engaged in providing services. Even manufacturing is subject to high degree of 'servicification' (Mercer-Blackman and Ablaza 2018) in which information services are an increasingly important input to manufacturing production.

Adapting the terminology of Reich, the 21st economy can be divided into three parts:

  i.   The goods economy, including agriculture, manufacturing, and distribution (including transport and trade);
  ii.   The in-person services economy including hospitality, health and personal care;
  iii. The information economy, including education, financial services, government and most professional services.

The transformation to an economy dominated by information is now well under way. The information economy is now larger, on a variety of measures, than either the goods economy or the in-person services economy. The majority of workers, including many in the goods and services

sectors, are now information workers. Since these occupations are on average more highly paid than production and service occupations, the information economy now accounts for a substantial majority of labour income.

Implications for work

As Marx observed, changes in the technology of production are closely inter-related with changes in the social relations of production, and in particular the relationship between workers and employers (or in earlier times, masters and servants).

The Industrial Revolution gathered workers together in large factories, where they could be subjected to detailed control, taken to its extreme in the Taylorist 'time and motion' theory of management. But, as Marx was among the first to observed, the same process created a powerful countervailing force, a large body of workers who could organize to defend and advance their own interest. Conflict between large employers and unionised workers was the central issue in what was then called 'industrial relations' from the mid-19th century to the late 20th.

The general tendency of the industrial economy was towards greater bargaining power for workers, high levels of unionisation and increasing equality.

The combined effects of the shift to a service economy and the globalisation of capital in the late 20th century weakened both the bargaining position of individual workers and the ability of unions to organise in the face of increasingly effective attacks on their operation and very existence. Unlike industrial workers, service workers were mostly dispersed, doing relatively heterogeneous jobs, making organization more difficult. Moreover, while workers were mostly restricted to local labor markets, the globalization of capital and goods markets meant that employers were increasingly able to transcend national boundaries.

Control and surveillance

A central issue in labour relations is that of control over work processes (Beniger 1986), which is closely related to the locations where work is performed.

In pre-industrial economics, people worked in or near their homes, and were relatively widely dispersed, making direct supervision impractical in most cases. Rather than receiving wages, agricultural workers were required to deliver some of their product to the owners of land or else to provide unpaid labour. Wherever their bargaining power permitted, farmers sought to commute these obligations to money rents. Craft workers commonly operated in their own homes on the 'putting out' system, working up materials supplied by capitalists and delivering finished products in return for money payments.

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to organise in the face of increasingly effective attacks on their operation and very existence. Unlike industrial workers, service workers were mostly dispersed, doing relatively heterogeneous jobs. At the same time, the separation between home and work continued, so that supervision and monitoring of work effort was continued and refined.

The information economy has far-reaching implications for control over work, some pointing in the direction of ever-tighter surveillance and others suggesting an increase in workers' individual autonomy and capacity to organise themselves.

Similar points apply to changes in the location of work, and in particular the fact that most information workers have access to computers and Internet connections powerful enough for them to perform their work at home, or in a wide variety of other locations. On the one hand, this development has supported an expectation on the part of employers that information workers should be permanently on call, willing to respond to emails outside office hours and so on.

On the other hand, once the link between physical attendance at an office and the performance of information work is broken, there is little value in close monitoring of what workers do when they are in their offices. It becomes increasingly more effective to focus on the outputs that are actually generated, and not worry about the process by which this happens.

The pandemic shifted the balance in favour of information workers. The switch to working from home, without warning and under highly unfavourable circumstances produced no observable reduction in productivity, even when it was combined with a requirement for home schooling. This experience undermined claims that had been made repeatedly (though without evidence either way) on the supposed benefits of physical presence.

Furthermore, attempts to impose the most intrusive forms of surveillance on remote workers (for example, by requiring access to computer audio and video) have mostly been unsuccessful. The results of such attempts have included diminished trust and workplace productivity, higher turnover and successful gaming of monitoring systems. Underlying all this is the fact that the only low-value knowledge work can be measured by inputs like keystrokes and time spent on-screen.

The general diffusion of ICT has also allowed a resurgence of more or less informal worker organization, which had been subject to increasingly stringent constraints under a variety of anti-union measures.

On the other hand, the development of work allocation platforms like Uber and Airtasker has facilitated the resurgence of the 'gig economy' (Crouch 2019), a form of organisation which has always prevailed when workers are not in a position to demand secure employment. Far from being new, the gig economy is a reversion to forms of employment that prevailed in the past. A notable example, was the "Hungry Mile' walked daily by Sydney waterfront workers in the 1930s, seeking casual employment.

Concluding comment
The information economy has positive opportunities for workers, but also plenty of dangers. It remains to be seen which will prevail.

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To produce or reproduce: Is that the question for women?

Marian Baird

In this lecture I want to focus on work and care, or production and reproduction. Both are essential if Australia is to be a productive society, in the full meaning of the word. That focus necessarily draws me to the position of women in Australia today. They face a number of work and care tensions, and Australia as a society faces a number of critical gender related work and care problems. These tensions have been building for some time but have been exacerbated by the COVID-19 health-economic crisis.

What are the problems?

First, fertility rates are predicted to be low, and below population replacement. The predicted fertility rate is expected to be around 1.6 (McDonald 2020). That is not replacing our population. It also limits growth in the size of our workforce, already under pressure (Temple & McDonald 2017). This latter problem will be compounded by low immigration.

Second, Australia (like many high-income countries) has an ageing population, resulting in high and growing care demands. With an ageing population, demand for elder care and care of those who are frail or with a disability will continue to increase, setting the scene for increased work and care clashes for women.

Third, women are withdrawing from the labour market. After decades of growth, women's participation is now falling, driven by COVID-19. It is not yet clear what will happen in the recovery, except we know from previous research on pandemics and recessions that women's economic security and well-being is more negatively affected than men's, and that full recovery takes from three to seven years (Baird & Hill 2020).

In seasonally adjusted terms, in August 2021, the participation rate for women decreased from 61.9% in March to 60% in September, a decrease of 1.9% - and back to the August 2017 rates (with the exception of March 2020).[1] This drop indicates a disaffected, even distressed, reaction from women, and the potential for a long negative COVID impact. (For males participation rates decreased from 70.9% in March to 69.3% in August, a decrease of 1.6%)

We hypothesise that women's exit from the paid labour market is due the extra care pressures brought on with responsibility for schooling at home during COVID-19, leading women to re-consider how to combine family responsibility with paid work, especially if that work is not, in itself, in good jobs. This will have longer term negative labour market consequences for these women. We have seen related evidence of this in universities. In a recent study with colleagues, during COVID-19 female academics more than male academics have withdrawn labour effort from grant application writing and article preparation, with implications for longer term career success (Peetz et al 2021).

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[1] https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/labour/employment-and-unemployment/labour-force-australia/sep-2021, Accessed 14 October, 2021.

Fourth, for some time we have seen a major lack of respect for women in the workplace and community. Research we undertook in 2018-19 of young Australia working women and showed that respect was what women wanted most at work (Baird et. al. 2018). The 'Respect at Work' report of the Sex Discrimination Commissioner (AHRC 2020) tells the same story, as do the many (too many) recent reports and incidents reported in the media.

This lack of respect is coupled with a range of other workplace inequities. Despite years of education and Australian women being among the highest qualified in the world, they experienced unequal treatment at work. An ongoing and persistent pay gap, working hours gap, career and leadership gaps, superannuation gaps, as well as harassment and discrimination are characteristic of too many workplaces. (Baird & Heron 2020).

The COVID-19 health/economic crisis has exacerbated all these problems.

In all, the gender contract at work and in Australia is badly damaged, if not broken, and we need to repair it. Why is this important? Because, as Carole Pateman said so eloquently some time ago (Pateman 1991), we live in an 'employment society', where work is the marker of our citizenship and from which many economic and social benefits flow. Work today, however, is not defined by regular or secure employment. Platform or gig work is growing and insecure, casualised work is widespread, and more so amongst women than men. Pre-COVID, 24% of the total workforce were casual, and more than a quarter (27%) of female workers were in jobs that did not provide paid leaves (ABS 2020).

The gender contract at work is critical therefore because work is so central to our lives, and also our economy. In academic terms the 'gender contract' is 'the systematic ordering of relations between women and men as a gender system that is constructed, controlled and reinforced by a gender-based power structure (Hirdman 1988; 1992; 1993).

In other words, the 'gender contract' refers to how as a society, we understand the rules of the game between men and women, and for our purposes today, what we expect of women and men in terms of paid work and unpaid care. In Australian workplaces today we also have to broaden our understanding of the gender contract to be inclusive of not just cisgender men and women but all people across the sex and gender spectrums, including those in the transgender, gender diverse and non-binary community. As research in Sweden has shown, (Haandrikman, Webster & Duvander (2021) the gender contract can and does vary by geographic location; furthermore, any analysis of work and care requires an intersectional approach, also taking into account class, race and age (Folbre; 2020), sexual orientation and gender identity.

We need to ask ourselves these questions: What are the expectations between women and men, and of women and men, and between cisgender and gender diverse people in Australia? Can women be both active economic producers *and* social and biological reproducers? How can women be involved in the labour market and also socially reproduce by providing care for others if our institutions, and our gender contract, does not support them?

The question to do paid work or not, to have or delay having babies or not, while highlighted during COVID (Qu 2021), is not just a COVID question for young Australian women. In research we undertook of 16–40-year-olds we found that this question was already preoccupying their minds. Our research found that shared domestic labour was desired by young women and men and there was a convergence between the expectations of young men and women with children about

parenting and the essential role that a supportive work and care policy context plays in the future of work and family formation. Others have also found that attitudes to fatherhood are changing (Churchill & Craig 2021) and this is also reflected in some workplaces which are now encouraging men to take parental leave.

In the absence of supportive policies, young women calculate that the cost of combining children with work is too high, leaving their ability to work, form families, and care at risk. In the current context, our data suggest that, for many young women, having a career will trump having a child, or more children, and led us to speculate that the one child family was fast approaching in Australia (Hill et al 2019). The demographic trends seem to be confirming that.

What can be done in policy terms to assist Australia's young women and men - our future generation?

I turn to three policies that we are all familiar with but need serious attention and change: paid parental leave, care policy and flexible work policy. I also add one policy quickly emerging onto the policy agenda: reproductive leave policy.

1. Paid Parental Leave and Dad and Partner Pay. These are two major and relatively recent pieces of social policy, introduced in 2010 and 2012 respectively. Ten years after the introduction of Australia's first paid parental leave scheme we see success in its application, but also room for improvement (Baird, Hamilton & Constantin 2021). Use of the scheme is highly gendered, and fathers use of parental leave is negligible. There are multiple factors influencing this gendered split, but changes to the architecture and administration of the scheme could promote higher take up by fathers and therefore greater involvement in parenting.

   Some employers (noting that 50% do not offer any paid parental leave) are moving in these directions already, notably in those sectors with higher profits and higher skilled workers. They are providing longer paid leaves, at replacement wage levels, with superannuation and not distinguishing between mothers and father, primary or secondary carers. This may aid in re-shaping the gender contract at work and at home – by enabling both parents to care and not 'career punishing' women or men for taking the leave.

2. Care policies. Here I refer to child-care and time to care for self, elders and others. Again, this is not a new problem but the COVID pandemic accentuated the childcare dilemma in Australia, as well as the crisis in paid leave to care for self or others. The childcare system is marked by cost, complexity and rigidity, and COVID demonstrated that we could do it differently, and need to seriously overhaul the system. COVID also uncovered the lack of paid leave many workers have to care for themselves or others. Paid sick leave is not available to those in casual positions, as I said early – this is one-quarter of our workforce. Additionally, COVID demonstrated the necessity of having a quality care workforce – but they themselves are underpaid and often in precarious, multiple jobs (Macdonald & Charlesworth 2021), putting extra strains on themselves and the system.

