DEALING WITH VIOLENCE

THE CHALLENGE FACED BY POLICE AND OTHER PEACEKEEPERS

KARL SCHONBORN, Ph.D.

Foreword by Lewis Yablonsky, Ph.D.

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By

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To

MILLICENT CLUTE SCHONBORN

LAURA STENERSON SCHONBORN
and

JACK REIFF SCHONBORN

FOREWORD

In *The Rebel*, his philosophical essay on the meanings of rebellion and revolution, Albert Camus made a pertinent comment applicable to contemporary violence:

> The poets themselves, confronted with the murder of their fellow men, proudly declare that their hands are clean. The whole world absentmindedly turns its back on these crimes; the victims have reached the extremity of their disgrace: they are a bore. In ancient times the blood of murder at least produced a religious horror and in this way sanctified the value of life.[1]

There are still types of violence and homicide that produce emotional reactions in the mass mind. However, the highly intelligent and socially ingrained human executions of war, starvation, pollution, and unnecessary disease no longer seem to stir the general population beyond a murmur of tacit recognition. These phenomena seem unreal to most people since they are mainly experienced secondhand from television, the newspapers, or on a movie screen. This blurring of reality is most evident in today's children. For many of them, the violence shown in a real-war report on the TV news is not too different from the fictionalized war of a dramatic program.

Part of the reason for the tacit acceptance of violence is that the preponderance of violence in most societies is legal and therefore is sanctioned and considered rational. War and law enforcement violence are two prime examples. War is the ultimate violent activity undertaken by a society; it is considered to be legal, sanctioned, and rational. In most circumstances this pattern of violence is justified by virtually all segments of the society, especially when the country is the victim of what is defined as an unprovoked attack. In general, wars are considered justified by the dominant groups in the society when the nation is committed to them in an effort to defend the status quo of its social structure. When law-enforcement officials engage in violent activities, they justify their actions as necessary for the maintenance of "law and order," which they tend to equate with the maintenance of the

status quo of the social and political structure. In many situations, violent actions by the nation (war) and by law-enforcement officials are forces militating against social change. Violent efforts to maintain present (or idealized versions of former) standards of morality, national boundaries, or spheres of influence are regarded as legal, sanctioned, and rational by large segments of our society.

The process of war requires the direct and indirect brutalization of young people—who must necessarily fight the wars. Youngsters must be conditioned and motivated to join the armed forces, where they are systematically trained to kill. War is therefore a pattern of behavior that is glamorized and aggrandized for young people. Often this preparation for violence has the fallout of pushing young people closer to a violent edge of behavior outside of the armed services. Many gang patterns are crude imitations of society's larger and more sophisticated patterns of institutionalized violence.

Therefore, when philosophers, like Camus, allege that violence and murder have become normative behavior patterns, there exists a basic element of truth. Some literary observers take violence a step further to imply that the pattern has become an accepted element in most societies, and that there is a blurred delineation between so-called "senseless" and "rational" violence. For example, in a recent film, *Hard Contract*,[2] a hired killer—the story never discloses his employer—sits casually in a theater munching a candy bar. He is calmly watching an actual newsreel portraying the horrendously violent Biafran war in Africa. The film shows the varied casualties of war, including the bloated dying bodies of starving Biafran children. A news commentator on the screen, in a monotone voice, bereft of any emotion, is speculating on the predictable further deaths of thousands of Biafran children, inevitable victims of the seemingly uncontrollable war and starvation. In the midst of this impersonal human holocaust, the protagonist in the movie audience leans over and quietly kills his victim-of-the-month. The audience (and we are all in reality part of this audience) is confronted with the question: Which is more horrible—the inexorable murders on the screen or the "real" murder in the theater? Is one more real than the other? The total film message suggests that we have broken through the sound barrier into the humanization (and acceptance) of violence. *Hard Contract*, like *The Rebel*, implies that the general public is no

longer horrified by violence, that violence has become an integral part of the new "human" condition.

Part of the numb observation and acceptance of violence as a characteristic of the current human condition is related to the fact that the avalanche of information about violence which is supplied daily by the mass media is simply *descriptive* of the phenomenon of violence. Little if any of the tidal wave of material that inundates the public is directed at solutions or ways of dealing with the problem. If more solutions were available, people would be less likely to become disaffected because they would see some possible hope for resolving this destructive problem. This is the central reason why I view Professor Karl Schonborn's brilliant analysis of violence and its control as a monumental contribution to the humanistic solution of a complex problem. His book is one of the few contributions to our greater understanding of violence as well as to our prospects for effectively controlling it.

As we move into the 21st century, the ultimate violence of a potential nuclear holocaust hovers in the wings as we helplessly rely on the fragile efforts of a handful of politically-motivated leaders to maintain a shaky peace. Implicit in Professor Schonborn's work is the inextricable relationship between, at the lowest destructive level of violence, simple interpersonal conflict and, at the ultimate level of violence, apocalyptic bombs that could wipe out the majority of the earth's population.

As I read and digested the range of information and insights in Dr. Schonborn's analysis of violence, I became increasingly aware of how our ability to contain the mass violence of war is, in the casual nexus of society, ultimately and directly related to the daily conflict engaged in by intimates in familial and other personal relationships. (As Professor Schonborn notes, two thirds of all aggravated assault occurs among family intimates or friends and acquaintances.) There is logic in the proposition that this kind of basic aggression acted out upon intimates is often displaceable onto the larger battlegrounds of war. In reverse, large conflagrations (mass riots, imminent or actual wars) set the emotional tone for the more personal violence that takes place among "friends" and in families. Professor Schonborn's inquiry tends to reveal this gestalt of the violent condition. In brief, control of any form of violence is interdependent with the control of other patterns.

The sense of alienation experienced by most people is one of the rampant maladies of our time that supports and reinforces the "legal violence of war." Alienation is a force that enables a majority of people to support illegal and immoral wars and their concomitant killings. Common people do sanction many little murders and big murders, especially if the perpetrators are legitimately acting within the proper formal societal context. Alienation, involving the death of compassion or *social death* (see my book *Robopaths: People As Machines* [3]), is an element that fosters mass violence.

R. D. Laing, the British psychoanalyst, develops the relationship between alienation and violence further. He defines alienation, particularly of the white European and North American, as a sense of "being at an end: of being only half alive in the fibrillating heartland of a senescent civilization." [4] This pervasive condition of estrangement from ourselves and from the human community provides a setting in which people have perpetrated incredible acts of violence upon each other and have been able to rationalize such behavior as "normality." According to psychoanalysts such as Laing and Erich Fromm, it has become "normal" to be alienated; and the more one thus behaves like everyone else—that is, treating others as commodities rather than as human beings—the more one is taken to be sane. It is Laing's belief that those who are considered sick in an alienated world might be the healthiest of all. Laing conceptualizes the "the condition af alienation, of being asleep, of being unconscious, of being out of one's mind, is the condition of the normal man." [5] As suport for this premise, he notes that "normal men have killed perhaps 100 million of their fellow normal men in the last fifty years." [6]

Apart from this "normal" violence, American society has recently had an increasing amount of a brand of violence popularly called "senseless" violence. Notable in American history are the following cases: the assassinations of John F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King, and Robert Kennedy; the serial killing of eight student nurses by Richard Speck in Chicago; the mass killing of nine people in a home in Victorville, California; the savage ritualistic murders of Charles Manson's "family;" the murder of over twenty-five migrant farm works by Juan Corona; and the brutal homicides of more than twenty-eight teen-agers over a three-year period in Houston, Texas, by Wayne Henley, David Brooks, and Dean

Corll. These last grisly murders were described by Brooks in his statement to the police:

> In all, I guess there were between twenty-five and thirty boys killed, and they were buried in three different places. I was present and helped bury many of them but not all of them. . . . On the first one at Sam Rayburn [Reservoir] I helped bury him, and then the next one we took to Sam Rayburn. When we got there, Dean and Wayne found that the first one had come to the surface and either a foot or a hand was above the ground. When they buried this one the second time, they put some type of rock sheet on top of him to keep him down.[7]

It is my contention that the majority of so-called senseless violence is fostered by the violent climate of "normal men" committing "normal violence."

Although Professor Schonborn modestly excludes senseless violence from the purview of his analysis, it is my belief that his analysis and the methodologies for control he puts forth encompass this brand of violence. The control of "rational" violence tends to reduce "senseless" violence by diminishing the climate of violence in which the more difficult to comprehend forms of violence flourish. Briefly stated, it is logical to assume that reducing the more manageable patterns of violence tends to reduce senseless violence by eliminating the framework or ethos that produces the rawer, less comprehensible forms of violence.

In this regard, Professor Schonborn makes a significant contribution by making a point based on considerable research, that *violence begets violence.* He advocates that whenever possible in controlling violence, "authoritarian peacekeeping" should be supplanted by "humanitarian peacekeeping." "Authoritarian peacekeepers" are characterized by closeness, formality, rigidity, and overreaction; they rely primarily on coercion, physical power, and the use of lethal weapons.

In contrast, "humanitarian peacekeepers" are characterized by openness, informality, flexibility, and underreaction; they rely primarily on conversation, persuasion, and social science knowledge about human behavior. It is apparent from Professor Schonborn's analysis and examples that the more humanistic peacekeepers are, the more effective they are in controlling or defusing violence. By contrast, the macho, image-involved, tough approach to curb-

ing violence often serves to throw gasoline on the fires of conflict and thus serves as an irritant toward further violence.

I am in complete agreement with what I discern as Professor Schonborn's basic proposition about violence. Throughout his analysis he implies a central sociological principle that I would state as follows: if negative forms of human interaction facilitate violence, then counterattack forces that positively affect the social structure can defuse or control violence. This, it seems to me, is the heart of the matter. If we understand the social factors that produce violence and intervene sensibly, then violence is not an inevitable conclusion of social conflict. Dr. Schonborn illustrates this point with many fascinating actual case examples of how various patterns of violence can be controlled, dissipated, or ameliorated. He cogently describes how "peacekeeping" can be elevated to an art that can be mastered for practical application in a myriad of situations. In this vein he aptly points to the precise way that "peacekeepers" who are knowledgeable and properly trained can become part of the social networks of conflicting parties and intervene with the positive result of reducing or eliminating violent consequences.

Professor Schonborn's book is a refreshing relief from the barrage of dismal literature on violence, since it fosters a sense of hopefulness rather than helplessness in dealing with a critical social malady. Written in a concise and engaging fashion, it seems to me that it is vital reading for anyone concerned with violence. Since the deleterious impact of violence affects almost everyone, this important work should be read by a mass audience.

Lewis Yablonsky

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Karl L. Schonborn

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DEALING WITH VIOLENCE

[CHAPTER 1]

VIOLENCE, CONFLICT & PEACEKEEPING

THE WHIRLWIND OF violence strikes everywhere—in the home, the street, the schoolground, the battlefield. At one moment it is the burst of gunfire that kills a person; at another, the burst of an exploding bomb that kills a thousand people. In all its different forms, violence constitutes one of the gravest problems facing the world today.

Violence is not new. It has been with men throughout the ages. Only recently, though, has vivid television reporting allowed it to slash its way into everyone's consciousness on an almost daily basis. Assaults, homicides, prison riots, campus disorders, racial disturbances, and military clashes constantly come to one's attention—live and in color.

As if real violence were not enough, make-believe violence is presented on network television (in movies, dramas, and action programs) at the rate of seven incidents per hour.[1] By the time the average American youngster is fourteen years old, he has witnessed the violent destruction of 13,000 human beings on television, and this just during the "children's hours" (from 4 to 9 p.m.)[2]

What makes violence so frightening for most people is that no one—not even those living in rural or suburban areas—is wholly safe from it. Nearly a million violent crimes are committed in the United States each year; and they occur here, there, and everywhere.[3] Clearly, it is incumbent upon authorities and citizens alike to gain a better understanding of violence and develop more effective techniques for dealing with it.

Solutions to the problem of violence have not been lacking. Besides the age-old technique of extreme social repression (Hitler's solution for violent crime), new techniques have attracted attention of late. These have involved the following:

—social engineers administering genetic, biomedical, and psy-

chological tests to identify "potential" criminals and delinquents who can be "treated" before they become dangerous.

—public authorities monitoring violence-prone citizens by means of micro-transmitters surgically inserted in their earlobes which inform computers of their whereabouts at any given time.

—neurosurgeons cutting out so-called "violence centers" from the brains of assaultive, homicidal people.

—behavioral psychologists deconditioning hyper-violent people through nausea and shock treatments (cf. the neo-Pavlovian technique used to modify behavior in Anthony Burgess' *A Clockwork Orange*).

—civic authorities putting anti-hostility chemicals into public water supplies (cf. the "soma" used to control people in Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World*).

—psychosurgeons implanting electrodes in the brains of violent people, especially those suffering from certain neurological diseases (cf. the feedback system used to prevent murderous rages in a psychomotor epileptic in Michael Crichton's *Terminal Man*).

—public officials administering "anti-aggression" pills to heads of state to diminish any war-making tendencies they might have.

—prison superintendents drugging conflict-prone inmates with tranquilizers to keep them quiet for extended periods of time.

While some of these techniques might be effective, most are impractical on a large scale and are obviously incompatible with privacy, democracy, and self-determination. They also raise difficult administrative questions: Who is to control the controllers? Who is to make the crucial decisions about who should be tested and treated? And also many of these techniques overemphasize biological, physiological, and psychological causes of violence, neglecting sociological causes such as poverty, urbanization, and group, communal, or national pressures towards violence.

There are, of course, other ways of dealing with violence. One of these—quite different from the above Orwellian techniques—is known as *peacekeeping*. Peacekeeping involves taking action at the place where violence is occurring, and it ranges from a single policeman intervening in a fight between individuals to a thousand United Nations soldiers intervening in a war

between nations. Intermediate to these two extremes are interventions by other peacekeepers such as riot policemen, guardsmen, and army troopers.

Peacekeepers have a risky and unenviable task, but one that becomes ever more important as the amount of violence increases in societies. (Complex societies are more and more characterized by delicate networks of trust and interdependence, and they are less and less able to tolerate the trauma of violence.) As the peacekeeping task becomes more important, it demands ever-increasing skill, training, and sensitivity on the part of peacekeepers.

Unfortunately, peacekeepers do not always have the necessary skill, expertise and sensitivity to be effective. In countless small scale quarrels individuals have been needlessly insulted, roughed-up, or even killed by intervening peace officers. On a larger scale, the tragic events at Kent State, Attica prison, and Southern University, to cite only better known examples, attest to the shortcomings of some peacekeepers. And on an even larger scale, the mistakes of UN peacekeepers in the Congo and the Middle East have at times aggravated rather than moderated international violence and conflict.

The toll exacted by inept peacekeeping is high. The casualties include not only those who are unnecessarily injured or killed, but also those members of society who are embittered, disillusioned or radicalized as a result. It is important, then, that peacekeeping skills and training be improved.

The Nature of Violence and Conflict

Violence is any behavior that is designed to inflict injury—especially physical injury—on people or property. It usually consists of physical force, delivered with passion and intensity. (Many researchers define violence this way, including most of those who worked for the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence—henceforth referred to as the Violence Commission.)

Much violence grows out of circumstances in which people are in conflict with others. (Some violence, though, is random, senseless, and devoid of the social interaction which is required for social conflict. Killing strangers "for kicks" and other forms of so-called ultra-violence exemplify this; however, they lie outside the

scope of this book.) Conflict occurs when the goals, values, or practices of parties* in a given situation are incompatible—or are perceived to be so. This usually causes parties to try to neutralize, injure, or even destroy one another at some point. Children's scuffles over toys, gang fights over status, and military battles over territory are all examples of social conflicts.

The principal parties to a conflict may be groups, organizations, nations, or other kinds of social units.† Conflicting parties may be equal in size (group versus group) or unequal (group versus organization). Two, three, four, or more parties may be involved as principals; however, two are the rule since most multi-party conflicts turn into two-party conflicts. The reason for this is that people under stress tend to simplify their mental burden by reducing the number of parties, issues, and the like that they must contend with. There is also a tendency for the scattered power of parties allied in a struggle to become centralized through the formation of coalitions ‡ and the streamlining of decision-making. The end result is usually a two-party conflict.

A good deal of the violence discussed in this book involves conflicts between two equal sized social units. More precisely, the focus is on

Interpersonal conflicts (e.g. fights between marital partners or between bar patrons)

Intergroup conflicts (e.g. battles between gangs or between feuding clans)

Interorganizational conflicts (e.g. confrontations between campus organizations or between industrial organizations)

Intercommunal conflicts (e.g. clashes between racial communities or between ethnic communities)

International conflicts (e.g. wars between nations or between blocs of nations).

These five types of conflict account for a large proportion of the

* "Parties" refers to the social units—regardless of how many people they include—involved in a given conflict. Besides "first" and "second" parties (husbands and wives, blacks and whites), there are "third" parties (policemen, UN peacekeepers) and "fourth" parties (refugees, innocent bystanders) in many conflicts.

† Social units are collections of people who are conscious of sharing membership in a social aggregate of some sort.

‡ Summarizing research on coalition formation, sociologist Theodore Caplow has written

> The impulse to form coalitions with others who are fighting the same enemy is strategically irresistible and will usually continue until all of the active combatants have been polarized into two camps.[4]

violence present in the world, and they span the gamut from small to large incidents. Juxtaposed the way they are, the five types also help stimulate insights into similarities and differences among various kinds of conflicts, and they provide a systematic way of analyzing them.

Since they are fairly common, the five types of violent conflict worry a lot of people. (They therefore deserve study and attention so that they can be dealt with more effectively.) A recent national survey provides an indication of how troubled people are about these types of conflict—and the differential concern they have about each of them. Psychologist Robert Kahn and his associates asked a random sample of 1,374 American males about the kinds of things that especially worried or concerned them. Nine percent of the respondents mentioned crime ("*interpersonal*" conflict) as something that worried them. Another 9 percent said that violence by juvenile delinquents and other young people ("*intergroup*" conflict) concerned them. Fourteen percent, moreover, worried about student protests and rebellion ("*interorganizational*" conflict); and 22 percent agonized about race riots and racial problems ("*intercommunal*" conflict). However, 36 percent—by far the largest number of respondents—stated that war ("*international*" conflict) was a source of great concern to them. This is not a surprising percentage, though, given the substantial involvement of the United States in the Vietnam War at the time the survey was made.[5]

The Nature of Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping consists of the managing and moderating of conflict and violence. It tries to keep injuries and general destruction to a minimum, and its goal is the ultimate resolution of a conflict. (Resolution is quite difficult though since it involves finding solutions—and relatively permanent ones at that—to the problems raised by a conflict.)

Whether peacekeepers intervene in a given conflict or not hinges on a combination of factors; and as later chapters will show, this combination itself varies depending on the size of the conflict. For a variety of reasons, peacekeepers do not—and should not—intervene in every violent incident. First, some violence is hidden, precluding intervention. Second, some violence happens so swiftly that it allows no chance for peacekeeping. Third, some violence is such that even the most skillful peacekeepers may

not be welcome. An example of the latter might be a situation where both the conflicting parties and society at large decide that the violence is legitimate, rightful, and lawful.* This decision depends on the time, place, and context of the violence as well as on the number, nature, and point of view of the people doing the assessing. In general, if most of those concerned about an episode of violence view it to be socially constructive—i.e. having many more positive † than negative consequences—then intervention by peacekeepers is not warranted.

WHO KEEPS THE PEACE?

Police as Peacekeepers

The police have traditionally been the primary peacekeepers in society. As agents of the law, they are charged with maintaining

* These assessments—social, moral, and legal, respectively—are each made according to different criteria. *Legitimacy* or *illegitimacy* is usually determined by whether a majority of the people concerned feel that a given course of action is justifiable or desirable. (Revolutionary violence directed against the British by American colonists in the 1770's was considered legitimate by Americans, but illegitimate by Britishers.)

Whether violence is *right* or *wrong* is determined in approximately the same way, except that much more good-bad evaluation and moral judgment are involved. (Americans decided that political assassination attempts were rightful in the case of Adolf Hitler but wrongful in the case of Franklin Roosevelt.)

Lastly, whether violence is *lawful* or *unlawful* is determined by formal procedures (a ritualistic decree by a king or a committee of elites) or by legislative or parliamentary deliberations. (The killing of a national enemy in wartime is lawful while the killing of a personal enemy in peacetime is unlawful.)

To be sure, in an imperfect social order some acts may be regarded as legitimate even though they are unlawful (the lynching of a deviant by vigilantes). Conversely, other acts may be seen as illegitimate even though they are lawful (the shooting of a joyriding juvenile "felon" by police).

† Sociologists Georg Simmel and Lewis Coser have pointed out that conflict and violence have positive functions under certain circumstances.[6] Conflict, for example, can create loyalty and cohesion *within* social units. Jealousy and petty differences are submerged—even if momentarily—while members of a social unit prepare for and then do battle. Conflict can also organize and strengthen previously weak social units. Many groups, communities, and nations become more efficient and gain identity when they are engaged in conflict. (In fact international conflict created many of today's nations and continues to sustain a good number of them.)

In addition, violent conflict can serve as a signal that needs are not being met or that social systems are not functioning properly.[7] No matter if it involves two spouses or two nations, violence is a signal that change may be in order. In some cases, it may even serve as a vehicle for that change. Finally, conflict can serve still other positive functions such as ventilation, articulation, motivation (as a catalyst for change), and innovation (as a type of achievement).[8]

order among citizens. In particular, they keep the peace (hence the term "peace officer"), provide services (protect public and private property), and fight crime (enforce laws and prevent infractions).

Keeping the peace is probably the most important of these three tasks, since it takes up the largest portion of the policeman's time and involves the protection of people's rights and lives. Police peacekeeping means intervening in serious conflicts between husbands and wives; landlords and tenants; shopkeepers and customers; cabbies and fares. It also means dealing with gang fights, campus disorders, and racial disturbances.

Providing services consists of protecting property as well as licensing, inspecting, directing traffic, and assisting people who have locked themselves out of their cars or homes.

Fighting crime involves enforcing laws, detecting crimes, and arresting offenders. It is often the main, and sometimes the only task that people associate with the police, though in fact it takes only 10 to 20 percent of their time.[9] As police administration expert James Q. Wilson notes:

> The vast majority of police actions taken in response to citizen calls involve either providing a service (getting a cat out of a tree or taking a person to the hospital) or managing real or alleged conditions of disorder (quarrelling families, public drunks, bothersome teenagers, noisy cars, tavern fights). Only a small fraction of these calls involve law enforcement such as checking on a prowler, catching a burglar in the act or preventing a street robbery.[10]

Most police departments have used virtually the same peacekeeping procedures for decades, perpetuating ineptitude and inefficiency in a number of cases. Many, however, are beginning to experiment with new procedures. Some are using methods developed and tested by social scientists. Accordingly, a few departments require their officers to take special training in the management of fights between family disputants. Other departments require their officers to undergo intensive training in community relations and the handling of racial disturbances. Some departments have even created new kinds of communal peacekeepers. For example, there are Community Crisis Managers (police regulars) in Dayton, Community Service Officers (police probationers) in Atlanta, and Civilian Cops (police auxiliaries) in Pittsburgh, California.

Other Peacekeepers

Besides policemen, there are others who deal with violence and serious conflict. They include:

Mental health personnel—psychiatrists, psychologists, and psychiatric aides—who handle outbursts of rage and hostility, especially on the acute wards of mental hospitals. Therapists, marriage counselors, and others not working in institutions occasionally deal with violence too.

Teachers—whether at the grade school level or the college level—who increasingly confront violence and conflict in hallways, classrooms, and athletic facilities.

Correctional personnel—from prison guards to parole and probation officers—who often intervene in violent conflicts involving inmates, parolees, or probationers.

Social workers—clinical, communal, recreational—who frequently encounter violence. They must respond to it without resorting to guns or nightsticks, as must all non-police peacekeepers who are not authorized to use such weapons.

Rescue personnel—firemen, lifeguards, ambulance drivers—who often find themselves dealing with panicky, irrational people who resist, challenge, and even battle them.

Marshals and monitors—from youth corpsmen to crisis team members—who patrol campuses or ghettos urging calm and restraint during disorders. In numerous cities, marshals and monitors have been instrumental in cooling down conflicts.

Many clergymen, civil employees, and public servants (such as transit personnel and gas station attendants) also encounter violence and serious conflict from time to time.

Peacemakers

In addition to the peacekeepers noted above, a variety of people and agencies engage in peace*making*—a less active way of regulating conflict. (Traditional industrial and international peacemakers, among others, will be discussed in Chapter 16.) Some new types of peacemakers have emerged of late:

Go-betweens—who arbitrate disputes between businessmen and consumers who are dissatisfied with products, services, or warranties. Arbitration of this kind—which takes place in San Francisco and elsewhere—is faster than court litigation and just

as binding legally. Furthermore, it can be conducted in the evenings when people are through with work.

Ombudsmen—who help resolve serious racial antagonisms in high schools in Philadelphia and other cities. Student ombudsmen, trained as conciliators and trouble-shooters by school authorities, are called on to deal with pupil grievances and racial violence. Peacemakers of this sort offer an alternative to the use of armed police in school hallways: an increasingly common practice. (Officially appointed adult ombudsmen—mandated to receive and report grievances against the government—have long been used in Sweden.)

Mediators—who intervene in conflicts where women are fighting various kinds of sex discrimination. In Oakland and Berkeley such mediators have intervened in conflicts between women and corporations; women and universities; women and governmental agencies.

Interveners—who moderate disputes between hospital organizations and community organizations in Chicago and other cities. These disputes usually center around the speed, quality, and delivery of medical services.

Arbitrators—who resolve, out of court, conflicts which occur between people who have filed minor criminal charges against each other. The "Arbitration as an Alternative" program in Hartford helps reduce court loads and has been welcomed by overworked district attorneys; other cities have followed Hartford's lead.

Facilitators—who deal with the serious disputes which inevitably arise when corporations or public agencies merge. In Los Angeles, impartial facilitators help decide who gets what salary, what title change, and what relocation assignment.

Overseers—who keep the peace during local elections, particularly those for grass-roots representation on city planning councils, economic development boards, and public housing associations. In Pittsburgh and other places, overseers have supervised such elections and have controlled the tensions that so often lead to ballot box tampering and violence.

Having taken a *general* look at different kinds of violent conflicts and various responses to them, it is now time to take a *specific* look at several types of violence and peacekeeping. The following chapters examine five types of violence in detail and

analyze the peacekeeping efforts that are made with respect to each of the types.

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[PART I]

CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES & CONTROL OF VIOLENCE

[CHAPTER 2]

INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE & FAMILY CRISIS PEACEKEEPING

A policeman answering a family crisis call found a man threatening to shoot himself, his common law wife, their three children, and the officer too if he tried to interfere. Uncomfortable facing the man's .38 revolver, the officer nonetheless decided to ignore it. He sat down and asked the man what the trouble was; after a 45 minute discussion he discovered the man did not think that all of the children were his. The woman eventually admitted that two of the children in fact were not his. The officer then convinced the man that the kids were not to blame and that he should spare them. Finally he persuaded the man to put the gun away in return for his leaving and not taking legal action.

INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT

INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT OCCURS between people acting as individuals, rather than as members of social units. Individuals, however, are the building blocks of all social units, be they groups, organizations, communities, or nations. Unlike such aggregates, individuals have no division of labor or complex structure. Therefore, their violent conflicts are relatively simple in comparison.

Frequency, Causes, and Consequences of Violent Interpersonal Conflict

Deaths and Injuries among Disputants

The most serious type of interpersonal conflict is the kind that ends in death or homicide. (Homicide is usually defined as the willful felonious killing of one person by another.) Table 2–I shows the homicide rates (numbers murdered per 100,000 population) for a variety of countries around the world. For the United States the rate of 6.1 means that 12,130 murders were committed among the 197,864,000 people living in America in 1967; or put

TABLE 2–I
HOMICIDES (AND SUICIDES) PER 100,000 POPULATION [2]

Country	*Homicide*	*Suicide*
Australia	2.0	14.9
Austria	2.0	23.1
Canada	1.9	8.6
Ceylon	12.2	16.9*
Colombia	21.5*	6.1
Denmark	0.2	19.3
England and Wales	0.3	10.4
Finland	1.7	19.8
France	2.6	15.0
Greece	0.7	3.1
Hungary	1.9*	29.6
Israel	2.9	6.5
Italy	3.6	5.4
Japan	2.3	14.1
Netherlands	3.0	6.2*
New Zealand	1.0	10.0*
Norway	0.1	7.0*
Poland	1.0*	9.0
Spain	0.5	4.8
Sweden	0.3	21.6*
Switzerland	0.8*	18.4
Taiwan	12.4	16.8
United States	6.1*	10.9
Venezuela	8.0*	7.0
West Germany	3.0	23.0

* Indicates 1967 data. All other is 1966 data.

another way, there was one murder every forty-five minutes that year.[1]

An interesting fact revealed in Table 2–I is that few, if any of the wealthy, industrialized countries (United States, England, West Germany, Japan) have extremely high homicide rates. However, many of them do have high suicide rates. Among other things, this suggests that there might be an inverse relationship between violent *inter*personal and *intra*personal conflict. Researchers who have postulated such a relationship between homicide and suicide claim that aggression is either externalized in homicide or internalized in suicide. Sigmund Freud, for example,

considered suicide "a desire to murder, directed against the self."* Overall, the information in Table 2–I is inconclusive regarding a possible relation between the two types of conflict. While some countries (Colombia, Denmark, Sweden' do show an inverse relationship, others do not, having uniformly high (or uniformly low) rates for both homicide and suicide (Greece, Spain, Taiwan).

Still, serious *inter*personal conflicts often start as *intra*personal † conflicts—that is they may originate in the frustration, neurosis, or psychosis of an individual. By entangling others in their own troubles—through projection, scapegoating, and so forth—some individuals transform their intrapersonal conflicts into interpersonal ones.

The amount of homicidal interpersonal conflict has remained relatively constant over the years in the United States, as the following homicide rates per 100,000 suggest: 1910, (4.7); 1920, (6.7); 1930, (8.5); 1940, (6.3); 1950, (5.3); 1960, (5.0); 1970, (7.8).[4] To the extent that medical science has enabled physicians to save more and more potential homicide victims, however, the later figures may not accurately indicate the real rate of recent homicidal interpersonal violence. (The homicide rate, of course, varies from region to region and from city to city. Homicide rates for the Northeast and the South were 7.6 and 12.9 respectively in 1973, while those for Philadelphia and New York were 11.5 and 17.5. The national rate was 9.3).

* Freud would have appreciated the irony of this UPI news item from Prague, Czechoslovakia:[3]

> Vera Czermak jumped out of her third-story window when she learned her husband had betrayed her.
>
> Mrs. Czermak is recovering in a hospital after landing on her husband, who was killed, the newspaper Vecerny Pravda reported.

† Though it is beyond the purview of this book, *intra*personal conflict regulation is worth mentioning here. Better known as psychotherapy, it involves mediating between the conflicting parts of a patient's psyche. Suicide prevention work is a very active form of such conflict regulation and is conducted by volunteers and professionals who field phone calls from people in distress. Numerous public and private Suicide Prevention Centers or Emergency Help Centers operate in most states now. Staff members talk with distressed callers, assess the imminence of a suicidal act, and refer them to agencies, psychiatrists, or counselling programs for further help. During the course of a conversation, staffers try to identify those callers with a high suicide potential by working up a profile regarding their age, sex, race, health, employment, mental status, marital situation, and access to weapons. If an extremely high risk profile turns up or if a caller threatens to take his life immediately, staffers notify police, firemen, and other rescue personnel.

Other kinds of serious interpersonal violence also occur. Aggravated assault, robbery, and forcible rape are generally considered to be the most serious types of interpersonal violence after homicide.‡ The frequency and rates of these kinds of violence for 1973 were as follows:

	Number Incidents Reported	Rate per 100,000 Population
Aggravated assualt	416,270	198
Robbery	382,680	182
Forcible rape	51,000	24

Expressed more dramatically, there was an assault every seventy-six seconds, a robbery every eighty-two seconds, and a rape every ten minutes in the United States in 1973.[6] If homicide data are added, a rate of violent crime emerges—one measure of major interpersonal violence. Figure 2–1 shows fluctuations in the rate of violent crime since 1933.

Despite the recent increases in violence that this figure reveals, it is important to note that for most people the odds against becoming a victim of violent crime are high. As former Attorney General Ramsey Clark has noted:

> It happens to be a fact that if you are an American you have one chance in 400 years to be a victim of violent crime. But if you are a Negro or a Mexican-American the chance is one in 80 years; if a member of the white middle class, once in 2,000 years; if a white, well-to-do suburbanite, once in 10,000 years.[8]

Though it exists in suburbia (average rate, 146 per 100,000 people) and in rural areas (rate 97), violent crime is concentrated in cities with populations of one hundred thousand or more (rate 773).[9] Most city violence is committed by young males at the lower end of the occupational scale. The victims of violent crime tend to be young, poor, and black except for robbery victims, who tend to be older middle class whites.

‡ According to FBI definitions, *aggravated assault* is "assault with intent to kill or for the purpose of inflicting severe bodily injury by shooting, cutting, stabbing, maiming, poisoning, scalding. . . ." *Robbery* is "stealing or taking anything of value from the care, custody, or control of a person by force or violence or by putting in fear, such as strong-arm robbery, stickups, armed robbery, assaults to rob and attempts to rob." *Forcible rape* includes "rape by force, assault to rape and attempted rape. It excludes statutory rape (where no force is used and the victim is younger than the age of consent)." [5]



Figure 2–1. The Rate of Violent Crime in the US since 1933 [7]

Problems with Interpersonal Conflict Data

The figures for interpersonal violence cited so far must not be treated as definitive. Many of them come from the *Uniform Crime Reports*, issued annually by the FBI. These reports are compiled from police data voluntarily sent to the Bureau by over 6,000 law enforcement agencies across the country accounting for most—but not all—of the US population. However, the report figures represent only the number of *reported* crimes, not the number of *committed* crimes. (Crimes, simply defined, are violations of criminal laws.) Moreover, for an inexplicable reason, the figures include only the most serious act of violence committed if many different acts are perpetrated; a "lover's lane" incident where a boyfriend is assaulted by several men and his girlfriend raped and robbed is recorded as only an act of rape, the most "serious" of the three acts committed.

Researchers at the University of Chicago recently surveyed a national sample of 10,000 households and found that, except for murder, the rate for every violent crime is greater than that given in the FBI reports. The rate for aggravated assaults is more than twice what the FBI reports show, while that for robberies is

half again as great, and that for forcible rapes is three-and-a-half times greater.[10]

Even these University of Chicago rates may underestimate the actual extent of violent crime. Accurate figures may in fact be unobtainable because of measurement problems due to:

—differences in police agency reporting practices
—extensive hidden and unreported violence
—differences in definitions of what constitutes crime
—tendencies to distort facts and to collect data for politico-administrative purposes (e.g. to show what a good job police are doing).

Sociologists Rodney Stark and James McEvoy tried to assess the actual amount of violence the average American has been involved in. From a national sample of 1,176 taken in 1968, they found that one person out of seventeen had been threatened with a gun or shot at; one out of twelve had been threatened or actually cut with a knife; one out of eight had been punched or beaten; and one out of nine had been slapped or kicked.[11] In contrast to other researchers they discovered that low, middle, and upper income people had been exposed to approximately the same amount of violence, exploding the myth that violence is mainly a lower class phenomenon. Stark and McEvoy suggest that the relatively invisible middle and upper class violence (which usually occurs in single unit dwellings and private clubs) means that it does not come to the attention of authorities as often as the highly visible lower class violence (which generally takes place in thin-walled apartments and in public bars). The lawyers, clergymen, and marriage counselors who deal with middle and upper class violence keep it off the record—something that the police and social workers dealing with lower class violence cannot easily do.

A similar study by William Grotty indicated that 93 percent of a nationwide sample of respondents had experienced violence in some form—during childhood, adolescence, or military service. Fifty-five percent of the sample had been involved in fist fights as youths.[12]

Generalizations about Violent Interpersonal Conflict

The following generalizations can be made about the victims of violent interpersonal conflict.

One fourth of all homicide victims are family intimates.

The percentages below, drawn from a study of homicides in Chicago, suggest that more than one fourth of all homicide victims are spouses, lovers, or family members.[13] Many other studies corroborate this finding.

Relationship between disputants in homicidal conflicts	Percent
Spouse or lover	20
Other family	7
Neighbors	3
Friends or acquaintances	41
Business	3
No relationship	22
Undetermined relationship	4
	100

The intimacy and closeness of family relations can lead not only to homicide but to *excessively violent* homicide as well, according to criminologist Marvin Wolfgang. "Husband-wife slayings have a much higher incidence of excessive violence [more than one stab or one shot enacted] than any other type of interpersonal relationship between victim and offender." [14]

Three fourths of all homicide victims are either family intimates or friends and acquaintances of the offender.

The above percentages indicate that close and intimate *non*-family relations can also cause homicidal conflict. When victims who are friends and acquaintances are added to family victims, the total accounts for three quarters of all homicidal conflict.

The greatest risk of being murdered comes not from strangers in dark alleys but from family intimates and friends in one's own home. (Wolfgang found that 51 percent of all Philadelphia homicides occurred in the home.) Nonetheless the chances of being murdered are still very slim—the odds are one in twenty thousand in any given year and one in two million on any given day.[15]

Intimacy and closeness are also major factors in homicidal conflicts in other countries. Marshall Clinard, a sociologist, reports that:

> Personal contacts have been found to play a significant role in murders in Denmark and India. In a Danish study it was found that the murderer's victim was a relative or an acquaintance in nine out of ten cases. Strangers were seldom the victims. Most murders in India occur within the same caste and also frequently involve husband and wife.[16]

What are the reasons triggering most homicides? On the surface, the reasons given seem rather mundane. A recent study of 551 murders in Chicago found that domestic problems and jealousy were involved in 27 percent of the cases.

Circumstances of homicides [17]	Percent
Altercations	
General domestic	17
Money	9
Liquor	7
Sex	2
Triangle	6
Racial	1
Children	2
Other	38
Robbery	
Strong arm	3
Armed	9
Teen gang disputes	3
Other	3
	100

Wolfgang came up with similar findings in his investigation of 588 homicides in Philadelphia.[18] There, 14 percent were the result of "domestic quarrels" and 12 percent the result of so-called "jealousy quarrels"—a total of 26 percent. Also, criminologist Von Hentig found that 26 percent of the homicides in New York City during a four-year period arose out of "domestic disputes"; and the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company discovered that 30 percent of the five hundred homicides it analyzed in depth resulted from "domestic quarrels and jealousy."

Why does so much homicidal conflict occur in domestic settings? For one thing, there is a good deal of intimacy in the family setting. And the intimacy of the family predisposes it to conflict: the closer people get to one another emotionally, the greater chance they will fail to live up to each other's expectations. In addition, the more people are around each other, the greater the chance they will get on each other's nerves.*

*Holidays, rainy days, and other high-interaction days can bring family stresses to a head. This account from the gasoline shortage period is relevant:

> In the Netherlands, which has now gone through six carless Sundays, police report a dramatic rise in calls to break up fights among families forced to stay together; such duties have absorbed the energies of cops no longer needed for traffic control.[19]

Family settings also involve love, and love can easily turn to hate because love often leads to feelings of jealousy and exclusiveness. Families are thus vulnerable to conflict-generating possessiveness and territoriality, as well as to violence that can come from the interpersonal power and control that are frequently a part of love.