3. Working time flexibility. To enable work and care, all workers need the right to flexible work. Without doubt COVID has pushed flexibility of working time and place up the policy agenda (Baird & Dinale 2020). While a formal right to request flexible work exists in our National Employment Standards, we need a stronger enforceable right and

a more embracing right. We need to acknowledge that flexible work is not just for parents of young children. The elder care crisis in institutional settings and in terms of the intensity of informal care provided often, but not solely, by women, themselves also mature workers and simultaneously providing grandparental childcare, is putting women and families at breaking point.

Each of the above are important standalone policy areas and each can be improved upon. The other major change that needs to occur is in the linking of these three policy areas, so that there is a more seamless integration of parental leave timing, childcare availability and flexible work opportunities for all working parents. These changes would enable and promote different working behaviours from men and reduce numerous employment gaps women experience.

4. Reproductive leave is the fourth policy I wish to raise. While the above policies are all focused on the combination of work, family and care, there is a rapidly emerging policy debate about the reproductive body. As noted at the outset of my paper, there is a growing concern about Australia's declining fertility rate. Australia is not alone with this problem, but it has been exacerbated here as migration flows have been halted, traditionally a source of population growth and skilled labour for Australia (Wright & Clibborn 2020).

   Acknowledging the stresses and demands on the human working body, there have been some recent noteworthy moves to assist women and men in reproduction, sexual health and wellness. In one example in the Victorian mental health sector these were encapsulated in a claim in 2020 for reproductive leave by the Health and Community Services Union. This claim was across a range of areas from menstrual leave stillbirth, pregnancy loss, fertility treatments and vasectomy (Colussi, Hill & Baird 2021). In the private sector, this year Spotify introduced a 'family forming' policy. This policy allows every employee 'access to a lifetime allowance to use for IVF, donor services, adoption, fertility preservation or fertility assessments and education' (Aubrey 2021).

These policies demonstrate the increasing entanglement of work and personal life, they bring the body back into the workplace and pay attention to biological reproduction as well as social reproduction. Both are needed to assist in economic production.

How well accepted will these claims be? Initially they may cause some surprise or alarm, but it is interesting to observe how quickly conversation around menopause and menstrual leave has taken off around the world (Baird, Hill & Colussi 2021), with Australia's Chief scientist Cathy Foley calling for menopause leave very recently, saying '[U]nless we find ways to better support women during menopause, we risk losing the skills and leadership of women in their 40s and 50s.' (Foley 2021)

Australian women are central to productivity, as policy makers in Australia and globally are advocating (e.g. OECD; World Bank; IMF). Women are also central to the biological and social reproduction of our communities. Without policies that enable women to work, care and reproduce Australia will be a poorer and smaller nation.

We must take the opportunity of COVID-19 to reconfigure our gender contract, enabling and empowering women, men and all genders to be productive citizens. The COVID-19 experience globally and the subsequent recession is testament to the need for more engagement from academics and evidence informed policy (Baird 2020). COVID-19 focused our minds on the direct

connection between care work, usually undertaken by women, and the economy. Let us not forget that connection.

My hope for Australian women is that the question I posed for my speech will not be a binary 'to produce or reproduce', and that we will re-set the gender contract and our policy and institutional frameworks to enable women to not have to make the either-or choice. That will be to the benefit of families, the Australian community and the Australian economy as a whole.

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Emerging technologies and social futures

Sarah Pink

In 2020 just before the COVID-19 pandemic, in what now seems like a distant life, my colleagues and I - a team of design anthropologists, sociologists and technology experts - flew to rural New South Wales, to meet 34 seniors who had agreed to participate in a smart home technology trial, led by a not-for-profit healthcare provider[1]. This Australian study was the first interdisciplinary project of its kind to investigate how these technologies could best support seniors' wellbeing and independence.

In depth qualitative social science empirical and theoretical research and analysis in this project meant we could produce new insights into realistic applications for older people, based on their actual needs, uses for and values surrounding smart home technologies and the human services required to support them. That is, the senior participants worked with the technologies and the human team to learn and determine where they could use them for their benefit.

Put that way, the benefits that can be derived from living with such devices might sound obvious, but in fact the ways that emerging technologies impact on and benefit society are frequently expressed quite differently.

Every year the consultancies, technology journalists and engineers make proclamations about the top ten emerging technologies, which they believe will impact society and business in the coming year and into our futures. Examples include the MIT Technology Review's 10 breakthrough technologies for 2021, <u>Scientific American's 10 ten emerging technologies of 2020</u> and <u>McKinsey's Top Tech Trends</u>. Over the last five or so years the focus of these technology reports and predictions has shifted from attention to specific automated, intelligent and connected technologies such as self-driving cars, digital assistants or AI driven medical devices, towards automated systems, modes of connectivity and intelligent materials. That is, there has been a move from seeing our technological futures through the prism of visible and tangible automated devices that would appear in and 'change' our lives, towards envisaging how technologies as systems will make new modes of operating and structuring business, life and government possible.

Whatever the scale of the technologies they discuss, these reports and their predictions are based on the common misconception that technological advances, driven by engineering research and investment, will drive change. They naively but confidently assume that technological discovery and invention will solve society's problems - a phenomenon that social scientists call technological solutionism[2]. This is frequently portrayed as a causal process, by which to achieve the benefits to

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[1] 'Smart Homes for Seniors' (2020-2021) was delivered in collaboration with Monash University colleagues Yolande Strengers, Melisa Duque, Larissa Nicholls and Rex Martin. The project received funding from the Australian Government through a Department of Health Commonwealth Home Support Programme Innovation Grant and was undertaken through a collaborative partnership between McLean Care (Sue Thomson, Alicia Eugene and colleagues), Deakin University's CADET Virtual Reality Training and Simulation Research Lab (Ben Horan and Michael Mortimer) and Monash University.

[2] Morozov, E. (2013) 'To save everything, click here: The folly of technological solutionism.' PublicAffairs, NY.

society and individual lives that emerging technologies promise, they must be designed and applied in accordance with ethically driven regulatory frameworks, which would lead to their subsequently being trusted and accepted by the public.

The idea that technology drives societal change, as all good social scientists know, is contrary to both the established theory and the empirical evidence provided by at least a century of anthropological, sociology and science and technology studies (STS) research into how people perceive, experience and use technologies in everyday life. While retrospectively it might look as if a technology has created change, this rarely happens. For instance, take a technology that most of us will have used: it might appear that the introduction of the smartphone has changed the way people live and communicate. But studies of how people use their smartphones show that the device itself did not create lifestyle changes, but rather people used its possibilities to achieve their everyday priorities. Of course, our lives change over time, and they do so in relation to our use of technology. Yet this does not mean technology drives the changes, it is just part of life and its many other priorities and activities. As the *Smart Homes for Seniors* clip shows us, people shape uses of technology, and they do so in relation to their diverse needs at different life stages.

It is alarming to me as an anthropologist of emerging technologies that the opinion that society and people's lives can be shaped and improved by technologies that are tamed by regulatory frameworks are still so influential in government and policy circles[1]. It also amazes me that the views of engineering paradigms and accountancy firms (the consultancies) are so often taken more seriously than those of academic anthropologist and sociologist experts in how new technologies become part of real people's lives. At best, sometimes community consultations or co-design activities are proposed as ways of accessing public opinion. But neither consultation or co-design are analytical practices; they do not bring the deep knowledge of society and people that the social sciences specialise in. While a handful of projects shine through, there is a glaring missed opportunity for government and policy actors to draw on the world leading expertise of Australian social scientists to guide effective ethical and responsible policies, communications and engagement for emerging technologies that are appropriate to Australia and Australians.

What are the implications of missing the opportunity to bring anthropologists and sociologists into the processes of understanding and planning for Australia's technology futures? The case of future automated mobilities suggests it could lead to designs that seek to solve problems that do not necessarily exist.

Autonomous Driving Vehicles (ADVs) include self-driving cars, shuttles, buses and trucks, which have five levels of autonomy, as defined by the SAE international classifications, ranging for driver support to full autonomy. In 2015 self-driving cars were the most hyped emerging technology, envisioned to be on the roads in some countries by 2020. In 2017 an Australian Government report, based on surveys and expert consultation, recommended that to enable acceptance of ADVs amongst Australians there should be greater public engagement and testing of ADVs in situations where the public might experience them. By 2021, ADVs have not delivered their promise and are far from being on our roads, although there are some shuttles being tested on university campuses and in parks. There is certainly high-level enthusiasm for ADVs: the Australian Trade and Investment

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[1] As shown in government websites, policy reports and by interviews in the ADM+S Trust in ADM project.

Commission notes 'Strong government support exists at all levels for Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) and emerging technologies in automated vehicles'. And the Australian Government Department for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communication presents a series of future scenarios where ADVs solve the transport challenges of diverse personas. Yet there is still a gap in knowledge: we do not actually know how a diverse Australian population, with a strong car culture, as well as social values would really adopt ADVs.

Let's compare this with Sweden. There are some key differences to take into account: Sweden has a strong history of technological innovation and is the home to a leading automotive company. Drive Sweden, one of the Swedish Government's Strategic Innovation Programmes, has an Engagement theme which emphasises that 'The public needs to be part of the process of creating new mobility solutions through user-involving innovation methods', using 'everyday life experiences as starting points for creating realistic solutions and opportunities'.

Drive Sweden has funded two groundbreaking future automated mobility projects which I participate in, both subtitled A Human Approach; aptly shortened to AHA.[1] These projects are driven by the theory and practice of design anthropology, and involve interdisciplinary and multi-stakeholder teams from Universities, Volvo Cars and two cities. This work has created a new Living Lab model which uses social science research to bring real life experiences of everyday existing, simulated and imagined future ADV experiences to the attention of our industry and policy partners and stakeholders. Our team actually gets into the everyday lives of people as they experience, experiment and dream with and about ADVs.

The AHA lightbulb moments involve new realisations of what could be important. Our empirical evidence has led us to create what we call 'reframings' of the so-called 'problems' that technologies have been supposed to 'solve'. Instead, we consider how the technologies might really be useful to people, and what the implications of this might be for city planners and for the future of the automotive and service industries. We have learned for example that the 'first mile problem' (which is 'solved' for one of the personas in the Department for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communication scenarios) may not really be the problem. As a 'problem' the first and last miles are framed as the trips between the home, station and work that are not already covered by public transport, and which therefore people use cars to cover. But we found that for many people this short journey segment is not a problem that could be solved with an autonomous driving shuttle, and in fact for many others it is not even a problem at all, because they like to walk, cycle or socialise during that part of their trip. In fact, our findings also complicate the other personas and scenarios suggested. In the AHA projects social science expertise guides our collective designs for realistic and plausible future automated mobility systems. It means that the theory, empirical

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[1] Co-designing future smart urban mobility services - A Human Approach (AHA) and Design Ethnographic Living Labs for Future Urban Mobility - A Human Approach (AHA II), undertaken by Vaike Fors, Sarah Pink, Rachel Charlotte Smith, Magnus Bergquist, Jesper Lund, Esbjörn Ebbesson, Meike Brodersen, Peter Lutz, Thomas Lindgren and Kaspar Raats with Partners from City of Helsingborg - Susanne Duval Innings, City of Gothenburg - Suzanne Andersson, Volvo Cars - Patrik Palo, Casper Wickman, Robert Broström, Annie Rydström, Katalin Osz, Jan Nilsson, and transport companies Skånetrafiken and Västtrafik was through Drive Sweden by the Swedish Innovation Agency Vinnova, the Swedish Research Council Formas and the Swedish Energy Agency (2018-2022)

evidence and analytical expertise of the social sciences can have real societal value and impact, as well as academic impact.

In Australia, significant organisations like the Australia and New Zealand Driverless Vehicle Initiative (ADVI) and the iMove CRC, are making questions surrounding ADVs more prominent, and in the latter case funding research. However, we lack a coherent interdisciplinary research agenda for ADVs which draws on Australia's world leading social science expertise. ADVs are being tested at various places across Australia, including on University campuses, in parks and on test sites. In Sweden my colleagues and I have been funded by government innovation initiatives to work closely with AD car tests to understand how people's experience simulated AD cars (Wizard of Oz cars). In addition to our projects, I was awarded a 6-month Swedish Knowledge Foundation Professorship[1] to collaborate in building our design ethnographic research approach. Here in Australia an important opportunity to draw on the expertise of the social sciences is being missed. At the moment there are ambitions to get ADVs on the roads in Australia, and new Australian automotive software, digital and service industries and start-ups are emerging. Ensuring that all of these ambitions and initiatives are aligned with how people live in the present and imagine their futures would seem crucial. This challenge cannot be solved simply by regulation, consultation exercises, surveys or co-design. As the Swedish AHA Living Lab example shows, it requires qualitative investigation, analysis and interdisciplinary and multi-stakeholder collaboration.

ADVs are one example. I have focused on them here because they are the area of emerging technologies that I have been involved in for the longest. However, the same principle applies to many other areas. In the Emerging Technologies Lab this is our agenda, for example as well as our work with seniors and smart homes: we are bringing ethnographic and design futures research into collaborations with the energy industry to understand the future of automation in residential energy demand[2]; we collaborate with the City of Melbourne to bring human values into designing future city data sensing; and we are investigating diverse possibilities for future automated mobilities as part of our research in the Transport Mobilities focus area of the ARC Centre of Excellence for Automated Decision-Making and Society[3]; and to understand the place of automation and robotics in the future of work.

Emerging technologies raise interdisciplinary problems, and Australia still lacks a strategic interdisciplinary research agenda designed to address this. There are two key ingredients missing: co-leadership by experts in qualitative social science - that is by academics who really understand how technologies play out in people's lives who can ensure that interdisciplinary research moderates the ambitions of technologically driven agendas towards realistic, plausible and ethical ways forward; and an agenda to create new methods of working through research which combine the best in

applied and interventional research with the best in scholarship - the cutting edge of social science theory needs to be combined with the newest in engineering research, to create the new insights about new technologies and possible futures that are simply not available anywhere else.

But this is not just a call for government, policy and industry to change their view of the social sciences, it also means, as I have often argued, a new turn for the social sciences. Whereas social science research has conventionally studied and learned from the past and the present that we need a new futures-focused, interdisciplinary and public-facing social science. We need to train a new generation of social scientists to work at the intersections that matter and the uncertainties of the unknown, with designers, stakeholders, engineers and computer scientists to actively engage in the future technology space.

The Australian RoboDebt scandal should be a compelling indicator that where new technologies are intended to intervene in everyday life situations, the people concerned need to be engaged with in ways that are transparent and collaborative rather than punitive. The qualitative social sciences - anthropologists, sociologists - already know how to do this, and their expertise, along with the evolution of a new future-focused social science is essential to ensuring that Australian technology futures are ethical, equitable, responsible and indeed workable and suited to the people who will be living them out.

Anywhere, anytime: Possibilities and pitfalls of future work

Mark Griffin

The nature of work is changing as technology enables new ways of completing tasks and delivering services across many industries. Although the popular image of human-like robots replacing individual jobs is a distant view, rapid progress in the way people can engage with automation will continue to disrupt work activities for the foreseeable future. Ever more frequently, people will more interact with each other over dispersed networks using continuously improving communication platforms that are mediated by artificial intelligence. These technologies will continue to evolve and support work activities in fields ranging from health and education to defence and manufacturing.

Until recently, automation tended to replace more routine physical tasks across industries such as manufacturing, with little impact on professional and managerial occupations. More recently, automation is replacing cognitive tasks such as processing legal documents, directing service queries, and employee selection screening. Increasingly, work requirements for people are those that cannot be readily automated, such as interpersonal negotiations and service innovations, in other words, work that cannot be achieved through algorithms.

Given these largely inevitable developments, we need a better understanding of the ways human values can be effectively integrated with advanced technological systems. New forms of work, such as those involving remote operations, can enable workers to be more engaged and proactive in their work. However, for work to be meaningful and useful, roles must be purposeful, challenging and encourage creative problem solving. At the same time, workers must be protected against the high mental workloads, fatigue and loss of situational awareness that can occur when tasks involve sustained vigilance of steady state systems. Too often, the human requirements for work are integrated subsequent to technical design of the work process. Or, more accurately, the work process as imagined by technical designers.

This essay provides a brief overview of the extraordinary potential for work to be conducted anywhere at any time. Some possible scenarios of future work were more visible during the pandemic. Communication platforms that supported working from home developed rapidly in response to the demands of dispersed teams, communicating, planning, and acting. Cisco Systems recently estimated the number of employees able to work remotely jumped over 50% and a large percentage will retain a higher capacity to conduct work from home in the future.

The shift to working from home gives some insight into the positive and negative consequences of this shift in the location of work. But this change is just a small slice of the possibilities now unfolding at the intersection of communication technology, algorithmic decision making, and robotics. If current technology trajectories continue in somewhat the same direction, we can assume that the capacity to manage work across new patterns of time and space will increase rapidly as well.

Nowhere is this potential more evident than the field broadly defined as Remote Operations (RO). Once the domain of specialized manufacturing or managing hazardous processes, RO is becoming an intrinsic feature of industries such as health, services, and education.

In the following sections, we explore the potential of RO technologies to transform work and the possibilities and pitfalls this change entails. We explore the human aspect of RO across two

questions. First, RO can enhance or diminish human networks. Networks are the technological foundation of successful RO but is the impact of these systems on human networks more positive or negative. Second, ROs are increasingly used for health services such as telehealth in remote regions, but can they enhance the health of workers in RO? For both questions, pessimistic and optimistic outcomes are feasible depending on the actions taken by business and governments in the coming years.

Remote operations

The implementation of Remote Operations (RO) across multiple industries provides an insight into the possibilities of future work. RO is the ability to manage, monitor and control a system from a location separated from the activity. Although RO is often seen as application for work in harsh, complex, or high-risk environments, these systems are emerging across most industries. For example, RO systems are used to support ward management in hospitals with potential to distribute expertise across many sites.

The Australian Remote Operations Space and Earth (AROSE) collaboration embeds this idea as the central feature of new industrial opportunities in Australia. The collaboration draws on expertise in the resources and space industries to enhance the opportunities for business across a range of industries. Key features of RO defined by AROSE include.

- RO is the intersection of asset management, robotics, sensors, communications, and control, and is underpinned by a suite of technologies, a skilled workforce, and processes.

- RO includes the collection, analysis and interpretation of data or information flow, often autonomously.

- RO can include and be enhanced by automation and autonomous solutions through the use of AI, ML and robotics technologies.

Networks

The concept of networks is one of the most important features of ongoing technological change. The disruption to global supply chains throughout the pandemic highlights the extent of networks at a macro level. At the micro-level, the capacity to link people, objects, and processes exemplified by the popular and scientific attention given to the Internet of Things (IoT).

Digital networks not only enable the extraordinary possibilities for industrial automation, they also transform the possibilities of human networks Optimism about horizontally integrated networks (as opposed to traditional vertical integration) promises to drastically change collaboration practices, transform education, and enhance decision making. Despite much hype around this potential, for humans, the implication of networks has remained fairly superficial, shaped largely by technological concepts rather than research and understanding of human interactions. Recently, there has been a move to integrate network concepts more systematically into the study of teams in organisations. This integration promises a new era of understanding the organisation of work that can be undertaken anytime and anywhere. It will be helpful to understand how well recent technical concepts such as intent-networks and fog nodes might align with emerging human concepts such as multi-team systems and rapid trust teams.

Fundamental question about human-machine interactions must be answered before more advanced human network models can be devised and implemented. Do bots, algorithmic management, and interacting with robots change how we relate to other human beings in the workplace? How do humans experience interactions with automated systems? Collaboration and coordination within enhanced human networks will improve decision making for complex environments as diverse as defence and health. A key pitfall is tat organisational boundaries are blurred as a single source of command and control becomes a less central feature of ROs.

Health and wellbeing

The second major human consideration for ROs concerns the health and wellbeing of individual workers. The intrinsic challenges can be seen in data that shows employees desire greater opportunities to work from home but tend to report concomitant increase in isolation and home-work conflict, and experience poorer mental health overall. For individuals to benefit from the flexibility of location and time, renewed attention will be needed to understand mental and physical consequences of work.

At one extreme, there is the possibility of more fragmented work periods. For example, a more fragmented working schedule might provide better management of work and non-work demands. Juggling school rosters with work rosters becomes more feasible when work is more easily broken into independent pieces. Yet we know relatively little about the short or long-term consequences of new work patterns. Interruptions can be positive as sources of variety that enable recovery and support creativity. On the other hand, they can create demands by requiring constant cognitive reorientation.

At the other extreme, RO can create work periods of sustained vigilance but little opportunity for activity or change. Maintainers of complex automated systems might be on call for lengthy periods but be required to act only for intense bursts of activity in times of crisis or emergency.

We can see both of the above extreme patterns emerging across a range of industries where the use of RO is increasing. Each scenario has short and long-term health implications. We can extrapolate from our studies of varied work environments to outline some of the possibilities and pitfalls for health when RO is adopted more widely. Fragmented daily demands generate strain on cognitive and physical systems that can accumulate over longer periods to influence chronic outcomes such as burnout and depression. This negative pattern can be mitigated by appropriate timing and alignment with biological systems that regulate daily energy. Not only might negative effects be ameliorated, health can also be improved if there is greater attention to how work activities are coordinated across time and space.

Two concepts important for understanding work in new environments are endurance and thriving. Endurance describes the process through which humans maintain health and effectiveness over long periods of time. Research studies are beginning to show the patterns of effort and recovery that are sustainable across a variety of work demands. Thriving goes beyond maintenance to capture the need for ongoing learning and development.

Neither endurance or thriving can be achieved without greater attention to the impact of work systems on human health. On the other hand, the possibilities of RO include the flexibility and variety needed to create meaningful work that enhances wellbeing if managed more systematically.

Conclusion

The urgency and complexity of change often means that the human considerations are second in both importance and planning relative to technological changes. Yet there is broad consensus that the human element is critical for the implementation of new technology. The expansion of RO is another expression of this conundrum; systems are implemented before the human possibilities and pitfalls are recognised, leaving limited scope for more positive human design.

Nevertheless, our knowledge of the human implications of work are increasing and a more symbiotic link between technological change and the human experience of work is possible. Taking account of the human factors raised above will necessarily increases the complexity for organising and managing work. For example, complexity will increase because if differences in the psychological and social circumstances of individuals is to play a larger role in designing and managing work.

But are such challenges more difficult to solve than the intricate logistics of the global supply chain or the engineering ingenuity needed for remote robotics? Surely not. In these environments, the human advantage will be captured if the same insights driving modern networks are used to manage the work time and location of individuals.