Another reason families are the locus of so much violent conflict is that they entail compulsion and pressure. Parents, children, and various relatives are often involuntary members of families, and blood relationships make it difficult for them to leave when the going gets rough. Thus, conflict grows because incompatible family members, like the characters in Jean Paul Sartre's *No Exit,* are trapped in a situation which requires them to keep interacting with each other.

The constant change implicit in family life also causes conflict. The needs of each member continually change as family size increases; and as members grow older their roles change as well. Thus as each set of problems is surmounted, new ones threaten to disturb family equilibrium.

Finally, social pressures often come home to roost within the family unit. The frustrations of overcrowding, unemployment, low incomes, inferior housing, and inadequate education all strain domestic relationships and can lead to violence.

Two thirds of all aggravated assault victims are either family intimates or friends and acquaintances of the offender.

Studies of aggravated assault reveal a similar pattern of victims and preferred settings. One third of all aggravated assault victims are closely related to their attacker, while another third are unrelated friends and acquaintances. The home is the locus for more than half of all assaults.

Like most homicides, most aggravated assaults are triggered by quarrels, altercations, or jealous rages. Aggravated assaults differ from homicides in that the attacked victims survive rather than die. (Murderers often have no more intention to kill than persons guilty of aggravated assault. Their victims just happen to die.)

Since 1933 the rate of aggravated assault in America has grown from 40 per 100,000 inhabitants to the current rate of 187 per 100,000. This is double the rate in England and Wales and

eighteen times as high as the rate in Canada.* [20] Several types of aggravated assault deserve mention because of their frequency: wife beating, child beating and landlord-tenant violence.

Wife beating. Repeated physical assault against one's wife is commonly termed wife beating.† (Husband beating is rare, but it does exist.) Chronic wife beating occurs among all social classes in the United States, but it tends to be concentrated in the lower strata. "Alcoholism" and "inability to communicate" are the two most frequently cited causes of wife beating.

With the growing awareness of women's rights, fewer wives are willing to tolerate severe and recurrent beatings. More and more wives are reporting abuses to authorities and pressing charges. Many states now have statutes similar to California's:

> Any husband who willfully inflicts upon his wife corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition, and any person who willfully inflicts upon any child any cruel or inhuman corporal punishment or injury resulting in a traumatic condition, is guilty of a felony.[23]

Child abuse. Penal Codes usually recognize another kind of family assault: child beating or nonaccidental physical injury to children. Some states are beginning to require that physicians and others who frequently come into contact with battered children report all such cases. These people have traditionally been reluctant to report child abuse for two reasons. First, until recently it was not thought to be anyone's business how other people "disciplined" their children. Second, it is easy to be in error, and thus legally guilty of slander. The chance of error stems from the fact that abused children are usually too young to explain what has happened to them or too afraid to accuse their parents.

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*As for the other major kinds of interpersonal violence, the rate of forcible rape in America has steadily increased from 4 per 100,000 females in 1933 to about 22 currently.[21] The robbery rate, however, has fluctuated greatly since 1933; no overall trend is apparent. (This may be because robbery differs from other types of interpersonal violence in that its victims tend to be middle-aged whites rather than young blacks, who are disproportionately likely to be victims of homicide, assault, and rape. Beyond this, robbery is generally a calculated act—as a career, it is one of the last unskilled jobs in America—instead of an act of passion.)

† A study of verbal rather than physical assault among "happily married" couples found that such couples average a real verbal Donnybrook once every twenty-six weeks and a lesser verbal quarrel once every six weeks. Only one wife in nineteen ever packs her bags and leaves as a result of these conflicts, however.[22]

Physicians and others normally hear the story of the accompanying adult, who invariably claims that the child fell down some stairs or ran into a door. Many abusive parents change doctors constantly so that no one physician will become overly suspicious. Reputedly, most child abuse goes on for one to three years before it is finally discovered.

A few illustrations of child abuse may underscore the seriousness of the problem:

—In Kansas City a man was arrested for beating his year-old son and two-year-old daughter. He said he could not recall why he had done it.

—In Cincinatti a twenty-two-month-old boy was hospitalized for the fourth time during his brief life after being mauled by his mother.

—In Washington, D.C., a blonde, blue-eyed four-year-old girl was admitted unconscious to a hospital. Lacerations covered her back, face, arms, and legs. An X-ray examination disclosed a fractured skull. She told doctors: "Mama kept hitting me with a big black stick."

The extent of child abuse in the United States is not known, although a common estimate is that there are 60,000 cases every year.[24] (This gives a rate of about 30 per 100,000.) Other estimates put the number of cases as high as two and one-half million per year. Many abused children die from head injuries and damage to internal organs, and rough estimates indicate that child abuse trauma accounts for more deaths among US children than leukemia, cystic fibrosis, muscular dystrophy, or automobile accidents.[25]

Though research into child abuse is still in its early stages, a few generalizations about the abusing parent have emerged. Many abusive parents are socially isolated, emotionally ill, or mentally retarded. Some were beaten themselves as children; thus they are only perpetuating a tradition of child abuse. Most child battering parents are troubled and conflict-ridden. When asked if children are ever abused for no reason at all, one expert commented "We find in most cases that there is some sort of a conflict even though it may be beneath the surface."[26] The troubles may have to do with finances, spouse "misbehavior," or simple everyday pressures.

An abusive parent may blame his child for family financial

troubles because he represents another mouth to feed. Illegitimate children are particular targets for this sort of blame, as they are often unwanted from birth. (In the future, wide availability of abortion may offer a partial solution to this problem.)

Spouse misdeeds may also be linked to the battered child in some cases. One parent may assault a child because he looks or acts like the other parent who may have been cruel recently or just deserted the family. Children may also remind a troubled parent of a former phase of his own life—when perhaps he too was a battered child. If the parent himself was unworthy enough to have been beaten as a child, he reasons, then *his* child must likewise be unworthy. Even a parent's current feelings of unworthiness may be projected on to a child, resulting in abuse.

Also, children occasionally serve as convenient scapegoats for parental anger stemming from everyday pressures. The abuse may be triggered by a trivial incident, as many child batterers have stated. ("Baby was fussy," "Wet pants," "Cried too much," "Was too active," "Spilled food on floor.") In these cases the child is no more than a handy target for the accumulated frustrations of the parent.

Landlord-tenant conflicts. Indirectly related to family conflicts are landlord-tenant disputes. While these will not be discussed in detail, a few of the issues involved might be mentioned briefly. Tenants often trigger conflict by damaging the landlord's property, refusing to pay rent, accumulating garbage, and engaging in similar annoyances. Landlords, on the other hand, often cause friction by trespassing, terminating services, removing doors and windows, and changing locks to shut tenants out or lock their property in.

Police are frequently summoned to deal with these landlord-tenant conflicts. They are called for several reasons: (a) they are usually the only third parties available for intervention, (b) these conflicts concern laws that must be enforced, and (c) police are the only public servants trained to handle the violence that results from many of these conflicts. Interestingly, police have found that violence is likeliest to occur if an apartment manager deals with a tenant in lieu of the landlord himself. This is perhaps due to the fact that managers are more likely than landlords to be *young males*—the most violence-prone of all categories of people.

Deaths and Injuries among Peacekeepers

Intervening in family crises is a dangerous business. During the ten years between 1963 and 1973, 103 of the 786 police killed † in the United States were slain while responding to disturbance calls (family crises, man with a gun, etcetera.).* [28] While no precise injury figures for the same ten-year period are available, about one third of the police injured in the United States are hurt while intervening in family conflicts. ‡ [31]

FAMILY CRISIS PEACEKEEPING

Most present day family crisis intervention is conducted by the police. The large number of police killed or injured during crisis interventions constitutes a serious problem for police departments. The high fatality rate, by the way, cannot be explained away by asserting that the slain police must have been inexperienced rookies. Only a small percentage of the police slain during family peacekeeping have been inexperienced, and FBI figures show that most have been veterans with at least five years or more of policework to their credit. That police deaths result from improper peacekeeping procedures or insufficient vigilance seems much more plausible than the "rookie" theory. Many of the police killed while attempting to arrest disputing parties have had their own guns used against them. In many situations, police have used excessive force or have goaded parties into attacking them. Along these lines, social psychologist Hans Toch analyzed the causes of a

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† The other 683 officers were slain under the following circumstances: 60 were responding to burglaries in progress or pursuing burglary suspects; 155 were dealing with robberies in process or chasing robbery suspects; 199 were attempting other arrests; 37 were handling and transporting prisoners; 56 were investigating suspicious persons and circumstances; 60 were directing traffic, and 116 were engaged in miscellaneous other duties.[27]

* American police, according to criminologist Robert Silverman, are generally four times as likely to be killed as regular citizens, having a homicide rate of 21.1 in comparison with 5.7 for citizens for the 1964 to 1966 period.[29]

Despite these figures, the notion that police work is unusually hazardous may be unwarranted. Fatality rates in other occupations are often higher than those for police work as a 1955 study indicates. (They are 300 percent higher in mining, 150 percent higher in construction, 60 percent higher in agriculture, and 30 percent higher in transportation.)[30]

‡ During 1972 there were 31,763 assaults on US police officers, 12,230 of which resulted in injury. The greatest proportion of these assaults—27 percent—occurred while officers were responding to "disturbance" calls.[32]

number of recent attacks on San Francisco and Oakland policemen and came up with the following types and frequencies.[33]

Type of attack	San Francisco	Oakland
Assault in defense of personal autonomy (touching, orders, etc.)	322	56
Assault as expression of contempt (retaliation, etc.)	247	54
Assault in effort to escape	140	41
Assault to prevent being moved	105	34
Assault to protest captivity	89	34
Assault as extension of other's violence	105	32
Assault in defense of others	103	28

Toch's analysis shows that the most frequently cited reason for attacking a policeman was that the officer threatened the attacker's autonomy by touching him, grabbing him, or giving him orders. It seems apparent, therefore, that police peacekeepers would do well to avoid unnecessarily touching or handling disputants, knowing that sensitive ones are likely to attack in retaliation.

Of course, police also need to be careful about taking too little action, since too little action can be as dangerous to the officer as too much. In essence police are very vulnerable—both legally and physically—during family crises. It is not surprising that a good number of police dislike handling them. One officer spoke for many when he told interviewer William Westley:

> You know if there is one thing these men hate more than anything else it is to go out on a call for a family quarrel. You ought to see their faces when they hear the call come over the radio.[34]

To a degree police dislike family conflicts because they have little or no training in how to deal with them.‡ If such training

‡ James Q. Wilson notes some of the consequences of this lack of training in his discussion of order maintenance (peacekeeping) and law enforcement (crime fighting) tasks:

> The difference between order maintenance and law enforcement is not simply the difference between "little stuff" and "real crime." . . . The distinction is fundamental to the police role, for the two functions involve quite dissimilar police actions and judgments. Order maintenance arises out of a dispute among citizens who accuse each other of being at fault; law enforcement arises out of the victimization of an innocent party by a person whose guilt must be proved. . . . Because an arrest cannot be made in most [order maintenance cases] the officer is expected to handle the situation by other means and on the spot, but the law gives him no guidance on how he is to do this. . . . Alone, unsupervised, with no policies to guide him and little sympathy from onlookers to support him, the officer must 'administer justice' [at] the curbstone.[35]

were provided—as it is in some police departments—then some of the dislike, and danger too, might be mitigated.

Today, police are almost the only helping agents who will make house calls twenty-four hours a day. Moreover, they are the only people sanctioned to use physical force to deal with family violence. Thus, they are the ones most people call—though often with ambivalence and reluctance—when serious family conflict erupts. Psychologists, sociologists, and social workers may someday be more involved in on-the-spot family peacekeeping; but at the moment police are the primary managers of domestic crises.

Mindful of this, a variety of police departments have initiated training programs and experimented with new procedures in order to make family crisis peacekeeping less dangerous for policemen as well as disputants. In 1966 there were almost no such experimental projects; today there are scores of them with many others in the planning stages. Among the better known programs have been those in New York City, San Francisco, Oakland, and Dayton. Less well known programs have been instituted in Bridgeport, Connecticut; St. Louis, Missouri; Lowell, Massachusetts; Louisville, Kentucky; Multnomah, Oregon; Tacoma, Washington; and Hayward, Richmond, and Redondo Beach, California.

The goals of these projects have been to reduce arrests, minimize repeat interventions,* and cut down on casualties among officers and disputants. Additionally, these projects have aimed at improving the liaison between police departments and other agencies that deal with family problems (courts, welfare departments, social service agencies, and the like).

Generally, these experimental programs have not tried to turn police into social workers or amateur psychologists. Rather, they have tried to impart safety skills, social science insights, and an understanding of how the confluence of urban ills surrounding health, housing, education, and employment work to create and sustain family conflicts.†

* The reasons for this goal are both economic and operational. Since the average family crisis intervention costs $100 and takes half an hour, a reduction in repeat interventions means that money is saved and patrolmen have more time to perform other important tasks. Commonly one out of every two family fight calls is a repeat call.

† Such conflicts are not limited to urban areas where social ills predominate; they occur with great regularity in rural areas too. One official with much experience in rural police work has reported that family conflicts are second only to traffic accidents in their demand on the policeman's time in rural areas.

To give an idea of what these programs entail, a scenario of a new style crisis intervention will be briefly reviewed here.[36] After receiving information from the police dispatcher, peacekeepers rush to a family conflict scene. They *take safety precautions* from the very start. They do not pull up in their black-and-whites with sirens wailing and tires screeching. Instead they drive up quietly and avoid slamming car doors. Approaching the house or apartment cautiously, they take advantage of shadows and listen carefully before knocking on the door. (They never stand directly in front of doors—too many police have been shot through doors.) All this time they size up the conflict situation by paying attention to shouts, threats, or gun reports.

Once contact is made with disputants, peacekeepers *neutralize any violence* that may be occurring. Persuasion is generally used before physical force of any sort. Police try to defuse violence by instruction (telling disputants to go into different rooms temporarily), distraction (inquiring "How're you folks tonight? Mind if I smoke?") or even confusion (stating "Please yell louder, I can't hear" or asking "Who wants to be arrested?"). Sometimes, though, physical force is required to defuse violent situations. When the violence is controlled—or if there is only a threat of it—police visually and then physically frisk disputants for guns, knives, scissors, and so forth.

After violence or its potential has been dealt with, peacekeepers *gather information* regarding the nature of the conflict. Instead of interrogating and monopolizing the interaction, they probe and listen. When all sides have had their say, peacekeepers try to establish some consensus among disputants about the basic facts of the conflict.

At this point peacekeepers must decide whether to *leave the scene, mediate the quarrel, refer the disputants to a social agency, persuade one party to leave*, or *arrest one or more parties.*

There is agreement among peacekeeping experts that it is better to mediate or refer than to expel or arrest. This is the goal in most experimental peacekeeping programs. In this regard, an analysis conducted by the Oakland Police Department found that out of 998 peacekeeping efforts engaged in during twelve months by special family crisis police, 67 percent ended in mediation,

28 percent in referral,‡ and 5 percent in arrest.[37] Despite the fact that a third of the domestic fights involved violence, only a few family police and a small number of disputants were significantly injured.

In order to further clarify what goes on during this new style of family peacekeeping, a detailed look will be taken at the approach used by the Family Crisis Intervention Unit in Manhattan.

New York City Crisis Police as Peacekeepers

Specially trained family crisis police intervene in serious interpersonal violence in New York's 30th Police Precinct—a ghetto area on the upper west side of Manhattan teeming with people and problems. An account of a not-atypical intervention is presented here:

> [A crisis policeman reponds to a call for help from] a man and wife in a shabby basement apartment [who] have been at each other all night. "I want him locked up, officer," [the wife demands. The husband retorts] "Hell, lock her up too," and holds out his arm to show where his wife has cut him with a kitchen knife. "I'll go as long as she goes too; otherwise, you got to fight me."
>
> Carefully, with a look of weariness in his round, good-natured face, [the policeman takes off his coat] and sinks slowly into the only comfortable chair in the living room. "What's you folks been drinkin'?" he asks. "Scotch," the glowering, heavyset man answers. [The officer asks for and receives a glass of Scotch which he doesn't really drink.] Then he takes off his shoes and rubs his arches. . . .
>
> [Frequently he becomes part of the family and the couple tells him their troubles. When the outpouring of emotion ends half an hour later, the policeman advises them] "Look at her side; look at his"—and tells them that the next time they want to fight, [they should] call him up at the station house and they can fight with him and keep it in the family. . . .[38]

How Crisis Police Intervene

To fully understand how New York family police operate, their manner of crisis intervention will be reviewed from start to finish.

‡ Unfortunately, only 19 percent of the referred family disputants followed through and visited the recommended agency. However, this poor showing was not due to dissatisfaction with the family police, since three fourths of the disputants contacted in a follow-up interview said that they were pleased with the police's behavior during the intervention.

A two-man biracial crisis team is available night and day for family peacekeeping in one of the police precincts in Manhattan. When a crisis call comes into police headquarters, the team leaves its normal beat and races to the scene of the trouble in a special car. (Crisis cars are generally similar to other squad cars except that files on previous peacekeeping efforts and on social agencies are kept in them.)

As they speed toward the conflict scene, crisis police quickly check the peacekeeping files to see whether a prior visit has been paid the family in question; and if so, whether weapons were involved in their last fight. They also check to see what the issues were as well as what the outcome was.

With this information crisis police do not have to start at the beginning regarding issues, problems, and complaints every time they conduct a repeat intervention. They are also able to use names when addressing disputants, thus personalizing and humanizing their peacekeeping effort. (Besides names and so forth, the peacekeeping files contain information regarding the race, ethnicity, and legal relationship of family disputants.) The social agency files give crisis police the addresses and phone numbers of community agencies to which family disputants may be referred for further help and assistance.

The first challenge for crisis police when they arrive is to gain admittance to the apartment or house where the dispute is taking place. Problems arise at this point if the quarreling parties on the other side of the door cannot understand what the police are saying. For this reason, crisis police receive instruction in a few foreign languages. They learn basic phrases such as "Please open the door," "We want to help you," "What's the matter here?", "Do you want an ambulance?", and "Give me the gun!" When languages are involved that police have no familiarity with, they get neighbors to act as go-betweens.

Family crisis peacekeepers enter a conflict scene in pairs, each covering the other; but they immediately separate, one going toward the first disputant and the other toward the second one. As they move into a conflict scene crisis police keep a watch out for firearms and inconspicuously gather up knives, scissors, and other potential weapons. They also scrutinize disputants for non-

verbal gestures * that might indicate imminent violence. From their training, crisis police know that some *head* signs (nostrils flaring, pupils dilating, veins pulsing, teeth grinding) and some *body* signs (torso crouching, fist clenching) signal impending attack. (In addition, crisis police avoid unnecessary crowding or intruding during interventions. Physical intrusion can trigger defensive and even violent behavior in highly-charged people.†)

Peacekeeper responses to nonverbal gestures vary from situation to situation and from officer to officer. Upon observing such signals in an angry husband, one crisis policeman loosened his tie, put his nightstick on a table, and started to talk about the heat and the long climb up the stairs to the disputants' apartment. The husband, crouched and ready to attack, began to relax out of amazement at what the policeman was doing. Other crisis police have reacted to facial and postural danger signals by asking for a cup of coffee, requesting permission to smoke, or questioning disputants about their hobbies.

Crisis peacekeepers try to remain calm, impartial, and nonthreatening during interventions, careful not to slur or challenge the masculinity or femininity of any disputants. They avoid backing disputants into corners, verbally or physically; outs and escapes are left so that "face" may be saved. Crisis police also try to get disputants to vent their emotions. This means standing by as they let off steam about this, that, and the other. A man sometimes feels the need to engage in a tirade or tell off police in order to reassert the fact that he is still head of the house after police enter and threaten his king-of-the-mountain status. Officers

* Regarding such gestures, "kinesics" expert Albert Mehrabian has found that the words people use account for only 7 percent of what they communicate; 38 percent is conveyed by their manner of speech (intonations, stress, pauses); and an astounding 55 percent by nonverbal facial and postural gestures. (Some students of kinesics—or body language—claim that there are at least 700,000 nonverbal gestures and movements.)

† Edward Hall, a pioneer in the field of "proxemics" or personal space, long ago found that people are careful about letting others get too physically close to them. Unless one is in a bus, train, or room that is crowded, *strangers* are usually kept at "public distance" (12–25 feet); *acquaintances* at "social distance" (4–12 feet); *friends* at "personal distance" (1.5–4 feet); and *intimates* at "intimate distance" (0–1.5 feet)—with exact distances subject to variation from culture to culture.[39] Moreover, proxemics researcher Augustus Kinzel discovered that "violence prone" prisoners generally prefer larger distances (3 feet) between themselves and others than do regular prisoners (1.5 feet).[40]

must later reestablish their authority. (Usually this is not hard to do, because ventilation saps energy and strength, even among hyperactive husbands.)

A family crisis officer usually leaves his nightstick in the squad car and rarely draws his gun during interventions. If he does draw his gun, he makes every effort to avoid using it, as the following account suggests:

> [After haggling with crisis police about whether to let his estranged wife retrieve her baby and clothes, an angry husband] rushes into the kitchen and comes back with a bread knife. "If she goes with the clothes, you're going to have to kill me tonight. Tonight I got to die," he says.
>
> [The policemen pretend to] ignore him. But as they turn to leave, the man moves toward them waving the knife. [One of the police] draws his revolver and tells the man: "Put that away and settle this in court tomorrow." The man keeps coming. [The officer] cocks his revolver and says: "Buddy, it isn't a question of me shooting you, but [a question of] where you're going to get shot." As the man hesitates, [the officer] grabs the front door, shouts "Merry Christmas, Happy New Year and a good night to you," and slams the door. . . .[41]

The crisis officer reacted this way because he felt the "Tonight-I-got-to-die" husband was primarily looking for sympathy and the best way to get sympathy in some neighborhoods is to get roughed up or shot by a policeman.

Assuming violence—or the immediate threat of it—is under control, crisis police try to get disputants into the opposite corners of a room or into different rooms if possible. Once disputants are separated, police take turns listening to the various versions of the conflict so that they can sift out the common elements in the stories, especially regarding who did what to whom. After this is done, police bring disputants back together and have them tell their stories in each other's presence—a subtle way of fostering veracity and consistency. Police let only one disputant speak at a time.

Officers then encourage disputants to come up with their *own* solution to their problem, so that they will not rely too heavily on the assistance of outsiders' advice. Like labor-management mediators, crisis police continually ask parties for their opinions and suggestions. This is the essence of good mediation.

Peacekeepers often find themselves making deals or contracts

with disputants. Two police were once called to an apartment where a drunken husband was beating his wife, in part to express his anger that a judge had just taken away his driver's license. After stopping the violence and hearing the full story, police offered to try to get the man's license back *if* he promised to give up alcohol for a full week and visit Alcoholics Anonymous. To seal their contract, the police and the man agreed that he would pour several bottles of beer down the kitchen drain with the officers witnessing the symbolic gesture.

As they conclude their mediation efforts crisis police usually ask disputants to describe their plans for dealing with the problems (sexual, oedipal, financial, etcetera) underlying their conflict. If these plans seem satisfactory, the police leave—but not before suggesting that disputants contact them immediately if things ever get out of hand again. If the plans are not satisfactory police continue talking with disputants in order to help them improve their plans.

Crisis police frequently refer disputants to social agencies or health departments for further help, giving them names, addresses, and phone numbers as well as "priority appointment" cards which get them quick attention when they appear for assistance. (Occasionally police drive disputants to a social agency for immediate help.) Police try to recommend agencies that are free, effective, and near the disputants' home. Typical referral agencies include: Family Services, Catholic Charities, Planned Parenthood, Alcoholics Anonymous, Wage Earner Plan, Legal Aid Societies, and public health and welfare departments.

In rare cases, crisis police find they must (a) persuade one of the disputants to leave the premises for a while or (b) arrest one or more of the disputants and take them to jail to "cool off."

Training Crisis Police

A month-long peacekeeper training program imparts skill and knowledge—as well as empathy—to police to enable them to do better what they do most of the time anyway: assist people involved in interpersonal conflicts. No effort is made to change the self definition of police from that of "generalist" to that of "specialist" or even more important, from that of "policeman" to that of "therapist." There are *institutional* reasons for this. In the eyes of the New York City Police Department, crisis peacekeepers are

policemen first and foremost—with regular duties of patrol, protection, and paperwork to perform. (Accordingly, crisis police issue tickets for traffic and parking violations as ardently as any of New York's finest!) There are *psychological* reasons too. Studies have shown that police generalists often reject police specialists and regard them as inferiors. For example, police generalists frequently do not regard traffic control specialists as "real" police. (Feelings of rejection and exclusion can decrease morale and effectiveness among specialists.)

Part of the rationale behind training crisis police is the fact that research has shown the worth of using paraprofessionals to better utilize the knowledge of professionals.[42] By training a number of paraprofessional policemen—whose mobility and availability enables them to make "house calls" night or day—the expertise of a few professional sociologists and psychologists can be multiplied manyfold.

Another part of the rationale is the fact that police have a perfect opportunity to engage in "preventative" mental health work. Since psychiatric and psychological resources will never be adequate to the demand for cure and treatment of mental illnesses, prevention is the only sensible strategy. If police spend a little extra time during their interventions nipping future conflicts in the bud, they can sometimes prevent emotional troubles and disturbances from developing. Thus police represent an important mental health and conflict resolution resource in most communities.

Family crisis training in New York City is conducted by means of films, lectures, group discussions, role-playing sessions, field trips to community agencies, and reading assignments on abnormality, family therapy, and marital adjustment. Among other things, family peacekeepers are taught to be aware of the tactics quarreling parties use. During verbal fireworks, disputants may engage in: *game-playing* (employing "If it weren't for you . . ." or "Look how hard I've tried . . ." ploys);[43] *gunny-sacking* (saving up grievances and unloading them all at once);[44] *generalizing* (saying "You always do this . . ." or "You never do that . . ."); *exploding* (using everything short of the kitchen sink as ammunition); and *withholding* (refusing to talk, discuss, or argue). In a sense, disputants using these tactics are fighting

"dirty." Crisis police are instructed to encourage "fair" fighting when they notice dirty tactics being used.

Personal learning as well as textbook learning is emphasized during family crisis training. Through discussion group sessions, crisis police explore their attitudes, feelings, and self-perceptions. One attitude they explore in great detail is the *machismo* attitude many of them hold. (This attitude is really a cluster of attitudes about the need to be tough, dominant, and impervious to emotion.) Police learn that their machismo attitude allows some disputants to manipulate them and provoke them into using unnecessary force.

During role-playing sessions, officers who cool conflicts get rewarded and praised; those who control them in a machismo fashion get ignored. Officers are taught skills which enable them to deal with violence in nonphysical rather than physical ways. They begin to lose some of their dislike for family fight interventions because of their new skills and their new awareness that most family disputants act in ways that are understandable and even somewhat predictable.

A psychologist who helps police work through their "masculine mystique" describes how one policeman moderated his machismo attitude during training.

> Officer G., at the beginning of the project, felt strong urges to retaliate when cursed. Near the end of the project, he saw that when a husband called him a "motherfucker," [it] was a sign of the man's frustration and feeling of impotence. To retaliate out of the officer's own injured feelings would only serve to make the man feel smaller [and more inclined to attack the officer].[45]

Another attitude which family crisis trainees explore is the intolerance which many of them have for deviance of every kind. During role plays, officers interact with actors and actresses—hired to portray deviants—and then get feedback from them about their behavior. Generally, the "deviants" react very negatively to the officers' intolerance and moralistic attitudes. Officers soon learn that disputants can be put off and even incensed by "good/bad" judgments, no matter how subtle the officers are in expressing them.

By means of group discussions, crisis police are encouraged to think through their attitudes toward such deviant behavior as

incest, addiction, alcoholism, and homosexuality. In conjunction with assigned readings on deviance, these discussions help officers begin to cease judging deviant behavior. (Since many officers are taught to regard behavior as either right or wrong, this is no small accomplishment.)

Family crisis training is an ongoing process that lasts well beyond the month of formal instruction. Individual and group sessions with clinical psychologists are held periodically. Their purpose is twofold: *to debrief* (i.e. enable peacekeepers to dissect the details of specific interventions they have conducted), and *to support* (i.e. help peacekeepers cope with some of the doubts and worries they have about their own performance during interventions). Since crisis police are supposed to keep a tight rein on their feelings during interventions, they understandably have a certain amount of unreleased emotion and bottled-up anger that has to be dealt with to insure their continued effectiveness as peacekeepers.

New York City Regular Police as Peacekeepers

Regular police in New York who have not had special training often handle interpersonal conflicts in such a way that they and others end up in the hospital, recovering from fractures, concussions, and gunshot wounds. Why is this? The rest of this chapter attempts to answer this question by examining the techniques used by police untrained in family crisis peacekeeping.

> When the officer reached the door of the apartment, he heard the sounds that had prompted neighbors to call the police—shattering dishes and smashed furniture. Curses and obscenities punctuated the din. . . . "Get outta here," snarled Mr. Jensen [to the policeman]. "Beat it," snapped his wife, "This is none of your business." She had a knife in her hand. . . . The two Jensens faced each other . . . in belligerent stances. The man's left arm had been cut and blood ran from the wound.
>
> "You call me that name again and I'll . . ." Jensen growled, advancing on his wife. The officer, fearing further violence, stepped between the two. In the next moment he was sprawled on the floor, held motionless by the drunken weight of Jensen and the fury of his wife. Their anger had focused on him suddenly, and he felt heavy blows thud into his ribs while Mrs. Jensen clawed at his face and head.[46]

How Regular Police Intervene

That the officer intervening in the Jensens' conflict would have benefited from special training is obvious. The fact that he had no such training is not surprising, though. According to sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset, most policemen in the United States receive less than two hundred hours of training, and much of this is for situations which they rarely encounter. (By contrast, the average medical doctor in the United States receives eleven thousand hours of training.) [47]

Although the New York City Police Department gives its recruits a good deal more than two hundred hours of training, it has not paid much attention until recently to family crisis procedures during its eighteen-week training academy program. What this means is that most regular police in Manhattan, like most other police in the United States, use antiquated procedures for dealing with family conflicts.

One procedure they use is the arrest. The grounds for arrest may be trivial ("Caused repeated peacekeeping visits") or substantial ("Caused serious injury with a deadly weapon"). Arrests are made for some assaults. Regular police cannot make an arrest for "simple" assault if it occurs before they arrive on a scene and witness it. In such instances, though, they encourage the victimized spouse to make a citizen's arrest. Regular police can make an arrest for "aggravated" assault, whether they observe it happening or not.

The trouble with relying on the arrest procedure during family crisis peacekeeping is that it has drawbacks. In many cases, after an arrest is made, the victimized disputant fails to come to court to press charges. This wastes everybody's time—judges, court personnel, and police officers. Probably all the victimized party wanted to do when he summoned the police was to scare the other party, get him out of the house, or get an outsider's opinion on the issues of the conflict. An arrest was not really intended.

Another reason why the arrest is a poor crisis intervention procedure is that many families cannot financially survive if a breadwinner is locked up, especially if he loses his job as a consequence. Arrests seem to exacerbate family tensions rather than diminish them.

As part of the arrest procedure some regular police use the "Pat and Mike" technique. This requires one officer, "Pat," to feign

extreme toughness and volatility. The other officer, "Mike," tells disputants that he can prevent Pat from belittling, arresting, or brutalizing them only if they (the disputants) cooperate with him and work toward resolving their conflict. (Of course, the Pat and Mike technique is not restricted to crisis peacekeeping interrogations and other police work; mothers have always warned unruly children that they will bring "tough" fathers into the picture if cooperation is not forthcoming.)

Another procedure regular police use in family peacekeeping involves arranging a "peace bond." Set up by the police, but issued by the courts, a peace bond is technically an injunction against any further disruptive conflict on the part of disputants. The bond requires the assent of neighbors who feel their sleep or peace of mind is being disturbed by the ruckus and noise of a conflict. If disputants fail to comply with the provisions of a bond, police can fine them or jail them at once even if the evidence of infraction is only circumstantial. A similar arrangement can be made where a civil restraining order is issued on behalf of one disputant to keep the other one(s) away from him. Violation of such an order is considered contempt of court and carries stiff penalties.

The problem with these legalistic procedures is that they involve police in areas outside their expertise: they call on police to give legal advice, a risky business to say the least. Moreover, legalistic procedures tend to be used by officers as a quick and easy way to get out of uncomfortable family crisis situations. In addition, these procedures fail to appreciate the social-psychological complexities of family conflicts. Just how complex family conflicts can get is hinted at in the following account:

> One officer, when he arrived to investigate a [family disturbance], was accused by the wife as her lover. In utter consternation, the officer found himself sputtering denials to the false charge while the spiteful wife laughed and the enraged husband advanced on him.[48]

Regular New York City police frequently use the advisement technique to deal with family disputes. However, giving advice (offering solutions for conflicts) is seldom successful, and when it is successful, it only lasts until the next crisis. It makes disputants overly dependent on outsiders instead of teaching them to handle their problems themselves.

As opposed to advisement, mediation encourages disputants to come up with their own solutions. Such an approach takes some of the onus out of family peacekeeping which can be tiring if police are expected to constantly solve other people's problems, many of which involve issues and life styles they are unfamiliar with. Mediation also removes some of the personal ego threat to police because they no longer find themselves defending their solutions or feeling guilty later if they do not work.

Unfortunately, regular police do not make good mediators, because normal police work has taught them to ask closed rather than open-ended questions. Their highly developed interrogation skills do not serve them well during mediation because they wind up doing more of the talking than the conflicting parties. Disputants quickly answer their closed questions with either "yes" or "no," and then the burden of initiation shifts back to the peacekeeper. This is fatiguing. (It is one more reason why many police dislike family crisis work.) Open-ended questioning puts the burden on disputants and keeps it there.

Another technique used by regular police is to force the man to leave the premises in a male-female conflict. This may mean that he walks around the block or that he spends the night elsewhere. However, unless drunkenness is the problem, exiled males usually return as soon as possible—ready to fight more fiercely than ever—and this requires another intervention by the police. Often the female too is at fault, and deserves exile as much as the male.

A related technique is to scold the male and tell him to "act like a man." But this can trigger an attack on peacekeepers, especially if the man is told that he is a coward for picking on his wife instead of "someone his own size" (such as a policeman).

Many regular police use the oldest technique of all, physical force, during family crisis peacekeeping. This can lead to physical contests with irate husbands, however, who may be bigger or in better shape than the peacekeepers. (Driving around in a squad car forty hours a week is not an ideal physical conditioning program.) Often it is all an officer can do to restrain a disputant long enough for another policeman to put on handcuffs. (Incidentally, tentative findings from a major police department in the West indicate that officers shorter than 5'8" get into many more police-citizen brawls than those taller than 5'8".[49] This may

be due to a variety of factors: (a) police under 5'8" may be overly tempting targets for large, trouble-making citizens who feel physically superior; (b) officers under 5'8" may get less respect because they are more likely to be Asian-Americans or Mexican-Americans; (c) police under 5'8" may have a Napoleonic chip on their shoulder which provokes citizens to resist or attack them.)

According to state law, a New York City policeman may use physical force—though not necessarily "deadly" physical force—against disputants only when he believes it is necessary:

(1) to effect an arrest or to prevent the escape from custody of a person whom he reasonably believes to have committed an offense . . . or

(2) to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of physical force while effecting or attempting to effect such an arrest . . . or while preventing or attempting to prevent such an escape.[50]

While these state regulations regarding physical force are followed by most regular police who intervene in family crises, they are ignored by many. That this happens is attested to by the following account reported by police scholar Herbert Vallow:

> While on the witness stand, the policeman was asked why he struck the blow and his answer was, "He called me a — and I don't take that from nobody, so I took my club and. . . ." [51]

Illegal police action of this kind may be a natural outgrowth of the occupational subculture that police inhabit. According to sociologist William Westley,

> Although legally [the police's] use of violence is limited to the requirements of the arrest and the protection of themselves and the community, the contingencies of their occupation lead them to enlarge the area in which violence may be used.[52]

Westley drew this conclusion after careful analysis of the responses of numerous policemen to the following question: "When do you think a policeman is justified in roughing a man up?" Responses to this "physical force" question are summarized below: [53]

Circumstances	Percent of Police Who Felt Physical Force Would be Justified
When disrespect for the police is shown	37
When impossible to avoid	23
To obtain information	19
To make an arrest	8
For the hardened criminal	7
When you know the man is guilty	3
For sex criminals	3
	100

There are several theories to explain the illegal broadening of the use of physical force by police.* However, the significance of Westley's findings for this discussion is that violence during family conflict intervention may be caused as often by police as by disputants. Thus, a policeman who deliberately or inadvertently slurs the ethnicity or masculinity of a disputant can expect to be insulted in return. If the policeman's response to this show of disrespect is to use physical force, then the resulting violence and casualties should be blamed on him instead of on the disputant. Similarly, violence resulting from a policeman's short temper or sensitivity to epithets should also be blamed on him.

SUMMARY

The frequency and causes of violence between spouses, intimates, and friends were examined in this chapter as were a variety of techniques for keeping the peace. Among other things, crisis police—schooled in family psychology and mental health first aid—were contrasted with regular police who rely on conventional procedures. Some of the traditional techniques of regular police were found to be inadequate for coping fully with the dangers and complexities of serious interpersonal conflict.

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[CHAPTER 3]

INTERGROUP VIOLENCE & STREET GANG PEACEKEEPING

At 3:30 one April afternoon not long ago, a large-scale gang fight broke out at the corner of Wiota and 39th Streets in Philadelphia. It was the tough Aspen Street gang going against the well-armed Fairmont Avenue gang. When a lone off-duty Philadelphia police officer happened upon the rumble, he jumped from his car to intervene. In the ensuing confusion, one of the Aspen Streeters shot at the policeman twice, but missed both times. The policeman returned the fire, and did not miss. Members of both gangs instantly scattered. They left the seriously wounded young Aspen Streeter behind, lying on the pavement in a growing puddle of blood.

INTERGROUP CONFLICT

INTERGROUP CONFLICT OR violence does not involve just any collectivity. It would, if the word *group* were used in the broad, generic sense. However, *group* in this chapter refers to aggregates of two to twenty members which are characterized by closeness, social pressure, and flexibility in meeting member's needs. (Common groups of this sort are clans, gangs, and cliques.)