Session Five: Can dealing better with crises lead to a more just and diverse society?

Chaired by Jude McCulloch

What role for migration, social cohesion and multiculturalism in Australia's post-COVID social recovery?

Fethi Mansouri

Introduction:

The COVID-19 pandemic continues to cause unprecedented disruption and devastation to individuals, societies and the international community at large. For almost two years, the world has been impacted in seismic ways across all domains of life. Alongside health issues, the social, cultural, political and economic effects of the corona-virus have deeply disrupted taken-for-granted modes of living, learning and working. As the impacts of the pandemic continue to unravel in Australia but also globally, the COVID-19 crisis with its impact on social connections and cross-border mobility seems to be changing in more systematic ways the way our social lives are structured and lived. The world that will emerge on the other side of this pandemic is most likely going to be different not only in terms of the manifestations and intensities of our mobility, connections, and interdependencies, but also in relation to how we envisage individual and collective priorities and modes of governance for our lives and or societies.

One of the key outcomes of this pandemic is that in addition to its devastating health impacts, it has also exposed and exacerbated entrenched social inequalities within and across nations. While there are society-wide impacts from the disease, its ramifications are not equally felt. According to Human Rights Watch (2020), those most negatively impacted by the pandemic:

'tend to be marginalized and excluded; depend heavily on the informal economy for earnings; occupy areas prone to shocks; have inadequate access to social services; lack social protection; are denied access to such services on the basis of age, gender, race, ethnicity, religion, migrant status or other forms of discrimination; have low levels of political influence and lack voice and representation; have low incomes and limited opportunities to cope or adapt; and have limited or no access to technologies. And often these vulnerabilities intersect. People living in war-torn societies, where often health systems have collapsed, are particularly vulnerable'.

It is for this reason that both disadvantaged communities and minority groups including those from culturally and linguistically different (CALD) backgrounds have often been the first to feel the impact of crises. In Australia, migrant communities as well as Indigenous Australians are among those disproportionately experiencing the adverse impacts of the pandemic both in relation to public health programs and services provisions, as well as increased social exclusion and discrimination These negative experiences challenge the broad human rights and social justice agenda in more general terms, but also in more specific terms raise important questions about multiculturalism, migration and mobility in post-pandemic Australia that this paper explores.

Impact of the pandemic on migration and multiculturalism in Australia

Australia has long been recognized as a 'successful', super diverse, highly mobile country shaped by immigration, emigration, and internal mobility for almost of its history (Hugo 2012). Recent crises, including the COVID-19 pandemic, crippling droughts, climate change including severe storms of increasing intensity and mega-bushfires, coming at a time of unprecedented geo-strategic shifts (including the challenge of dealing with a rising China), have highlighted Australia's vulnerability to

disrupted flows of mobility, not only for economic stability and social cohesion, but also the maintenance of global supply chains, infrastructure, public health, and regional peacekeeping. The consequences of disrupted mobility have been heightened even further in the context of a confluence of global challenges including climate change, demographic shifts, and tectonic social transformations via new technologies. While the deleterious effects of global crises, such as pandemics and climate change, have been felt in all corners of the globe, Australia's position as a vast continent, largely arid, and unevenly and sparsely populated, located on the edge of Asia, presents particular challenges and opportunities.

Alongside these intersecting global processes, particular challenges pertaining to social cohesion, diversity management, community resilience, digital inclusion and the exacerbation of inequalities have come to the fore during the current pandemic and impacted Australia's multicultural agenda. This is because, at its core, multiculturalism reflects a commitment to normative prerogatives; most notably recognition of collective cultural claims and social justice in relation to political incorporation. It is in relation to these two critical normative orientations that the multicultural agenda in Australia is being most affected. This is clearly illustrated by the increased racial vilification of certain communities, in particular Asia Australians, as well as concerns raised by other CALD communities that government responses to the pandemic are often failing to adequately engage with them or provide culturally and linguistically appropriate messaging for public health directives. Below, I discuss how the broad multicultural agenda has been impacted during the pandemic at the cultural, social, and political levels in Australia.

The cultural impact of the pandemic:

In regard to intercultural relations and diversity governance, as many scholars have noted, there has been an increase in racism and xenophobia in the ongoing global responses to the pandemic, including in Australia (Elias, Mansouri and Paradies 2021; Cheng & Conca-Cheng 2020; Bright 2020). Indeed, it has even been suggested that COVID-19 is causing certain societies and communities to suffer two pandemics (Bright 2020): a health pandemic and a socio-cultural one. Many scholars have noted that the pandemic is occurring in a context of already increasing exclusionary nationalism, leading to the intensification of racism towards minority groups (Bieber 2020; Cheng & Conca-Cheng 2020; Elias, Mansouri and Paradies 2021).

The initial identification of the virus in Wuhan, China is causing Chinese and other Asian communities in Australia to be the target of racial vilification and abuse (Sun 2021; Mansouri 2020; Bieber 2020; Elias, Mansouri and Paradies 2021; Human Rights Watch 2020). Asian Australians, including Chinese Australians and new Chinese migrants, have reported a significant rise in racism during the early months of the pandemic. More than 400 racist attacks were reported between April and June 2020 alone with many detailing how they were accused of having 'brought the virus over here' (SMH 2020; Asian Australian Alliance 2020). Many other Chinese Australians have also reported increasing hostility since the virus outbreak, such as homes being vandalised with racial slurs (Young, 2020; Fang & Yang, 2020). Racialized public discourse, even in an acute crises, does not happen in a vacuum. Many scholars have discussed how anti-Chinese racism in Australia has been driven and shaped by biased media coverage (Sun 2021; All Together Now 2020; Asian Australian Alliance 2020). This is not only a problem of fringe media outlets or social media platforms, but crosses over to even 'credible' media organisations, such as the ABC that produced high levels of unfavourable reporting about China in relation to COVID-19 and played down or left out favourable reporting (Sun 2021). In

the meantime, the tabloid press and shock-jock radio hosts are maintaining a constant thread of fear-mongering 'about the "yellow peril," anxiety about "reds under the bed," and an almost orientalist depiction of the Chinese as an alien and repugnantpeople who eat bats' (Sun 2021: 36). Such racist discourses are often transmitted to the online world as people turn to social media platforms for information amidst isolation, quarantine and lockdowns (Elias, Mansouri and Paradies 2021).

As these spikes in racist attacks show, the multicultural agenda in Australia is one of the casualties of the pandemic (Duckett 2020; Napier-Raman 2020). So far, the first and second waves of the virus elicited different patterns of racism and xenophobia against ethno-cultural minorities. The first wave caused the Chinese Australian community (and other communities who appear Chinese/Asian) to be targeted; the second wave vilified members of other CALD communities, especially residents of suburbs with high proportions of migrant communities in metropolitan Melbourne (Duckett 2020). Indeed, certain communities have been singled out in the fight to contain the outbreak. The Chief Health Officer Professor Brett Sutton, for instance, singled out members of the Afghan community as spreaders of the virus in Melbourne's south-eastern suburbs during Victoria's second lockdown (Mohabbat 2020; Michie 2020). The Afghan Australian Community has expressed "concerns and disappointment", stating that government and health authorities made the accusation without evidence, thus "grossly unfair" to place blame on them (Mohabbat 2020).

Entrenched forms of oppression are often inherently intersectional; in the second wave of the pandemic classism has been entangled with racism. Unlike the first wave, the second wave of the pandemic in Melbourne spotlighted relatively low-income suburbs, often home to recently arrived migrant populations and with high density living conditions (Duckett 2020; Stobart & Duckett 2021). The Victorian government was particularly harsh in managing the virus spread in social housing. During the early phase of the second wave, cases linked to public housing towers resulted in eleven towers – home to thousands of people – being put into strict lockdown by the government. These towers, some 20 to 30 stories high, house almost exclusively migrant communities, and are often over-crowded. Police arrived within hours of the announcement to enforce the lockdown with almost no warning. Residents could not leave their accommodation for five days – not even to go food shopping. An independent ombudsman inquiry found that the lockdown 'did not appear justified and reasonable in the circumstances, nor compatible with the right to humane treatment when deprived of liberty' (Stobart & Duckett 2021). As Mansouri noted, the pandemic has 'generated new forms of ethno-cultural racism, intensified inequalities, and further exposed systemic structural discrimination' (2020: 2).

The spatial politics of the COVID-19 pandemic extends to the gap between those who can work from their homes and those who cannot (Murji & Picker 2020: 9). As a result, those at the lower end of the socio-economic spectrum, particularly frontline workers, low-income earners and those already in precarious working conditions have been disproportionately impacted (Duckett 2020; Napier-Raman 2020). Such workers who were frequently deemed expendable pre-pandemic, are now understood as "essential" and more at risk of contracting the virus. This includes low-wage workers and those engaged in precarious work, such as meat processing workers, aged care and hospitality workers, many of which have CALD backgrounds (Bucci, 2020; Boseley, 2020).

The social impact of the pandemic:

The core ethical objective a robust multicultural agenda must commit to is a distributive justice agenda that ensures equitable access to resources to everyone regardless of individual characteristics (Kymlicka 2016). In the context of the pandemic, issues of access to, and equity of, social and health service provisions are being experienced unevenly. CALD communities, especially those more vulnerable groups including temporary migrants and women, are more deeply affected. Reports from the Federation of Ethnic Communities' Councils of Australia (FECCA 2020) and the Ethnic Communities' Council of Victoria (ECCV 2020) highlight some of the pre-existing conditions that reveal a less-than-cohesive multicultural society than the Australian Government regularly promotes in their political rhetoric.

In a survey conducted by the ECCV (see graph below) that sought responses from multicultural organisations in relation to areas of concern, findings show that CALD communities have been most affected by the COVID-19 pandemic across almost all areas of their everyday lives. But the top three reported areas of concern were 'unemployment, financial wellbeing and social isolation', with mental health coming in as a fourth priority (ECC V, 2020: 5).

Figure 1: Community concerns during and post pandemic (reported in ECCV 2020:5)

Concerns were also raised about CALD communities' access to certain services and health information during the pandemic .This was reflected in survey respondents' concerns about 'access to information regarding COVID-19 isolation, loss of income, access to Centrelink and myGov, immigration restrictions, funding for cultural and social activities, and the risk of increasing socioeconomic disparities' (ECCV 2020: 5). These intersecting areas of concern affecting CALD communities are intertwined and cannot be considered in isolation.

Temporary migrants

Perhaps one of the weaknesses in so-called liberal, democratic societies is the ways in which certain rights and protections are bestowed upon individuals on the basis of their migration status. In other words, care, solidarity and support are directed towards those deemed to belong formally to the political community via citizenship, while those not formally incorporated, for example asylum seekers, refugees, international students and seasonal workers, are often denied basic rights and protections. In the context of this pandemic, temporary migrants from CALD communities were especially affected by the social and economic devastation wrecked by COVID-19 as they tend to be precariously employed, are more vulnerable to exploitative work practices, and are usually the first to experience job loss in such crises (Berg and Farbenblum, 2020: 6). Temporary visa status excludes people from government benefits such as JobKeeper and JobSeeker even while other comparative countries, such as the UK and Canada, have supported their temporary migrants more during the pandemic (Berg and Farbenblum, 2020: 6).

Nationality	"Harassment/ verbal abuse"	"People avoided or stared at me because of my appearance"	Proportion who experienced at least one of these	Number of respondents who answered question
China	35%	34%	52%	963
Malaysia	25%	41%	52%	161
South Korea	12%	38%	45%	98
Taiwan	26%	33%	45%	78
Vietnam	23%	39%	44%	186
Indonesia	24%	35%	42%	184
Hong Kong (S.A.R.)	21%	35%	41%	95
Nepal	22%	22%	32%	328
Philippines	16%	25%	32%	186
India	17%	19%	27%	855
Bangladesh	16%	20%	27%	81
Pakistan	17%	17%	24%	79
Colombia	19%	8%	22%	243
Sri Lanka	14%	18%	21%	84
Brazil	17%	8%	21%	85

Figure 2: Experiences of overt/covert racism and verbal abuse (table reported in Berg and Farbenblum 2020: 44)

Temporary visa status may further exclude individuals from receiving any form of support from social service providers, including those aiming to alleviate the adverse impacts of the pandemic responses in particular the lack of employment opportunities because of extended lockdowns. The exclusion of temporary migrants from accessing social support services such as the JobKeeper program, have increased concerns that the policy would create structural issues; that 'higher levels of

unemployment, more job seekers on the market, and more employers struggling to maintain their workforces will create even greater incentives for exploitation to be risked' (Houghton 2020: 3). For many temporary migrants, the loss of employment disrupts their pathways to a more secure belonging in Australia, as their applications are usually tied to their permanent residency and progression towards citizenship application. These ''tied' visas' require workers to be dependent on their employers' for the sponsorship of their visas (Houghton 2020: 2). CALD communities already struggle to find employment and face additional barriers compared to white Australians. These can include a limited of competency in the English language; a lack of familiarity with Australian workplace culture and socialisation; being unfamiliar with 'Australian ways' of writing CVs and filling out forms; not having local networks and connections; and the inability to translate their former work experiences into the Australian context (FECCA 2020: 12). A survey (see table below, Berg and Farbenblum 2020: 44) conducted during the pandemic revealed that racism and discrimination persist for temporary migrants of CALD backgrounds, particularly for those of Asian descent.

As shown in Figure 2, shows both overt and covert forms of racism were experienced by respondents, with the highest levels of discrimination reported by those of Chinese background. Nearly a quarter (23%) of temporary migrants surveyed reported experiences of verbal abuse, and this figure increased if they come from a Chinese and/or East Asian background (52% of Chinese and East Asian respondents reported experiences of racism) (Berg and Farbenblum 2020: 8).

CALD women

If the diversity agenda is framed as an inherently intersectional one, then the lived experiences of CALD women illustrate the devastating ways race, gender and socio-economic status compound to entrench oppression, disempowerment and discrimination. As reported in the literature, this situation is exacerbated during the COVID-19 pandemic as CALD women already 'have poorer health outcomes than the general population and they experience significant inequities in access to health services' (Multicultural Centre for Women's Health 2021: 11). The main areas of concern for CALD women are 'sexual and reproductive health, mental health and occupational health and safety'; where the latter two present new concerns during the pandemic due to loss of employment and restriction of mobility during lockdowns (Multicultural Centre for Women's Health 2021: 11). Of

The COVID-19 Pandemic and impact for clients

Category	Percentage
New clients seeking help for the first time	67%
Female clients with school age children	63%
Clients from Cultural and Linguistic diverse communities	47%
Female clients with existing DV Protection orders	43%
Clients with Disabilities	40%
Clients from rural and remote communities	33%
Clients of Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander descent	32%
Potential perpetrators seeking help	13%
Clients in LGBTQ+ relationships	10%
Other	8%

particular concern for CALD women during the pandemic were issues of domestic violence. Findings from a survey (see graph below) based on the responses from 362 participants who work in the domestic violence sector, found that 67% of these providers have seen 'new clients seeking help for the first time' and 47% of them reported that their 'clients [come] from cultural and linguistic diverse communities' (Carrington et al. 2020: 7).

Figure 3. Impacts of pandemic on clients reported in Carrington et al. (2020:07)

More critically, 313 of these providers (86.46%) reported having to cope with the 'increased complexity of their clients' needs' (Carrington et al. 2020: 17). One of the challenges in managing domestic violence issues for clients during the pandemic is restrictions placed on formal support services. Not only limited in their access to services, domestic violence victim-survivors find themselves confined at home with their perpetrators, which further increases the level of risk they face (Carrington et al. 2020: 20). Moreover, there is a gap in the availability of culturally- appropriate services for women and children in domestic violence situations (FECCA 2020: 9). Where these services are provided, they are few in numbers and may not be easily accessible.

The political impact of the pandemic:
One of the most salient impacts of this pandemic is the level of disruptions it is creating for mobility and freedom of movement more generally (Greene 2020). These disruptions are playing out both locally by constraining forms of social connectedness, as well as nationally in Australia with state border closures, and also transnationally with border closures and increased border securitization. Mobility and border issues have emerged in politically racialized ways during the pandemic. While Australian citizens returning home from countries experiencing large outbreaks such as the U.S., the UK. or Europe were not barred from entry, Australian citizens and permanent residents in India were singled out and banned from entering Australia – threatened with five years imprisonment - prompting criticisms of the policy as "racist" (Time 2021; Khorana 2021; Stobart & Duckett 2021).

But if there was a specific country where the resurging politics of border control was at its zenith, then surely this country is China. Growing tensions between Australia and China are escalating even further during the pandemic with circulating Australian discourses, politically and in media, fuelling speculation that China not only produced the virus, but also handled the COVID-19 pandemic poorly. Such discourses and their related public perceptions are heightening negative sentiments towards Chinese Australian communities and driving incessant debates on how to manage the future mobilities of Chinese visitors and students (Ong 2021; Hull 2020). Recent surveys on Australians' opinions of China similarly indicated increasing negative sentiment towards Chinese nationals. The 2020 Scanlon Foundation (Markus 2020) survey tested attitudes towards ten specified national groups and found that negative responses towards Chinese people had risen enormously (47% - up from 13% in 2013) and was lower only than those toward Iraqi(49%) and Sudanese (49%) people. Similarly, the results of the Lowy Institute Poll 2021 presented another record low for Australians' views of China; even views of China's economic growth — historically a positive for Australians — have now shifted into negative territory. Most Australians (63%) now see China as 'more of a security threat to Australia'. Furthermore, a 2021 poll by the Australia-China Relations Institute and the Centre for Business Intelligence & Data Analytics at the University of Technology Sydney (Collinson and Burke 2021) came to similar conclusions. The poll showed that Australians' views on China have generally become more pessimistic, with many Australians (62 percent) saying that their view 'has become more negative following the start of the COVID-19 pandemic'. The poll also highlighted how

negative views of China are shaping perspectives of Chinese Australians. Approximately 63% of Australians said that '[p]olitical tensions in the Australia-China relationship are negatively impacting Australians of Chinese origin'. 39% of Australians say they believe that 'Australians of Chinese origin can be mobilised by the Chinese government to undermine Australia's interests and social cohesion'. Thirty percent of Australians disagree with this statement, with 31 percent undecided. All this highlights how the politics of ethicised nationalism can imbricate with bio-politics in a way that deepens racialisation of 'othered' groups who become a threat to national security and social cohesion in the public imagination.

International students

Australia's approach towards international students during COVID-19 exemplified a "parochial, neoliberal approach exclusively in line with national interest" (Qi and Ma 2021: 107). The government was unapologetic about its harsh approach, which including telling international students who could support themselves to "make your way home"; requiring them to quarantine in third countries before any possible entry to Australia; and excluding those still in the country from JobKeeper and JobSeeker subsidy. These exclusions of international students have undermined Australia's reputation as a global and regional leader (Qi and Ma 2021). If not for some compensatory measures taken by state and local governments, university support, and general good will, the consequences for international students would be worse still.

A survey of over 6,100 temporary visa holders (Berg and Farbenblum2020) found that hundreds of international student respondents tied a sense of long-lasting distress, anger and dehumanization to the Prime Minister's instruction to "make your way home". The determination to exclude temporary migrants, including international students, from government support packages also contributed to feelings of abandonment, humiliation, and worthlessness. The survey found 59% of respondents indicating that, as a result of their experiences during COVID-19, they were less likely or much less likely to recommend Australia as a place to study or have a working holiday. Particularly so for Chinese students (of whom 76% were now less likely to recommend Australia for study) and Nepalese students (69% were less likely to recommend Australia).

Many Chinese international students were also confused and disappointed by the first travel policy issued by the Australia Federal Government on 1 February 2020 regarding COVID-19 control (Qi and Ma 2021). This policy differentiated Chinese international students from other international students. In early February, the Australian Department of Education, Skills and Employment (DESE) released guidelines through its 'Novel Coronavirus FAQ: Advice for International Students', which explicitly required Chinese international students wishing to return to Australian universities to observe a 14-day quarantine period in a third country, so as to avoid their visas being cancelled: "If you are an international student and travelled to mainland China, you will not be able to enter Australia until 14 days has passed since you left mainland China" (Version 1, DESE 2020: 7). This travel policy misled and confused many Chinese international students (Qi and Ma 2021). However, despite the ban on direct entry from China, 47,000 Chinese citizens entered Australia from China, detouring via Malaysia, Thailand, and Cambodia (Choudhury 2020; Haugen & Lehmann 2020). This travel policy has led to criticisms that Australia is unconscionable: externalizing the risk of infection while profiting from international student mobility (Choudhury 2020; Haugen & Lehmann 2020). While a pilot program to allow some international students to return to Australia was initially going to exclude Chinese nationals due to rules surrounding vaccination status (Ong 2021), the recent

recognition of Sinovac by Australia's Therapeutic Goods Administration Australian means that more than 80,000 Chinese international students are set to be allowed back into Australia when international borders reopen (Bagshaw and Massola 2021).

The data gap around CALD communities during the pandemic:

The pandemic has revealed a significant data collection gap on the experiences of ethnic and religious minoritised groups, which poses a challenge for understanding how different communities respond to public health interventions.

A key gap in the public health response to the pandemic has been the lack of data on CALD communities captured by key government authorities beyond language spoken at home and country of birth (Jakubowicz 2020). The diversity of ethnicity and cultural backgrounds cannot be expressed simply with these two variables, especially since country of birth does not fully reflect ethnicity and cultural heritage, particularly for diaspora communities and refugees who traverse different countries before their final settlement (FECCA 2020: 14). This lack of data impedes effective health communications especially in such times of crisis, where health and government authorities are not able to get accurate, factual (and evolving messages) out to relevant communities faster than, in this case, the spread of the COVID-19 virus. This gap is an inheritor of a long history of inadequate collection of data concerning ethnicity in Australia and has come under more intense scrutiny of late (FECCA 2020), as its impact on health communications is amplified through the current pandemic and will continue to be as communication about the vaccine are rolled out.

The pandemic has revealed that the umbrella term 'CALD' does not fully capture or express the super-diversity of the communities that it is meant to encapsulate, and, consequently, it may even inadvertently make invisible those who are especially prone to social and economic risks. Some of this exclusion and invisibility can manifest in the form of 'individuals with low levels of English, socially isolated migrant seniors, temporary visa holders, those with lower levels of income or in casual work, residents in public housing and high density households, as well as groups experiencing racism' (ECCV 2020: 8). The inability to identify and reach out to CALD communities affected by the pandemic highlights the need for attending to both the software (cross-cultural relations, inter-personal attitudes etc...) and the hardware (institutions and policies) of the diversity agenda (Kymlicka 2017).