Serious intergroup conflict exists in many countries. Italy, Mexico, Albania, and Sardinia still have vestiges of the *vendetta,* a violent feud in which members of one group—often a kinship clan—are in constant retaliatory conflict with members of another group.[1] In the United States such feuds, like the famous one between the Hatfields and McCoys, have died out, partly because the American legal system eventually defined vendetta violence as a wrong against society rather than just a wrong against some clan. Thus society (through its courts), instead of the injured clan, was authorized to redress wrongs done by a group against another. In this way, the cycle of violence and counterviolence was finally halted. The breakdown of extended kinship systems through urbanization and migration to cities also contributed to the passing of clan vendettas in this country.

But urbanization itself created a new and different form of ven-

detta: street gang warfare. Most of the serious intergroup conflict in the United States today occurs between youth gangs in large cities. However, gang fights have been a part of the American urban scene for some time. New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Francisco—each with a hundred or more gangs—have had such fights in their streets for decades. In all of these cities, gang activity is a substantial problem. Elsewhere—in Oakland, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Miami, Baltimore, and Washington, D.C. for instance—it is less so. But gang activity comes and goes in cycles, and it often disappears from the streets only to reappear in prison yards or school classrooms.

In recent years *prisons* in California, Illinois, New York, and New Jersey have been plagued by homicidal gang fights which have been brought in from the streets. Some city gangs reputedly have as many members inside prison as they have outside: the Black Disciple and Vice Lord gangs of Chicago, for instance.

High *schools* in both urban and suburban areas have witnessed a great surge of violence within classes and corridors of late. Athletic events have had to be cancelled for fear of violence, especially gang violence. Gangs have introduced street weapons into the schools. One such weapon, the ferocious nun-chakos, consists of a pair of clubs attached by a chain. It can be used as a bolo, a garotte, or a vice-like bone crusher. School authorities are trying to cope with the violence problem by bringing security guards and electronic monitoring systems into the picture. (Some teachers carry pocket transmitters which they can trigger to alert administrators when violence breaks out.)

Frequency, Causes, and Consequences of Violent Intergroup Conflict

Most countries are troubled by juvenile gangs or quasi-gangs. (They are called *mambos* in Japan, *halbstarke* in Germany, *vitelloni* in Italy, *tsotsio* in South Africa, and *blousons noirs* in France.) [2] England, Sweden, Poland, Russia, Australia, and the Philippines are afflicted with youth gangs to a significant degree. However, nowhere have gangs been as numerous or dangerous as in the United States.

What is the current gang situation in the United States? The best answer is that it keeps changing. Different kinds of street groups—social gangs, conflict gangs, criminal gangs—come and

go over the years. Gang activities, attitudes, and values are also continually in flux.

During the sixties, street gangs seemed to be dying out. The prevalence of drugs has been cited as one reason for this. Gangs, of course, had long experimented with marijuana and hard drugs. Pushers used to flock to neighborhoods where gang wars were imminent, knowing that they would find customers among gang members tensed up about impending rumbles. (A common tactic for fearful members, in fact, was to get so strung out on drugs that they would be excused from participating in the rumble—without losing face—since everyone knew "You can't nod and gang-war at the same time.") As drugs became more and more available in the sixties, they eventually sapped the fighting urge of most every gang member.

Other reasons have been cited for the decline of gangs during this period: for example, both the Civil Rights movement and the Vietnam War allegedly diverted and siphoned off gang member energy and manpower. If true, this lends support to theorist Robert Merton's contention that innovation (via gangs), retreatism (via drugs), rebellion (via politics), and ritualism (via neurosis) are all somewhat interchangeable responses to the strain that sometimes results when people are denied access to societal rewards.

After decreasing nationwide in the sixties, gangs re-emerged in the seventies. Disaffection with drugs as well as the ending of American involvement in Vietnam caused youths to turn once again to gang activity. (Ironically vigilante gangs even appeared whose main mission was to keep drug pushers out of certain neighborhoods.) [3]

The Gang Scene in Major Cities

In **Chicago** gangs are an almost permanent part of the social landscape. In the twenties there were fist fights between the Belmonts and Elstons and rock-throwing battles between the Murderers and Aberdeens, all graphically described by sociologist Frederic Thrasher. Later, Chicago gangs began using more sophisticated weapons. In the forties and fifties these were knives, machetes, and zip guns. By the sixties, grenades, Saturday-night specials, and even automatic weapons had come onto the scene. (This escalation is reflected in the fact that during the 1968 to

1970 period, Chicago experienced seven hundred major gang incidents and fifty-nine gang killings per year, a rate of 2.0 killings per 100,000 population.)[4]

Over the years, the Lawndale area of Chicago has been dominated by different types of gangs: first by Polish, then by Jewish, and then by black gangs. Of the black gangs currently in Lawndale, one of the best known is the Vice Lords. A member of the Vice Lords recently described a typical gang fight this way:

> Now a fight like this really looks funny when it starts, but it turns out to be terrifying. When it's just coming night is when most of the fighting occurs so if the Man come, then everybody can get away.
>
> You get a stick, or maybe a knife, or a chain. And some fools got shotguns. What you really do [is wait until the two war counselors threaten each other]. . . . Now everybody's standing there watching everybody else to see what's going to happen. And all of a sudden maybe a blow will be passed, and if it is a fight start right there . . . automatically the first thing you do is hit the [rival] man closest to you. . . . If it look like you getting whupped, you get out. It's all according to your nerve. The first who runs, that's it right there. . . . That's how a club gets its rep—by not running, by standing its ground.[5]

On the basis of research into the rumbles of the Vice Lords and other gangs, four phases in the typical gang fight can be identified: *prefight gathering* (strategizing, bragging, drinking); *verbal encounter* (exchange of threats and insults); *violent encounter* (fighting and rumbling); and *postfight gathering* (analyzing, bragging, drinking).[6]

Another contemporary Chicago gang is the Black P. Stone Nation (formerly the Blackstone Rangers). Their turf is the Woodlawn area of Chicago's south side. Narcotics, extortion, intimidation, and shooting sprees are all part of their repertoire, as is constant fighting with a rival gang, the Black Disciples. Of late, though, the Nation has turned its attention to job training and community organizing. (It still finds time, however, to extort, gamble, profiteer in guns, and federate with weaker gangs such as the Maniacs, the Pharoahs, and the Warlocks.)

The Black P. Stone Nation has been involved in so many activities in fact—some of which have been supported by local and federal financial funding—that it is hard to know what to think of it. Assessment is made even more difficult because the Nation is sometimes praised by the local black community for

being constructive (it is credited with cooling race riots in 1967 and 1968) and sometimes damned by it for being destructive (the gang is charged with killing numerous people during these years).

Racial feelings are behind some of today's gang violence. However, no hard and fast generalizations can be made because of the many exceptions. To illustrate, a white British tourist in Chicago encountered a black gang that threatened to rob and beat him. He told the gang that he was a foreigner, that he had just arrived from England, and that he did not think this was the way to treat a visitor to the United States. A gang member then responded by saying "Oh, we thought you were one of those white guys." The gang left him alone.[7] For some gangs, "whiteness" is not always a matter of skin color *per se*.

The gang scene in **Philadelphia** resembles that in Chicago, at least statistically. During 1968 to 1970, there were six hundred serious gang incidents and thirty-six gang deaths each year, or a rate of 2.0 killings per 100,000 inhabitants.[8] In the last five years, 191 youths have died in rumbles and related gang violence.[9] As one city spokesman said, "Gang killings are getting so prevalent in Philadelphia that it doesn't make the paper anymore, especially if you're black." [10]

There was a period in the sixties when the city significantly reduced the number of large-scale gang fights in its streets. During the same time, though, there was an increase in the incidence of small-scale gang attacks on individuals. And so, the number of stabbings, shootings, and deaths has remained fairly constant over the years.

The Clangs, the Montgomerys, the De Marcos, and the Da Nang Deltas are just a few of the 150 gangs estimated to be active in the City of Brotherly Love today. Membership in most gangs—or "corners" as they are often called—ranges from fifteen to forty teen-agers. According to the Pennsylvania Crime Commission,[11] there are thousands of gang members in Philadelphia (the majority of whom are black); and most of them come from areas which suffer disproportionately from the city's social and economic ills.

The Commission also reports that between 1963 and 1970, gang members constituted 70 percent of all people killed by gangs and 81 percent of all people assaulted by gangs.[12] About 25 per-

cent of all victims of gang violence were innocent bystanders, not gang members. These bystanders got caught in the line of fire of gang shoot-outs or became unwitting victims of other kinds of gang violence.

In **Los Angeles**, newspaper headlines tell the story of its two hundred or so gangs (only 40 of which are black or Chicano): "Rat Packers on Rampage," "Teen Gangs Flare; Two Leaders Shot," "Gang Rampage in LA," "Police Thwart Gang War," "LA Gang Leader Near Death—Felled with Gunshot." [13]

Although black gang activity reputedly tapered off after the Watts riot, Chicano gang conflict picked up. At the moment, violence appears to be rising among white working class gangs such as the Midnighters, the Undertakers, and the Lynchmen. Rivalries and killings among some of these gangs have continued unabated for thirty years—a long time in a young city like Los Angeles. The LA Police Department reports that there are about thirty gang homicides and three hundred attempted gang homicides per year in the city.

The gangs **in San Francisco** tend to be made up of Chinese-American youths who specialize in assassination and terroristic extortion of shopkeepers and restaurant owners. Much concern has been expressed regarding the power these gangs wield in the city's Chinese district. Gangs such as the Yu Li, the Wah Ching, and the Suey Sing were described by California's Attorney General as "a serious threat that has to be reckoned with." [14]

Most of these gangs hang out at Mah-Jong parlors, pool halls, and tea houses—the same haunts frequented many years ago by the Bugs, a legendary Chinatown gang which dressed completely in black and affected upswept hair and high-heeled boots to compensate for the fact that few of them were over five feet tall.

A good number of the Chinatown gang members were model students in China and Hong Kong before they immigrated to the United States. In America, however, the language barrier doomed their parents to sweatshop jobs that required them to be away from their teen-aged children for long periods of time each day. As a result, the family unit often broke down, leaving neglected and frustrated youths with time on their hands. Unable to find jobs, and thus unable to assimilate, many of them turned to violence.

Historically, **New York** has had more gangs and gang members

than any other city in America. In the *forties,* the city was already sending peacekeepers into neighborhoods to deal with gang violence. These were called detached workers because they did not work in social agency offices; their offices were the streets. Despite the impression fostered by the Sharks and the Jets in "West Side Story" and despite the publicity given the Egyptian Kings when they viciously killed a crippled boy in 1957, detached workers were fairly successful in reducing gang violence throughout the *fifties* in New York City. Since gangs were on the wane in the *sixties,* peacekeepers were able to catch their breath. During the *seventies,* however, there was a revival of gangs in the Bronx, Queens, Brooklyn, and Chinatown.

The gang situation in the South Bronx is worth examining in detail. The new gangs in the area are much more virulent than their predecessors of the fifties and sixties. In 1972 the police attributed more than eight hundred violent crimes to South Bronx gangs such as the Javelins, Reapers, Immortals, and Ghetto Brothers.[15] Several thousand youths belong to the 70-odd area gangs—or "cliques" as some members prefer to call them. Typically, the youths "wear their colors," by sewing distinctive coats of arms onto their hats, shirts, and denim jackets.

The Savage Skulls, Cypress Bachelors, and Young Sinners fight with clubs, chains, and heavy firearms brought back in pieces from Vietnam. Some of their gang-warring, as well as much of their drinking and drug use, goes on in the five thousand or so abandoned buildings in the area.

The South Bronx has been called a necropolis, a city of death. Physical services have broken down throughout the region; houses are frequently without heat, water, or sanitation services. A litany of ills plague the half million residents of the area (two-thirds are Puerto Rican, one-third are black): poor schools, poor medical care, inadequate food and clothing, etcetera. Forty percent of the people in the South Bronx were on welfare in 1972 and 30 percent were unemployed. More than 10 percent of them are heroin addicts. It is no surprise that gang violence rages so vehemently in the South Bronx.

Gangs and Sex

Most gangs are composed solely of males. Some have female "auxiliaries," though, with feminine names such as the Molls,

Belles, Vicettes, Ghetto Sisters, and Lady Operators. Female gangs are a fairly recent phenomenon. Of the gangs studied by Frederic Thrasher in the 1920's, only 6 out of 1,000 were female. While no definitive figures are available, studies suggest that perhaps as many as 100 out of 1,000 gangs are female today. Female gangs seem to be shorter-lived, smaller-sized, and less seriously violent than male gangs.[16] Nonetheless, besides engaging in truancy, drinking, drugging, and promiscuous sex, female gang members periodically engage in vandalism, robbery, and assault.

Changing times and women's liberation account for the increase in female auxiliary gangs and for the appearance of a number of wholly independent female gangs. Forensic psychiatrist Trevor Gibbens, who has studied female offenders, states:

> Girls who used to grow up in relatively sheltered homes now freely roam the streets just like the boys have always done. It is a natural result that, in becoming equal, they have become equal in all areas, including violence.[17]

England has the eeriest girl gangs of all. The bovver bird gangs of London swoop down on rival gang members or innocent citizens on the street—shrieking, scratching, kicking, biting, and robbing. Not even elderly women are safe from their attacks, which are often spontaneous quests for thrills instead of calculated attempts to rob. The girls casually call this "Granny bashing," reminiscent of the "Paki [stani] bashing" of the Skinhead gangs of the sixties. A fifty-five year old male victim of a "bother" bird attack recounted it thus:

> It was suddenly like having banshees wailing in my ear. They kept screaming while two of them took my arms and one jabbed my back with what felt like a knife blade. . . . They took everything I had.[18]

Members of London's thirty or so female gangs are harder to deal with than the seemingly more threatening members of male gangs. For one thing, the girls do not always dress distinctively, the way the Teddy boys did. And the girls rarely tip off authorities by boasting, swaggering, or loitering as male gang members do. Furthermore, they are adept at disguises (wigs, half-masks, and make-up) and often come from middle and upper-middle class backgrounds, which complicates both detection and prosecution.

TABLE 3-I
TOTAL NUMBER OF ARRESTS OF JUVENILES AND ADULTS IN THE U.S. IN 1972[20]

Offense Charged	*Under 18 years*	*Over 18 years*
Violent Crime	67,555	231,666
Percent Distribution	23	77
Criminal homicide:		
(a) Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter	1,634	13,415
(b) Manslaughter by negligence	282	2,704
Forcible rape	3,842	15,531
Robbery	34,823	74,394
Aggravated assault	27,256	128,325
Property Crime	562,614	552,294
Percent Distribution	51	49
Burglary—breaking or entering	160,276	154,017
Larceny—theft	336,983	341,690
Auto theft	65,255	56,587
Miscellaneous Crime		
Other assaults	60,322	247,316
Arson	6,203	4,442
Forgery and counterfeiting	4,311	40,002
Stolen property; buying, receiving, possessing	21,988	49,766
Vandalism	91,586	38,138
Weapons; carrying, possessing, etc.	18,656	101,015
Prostitution and commercialized vice	1,399	43,345
Sex offenses (except forcible rape and prostitution)	10,977	40,147
Narcotic drug laws	98,308	333,300
Gambling	1,728	68,336
Offenses against family and children	1,034	51,901
Driving under the influence	7,568	596,723
Liquor laws	76,894	130,781
Drunkenness	40,625	1,344,110
Disorderly conduct	127,756	454,757
Vagrancy	5,547	50,133
All other offenses (except traffic)	256,815	709,907
Suspicion	12,421	29,054
Curfew and loitering law violations	116,126	—
Runaways	199,185	—

(FBI, *Uniform Crime Reports 1972,* Washington, D.C., U.S. Government, 1973 p. 126.)

Gangs and Age

There is some evidence that the average age of gang members has decreased over the years. One consequence of this is that legally sophisticated older gang members can more easily get young kids to take the blame for their crimes, knowing full well

that courts are more lenient with the extremely young. (The young kids go along with this because getting arrested boosts their status among their peers.)

Gang jargon indicates the span of ages involved in the typical gang: Old Heads (18–23), Young Boys (14–17), and Midgets (12–13 years). According to one report, youths charged with gang homicide in Philadelphia between 1963 and 1970 ranged in age from thirteen to twenty. Sixty-five percent of them were seventeen years old. (The majority of victims of gang assaults and homicides were under twenty-five.[19])

FBI statistics provide information about the amount of crime and violence committed by young people in other cities in the United States. Table 3–I shows the number of youths under eighteen arrested for all types of offenses in 1972. Since these FBI figures are arrest data, they are technically a measure of law enforcement activity, rather than crime activity. Nevertheless, they still indicate the amount of trouble youths get into across the nation.

As Table 3–I shows young people under eighteen comprised 26 percent of the seven million or so people arrested in 1972. More specifically, they accounted for 23 percent of those arrested for violent crimes and 51 percent of those arrested for property crimes.

Gangs and Group-ness

The group nature of gangs is important in that it is largely responsible for the frequency and intensity of gang violence. Most youths do not have the boldness, desire, or means to act violently on their own; but companionship and group pressure make the difference. (Many criminologists believe that *most* serious juvenile delinquency is a group phenomenon. Some say that three quarters of all delinquency is group-inspired and executed.)[21] While being interviewed about a gang killing they had been involved in, several different members of a New York City gang alluded to the factor of group pressure:

> I was walking uptown with a couple of friends and we ran into Magician. . . . When he asked me if I wanted to go to a fight, I couldn't say no. I mean, I could say no, but for old time's sake, I said yes.

> Everyone was pushin' and I pulled out my knife. I saw this face—I never seen it before, so I stabbed it.
>
> He was laying on the ground lookin' up at us. Everyone was kicking, punching, stabbing. I kicked him on the jaw or someplace; then I kicked him in the stomach. That was the least I could do was kick 'im.
>
> They have guys watching you and if you don't stab or hit somebody they get you later. I hit him over the head with a bat.[22]

Most present-day gangs have the four properties associated with small groups: easy interaction, informal norms, substantial cohesion, and minor division of labor. Some gangs constitute less of a group than others. They are characterized by impermanence, minimal cohesion, sociopathic leadership, meager norm consensus, and limited role definitions and expectations.[23] Such gangs are not really genuine groups; sociologist Lewis Yablonsky calls them "near groups."

The four properties of groups have certain specific implications for gangs:

(1) Face-to-face interaction among all gang members is easily attained because the average size of a gang is around twenty members. When one member speaks, all can hear.

(2) Since interaction is easy, most norms are informal and unwritten. Despite this informality, though, the sanctions surrounding some norms—especially those regarding "finking" and "maintaining a rep"—are powerful and effective.

(3) Cohesion is generally strong in street gangs. It poses a grave problem to authorities because of its emboldening effect on gang members. Some experts recommend that police, journalists, and detached workers avoid specific gang names in public references (the Centaurs, the Moroccans, the Diamond Streeters) in order to decrease gang cohesiveness.[24]

(4) Most gangs have a rudimentary division of labor, expressed in such roles as "Runner" (leader), "Warlord" (strategist), "Check Holder" (opinion leader). Other roles include "Goat," "Brain," "Sissy," "Jester," and "Show-off." Each of these serves a function in the gang.

Gangs and Violence

Youths in New York City in the fifties used these terms to refer to different kinds of gang violence: [25]

Roughing: A jostling of one member of a gang by a rival gang member.

Fair One: A fist fight between two boys.

Stomping: A gang fight in which the enemy is knocked to the ground and kicked while down.

Rumble: A minor gang fight sometimes produced by a 'sounding'.

Burn, Waste, or *Go Down:* To hold a gang fight in which 'blades' [knives] and 'pieces' [guns] are used.

Call it on: To hold a prearranged grudge fight in which anything goes.

Terminology has changed somewhat over the years. A member of the New York City Balkans defined the kinds of violent conflict prevalent today in this manner: [26]

Stomp: That's when three or four guys will jump one, for no reason at all. . . .

Jap: That's when a group of guys, two guys or three guys, go down to a different club's territory, get in fast, beat up one or two guys and get out. The thing is not to get caught. They can do that with fists or they go in sometimes with guns, knives, depends on the group they're fighting. . . .

Bop: That can be a small group, five, ten, twenty guys from one team, having it out with the same number from a different team. . . .

Rumble: That's when both clubs are getting everybody they can—brother gangs and all—to go out and fight. It's an all-out gang war. . . . Guys sometimes say when they're gonna rumble, that they'll give you a *fair one;* that's when one guy from one team will meet another guy from another, and it's supposed to be just between those two groups. Just two guys, nobody else is supposed to butt in.

Violent gang conflict, then, occurs in various forms with various numbers of participants. It does not necessarily involve two equal parties, and it may involve symbolic conflict where representatives of two gangs have it out in lieu of an all-out encounter.

The following is a systematic way of classifying gang conflicts: [27]

—Fights between two *unarmed members* of opposing gangs to settle a minor dispute or accidental slight.
—Fights between two *armed members* of opposing gangs to settle a serious difference. (Knives, chains, and zip guns are used.) These may or may not be symbolic conflicts.
—Fights between a single member of one gang and several members of another to settle a score or to avenge a loss incurred in a previous fight.
—Fights between *small bands* from rival gangs. Planned in advance, these are conducted so as to inflict the greatest possible damage on the enemy.
—Fights between *large bands* from rival gangs. These are all-out wars where gangs confront each other using any weapons available—up to and including automatic rifles and sawed-off shotguns.

Gang conflict can erupt almost any time of the day and year. However, the most likely times are—in decreasing order—(a) hot, summer week*end* evenings, (b) hot, summer week*day* evenings, (c) fall or spring weekday afternoons.[28]

There is some indication that violent conflict sustains and even strengthens gangs. In his classic work, *The Gang*, Thrasher showed that gangs develop through strife and thrive on warfare.[29] This is quite in keeping with the contention of Georg Simmel and Lewis Coser that conflict usually unites and integrates each of the parties participating in it.

It should be noted that street gangs do other things besides fight; gang warring is merely their most dramatic and visible activity. One analysis of 1,259 gang incidents during a seven-year period in Philadelphia showed that only 35 percent of them could be described as gang fights.[30] A more detailed study of 217 gang incidents in the same city revealed that 22 percent could be classified as fights.[31]

There is no simple answer to the question of why gangs fight. They fight for many reasons, and these tend to change from decade to decade. Some of the more enduring reasons, however, include:

Status. Gang youths often fight in order to gain prestige in the eyes of their peers and their society as a whole. They want to show that they are people worth noticing, people to be reckoned with. A homicidal youth who had "got a body"—i.e. killed—ex-

pressed this striving clearly when he said: "I'm not going to let anybody steal my 'rep'. . . . When I go to a gang fight I punch, stomp, and stab harder than anyone." [32]

Criminologists Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin elaborate on the issue of fighting for a rep:

> The immediate aim of the world of fighting gangs is to acquire a reputation for toughness and destructive violence. A 'rep' assures not only respectful behavior from peers and threatened adults, but also admiration for the physical strength and masculinity which it symbolizes. It represents a way of securing access to the scarce resources for adolescent pleasure and opportunity in underprivileged areas.[33]

Status striving in gangs is not wholly unlike status striving in corporations, where respectable people try to move ahead by virtue of dedication and hard work.

Territory. Gangs often fight over turf or territory. Since turf is scarce in urban areas, it is highly valued. Consequently gangs become possessive about sidewalks, street corners, vacant lots, and even buildings. In time they come to feel that they literally own them. A kind of urban territorial imperative causes them to attack youths—especially rival gang members—whom they catch "trespassing." Writer Barrett Seaman has noted one of the consequences of divvying up territory: "The difference between life and death can often depend on whether a boy walks on one side of a street or the other." [34]

Safety. This reason for fighting is related to the preceding one. Gangs feel they must protect their members' safety, although this often includes protecting intangibles such as their good name and their style of life. Gang members really need protection from time to time—mostly because they have asked for trouble—but often their fears about their safety are imaginary and paranoid. (This paranoia is not surprising, though; most people involved in on-going conflict and violence eventually begin to extend their fears from real to imagined threats.)

Girls. Serious fights often break out when members of rival gangs "want" the same girl. This reason is also related to territoriality, since males in the gang subculture often regard females as property.

Kicks. Gang youths frequently engage in violence merely to break the monotony of their daily existence. They thirst for chal-

lenges and new experiences. Fighting, or anything else that society forbids gives gang members the thrills they desperately seek.

Affirmation. Some violent gang youths, like a lot of other violent people, need to prove to themselves that they are alive rather than dead—emotionally and psychologically. For such people, who are utterly overwhelmed by their own alienation and hopelessness, violence provides a self-affirming existential high. They can feel and can come alive—if only for a moment.

Pride. A slur, insult, or disrespectful gesture can easily trigger a fight between gangs, especially if they are composed of members of different ethnic or racial backgrounds. Mere rumors or allegations of slights to ethnic or racial pride also precipitate violence.

Drugs. Some rumbles are caused by the bravado and recklessness that often result when youths experiment with alcohol and other drugs. Drugs foster violence in other ways too. Fights occur, for instance, when gang members sell contaminated drugs, or when they sell on a rival gang's turf and thereby horn in on profits.

Discipline. Conflict sometimes erupts because one gang takes upon itself the task of disciplining another gang. Since so much gang activity is illegal or quasi-legal, gangs do not ask police and the usual authorities to maintain discipline and standards in their world. This would blow everyone's cover, so to speak. Instead, gangs enforce their own norms, punish their own wrongdoers, and generally act as social-control agents in the subculture they inhabit.

Gangs and Class

Violent gangs tend to draw their members from the lower class. Thus much gang activity reflects lower-class values and behavior patterns. To a certain extent, this behavior of gang members can be seen as a reaction against middle-class standards and requirements they cannot meet. Criminologist Albert Cohen has noted that lower-class youths often use gangs "as a mode of reaction and adjustment to a dominant middle-class society that indirectly discriminates against them because of their lower-class position." [35]

The incompatibility of middle and lower class values is both a

cause and an effect of gang violence. The key values and concerns of male youths in each class are listed below:

Middle Class [36]	Lower Class [37]	
Responsibility & Respect for property and possessions	Trouble	(Entails getting in and out of brawling, drinking, and sex escapades)
Ambition & Achievement and acquisition of skills	Smartness	(Requires being able to con, dupe, and one-up others)
Delayed gratification	Excitement	(Involves search for stimulation, thrills, danger)
Control of aggressiveness and violence	Toughness	(Involves physical prowess, masculinity, and bravery)
Forethought & Judicious use of time	Fate	(Concerns "fortune" and whether luck is hot or cold)
Cultivation of personality and courtesy	Autonomy	(Involves independence, self-sufficiency, and a "No one pushes me around" attitude)

Given these different values and concerns, gangs that form among youths will generally be "social and nondelinquent" in the middle class and "violent and delinquent" in the lower class.

There are exceptions, of course. Sociologists Larry Karacki and Jackson Toby studied a violent middle-class gang in a Midwestern city. The Dukes brawled with other gangs at schools, parks, and taverns as well as engaging in a variety of other delinquent activities.[38] Most members of the Dukes gang had parents who owned their own homes and could be considered middle class or marginally so. None of the youths in the Dukes gang were deprived the way that most other gang members are. They suffered no ethnic or racial handicaps and few of them came from broken homes. Most possessed average vocational and educational aptitudes; their poor school performances were due to the fact that they were unwilling rather than unable to do well. Karacki and Toby suggest that the violence of the Dukes' youths stemmed from a lack of commitment to their parents' middle-class life style. Instead, the youths preferred more of a lower-class style—hedonism, immediacy, and the assertion of masculinity through physical aggression.

STREET GANG PEACEKEEPING

While most intergroup peacekeeping in the United States involves gang warfare, it is worth briefly noting a type which

involves prison warfare. In the United States different approaches to keeping the peace during prison riots and conflicts have been tried with varying degrees of success. The handling of the trouble at Attica State Prison in New York illustrates one approach.

The conflict between inmates and prison officials at Attica was complex and long standing. It came to a head in September 1971 when convicts captured thirty-eight correctional personnel and large parts of the fortress-like facility—due to a rusty bolt which caused a gate to give way when inmates put pressure on it. Much posturing and negotiating went on for several days between prisoners and officials regarding inmate demands and the fate of their hostages. Television newsmen and thirty-three mediators—some quite political and controversial—were allowed into the prison compound as observers early in the dispute. As time went on, these observers were probably more of a hindrance than a help since they got in the way and complicated issues often times.

However, the observers were nothing in comparison to some of the sheriff's deputies, state troopers, and National Guardsmen who were called to "rescue" the hostages by taking control of the prison away from the inmates.

> Through the stinging mist of CS pepper gas dropped by Viet Nam-style helicopters, yellow-clad troopers set off a barrage of rifle fire from atop 30-ft. prison walls. More than 500 officers—armed with shotguns, rifles, pistols and clubs—charged into the crowded compound, shooting as they ran. Sporadic firing [from the] officers continued for nearly an hour.[39]

As a result of this peacekeeping action, twenty-nine inmates and ten of the hostages lay dead or dying.

By most accounts the peacekeepers involved in the effort to retake Attica were brutal and negligent. They used excessive firepower, often against people who posed no threat whatsoever. Moreover, according to the McKay Commission the assault was poorly planned and no command structure existed after it began.

A different approach to dealing with prison riots and disturbances was used by seventy-five sheriff's deputies in Los Angeles at approximately the same time as the Attica episode. The LA deputies carried neither guns nor batons as they entered cell blocks in which prisoners had set fires and run amok for five hours. Few, if any, injuries resulted. "We felt no weapons were

needed," claimed a spokesman for the sheriff's department.[40] It was an accurate and appropriate appraisal of the situation.

Sensible techniques of intervention and conflict regulation are certainly necessary for coping with prison violence. However, prison reform is clearly the only long-term solution for violence at Attica, Folsom, San Quentin, the Manhattan Tombs, and the countless other correctional facilities which have experienced severe prison unrest. (Waves of prison riots swept across the nation in 1952, 1955, and 1968.) As the McKay Commission on Attica concluded in its report:

> The cycle of misunderstanding, protests, and reaction continues, and confrontation remains the only language in which inmates feel they can call attention to the [inadequacies of the prison] system. . . . Attica is every prison, and every prison is Attica.

Techniques for Resolving Intergroup Conflicts

Peacekeepers who deal with street gang conflicts use a variety of techniques. Some have taken pointers from intergroup relations experts who have suggested the following techniques for resolving conflicts.[41] (As noted below, these are not without their faults.)

Assemble leaders from opposing groups for negotiations and truce talks. Peacekeepers can arrange for leaders to meet alone or in the presence of peacekeepers.* However, since leaders are accountable to the aspirations and expectations of their followers, they can deviate from these (or contradict them) at the negotiation table only at the risk of losing their following. Thus if peacekeepers persuade leaders to agree to a truce or a cease-fire, it will have no effect unless their followers abide by the agreement. In other words, the summit meeting technique may fail because of its inherent elitism and its built-in potential for agreements which are not supported by followers.

Appeal to moral values and ideals. Peacekeepers can make pleas for understanding, cooperation, and forgiveness among warring groups. Social psychologist Muzafer Sherif notes that this tactic works only as long as the appeal is fresh in people's minds.[42] In his studies of conflicting groups of boys at summer

* Civic volunteers in Philadelphia have set up a leaders' council for resolving street gang conflicts. The council is supposed to meet once a week, but at latest report it was meeting less than once a month.

camp, Sherif found that moral appeals for brotherly love worked best on Sundays when the groups heard them at chapel services. However, tolerance, cooperation, and understanding usually dissipated by the time Monday rolled around.

Disseminate accurate information about groups—thus dispelling false impressions. Peacekeepers can use fact sheets and information campaigns to show groups the true facts in a given situation. However, the problem with this tactic is that people often resist the truth. As psychological research has shown, people misperceive it or twist it to fit their preconceptions. Furthermore, as Sherif has remarked : "Information that is not related to the goals currently in focus in the activities of groups is relatively ineffective. . . ." [43]

Divert group members' energies away from collective goals to individual goals. When members of belligerent groups are put on an "every-man-for-himself" basis, intergroup hostilities sometimes disappear. With respect to street gangs, peacekeepers can offer prizes to gang members who, say, win the the most athletic contests, sell the most raffle tickets, or design the best murals or posters. Such a reward structure emphasizes individual rather than group orientation; but it does not always work with strongly cohesive groups.

Bring groups together to share pleasant activities. In cases where gangs are in conflict, peacekeepers can arrange joint recreational activities such as dances, rock concerts, or trips to sporting events. Unfortunately, while group members may enjoy them, activities like these do not always reduce intergroup tension because they do not foster *inter*dependence or require cooperation between groups. Such activities may, in fact, provide groups with opportunities for engaging in insults, threats, and other antagonistic behavior.

Persuade conflicting groups to fight a common enemy. Peacekeepers can encourage groups to find a mutual enemy so they can forget their animosity towards each other. The problem here though is that such peacekeeping does not resolve conflict, but merely postpones resolution of it. And when two parties are combined to fight a new outside party, conflicts only grow larger and more dangerous in the long run.

Create a set of superordinate goals which forces cooperation among groups. This is like the previous technique except that

here peacekeepers unite groups in order that they may cope with an inanimate, rather than animate, challenge which—more than likely—no one group can surmount alone. In his experiments, Sherif presented a set of superordinate goals to antagonistic groups of boy campers which forced them to cooperate and forget their hostilities. The set of goals required the groups to jointly (a) find a break in the camp's water system in order to reestablish the water supply; (b) pull a large truck to start its motor so that badly needed food could be brought in; and (c) contribute dimes and nickels to a fund in order to rent a movie that all campers wanted to see. Superordinate goals that peacekeepers could introduce to city gangs engaged in warfare might call for them to cooperate to keep an entire community free of hard drugs, join forces to clean up empty lots and repair unsafe buildings, cooperate to provide help to the needy and handicapped.

In addition to programs based on some of these techniques, gang peacekeepers have instituted *prevention* programs to forestall gang violence. Some of the best known of these are the Mobilization for Youth project on New York's Lower East Side, the Los Angeles Youth Project, the Chicago Area Project, and the Youth for Service project in San Francisco.

Peacekeepers have also engaged in *intervention* programs to deal with gang conflict. Boston, Chicago, New York, Los Angeles, El Paso, San Antonio, and Philadelphia all have had programs of this type. Philadelphia's intervention program is examined in detail in the next section.

Philadelphia Gang Workers as Peacekeepers

The gang worker's area of operation is the street corner, the pool hall, and the pizza parlor. He does not expect gang members to come to an office (the Man's turf), so he goes to them. Part of his task is to head off rumbles and redirect destructive behavior into constructive channels. The typical Philadelphia gang worker is not unlike the one described here:

> His job is to go into a neighborhood that has a street gang known for particularly vicious habits, try to win the confidence of its members, and then, if possible guide them in the direction of healthier pursuits. . . . [He] has almost total empathy with young people—especially the delinquent kind—and they trust him. He speaks their language without patronizing them. Like most of the delinquents

> he has worked with, he comes from a rough, semi-slum background; his parents were immigrant Italians, and they had twenty-one children, six of whom have survived. As a boy, he did his share of gang fighting.[44]

Created after a successful pilot project in a gang-ridden slum, the Philadelphia detached worker program helps gang youths learn socially acceptable behavior and offers them a number of social, medical, and vocational services. Some two hundred gang workers participate in the program.

Intergang peacekeeping is often conducted without the consent of the parties concerned. Peacekeepers get the names of gangs that are in conflict or need help—in the view of the police and other city officials—and then try to establish contact with them. Stiff resistance is expected and frequently encountered from members.

Gang workers attempt to develop a one-to-one relationship with as many youths as possible. The nature of the relationship varies from case to case and it has both a psychological and sociological aspect.

The **psychological** aspect involves the mechanism of "identification" which operates during the *unplanned* activities engaged in by the youths and the gang worker—hanging 'round, street-roamin', car-cruisin', and so on. During these activities youths gain ego strength by using the gang worker as a role ideal. They "want to be like him."

The gang peacekeeper is a model of a successful adult male. Such models are often missing from the lives of gang members whose fathers, uncles, or older brothers may not be around. As a role model, the gang worker teaches youths how to get what they want without using violence.* He shows them how to use manipulation and connivance instead. (Manipulation and connivance serve not only as alternate ways of attaining goals, but also as substitute outlets for psychic aggression.)

The **sociological** aspect of the relationship involves the mechanisms of "re-socialization" and "opportunity-patterning." These operate during *planned* activities, as when peacekeepers and gang

* That Philadelphia youths employ violence hardly needs further comment after the figures cited early in the chapter. They commit over 50 percent of all violent crimes in Philadelphia.[45] Moreover, 46 percent of all arrests for "major" crimes involve youths aged ten to eighteen.[46]

members work together vis-à-vis dances, club meetings, athletic events, and vocational training. In order to sponsor a dance, conduct a meeting, win a football game, or learn a new job skill, gang members must develop self-control and perseverance. Such traits, in turn, increase their self-esteem. Re-socialization and opportunity-patterning of this sort create new modes of behaving and open up doors previously closed to gang members; they thus reduce the tendency of gang youths to engage in conflict and violence.

In a project lasting two and a half years in one area of Los Angeles, peacekeepers arranged at least one planned activity for each gang every two weeks. Of a sample of 241 such activities, 113 were athletic events (football games, basketball games); 90 were outings (dinners, beach parties, Dodger baseball games); 16 were service events (community projects, panel presentations); 14 were self-help projects (sex education programs); 6 were truce meetings; and 2 were money-raising events.[47]

Sociologists Jacob Chwast and Sheldon Seller point out some of the recurring challenges to gang peacekeepers: [48]

(a) *Violence.* When gang rumbles threaten to erupt, peacekeepers must sometimes mobilize extra community resources for assistance: for example, coaches, teachers, and clergymen. Peacekeepers must make themselves available twenty-four hours a day to gangs during these crises.

(b) *Ambivalence.* As with therapists and other agents of change, gang workers are both liked and disliked by their clients. Besides identifying with peacekeepers (like), gang members constantly question their sincerity, dedication, and trustworthiness (dislike). Peacekeepers must be prepared for ambivalent, hot and cold reactions from gang youths.

(c) *Control.* Gang workers must periodically assume responsibility for some gang members. They cannot be afraid of exercising the control and discipline over members that this responsibility sometimes entails.

(d) *Values.* Gang workers generally must promote middle-class values and standards such as avoiding trouble, telling the truth, and respecting the law. If they fail to affirm these values and adhere to them in certain situations (with regard to offenses committed by gang members, for example) they run the risk of becoming law breakers themselves.

(e) *Influence.* Gang peacekeepers must realize that many gang youths are reluctant to get emotionally close to others—especially adults—because they may still remember past interpersonal traumas. To reach and influence these youths, peacekeepers must not move too fast or be too friendly right away. Often the only relationship that can be established with such youngsters is one that is mediated by the gang as a whole.

(f) *Families.* Sooner or later, peacekeepers may come into contact with gang members' families. They should regard these families as part of the cause of the gang problem as well as possible contributors to its solution. Peacekeepers should keep in mind, too, that the families of gang members often need special attention in their own right.

(g) *Action.* Most gang youths are action-oriented, not word-oriented. Therefore, peacekeepers should emphasize activity, not analysis, when building and establishing rapport with gang members. Words and soul-searching rap sessions can come later.