New drivers of migration and their implications for Australia's multicultural social fabric

Australia is historically a land of migration and mobility that saw early human migration to the continent commence some 80,000 years ago when the ancestors of the Aboriginal people arrived in the continent via nearby islands in the South East Asia maritime region. More contemporary European settlement started to take place in the early 17th century and as a settler-colonial society, Australia introduced and maintained the controversial migration restriction act (White Australia policy) in 1901 that sought to preserve the European racial composition of the newly federated nation. And this racially exclusionary policy remained active until the early 1970s when policy-makers rejected the race-based imperial principles of the White Australia policy and instituted a more progressive multicultural framework. This important shift drove nation-building andshaped macro-economic policy by attracting skills and resources from a wider range of countries, particularly

within Australia's Asia-Pacific neighbourhood then gradually from other more distant regions (Galbally 1978; Fitzgerald 1988).

But despite the adoption of multiculturalism in the early 1970s, and though patterns of migration began to diversify geographically, overall Australian migration policies remained focussed on attracting highly skilled labour whilst retaining a critical family reunion component and a small humanitarian intake. However, successive reviews of immigration policies have often missed major structural and societal implications of shifts in migration and mobility trends. Addressing these changes and the resulting challenges are crucial for the country's future in order to bolster system integrity and overall sustainability.

As the Australian Treasury noted recently, a recalibrated approach to migration policies will be crucial to Australia's future prosperity and will play a central role in supporting the recovery of the Australian economy from COVID-19 and will help offset the long-term structural problem of an aging population (Treasury 2021; Gamlen 2020). The pandemic has accentuated this demographic challenge with the country experiencing an almost total halt to migration intake programs whilst an unprecedented 500,000 migrant shave left the country during the 2020-21 period (ABC, 2021). This is in sharp contrast to pre-pandemic migration levels where the net migration intake was hovering around the 200,000 (accounting for both people moving in andout of Australia).

These are significant challenges that have been exacerbated by the pandemic, though the structural cracks have developing over at least the last two decades when patterns of migrations globally started to shift to mirror new geo-political shifts, diversification of destination options, and significant advances in information technologies. These changes have been amplified by the pandemic and in particular the manner within which the Australian government approached border closures and strict lockdowns that had severe negative impacts on Australian families with transnational links, international students, temporary workers and other short term visitors. This is at a time where other émigré societies have managed to maintain reasonably flexible and open borders that ensured continuity of movement in and out of jurisdictions in ways that support migration, international education and family connections. And there is no doubt that the way the government manages a post pandemic approach to migration will have critical implications for Australia's population, economy and society more broadly.

Conclusion:

Despite its strategic value to the country, migration has unintended consequences that need to be anticipated and managed. These consequences include for example the more salient transnational ties Australians have today with almost half of all Australians being born either overseas or to a migrant parent (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2016). Furthermore, migration has perhaps had its most pronounced impact of Indigenous peoples who firstly have experienced dispossession during European colonial settlement then subsequently have never been consulted about migration policies. And in recent opposition to migration has seen almost 20% of Australians indicating that the country receives too many immigrants (Markus 2020). Such negative attitudes are linked to economic f=fluctuations in particular rates of unemployment and underemployment oftenleading directly to spikes in racism (Elias, Mansouri and Paradies 2021; Dunn et al 2014).

The COVID-19 pandemic has at once exposed and exacerbated entrenched inequalities within and across societies. As the world continues to come to grips with the new pandemic realities and its many associated challenges, the role of inclusive pro-diversity policies, such as multiculturalism,

become even more needed now than ever before as they offer both the ethical foundations (software) as well as the institutional tools (hardware) required to engage in inclusive, participatory, and respectful deliberations about the post COVID-19 agenda.

There is no doubt that the way governments, industry and communities respond to COVID-19 will have serious, long-term implications for countries such as Australia, as well as globally. The emerging post COVID-19 world will be shaped by new dynamics and complex realities immersed in virtual inter-connectivity and driven by cross-sectoral engagements. To this end, the multicultural ethos of support for cultural diversity and socio-political incorporation can play a significant role in developing a new socio-cultural compact that will contribute to shaping the way we live, work, connect and engage across national, ethnic and cross-cultural lines.

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Sharpening the lens on gender inequality: Moving beyond homogeneity

Janeen Baxter

The Puzzle

Global rankings of gender equality produced by the World Economic Forum show that Australia has dropped from 15th in the world to 44th in the last 14 years (World Economic Forum, 2019). The index used to assess national gender gaps includes measures of economic, education, health and political empowerment gaps. At the current rate of change, gender equality will be attained in 163 years in our region and 257 years across the globe. The data were collected prior to the COVID-19 and are likely to show even larger gaps in future rankings given what we know about changes in women's employment, health and empowerment since the outbreak of the pandemic.

The World Economic Forum ranking is useful for cross-national comparisons and as such, is necessarily based on relatively blunt, but cross-nationally comparable, measures collected by official statistical agencies. But the conclusions accord with recent evidence and trends collected by researchers and other agencies within Australia. There is considerable evidence from a range of sources that gender equality in Australia is declining, or at best, stalled.

Evidence for this includes trends in the gender wage gap showing an increase of 0.8 percentage points to 14.2% in the gender pay gap since November 2020 (13.4%) (WGEA, 2021). Women are underrepresented on boards and in top CEO positions across all industries comprising only 32.5% of key management positions, 28.1% of directors,18.3% of CEOs and 14.6% of board chairs (WGEA, 2021). Older women are the fastest growing group of homeless people in Australia, have less wealth than men, and retire with substantially less superannuation (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2019; Australian Human Rights Commission 2019). Almost 1 in 4 Australian women have experienced domestic violence (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2019), over half of female homicide victims are killed by their intimate partner and over 90% of female homicides are perpetrated by men (Bricknell 2020). Women continue to undertake the majority of housework and care work and, not surprisingly, report higher levels of time pressure, stress, depression and burnout than men (Ruppanner et al, 2018).

At the same time, there is evidence that gender inequality has declined in some areas. Demographic trends, public attitudes and some social policy changes suggest that we should be seeing declining gender inequality. For example, more women than men now complete Year 12 and attain a Bachelor's degree or higher qualification (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2019). This has been the case for several years. There are more women in the labour market, in parliament, and at senior levels in large companies than at any other time (Workplace Gender Equality Agency, 2020). We have laws addressing equal wages, sex discrimination and paid parental leave. We have had high-profile campaigns targeting sexual harassment and domestic violence and have had these legislative measures for some decades. Women increasingly marry later (or not at all), delay having children, have fewer of them or none at all, have greater access to divorce and protection against lost of assets following divorce, greater financial independence and less time in care work over the course of their lives (Qu, 2020). And there is evidence, at least on some indicators, of increasing support for gender inequality. Data from the Australian Survey of Social Attitudes (2015) shows that around 90%

of Australian men and women believe that men should be as involved in parenting as women. And data from ANROWS (Australia's National Research Organisation for Women's Safety) shows that most Australians support gender equality and are more likely to support gender equality in 2017 than they were in 2013 and 2009.

So, what is going on here? How can we explain these apparently diverging indicators and trends?

The Explanations

There are a number of possible explanations. First social change is likely uneven over time and not linear. It is probably not surprising then that some areas change more quickly than others. We also know that legislative changes such as equal pay for equal work do not tackle issues of gender segregation with women concentrated in low-paying sectors of the labour market, or working fewer hours due to their unpaid work and childcare responsibilities, or their lack of access to promotion and positions of authority that pay higher wages due to glass ceilings and discrimination in promotion practices. Given the complexity and pervasiveness of the gender system and the way in which gender differences are so deeply ingrained into the very fabric of social life, it may be naive to expect a smooth, even, one-way progression to equality across all areas and domains.

Second, change may be actively resisted or as suggested by some, there may be a backlash that leads to stalling or declining equality (Butler, 2021; Williamson). There is some evidence of this in Australia in relation to diversity and inclusion policies in workplaces. A 2020 report by Chief Executive Women and Male Champions of Change cited evidence of gender fatigue, concerns about the demise of meritocracy, reverse discrimination, the rise of identity politics and views that gender equality strategies are a zero-sum game where women are the 'winners' and men are the 'losers'. At a global level, a 2018 United Nations Human Rights paper reports that since the Fourth World Conference on Women convened by the United Nations in 1995 in Beijing, 25 years ago, many of the hard-won victories for women, particularly in the area of sexuality and reproduction, gender-sensitive education and gender-based violence, are at risk (UN, xxx).

Third, social, political or economic events, such as recessions, pandemics and political upheavals and changes may, sometimes inadvertently, undermine progress toward equality. Although Australia may have fared relatively well compared to other countries in terms of the global financial recession, is a relatively stable democracy compared to other states, and has many fewer deaths from COVID comparatively, the impact and ripple effects from these global disasters may well have consequences for gender inequality. The clearest recent example is the COVID pandemic with considerable evidence showing that women have borne the brunt of industry setbacks in tourism, hospitality and retail while at the same time, picking up much of the unpaid labour associated with home schooling and extra caring responsibilities (Ruppanner et al 2020). Women have also been at the forefront of industries and service sectors dealing with the devastating consequences of COVID through their over representation in health and aged care sectors. While this may have increased the recognition of women's contributions in these areas, there is no evidence that it has lead to greater pay earnings rewards or better job security and condition.

The Solutions

What can we do as social scientists/researchers/policy advocates to improve gender equality?

First, keep the issue on the research, policy and public agenda. Too often I receive advice that research on housework labour, work-family balance or gender inequality is a little old fashioned and

not cutting edge enough to warrant funding, policy interest or further research. Gender inequality, for some, is no longer a fashionable, hot topic in the way it might once have been in the 1970s or 80s. Not surprisingly, this fatigue or advice to move on often comes from men. To this I say, research on social issues should do its best to resist fashion and rather I argue for continued focus on what is an increasing problem, not just for women but for all of us.

Second the research needs to be high quality, empirically rigorous and theoretically informed. This is on the one hand obvious, but hard to achieve in practice. Too often what is published and presented is descriptive and analytically light, and relying on the same theories and ideas that were dominant decades ago when feminist research first developed in social science.

Third we need a new approach and I believe the new approach must have the following elements:

a. *Less focus on women and more focus on gender.* Too often gender inequality is constructed as a women's problem, and solutions are developed that support women to manage multiple (conflicting) responsibilities, but do not challenge men or gender divisions. For example, policies for work-family balance, parental leave, flexibility are too often developed with women in mind and not surprisingly it is women who take up these opportunities and then find themselves falling behind, because they can not reasonably manage the demands of both paid and unpaid work, or they are stressed, tired and with poor levels of mental health (Ruppanner et al, 2018; Westrupp et al, 2016). A recent report from the Grattan Institute makes a strong case why more gender equal parental leave policies would not only improve gender inequality in care work at home, but support men to develop strong emotional bonds with their children, lead to cultural changes in workplaces about the importance of time for care work by both men and women, improve outcomes for children and lead to stronger family relationships. All of this on top of supporting women to maintain employment and earnings during the childrearing years (Wood, Emslie and Griffiths, 2021). In other words, there are many positive outcomes, in addition to fairer and more equitable gender divisions in paid and unpaid work. There are also many likely flow-on effects further on in the life course if women are able to maintain strong connections to the labour market for their housing, superannuation, and wellbeing.

b. *Incorporate heterogeneity and intersectionality into our theories and polices*. What works for some groups will not necessarily work for others. Theory and policies for equality must take diversity seriously. This means understanding differences in experiences and outcomes that may require different approaches and strategies in different contexts, time periods and for different social groups. The issues constraining gender equality for migrants, Indigenous people, young, old, working class groups, refugees, people of diverse sexualities, across geographical regions and time will vary and strategies that overlook these intersecting inequalities will not be sufficient. What works in one social setting, time or place may not work in others. Theory and policies must be dynamic.

c. *Strategies for change must both empower and support individual change in behaviours and attitudes but also tackle institutional/organisational change*. By institutions I mean education systems, welfare systems, labour markets, social policies, and legislation. The two are not unrelated – institutional change around workplace policies for example can drive individual behaviour change and individuals can be very powerful in driving institutional change. We need to work at all levels and not focus, as we have done with labour market policies, simply on encouraging women to behave more like men. We need also to encourage men to behave more

like women and we need to create the cultural and institutional environments that enable these behaviour changes.

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A duty of care and de-colonising governance: New models for environmental and climate change challenges

Lee Godden

Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD) has been the mainstay of environmental law and policy in Australia for over three decades. ESD is the guiding objective of Commonwealth legislation, the *Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act* 1999 (EPBC Act). It might be the objective of national climate legislation if we had comprehensive laws beyond the voluntary emissions reductions schemes secured by the *Carbon Farming Act* 2014.

While the causes of ecological decline and biodiversity loss are complex, and climate change is accelerating loss, ESD is not driving even modest outcomes for ecological protection.

In a recent UN report, Australia is ranked second in rates of species extinction against a baseline from 1700. Tellingly, that period covers first European contact, and subsequent colonisation of a land inhabited for approximately 60,000 years by Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders whose culture emphasises deep connection with, but also holistic governance of land and waters, enlivened by scared obligations of care for wildlife.

With that preamble, this presentation considers the intertwined legal and policy challenges of addressing biodiversity loss and climate change.

While the sustainable development principle was ground-breaking in mid-twentieth century, a half-century later, ESD appears a compromise between environmental law requirements and the imperatives of nation-state economic development. In practice, it favours development over protection, especially for biodiversity which typically is sacrificed in that trade off. To understand why sustainability is failing, we need to understand it as derivative of Eurocentric knowledge, law and state practice. The presentation draws on Scott's, 'Seeing like a State' to explore why Australia as a nation cannot 'see' the unfolding ecological crisis. The adoption of duty of care concepts and moves to decolonise environmental law by better integration of Indigenous values may offer pathways for revisioning future laws.

If we unpack the origins of sustainability it reveals a bifurcated sustainability agenda that was marked by concern with 'wise-use' of resources, alongside the intrinsic value of ecosystems and nonhuman species. Today ESD becomes a negotiation between powerful and less powerful 'stakeholder' interests to achieve some measure of environmental protection while development proceeds.

The retreat from development initially signalled by the COVID-19 pandemic, now sound hollow, given the resumption of high-intensity societies, financial resurgence and resource demands, infrastructure stimulus packages, and incentives to recommence consumer spending.

Yet co-mingled pressures have overtaken the sustainability program. Many Australians are registering a deep angst about environmental destruction and the intergenerational impacts of climate change, together with activism that transcend conventional sustainability pathways (Richardson 2020). Climate change protests, efforts to establish a climate emergency, and the rise of climate litigation to prod an inadequate national policy, are illustrative. It is countered by entrenched

positions on economic values and ways of 'seeing' that are part of a colonial legacy in which sustainability is implicated.

Sustainability is a 'duty' of nation-states under international instruments and national legislation. Australian governments have interpreted such duties from within a colonial legacy of administrative control over land and resources. A deregulatory agenda however now constrains the viability of state-centric sustainability models. The state remains nominally accountable for environmental protection but new governance configurations place limitations on the state's institutional reach, severe restrictions on its resources, and constraints on its capacity for monitoring, compliance and enforcement. In short, the methods attributed to the state to enact sustainability may no longer apply. The metrics of sustainability remain, but the capacity to achieve them is dwindling.

Western scientific knowledge plays a prominent role in environmental law. Yet the underlying methodology of environmental law compliments, rather than challenges contemporary knowledge traditions. The classic model of scientific method and practice that posits a linear trajectory from problem identification to legislative sustainability 'solution' often fail to comprehend complex, multifaceted situations. This policy impasse has deep historical roots in the practices supporting natural resource management that Eurocentric nations developed over several centuries to realise economic value.

In its signature, sustainable development – denoted by the collapse of complex variables to a balancing formula, environmental governance is an exemplar of the modern, state project. As James C Scott notes, '[c]ertain forms of knowledge and control require a narrowing of vision. The great advantage … is that it brings into sharp focus certain limited aspects of an otherwise far more complex and un-wieldy reality.' Scott articulates how modern (European) states, from the 18th century onward developed a particular scoping of science and mathematics to make phenomena 'legible' by reducing complexity. When phenomena become legible and able to be readily 'seen' by the state, in lists, categories and as 'metrics', then they are susceptible to careful measurement and calculation.

Scott's proposition is that through legibility, phenomena such as forests and natural resources [and now in Australia as minerals, coal, LNG] are rendered amenable to utilisation or conservation in the interests of the state. In tracing this phenomenon, Scott posits the rise of scientific forestry across the 18th century, 'as a metaphor for the forms of knowledge and manipulation characteristic of powerful institutions with sharply defined interests, of which state bureaucracies and large commercial firms are perhaps the outstanding examples.'

Scott describes how the 'real' forest was replaced by an abstraction of calculation and measurement which substituted the complex and stochastic ecology of trees for public fiscal value, which in turn served as an indicia for successful (sustainable) management of forests. The highly-regimented and monoculture forest became the archetype for sustainability. A consequence of the state centric vision in many instances – often realised much later – was an unprecedented ecological failure. Scott details the rapid diffusion of scientific forestry practices from Europe in later centuries to many natural resource management settings.

For some European nations one way of resolving ecological 'failure' was to appropriate the lands and waters of other peoples in the colonial expansion that occurred from the late 18th century onward, and which saw Australia 'discovered' in 1770 and 'settled' in 1793.

Two hundred or so years on, sustainable development remains an abstraction – from not only the raw data of complex ecological realities – that might be recovered through methodological mimesis, but from what is actually occurring in local places. The capacity of modern states to gauge sustainability by measurement, metrics and indicators, and to only 'see' a predominantly economic value for its *raison d'etre* remains largely unqualified.

At this juncture we return to the intertwined challenges of climate change and biodiversity loss.

Within Australia we are reaching critical thresholds for many ecosystems, and tipping points for climate change. The 2021 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report indicated the world is likely to reach 1.5°C of warming within nine years. This fact was not matched by the Federal Government making new commitments on emission reductions. Our national climate change targets recently saw us ranked last out of 200 countries. Australia is highly exposed to climate change impacts, including drought and bushfires which have devastating human and biodiversity impacts. Australia will not meet even its modest reduction commitment. Recent government estimates suggest a gap of about 25 Mt of CO2-e per year by 2030, unless rapid uptake of new (largely undeveloped) technology occurs. While Australia claims to have exceeded its UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol targets - this was largely by reducing land clearing alongside increases in timber plantations on agricultural land in the 1990s and 2000s. But the capacity to further reduce emissions via land clearing is limited.

That might be a win for biodiversity - yet in the latest trade-off around development and environment (aka sustainable development) is that the Net Zero climate targets for 2050 have been agreed to on the basis of changes to the EPBC Act. The EPBC Act has long been targeted as encroaching on 'traditional rights and freedoms' (ALRC report 129). The focus for challenge is restrictions on native vegetation clearance where these protect biodiversity (threatened species and ecological communities). There has been Federal Court and High Court litigation challenging the legitimacy of laws restricting clearance as a 'taking' of private property. Although the initiatives on climate change are welcome, biodiversity has been traded off (sacrificed) to retain certain forms of economic development. This trade-off may provide disincentives for other forms of managing vegetation, i.e. restoration, 'new gen' farming and future carbon farming 'offsets'. New modelling estimates the climate change costs in the next century (including costs related to biodiversity loss) will dwarf the COVID-19 economic shocks. Local communities that experienced the immense human and environmental toll of 2019-20 bushfires had a stark vision of the future ecological crisis. This had been predicted by fire ecologists, warning of climate change exacerbating bushfire threat. ESD seems ill-equipped to deal with the momentous scale, or to offer a viable form of calculation of the costs of such crises. For Scott, 'Finding ways out of this failure requires rethinking. It is doubtful that pure rationality provides sufficient guidance.' (Bosselmann 2016).

The deeply entrenched position of how the nation state 'sees' (or not) the twin challenges of biodiversity loss and climate change are not easily dislodged. Two pathways offer potential ways forward, although prospects for substantial national legislative change (apart from EPBC land clearance revisions) appears minimal. Ironically, one pathway draws on litigation around the EPBC Act.

In Australia, as a settler colonial nation, the project of reimagining ESD should align with reconciliation and decolonisation. Reimagination of how the state 'sees' should re-think the knowledge systems for understanding the relationship between environment and society.

Indigenous peoples' connection to traditional land and waters, over millennia offers one model. One pathway therefore involves engaging more fully with Indigenous law, practice and traditional ecological knowledge systems. Environmental law gradually is becoming more inclusive of the participation of Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders but it is selective and not directed to revising ESD principles.

Typically, Indigenous peoples' participation has focused on co-management in protected areas, and management on Indigenous held lands. Native title, whereby settler law 'recognises' pre-existing rights to land and waters of Traditional Owners has provided leverage. Yet Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islander involvement in mainstream environmental law has not been substantial. The ESD model still reinforces the state as decision-makers who engage other groups through procedurally organised 'relationships'.

The above pathway however may merge with a reimagination of a government 'duty' concept. Revisioning of the classic ESD duty via intergenerational equity infuses Justice Bromberg's decision in *Sharma v Minister for the Environment.*[1] Specifically, it provides a forward orientation to the EPBC Act in acknowledging the physical impacts of enhanced climate risk on future generations. [2] The application was brought by Australian children seeking an injunction to prevent the Commonwealth Environment Minister from giving an approval under the EPBC Act for the extension of the Vickery coal mine near Gunnedah, NSW.[3] It was argued that the Minister has a duty to protect young people from the accelerating impacts of climate change in Australia. Justice Bromberg affirmed the existence of a duty and that it requires the Minister in exercising powers under the EPBC Act to avoid future personal injury to young people:

> "…the Minister has a duty to take reasonable care to avoid causing personal injury to the Children when deciding, under s 130 and s 133 of the EPBC Act, to approve or not approve the Extension Project."

This judgment, on appeal, provides a foundation for reimagining the required duties in achieving ESD. ESD is one consideration that the Minister must have regard to in deciding an application, such as the coal mine project. The Bromberg duty concept reframes how the state is to 'see' the future.

Significantly, while the duty is future oriented, it is also place and people specific in how it reinterprets the ESD principles of intergenerational equity and precaution. Thus, although the Sharma duty looks at avoidance of physical injury to children from climate change,[4] further elaboration of 'duty' by the Courts could require the Commonwealth government to undertake substantive measures to decrease climate change impacts, and to extend a duty of care to the more-

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[1] *Sharma by her litigation representative Sister Marie Brigid Arthur v Minister for the Environment* (No 1) [2021] FCA 560 (Sharma (No 1); *Sharma by her litigation representative Sister Marie Brigid Arthur v Minister for the Environment* (No 2) [2021] FCA 774 (Sharma (No 2).
[2] ESD is an objective of the EPBC Act, s 3A.
[3] Sharma (No 1) [7]-[10].
[4] Sharma (No 2) [48].

than-human world. Governments might have a duty of care for the future state of biodiversity and avoidance of climate change.[1] The state will need to 'see' ESD differently to fulfill such a duty.