Philadelphia gang workers use these and other techniques to reduce street violence. For example, they try to transform gangs into boy's clubs, YMCA groups, Scout troops, or athletic teams which play in leagues sponsored by local merchants. This "conventionalization" of gangs reduces violence by teaching youths reliability, dependability, and the importance of observing rules.

Philadelphia's peacekeepers also try to lessen gang cohesiveness. They do this by always talking to individuals rather than to gangs as a whole and by getting gang members into situations (such as jobs) which separate them from the group. Generally, peacekeepers play down the names of gangs, especially when dealing with the media. And they discourage new youths from joining gangs. (This is almost impossible in some cases because the prospects are siblings or cousins of gang members, and thus de facto members already.)

Peacekeepers also try to arrange gang war truces and cease fires. One went about this in the following way:

> "There you are," [the gang worker] said when everybody [from the two rival groups] was seated. "Just like the U.N. First, I want to thank you guys for coming here. . . . What are we going to do about this war? You each got a beef against the other. Well, what's the beef? Let's talk about it." [After some discussion, the gangs began arguing about who "owned" a particular corner.] The argument over

> the street corner grew hotter, and after a while [the gang worker] broke it up by rapping on the table with his knuckles and saying, "I got a suggestion—why don't both sides give up the territory?" He pointed out that the corner had nothing to recommend it, being undesirable for recreation and difficult to defend. After debating about that for a minute or two, both sides agreed to relinquish their claim to the corner.[49]

One reason peacekeepers are able to wangle such truces is that many gang members do not really want to fight. Time after time, one member—queasy from fear—will warn a gang worker or tip off the police in hopes that a rumble will be called off and that he will be saved from fighting without having to lose face.

There are several indications that gang workers have reduced the frequency and seriousness of intergroup conflict in Philadelphia. Data from one area of the city show that eight peacekeepers dealing with eight hundred gang members were able to cut gang rumbles by 45 percent. Also in the year before peacekeepers began working, there were thirty-eight gang fights which resulted in three deaths. However, during the first year of peacekeeper intervention, there were twenty-one fights and no deaths.[50]

Violent gangs and their conflicts are a symptom of social disorganization. For this reason, they must be dealt with by a variety of peacekeepers. In addition to gang workers, the other peacekeepers who see a good deal of gang action are the police. Their role in the regulation of gang conflicts will be examined now.

Philadelphia Gang Police as Peacekeepers

Police involvement in gangfights is summarized by newspaper headlines: "Gang War over Park Broken by Police," "Hoodlum War Averted as Cops Act Fast," "Punk Fight—Police Nip 200." Big city police are inevitably involved in controlling gangs, and the Philadelphia police are no exception. Although some gang peacekeeping is conducted by regular police* who randomly happen upon gang fights, most of it is carried out by a special police unit. Established in 1960 as part of the Juvenile Aid Division of the police department, the Gang Control Unit (GCU)

* How do police feel about gang youths? Sociologist Arthur Niederhoffer asked this question of a sample of 186 policemen. From a list of sixteen frequently encountered clientele types—ranging from "Cop Fighter" to "Annoying Drunk"—Niederhoffer's respondents ranked gang members eighth.[51] Thus, police do not dislike gang youths, but they do not like them either.

numbers seventy-one men. (Its counterpart in Chicago, the Gang Intelligence Section, has almost four times as many men.)

Gang control police represent an interesting blend of theory and practice, idealism and realism. They can sit around GCU headquarters and theorize about the causes of gang conflict, but at a moment's notice they can also strap on guns, rush to the scene of a fight, and take practical action. Since gang control police know their contact with a gang member often determines his life-long attitudes toward law and authority, they try to give second chances whenever possible. But they can be extremely tough when dealing with serious violence. The informal policy of the Gang Control Unit is to be "fair but firm."

What Gang Police Do

The primary tasks of gang control police are:

1. Intervening in gang conflicts;
2. Collecting evidence, apprehending suspects, and testifying in court;
3. Gathering intelligence on weapons and confiscating them;
4. Obtaining information about members, territories, and impending fights;
5. Patrolling areas in which gangs are active.

Intervening in gang conflicts. This task is best explained by describing a typical GCU police intervention. Peacekeeping police may come upon a gang rumble during patrol, or they may be sent to break one up by the radio dispatch officer. Sometimes the mere arrival of police frightens off gangs. If it does not, the first police on the scene usually wait for reinforcements before taking action. One or two men are understandably reluctant to intervene in a rumble.

Police responding to gang fight situations generally cut off their sirens and red lights when they get within a few blocks of the trouble. Maintaining a low profile keeps fourth parties (especially neighborhood children) from coming out to watch. It also keeps gang fighters from getting more excited, and prevents gang members who may be guilty of serious crimes from prematurely scattering.

When a number of police are on the scene, the fight usually breaks up. If it still rages on, though, police draw their nightsticks and approach the periphery of the fracas, dispersing as

many youths as they can. Using their nightsticks as prods, they work their way through the mob to selectively arrest known or suspected leaders.†

By this point police usually have the fight under control, especially if no more than fifty or so youths are involved. If the fight is an unusually large one, gang police get reinforcements from the other hundred or so police in the Juvenile Aid Division. When even more manpower is needed, regular police are called in, although they are less adept at working with juveniles.

If a gang member commits a serious crime during a rumble (such as assault with a firearm), police may choose to arrest him at a later time rather than risk a shoot-out which would endanger the lives of large numbers of people, including bystanders. Such a strategy is possible (a) because GCU police have an extensive file of names and home addresses of gang members which facilitates later arrests, and (b) because GCU police use the Philadelphia Police Department's "Flash Information" system. (Cf. "Digicom" system manufactured by Sociosystems Products of the GTE Sylvania Company.) The Flash Information system coordinates the pursuit of a suspect moving along city streets. Using radio transmitted reports, it plots the position of all police cars in a given area. The system then notifies the nearest squad car as the suspect moves into its range. This tracking process continues until the suspect is caught.

The Flash Information system is also useful when police cars are converging on the scene of a fight and gang members are scattering. The system tells incoming police what paths the fleeing youths are taking so that they can then intercept them. Since more and more gang members are using cars to get to and from gang fights, the Flash Information system is becoming increasingly indispensible.

Collecting evidence, apprehending suspects, and testifying in

† At one time GCU police used a nonselective "round-up" approach, filling paddy wagons with everyone they could apprehend at a fight scene and charging each of them with conspiracy to commit violence. However, innocent bystanders were often included in these arrests, and many youths already indifferent to authority became hostile to it after these arrests. Also, as more and more juveniles were rounded up, fewer and fewer of them talked. GCU police thus lost their rapport with many gang members, some of whom ceased to cooperate with them at all. Public pressure and common sense soon forced GCU police to discontinue their "round-up" policy.

court. Gang police also gather evidence about crimes committed during street fights. After obtaining evidence by interviewing people they record it on "Offense Sheets," which call for specific information about assailants, complainants, and the manner in which alleged offenses were committed.

Police often obtain evidence by visiting gang members in hospitals after fights. If a victim knows only his attacker's nickname, GCU police consult their large computerized file of names, nicknames, and aliases. (Since Philadelphia may have twenty gang members who call themselves "Barracuda," the computer retrieves the "Barracuda" who lives nearest the scene of the fight. He is usually the "Barracuda" in question, but not always.)

Often a victim of gang violence balks at identifying his assailant(s). Even a seriously wounded youngster may refuse to talk. While this may be due partly to a fear of self-incrimination, it is due mostly to a fear of reprisal. This fear is not mere romanticization. A youth may be in critical condition in a hospital *precisely because of* reprisal from a rival gang. Vicious cycles of retaliation often take place as gangs feud back and forth, exchanging an eye for an eye and a life for a life.

Gang police get other evidence by bringing in witnesses for questioning under "remedial disposition"—a euphemism for arrest. Juveniles are only held a short time under remedial disposition. After questioning, they are turned over to their parents. The degree to which Philadelphia police rely on this quasi-legal method of obtaining information is indicated by the fact that they conducted 8,792 remedial dispositions in 1969—a typical year in this regard.

Once GCU police ascertain who allegedly shot or stabbed whom, they apprehend the suspect if he is not already in their custody. They have an excellent clearance rate for the crimes they investigate. ("Clearance" occurs when at least one person has been arrested, charged with a crime, and turned over to a court for prosecution.) The GCU clearance rate in 1969 for forty-one gang killings was 100 percent.[52]

Gang police testify in court about gang conflict offenses—a duty which takes up a goodly amount of their time. In fact GCU police, like gang youths are often frustrated and alienated by the sometimes slow and inefficient juvenile justice system with which they deal.

Gathering intelligence on weapons and confiscating them. This task resembles that of arms assessment and regulation undertaken by UN peacekeepers intervening in international conflicts. It consists in part of finding out which gangs are building arsenals and which gang youths own firearms. However, "ownership" is only the tip of the firearms iceberg, since even if ownership is prevented, there is still the problem of "access." Gang youngsters have easy access to firearms in Philadelphia as one attorney has testified:

> There was not a single child that I represented who didn't tell me that he was able to get a gun whenever he wanted one. Those guns float like a floating crap game. They are in one's house or in a vacant lot.[53]

On the surface of it, this easy availability of guns is surprising. Philadelphia has one of the strictest gun control laws in the nation.[54] Passed in 1965 after much fanfare, the gun registration ordinance requires prospective owners of handguns or long guns to be photographed, fingerprinted, and investigated for possible criminal intentions. However, if one gives it some thought, the ready availability of guns is not really surprising. Unregistered guns can be obtained in neighboring cities and states and brought into Philadelphia. Consequently, although 25,000 guns were registered by the License and Inspection Bureau in the five years following the passage of the gun ordinance, numerous others escaped registration and found their way into the hands of Philadelphia gang youths.[55] (In 1969 alone, gang police confiscated fifty-nine handguns, fourteen shotguns, and five rifles from gang youths; all were unregistered except for a few that were stolen.[56] In sum, gang members will continue to have firearms until gun ordinances are uniform and well-nigh universal.

In case there is any doubt that guns are used by gang youths, it should be pointed out that there were 117 street gang shootings in Philadelphia in 1969. (Guns were used in twenty-four of the forty-one gang killings that year.) The following newspaper account of a typical gang fight suggests how important firearms are in such conflicts:

> Nearly 100 members of two North Philadelphia gangs clashed . . . at 9:30 last night, leaving one youth shot to death and another knifed

in the back. There were also five innocent victims of the shootout —a boy and four women—who were peppered with buckshot.

About thirty members of the 30th and Norris Streeters were gathered on 31st Street . . . when they saw forty members of the 29th and Diamond Streeters headed in their direction. . . . The 30th and Norris Streeters retreated around the corner to a vacant house . . . where they armed themselves with weapons they had hidden there, including a handgun, a 12-gauge double-barreled shotgun, and a 16-gauge shotgun. They then returned to 31st Street and exchanged shots with the 29th and Diamond Streeters.

The slain gang member, who was hit in the chest by a shotgun blast, was dead when taken to the hospital.[57]

As if *regular* guns were not enough of a problem, gang control police must also cope with *improvised* guns. These are almost impossible to control by ordinances, but can be partially regulated by vigilant confiscation programs. Gang police are taught to recognize improvised guns in both their assembled and disassembled states, even when the various disassembled parts are carried by different gang members.

The zip gun is perhaps the most popular improvised firearm among gang youths. It is easily constructed and, despite its crudeness, it is a deadly one-shot weapon. A two-inch square piece of wood constitutes its handle, a short piece of pipe its barrel, a rubber band its trigger, and a nail its firing pin. Ammunition for it in the form of .22 rim-fire or center-fire bullets can easily be obtained from sporting-goods stores. However, the cheap, low tolerance materials of the weapon often cause it to explode in the user's face.

Other improvised firearms used in gang conflicts include homemade rifles (longer and larger than zip guns) and makeshift shotguns (made from plumber's pipe, plumber's tees, pipe caps, and shotgun shells—costing a total of $4). Like zip guns, these are easily disassembled and concealed.

Besides improvised firearms, gangs use *modified* ones. They ream out athletic starter pistols so that they will accommodate real ammunition instead of blanks; and they saw off shotguns and load them with double-0 buckshot. Shotguns like this are a serious problem for GCU police. They are used in a very deadly form of conflict where one gang approaches another in a wedge or cluster formation. At a given signal, the youths in front step aside to reveal a gang member with a previously-hidden sawed-

off shotgun. The shotgun is fired at the rivals and the aggressors scatter.

Keeping track of firearms is only half of the Gang Control Unit's task. It must also keep tabs on other weapons—mostly knives, ice picks, and miscellaneous sharp implements. In 1969 alone there were sixty-four gang stabbings in Philadelphia, seventeen of which resulted in fatalities.[58] To reduce the number of these incidents, gang police confiscate countless illegal knives and dangerous weapons every year.

Clearly, gang police have their hands full coping with all the weapons that are part of the street gang subculture. And these weapons have grown more deadly over the decades: fists have yielded to knives, knives to guns, and manuals to automatics. The black eyes and bloody noses of yesterday's gang fights were nothing compared to the wounds and injuries of today's fights.

Obtaining information about members, territories, and impending fights. Gang police gather information about both old and new gangs regarding their turf, their members, their leaders, etcetera. To nip conflicts in the bud, police also try to learn about impending fights. They do this by means of:

(a) *Patrol and vigilance.* As they perform their assigned tasks and conduct their daily patrols, gang police look for signs and hints of upcoming rumbles.

(b) *Logical deduction.* If two gangs have fought recently, GCU police can pretty well deduce that there will be a *rematch* fight between them or a *scapegoat* fight between the bested gang and the gang it traditionally bullies.

(c) *Information networks.* Communications from public and private agencies often provide police with intelligence about imminent fights. One of the most useful agencies of this sort is the Youth Conservation Service (YCS). It maintains an "Emergency Communication System" designed to coordinate information on upcoming gang conflicts. As rumors and reports come into the twenty-four hour YCS switchboard, they are recorded, checked out, and shared with other agencies, including the Gang Control Unit.

(d) *Phone tips.* Citizens, merchants, and residents in high-density gang areas frequently call the Philadelphia Police Department to report violence and rumbles. Members of gangs preparing to rumble sometimes phone too. They call out of fear, resentment,

or common sense—usually hoping to abort or delay a fight. (These "Dime Droppers" who secretly phone the police are detested by fellow gang members. Their action is tantamount to finking or ratting on a buddy, even though gang youths may privately be relieved at not having to fight.)

Patrolling areas in which gangs are active. Like most other law officers, gang police patrol "beats." These include the turf * of currently troublesome gangs as well as bars, schools, playgrounds, snack shops, subway stations, recreation centers, and other popular youth hang outs.

Besides routinely patrolling their beats in unmarked cars, gang police watch over local athletic and social activities. At sports events, police wear street clothes, remain inconspicuous, and keep an eye on "foreigners"—gang members from other parts of the city. Foreigners are allowed to do most anything they please, provided they do not cause trouble by "moving against" a local gang.

SUMMARY

The intergroup violence dealt with primarily in this chapter—youth gang violence—grows mostly out of urban rootlessness, the need for self-assertion, and the hunger for membership in meaningful small groups. Two of the peacekeepers that have emerged to cope with the problem of gang violence were examined here: *gang workers* (who make friends with street youths, act as role models, and moderate gang violence) and *gang police* (who confiscate weapons, patrol gang areas, and intervene in street fights).

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[CHAPTER 4]

INTERORGANIZATIONAL VIOLENCE & CAMPUS DISORDER PEACEKEEPING

On a November day in 1969, 350 students at M.I.T. massed themselves in front of a campus laboratory to discourage scientists from entering and doing war research. However, 300 helmeted police were on hand to keep the peace. (They were only partially successful, though, since 10 people were injured before the action ended.) The next day, students occupied the M.I.T. administration building, but left peacefully toward evening. All this turmoil was triggered by activist demands—earlier in the week—that war research be stopped at two laboratories and at the Center for International Studies. (After the demands had been presented, 1,000 students marched through the administration building, milled around, made speeches, and then dispersed—only to appear the next day to begin their mass blockade.)

INTERORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICT

INTERORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICT INVOLVES struggle between social units known as organizations or associations. (Such units usually have a number of rules and goals that are formally written down and a moderate division of labor which is manifested in a variety of roles.) Of late, violent interorganizational conflicts have taken place primarily on college and university campuses, where activist organizations have repeatedly clashed with administrator organizations. Similar kinds of conflicts have occurred over the decades between labor and management organizations, farmer and banker organizations, and cattle-men and railroad-men organizations; but these conflicts are less common these days, especially in the United States.

Frequency, Causes, and Consequences of Violent Interorganizational Conflict

Violence Between Industrial Organizations

While conflicts between workers and managers have occurred in most nations, they have rarely been as severe—or as helpful

in the long run—as they have been in the United States. One social scientist summarized the industrial violence that took place in America during the peak years this way:

> There were the bloody railroad strikes in 1877 that killed 150; the Rocky Mountain mining wars that took the lives of 198, including a

TABLE 4-I
INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT & PEACEKEEPING SINCE WWII[4]

	Interventions (5 yr. periods)		Fatalities (1 yr. periods)	
Year	*Natl. Guard*	*Militia*	*Number*	*Location*
1945			*	
1946			*	
1947			0	
1948	5	1*	1	Maryland
			3	Illinois, Iowa
1949			1	Kentucky
1950			1	Tennessee
			1	Alabama
1951			1	Georgia
			1	Arkansas
	1	2	1	Tennessee
1952			0	
1953			1	West Virginia
			1	Pennsylvania
1954			0	
1955			1	Louisiana
1956			0	
1957			2	Tennessee
1958	6	1	1	New York
			2	Florida
1959			4	Kentucky
			1	Louisiana
1960			1	Wisconsin
1961			1	New York
1962	1	0*	3	Tennessee
1963			*	
1964			*	

* Exact number unknown or uncertain.

governor, at the turn of the century; the brutal Molly Maguires, a secret band of Irish miners in Pennsylvania; the Wobblies, or Industrial Workers of the World; the industrial and railroad police who brutally beat laborers from Pennsylvania to California; the garment workers' strike in Chicago in 1910 that resulted in 7 deaths, an unknown number of seriously injured, and 874 arrests; the 20 lives lost in the Illinois Central Railroad strikes in 1911; the 1919 steel strike in which 20 persons perished; the national cotton textile labor dispute of 1934 that spread from Georgia and South Carolina to Alabama, even to Rhode Island and Connecticut, with 21 deaths and 10,000 soldiers on strike duty.[1]

Not surprisingly, some experts claim that "The United States has had the bloodiest and most violent labor history of any industrial nation in the world."[2] The period of major strife was 1870 to 1930, and during this period violence occurred *primarily* in coal and railroad industries from 1870 to 1890; in coal, textile, and streetcar industries from 1890 to 1910; and in coal, steel and transportation industries from 1910 to 1930.

Labor-management conflict was significantly reduced with the passage of New Deal legislation, which routinized and institutionalized it by means of protocols and collective bargaining. (Simply defined, collective bargaining involves negotiation between unionized workers and their employers for the purpose of reaching agreements on wages, hours, and working conditions.)

But some sporadic violence has occurred between workers and managers since the New Deal. As noted in Table 4–I, many people have been killed or wounded in post World War II clashes; and the militia and National Guard have been called up several times to keep the peace, as they had to long ago in the famous 1894 Pullman strike, the 1913 Colorado coal strike, and the 1919 West Virginia mine strike.[3] Most recently, there has been occasional violence between Caesar Chavez's United Farm Workers Organizing Committee (UFWOC) and various other union and management organizations in California's lush agricultural valleys.

Violence Between Criminal Organizations

Serious conflicts between crime syndicate organizations in this country also deserve mention. Three protracted Cosa Nostra conflicts can be identified: The first was the war between the

Masseria and Maranzano organizations (or *families* *) during 1930 to 1931; the second was the war between the Genovese and Costello organizations during 1951 to 1957; and the third was the war between the Gambino and Colombo organizations during 1970 to 1971. In these conflicts, mattresses were often dragged into rented buildings—temporary fortresses—so that men could sleep while conducting their wars for regional supremacy. One reporter described a recent clash this way:

> 'Going to the mattresses' is a tradition of Mafia warfare, . . . Last week about 20 members of the Gallo mob were dug in. . . . If they have followed their practice from the days of the 1961 Gallo-Profaci war they have nailed chicken wire over the windows to prevent hand grenades from being lobbed in. In such campaigns, security is tight. Sentries are posted on nearby streets to watch for strangers in the neighborhood. The food brought in to feed the garrison is checked for poison.[5]

Violence Between Political Organizations

Serious interorganizational conflicts of a political nature occur throughout the world. In Central America, South America, and the Middle East, political parties often violently confront one another before, during, and after elections. Losing politicians and party officials must frequently leave the country to save their lives. In the United States, large-scale political organizations such as the Democratic and Republican parties have not engaged each other in violence for many, many years. However, small-scale political organizations—such as the Black Panther party, the American Nazi party, the Jewish Defense League, and the Ku Klux Klan—have been involved in violent conflicts from time to time.

Violence Between Campus Organizations

Encounters between campus activists and administrators have been the dominant type of interorganizational conflict in America over the last decade. During the 1968 to 1969 academic year

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* A family, in Mafia terms, is an association of 75 to 1,000 men of Italian descent who are bound by a code of conduct (omerta) and a loyalty oath of blood and fire. They are organized into squads of soldiers (Buttonmen) under the command of lieutenants (Capo-regimes) who in turn take their orders from an underboss (Sottocapo) and a boss (Capo). Family members are often, but not always, blood-related.

alone, a large proportion of the nation's 2,300 college campuses experienced some kind of conflict or violence.[6] (Still, the American Council on Education reports that only 6 percent of the incidents resulted in *serious* injury to persons or damage to property.)

Recent campus conflicts were not exclusively confined to US colleges and universities. The following incidents are typical of what was happening around the world:

—Hundreds of students today ransacked the office of [the Barcelona] University Rector and tried to throw him out a window. . . . After a wild meeting of 2,000 students in the central university building, about 500 rushed toward the rector's office, painting slogans on the walls as they went.[7]

—Elaborately equipped police swirled around a barricaded building [at Tokyo University] while ragged defenders struggled to hold them off. Helicopters clattered overhead broadcasting calls for surrender; tear gas billowed and missiles flew. . . . A year-long strike was coming to a violent end. Students were striking [to protest the old order—outdated lectures, remote professors, and inflexible administrative practices.] [8]

—At Frankfurt University, 200 members of the Socialist German Students' League barricaded university entrances, surrounded buildings with a tough, red-helmeted picket line, and battled anyone who tried to enter classrooms.[9]

—After a five-day sit-in at Cairo University, called to protest the arrest of anti-regime student leaders, 3,000 students decided to march on the capital's central square. At the university bridge over the Nile, they were halted and turned back to their campus by riot police equipped with helmets, shields, batons, and tear gas.[10]

While fully definitive statistics on campus violence in the United States are not available yet, some approximate statistics are. Between June 1963 and June 1970—the heyday of student unrest—2,060,000 people participated in 433 major campus conflicts across the country.[11] In the process 12 people were killed, 1,847 were seriously injured, and 27,000 were arrested.[12]

These conflicts manifested themselves in everything from mass protests to crippling seizures of buildings to full-scale rioting. Initially, most of the issues had to do with campus problems: the treatment of students, the aloofness of administrators, the handling of controversial faculty and guest speakers, the participation of students in institutional decision-making, the territorial

expansion of universities which caused the displacement of poor people, and so forth. Eventually, though, ecology, conscription, and the Vietnam War became entangled in many conflicts between activists and administrators. The 1963 to 1970 statistics do not include conflicts which revolved *exclusively* around these latter issues, however.* And since conflicts which do not involve two or more identifiable organizations are not interorganizational, violence of the following sort is not included either:

—Ultra-radicals wantonly trashing property in anti-government demonstrations (e.g. the Weatherman rampage in Chicago).

—Unorganized hippies and street people attacking police and other authorities (e.g. the People's Park strife in Berkeley).

—Youths and Yippies expressing outrage at being excluded from the national political process (the Democratic Convention turmoil in Chicago).

Campus conflict is by no means new in American history. According to historian Lowell Harrison [14] there has been serious campus strife in the United States since 1776, with the period between the Revolutionary War and the Civil War being almost as tumultuous as the sixties. In 1811, a senior at Columbia University delivered such an inflammatory commencement address that he was refused his diploma; whereupon his classmates pushed him back on the stage for it and a fracas broke out. City police and authorities were immediately called to the scene, but students routed them as well as the faculty—thus taking charge temporarily of the building where graduation was being held. At the University of Virginia students rioted regularly in 1827. Once they even armed themselves and took control of the campus, arranging for masked students to patrol the university. At other campuses during this time faculty and college presidents were shot, stabbed, and dynamited on occasion. Some feared enough for their lives to start carrying firearms. This happened even at "gentlemen's" colleges such as Yale.

What can be said about the kinds of campuses where serious

* For such statistics, see Irving L. Horowitz's, *The Struggle is the Message,* which catalogs most of the anti-war strife and demonstrative protest that occurred during the period.[13] Numerous organizations with initials constituting a veritable alphabet soup were involved: SDS, SANE, AFSC, WILPF, CNVA, WRL, FOR, WSP, YWF, etc.

interorganizational conflicts took place during the sixties? A study of 1,230 US campuses suggests the following generalizations.[15]

(1) Campus conflicts occurred at a relatively even rate across the United States; no regional concentration in the North, South, East, or West was evident. However, New York, Massachusetts, Michigan, Illinois, Iowa, and California had more conflicts than most states; and New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Missouri, Minnesota, Texas, and Oregon had fewer.

(2) Schools which experienced severe conflict generally had more open and heterogeneous student bodies than the national average.

(3) The larger the size of the campus, the greater the likelihood of protest and conflict. This can be explained in part by the fact that many newly-enlarged institutions did not change their administrative structures during the enrollment explosion between 1951 and 1966. (During this period, student attendance at public universities increased from 1.3 million to 4.0 million.) Conflicts may have been generated, then, by out-of-date administration procedures as well as by bureaucratic impersonality.

(4) Private schools had conflicts to the same degree as public ones.

(5) Conflicts were most common at institutions where the faculty contained a high proportion of Ph.D.s and where entering freshmen had high college board scores. The reason for this might have been the tendency of professors at such institutions to spend a great deal of time doing their own research, neglecting gifted undergraduates in the process.

Who exactly participated in administrator-activist campus conflicts? Administrators are readily identified and characterized. Activists, on the other hand, are less easy to identify and describe. In 1967, according to sociologist Richard Flacks,[16] only 2 percent of the national college population could be considered to be true activists. But with the broadening of the issues and causes espoused, this figure enlarged manyfold. Activists were able to increase their numbers over the years because, according to Flacks, they were articulate students from middle and upper-middle class families. Their verbal skills and respectable backgrounds made them highly persuasive.

At the height of the campus unrest years there was a coalition of students that involved almost all of the major campus types:

activists, ("hippies" and "nonconformists"), *academics* ("scholars" and "intellectuals"), and *collegiates* ("Greeks" and "goodtimers").

CAMPUS DISORDER PEACEKEEPING

Campus peacekeeping consists of responding to serious conflicts between activists and administrators. Usually it involves local, county, or state police, but sometimes National Guardsmen give assistance.

To gain some idea of the importance of studying (and improving) campus peacekeeping techniques, the interventions at Kent State University in May 1970 and at Southern University in November 1972 will be briefly examined.

Kent State University

Kent State's troubles were no more complex than those of most universities during the late sixties and early seventies. In November of 1968 the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and the Black United Students (BUS) sat in for five hours to protest campus recruiters from the Oakland Police Department which, they alleged, had been persecuting Oakland Black Panthers. The issues of black studies and black admissions were also involved, but no major violence resulted in the fall.

In the spring of 1969, SDS called for:

1. Removal of a state crime laboratory from the campus;
2. Abolition of the University's law enforcement degree program;
3. Removal of a campus research center partially funded by the Department of Defense; and
4. Abolition of the campus ROTC training program.

The usual scuffles, arrests, and disciplinary hearings occurred as a result of the activities SDS and BUS undertook in connection with these demands.

The subsequent year at Kent State was relatively tranquil until President Richard Nixon announced on April 30, 1970 that United States troops were being ordered into Cambodia. Student rallies, street demonstrations, and trashing rampages took place in the days that followed, as they did on numerous campuses across the country.

Local and state officials had a variety of peacekeeping agencies they could count on if necessary, including:

—a thirty man campus security patrol

—a twenty-two man City of Kent police department

—a twenty-nine member county sheriff's department (with eighty-three other part-time deputies scattered throughout Portage County)

—a fifty-five man highway patrol force (with an additional 1,075 men distributed around the state)

—a nine-hundred man Ohio National Guard contingent (on duty at a teamsters' strike in a nearby town).

After the Kent State ROTC building was burned on May 2, worried officials summoned nearly every available peacekeeper to help cope with the situation.

On May 4, a hundred National Guardsmen armed with pistols, tear gas, and fully loaded M-1 semi-automatic rifles found themselves playing cat and mouse with several thousand students—some of whom were provocative, but most of whom were passive. The Guardsmen had no formal command structure—having been hastily pulled away from strike duty—and most of them had had only three hours of sleep the night before. After much movement back and forth across the huge lawns of the campus—to control the crowds—the troops exhausted their supply of tear gas. A short time later they concluded, though incorrectly, that they were surrounded by students. What happened next is well-known. In thirteen seconds, twenty-eight of the hundred Guardsmen apparently panicked—though some assert that they were merely following through on a prearranged plan—and fired 61 rounds (55 rifle bullets, 5 pistol slugs, and 1 buckshot round) into the crowd. Four people were killed and nine were wounded.

The Kent State peacekeeping operation provoked much controversy. The events drew the immediate political attention of the nation, and Kent State became a rallying point for those increasingly hostile toward the Nixon Administration's handling of the Indochina war.

Since 1970 numerous investigative bodies have tried to ascertain what really happened at Kent State and why. Among these have been the FBI, the special Ohio Grand Jury, the United Methodist Church, and the President's Commission on Campus Unrest (headed by William Scranton). The FBI claimed that

the shootings "were not necessary and not in order." [17] The Scranton Commission concluded: "The indiscriminate firing of rifles into a crowd of students and the deaths that followed were unnecessary, unwarranted, and inexcusable." [18]

Though there are still many unanswered questions—was there a conspiracy to shoot on the part of the Guardsmen?—it is generally agreed that the barrage of fire represented exceedingly poor peacekeeping procedure. (If the Guardsmen *actually* were surrounded and in real danger of bodily injury, then they and their commanders were at fault for allowing themselves to be maneuvered into such a position.)

Southern University

Another case which illustrates the importance of studying (and improving) campus peacekeeping is the 1972 incident at Southern University in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. (This incident resembles that one at Kent State, but it is even more like the Jackson State incident—where 2 were killed and 12 wounded—which similarly involved black activists clashing with black administrators.)

Tensions at Southern, the nation's largest black university, had long been growing between students and administrators with respect to a number of issues. In the fall of 1972 students set forth a fifteen-page grievance paper calling for:

—Better living conditions:
removal of substandard housing on campus,
removal of unsanitary conditions.

—Better study facilities and new equipment for the physics, biology, psychology, recreation, and political science departments.

—Greater student voice in university affairs, especially with regard to hiring and firing.

—Resignation of Southern's President, Dr. Leon Netterville.

—Resignation of the Dean, Dr. Emmett Bashful.

—Better wages and working conditions for cafeteria workers.

Southern University was soon rocked by a series of marches, sit-ins, demonstrations, and class boycotts in support of these demands. Several efforts to resolve the activist-administrator conflict failed, including some made by the Governor of Louisiana.

Ironically, it was a rather innocuous occurrence that triggered the call for police intervention. A number of students went to

the Administration building to find out from President Netterville why four students had just been arrested for no apparent reason. When an answer was not forthcoming, the students decided to remain in the building until a satisfactory explanation was presented.

As time passed, some of the students began to erect barricades inside the building; others informally addressed a crowd outside which slowly grew from several score to several hundred. Eventually, two hundred white state police and sheriff's deputies arrived, carrying shotguns, tear gas, riot batons, and personal revolvers in some cases. An armored vehicle was also brought in.

Police took up positions in a large semicircle around the front of the "occupied" Administration building, with the crowd between them and the building. After absorbing epithets from the students for a while, police peacekeepers gave orders over a loudspeaker that the crowd had five minutes to disperse. (Some people later claimed that the noise of the crowd and the police helicopter overhead prevented many on the scene from hearing the order to disperse.)

Suddenly though, a state police lieutenant threw a tear gas canister into the crowd, mistaking a "remark" from a superior to be an order to use gas. Students threw the canister back at the police, who then retreated to put on their gas masks and fire off more gas. But amid the muffled sounds of exploding gas and smoke shells there were sounds resembling gun shots. When the smoke and confusion cleared, two black students at the edge of the crowd had fallen—one dead, the other dying, from buckshot wounds.

Seven hundred National Guardsmen were immediately called in to deal with the ensuing rage, and Southern was ordered closed for several days. These actions, however, did not quite prevent further trouble. Two campus buildings were burned, and a run on ammunition in Baton Rouge forced the Governor to declare a state of emergency and suspend ammunition sales.

As with Kent State, there have been a variety of investigations of the peacekeeping effort at Southern University. They have been conducted by the FBI, the East Baton Rouge Grand Jury, the Black People's Committee of Inquiry, and the Louisiana Special State Committee of Twelve. While the investigative find-

ings vary somewhat with regard to details,* all point to the fact that the deputies and state police were woefully negligent peacekeepers.

Mutual Aid Systems

To cope with interorganizational conflicts, some states have set up Mutual Aid systems for police peacekeepers. Such systems provide extra manpower and equipment when local peacekeeping resources have been expended or when they are unable to cope with an emergency. Mutual Aid systems also coordinate operations during a crisis—the dispatch of riot personnel and special equipment for example—and collect and disseminate information before, during, and after an incident.

The state of California, for instance, is divided into seven Mutual Aid *regions* (and each region is divided into operational *areas* supervised by a county sheriff). If, say, a Berkeley campus conflict gets out of hand, local police can call on the peacekeeping resources of the fifteen other counties in their Mutual Aid region. They can also ask for assistance from the State Office of Emergency Services, which has vans stocked with riot control gear, body armor suits, and communications equipment.[20]

US Army Systems

The US Army developed a four-phase peacekeeping system (itemized in Fig. 4-1) and made it available to many local police forces in the early seventies. The system is predicated on two basic assumptions: that many conflicts reach alarming di-

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*Apparently #4 buckshot was fired by one of the six deputies who were permitted to have live ammunition in their shotguns but not allowed to advance it to the firing chamber unless ordered to do so. The spokesman for the Special State Committee, the Louisiana Attorney General, said, "I think it is a fair assumption that the shot came from one of the deputies. However, we have no evidence as to whether the shooting was accidental or deliberate." The Attorney General also laid to rest charges that student grenades or bomb fragments could have inflicted the wounds. (Intensive investigation revealed the students carried no weapons of this sort.) He did brand the "occupation" of the Administration building "improper" because it impaired normal use of the facility.

There has been speculation that some other deputy fired the buckshot, confusing a shotgun shell with a tear gas shell. According to weapons authority Colonel Rex Applegate, however, "The size, shape, and general appearance of the tear gas shell is such that it cannot be confused with conventional shotgun shells."[19]

Phase	What events occur?	Who keeps the peace?	Who is notified?	Who decides to move to next Phase?
I	"A peaceful demonstration involving any number of people."	The police who are on duty.	Police Chief. Mayor. Fire Chief. FBI.	The police commander on duty.
II	"Arrests are made." "More arrests are made."	Additional on-duty police. Helicopters. Sniper Squad.	Intelligence officers of: Sheriff's office, State Police, National Guard, [Pentagon. Also notified are:] City officials, Hospitals, Board of Education, Chamber of Commerce, News Media, Civil Defense.	[The Police Chief] The Mayor
III	[Unspecified]	Whole police department. County & State forces. National Guard.	Federal troops [put on alert]	The Governor
IV	"Disturbance continues to spread." "The situation cannot be controlled with forces at hand—serious domestic violence is in progress."	Federal troops.		[The President]

Figure 4–1. US Army 4–Phase Peacekeeping Plan [21]

mensions because peacekeeping forces are not alerted soon enough; and that conflict regulation is a community responsibility as well as a police responsibility.

The time frame for movement through the four phases may be hours or days, depending upon circumstances. The system includes a provision for bypassing one or even two phases if circumstances warrant it.

Costs of Violence and Peacekeeping

Besides casualties and disruption of "business as usual," another consequence of serious interorganizational conflict is its cost in dollars and cents. Accurate cost figures are hard to come by, though, because of (a) the tendency people have to inflate them, (b) the lack of standardization that exists in computing them, and (c) the fact that many such figures are often estimates rather than itemizations. Also high cost figures can be deceptive, giving the impression in some cases that trouble was grave when in fact it was minor. For example, Stanford University paid out $580,000 † after an incident which only involved the breaking of windows and the writing of words on campus buildings.

Despite the problems with cost figures and despite the fact that some of the following are not genuine campus conflicts, a few figures for crises at the University of California at Berkeley are given here: [23]

—$225,000 total conflict cost ($113,000 of it for peacekeepers). Demonstrations took place each evening from June 28 to July 3, 1968, to show support for the students' strike in France. Campus police, Berkeley police, Alameda County sheriffs, and California Highway patrolmen were involved as peacekeepers, and they sustained many injuries. Molotov cocktails were used. Imposed curfews seemed to be effective.

—$460,000 total ($15,000 for peacekeepers). Activities in support of the demonstrators at the Chicago Democratic Convention occurred between August 30 and September 10, 1968. Reserve officers and Mutual Aid officers were required. Allegedly firearms were carried by some of the activists.

—$30,000 total ($15,000 for peacekeepers). Turmoil erupted October 22 and 23, 1968 because of the denial of academic credit for courses taught by Black Panther Eldridge Cleaver.

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† While insurance companies pick up the tab for much campus violence, they often raise their premiums and deductible figures after each case. This increase is usually passed on to students and parents in the form of higher tuition and dormitory fees.

This has led to complaints that insurance companies profit from the threat of campus unrest. A survey of 382 campuses showed that they paid $5,382,000 in insurance premiums during the 1968–69 academic year, but got back only 22 percent of this in damage claims.[22]

Activists protested, vandalized, and occupied Sproul and Moses Halls. Hundreds arrested.

—$170,000 total ($125,000 for peacekeepers). Sporadic incidents occurred between January 22 and March 14, 1969 to demonstrate support for a Third World Liberation strike. Mutual Aid forces were needed to deal with extensive violence. At one point Governor Ronald Reagan declared that "Extreme State of Emergency" existed.

These cost figures underscore the message of Kent State and Southern University: that it is important to study campus peacekeeping so that it might be improved. To this end, detailed case studies of interorganizational peacekeeping are presented in the next two sections:

New York City Marshals as Peacekeepers

Across the United States peacekeepers called marshals ‡ have intervened in countless interorganizational conflicts. Marshals have been active in large cities such as New York, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and Chicago as well as in small ones like New Haven, Cambridge, Berkeley, and Urbana.

In New York City, marshals have voluntarily kept the peace at numerous rallies, demonstrations, and campus conflicts. Their objective when intervening is to minimize violence and deal with disputes as constructively as possible. Their motivation is partly political, partly pragmatic, and partly altruistic. This mixture of motives makes it difficult to characterize marshals; however, they tend to be male, white, and under thirty.

Political and religious groups have trained and organized thousands of marshals over the years in New York City. To do this they have utilized such diverse training techniques as psychodramas (contracted-roleplaying), sociodramas (protracted-roleplaying), chalk talks (situation-analyses), and strategy games (decision-simulations).

While marshals intervene mostly in campus conflicts, they often intercede in other situations with high violence potential. For instance, during the huge anti-war demonstration in Washington, D.C. in 1970, marshals—bused down from New York—linked

‡ These marshals are not to be confused with US Marshals who are certified police, authorized to carry out court orders and perform minor law enforcement functions.

arms and prevented large groups of people from engaging in violence at the Department of Justice building.

More recently, marshals intervened at a critical moment during a rock concert in Manhattan to prevent major violence from erupting. The trouble developed when a television crew started to set up a steel tower for their cameras in the midst of the concert audience. Angry youths whose view of the stage was beginning to be obstructed by the growing tower threatened to smash thousands of dollars worth of television equipment if the crew continued their work. Marshals stepped forward and, after much discussion, persuaded the youths not to take violent action. They also persuaded the camera crew to relocate their tower.

Historical Origins of the Marshals

Marshals have their roots in the practice of self-policing which began among participants in the labor-management conflicts of the thirties. This practice re-emerged during the nonviolent civil rights struggles of the fifties, when leaders in SCLC, SNCC, and COFO deputized marshals to keep the peace during demonstrations. These civil rights marshals helped thousands of demonstrators adhere to the tenets of nonviolence. Most demonstrators were able to refrain from responding in kind to antagonists who insulted, attacked, and injured them. However, a few needed reminders and occasional firm intercession from marshals to maintain their equanimity and remain nonviolent.

During the sixties, a variety of political and religious associations expanded the notion of marshalling and self-policing. They developed manuals, handbooks, and training programs, and also sponsored national and international conferences to disseminate the concepts and techniques of marshalling. As a consequence, a multiplicity of marshal peacekeeping projects came into existence in the United States as well as in England, Ireland, Canada, Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and India.

Tasks and Functions of Marshals

In responding to interorganizational conflict, marshals interpose, patrol, instruct, observe, and protect.

1. **Interpose.** Marshals often place themselves directly between disputing parties in order to make it more difficult for them to confront each other directly. Thus if one organization (the Young

Americans for Freedom, say) threatens to attack another (the Students for a Democratic Society, for example), marshals interpose themselves to keep them apart. This distracts them, dampens their emotions, and generally deters violence. If violence breaks out, nevertheless, marshals join hands and cordon off the fighters. Isolating violence in this manner prevents passersby from being caught up in it and allows it to exhaust itself more quickly.

2. **Patrol.** Marshals patrol interorganizational conflict scenes, keeping watch for potentially explosive situations. Instead of uniforms, they wear vests, armbands, headbands, or other distinctive attire to identify themselves as peacekeepers. By means of patrols, marshals deter violence in much the same way that police deter crime on the beat and reckless driving on the highways. Unlike some police on their beats, though, marshals do not provoke or intimidate; instead they set a tone of tolerance and nonviolence.

3. **Instruct.** In order to gain legitimacy in the eyes of parties involved in on-going interorganizational conflicts, marshals dispense general nonsensitive information to all conflict participants. Once parties see that marshals are helpful, they accept their presence at the conflict scene more easily. Marshals provide up-to-date news on the course of the conflict and give out information about the whereabouts of hospitals, legal services, emergency telephones, and so on. This information is dispensed either at the periphery of a conflict scene (by marshals at fixed locations) or at the center (by marshals on the move, linked by walkie-talkies and other communication devices). If a conflict involves large masses of people and public address systems, marshals usually have access to the microphones for important messages or announcements.

4. **Observe.** Marshals serve as impartial witnesses to the development and denouement of interorganizational conflicts. During later reconstructions of events in court, marshals provide valuable testimony. Their eyewitness observations—and photographs and tape recordings where they have made them—tend to be unbiased and comprehensive. Marshals also advise disputing parties of their constitutional rights. It is not unusual for lawyers to be included in the ranks of marshals—for their legal skills and for their expertise in mediation.

5. **Protect.** To win the respect of conflict participants—so that their pleas for nonviolence will be heeded during critical moments—marshals administer first aid as well as protect *people* (key figures, disabled persons), *property* (medical facilities, communication systems), and *territory* (press areas, speakers' platforms). For this reason, large numbers of marshals sometimes surround a vulnerable person or object and- (a) sit down close together to form a human *barricade* three to ten people deep, or (b) join hands (or arms) to form a human *fence*. If attackers attempt to break through these barriers, marshals make eye contact with them and try to talk them out of persisting. Since marshals are usually quite articulate, they can rely heavily on verbal persuasion as a substitute for physical force. (They often talk attackers into giving up guns and other weapons.) If attackers still try to break through their protective barrier, marshals use passive resistance techniques (such as going limp) to hinder the attack. Insults and physical blows from attackers are not returned by marshals.

How Marshals are Organized and Trained

Marshals work in teams, especially when significant numbers of them intervene in large conflicts. Team captains are used under these circumstances; but unlike traditional police, marshals try to play down command structures and rank-hierarchies whenever possible.

Only rarely do marshals use wedges, echelons, or other paramilitary formations to regulate conflict participants. Such formations frequently evoke resentment and lead to charges that the marshals are "peace pigs." When paramilitary formations *are* used, marshals move slowly since abrupt and unexpected motions can trigger violence or overreaction from tense or frightened people. "Reserve" marshals are often kept on call at the periphery of a conflict scene to be used as reinforcements if necessary.

Marshals receive two general kinds of training: tactical and philosophical. *Tactical* training is a short-term process. It requires anywhere from three to thirty hours of briefing, strategizing, and role-playing, mostly for imparting basic nonviolent peacekeeping skills. A few days before the massive Washington, D.C. protest against theUS incursion into Cambodia in 1970, a handful of

institutions * gave tactical marshal training to some five thousand volunteers. These novice marshals kept the peace among the half million protesters (and counter-protesters) who had converged on the nation's capitol.

Philosophical training, on the other hand, is a long-term socialization process necessitating at the minimum, several months of study in the theory and techniques of nonviolence. Nevertheless, it still requires a number of role-playing sessions and quick-decision exercises to impart basic peacekeeping skills. Philosophical training is generally considered to be more effective than tactical training in producing reliable and effective marshals.

New York City Police as Peacekeepers

Conventional peacekeepers such as urban policemen have intervened in many interorganizational campus conflicts. The New York City police, therefore, will be examined in this section. Since the complexities of campus peacekeeping might be lost or glossed over in a survey of ten, or even five, cases, one particular case of intervention will be analyzed in detail here: the New York police's effort to keep the order at Columbia University in April 1968. (It must be emphasized, however, that the worth and effectiveness of the New York police's interorganizational peacekeeping do not stand or fall on the basis of the Columbia intervention alone. It was simply one of many interventions that they were involved in over the years.)

The Background of the Columbia Crisis

Serious interorganizational conflict was nothing new to Columbia's eighteen thousand students, two thousand faculty, and numerous administrators in 1968. Trouble had occurred at Columbia in 1965 when a conflict over Navy ROTC became violent and police were called in to intervene; in 1966 when demonstrators prevented CIA recruiters from conducting interviews; and in 1967 when SDS and anti-SDS organizations clashed over the presence of Marine Corps recruiters on campus. Thus in 1968, when SDS activists attacked administration policies regarding

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* Examples: the American Friends Service Committee (New York City), the Nonviolent Training and Action Center (Chicago), the Friends Peace Committee (Philadelphia), the New England Committee for Nonviolent Action (Providence), and the Nonviolent Direct Action Group (Cambridge).

defense research, Dow Chemical recruitment, and construction of a new university gymnasium, the campus was not particularly aroused. The only people *really* aroused were a handful of SDS activists. Disciplinary proceedings had been initiated against them because one of their recent protests had been held indoors, contrary to university regulations.

In fact, reaction to the brewing conflict between activists and administrators was so mild that when Mark Rudd and the others being disciplined (put on probation) decided to hold a rally to complain about their situation on April 23, no special arrangements were made by campus guards or city police. (Ten city policemen in the university precinct were told to remain alert in case trouble should develop; however, only two of them were actually in the vicinity of the campus at the time of the rally.)

Tuesday, April 23rd

At the noontime rally, five hundred pro-SDS and one hundred anti-SDS people showed up to listen to speeches and calls for action from the SDSers. After the rhetoric, Rudd and the SDS supporters marched to several different parts of the campus and then, in an almost haphazard fashion, attempted to enter Low Library. They were thwarted in their attempt, though. Undaunted, the activists turned around and went to Hamilton Hall where—either by design or by accident—they seized the building. Though they were very much in evidence, Columbia's campus guards made no effort to forcibly prevent the seizure of Hamilton Hall, nor did they intervene when Dean Henry Coleman and two of his aides were taken hostage in their own offices a short while later.

During the first hours of their occupation of Hamilton Hall, the activists discussed their grievances in plenary meetings. After much debate, they drew up the following list of six demands: [24]

1. That construction of the gymnasium be stopped
2. That all ties with the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) be discontinued
3. That the ban on indoor demonstrations be rescinded
4. That criminal charges arising out of protests at the gym site be dropped
5. That probation of the "IDA-six" be rescinded
6. That amnesty be granted for the present protest

Wednesday, April 24th

Over the course of the many plenary meetings in Hamilton Hall, friction developed between black and white activists. The tension came to a head early Wednesday morning when the two hundred whites were nonviolently expelled from the building by the seventy blacks. The exiled whites then seized their own building—Low Library—breaking windows, rifling files, and injuring a campus guard in the process. At this point, campus guards called the New York City police for help.

Thirty-five police soon arrived and immediately began to confer with various officials (administrators, campus patrol officers, etcetera) about the situation. Though it makes little sense in retrospect, the city police took the position that they could not clear the white activists from Low Library without clearing the black activists from Hamilton Hall. They deemed the latter action inadvisable as it might trigger a riot in nearby Harlem, still angry and shaken by the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. a few weeks earlier.[25]

Later in the morning, campus guards entered Low Library to retrieve various art objects from the President's office, which the activists had declared to be a "liberated" zone. Inexplicably though, the guards made no effort to evict the few protesters who remained in the building. (This was a costly error since the building could have been cleared so easily, with a fraction of the effort that was later required.[26]) The activists—who had fled Low Library in fear of being arrested by the guards—soon sneaked back into the building. About this same time, making the situation more complicated, architecture students seized Avery Hall to show their dissatisfaction with recently instituted procedures in their department.

Thursday, April 25th

The next day graduate students seized Fayerweather Hall to express their discontent about delays in long-overdue graduate school reforms. Still later other students seized Mathematics Hall.

At this point New York City police were in *constant* touch with the situation, whose seriousness had become painfully apparent to everyone. The Deputy Commissioner and Chief Inspector kept an eye on new developments and began to devise peace-

keeping strategies. While major intervention was being planned, though, minor intervention was occurring around the campus with moderate success. For example, an Assistant Chief Inspector prevented a major outbreak of violence Thursday evening when he talked a crowd of pro-administration demonstrators into allowing a thousand trapped pro-activists demonstrators—led by Charles 37X Kenyatta—to pass through them unharmed. The inspector and two hundred police used gentle pressure to clear a path through the pro-administration crowd, which the pro-activist demonstrators used to get off campus.

Friday, April 26th

It had been decided that the city police would intervene early Friday morning to remove activists from all buildings. However, the decision was reversed at the last moment—perhaps unwisely—after a neutral yet powerful sector of the Columbia faculty asked that more time be allowed for negotiation and compromise. While the police did not clear the buildings on Friday, they did begin arriving *en masse* on campus, deploying themselves outside buildings and in various other places around the university.

Saturday, April 27th

By this time, Columbia administrators had made major concessions to the activists. Most of the demands had been granted: gym construction was to be halted, military research was to be ended, and amnesty was promised in so many words. However, the activists were not satisfied; they wanted *all* six of their demands met. So the conflict went on, with more and more people joining one side or the other and engaging in ever-escalating incidents of violence here and there around the campus.

Sunday, April 28th

As the crisis grew, people realized that further delay in clearing the five buildings would be disastrous. And so police and various officials feverishly continued to plan the details of the major intervention. According to the Cox Commission * Report,

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* After the crisis was over, a commission charged with investigating what happened at Columbia was chaired by Harvard Law Professor Archibald Cox, the man selected in 1973 to be the first Special Prosecutor for the Watergate affair.

they discussed and agreed on several guidelines for the action to clear the buildings:

1. Students would be ordered to leave by a University official using a bullhorn, and would be given the opportunity to leave unmolested.
2. The buildings would be cleared early in the morning when the fewest people would be on campus and much of Harlem would be sleeping.
3. The police would use overwhelming force so that students who remained in the buildings, outnumbered at least four to one, would find no point in resisting arrest.
4. The police would not bring police vans on to the campus to remove those arrested. The vans were to be parked along the perimeter of the campus.
5. There would be no unnecessary arrests.
6. It would be Police Department policy, whenever possible, to use only uniformed men for the actual clearing of a building; however, some nonuniformed men would be present both to assist in handling the arrest procedure and for investigative purposes.
7. The Police Department would assume full responsibility for providing medical assistance to anyone injured, since he would be a person then under arrest.
8. There would be an effort to clear the buildings without substantial incidence of injury.[27]

Monday, April 29th

Police made final preparations on Monday for their major intervention. This involved readying 1,000 of the 26,000 men on the New York City police force.

The intervention turned out to be far different from what the guidelines envisioned, as the next day's events showed.

Tuesday, April 30th

During the height of the police action, between 2 A.M. and 6 A.M., a great deal of violence occurred at every occupied building except for *Hamilton Hall*. Hamilton was held by black activists, and it was cleared without any violence. The police intervention there was carefully planned and supervised by black officers. As one commentator remarked:

> With the two highest Negro officers in the New York police force observing, [the clearing of Hamilton Hall] was a model arrest operation—except that no one had brought a key for the main door and it had to be forced open.[28]

Squads of peacekeeping police entered Hamilton Hall at 2:30 A.M. Since the black activists had voted not to resist arrest, eighty-six of them were escorted out of the building without incident and put into police vans parked off campus on Amsterdam Avenue.

Police then went to *Low Library* where they used "saps"—flat leather blackjacks—to wade through the mass of people blocking the entrance to the building. After announcing to the people occupying the library that they could leave of their own accord in the next few minutes, police waited a short time and then began clubbing and dragging those who remained including many who had decided to "passively resist" by going limp and by linking arms. Officers arrested ninety-three.

The police also used force when they encountered resistance at *Avery Hall* at 3 A.M. Forty-two people were arrested and scores were dragged or carried out of the building by squads of uniformed and plainclothes police. In the process, according to one report: "A *New York Times* reporter was roughed up, shoved down stairs, and hit on the head with handcuffs (12 stitches), even though he held up his press card high yelling, 'Press!' 'Press!' "[29] The police were not the only ones being nasty. Some activists were assaultive and some faked injuries and played to the grandstands.

After Avery was cleared, police used a wedge formation to break through the crowds surrounding *Fayerweather Hall*. This resulted in some bloodied noses and heads. Once police were inside Fayerweather, havoc broke out. As one account related it:

> At Fayerweather Hall, where protesters had preplanned every act by majority vote, students who intended to submit cleanly to arrest lined up at the door; those who preferred to be dragged out sat on an upper floor; those who decided to resist linked arms on another floor. But the neat plans went awry as police kicked and clubbed their way through the building. For no clear reason, they even attacked newsmen, including a *Life* photographer, and of all people, columnist Walter Winchell.[30]

All told, 268 were arrested.

Finally at 4 A.M., police breached an elaborate barricade in order to get to *Mathematics Hall*. Upon gaining entrance, though, they faced further problems. Activists had soaped and greased the stairs to hinder them. As the police pressed forward, activists allegedly bit them, kicked them, spat upon them, and sprayed them with fire extinguishers. There was extensive violence from all sides. A total of 203 were arrested.

While Mathematics Hall was being emptied, one of the most chaotic moments of the peacekeeping intervention occurred. Police tried to clear spectators and others off South Field to make room for vans which would facilitate the removal of arrested persons. (Contrary to the agreed-upon guidelines, the police brought vans on to the campus. They felt they had to do this because the number of arrests proved to be far greater than had been anticipated and each arrest required a long trip back and forth to a van.) Unfortunately, the police assigned to sweep people from South Field did not realize that there were no escape routes for the crowds, since most campus gates had been locked to limit access to the university when trouble first broke out. Thus when police suddenly swept through South Field, the crowds that were caught in the squeeze panicked. For several terrifying minutes, people stumbled and scrambled over one another to escape the police onslaught. Many were hurt, including numerous innocent bystanders.

Throughout the entire peacekeeping operation police did not fire their guns, despite the fact that activists in some of the buildings were rumored to be ready to use firearms against the police. Peacekeepers basically adhered to the New York Police Commissioner's long-standing order that "No unnecessary discharge of firearm or unnecessary withdrawal of revolver from holster" should take place during peacekeeping interventions.

In the course of clearing the five buildings, 692 arrests were made. Of these, 75 percent were Columbia students; 4 percent were Columbia alumni; and 21 percent were neighborhood residents, students from nearby colleges, and outsiders such as Jerry Rubin.[31] Regarding casualties, hospital records show that seventy-seven students, fourteen police, and eight staff and administrators were admitted for injuries ranging from sprains to scalp lacerations to skull fractures accompanied by profound shock.[32] The total figure of ninety-nine injured probably underrepresents

the true total, because it does not include many casualties who sought private treatment from personal physicians or no treatment at all.

That the New York police peacekeeping effort went badly may not be wholly clear from this preceding account. However, Columbia sociologist Daniel Bell's version leaves no doubt:

> In all, about a hundred students were hurt. But it was not the violence itself that was so horrible; despite the many pictures in the papers of bleeding students, not one required long term hospitalization. It was the capriciousness of that final action. The police simply ran wild. Those who tried to say they were innocent bystanders or faculty were given the same flailing treatment as the students. For most of the students, it was their first encounter with brutality and blood, and they responded in fear and anger. . . . In a few hours, thanks to the New York City Police Department, a large part of the Columbia campus had become radicalized.[33]

Peacekeeping at Columbia went poorly for many reasons. To begin with, the police underestimated the number of participants involved in the conflict—especially the number of people encamped inside seized buildings. This was mainly due to inadequate intelligence gathering. Denied ready access to all buildings except Hamilton Hall, they had no idea that the people occupying them numbered far more than a few frenetic activists. Consequently, the intervening squads of police were far too small to deal effectively with the number of protesters. Police panic and over-reaction occurred as a result. (In the *one* situation where there was sufficient intelligence—and thus sufficient manpower—the peacekeeping effort was effective and nonviolent. In the case of Hamilton Hall an Assistant Chief Inspector had gathered intelligence during his frequent visits to the building.)

Also the police failed to realize that they had to get through crowds and barricades *before* they could gain access to buildings and deal with activists. Combined with their error about the numbers occupying the buildings, this error caused police to be even more understaffed. Since they were tired and angry by the time they got inside the occupied buildings, police vented their frustrations on everyone, even those who were passive and nonthreatening.

Finally, the police miscalculated in thinking they could intervene one thousand strong in the middle of the night and catch

conflict participants off guard, thus minimizing resistance. In reality, all participants involved in the Columbia crisis were instantly apprised of each new development—especially those involving the police—by word-of-mouth and by the campus radio station. Moreover, many nonparticipants—who learned of the impending police action via the grapevine—turned out at 2 A.M. just to watch. (Some of these unwittingly became victims of police ineptness and viciousness on South Field.) Similarly, the police idea that publicity could be minimized by intervening in the early morning was incorrect. Newspaper and television reporters, who were on the campus twenty-four hours a day during the conflict, had no difficulty covering the 2 A.M. action.

While the peacekeeping effort went badly for some of these reasons, one question still remains: why did New York police use such immoderate and irrational force? One part of the answer lies in the fact that many of the police felt physical force was their only weapon against verbal force. As one policeman involved in the intervention said:

> Most cops I know will walk into the mouth of a cannon. But they're terrified of words. . . .
>
> In a way, I think the police felt much more challenged by the words of the Columbia students than by any [physical] threats there may have actually been.[34]

This feeling of inadequacy in the face of verbal attacks was often accompanied by a feeling that Columbia students were of a different class than they. Thus the police felt hatred and resentment combined with envy and admiration. Such complex emotions, of course, are difficult to deal with. Nevertheless the New York City Police Department should have made its officers aware of the possibility of such emotions and eliminated from campus peacekeeping those men who could not control their feelings.

Another part of the answer to the immoderate force question is that police felt afraid and uncertain as they went about their peacekeeping task. This fear and uncertainty resulted from their lack of experience and preparation, and from the fact that they were taking orders from commanding officers they did not know well or at all. (In addition, they were on unfamiliar precinct territory and were forced to put in long hours under rather difficult conditions.) Once engendered, this fear and uncertainty led police

to use immoderate and irrational force—in much the same way that frustration causes aggression in other situations.

SUMMARY

Violence between organizations poses a real challenge for peacekeepers, partially because it often involves large numbers of conflict participants. To better understand this challenge, a detailed look at the nature, causes, and control of interorganizational violence was undertaken in this chapter. Campus conflict in particular was singled out for intensive analysis. In addition, both conventional and unconventional kinds of campus peacekeeping were examined.

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[CHAPTER 5]

INTERCOMMUNAL VIOLENCE & RACIAL STRIFE PEACEKEEPING

Police dispersed a milling crowd of 200 blacks one Saturday afternoon in East Baltimore. By 6 p.m. in the evening, however, a full scale riot had erupted. A large furniture store was set afire and crowds were throwing rocks and breaking windows. City police and 400 state troopers tried unsuccessfully to control the situation, using CS tear gas on several occasions. The next day, 6,000 National Guardsmen were called in to deal with looting, firebombing, and attacks on firemen fighting fires. Throughout Sunday and Monday, blacks and whites sporadically clashed in the streets. By Tuesday, most of the violence had died down. In all 6 people were killed, 900 injured, 5,800 arrested, and $14 million in property destroyed.

INTERCOMMUNAL CONFLICT

RACIAL, RELIGIOUS, AND ETHNIC conflict is generally intercommunal—that is, it is strife between communities over incompatible goals, values, or practices. Such conflict is part of the urban disorder that now plagues America and many other industrialized countries.

Similar to, yet more complex than organizations, communities share many of their characteristics: written rules, formal roles, and extensive division of labor, for example. Communities are comprised of localized populations that provide for most of their daily needs. (These needs range from simple food and shelter to education, government, and protection from deviants.) Also communities tend to be homogeneous in terms of race, ethnicity, or religion. In the United States there are Black communities, Polish communities, and Jewish communities to name but a few. (Other countries besides the United States have a great variety of racial, religious, and ethnic communities. Russia has dozens of races and ethnicities, in addition to having numerous communities of Catholics, Protestants, Buddhists, Moslems, and Jews. South Africa, in terms of race alone, has communities of "Whites," "Africans," "Coloreds," and "Indians.")

Intercommunal conflicts exist in these and other nations around

the world. Some of the better known conflicts have included the Hindu-Muslim communal conflict in India, the Ibo-Yoruba communal conflict in Nigeria (part of the Biafrian War), and the Catholic-Protestant communal conflict in Northern Ireland, which has cost over seven hundred lives in the past four years.

As an extremely heterogeneous country, the United States has had more than its share of intercommunal conflict. US census figures reflect this heterogeneity. The following are the racial and ethnic percentages in the United States: [1]

White	70.0%
Black (Negro Americans)	12.5
Yellow (Asian Americans)	.6
Red (Native Americans)	.4
Brown (Mexican Americans)	.3
Other	16.2
	100.0%

And the following affiliation percentages show the religious heterogeneity in the United States: [2]

Protestant	66.2%
Catholic	26.1
Jewish	3.0
Other	1.2
No Religion	2.8
Not Reported	.7
	100.0%

Frequency, Causes, and Consequences of Violent Intercommunal Conflict

From the figures just cited, one would expect *most* of the intercommunal conflict in the United States to be between majority and minority communities, i.e. between whites and nonwhites and between Protestants and nonProtestants. This is in fact the case, although some conflict does exist between minority communities themselves (e.g. Blacks versus Yellows, Catholics versus Jews). The major types of intercommunal conflict in the United States are described below.

Red-White conflicts began when European whites arrived in North America and started to compete with Indians for land and resources. Warfare, massacre, expulsion, and forced assimilation followed. This tragic chapter in American history reached its nadir in 1890 when three hundred Sioux (two-thirds of whom were women and children) were slaughtered by five hundred Seventh Calvarymen at Wounded Knee Creek, South Dakota.

The recent occupation of Wounded Knee is a reminder that the old red-white conflicts have yet to be fully resolved.

Yellow-White conflicts have been frequent in the United States, though less frequent than red-white or black-white conflicts. Sociologist Alphonso Pinkney writes of the violence involving Chinese Americans:

> There were frequent massacres of Chinese railroad and mining workers in the West during the second half of the nineteenth century. For example, a mob of white persons raided the Chinese community in Los Angeles in 1871, killing nineteen persons and leaving fifteen of them suspended from scaffolds to serve as a warning to survivors. And in Rock Springs, Wyoming, during a railroad strike in 1885, white workers stormed the Chinese community and murdered sixteen persons, leaving all their homes burned to the ground.[3]

Similar things happened from time to time to Japanese-Americans, especially when they were perceived to be an economic threat by white workers.

Brown-White conflicts have also been common, but mainly in the West and the Southwest. One of the most recent conflicts occurred in September, 1970 when a brown-white race riot in East Los Angeles resulted in fifty-two injuries, seventy arrests, and extensive property damage. (A community of "brown" Mexican Americans could be thought of as either a *racial* or an *ethnic* aggregate, since it might include such diverse people as Mexican immigrants, Spanish immigrants, and Spanish-speaking persons of American Indian descent. Because it is not always clear whether a given aggregate is a racial, religious, or ethnic collectivity,* "community" is a good generic term for such aggregates.)

* A *racial* collectivity is "one whose members through biological descent share distinctive common hereditary characteristics," while a *religious* collectivity is "one whose members share a common orientation (set of beliefs and values) toward real or imaginary things and events. . . ." [4] An *ethnic* collectivity, moreover, is one whose members "share an accent, style of dress, food habits, family arrangement, or any other cultural cluster that distinguishes them. . . ." [5] The following account illustrates that ethnic violence has not been altogether different from racial violence in the United States.

> In the year 1863, in New York, the Irish were called "shanties," which means "nigger." In the year 1863, amongst the Irish in New York there was 44 per cent unemployment. In the year 1863, Irish could not buy property in certain parts of New York. In the year 1863, policemen used to come into the Irish district five and six together. In the year 1863, the Irish were dirty, they didn't wash, they stank, they were ugly, they were all the things that Negroes are called today. And in the year 1863, the Irish rioted in New York. They killed over three hundred people. . . .[6]

Black-White conflicts have occurred the oftenest of all and have been the predominant type of intercommunal violence in America for the last few decades. Because of its frequency and importance, black-white violence will be examined in some detail.

Lynching was a common form of racial violence for years. It was used for punishment and for social control (to keep blacks from challenging white dominance). Tuskegee Institute reports that between 1882 and 1962, 4,736 Americans were lynched; 73 percent of whom were black. During the 1890's—the heyday of lynching—an average of 111 blacks were lynched every year.

The race riot, however, has been the primary form of black-white violence in the United States.† One of the earliest race riots occurred in Philadelphia in 1834. Others took place in New York City in 1863, Memphis in 1866, Cincinnati in 1886, New York City in 1900, and Atlanta in 1906. Between 1913 and 1963, there were at least 76 significant black-white riots in America. These included conflicts in *Houston* in 1917 (two blacks and seventeen whites dead); *East St. Louis* in 1917 (thirty-five blacks and eight whites dead); *Chicago* in 1919 (twenty-three blacks and fifteen whites dead); *Tulsa* in 1921 (forty blacks and one white dead); *New York* in 1935 (two blacks and one white dead); *Detroit* in 1943 (twenty-five blacks and nine whites dead); *Los Angeles* in 1965 (thirty blacks and four whites dead); *Newark* in 1967 (twenty-one blacks and two whites dead); and *Detroit* in 1967 (thirty-three blacks and two whites dead).[7]

The cost in direct property damages for these riots is staggering: $45 million for Watts, $64 million for Detroit, and $15 million for Newark, to cite a few examples.[8]

During the five years between June of 1963 and June of 1968, over 200,000 people were involved in 239 *violent* racial conflicts in the United States. These resulted in a total of 190 deaths, eight thousand injuries, and fifty thousand arrests. During this same period, 1,100,000 people were involved in 310 *nonviolent*

† Sociologist Morris Janowitz asserts that there are three different types of race riots:

(a) *communal* riots in which two aggregates confront each other directly;

(b) *commodity* riots consisting of attacks on the symbols or property of the opponent (including arson and looting—the latter being a primitive form of income redistribution);

(c) *terroristic* riots involving bombings, shoot-outs, and sniper attacks.

Some riots may have elements of all three types.

racial conflicts, including, among others, clashes over civil rights and integration issues. These sets of Violence Commission figures provide the closest thing available to a "Richter scale" for recent black-white conflict in America.

The Causes of Intercommunal Conflict

There is relatively little solid information on the etiology or cause of intercommunal conflicts. Some theories have been advanced, though.

1. *The "Absolute" Deprivation Theory*

This theory originates with Plato, who suggested in *The Republic* that extreme poverty could cause violence between aggregates. Aristotle seconded this notion in his *Politics*. Aggregates deprived of a modicum of food and shelter—and in present-day terms, employment, education, and health-care as well—are likely to attack their neighbors or anyone else they perceive to be responsible for their deprivation. This is essentially a theory of haves versus have-nots.

However, anyone intending to use this theory to explain recent racial conflicts in the United States should look at the figures in Table 5–I, which contrast the living conditions of blacks and whites for 1967 to 1969. These figures are for years when there was much racial conflict, yet the ones for black Americans do not indicate that *absolute* deprivation existed then. (They do indicate the presence of some inequality, though, when compared with the figures for white Americans.)

TABLE 5–I
STANDARD OF LIVING OF BLACK AND WHITE AMERICANS[9]

	Black	*White*
Median family income per year	$5,359.00	$8,936.00
Percent of families below poverty level	29.00	8.00
Percent of families with incomes $25,000 and above	.40	2.80
Per capita income	$1,348.00	$2,616.00
Percent unemployed	7.00	3.80
Percent receiving welfare	16.00	3.00
Percent who own home	38.00	64.00
Percent who own car	40.30	51.80
Percent who own color TV	12.40	33.50
Percent addicted to hard drugs	.14	.02
Percent of fatherless households	29.00	9.00
Life expectancy in years	64.60	71.30

Other evidence, especially from history, suggests that the theory of absolute deprivation is unsound. In fact, it breaks down completely when one considers near absolute-zero deprivation. In this state, where caloric food intake is very low, apathy and indolence result rather than energy and violence.

2. *The "Relative" Deprivation Theory*

This theory is more sophisticated. It contends that a community is driven to violence not by the absolute amount of deprivation it sustains, but by the amount of deprivation it sustains *relative* to other communities. According to the relative deprivation theory, blacks in the United States, who are much better off materially than blacks in Africa or peasants in India, may nonetheless be more prone to violence because the proximity of white wealth makes them feel relatively more deprived. The incessant reminders of the mass media in the United States make blacks even more acutely aware of their relative deprivation.

The issue of inequality is integral to the theory of relative deprivation. The sharper the perceived inequality between two communities—or between one community and another that serves as a standard of comparison—the greater the likelihood of violent conflict.

The issue of legitimacy is also critically important. One reason the peasants in India put up with their lot is that their frame of reference—comprised of religious beliefs, rationalizations for the caste system, and so on—tells them that their deprivation is legitimate. It is part of the grand order of creation. The frame of reference for American blacks tells them just the opposite. Their deprivation is therefore *perceived* to be illegitimate.

The relative deprivation theory involves the psychological phenomena of perception and expectation. The mechanism that fuels the violence and conflict is the frustration of expectations. Conflicts between communities are most likely to occur, then, when expectations are thwarted, when promises of a better deal are broken, or when hoped-for prosperity fails to materialize. (Along these lines, sociologist James C. Davies has pointed out that frustration and ensuing violence are greatest when a period of growing prosperity and optimism is interrupted by a sudden downswing or recession.[10])

There is considerable evidence to support the notion that the frustration of high expectations can cause intercommunal violence. Much of the recent racial trouble in America occurred in Northern cities (a) which had above average civil rights records, (b) which had taken stands against discrimination, and (c) which had implemented many community relations projects. The hopes and expectations of blacks were high in these cities. When federal aid was cut back to finance the Vietnam War and the space program, black aspirations were terribly frustrated. (Also during this period the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and various Supreme Court decisions had raised hopes. When reality eventually failed to measure up, the disillusionment was too much to bear.)

Support for the relative deprivation theory comes from the fact that most of the active participants in the racial violence of the sixties were relatively, rather than absolutely deprived. Indeed, they were somewhat "advantaged" vis-a-vis others rather than being absolutely "disadvantaged." According to the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (henceforth the Kerner Commission), most of the participants were *young* (an advantage in a youth-oriented culture), *male* (an advantage in a male chauvinistic society), *employed* (an advantage at a time when many people were without jobs), and passably *educated* (an advantage in a technocratic society).[11]

In essence, an important though not all-important factor in causing intercommunal violence is the frustration which stems from the gap between real and ideal social conditions. Of course, frustration does not always lead to aggression and violence. It may lead instead to apathy, withdrawal, fixation, regression, sublimation, or rationalization. Drugs, religion, and other modes of coping may also take the place of violence.

3. *The Other Theories*

There are additional theories that identify other causes of intercommunal violence, although they are less elegant and parsimonious than the previous two theories. H. O. Dahlke's theory, for example, suggests that violence between majority and minority communities is most probable when:

(a) the period is one of change and mobility;

(b) the minority group possesses an outstanding trait or characteristic which can become a basis for negative assessments;
(c) lawful authorities assign the minority group a subordinate status;
(d) one or more major associations or organizations direct the attack against the minority;
(e) the press and other media have been minority-baiting; and
(f) suitable personnel (students and marginal workers) are available for initiating action.[12]

Still other theories suggest that intercommunal violence can be caused, among other things, by

—economic threat to communities due to declining prosperity of an area
—indications that a majority will tolerate attacks on itself; and will not respond with repressive measures
—climates conducive to, and even supportive of, violence
—willingness of a majority community to accommodate or yield to the wishes of a minority community
—police harassment or brutality
—outside agitators (Riffraff, Revolutionaries, Reds)
—long, hot summers with a lack of anything to do
—imitation and mimicry due to the McLuhanesque shrinkage of the world by the electronic media
—tradition and institutionalization ("Violence is as American as cherry pie")
—self-affirmation (as presented, say, in Franz Fanon's theories of identity and rebirth).

There is evidence to support some of these theories, but to itemize it here would be beyond the scope of this book.

INTERCOMMUNAL PEACEKEEPERS

Intercommunal peacekeepers, like other interveners, attempt to manage and regulate serious conflict. Besides police peacekeepers, there are *indigenous* peacekeepers (e.g. Soul Patrols in Providence), *monitor* peacekeepers (e.g. Quaker teams in New Haven), and *vigilante* peacekeepers (e.g. Imperiale's sentries in Newark). A few of these will be considered now to see how they deal with racial strife and urban violence. Afterwards, police and other law enforcement peacekeepers will be considered.

Indigenous, grassroots peacekeepers emerged in Elizabeth, New Jersey in July of 1967 to help cope with some intercommunal violence. It all started one evening when idle youths near two high-density housing projects began to break windows, prompting police to move in. Angered, the youths started to pelt the police with rocks and bottles. Anti-poverty and Human Relations Commission workers soon arrived on the scene. They persuaded the police to withdraw and then talked the juveniles into leaving.

However, the next day police officials intensified the number of patrols in the troubled area and issued helmets, shotguns, and rifles to their men, fearing a resumption of violence would occur as was often the pattern with such disorders. Also, the mayor announced publicly that police would "Shoot to kill" and that "Force would be met by superior force." (Any officer who deviated from this order was to be considered derelict in his duty.[13])

Local black leaders were dismayed. They asked the mayor to let them create a special "peacekeeping task force;" and surprisingly enough he agreed. One hundred stickers with the word "Peacekeeper" on them were quickly printed up for use as badges and armbands. People from the community were then recruited to patrol the ghetto, in order to convince people to remain orderly or get off the streets. (Peacekeeping officials feared an outbreak of the severe racial violence that had gripped neighboring Newark just a few days earlier.) Even black militant Hesham Jaaber, who had officiated at Malcolm X's funeral, signed on as a peacekeeper and rode around with a bullhorn, urging calm. Two dozen of his followers—distinctive in their red fezzes—also took to the streets to help maintain order.

These indigenous peacekeepers succeeded in keeping things quiet. The police, convinced of their effectiveness, ceased their heavy surveillance of the troubled area. Elizabeth experienced no further serious violence.[14]

Indigenous peacekeepers were active in other cities * that experienced intercommunal conflict in 1967 and 1968. In most cases, they were young black males who were variously called Youth Patrollers, Youth Corpsmen, Police Partners, White Hats, or Red Vests. These youth patrols grew out of the tradition of

* Boston, Pittsburgh, Providence, Cincinnati, Los Angeles, Nashville, Louisville, Saginaw, Toledo, Dayton, Grand Rapids, New Rochelle, Des Moines, and Kansas City (Mo.), to name only a few.[15]

community control and self-defense long present among blacks in the ghetto. As early as 1956, an armed Self Defense Guard was created in Monroe, North Carolina, to protect the black community from harassment by the Ku Klux Klan. Years later a Community Alert Patrol was formed in Watts after the 1965 riots to serve as a buffer between the black community and the white police patrolling it. In 1966, an *armed* Shotgun Patrol was instituted by Black Panthers in Oakland "to inform blacks of their rights when dealing with the police" and "to preserve the community from harm." About the same time, an *unarmed* Peace Monitor Patrol was created as part of Operation Freeze Baby, designed to calm racial tension in the streets of San Francisco.

Some peacekeeper youth patrols were highly organized. They had chains of command and formed alliances with civic associations and local authorities. (In many cases, authorities paid youths an hourly wage to preserve the peace.) Other youth patrols were nothing more than loose disorganized aggregates of individuals. (The larger patrols—numbering into the hundreds—naturally tended to be the best organized.)