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[1] As a postscript, the challenge of 'seeing' ESD differently continues. On appeal to the Full Federal Court, (Minister for the Environment v Sharma [2022] FCAFC 35) it was decided that the Commonwealth Minister for the Environment does not owe a duty of care to Australian children to protect them from the physical effects of climate change due to the grant of EPBC Act approvals for fossil fuel projects. Reforms to the EPBC Act are in progress.

Appendix A: The Executive Committee and the National Office Staff at November 2021

Executive Committee

President, Professor Jane Hall

President-Elect, Professor Richard Holden

Treasurer, Professor Wai Fong Chua AM

International Secretary, Professor James Fox

Policy Committee Chair, Professor Sue Richardson AM

Governance Support, Professor Kevin McConkey AM

Chair Panel A and Acting Chair, Grants & Awards Committee, Professor Neal Ashkanasy OAM

Chair Panel B, Professor Kevin Fox

Chair Panel C, Professor Kate Darian-Smith

Chair Panel D, Professor Don Byrne

National Office Staff

CEO, Dr Chris Hatherly

Manager, Fellowship, International and Awards, Michelle Bruce

Business Manager, Alice Balnaves-Knyvett

Policy Manager, Andrea Verdich

Policy Officer, Dr Isabel Ceron

Communications Managers (job-share), Bonnie Johnson and Sue White

Events Manager, Anna Dennis

Accounts and Administration Officer, Kate Luke

Appendix B The Symposium Committee, Program and Participants

Symposium Committee

Professor Kevin McConkey AM (Chair)
Dr Dylan Lino
Professor Deborah Lupton
Professor John Maynard
Professor Sarah Pink
Professor Mark Western
Professor Sarah Wheeler
Professor Hugh White AO
Professor Glenn Withers AO
Dr Chris Hatherly (CEO)
Anna Dennis (Events Manager)

Mon
22
Nov
2021

11.00am
–
4.15pm
AEDT

THE SOCIAL FUTURE OF AUSTRALIA
PROGRAM

Day One

11.00AM - 11.20AM	**INTRODUCTION**	**SPEAKERS**
	Welcome to the Academy	Jane Hall
	Introduction to the Symposium	Kevin McConkey
		Chris Hatherly (Chair)

11.20AM - 11.35AM	**THE SOCIAL SCIENCES IN AUSTRALIA**	**SPEAKER**
	Stepping up: Are we ready to deliver meaningful impact in a changing world?	Mark Western
		Kevin McConkey (Chair)

11.35AM - 11.45AM	**SESSION BREAK** (10m)	

11.45AM - 12.35PM	**A ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES**	**PARTICIPANTS**
	Place and function of the social sciences: reflections and directions	John Dewar
		Chris Feik
		Cathy Foley
		Andrew Leigh
		Deborah Lupton
		Danielle Wood
		Michelle Grattan (Chair)

12.35PM - 1.00PM	**LUNCH BREAK** (25m)	

1.00PM - 2.20PM	**CAN AUSTRALIA ACHIEVE MEANINGFUL RECONCILIATION WITH FIRST NATIONS PEOPLE?**	**SPEAKERS**
	1. Fight for liberty and freedom – understanding the lessons of history: an Aboriginal perspective	John Maynard
	2. The land still speaks – supporting First Nations languages in Australia	Felicity Meakins
	3. The Uluru Statement and the priority of a Voice	Thomas Mayor
	4. Climate change as a transformative opportunity for reconciliation	Bhiamie Williamson
	Commentary and Q&A	Ian Anderson (Chair)

2.20PM - 2.40PM	**AFTERNOON TEA BREAK** (20m)	

2.40PM - 4.00PM	**CAN AUSTRALIA BETTER MANAGE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN A CHANGING WORLD?**	**SPEAKERS**
	1. Rogue nation?	Klaus Neumann
	2. Will we go to war with China?	Hugh White
	3. Uptight and uncomfortable: Australia's engagement with the global human rights regime	Renée Jeffery
	4. Existential threats, shared responsibility, and Australia's role in "coalitions of the obligated"	Toni Erskine
	Commentary and Q&A	James Fox (Chair)

4.00PM - 4.15PM	**SUMMARY COMMENTS & CLOSE**	**SPEAKER**
	Reflections on key points and needed actions from Day 1	Glenn Withers

Tues
23
Nov
2021

9.00am
-
4.00pm
AEDT

THE SOCIAL FUTURE OF AUSTRALIA

PROGRAM

Day Two

9.00AM - 10.25AM

HOW CAN AUSTRALIA IMPROVE EDUCATION AND HEALTH IN A CONSTANTLY CHANGING WORLD?

1. Quality and equity in education: simultaneous pursuits or trade-offs?
2. Ensuring good mental health during the pandemic and beyond
3. Valuing diversity as strength in how we build social equality
4. Looking back and looking forward: Are the health and health care problems of yesterday doomed to be still the problems of tomorrow?
Commentary and Q&A

SPEAKERS

Barry McGaw

Richard Bryant
Karen Fisher and Peri O'Shea

Stephen Duckett
Patrick McGorry (Chair)

10.25AM - 10.40AM **MORNING TEA BREAK** (15m)

10.40AM - 12.00PM

PRODUCTIVITY AND INNOVATION IN THE FUTURE
1. How is the labor market changing: how does it need to change?
2. To produce or reproduce – Is that the question for women?
3. Emerging technologies and social futures
4. Anywhere, anytime: Possibilities and pitfalls of future work
Commentary and Q&A

SPEAKERS

John Quiggin

Marian Baird
Sarah Pink

Mark Griffin
Sarah Wheeler (Chair)

12.00PM - 12.30PM **LUNCH BREAK** (30m)

12.30PM - 1.20PM

A ROUNDTABLE ON IMPROVING THE STATUS AND RECEPTION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
Can the social sciences do more and be seen to do more for this country and for the world?

PARTICIPANTS
Emma Campbell
Rosalind Croucher
Alison Pennington
Deborah Terry
Maggie Walter
Dan Woodman
Misha Ketchell (Chair)

1.20PM - 1.30PM **SESSION BREAK** (10m)

1.30PM - 2.50PM

CAN DEALING BETTER WITH CRISES LEAD TO A MORE JUST AND DIVERSE SOCIETY?
1. Historical roots and consequences on violence, health, and minority politics
2. The future of migration, multiculturalism, and diversity in Australia's post-COVID social recovery
3. Sharpening the lens on gender inequality: Moving beyond homogeneity
4. A duty of care and de-colonising governance: New models for environmental and climate change challenges
Commentary and Q&A

SPEAKERS

Pauline Grosjean, Victoria Baranov & Ralph De Haas

Fethi Mansouri

Janeen Baxter

Lee Godden
Jude McCulloch (Chair)

2.50PM - 3.05PM **AFTERNOON TEA BREAK** (15 m)

3.05PM - 3.50PM

A ROUNDTABLE ON THE WAYS FORWARD
Leadership, actions, and reactions for the social sciences and the Academy

PARTICIPANTS
Glyn Davis
Jane Hall
Dylan Lino
Jane McAdam
Richard Holden (Chair)

3.50PM - 4.00PM

CONCLUSION AND THANKS
Reflections on key points and closing

SPEAKER
Kevin McConkey

Appendix C: Academy Presidents

Presidents of the Social Science Research Council

1943 (Apr)-1952 (Feb)   Dr Kenneth Cunningham
1952 (Mar)-1953 (Aug)   Professor Sir Douglas Copland
1953 (Aug)-1958 (Jun)   Sir Leslie Melville
1958 (Jun)-1962 (Jun)   Professor Sydney Butlin
1962 (Jun)-1964 (Oct)   Professor Wilfred Borrie
1964 (Oct)-1966 (Nov)   Professor William O'Neil
(Terms commencing November)
1966-1969   Professor Percy Partridge
1969-1972 (Nov)   Professor Richard Downing

Presidents of the Academy

1972-1975   Professor Geoffrey Sawer AO
1975-1978   Professor Fred Gruen AO
1978-1981   Professor Alan Shaw AO
1981–1984   Professor Keith Hancock AO
1984–1987   Professor Joseph Issac AO
1987–1990   Professor Peter Karmel AC
1990–1993   Professor Peter Sheehan AO
1993–1997   Professor Paul Bourke
(Terms commencing January)
1998–2000   Professor Fay Gale AO
2001–2003   Professor Leon Mann AO
2004–2006   Professor Sue Richardson AM
2007–2009   Professor Stuart Macintyre AO
2010–2012   Professor Barry McGaw AO
2013–2015   Professor Deborah Terry AO
2016–2018   Professor Glenn Withers AO
2019-2021   Professor Jane Hall
2022-2024   Professor Richard Holden

Strategic Plan – 2019-2022 (rev May 2021)

ACADEMY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES IN AUSTRALIA
50 Years

Our Purpose	**Recognise and champion excellence in social science.**

Our Principles	**Excellence | Independence | Integrity** **Acknowledgment and Respect for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples**

Our Plan

Recognise and Enhance	Shape the Nation	Communicate	Equity, Diversity & Inclusion	International
1. Recognise and champion excellence in Australian social science. 2. Support and enable the next generation of Australian social scientists.	3. Develop and advance robust solutions to nationally important issues. 4. Advocate for systems and resources that support world-class social science research and policy advice.	5. Promote awareness and understanding of the social sciences. 6. Support and enhance independence and balance in reporting and communication of research.	7. Facilitate recognition and involvement of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people and knowledge in social science research and engagement activities. 8. Promote and support equity and diversity in the social sciences.	9. Facilitate international social science research exchange and collaboration. 10. Promote the development of social science research capability, especially in the Asia Pacific.

Operations: 11. Commit to sustainable support for the activities of the Academy.   **12.** Adopt a thematic appropach to relevant Academy activities and events.

Our Projects

1.1. Review the Academy's panels and election processes. 1.2. Explore awards program expansion. 2.1. Work with the Academy of the Humanities in Australia to support a national Humanities and Social Sciences Early- and Mid-Career Researcher network.	3.1. Develop 3-year policy action plans in identified areas. 3.2. Engage with Australian and State/Territory governments. 4.1. Develop policy position papers. 4.2. Produce and publish a state of the social sciences report. 4.3. Convene workshops and roundtables on key issues.	5.1. Develop engaging digital content. 5.2. Enhance reach and promotion of Academy lectures and symposia. 5.3. Coordinate annual Social Sciences Week. 5.4. Run a 50th anniversary events program in 2021. 6.1. Collaborate with media outlets to promote evidence-based communication.	7.1. Develop and implement a series of Reconciliation Action Plans. 8.1. Produce a report on equity and diversity in the social sciences. 8.2. Develop and promote equity and diversity policies.	9.1. Engage with the International Science Council and other international bodies. 9.2. Facilitate bilateral and multilateral research programs. 10.1. Support social science research capacity in the Asia Pacific.

Operations: 11.1. Seek sponsorship for Academy events and activities.   **11.2.** Secure grants and partnership funding.   **12.1.** Determine thematic and priority areas.

Performance & Outcomes

▪ Fellows report satisfaction with Fellowship and Award processes. ▪ Formal engagement with EMCRs increases (>1,000 actively engaged in 2022).	▪ Better engagement with policy makers, including increase in invited contributions and commissioned projects. ▪ Wide recognition of the Academy by social scientists.	▪ Academy's public reach grows, approaching 100,000 followers in 2022.	▪ Second-stage *Innovate* RAP in place in 2022. ▪ Academy recognised for its leadership in equity, diversity and inclusion.	▪ Successful Association of Asian Social Science Research Councils (AASREC) conference held in 2021. ▪ Significant increase in value of international research grants administered.

Operations: Diverse revenue grows to 30% of total by 2022.