Youth patrols kept the peace in a variety of ways: they broke up hostile crowds, and interceded in altercations or violent situations which threatened to trigger larger-scale violence. In most cases, they used words rather than force to achieve their ends. Fists were used in a few cases; weapons almost never.

A typical youth peacekeeper intervention into a violent situation—one between white firemen and black juveniles in Boston—is described in the following newspaper report:

> When firemen [responded to a three-alarm fire], they were pelted with rocks; but a group of teen-agers, wearing white armbands, circulated through the area. Using loudspeakers, they convinced the youths to stop the rock throwing and then passed out mimeographed sheets that [gave several reasons for "Cooling it."] [16]

Here peacekeepers used standard conflict regulation techniques: they kept antagonists talking (which inhibits violence); they left antagonists verbal as well as physical "outs"; and they made suggestions instead of demands. There were, however, moments when suggestions gave way to demands, as this account from a Michigan newspaper indicates:

> "Come on now, get out of the park! Go on home," yelled one

> [peacekeeper] at a group of about 40 youths assembled in Campau Park around 3 A.M. The youths moved along, sullenly to be sure, but they moved. Whenever a large group of youths assembled at street corners, [peacekeepers] . . . would drive up and talk, trying to keep the youths calm.

For the most part they were successful.[17] Youth patrols often succeeded simply because they could outtalk, outlast, and outrun most conflict participants.

Sometimes indigenous peacekeepers patrolled the streets along with police, civic leaders, and even celebrities such as James Brown and Harry Belafonte. They saturated conflict areas, a fact which impressed officials. Mayor Doorley of Providence said of the local youth patrol: "They were great. All night you could see those white helmets, up and down the streets." Such patrols discouraged violence and reassured frightened residents that order could be maintained.

Indigenous peacekeepers usually wore badges or distinctive dress to identify themselves. In Pittsburgh, red vests were worn; in Newark, black armbands and red insignia; in Grand Rapids, black jackets with red-cross armbands; and in Tampa, Dayton, Atlanta, and East Palo Alto, white armbands and white helmets. This attire not only made peacekeepers visible—thus deterring some violence—but also enhanced their authority and legitimacy. Together with identification cards, the "uniforms" helped policemen, reporters, and politicians keep track of the peacekeepers and distinguish them from conflict participants in some cases.

Youth patrollers provided information about the whys and wherefores of curfews, and the pros and cons of violence. As a Dayton newspaper noted:

> [Peacekeepers] were giving out plain talk to the young people they found on the streets, giving practical reasons for staying out of trouble. "If you get a police record, it's like running a race with weights on your feet," one [peacekeeper] told a group of youngsters. "I've got a juvenile record, and I don't want you to have one . . . ."[18]

Youth patrollers also protected people and property. They rescued people from burning buildings and transported the wounded and injured to hospitals. They helped in the removal of possessions from fire-threatened homes, and they guarded stores against looting. (Although preferential treatment was usually given to stores marked "Soul Brother," white stores were

also protected.) Youth patrols watched over official buildings and vehicles, especially fire-engines which were often targets for attack.

Regarding the overall effectiveness of youth patrols, one researcher who studied them concluded

> The patrols demonstrated their ability to contain and disperse crowds, to cool tempers, to get people off the streets, and in some instances, to convince active participants to stop engaging in the violence. Angry young men listened to [their] message to "cool it" and responded in an affirmative way. . . .
>
> In the overwhelming number of cases in which information is available, youth patrols were extremely effective in handling crowds and reducing tensions in given situations. In general, their performance under trying circumstances was impressive.[19]

And the Kerner Commission had this to say about youth patrols:

> The Commission still lacks conclusive evidence on whether youth groups like the "White Hats" can be effectively utilized in all instances to help control disorders. . . . But the fact is they have been used with at least some degree of effectiveness. The Commission, therefore, recommends that intracity planning give attention to the possibility of using youth groups in control activities.[20]

Elements in the Conflict Regulation Equation

Indigenous peacekeepers should not be over-rated, because much of the social chemistry of racial conflict and its regulation is still not understood. For instance, it is not fully known why the early seventies have been relatively free of the severe racial violence of the late sixties. The following explanations have been suggested (peacekeeping seems to be only one of the elements in the equation):

1. *Improved Peacekeeping Machinery*

Much progress has been made in the area of peacekeeping:

(a) Some grassroots peacekeepers have been as effective at prevention as intervention. For example, scores of peacekeepers in Brooklyn's Bedford-Stuyvesant district have been able to get into the streets within minutes of trouble and prevent the escalation of potentially dangerous incidents.

(b) Community Relations teams formed by the U.S. Department of Justice have also been able to extinguish the sparks of racial conflict quickly. To illustrate: When a black man shot

underworld leader Joe Colombo in 1971, violence between Italian Americans and Black Americans seemed imminent in parts of New York City. It was averted, though, thanks to Community Relations teams that came in from Washington, D.C., and patrolled critical neighborhoods twenty-four hours a day.

(c) Police departments have retired, retrained, or transferred officers who were violence-prone during racial peacekeeping. Also, more minority policemen have been hired, though proportional representation has yet to be achieved. (See Chapter 14 for statistics regarding this.) In addition, police departments are responding to racial strife more rapidly, as this account shows:

> In the past, when a disturbance broke out, [police] would wait until a mob formed before trying to intervene. After that, the use of too much force was usually predictable. Now they move in massively on an incident before it gets out of hand. And the show of force—or occasionally a calculated withdrawal as a gesture of confidence in local leaders—is usually enough.[21]

2. *Fear and Despair*

Increasing numbers of urban police departments are purchasing better equipment and more powerful weapons. This in itself deters a certain amount of racial violence. In addition, authorities are calling out the National Guard at much earlier stages in conflicts than they used to. One knowledgeable source claims that "Calling in the National Guard, once in effect an admission that a situation was getting out of control, is now early routine in almost any sizable disturbance."[22] All of this instant, massive response with weapons and Guardsmen frightens people away from engaging in certain kinds of intercommunal violence.

Coupled with this fear is the despair that has developed because of the hard line recent Administrations have taken regarding race relations. Ironically, though, this despair has meant that there has been little gap between expectations and reality—certainly none like that which occurred after the expectations of the Camelot years and the Civil Rights Act were dashed. Without a gap there has been less frustration and hence less violence.

3. *Changes in Attitudes*

(a) *Black* attitudes. Many blacks feel that violence—whether strategic or symbolic—is no longer useful, if it ever was, in race

relations. They see violence as a no-win, self-defeating proposition, and feel that more will be accomplished by working for conventional political and economic power. Running for elective office, registering black voters, and organizing food programs, health clinics and black businesses seem more sensible. Build, baby, build has replaced burn, baby, burn, especially among older blacks.

(b) *White* attitudes. Whites, too, have learned from experience. They have learned not to press the panic button when nonviolent protests or even small-scale violence occur. And they have learned more about blacks and their needs and aspirations. The result has been improved race relations.

Also, many elected white officials have emulated the former Mayor of New York City, John Lindsay, who personally visited troubled areas during racial strife—recognizing the dignity of all parties concerned—and still found time to negotiate behind the scenes to defuse tensions.

4. *The Loosening of Purse Strings for Bread and Circuses*

Highly publicized threats and predictions of further racial violence made local, state, and federal governments jittery. They began to ante up funds. The money financed Model Cities programs, antipoverty projects, job-training programs, and neighborhood clean-up campaigns. Private corporations, as well as the Small Business Administration, loaned capital for the creation of black businesses.

In addition to bread, blacks were offered circuses. Games, parades, craft fairs, and music festivals were held in many cities during the long hot summers to occupy the bored and divert the disenchanted. An ethnic awareness festival—complete with carnival—may have kept Watts peaceful during the summer night in 1971 when Soledad Brother George Jackson was killed. Without the festival, the killing might have triggered massive violence, especially since it occurred on the sixth anniversary of the historic Watts riot.

5. *Good Luck and Happenstance*

Nothing need be said regarding the role that chance plays.

Philadelphia Monitors as Peacekeepers

Unlike most indigenous peacekeepers, Philadelphia monitor peacekeepers were mainly white, middle-class, and unremunerated. They came into being during several anxious weeks in September, 1970, when extreme tension built up between black and white communities in Philadelphia. The tension was triggered by an upcoming Black Panther convention which was to be held in one of the most racially explosive parts of the city. Called for the purpose of "rewriting the American Constitution," the "Revolutionary People's Constitutional Convention" was to feature speeches by Huey Newton and other black militants.

Besides denunciations and accusations via the media (which often occur preceding controversial scheduled events), Philadelphia experienced three potentially explosive incidents shortly before the convention. Though unrelated to the convention itself, these inter-racial incidents occurred so close together that both black and white communities perceived them as part and parcel of larger violence to come.

The *first* was a black gunman's unprovoked attack on several white policemen sitting in a guardhouse in a Philadelphia park. The attack left one policeman dead and one wounded. It was alleged to be part of a terrorism campaign being launched by seven black militants.

The *second* occurred the following night. Two blacks shot two white policemen in an incident which was totally unrelated to the guardhouse attack. Neither of the blacks were considered "militants" by the police.

The *third* incident was probably precipitated by the first two. It involved a police raid, 150 strong, on three Panther office buildings in the city. The alleged purpose of the raid was to confiscate weapons rumored to be illegally cached. There were gun battles at two of the Panther offices, and three policemen as well as several Panthers were injured.

The raid incensed the black community—not so much because it had been based only on rumors of weapons cached, but because police had forced some male Panthers to strip completely during a sidewalk search for weapons. Pictures of a dozen naked and half-naked blacks—lined up facing a wall—made the news

media from coast to coast and intensified antagonisms between blacks and whites in Philadelphia. Moreover, a few intemperate remarks from public officials after the incident did little to reduce antagonism.

At this point, a number of Quakers began organizing themselves as monitors in order to deal with the racial violence that seemed almost inevitable. They planned to be on hand at key locations throughout Philadelphia during the convention, to counsel moderation and intervene should violence break out.

How Monitors are Organized and Trained

The Philadelphia monitors were on duty around the clock for all three days of the convention, organized into "executive" monitors, "rank and file" monitors, and "roving troubleshooter" monitors. Coordination was centralized so that a few people could make quick, informed decisions about action to take whenever violence erupted.

Prior to the convention the monitors underwent training for their tasks. As part of this, they conducted simulations, enacted role-plays, and practiced nonviolent peacekeeping techniques, concentrating on the tactics of isolation and interposition. The monitors numbered 150, of whom more than half were over forty years of age. Most were white, although there were a few blacks and a few inter-racial couples in their ranks.

Tasks and Functions of Monitors

Philadelphia monitors were prepared to interpose, patrol, instruct, observe, and protect during the three days.

1. **Interpose.** Only two situations warranted interposition however; and, fortunately, both were resolved before monitors had to intervene in strength. The first of these occurred at the main convention auditorium, where 4,200 black and 1,800 white conferees had converged to hear Huey Newton speak. Because the auditorium could only hold 4,500, many people were turned away at the doors. Angered, some of them began to scuffle among themselves and with gateguards. Just as monitors were moving in to keep the peace, it was announced that Newton would speak twice so that everyone could have a chance to hear him. This prevented major violence from erupting.

The second situation involved a spontaneous disturbance which broke out one evening during the convention. Large numbers of black youths swarmed through two main streets near the convention center throwing rocks and bottles at streetlights and store windows. Yet after half an hour, the destruction was over, almost before it began. The presence of monitors and Panther officials may have had something to do with this, though, it is hard to say for sure.

2. **Patrol.** While Philadelphia monitors covered no rigid beat or circuit, they did patrol important convention areas. Some, working in teams of two, patrolled city streets as well. They all wore armbands, red vests, and ID badges so that they could be readily identified.

3. **Instruct.** To attain legitimacy and respectability in the eyes of parties to the conflict, monitors manned information centers—providing, among other things, phone numbers and addresses where emergency medical and legal aid could be obtained. They also gave out news briefs, schedules of convention proceedings, and maps of Philadelphia and its transit system.

4. **Observe.** Rumor and misinformation had caused some of the problems that preceded the convention. The monitors therefore wanted to be able to supply an objective account of any controversial incidents that arose during the convention. For this reason, some monitor teams carried cameras and portable tape recorders. (This observation task did not turn out to be critical since relatively few controversial incidents occurred.)

5. **Protect.** Monitors were ready and able to protect *people* from violence, especially innocent bystanders. However, since they did not have much occasion to do this they primarily gave medical assistance. (Several cases of exhaustion were handled, and bandages, salt tablets, and other forms of first aid were dispensed as needed. Monitors also coordinated more serious medical treatment by providing emergency communication and transportation to a nearby medical center.) Monitor peacekeepers occasionally helped Black Panther teams frisk people entering the main auditorium. (Signs at the doors read: "Your personal belongings will be searched. All dangerous objects will be confiscated!") Switch-blade knives, tear gas canisters, and a variety of other weapons were found during their searches. The frisk

procedure was instituted for several reasons. The lives of certain speakers and attending notables had been threatened,* and *agents provocateurs* were said to be on hand, bent on sabotaging the convention by "staging" violence or "planting" drugs. Monitors helped protect *property* from violence, too. They watched over microphones, press areas, speaker's platforms, and the like.

Monitor Effectiveness

While there was relatively little violence at the convention itself, a white man and woman attending the convention together were shot and stabbed by four black youths in a nearby alley, apparently during a marijuana sale. No one else was seriously injured in the area during the three-day weekend. All told there were only eight arrests—in a region where seventy-five arrests are usually made during an average three-day weekend. The low arrest rate may have resulted in part because police kept a "low profile" during the convention. Only two uniformed policemen were stationed in the convention area to direct automobile traffic. (However, plainclothes police remained in the vicinity in unmarked cars.)

The success of the monitors' peacekeeping efforts led to a great number of public tributes. Moreover, the Philadelphia Black Educators Forum was impressed enough with the performance to call them in several months later to keep the peace at a teachers' strike.

Philadelphia Police as Peacekeepers

The police in the City of Brotherly Love provide an interesting contrast to the monitors with regard to racial strife intervention. This is illustrated clearly by the techniques and procedures the police used during an intercommunal conflict in the city in 1964. The racial conflict was fairly typical for the time: several other American cities—Chicago, Cleveland, New York, Rochester, Jersey City, Patterson, Elizabeth, and Jacksonville—experienced similar strife that year.[23]

9 P.M., Friday

The beginning of the trouble came Friday evening, August 28,

* Weapons and ammunition had been found the day before the convention in an out-of-state car, reportedly bringing conferees to Philadelphia.

when a stalled car in an intersection strained the tempers of a number of blacks and whites. Unfortunately, the episode occurred in Philadelphia's worst slum, an area known as "the Jungle" because of its high population density and its high crime, disease, poverty, and unemployment rates.†

Soon a crowd of onlookers gathered at the intersection, and a traffic jam resulted, bringing yet more people and more tension to the scene. The crowd suddenly turned hostile when two police officers—one white and one black—tried to arrest a black woman for disturbing the peace. It became even more unruly and vicious as the police waited for reinforcements to arrive. When they did, they were met with a torrent of bricks and bottles.

By this time the guilt or innocence of the arrested woman had ceased to be important. What mattered most to the crowd was that they lived in a society where blacks were exploited by white merchants, and where blacks were held accountable for everything they did while whites were not. The crowd's hate soon focused on anyone white or anything symbolic of the white community. Understandably, the police decided to sit tight, awaiting even more reinforcements.

11 P.M., Friday

Before long there were a thousand people jeering, cursing, and throwing rocks. Around 11 P.M., white-owned stores and buildings came under intense attack, as did police and their vehicles. A difficult problem developed when members of the crowd—who began scuffling with the police—started to rip badges off police uniforms and use the sharp points to scratch and slash at them.

† Regarding *crime,* the area had the highest rates for adult and juvenile crime in the city. Corrupt politicians, racketeers, and vice lords exerted unusual influence and power in the area.[24]

Where *disease* was concerned, Philadelphia's highest rates for tuberculosis, infant mortality, and venereal disease centered in the area. Its poor sanitation and run-down housing only aggravated its density problem (2,000 people per city block; 55,000 people per square mile).

Regarding *poverty,* the area's median income was 30 percent below that for the city as a whole. Those who were lucky enough to work were usually laborers, household domestics, and unskilled workers. More than 4,000 children in the area received Aid to Dependent Children and other forms of public assistance.

With respect to *unemployment,* the Jungle had an "official" jobless figure of 13 percent, the highest in Philadelphia. The "real" figure was more like 20 percent when part-time workers and people who had given up looking for jobs were counted.

Because of this, police were ordered to remove their badges. But this effectively made individual police anonymous and unaccountable for their actions. (Police were remiss in going into such a situation wearing paraphernalia that could be used against them. They should have worn soft sew-on or snap-on badges.)

At this juncture a Deputy Police Commissioner tried to organize the police and gain control of the situation. His efforts failed. The Police Commissioner himself eventually arrived on the scene and took command of the operation. He immediately issued helmets and riot batons to his officers, and put all seven thousand Philadelphia police on twelve to fourteen-hour tours of duty. His actions corresponded roughly to Phase 3 of the following emergency mobilization plan, which is standard in many police departments:

Phase 1—mobilizes all on-duty personnel including supervisory, administrative, and auxiliary personnel.

Phase 2—mobilizes all personnel of the department next due to report for duty.

Phase 3—mobilizes all personnel of the department last relieved from duty.

Phase 4—mobilizes all emergency police reservists.[25]

Manpower mobilization plans do not solve all operational problems for peacekeepers; major problems regarding the deployment of manpower—not to mention the deployment of vehicles and equipment—remain. In the early stages of the Philadelphia riot, there was confusion at the 23rd precinct headquarters because *too many* police were on hand. At the same time, *too few* police were on hand at the riot scene, resulting in the men there being outnumbered fifty to one. By midnight, the racial violence was completely out of control. The police were forced to band together in small groups and stick to the main streets to avoid being overpowered and seriously injured by the crowds.

2 A.M., *Saturday*

At 2 A.M. the police decided they had enough organized manpower to form a flying wedge of several hundred men. They moved into the thick of the conflict and tried to restore order block by block. After clearing people from an area, they "secured" it, leaving men on guard to deter further violence. The whole procedure took many hours (since hundreds of people

had to be arrested) and demanded a good deal of patience and physical energy. Furthermore, the sheer number of arrests made it impossible for the police to fully document each case. Finding witnesses and collecting evidence required more time than any of the peacekeepers could spare. Thus, many of the arrest cases were weak in court. (The same thing happened when district police made mass arrests of antiwar demonstrators in Washington, D.C. in 1971.)

Parenthetically, problems arising from mass arrests of this sort filter all the way through the justice system. Mass arrests clog jails, create bottlenecks, delay court proceedings, and overburden judges, district attorneys, and public defenders. They also cost taxpayers an enormous amount, especially if large numbers of defendants later file suit for false arrest and win.

9 A.M., Saturday

By morning the disorder was more or less under control. There was some sporadic violence. The Police Commissioner continued to oversee the peacekeeping effort, having virtually moved his office from police headquarters to the 23rd precinct station house in the conflict zone. (He remained in personal command for all but three or four hours during each of the several days of the turmoil and subsequent "occupation" which saw peacekeepers deployed throughout the riot area to discourage new hostilities.)

11 A.M., Saturday

Isolated outbreaks of violence continued to occur at the fringes of the "secure" areas.

2 P.M., Saturday

One thousand, one hundred policemen took up "guard" positions throughout the conflict area. There was still scattered and occasional violence in the streets.

9 P.M., Saturday

The Police Commissioner increased manpower in the trouble area by 20 percent to cope with the extra problems brought on by nightfall.

The round-the-clock occupation of the trouble zone lasted ten

days. It ended when 1,300 police and 150 vehicles were withdrawn on September 8th.

Police Effectiveness

After the peacekeeping effort there was much criticism to the effect that the police were wholly unprepared for this kind of intercommunal conflict intervention. Most of this criticism was ill-founded. In fact, the police did have a contingency plan of sorts, but it was not publicized in advance. (It is not clear whether this lack of publicity was intentional or accidental.) The mere fact that they had a plan, though, made the Philadelphia police unique at a time when very few departments across the nation had racial unrest contingency plans. This lack of planning has since been rectified, as race relations authority Allen Grimshaw has pointed out:

> By 1968 every major urban center in the U.S. had detailed plans for action in event of large-scale racial disturbances—plans which included the use of Federal forces.[26]

Among other things, the Philadelphia contingency plan advocated the following:

1. *The use of sensible crowd-control procedures.* Departmental manuals and directives outlined the appropriate techniques to be followed. The correct use of wedges, barricades, and the like was spelled out in detail.

2. *The use of sound arrest procedures.* As set forth in the department's *Recruit Notebook*, sound procedure required that arrests be unhurried, respectful, and constitutional. Lamentably, not every person arrested during the riot was "requested to cease and desist," "told of the codes and laws he was breaking," and "warned a second time," as the *Recruit Notebook* directed.

3. *The use of minimum physical force.* The relevant procedures for this were not laid down in departmental manuals. Nevertheless, Philadelphia police generally avoided unnecessary physical force during their peacekeeping effort. This restraint and moderation was greeted with mixed emotions both inside and outside the police department.

Inside the department, most men approved of the way the intervention had been conducted. A few—including some black officers—felt their hands had been tied by the policies set down.

One black policeman suggested that "a lack of positivism" had characterized the whole proceeding. He complained, "I don't say shoot people, but we should look the situation in the face." [27]

Outside the department, the Mayor, for example, praised the "intelligent police action" which, he said, proved that "law and order can be obtained in a big city without dogs, horses, or fire hoses." [28] Others, like the President of the City Council, felt tougher measures should have been employed; he felt the canine corps should have been used in the first hours of the conflict.[29]

The upshot of this debate was that the Police Commissioner—though he vigorously rebutted many of the critics—ordered a full-scale review of his department's peacekeeping policies and procedures.

Some new policies grew out of this review. They included ones concerning shows of force and the adequate delivery of manpower to conflict scenes. Some of these policies manifest themselves in the current procedure of keeping buses filled with police on standby alert during crises. When violence threatens or actually breaks out, these buses are rushed to the scene. Bright red, with sirens and lights, they carry riot-trained police and tow trailers filled with rifles and shotguns. Their deterrent effect is overwhelming. For this reason, the buses are sometimes left to sit for hours in racially tense areas. This conspicuous show of force tactic was used to cope with the racial unrest in Philadelphia which followed the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr.*

SUMMARY

Intercommunal violence is unwieldy and difficult to moderate. This is because it usually involves large numbers of people and is rooted in social and historical ills. Containment does not re-

* Although the crisis following King's assassination in May 1968 was not nearly as serious as the 1964 riot, it did result in thirty-seven injuries, one hundred arrests, twelve cases of arson, four episodes of looting, and 343 cases of vandalism.[30] Thirty or so fights took place between blacks and whites during the trouble, including one that occurred in the Philadelphia City Hall courtyard. Police intervened and used nightsticks to break it up.

During the King assassination disorders, the Mayor used the standard tactics of closing bars, establishing curfews, and restricting the sale of weapons, ammunition, and gasoline (for firebombs). In addition, the Mayor issued an emergency proclamation which forbade groups of more than twelve people to gather on street corners. The constitutionality of his proclamation was doubtful but its effectiveness was not.

solve intercommunal conflict, but more thoughtful handling of it can curb some of its damaging aspects. The complex nature of intercommunal conflict has led to diverse theories about its origin and causes. Some of these theories were analyzed here, as were the procedures various kinds of peacekeepers employ to cope with racial violence.

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[CHAPTER 6]

INTERNATIONAL VIOLENCE & UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING

A military clash broke out between Arabs and Israelis one midnight along the shores of the Sea of Galilee. UN peacekeepers showed up at a moment's notice, and had arranged a cease-fire by 7:30 a.m. the next morning. UN personnel, peacekeepers, and truce supervisors have been active in the Middle East since 1948. For years, along the Gaza Strip and at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba, the UN Emergency Force kept up a ceaseless, 24-hour patrol by foot, jeep, and aircraft. In 1974, UN troops in blue helmets supervised cease-fire lines and facilitated the transfer of control of Egyptian territory at Kilometer 101 and other places where Arabs and Israelis confronted each other eyeball to eyeball.

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT ARISES between social aggregates known as nations. (Nations usually have political autonomy, definite territories, distinctive cultures, and ongoing systems of regeneration and socialization. They are made up of countless groups, organizations, and communities.) Commonly called war, international conflict involves widespread purposeful damage to people and property. However, war is more than just violent conflict between nations; it is a comprehensive system of cultural patterns and institutions which facilitate legalized killing among large numbers of people.

Frequency, Causes, and Consequences of Violent International Conflict

Wars have occurred almost continually since the invention of the nation-state around 1600 A.D. (Of course, wars took place with regularity before this, too.) In his study of the frequency of international conflicts, political scientist Quincy Wright found that several hundred wars occurred between 1480 and 1964. They ranged in size from wars between small nations that lasted a few months to wars between large nations lasting many years.[1]

(In the 20th century there have been thirty wars, according to Wright.[2])

International conflicts exact incredible costs in terms of casualties, resources, time, and energy. World War I is estimated to have taken thirty-nine million lives. (Of these, nine million were military and thirty million were civilian.) World War II cost fifty-two million lives (seventeen million military and thirty-five million civilian.) [3]

The figures below show the cost in casualties of the various wars the United States has been involved in: [4]

	Duration	US Battle Deaths	US Total Casualties *
War of 1812	1812-15	2,260	8,765
Mexican War	1846-48	1,733	17,373
Spanish-American War	1898-99	385	4,108
World War I	1914-18	53,402	320,518
World War II	1939-45	291,557	1,076,245
Korean War	1950-53	33,629	157,530
Vietnam War	1961-73	45,948 †	359,534

The casualty figures for the Vietnam War might be elaborated upon, given the importance of that conflict in recent American history. In addition to American deaths, there were 196,863 South Vietnamese and 922,793 North Vietnamese (and Viet Cong) battle deaths.[5] With regard to civilians, an estimated 415,000 South Vietnamese and 185,000 North Vietnamese were killed.

These casualty figures are only a small part of the story. The total human cost of the Vietnam War was immense. Over the last decade, the war created eleven million refugees in Indochina as a whole. Almost a million of these were orphaned South Vietnamese children. The conflict also created 544 American P.O.W.s and 1,249 M.I.A.s. (North Vietnam's P.O.W.s numbered 36,364.) The war exacted a terrible ecological price too. The United States dropped 6.8 million tons of bombs (2.0 million tons were dropped in World War II), causing an estimated 24,500,000 craters in South Vietnam alone. Also, the United States used twenty million gallons of chemicals to defoliate an

* The figures in this column represent the combined total of battle deaths, other deaths, and nonmortal wounds. For wars before World War I, the figures represent the best data from available records. Due to incomplete records and possible differences in the use of terminology and reporting systems, they should be treated as estimates.

† Battle deaths elsewhere than in South Vietnam include: 294 in Laos, 531 in Cambodia, and 498 in North Vietnam.

estimated 6,400,000 acres. All of this cost taxpayers dearly. US citizens—not to mention those of other nations—anted up $136 billion for the military aspects of the war and $5 billion for other aspects (construction, medical aid, governmental support, and economic aid to the region).

Mathematician Lewis Richardson cataloged the fatalities resulting from all the international conflicts that occurred between 1820 and 1952. To avoid the pretense of unwarranted precision, he used logarithms to represent war-related military and civilian deaths. His figures below indicate how many wars during the period had fatality figures of various magnitudes: [6]

Number of Wars	Fatalities (in Logarithms)	Fatalities (in Numbers)
2	6.5 and above	>3162277 deaths
7	5.5 to 6.5	>316227 deaths
26	4.5 to 5.5	>31622 deaths
70	3.5 to 4.5	>3162 deaths
209	2.5 to 3.5	>316 deaths

When both the frequency of wars *and* the magnitude of their casualties are examined together, a significant fact emerges. Over recent centuries, wars have been occurring with decreasing frequency; but when they have occurred they have taken increasing numbers of casualties, proportionate to population.

The overall trend in international violence is reflected in sociologist Pitirim Sorokin's "Index" numbers, which combine frequency figures with casualty figures for a given century: 12th century, 3; 13th century, 4; 14th century, 7; 15th century, 9; 16th century, 15; 17th century, 45; 18th century, 40; 19th century, 17; and the first half of the 20th century, 52.[7] The change in the size of the Index number from century to century is what is most important here. (The fact that the 19th century figure is out of sequence is due in part to the Pax Britannica, when Britain ruled and controlled much of the world.)

Certain nations are more likely than others to become embroiled in wars. These include great power nations, autocratic centralized nations, geographically adjacent nations, and strategically vulnerable nations. Regarding great powers, though, a "chicken and egg" question arises: which comes first, greatness or belligerence? Great powers fight about twice as often as other nations; on the whole, they fight much shorter wars, however.

Along these lines, it is worth noting that between 1480 and 1940, France was involved in 47 percent of the wars in Europe. Austria-Hungary was involved in 34 percent, Germany in 25 percent, Great Britain in 22 percent, Russia in 22 percent, Holland in 8 percent, Sweden in 4 percent, and Denmark in 2 percent.[8]

The financial cost of war to major powers has risen over the years. In 1870, the major powers spent an average of $2 per person in their country for war and war-related activities. By 1914, it was up to $4. By 1931 it was $25, and by 1963, a whopping $200.[9]

It should be pointed out that some international conflicts —like some smaller conflicts—serve positive functions. Wars create nations, extend frontiers, control populations, dissipate boredom, encourage national cohesion, provide outlets for aggressive misfits, and motivate scientific and artistic achievement, though in a negative way.

Causes of War

Various people have various opinions about what causes international violence. If a few generalizations—and perhaps simplifications—are indulged in, it could be said that:

The man on the street thinks wars are caused by all sorts of things: conspiracies, overpopulation, the devil, human nature, or just plain fate (a "jammed" rudder can put ships of state on a collision course). He may also see wars as the sport of kings, the last resort, or anything else that conventional wisdom suggests.

Biologists see international violence as the ultimate result of man's will to prevail. (This will is intrinsically bound up in innate needs regarding aggression, predation, and reproduction.) International violence—as an expression of a collective will to prevail —can be activated by any serious threat to territory or vital interests.

Psychologists feel that war arises from men's expectations and misperceptions, as well as from the disturbed psychic states of some national leaders and decision-makers. Thus war "begins in the minds of men," as the UN Charter asserts. Psychologists believe that in order to abolish war, men must cease to expect it as the world's lot, must clarify their perceptions of reality, and must gain stronger control over leaders and elites.

Anthropologists tend to think that international conflicts grow

out of certain values, technologies and cultural patterns. They believe also that war is a social invention; and they feel that, as such, it should theoretically be de-invented or modified out of existence.

Economists on the other hand, see violent international conflict as the result of economic pressures for resources and commodities. These conflicts occur because things are in short supply or because people want more than their share, due to either learned or unlearned greed.

Political scientists feel that war is merely part of an eternal struggle for power, status, and domination. Their concern with these factors, as well as with the factor of nationalism, makes their perspective similar to that of sociologists.

Sociologists believe that the seeds of war lie in the structure of national and international systems. Propaganda, militarism, and many other "isms" are important causal factors too. The virulence of the "isms" seems particularly clear to sociologists since in their view wars were caused primarily by religious absolutism between 1492 and 1648; by political absolutism between 1648 and 1789; by industrial nationalism between 1789 and 1914; by politico-economic nationalism between 1914 and 1945; and by third-world nationalism between 1945 and the present.

Where wars caused by third-world nationalism are concerned, political scientist Lincoln Bloomfield estimates that an average of 1.5 new conflicts will break out in the world each year.[10] These new conflicts will have to be attended to, if for no other reason than to prevent them from threatening world peace. Like a running sore, they may spread and infect the whole international system: a grave danger in the nuclear age.

One way of dealing with them will be **Unilateral** intervention on the part of major power nations. This is how the United States dealt with conflicts in South Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, and elsewhere.* (Russia and other countries have also engaged in unilateral intervention.) However, the cost of such intervention has usually been enormous for all nations concerned, as Vietnam clearly illustrated. Even when intervening countries have been "successful," as in US intervention in the Dominican

* According to the *Congressional Record*, the armed forces of the United States were deployed abroad for military action 163 times between 1798 and 1945—and without the approval of Congress in many cases. This averages out to about one act of military intervention per year during the period.[11]

Republic and Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia, they have paid a high price generally in the form of diminished prestige and moral credibility in the eyes of the world. European-American relations were especially strained by recent US overseas interventions, as were Sino-Soviet relations by recent Russian interventions.

A better way of dealing with the 1.5 new conflicts each year would be **Multilateral** intervention on the part of many nations acting under the auspices of associations such as the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and the Organization of African Unity. Multilateral intervention can defuse conflicts and prevent them from escalating into confrontations between major powers. Its cost is a fraction of the cost of unilateral intervention. The largest United Nations interventions have run $1 million per month (lasting for about twelve *months*). American intervention in Vietnam cost $800 million per month (lasting for about twelve *years*)! †

There are indications that the lessons of the Vietnam War have made the United States and Russia more willing to cooperate with multilateral intervention agencies such as the United Nations. Both superpowers want to prevent wars ‡—especially brush-fire ones—from accidentally igniting nuclear fire-storms. Fewer superpower vetoes will probably be cast in the future when peacekeeping intervention proposals come up in the UN Security Council.*

† It is interesting to speculate about what would have happened if the United Nations had been allowed to intervene in Vietnam in 1954 after the French defeat. UN peacekeepers could have supervised the elections called for by the Geneva Accords and then attempted to deal with any aggression which materialized from North Vietnam. If necessary, something like former Secretary of Defense McNamara's billion dollar electronic line might have been erected to detect and prevent infiltration from the North. The 20,000 observers needed to supplement the line would not have exceeded the number of UN peacekeepers in the Congo conflict. The cost to the United States, and to the world for that matter, might have been a good deal less than it turned out to be.

‡ In a typical recent year armed conflict was going on in thirteen trouble spots around the world: the Middle East, South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Burma, Thailand, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Mozambique, Angola, Chad, and the Philippines.

* The veto has not always blocked UN peacekeeping attempts. Some of the largest UN interventions (in the Congo, in the Middle East, etcetera) were undertaken in spite of *de facto* opposition from at least one great power. Resourcefulness on the part of Secretaries-General Trygve Lie and Dag Hammarskjold, as well as a special Uniting-for-Peace resolution passed by the General Assembly, enabled the UN to overcome this opposition.

INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPERS

International peacekeepers intervene as third parties in violent conflicts between nations. Their task is to moderate and terminate conflicts which threaten world peace and security. Usually these peacekeepers are UN personnel and soldiers on loan from UN member countries. They may be only a handful of men equipped with binoculars and two-way radios or thousands of men equipped with tanks and jets.

UN peacekeeping has kept many conflicts from escalating or re-escalating into full scale war, as in Iran, Cyprus, Greece, Kashmir, and Indonesia. To a degree, UN peacekeeping can be credited with preventing a hot shooting war from breaking out directly between the major powers since the end of World War II. However, part of the credit for this must go to other activities of the United Nations. For example, debates in the General Assembly—the town hall of the world—have allowed divergent views to be expressed and issues to be clarified. Since its inception, the United Nations has dealt with over seventy cases involving breaches of the peace or threats of war. Among other things, it helped moderate the Middle East conflict in 1973; it turned back an invasion of Cyprus by Turkey in 1967; it stopped a war between India and Pakistan in 1965; and as far back as 1946, it resolved a conflict between Russian and Iran.[12]

At various times UN peacekeepers have:

—interposed themselves between antagonists to create a buffer (Congo)
—established demarcation lines (Cyprus)
—patrolled frontiers (India-Pakistan)
—policed demilitarized zones (Egypt)
—maintained law and order (Cyprus)
—supervised truces and cease fires (Middle East)
—prevented infiltration and subversion (Congo)
—mediated conflicts (Greece)
—disarmed soldiers and interdicted illegally imported arms and ammunition (Congo)
—quelled riots and civil disorders (Cyprus)
—transferred governmental authority (West New Guinea)
—investigated acts of aggression (Yemen)
—carried out full-scale military operations (Korea)

A Brief History of International Peacekeeping

International peacekeeping began in earnest with the League of Nations. Created in 1919 by the Versailles Treaty, the League moderated many serious conflicts between countries. For example, it sent a peacekeeping force of 3,300 troops from Italy, Britain, Sweden, and Holland to the Saar Territory in 1920 to smooth out a conflict between France and Germany. In the same year, an international force was organized for, but not dispatched to, the no-man's-land between Poland and Lithuania. In 1934 the League interposed a peacekeeping force between Peru and Colombia in the upper Amazon. Over the years the League also prevented major violence from erupting in Macedonia, Upper Silesia, and the Aland Isles.

The League's successor, the United Nations, was founded in 1945. Its peacekeeping activities derive from Articles 39 to 47 of the UN Charter. The following is an itemization of the better-known UN peacekeeping missions.[13]

Initials			Number of UN Soldiers	Number of Countries Donating Soldiers
UNEF	UN Emergency Force in *Egypt*	1956–67 1973–74	6,000	10
UNTSO	UN Mission in *Palestine*	1948–71	500	17
UNOGIL	UN Observer Group in *Lebanon*	1958–59	600	21
UNOC	UN Operation in the *Congo*	1960–64	20,000	35
UNSF	UN Security Force in *West Irian*	1962–63	1,600	3
UNYOM	UN *Yemen* Observation Group	1963–64	200	10
UNFICYP	UN Force in *Cyprus*	1964–75	6,500	9

The United Nations has also maintained the peace in Kashmir (1949–1974), the Dominican Republic (1965–66), Laos (1959), Jordan (1958), Palestine (1947–56), Indonesia (1965–66), and Greece (1946–54).[14]

Interestingly, the distinctive UN flag was born during an early peacekeeping effort. When UN personnel had to cross borders frequently during their investigation of the 1947 conflict between Greece and her neighbors (Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia),

they found themselves without an identifying flag. White, black, and red flags were not appropriate because of their connotations. So were most other colors and combinations. Thus a UN officer went out and bought a piece of light blue cloth at the local bazaar—dyed a color indigenous to the area—and painted the UN insignia on it. The makeshift flag eliminated all further border crossing problems, and eventually became the familiar official UN flag.

The fact that the United Nations has not intervened in every case of violent international conflict raises the question of why it intervenes in some conflicts and not others. There are several possible answers:

—because the parties involved in some international conflicts do not request UN intervention. Without an invitation from at least one party, the United Nations cannot intervene.

—because the countries participating in some conflicts are not UN members and they do not wish the UN to interfere in their affairs.

—because the allies of parties to an international conflict may intervene first, making it difficult for the United Nations to follow suit.

—because even after a request for UN intervention, Security Council members frequently cannot agree on the kind of peacekeeping effort to mount.

—because maxi-powers (and sometimes mini-powers) refuse to give financial support to certain UN peacekeeping endeavors.

—because some international conflicts do not threaten world peace and security, and thus are outside the UN mandate.

For these and other reasons the United Nations did not get involved in conflicts between France and North Vietnam (1947–54), China and Burma (1950–53), France and Algeria (1954–62), Russia and Czechoslovakia (1968), the United States and North Vietnam (1961–73).

The issue of intervention versus nonintervention is very complex. A humorous insight into some of its complexities was provided by Philippine Foreign Minister Romulo:

> When there is an issue between two small powers, the issue disappears. When there is an issue between a small power and a big power,

the small power disappears. When it's an issue between two superpowers, the United Nations disappears!

Peacekeeping by the OAS, OAU, and Other Associations

Besides global associations such as the League and the United Nations, regional associations have engaged in international peacekeeping. The *Organization of American States* sent its Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) to the Dominican Republic in 1965 to prevent the superpowers from exploiting the situation there. Composed mostly of Brazilian troops, the IAPF was created to implement OAS' mandate to settle conflicts among its members in a peaceful way. The OAS has also kept the peace during several other serious crises, including the so-called Football War.

The *Organization of African Unity* has dealt with two-party conflicts involving Algeria and Morocco, Somalia and Ethiopia, and Ghana and Upper Volta. The OAU was also active during the war in the Congo and the Biafran War.

Another regional association, the *Arab League*, sent a peacekeeping force to Kuwait in 1961, and has also engaged in peacekeeping endeavors in Lebanon, Jordan, and the Sudan.

Finally, the *Council of Europe* has intervened to a degree in conflicts involving Italy, Greece, and other countries; however, it has not really done much peacekeeping since World War II. An attempt several years ago to work out a NATO-run peacekeeping force for Cyprus—linked to the United Nations—did not materialize. (Nevertheless, joint peacekeeping operations conducted by the United Nations and NATO, SEATO, CENTO, or Warsaw Pact nations offer interesting possibilities for the future.)

There have been occasional *ad hoc* peacekeeping efforts by agencies other than global or regional associations. The International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS) in South Vietnam is an example. The ICCS operation is composed of 1,160 neutral observers, 290 from each of four different countries. The observers operate out of forty-odd offices scattered throughout South Vietnam. These are coordinated by seven regional headquarters and by a main headquarters in Saigon. The ICCS takes its orders from the faction-ridden Joint Military Commission, to whom it reports truce violations. Hundreds of thousands of such violations—ranging from isolated shellings to major en-

counters between massed troops—have been reported by both sides. ICCS has been able to investigate only a small number of these.

Unfortunately, ICCS peacekeepers—sent to South Vietnam after the 1973 Paris Accords—seem fated to reenact the poor performance of their predecessors, the International Control Commission peacekeepers who were sent there after the 1954 Geneva Accords. ICCS peacekeepers are ineffective because there is no larger authority to back them up. Thus, truce violators go unpunished.

Another reason ICCS peacekeepers are ineffective is that they are politicized, seldom agreeing among themselves. Half of them usually support South Vietnam and half, North Vietnam. As a result, very few truce violation reports get filed, since the Paris Accords require that all such reports be unanimous. About the only time all the ICCS peacekeepers seem to agree on a violation is when an artillery shell lands in the front yard of an ICCS building.

However, the major reason ICCS has had trouble keeping the peace in Vietnam is that neither the North nor the South appear to want peace at this stage in the conflict.

UN Soldiers as Peacekeepers

Two international peacekeeping episodes are examined below. Both have to do with a violent conflict that erupted in the Congo (now called Zaire) and required a substantial amount of peacekeeping for several years. (As with the detailed examinations in some previous chapters, the strengths and weaknesses of the case study method should be borne in mind at all times.)

The Background of the Congo Conflict

The Congo was brought to Western attention by newspaper correspondent Henry M. Stanley, who went there on a celebrated journey to find missionary explorer David Livingstone. Located in south central Africa, it is exceedingly rich in natural resources. Its uranium, gold, tin, copper, zinc, cobalt, and diamonds make it quite important to the rest of the world. The Congo has a population of thirteen million, and covers an area one-third the size of the United States.

For many years, the Congo was a Belgian colony and was

divided into six provinces. In 1960, it became independent of Belgium. However, internal trouble and external pressures soon forced the new country to ask the United Nations for help, thereby triggering one of the most sophisticated international peacekeeping ventures ever attempted.

The seeds of the Congo crisis were sown in the fifties, when Belgium failed to prepare the country for self-government. When the colony gained its autonomy on June 30, 1960, an immediate internal scramble for political and economic power resulted.

At one point during this dangerous free-for-all, Congolese troops mutinied against their officers (who were for the most part Belgians who had remained in the Congo after independence). The troops wanted more pay, more promotions, and more autonomy from Belgian authority. The mutiny began July 5. Soon violence against Belgians and Belgian symbols spread over much of the country. In response, Belgium dropped paratroopers throughout the Congo on July 11. Intense fighting ensued between Congolese and Belgian troops. On July 11, too, Province Chief Moise Tshombe announced that the southernmost province, Katanga, was seceding from the Congo. Many suspected that Belgium had engineered this move in order to weaken the Congo as a whole. (Suspicions deepened a few months later when it was learned that Belgium was supplying Katanga with arms and personnel, including officers. This military aid continued for a year or more.)

Given these events, it was no surprise that the Congolese government soon asked the United Nations to send in a peacekeeping force. In their telegram to the UN Secretary-General, Congo President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba requested:

> Urgent dispatch by the United Nations of military assistance. This request is justified by the dispatch to the Congo of metropolitan Belgian troops in violation of the treaty of friendship signed between Belgium and the Republic of the Congo on 29 July 1960. . . .
>
> We accuse the Belgian government of having carefully prepared this secession of Katanga with a view to maintaining a hold on our country. . . . The essential purpose of the requested military aid is to protect the national territory of the Congo against external aggression which is a threat to international peace.[15]

In effect, the Congolese felt that they were embroiled in an inter-

national conflict.* The conflict—precipitated by Belgium's attack—was further complicated by superpower attempts to exploit the situation for their own ends.

After some debate, the United Nations granted the Congo's request for a peacekeeping force and then passed a resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo. (The UN Security Council approved the Congo's request because neither the United States nor Russia exercised its veto, each believing UN intervention to be the least costly way of preventing the other from realizing its objectives.)

The Blue Berets

UN soldiers began arriving in the Congo on July 15. They came from sixteen nations, most of which were African. Two of the non-African nations were Sweden and Canada—known for their readiness to loan troops to the UN for peacekeeping.† American and British aircraft flew the troops in.‡

After the authorization vote, it took forty-eight hours of around-the-clock activity at UN headquarters to field the force. During this time some New Yorkers in the vicinity of the UN building were mildly astonished to see Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, Nobel laureate Ralph Bunche, and other UN notables getting snacks at three in the morning at all-night cafes in the area.

To identify and standardize somewhat the diverse uniforms of the donated troops, UN insignia were attached to every uniform; and berets and helmets colored UN blue were issued (hence the name "Blue Berets" for UN peacekeepers). Equipment and vehicles, from jeeps to armored trucks, were similarly labeled with UN flags or insignia.

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* During the later stages of the conflict, Belgium's direct involvement waned while Katanga became more and more the main protagonist, conducting a military, political, and propaganda fight against the Congo. However, the struggle was still an *inter*national conflict because Katanga was still being supported by Belgium and was essentially a "nation" herself in the sense that she had existed independently for some time and had become conceptually distinct from the rest of the Congo.

† If the United Nations finds it has to create a peacekeeping force, it first asks member nations for offers of soldiers and supplies. The Secretary-General then selects from among the offers, choosing troops from those nations least likely to have an interest in the conflict and least likely to be prejudiced towards any party.

‡ Superpowers and other major powers are generally not permitted to donate soldiers to UN peacekeeping missions. They are allowed to provide equipment and transportation, however.

The first peacekeepers to arrive in the Congo—contingents from Ghana, Tunisia, Morocco, and Ethiopia—came equipped with sidearms and heavy weapons. They were immediately instructed to use these weapons only in self-defense. They were told on orders from Hammarskjold:

> On no account are weapons to be used except in cases of great and sudden emergency and for the purpose of self-defense. . . . You should exhaust all peaceful means of keeping order before any resort to force. Every effort should be exerted to avoid harm to anyone. . . . Firing, even in self-defense, should be resorted to only in extreme instances.[16]

Thus, the major characteristic of the peacekeepers during the initial period in the Congo was restraint in the use of deadly weapons.

At the start of the operation, Hammarskjold had hoped that "a relatively small emergency force of perhaps 3,000 men could restore law and order quite quickly and fully and could then be withdrawn in rather rapid fashion."[17] Unfortunately, he was to be disappointed. As a matter of fact, unexpected problems forced Hammarskjold to send in many more than 3,000 troops. By the end of the first month of peacekeeping, there were 15,000 UN soldiers in the Congo. Yet, during the entire period of the operation, troops never numbered more than 20,000 men at any given time.

Tasks and Functions of UN Peacekeepers

The mandate issued by the United Nations required peacekeepers to:

—protect lives and property
—effect the withdrawal of Belgian troops
—intervene in conflicts between rival armies and factions
—prevent the introduction of arms and materiel by external sources

(1) Protecting lives and property The first part of the task involved providing protection for key political figures in the conflict and guarding innocent neutrals. Providing protection was very difficult, since the Congo was both a physical and a political jungle during this time. Kidnappings, assassinations, and massacres were the order of the day. Because of their insufficient numbers, UN peacekeepers could guarantee protection to im-

portant officials and politicians only if they remained in their own homes. If they ventured forth—which they felt they had to do sometimes—they took their lives into their hands. To illustrate, when deposed Prime Minister Lumumba was in UN custody, peacekeepers protected him at one point from being apprehended and brutalized by his successor, Colonel Joseph Mobutu. At a later point, however, when Lumumba purposely slipped out of UN custody, he was left unprotected and his enemies promptly killed him. (A UN investigation found that Lumumba was killed by a Belgian mercenary in the presence of Tshombe and other Katangan leaders.)

Guarding neutrals and refugees was even more difficult than protecting officials and politicians. Yet somehow, UN peacekeepers became quite proficient at it. They protected hundreds of innocent neutrals from a raging battle in Stanleyville on December 9, and rescued fifty-two Austrian medical workers during intense fighting in Bukavu on December 16. (On more than a few occasions, UN soldiers found themselves rescuing each other as well. In August of 1960, several rescue operations were effected when Congolese troops attacked small groups of UN peacekeepers who were posted at airports to keep out illegal arms and materiel.)

As the second part of this task, UN peacekeepers protected property. Besides guarding installations vital to their own safety, they guaranteed the security of hospitals, power stations, and sanitation plants, which were critical for the safety and welfare of Congolese civilians.

(2) Effecting the withdrawal of Belgian troops Many different tactics were used to get Belgian military forces to withdraw. The United Nations as a whole put *political* pressure on Belgium. Among other things, it passed resolutions asking her to withdraw her troops. However, the Security Council refused to yield to a Russian demand that Belgium be branded as an "aggressor."

The United Nations exerted *economic* pressure on Belgium by having UN peacekeepers seize Belgian companies and factories in the Congo. Once her holdings were in neutral UN hands, she lost her main reason for being in the Congo, which was ostensibly to protect her financial interests during the general scramble for power.

Lastly, the United Nations put *military* pressure on Belgium to withdraw. The very first peacekeepers to arrive in the Congo forced Belgian troops to stay where they were in Leopoldville, which happened to be around the main highway and airport. (Congolese troops were likewise pressured into remaining in their positions.) UN peacekeepers eventually persuaded most Belgian troops throughout the Congo to withdraw from their positions by promising that they would replace them, thus insuring that hard-won Belgian territory would not fall into hostile hands.

Despite UN pressure, some Belgian soldiers were extremely slow in leaving the Congo. Often they purposely dragged their feet. A few—usually mercenaries—were downright evasive, refusing to leave at all. However, blue berets did force *most* Belgian troops to withdraw within three months. This record equalled the one set in 1956, when UN Emergency Force (UNEF) peacekeepers expelled French, British, and Israeli troops from Egypt during the Suez crisis.*

(3) INTERVENING IN CONFLICTS BETWEEN RIVAL ARMIES AND FACTIONS UN involvement in the Congo turned the conflict into a classic three-party situation, as political scientist Ernest Lefever makes clear:

> During the first three months, there were three separate and independent establishments on Congolese soil without a clear understanding of the relationship or primacy among them. First, there was the . . . Congolese army of 25,000 men which was in the process of throwing out its 1,100 Belgian officers. Second, in mid-July 1960, there were Belgian forces numbering perhaps 10,000. Third, was the quickly improvised multinational [UN army] which had grown to 16,000 by the end of August.[18]

In a triadic situation, the interplay among the parties is relatively straightforward. However, additional parties soon entered the Congo conflict. By early 1961, many indigenous leaders—proclaimed and self-proclaimed, legitimate and illegitimate—were

* The same UNEF peacekeepers established another, albeit embarrassing, record in 1967, when Nasser asked Secretary-General U Thant to withdraw the 3,400-man force from Egypt. Instead of stalling, as Hammarskjold did every time Lumumba or Kasavubu called for the removal of Congo peacekeepers, Thant complied with the request in record-breaking time. The result clearly showed the importance of peacekeeping forces. Egypt immediately started to mobilize for war near Israel's borders, triggering a full-scale Israeli attack on her air force. The Six-Day War was on.

Figure 6–1. Deployment of UN Peacekeepers in the Congo

embroiled in the violence. Kasavubu had 7,000 troops in Leopoldville; Gizenga had 5,500 in Stanleyville; Tshombe had 6,000 in Elisabethville; and Kalonji had 3,000 in Kasai. UN peacekeeping capabilities were soon taxed to the limit.

To control these armies, the United Nations had to spread its troops rather thinly over the six provinces of the Congo. (The map in Fig. 6–1 shows where blue beret troops from various countries were located in December of 1960.) Given the vastness of the Congo and the relative paucity of peacekeeping manpower, it is impressive that the blue berets carried out their intervention tasks as effectively as they did. They intervened not only in numerous clashes between Belgian and Congolese soldiers, but also in significant battles between:

Congolese troops and Katangan troops (September 10)
Baluban troops and Katangan troops (December 4)
Congolese troops and Lumumban troops (December 5)
Congolese troops and Gizengan troops (January 1)
Katangan troops and Lumumban troops (January 13).

Though UN peacekeepers used deadly force on several occasions, they did not initiate it, employing it only in self-defense. (They took casualties and sustained them from time to time.) As observers often commented, they constituted a "peace force, not a fighting force."

To a certain extent, UN peacekeepers tried to cool down the Congo conflict by disarming the various combatants whenever possible. Sometimes they were relatively successful. For example, at one point UN General Alexander and two other blue berets completely and nonviolently disarmed all the Congolese soldiers in Leopoldville. Another time Tunisian UN peacekeepers disarmed 3,000 Congolese soldiers in Luluabourg without incident. That these were not isolated cases is evidenced by the fact that Russia soon objected to this disarmament program. It was succeeding too often and too well. Arms control was contrary to Russian interests in the Congo at the time.

Unfortunately, UN peacekeepers made the mistake of not giving continued priority to their disarmament program. Too often they failed to prevent disarmed troops from rearming. At one point they allowed some Congolese whom they had previously disarmed to rearm merely because Lumumba was insistent about it.

Because of this incident and others, UN peacekeepers acquired a reputation for "passivity" in some circles. This reputation was underserved, though, as international affairs experts Arthur Burns and Nina Heathcote have pointed out:

> One cannot see how—without grossly infringing on Congolese sovereignty and exceeding the Security Council mandate—any more "active" UN strategy would have been possible.[19]

Even if the reputation were deserved, it is doubtful whether passivity should necessarily be considered a negative trait for peacekeepers. Passivity (and deliberateness) may be quite functional, since they have a calming effect in most conflict situations. In fact, a good rule for many volatile situations is: "When in doubt, hesitate." Hesitation is preferable to rushing in, if such action makes matters worse.

(4) Preventing the introduction of arms and materiel by external sources This peacekeeping task had import from the very first days of the Congo conflict, when certain leaders threatened to seek help from France, China, the US, the USSR, or the Bandung Treaty nations. These threats were carried out in some cases, and various nations did try to introduce arms, supplies, troops, and propaganda materials.

UN peacekeepers intercepted external agents, troops, and materiel whenever possible. This meant regulating key roads and ports and occasionally closing airports to all non-UN aircraft. (For instance, peacekeepers once closed Leopoldville airport to incoming Belgian and Russian aircraft because they were suspected of bringing in arms and supplies.) In addition, blue berets conducted periodic searches for imported and contraband weapons. Regrettably, they had neither the manpower nor the legal authority to make such searches truly effective. UN troops also shut off radio stations in Leopoldville and elsewhere from time to time to prevent inflammatory broadcasts by propagandists and proponents of American, Russian, or Chinese involvement.

The consensus seems to be that despite its limitations, the United Nations performed its task of preventing external interference rather well. Political scientist Philip Jacob's assessment is similar to that of others who have studied the situation:

> Its greatest success was in immunizing the Congo from foreign power politics. . . . The United Nations made Congolese indepen-

dence a reality (during the life of the UN mandate) by removing the vestiges of Belgian colonial rulership, by keeping the cold war out, and by channeling all other extraneous influences (especially the various political cross-currents of the country's African neighbors) through the collective instrumentalities of the UN presence.[20]

To compensate for its limitations in manpower and authority, the United Nations substituted speed and swiftness. According to Burns and Heathcote, "In the Congo the UN operation was got underway quickly enough to cut off at least Russian intervention before it could go very far." [21] As for American intervention, some felt that the United Nations represented America's interests in the Congo to begin with. While this notion can be exaggerated —for instance, Russia went so far as to accuse Hammarskjold of being a puppet of the United States—there may be a grain of truth in it. As Lefever has said:

> The United States provided the strongest and most consistent support of any state. . . . If Washington had withdrawn its political, logistical, and financial support, the UN mission would have collapsed.[22]

However, for the United States to be giving substantial monetary support to a UN peacekeeping effort was nothing unusual. The United States has underwritten the bulk of the cost of UN peacekeeping missions over the years, contributing 48 percent of the cost of UNEF (Middle East), 33 percent of UNOGIL (Lebanon), and 35 percent of UNFICYP (Cyprus)—in addition to 48 percent of the expenses in the Congo.[23]

The performance of the initial UN peacekeepers in the Congo was generally outstanding. Burns and Heathcote give an informed and balanced assessment of the handling of several threatening situations during the early stages of the conflict:

> [A combination of peacekeeper] presence, informal staff work, and military diplomacy had effected an at least temporary patch-up of these threatening situations. From month to month, much of the [blue berets'] work was of this sort, undramatic and sometimes apparently less prompt than outside critics would have liked. But, considering the thin spread of . . . units, their peace-preserving achievements at this time were remarkable.[24]

UN *Force* Soldiers as Peacekeepers

A different type of peacekeeping operation began in the Congo on February 21, 1961. The number of UN soldiers and their

weapons and equipment remained unchanged. What was different, though, was that peacekeepers were now authorized to be aggressive in their use of deadly force.

Two special Security Council resolutions empowered UN soldiers "to take vigorous action, including the use of requisite measures of force if necessary," in order to accomplish their objectives.[25] These resolutions changed long-standing UN policy, which had allowed peacekeepers to shoot only in self-defense. In essence, UN peacekeepers were now able to use force offensively; in fact they were encouraged to do so to influence the outcome of conflicts, something heretofore forbidden by the United Nations.

UN Force (UNF) soldiers still performed the usual peacekeeping tasks: patrolling, policing, protecting, and disarming. But, because of the new policy, they became involved in several serious incidents.

The first of these occurred on March 3, when a few Congolese soldiers tried to arrest a UN radio operator in the city of Matadi for no apparent reason. UNF peacekeepers soon arrived on the scene. They apprehended the Congolese soldiers and began to return them to their base camp. In the process, they were fired upon by other Congolese troops. UNF peacekeepers shot back, killing a Congolese soldier. The situation quickly got out of hand; soon there was full-scale combat between UN and Congolese troops. The fighting continued sporadically for several days. When it ended, UNF soldiers found themselves surrendering two of their field posts in Matadi to the Congolese.

Needless to say, this was very embarrassing to the United Nations. Secretary-General Hammarskjold had to deal personally with the delicate problem of getting the Congolese to return the captured field posts. After many weeks of negotiation with Kasavubu, Hammarskjold succeeded; UNF peacekeepers were allowed to return to their posts on April 27.

The Matadi incident provided a hint of the problems which lay ahead for UNF soldiers in the Congo, thanks to their aggressive firearms policy. As Burns and Heathcote put it:

> The whole incident of Matadi revealed how little a United Nations force may be helped by resolutions [designed] to put might behind [it] and how well advised [UN] commanders are in accepting the

apparent ignominy of minor retreats instead of reinforcing and counterattacking as an ordinary occupying military force might do.[26]

And Lefever noted:

> On the question of protecting UN personnel and installations in the face of isolated provocations or deliberate attack, the principal weakness of the UNF was made clear on a number of occasions. . . . In some cases, such as Matadi, lack of adequate combat power was mainly responsible for the failures, but more often the cause was confusion over the rules of engagement on the part of the UN contingent officers concerned.[27]

The Matadi episode and others like it in Kindu, Niemba, and Port Francqui were deadly serious. Seventy-two UN soldiers and numerous Congolese were killed during these encounters.

Three other significant incidents are worth summarizing here. They are generally referred to as Rounds One, Two, and Three in the literature on the Congo crisis.

Round One—September 13 to 15

UNF soldiers did not *really* take advantage of their mandate to use aggressive force until the beginning of a series of encounters known as Round One. The exact responsibility for the poor UN decision-making during Round One is still being debated. Some UN administrative personnel, including Secretary-General Hammarskjold, were displeased with the assertiveness of the UN action during Round One. In fact, Hammarskjold was displeased enough to fly to the Congo in an attempt to straighten out the mess. Tragically, though, he was killed *en route* when his DC 6 mysteriously crashed near Ndola, Northern Rhodesia. The loss to the world was incalculable because Hammarskjold was such an extraordinarily gifted and innovative Secretary-General. He was posthumously awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

The stage was set for Round One when a UNF airlift brought 3,000 extra peacekeepers to the troublesome province of Katanga. The UN was concentrating this manpower as part of a plan to disarm Tshombe's Katangan army and expel several hundred Belgian mercenaries. (Most of Tshombe's officers were Belgian and the UN had long ago ordered him to expel them.)

UN soldiers took the first step in their plan on August 28 by seizing the airport, the radio station, and the post office at Elisabethville in Katanga. Next, they captured 440 Belgian mercenaries

and summarily deported them. Initially these actions succeeded only in creating strained relations between Tshombe and the UN's top man in Katanga, Irishman Conor Cruise O'Brien. Eventually however they led to anti-UNF riots and to a Belgian-Katangan assault on UNF peacekeepers, triggering the formal start of Round One.

The UN Force's response to this attack was code-named Operation Morthor (which means "Smash" in Hindi and seems a bit out of place in the UN lexicon). Launched on September 13, Operation Morthor involved simultaneous UN attacks on key Katangan facilities in Elisabethville, Jadothville, and elsewhere. Katangan troops counterattacked in Elisabethville on September 14; but although they inflicted great damage on UN troops, they were eventually repelled.

Other counterattacks were more successful, as in Jadothville where 158 UNF soldiers surrendered to Belgian-led troops on September 18. This victory spurred another Katangan assault on the UNF soldiers holding Elisabethville, but it failed a second time. Fighting finally ceased on September 20. A truce providing for an exchange of prisoners and a freeze on troop positions was agreed to.

Some political observers felt UNF peacekeepers were only trying to prevent the Katangans from overrunning UN positions during Round One. Others felt peacekeepers were trying to eradicate Belgian influence in Katanga once and for all. Still others felt they were trying to prevent Katanga's secession from the Congo.

This confusion over the objectives of the UN Force reflected confusion and organizational problems which had existed within the UNF peacekeeping operation for some time. Directives from UN headquarters were often vague. Moreover, prudence and tact were frequently lacking at command posts in the field. The frustration resulting from these and other problems often led to insubordination. Peacekeeping expert Ruth Russell comments:

> [UN action in Round One suffered] from an even worse than normal confusion of communication channels, both within and without the Congo. What appears to be the most valid judgment of it all is 'that UN headquarters had one policy and that some in the field, contemptuous of Hammarskjold's legality and his reluctance to use force, had their own.' [28]

These organizational problems were not helped by Hammarskjold's untimely death. The new Secretary-General, U Thant, had to grapple with an even greater array of problems. It is a tribute to his skill, however, that he succeeded as often as he did during his first years at what has been called the "world's toughest job."

Round Two—December 5 to 19

Although minor skirmishes continued, the incident known as Round Two did not begin until several months later. (This time all UNF peacekeeper actions were authorized in advance by the Secretary-General.) U Thant felt something had to be done to stem the rising number of attacks on UNF soldiers and to reestablish their freedom of movement, which had long been guaranteed them by the major parties to the conflict.

Round Two in Elisabethville began when Katangan troops allegedly fired upon UNF soldiers, who were clearing roadblocks that the Katangans had erected to hamper their movement and facilitate later attacks on them. UNF soldiers returned the fire and a full scale battle broke out. It soon spread to other parts of Elisabethville, particularly to the downtown area where Belgian mercenaries helped Katangans shell the UN Subcommand Headquarters. Fighting was intense, and many innocent bystanders were injured.

Eventually the encounter spread throughout Katanga. UN jets strafed and destroyed targets in and around Elisabethville, Jadothville, Shinkolobwe, Kolwezi, and Luena. There was a good deal of ground action here and there though not all of the 6,000 UNF troops and 12,000 Katangan troops in the province were involved.

Slowly but surely UNF soldiers seized the important Katangan installations in Elisabethville and other cities. On December 18, a cease-fire was agreed to which left UNF peacekeepers in a dominant position but still not in complete control.

Like Round One, Round Two triggered a great deal of debate after it was over. The UN's actions and Thant's decisions were defended by India, Canada, the United States, and some African and European nations. (President John Kennedy's support of the UN action drew strong protests from both Democrats and

Republicans, though.) England, France, Belgium, and Russia vigorously objected to UN behavior in Round Two.

Thant defended UNF activities by claiming that they had been necessary to maintain order in the Congo and to carry out the tasks enunciated in resolutions which were approved by a majority of the UN member nations. He also pointed out that after UNF soldiers had regained their freedom of movement and had secured their positions in Katanga, they had used no further force and had arranged for a cease-fire.

Round Three—December 28 to January 30

Round Three did not occur until two years later. For many months Katangan troops had steadily harassed UNF troops. (Among other things, UNF soldiers were assaulted, their roadblocks attacked, and their helicopters shot down.) UNF peacekeepers finally responded to these provocations by attacking Katangan military objectives in and around Elisabethville. Bombing and strafing attacks, combined with infantry assaults, helped the UN gain virtually complete control of Elisabethville during the first day of fighting. The UN Force then pushed onward into Kolwezi, Kamina, Kipushi, and Jadothville—all major Katangan strongholds.

The UN activity of Round Three squelched all of Katanga's hopes of seceding from the Congo. Fighting formally ended on January 15. A day later, secessionist leader Tshombe personally accompanied UNF peacekeepers to outlying pockets of Katangan resistance to urge the last of his troops to stop fighting.

The aggressiveness of UNF peacekeepers and the excessiveness of their kill-ratios * during Round Three dismayed England, France, Belgium, and even the United States. (London's *Sunday Telegraph* accused UNF soldiers of using "dubious means, including trickery and violence;" and one US Senator called the action a "flagrant, inhuman act of aggression.")[29] Despite the onslaught of criticism, Thant once again defended UNF peacekeepers:

> There would have been no fighting at all if the Katanganese gendarmerie had not made it unavoidable. . . . The United Nations is

* Three hundred and fifty Katangan soldiers and forty-two UNF soldiers were killed in Round Three. This is more than eight Katangan soldiers for every UNF soldier—a rather immoderate kill-ratio for an international peacekeeping force.

seeking no victory and no surrender in Katanga, for the United Nations is not waging war against anyone in that province. We are there, as we are in the rest of the Congo, only because in mid-July of 1960 we were appealed to by the Congolese Government to come to the aid of that newly independent government [to help it secure the withdrawal from its territory of all non-Congolese military personnel and to maintain law and order within a Congo whose territorial integrity and political independence needed protection.] [30]

While Thant captured the spirit of Round Three more accurately than some of his critics, it does seem that during the latter stages, and especially during the siege of Kolwezi and Jadothville, UNF soldiers used unnecessary force to regain their "freedom of movement."

From the end of Round Three until June 30, 1964, when the United Nations withdrew entirely from the Congo, UNF peacekeepers were involved in small, but still dangerous, encounters and continued to disarm troops and quell outbursts of violence.

SUMMARY

In an age when even a brush-fire war can threaten the security of the entire world, international peacekeepers provide a lifesaving alternative to the death-dealing scourge of war. UN peacekeepers have used a variety of approaches to regulate international conflicts. One of these involves peacekeeping troops that can shoot only in self-defense, while another involves troops that are authorized to take the initiative in the use of deadly force. The nature and consequences of these two modes of peacekeeping were explored in this chapter.

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[PART II]

POLICE & OTHER PEACEKEEPERS

[CHAPTER 7]

THE PEACEKEEPERS: HUMANITARIAN & AUTHORITARIAN

THE CASE STUDIES presented in Chapters 2 through 6 suggest that police and other peacekeepers may be either "humanitarian" or "authoritarian" in their handling of violent conflict. But these are relative terms. Few peacekeepers can be classified as one or the other in all situations. Even so, it is useful to classify peacekeepers as primarily humanitarian or primarily authoritarian in their approach because expanding the characteristics of social phenomena to their logical maximum and contracting them to their logical minimum—as is done with sociological "ideal types" such as these—can lead to new and worthwhile insights.

The terms humanitarian and authoritarian are used here to refer specifically to peacekeeping and conflict regulation, but they can also be used to analyze various kinds of policework—crimefighting, law enforcement, and the safeguarding of civil rights, for example. By the way, discriminating between humanitarian and authoritarian styles of conflict management may shed more light on one level of peacekeeping than another, but it should illuminate *some* issues and problems at all five levels.

Humanitarian peacekeepers are innovators and they believe that words are generally more effective than physical force during conflict regulation. Humanitarian police peacekeepers come close to the classic time-honored conception of police as "philosophers, guides, and friends." Humanitarian peacekeepers feel that weapons are unnecessary in most peacekeeping situations, and they are impressed by the fact that firemen, teachers, social workers, and ambulance drivers often confront violence successfully without guns or nightsticks. (When weapons are necessary, humanitarian peacekeepers prefer to use nonlethal ones such as Mace or tear gas.)

Authoritarian peacekeepers, on the other hand, are traditionalists. They believe in the efficacy of physical force and are not

terribly hesitant about using nightsticks or even guns. Convinced that physical power is generally superior to moral power, authoritarian peacekeepers often overdo it and are charged with brutality and malpractice as a result. In contrast to their humanitarian counterparts, authoritarian peacekeepers are often formal and inflexible during their conflict interventions. They are quick to pass judgment, and do not always respect the rights and dignity of participants in conflicts. On the contrary, they may swear at them, insult them, or use excessive force against them.

With these brief characterizations in mind, a more thorough discussion of the ways in which humanitarian and authoritarian peacekeepers differ can be undertaken.

HUMANITARIAN PEACEKEEPERS

The Use of Force

Humanitarian peacekeepers are willing and able to use physical force when it is absolutely necessary. They realize, however, that any degree of force—even quasi-physical force—must be employed very carefully, since force can easily be misinterpreted by conflict participants and bystanders. The following account describes one such misinterpretation. During a racial conflict, a policeman arrested a slightly injured man who had just committed an offense:

> As [the] officer was pushing the still-resisting subject into the vehicle, he had to shove the man's legs in forcefully with his knee and quickly slam the door. Police are taught to do this rapidly so as not to remain long with their backs to a hostile crowd. To onlookers, however, it appeared that the officer had kicked the handcuffed and bleeding suspect and then slammed the door on the man's feet.[1]

Education

Humanitarian peacekeepers advocate education and training for the complex tasks of conflict regulation.* They appreciate the value of police science courses—provided at some two-year and four-year colleges—and are receptive to the insights of soci-

* In 1967, only about 25 percent of the police in the United States had a high school diploma.[2] About 7 percent possessed a college degree. These figures have no doubt increased since then.

ologists, psychologists, and anthropologists. Humanitarians recognize, however, that book and classroom learning is of little use to them if it cannot be applied to the real world.

Humanitarian police are as open to the findings of the social sciences as they are to the technologies of the physical sciences (e.g. developments in crime lab procedures and in computer-assisted operations). However, they sometimes make the mistake of unconsciously misapplying such findings.

The anthropological notion of cultural relativity is a finding that is frequently misapplied. Cultural relativity suggests that since individual cultures and subcultures have vastly different standards of behavior, it is wrong to judge the behavior of others according to one's own cultural standards. Some humanitarian police have interpreted this as justification for lax enforcement of certain laws in the black urban ghettos. They reason "if the black subculture wants to live by violence, then let it." This reasoning is faulty in that it fails to recognize that every subculture is a part of a larger culture; and since American culture disapproves of violence towards others, humanitarian police are irresponsible when they countenance ghetto violence simply because as "cultural relativists," they respect the integrity of other lifestyles.

Education may create additional problems for humanitarian police. College courses, for instance, may unexpectedly attract some of them into new occupations. Many men have quit police departments to become, say, teachers or lawyers because they feel there is more status and less danger in these occupations.

Professionalism

Humanitarian peacekeepers like to think of themselves as professionals. To this end they advocate education, nonpunitiveness, good public relations, and genuine impartiality in all aspects of their work. Humanitarians also think of themselves as public servants who are strictly accountable for their actions. As a result, they set exacting performance standards for themselves, and demand high quality police recruits and rigorous training programs. All of this—coupled with the fact that many police are proficient in technical and scientific skills (computers, electronics, photography)—causes some of them to ask for salaries and privileges befitting professionals. Most humanitarian peacekeepers

acknowledge, however, that they are not yet true professionals,† though they hope this will not always be the case.

Uniforms

Humanitarian peacekeepers frequently experiment with new practices and procedures. (Examples of their innovativeness are included in some of the case studies given in previous chapters.) Many humanitarians experiment with uniforms. Some police peacekeepers have adopted the plainclothes style; others have toned down and modified the traditional blue police uniform.

In many cases, departments have called for major modifications in the dress of all their personnel. Departments in Denver, Oakland, and San Francisco suburbs, as well as those in numerous other areas, have required their officers to wear blazers and slacks instead of uniforms for some time now. In place of a badge, these men wear a patch on their blazer pocket which has their identification number superimposed over the departmental logo. (Some of these officers, like the ones in Menlo Park, California, carry a utility bag in their squad car which contains a nightstick, riot control jump suit and so forth.)

The advantages of these changes are obvious: youths and minorities often react negatively to paramilitaristic uniforms, and getting rid of epaulettes and knee-high boots makes rapproachment with such people easier and facilitates routine dealings and field investigations. At the same time, by toning down or replacing militaristic uniforms, police become less of a minority themselves. They are not as readily identified and stigmatized; as a result they are less likely to feel isolated, discriminated against, or hostile towards citizens.

Blazer-slack combinations and other non-military attire also help police feel more professional. And dressing like professionals

† It has been suggested that true professionals must belong to an occupation which meets the following criteria: [3]

1. High standards of admission
2. A special body of knowledge and theory
3. Altruism and dedication to the service ideal
4. A lengthy period of training for candidates
5. A code of ethics
6. Licensing of members
7. Autonomous control and regulation of its own members
8. Pride of the members in their profession
9. Publically recognized status and prestige.

encourages them to act professionally whereas dressing like military men encourages them to act militaristically.

Less formal clothes also allow peacekeeper personalities to emerge more easily—an important advantage in crisis intervention work where human qualities can be a great asset. Uniforms emphasize role-playing and discourage individuality and uniqueness. Where peacekeepers are to be interchangeable cogs in large peacekeeping operations, as in international conflicts, this can be helpful. It is not helpful, though, in peacekeeping situations requiring freedom from fixed roles and role expectations, as in interpersonal conflicts.

The whole question of police uniforms is complex, however, and there are no simple answers. In highly urban areas, uniforms are still probably necessary for most peacekeepers. Uniforms can command respect and obedience even if language and subcultural differences interfere with communication. They can also deter crime and reassure people that they are being protected. In big cities, uniforms make it easier for people to spot a policeman in an emergency.

Ranks & Hierarchies

Just as paramilitarism can create barriers between peacekeepers and conflict participants, it can make communication difficult between peacekeepers themselves. Recognizing this, some police departments have stopped ranking their officers as patrolmen, sergeants, captains, lieutenants and so forth. (Departments in Victoria, Texas and Lakewood, Colorado have not only done away with rankings but have begun to call their men "agents" or "public safety officers" instead of policemen. Other departments have renamed themselves "Police Services" or "Public Safety Departments.")

Dispensing with ranks allows expertise within a department to be used more effectively. Ranking usually means that a few top men make all the decisions; talented patrolmen—who are closer to the realities of police work—make very few. This wastes experience and manpower. As one police chief commented,

> The public really wants a policeman to be used fully. In most areas they hire a guy, train him 4 months, and then put him out on the street where he's not allowed to make any decisions for 5 to 10 years.[4]

In sum, humanitarian peacekeepers believe in the worth of advanced training and education, partly because it enhances their professionalism. They also believe in eliminating unnecessary militarism from their work, feeling that it interferes with flexibility and effectiveness. To authoritarian peacekeepers these issues and problems are of relatively little concern, as will be seen.

AUTHORITARIAN PEACEKEEPERS

The Use of Force

Authoritarian peacekeepers believe in physical force and rely on it. They prefer it to verbal persuasion or appeals to self-interest. Because they usually see the world as unpredictable and threatening, they adopt an attitude of power and toughness when dealing with other people. This attitude frequently leads to the misuse of force and sometimes to wanton destructiveness.

Education

Authoritarian peacekeepers seldom listen to what the social sciences have to say about conflict, violence, and other social phenomena. (Authoritarians often feel they know more about human behavior than most psychologists, sociologists, etcetera.) Their disdain for the social sciences is often part of a more general contempt for all higher education. (Of course, authoritarians may pay lip service to advanced education, but they are skeptical about its intrinsic value and see it mainly as a means of gaining power and money.) Anti-intellectualism is a common characteristic of authoritarian peacekeepers, as is rigid thinking and an inability to deal with problems except through rote solutions. Authoritarian peacekeepers are generally unwilling to try anything new—except, perhaps, the latest weapons and equipment. They support research into better gadgets and weapons, but not research into better peacekeeping procedures.

Personality Traits

Many authoritarian peacekeepers possess a cluster of psychological traits which T. W. Adorno has labeled the "authoritarian personality." (The cluster of traits was discovered by psychol-

ogist Adorno and his colleagues during their extensive research into prejudice and ethnocentrism.*) People with authoritarian personalities are characterized by over-conformity, dependence on authority, and an inability to express personal feelings, especially affection.[5] They also tend to see the world in simplistic stereotypes, dividing it up into "good guys" and "bad guys" for example. There are other authoritarian personality traits. Some of the ones that are particularly relevant for this discussion of peacekeeping include: [6]

—conventionalism and superpatriotism,
—aversion to insight,
—machismo orientation and male chauvinism,
—projection.

Conventionalism and Superpatriotism

Adorno defines conventionalism as "rigid adherence to conventional middle-class values." [7] Many authoritarian peacekeepers oversubscribe to middle-class values and norms and are wholly uncritical of them. Ironically, they must often fake or improvise their middle-class behavior, since they (along with most police and peacekeepers) usually come from working-class backgrounds. Authoritarian peacekeepers, then, display the "fanaticism" of the convert, with their conventional clothing and hair styles and their middle-class gestures and mannerisms. Their strong adoption of middle-class values and behavior makes authoritarians quite suspicious of unconventional values and behavior. They often react to them with strong emotion and with force.

The conventionalism of authoritarians is closely associated with superpatriotism—the belief that one's country and its leaders can do no wrong, and that other countries can do no right. Studies have found that traditional, authoritarian police often support extremely conservative, and even reactionary, political programs and candidates. Some authoritarians wear American flags as part of their uniform, despite the fact that this is generally illegal.

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* Despite its methodological weaknesses—pointed out by H. Hyman, P. Sheatsley, R. Christie, and others—the work of Adorno and his associates is a classic research contribution. It illuminates the key variables of ethnocentricism and reveals the functions prejudice serves for the prejudiced.

Aversion to Insight

Authoritarian peacekeepers tend to shy away from introspection, self-knowledge, and the like. (This means they are averse to examining their mistakes, and so they rarely learn from them.) Their aversion to insight extends beyond this. Authoritarian peacekeepers do not want others prying into their minds, their motives, or the agencies where they work.[8] They take a secretive, defensive stance towards the outside world. To avoid giving away too much information, they often resort to jargon, obscurantism, and the "authority" of their badge, stripes, or gun.

Machismo Orientation and Male Chauvinism

Authoritarian police and other peacekeepers regard *machismo* as the mark of a real man—a feeling that is reinforced by the "locker room" ethos of their normally all-male agencies. Within many exclusively male institutions—armies, men's schools, police departments, etcetera—a fear of latent homosexuality, among other things, often leads to exaggerated masculinity and pronounced male chauvinism. With regard to chauvinism, policeman turned criminologist Arthur Niederhoffer has written:

> Women involved in police incidents are generally considered to be unreasonable, quick to take offense, even dangerous. . . . This distrust of women seems to be historical and institutionalized among men working with the law.[9]

Chauvinism and distrust of this sort affect a peacekeeper's behavior during conflict interventions. He is likely to side with the male in family crisis situations, and to underestimate female resolve and strength during campus or racial disorders.

Projection

A related tendency of authoritarian peacekeepers is to attribute their own desires, feelings, and insecurities to others. This projection occurs frequently in peacekeeping situations. Adorno said this about authoritarian projection:

> Preoccupation with "evil forces" in the world [is] shown by [the authoritarian's] readiness to think about and to believe in the existence of such phenomena as wild erotic excesses, plots, and conspiracies.[10]

While suspicion and projection may be useful when a policeman is investigating crimes or detecting plots, they are a handi-

cap when he is trying to engage in peacekeeping. Suspecting the worst and attributing malice where none exists can only exacerbate conflict situations.

Authoritarian Peacekeepers—Born or Made?*

Some authoritarian peacekeepers are "born," that is, they have authoritarian personalities before they join a police department or other peacekeeping agency. One reason this happens is that a good many police recruits come from the working class, and sociologists have concluded † that the working class predisposes its members toward authoritarianism. (Niederhoffer claims that a study of New York City police recruits shows that 85 percent come from the working class. Their fathers' occupations range from skilled, to semiskilled, to unskilled. Similar findings from studies of other departments lead Niederhoffer to conclude that "Most police recruits come from working-class backgrounds.") [11]

In addition to working-class recruits already inclined toward authoritarianism, police work often attracts other "born" authoritarians who know that it allows and sometimes encourages the use of physical force. While police department psychological tests screen out sociopaths and other anti-social applicants, they do allow a certain number of violence-prone authoritarians to slip through. In effect, there is a self-selection factor which makes peacekeeping agencies—especially police forces—appealing to authoritarians.

It should be remarked that all police recruits in the United States are probably attracted to some degree by the chance to carry a gun and nightstick. (The glamour wears off quickly, however, once they realize the onerous responsibilities these weapons bring with them.) But there are other attractions too: the promise of adventure, the opportunity to serve the public,

* Adorno found that inadequate education was highly correlated with the development of authoritarian personalities. So too were child rearing practices and family atmospheres characterized by:

—harsh and threatening discipline
—parental love conditional upon displays of approved behavior
—hierarchical family structures, and
—parental concern about family status.

† The working class has been characterized by some sociologists (Lipset, Bell, Meier, and others) as fostering authoritarianism, misanthropy, anomie, and pessimism about the future. Shils, Riessman, and a few others disagree with this characterization, however.

Humanitarian Peacekeepers	Authoritarian Peacekeepers
Are Characterized by:	*Are Characterized by:*
Informality	Formality
Flexibility	Rigidity
Openness	Closedness
Underreaction (nonviolence-proneness)	Overreaction (violence-proneness)
Rely on:	*Rely on:*
Persuasion	Coercion
Words	Weapons
Normative power	Physical power
Social-science expertise	Sharp-shooter expertise
Innovative procedures	Traditional procedures
Non-role behavior	Role behavior

Figure 7–1. The Violence Brokers

and the built-in job security. (Police are always needed—even in times of economic recession.)

Other authoritarian peacekeepers are made. They take on their authoritarian characteristics after they are hired by a peacekeeping agency. In fact, some researchers contend that most authoritarianism does not come "with the recruits, but rather is inculcated in the men through strenuous socialization." [12]

Many peacekeeping agencies feel they must train and produce men who have a "take charge" mentality, men who define their roles in terms of directives (Warn! Disperse! Arrest!). As a result, these agencies turn a good number of their recruits into authoritarians. Some police agencies create authoritarians by means of their autocratic mode of organization, which subtly indoctrinates their recruits. Others do it by teaching recruits not to have "unnecessary" conversations with disputing parties. Still others achieve the same result by leaving the crucial issues of communication and interaction with disputants out of the recruit curriculum. As social psychologist Hans Toch has commented:

> Steps or policies necessary for sound interpersonal relations may nowhere be spelled out. No one, for instance, may impress on the young officer the need to communicate to civilian spectators the import of his actions and the reasons for them. As a result, the officer may take the position that if he is asked to justify his conduct, he betrays his [peacekeeping] force unless he points to his badge in response. And he can someday provoke a riot by leaving in his wake an information vacuum in which rumors can circulate.[13]

SUMMARY

The traits listed in Figure 7–1 provide a summary of the two peacekeeper types discussed here. It must be remembered that these "types" are abstractions to an extent. They have been created to foster insights and to facilitate understanding of peacekeeping and conflict regulation. Thus peacekeepers are never completely authoritarian or completely humanitarian in all interventions. (And even the ones that come close to being so do not possess each and every one of the characteristics itemized in Fig. 7–1.) Yet when the relative effectiveness of humanitarian and authoritarian peacekeepers is compared, it is clear that the two types bring about different outcomes in conflict situations. The next chapter examines their respective effectiveness in detail.

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[CHAPTER 8]

WHICH TYPES OF POLICE, TROOPERS & GUARDSMEN ARE THE MOST EFFECTIVE?

JUST HOW EFFECTIVE are different police, riot troopers, and UN peacekeepers at handling violent conflict? More specifically, do humanitarian police deal with family crises more effectively than authoritarian police? Do peacekeepers trained in humanitarian gang control or riot control techniques out-perform their authoritarian counterparts? Do non-aggressive UN soldiers function more effectively than aggressive ones?

To answer these and other questions, effectiveness reports on some 2,500 humanitarian and authoritarian peacekeeping interventions were examined and compared. Besides trying to deal with the practical issue of effectiveness, the study tried to probe certain theoretical issues—regarding deterrence, imitation, interactional exchange, etcetera—which have long interested social scientists. (Incidentally, certain theoretical concepts suggest that humanitarians are probably more effective peacekeepers than authoritarians because they try not to dictate solutions and behavior, try not to exacerbate fear and distrust, and try not to criticize disputing parties. Regarding criticism, humanitarians avoid criticizing because they realize antagonists in a struggle—the actors in roles—are often less to blame for violence than are antagonisms—the roles and the issues involved.)

"Effective" peacekeepers in this study were defined as those who obtained desired results with reasonable efficiency. To be more exact, four different measures of effectiveness were used: the quality of the conflict outcome elicited, the permanence of the outcome, the duration of the intervention, and the number of casualties resulting during the intervention.

Peacekeeping interventions were classified as humanitarian or authoritarian according to the criteria set forth in Chapter 7. (Humanitarian peacekeeping consists of a flexible, nonjudgmental approach that relies primarily on words, moral power, and social-

science expertise. Authoritarian peacekeeping, on the other hand, consists of a rigid, judgmental approach which relies primarily on weapons, physical power, and sharp-shooter expertise.)

Several thousand intervention case reports were obtained, covering all types of peacekeeping from interpersonal to international. (A total of 2,423 cases of humanitarian and authoritarian peacekeeping remained after screening.) All the case reports were screened, and those cases were dropped which:

(a) lacked complete information on many of the effectiveness variables;
(b) did not involve genuinely neutral peacekeepers;
(c) concerned conflicts or participants that did not fully comply with the definitions set forth for the study;
(d) involved moderate rather than serious conflict.

(Moderate conflicts were dropped since they would have allowed the charge that humanitarian, rather than authoritarian, techniques constituted the only reasonable approach in such situations. Since only cases of serious conflict were included, "threat" and "danger" to peacekeepers was held constant. The choice of humanitarian or authoritarian techniques depended, then, on a conscious policy or philosophy, not on the amount of threat the conflict posed to peacekeepers. In sum, all the intervention cases analyzed were serious enough to warrant the use of authoritarian techniques by peacekeepers if they were so inclined.)

The following paragraphs indicate the source and nature of the case reports analyzed.

Interpersonal Peacekeeping

Police interventions in serious family crises in Manhattan were selected to represent interpersonal peacekeeping. The New York City Police Department and the Psychological Center at the City University of New York provided data on numerous humanitarian and authoritarian interventions conducted in Manhattan in 1967, 1968, and 1969. The number of cases of humanitarian and authoritarian peacekeeping came to 1,388 and 492 respectively.

Intergroup Peacekeeping

Responses by urban police to street gang violence were chosen to exemplify intergroup peacekeeping. The Philadelphia Police Department and Department of Public Welfare supplied data on all gang fight interventions made by the city's police in 1966,

1968, 1969, and 1970—years selected at random. Most of the data were taken from the Offense Sheets police fill out after intervening in conflicts. A total of 101 humanitarian and ten authoritarian peacekeeping cases of this type were analyzed.

Interorganizational Peacekeeping

Local, state, and federal peacekeeper interventions into campus conflicts were selected to represent interorganizational peacekeeping. Crisis intervention episodes across the nation were examined for three randomly chosen years: 1968, 1969, and 1970. The data came from *Facts on File* summaries, which are based on facts gathered from hundreds of newspapers, periodicals, wire services, and information agencies. The number of cases of humanitarian and authoritarian peacekeeping that were analyzed amounted to seventy-six and twenty-five respectively.

Intercommunal Peacekeeping

Responses by police, Guardsmen, and Army troopers to serious racial violence were chosen as examples of intercommunal peacekeeping. Data on humanitarian and authoritarian interventions were obtained from compendia of information—not unlike the ones in *Facts on File*—assembled by the Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence at Brandeis University. The year 1968 was chosen at random, and eighty cases of humanitarian and fifty-four cases of authoritarian peacekeeping were examined for that year.

International Peacekeeping

UN troop interventions in violent conflicts between nations were selected to represent international peacekeeping. The cases examined occurred in the Congo from 1960 to 1964. The data came mostly from UN Security Council records and from reports issued by the Secretary-General. Some data, however, came from documents and tabulations provided especially for this study by the Field Operations Office of the UN Secretariat. A total of fifty-nine humanitarian and thirty-eight authoritarian interventions were analyzed.

Procedures

After the 2,423 cases of peacekeeping were gathered, their accuracy and validity were checked. This was done by randomly

sampling cases and comparing their facts and figures with those from other versions of the same case, i.e. from other information sources such as the *New York Times Index*. On the basis of these comparisons, all the case reports were judged to be sufficiently accurate and valid.

Next, several research coders—who did not know which intervention cases were humanitarian and which were authoritarian —used a variety of measures to assess the effectiveness of each intervention. (Coder reliability and consistency were checked from time to time and found to be excellent—agreement among coders was 95 percent or better usually.)

The various measures used to determine effectiveness are described in a general way here, having been subsumed under four broad headings:

(1) The **Quality** of the conflict outcome: the result fostered by peacekeepers and whether it was a low, medium, or high quality conflict outcome (defined respectively by industrial relations expert Mary P. Follet as a Domination, Compromise, or Integration outcome.*)

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* *Domination*—"A victory of one side over the other. This is the easiest way of dealing with conflict, the easiest for the moment but not usually successful in the long run." [1] Since one side wins everything and the other loses everything, domination means that one party commands, controls, or prevails over the other at will. This mastery allows the dominant party to determine much of the subordinate's future behavior.

Compromise—"That mode of resolving conflicts in which all parties agree to renounce or reduce some of their demand. A compromise in contrast to a dictated solution such as is involved in domination and conformity, implies some degree of equality or bargaining power. . . . The agreement involved in compromise is also to be distinguished from that involved in integration. In the former case, each party is able to identify the precise extent of his losses and gains; in the latter new alternatives are accepted of such a kind as to render it extremely difficult to discern the balance between concessions made and concessions received." [2]

Integration—"The true integration of two desires—in contrast to a compromise —signifies 'that a solution has been found in which both desires have found a place, that neither side has had to sacrifice anything. . . .' It is assumed, under such circumstances, that neither side ever gives in but that there often comes a moment when interests on both sides are suddenly perceived in a new perspective and 'unity precipitates itself.' So it is frequently comes about, once an integration is effected, that the compatible, even cooperative, effort compels a change in the whole motivation of the two parties, and a new relationship emerges. In this fashion true integration becomes a kind of 'flowing together,' a merging of purpose, which makes it possible for the interests of the parties to dovetail, 'to fit into each other,' so that all participants find some place in the final solution." [3]

(2) The **Duration** of the intervention: the amount of time peacekeepers spent intervening. (Duration was measured in hours and fractions of hours.)

(3) The **Permanence** of the conflict outcome: the number of times peacekeepers had to return to the scene of trouble and reintervene.

(4) The **Casualties** resulting during the intervention: the number of injuries and deaths which occurred after peacekeepers arrived on the scene. (To be counted, injuries had to be severe enough to interfere with a person's normal routine of activities.)

Results

Computer analyses of the data and coder assessments revealed that humanitarian peacekeeping is more effective than authoritarian peacekeeping, given the definitions and measures of effectiveness employed in the study. At some levels (such as the interpersonal level) for some measures, however, humanitarian intervention is not *significantly* † more effective than authoritarian intervention. And at a few levels, humanitarian peacekeeping is actually less effective for a few measures. The tables and figures that follow compare the two kinds of peacekeeping in terms of the four measures of effectiveness used.

With respect to the **Quality** of conflict outcomes, Table 8–I shows that in nearly two out of three cases, humanitarian police, troopers, and soldiers elicit higher quality outcomes than do their authoritarian counterparts. The "$p<.001$" entry in the first column in Table 8–I means that only one out of a thousand chi square statistical tests of similar data would give findings this strong by chance. One may confidently assume, therefore, that for interpersonal conflicts, humanitarian peacekeeping results in fewer low quality (Domination) outcomes than does authoritarian peacekeeping. The "$p>.05$" in the same column suggests that one can put less faith in the finding that humanitarian peacekeeping results in more medium quality (Compromise) outcomes than does authoritarian peacekeeping. Finally, the "n.s." at the

† A variety of statistical tests were used to ascertain the significance of disparities in effectiveness between the two types of peacekeeping: t tests, Mann-Whitney U tests, and chi square tests. Different tests were used when different mathematical assumptions and characteristics of the data obtained. (The specific statistical tests used will be mentioned in the discussions of each of the major findings.)

TABLE 8–I
STRENGTH (PROBABILITY OF ERROR) OF THE FINDING THAT HUMANITARIAN PEACEKEEPING ELICITS HIGHER **QUALITY** OUTCOMES THAN AUTHORITARIAN PEACEKEEPING *

	Inter-Pers. (Family) Pckpng	*Inter-Gp. (Gang) Pckpng*	*Inter-Org. (Campus) Pckpng*	*Inter-Comm. (Racial) Pckpng*	*Inter-Nat. (UN) Pckpng*
H1: Humanitarian pckpng. results in fewer *Domination* outcomes	$p^* < .001$	ns	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	ns
H2: Humanitarian pckpng. results in more *Compromise* outcomes	$p > .05$	ns	$p = .01$	$p > .05$	ns
H3: Humanitarian pckpng. results in more *Integration* outcomes	ns	$p = .05$	$p = .001$	$p = .01$	ns
N =	1880	111	101	234	97

* p: Probability, obtained from chi square tests
$<$: Smaller than
$>$: Larger than
ns: No significant difference found between Humanitarian and Authoritarian approaches.
pckpng: Peacekeeping

bottom of the first column means that the humanitarian approach does not result in significantly more high quality (Integration) outcomes than does the authoritarian approach. (The results for the other four levels of peacekeeping are shown in the remaining columns.)

In terms of the **Duration** of interventions, humanitarian peacekeeping is only slightly more efficient than authoritarian peacekeeping. Here statistical tests revealed only one truly significant difference between the two approaches regarding duration. This was for interventions at the intercommunal level. (See Table 8–II.) In fact, except for interventions at the intercommunal and international levels, the two types of peacekeeping are almost equally time consuming. Humanitarian and authoritarian peacekeepers both take about twenty minutes to carry out a typical interpersonal (family) intervention. They both require thirty minutes for an average intergroup (gang) intervention.

TABLE 8–II
DURATION (IN HOURS) OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF PEACEKEEPING *

	Interpersonal (Family) Peacekeeping		*Intergroup (Gang) Peacekeeping*		*Interorganizational (Campus) Peacekeeping*		*Intercommunal (Racial) Peacekeeping*		*International (UN) Peacekeeping*	
	HUM	*AUTH*	*HUM*	*AUTH*	*HUM*	*AUTH*	*HUM*	*AUTH*	*HUM*	*AUTH*
Total hours intervening	416.4e	147.6e	45.2	4.9	945.0	265.0	2197.0	950.0	542.0	1430.0
Mean hours per intervention	.3	.3	.4	.5	12.4	10.5	12.2	17.7	14.3	24.2
Results of t test	ns		ns		ns		p=.01		p>.05	

* p: Probability, obtained from t tests
e: Estimated from available incomplete information
>: Larger than
ns: No significant difference found between Humanitarian and Authoritarian approaches

However, humanitarians take twelve and a half hours and authoritarians ten and a half hours to conduct a typical interorganizational (campus) intervention. Humanitarians normally spend twelve hours and authoritarians eighteen hours during an average intercommunal (racial) intervention; and they require fourteen and twenty-four hours respectively to conduct an average international (UN) intervention.

As to the **Permanence** of conflict outcomes, chi square statistical tests disclosed no significant differences between humanitarian and authoritarian police, troopers, and soldiers. As Figure 8–1 shows, both approaches require about the same number of repeat interventions. (In fact, for some levels of conflict, authoritarians are slightly more effective than humanitarians.)

The two interpersonal level graphs in Figure 8–1 show that 76 percent of humanitarian peacekeeping efforts are permanent (that is, they require no repeat interventions)—whereas 89 percent of authoritarian peacekeeping efforts are permanent. These findings generally agree with those of a study of family fight interventions in Oakland, California during 1971 to 1972.[4] Eighty-five percent of the "humanitarian" interventions conducted by the Oakland police were permanent, compared with 89 percent of the "authoritarian" ones. (Exactly 10 percent of the Oakland humanitarian efforts required *one* return, in comparison with 8 percent of the authoritarian efforts; and 5 percent of the former



Figure 8–1. Permanence (in Repeat Interventions) of Different Types of Peacekeeping

TABLE 8-III
STRENGTH (PROBABILITY OF ERROR) OF THE FINDING THAT HUMANITARIAN PEACEKEEPING ELICITS FEWER CASUALTIES THAN AUTHORITARIAN PEACEKEEPING *

	Inter-Pers. (Family) Pckpng	*Inter-Gp. (Gang) Pckpng*	*Inter-Org. (Campus) Pckpng*	*Inter-Comm. (Racial) Pckpng*	*Inter-Nat. (UN) Pckpng*
H: IN COMPARISON TO AUTHORITARIANS HUMANITARIANS ELICIT					
Fewer 1st parties killed	ns	ns	$p=.001$	$p<.001$	$p>.05$
Fewer 2nd parties killed	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Fewer 3rds (peacekeepers) killed	ns	ns	ns	$p<.001$	$p>.05$
Fewer 4ths (bystanders) killed	ns	ns	$p=.01$	ns	$p>.05$
Fewer 1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th parties killed	$p>.05$	$p>.05$	$p<.001$	$p<.001$	ns
Fewer 1st parties injured	na	$p>.01$	$p<.001$	$p<.001$	ns
Fewer 2nd parties injured	na	ns	$p=.01$	$p<.001$	$p>.05$
Fewer 3rds (peacekeepers) injured	ns	$p<.001$	$p<.001$	$p<.001$	ns
Fewer 4ths (bystanders) injured	na	$p>.05$	ns	$p>.05$	ns
Fewer 1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th parties injured	ns	$p>.05$	$p<.001$	$p<.001$	ns
	1880	111	101	234	97

* p: Probability, obtained from Mann-Whitney U tests
$<$: Smaller than
$>$: Larger than
na: No data available
ns: No significant difference found between Humanitarian and Authoritarian approaches
pckpng: Peacekeeping

required *two* or more returns while only 3 percent of the latter did.)

The two intergroup level graphs in Figure 8–1 show that 23 percent of humanitarian interventions—as opposed to 50 percent of authoritarian ones—are permanent. The remaining pairs of graphs in Figure 8–1 make similar comparisons for the other three levels of conflict.

With regard to **Casualties**, humanitarian police, troopers, and Guardsmen elicit less bloodshed than their authoritarian counterparts on the whole. According to Table 8–III, which presents the results of Mann-Whitney statistical tests, this is true for intervention into almost every level of conflict.

Since casualties are such an important factor in any evaluation of peacekeeping effectiveness, Table 8–IV has been constructed to show the specific number of casualties that occur during humanitarian and authoritarian interventions into each of the five levels of conflict. When averages are calculated from the figures

TABLE 8–IV
NUMBER OF CASUALTIES RESULTING FROM HUMANITARIAN AND AUTHORITARIAN INTERVENTIONS [*]

	Interpersonal (Family) Pckpng		*Intergroup (Gang) Pckpng*		*Interorganizational (Campus) Pckpng*		*Intercommunal (Racial) Pckpng*		*International (UN) Pckpng*	
	HUM	*AUTH*	*HUM*	*AUTH*	*HUM*	*AUTH*	*HUM*	*AUTH*	*HUM*	*AUTH*
Peacekeepers (3rds) killed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	16	110
Disputants (1sts, 2nds) & bystanders (4ths) killed	0	2	7	0	0	12	21	46	179	361
Total 1sts, 2nds, 3rds, 4ths killed	0	2	7	0	0	12	21	50	195	471
Peacekeepers (3rds) injured	1	3	6	4	58	77	26	102	30	167
Disputants (1sts, 2nds) & bystanders (4ths) injured	100[*]	35[*]	72	9	161	451	1895	1605	37	518
Total 1sts, 2nds, 3rds, 4ths injured	101	38	78	13	219	528	1921	1707	67	685

[*] [*]: Estimated
pckpng: Peacekeeping

in Table 8–IV, it turns out that the typical authoritarian intervention into *international* conflict results in two peacekeepers killed and three injured, making it the riskiest of all kinds of interventions for peacekeepers. Authoritarian intervention into *intercommunal* conflict comes a close second in this regard. (Actually, if the risk of death and injury to *all* concerned—not just to peacekeepers—is considered, then authoritarian intervention into intercommunal conflict ends up being the most dangerous kind of intervention of all.)

In summary, the 2,423 cases examined suggest that humanitarian peacekeeping is more effective than authoritarian peacekeeping, at least in terms of the quality and permanence of the outcomes elicited and the reduced numbers of casualties resulting during interventions.

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[CHAPTER 9]

THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PEACEKEEPING

WHY IS HUMANITARIAN peacekeeping generally more effective than authoritarian peacekeeping? To answer this question the findings presented in the previous chapter must be examined in detail. Thus, the Quality, Duration, Permanence, and Casualties of the outcomes different peacekeepers elicit will be analyzed here in terms of various social psychological theories.

Quality of Conflict Outcomes

Domination

How is it that humanitarian police, troopers, and soldiers elicit few Domination outcomes? (It should be remembered that Domination outcomes are *low* quality conflict resolutions; Compromise outcomes are *medium* quality resolutions; and Integration outcomes are *high* quality resolutions.) For one thing, humanitarian peacekeepers discourage "zero sum" all-or-nothing approaches to conflict resolution. (In zero-sum situations, what one party gains the other party loses.) Humanitarians are aware of the complexity of social interaction and refuse to think of conflicts in simplistic "win or lose" terms. Their attitude, then, discourages Domination outcomes, where one party wins substantially and the other loses substantially. (Authoritarian peacekeepers, by contrast, perceive social conflicts in win or lose, good or bad, right or wrong terms. They tolerate and sometimes create situations where one party ends up commanding, controlling, or dominating the other.)

Humanitarian peacekeepers set an example for disputing parties to follow. Disputants see humanitarians using persuasion rather than coercion, and they are influenced by this behavior which is quite the opposite from Domination behavior. Disputants feel guilty about wanting to dominate each other after they see a

third-party—such as a policeman with prestige and power—come upon the scene and deliberately refuse the easy solution of domination. (Authoritarian peacekeepers, on the other hand, do not cause disputants to feel guilty or uncomfortable about domination and their desire for total victory. In fact, authoritarians may even encourage this desire by using physical force themselves. Disputants then justify their own use of physical force by reasoning that if peacekeepers can use it, so can they.)

Humanitarians also use a personal approach with disputing parties whenever possible. This approach is the antithesis of Domination, which involves the weakening or dissolving of social bonds between parties. (Authoritarians, by comparison, use an impersonal, dehumanizing approach with disputants and this facilitates Domination outcomes.)

Compromise

Why do humanitarian peacekeepers bring about so many more Compromise outcomes than authoritarian peacekeepers? One reason is that humanitarians emphasize openness and straightforwardness. This helps conflicting parties take the *first* step towards Compromise: the laying of all cards on the table. This means that disputants must clearly state their demands and grievances to each other and to peacekeepers. It may become clear that disputants have similar demands, unrealistic demands, or no real demands at all. (Authoritarian peacekeepers often do not get disputants as far along as this first step, partly because they are uncomfortable with openness and with the use of words to resolve conflicts.)

Humanitarian peacekeepers usually encourage disputing parties to take the *second* step toward Compromise: the reexamining and reevaluating of their demands and grievances. As a result of this reexamination and reevaluation, parties may agree to *win* equally (e.g. both gain 50 percent of their objectives). Or parties may agree to *lose* equally. Or they may agree to both win and lose to the same degree.

Humanitarians frequently encourage parties to take the *third* and final step toward Compromise: the implementing of the arrangement that was agreed to in the second step. Humanitarians facilitate this by affirming and promoting the norms and standards of fairness, justice, and reciprocity, and by being

tolerant and impartial in their own behavior. When peacekeepers set this kind of example, the chances of a Compromise resolution are greatly enhanced.

Humanitarian peacekeepers also foster Compromise outcomes by pointing out the commonalities that disputing parties share. Disputants usually have some common *perspectives* that transcend their temporary differences. They are all Joneses, Bostonians, Virginians, Americans, or NATO allies, and can unite behind that fact. Disputants usually have some common *interests* too. Humanitarian peacekeepers sometimes tell quarreling spouses that they should stop their incessant fighting because their children need harmony at home in order to develop normally. Similarly they tell belligerent racial communities that they should try to get along because they have a common interest in attracting investment and federal funds to their city—something that will not happen if they continue to do battle.

These peacekeeping strategems do not always work. In the heat of battle, parties may deny that they have anything in common because the conflict has made them too emotional to admit the truth. Ironically, when stalemates of this sort occur, authoritarians may be more adept than humanitarians at handling them since they have fewer qualms about making physical threats. Such threats often cause parties to unite and shift their hostility from each other to peacekeepers, thus breaking the log-jam.

Integration

Why are humanitarian police, Guardsmen, and soldiers better able to elicit Integration * outcomes than authoritarian peacekeepers? One reason is that humanitarians help disputing parties work through their disagreements in a fair, logical way. Another is that humanitarians promote feelings of care and concern for others. (Authoritarians tend not to do this; or if they do, their actions often contradict their words.)

Humanitarian peacekeepers also tend to be positive and hope-

* Integration outcomes differ significantly from Compromise outcomes in that disputants adopt a new perspective on their conflict in Integration; they do not merely agree to a stand-off where gains and losses are shared equally, as they are in compromise. In fact, the new perspective in Integration makes it difficult to determine whether gains and/or losses have been shared because in a sense, they become irrelevant. (Integration outcomes are less frequent than Compromise outcomes; not as much is known about them, therefore.)

ful about the problem-solving potential of disputing parties. (Authoritarian peacekeepers by comparison tend to be negative and pessimistic, which does not motivate disputants to work very hard toward settling their differences. In fact, by being negativistic, authoritarians actually dampen any momentum disputants may already have for problem-solving.)

Humanitarians intervene in conflicts in a flexible way, staying alert to possible new insights and solutions. When this alertness and flexibility is transmitted to the disputing parties themselves, then peacekeepers have created the conditions necessary for successful conflict resolution. (Authoritarians, on the other hand, intervene in conflicts in just the opposite way. This is because they are constrained by their own formalism, conventionalism, and aversion to insight.)

Humanitarian peacekeepers also bring about Integration outcomes by using novel and innovative tactics.† The way this works is that novel behavior on the part of peacekeepers triggers novel behavior on the part of disputants. This involves "generalization" from innovative peacekeeper actions to innovative disputant actions (to use a psychological concept). Since Integration requires disputants to redefine and reperceive their conflict, new actions from them can cause redefinition, reperception, and hence, Integration.

Whether the novelty employed by peacekeepers consists of *humor, surprise,* or *incongruity,* it stimulates disputants to synthesize a whole new view of their situation. As a consequence, disputants may redefine their conflict and alter the demands they make on each other. To illustrate, a family crisis policeman who has a brother who sells TV sets might be humorous enough about TV sales to cause disputing spouses to discover that neither's demand for certain TV programs should prevail over the other's; instead they should buy a second TV set to solve their conflict. Or, UN peacekeeping officers who alternate command over certain UN troops might thereby cause disputing nations to discover the merits of alternating use of the waterway or natural resource they are struggling over.

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† Examples of such tactics would be when police sit down, loosen their ties, and ask for drinks of water during family peacekeeping, or when they use chemical foams, shrill sounds, and bright lights during campus peacekeeping. (See Chapter 13 for more regarding such novel tactics.)

Integrative solutions such as these are sometimes arrived at in a way that resembles the "a ha" phenomenon encountered by educators and psychologists. The "a ha" phenomenon occurs when someone suddenly gains an insight, as when a school child first realizes that multiplication is the inverse of division, and exclaims "a ha."

Novel behavior on the part of humanitarian peacekeepers serves another function besides catalyzing integrative behavior on the part of disputants. As with judo (jujitsu), peacekeeper novelty keeps disputants off balance. While they are in this state, peacekeepers can psychologically control them more easily—just as a judo expert can physically control a larger opponent by using leverage and precisely-timed moves.

It must be remembered, however, that novelty is self-limiting. Its effectiveness diminishes as its newness wears off. This happens if peacekeepers use the same technique over and over during repeated interventions into the same conflict.

Duration of Conflict Interventions

Humanitarian peacekeepers generally spend a little less time at conflict scenes than authoritarian peacekeepers do. This is because humanitarians economize on ends and means—enough so, in fact, to compensate for the extra time that words and personalized treatment require. Humanitarians try to *moderate* conflicts by using lateral approaches, while authoritarians try to *terminate* them by using frontal approaches.

Since conflicts tend to have natural termination points, humanitarian peacekeepers save time and energy by merely moderating them and letting them end of their own accord. Authoritarian peacekeepers, on the other hand, expend much time and energy trying to prematurely terminate conflicts. To dampen every last spark, authoritarians supervise and sometimes even dictate each move disputants make. (Authoritarians often get carried away doing this. Many of them have consciously or unconsciously escalated from peacekeeping to punishing to brutalizing. This is illegal and counterproductive, besides being time-consuming. See Chapter 14 for a discussion of police brutality.)

The *lateral* approaches humanitarians use save them energy. These approaches involve intervening with mild strength at pressure points and leverage points—as with judo—rather than with

the brute strength authoritarians use in their *frontal* approaches. Small lateral actions by humanitarians sometimes bring about significant results because they have a multiplier effect similar to that of levers, catalysts, social rituals, and symbolic gestures. Regarding the lateral-frontal distinction, sociologist Robin Williams has said, "problems of group conflict are usually most readily resolved by indirection rather than by frontal assault." [1]

Permanence of Conflict Outcomes

Humanitarians and authoritarians tend to elicit the same number of permanent conflict outcomes. It is noteworthy that humanitarians—so effective in other areas—only hold their own with authoritarians when it comes to returning for second, or even third intervention in the same conflict. One reason for this might be that disputants may be so impressed, rewarded, or flattered by the treatment they receive from humanitarians that they are overly inclined to call them back the next time they are embroiled in trouble, instead of avoiding them as they might avoid authoritarians who treat them less well. (This inclination is not unlike that of some lonely or elderly people who visit their physicians or psychiatrists unnecessarily often because they give them personal attention—though not without charging "healthy" listening fees.)

Casualties of Conflict Interventions

Humanitarian peacekeeping tends to result in fewer casualties than authoritarian peacekeeping. This raises two questions. *First,* why do humanitarian police, troopers, and soldiers inflict relatively few casualties? One answer is that they prefer words to weapons and psychological power to physical power. And when they *do* use weapons, they prefer nonlethal ones (tear gas, Mace) to lethal ones (nightsticks, guns). In addition humanitarians are less likely to lose their tempers or to avenge insults than authoritarians. All this helps explain why the humanitarian approach causes fewer casualties then the authoritarian approach—even though the threat from disputants is the same under both circumstances.

Second, why do disputants—who are just as dangerous and just as heavily armed in both kinds of situations—inflict fewer casualties (on each other, on bystanders, and on peacekeepers)

during humanitarian intervention than during authoritarian intervention? Perhaps the best explanation for this can be provided by a theory which states that specific types of actions tend to elicit specific types of reactions. This theory—developed by sociologists Robert Bales, Paul Hare, and others—may be extended to include the various actions and reactions that occur in peacekeeping situations.

Much of the research with regard to this interaction theory has sought to determine whether *friendly* actions elicit *friendly* reactions, and whether *hostile* actions elicit *hostile* reactions. Many studies have found this quid pro quo relationship to hold true.* However, a few studies have shown that in some situations it does not occur.†

Interaction theory implies, then, that friendly, humanitarian peacekeepers are likely to evoke friendly (nonviolent) reactions from disputants, while hostile, authoritarian peacekeepers are likely to evoke hostile (violent) responses from them. (Such responses manifest themselves in physical attacks on rival disputants, peacekeepers, or innocent bystanders.) In terms of interaction theory, then, it is no surprise that humanitarian intervention results in fewer casualties than does authoritarian intervention.

What are the mechanisms that cause certain actions to "pull" or evoke certain reactions? There are several. The best known is probably the **self-fulfilling prophecy**, in which "public definitions of a situation (prophecies or predictions) become an integral part of the situation and thus affect subsequent development."[4] Playwright Anton Chekhov was thinking of this when he wrote, "If you hang a gun on the wall in the first act, you have to use it by the third." The self-fulfilling prophecy works in part because of the power of definitions of situations. Social theorist W. I. Thomas long ago stated that an accepted definition of a situation, no matter how absurd it is, can greatly influence the nature of a situation. Sociologist Robert Merton elaborates on Thomas' notion as follows:

> Men respond not only to the objective features of a situation, but also, and at times primarily, to the meaning this situation has for them. And once they have assigned some meaning to the situation,

* See, for example, various research studies conducted by Loomis, Lave, Swinth, Deutsch, and Krauss.[2]

† See studies by Shure, Harford, and Solomon.[3]

their consequent behavior and some of the consequences of that behavior are determined by the ascribed meaning.[5]

In conjunction with the definition of the situation, the self-fulfilling prophecy ‡ suggests that if humanitarian peacekeepers expect a conflict situation to be nonviolent, and if they can get disputants to expect nonviolence too, then the situation is in fact likely to be nonviolent. In essence, expectations, ascribed meanings, and definitions of a situation are very powerful peacekeeping tools, especially with regard to borderline behavior which can tip one way or the other. Even some quasi-peacekeepers are aware of this, as the following account makes clear:

> A reporter asked three umpires how they distinquished a ball from a strike. The first umpire answered, "There are balls and there are strikes and I calls them as I sees them." The second umpire answered, "There are balls and there are strikes, and I call 'em as they is." But the third umpire replied, "There are balls and there are strikes, but they ain't nothing until I calls them" [6]

Another force that causes certain actions to pull certain reactions is the **exchange** mechanism, which involves the exchange of desired behavior for rewards. Sociologist George Homans has formalized the mechanism this way:

> The more often within a given period of time a man's activity rewards the activity of another, the more often the other will emit the activity.[7]

In terms of the exchange mechanism, humanitarian police, troopers, and soldiers reward and reinforce nonviolent behavior on the part of disputing parties. In return for this, disputants continue to refrain from violence. (*Caveat:* It should be noted that the operation of the exchange mechanism depends on two con-

‡ The self-fulfilling prophecy operates when certain youths are said to be "delinquent" or certain minorities "lazy," as a number of studies in criminology and race relations have shown. The initial prophecy shapes and conditions subsequent perception and behavior to such an extent that false definition of situations can eventually become true; that is, youths can actually become delinquent and minorities lazy after a while, if they encounter these definitions of themselves over and over again, especially if they are ambivalent (or their behavior is ambiguous or marginal). The power of the self-fulfilling prophecy to "pull" certain responses has relatively little to do with whether the prophecy itself is good or bad, favorable or unfavorable. Research shows that the self-fulfilling prophecy operates whether youths are defined as "delinquent" or "nondelinquent" or whether minorities are defined as "lazy" or "ambitious."

ditions being met: that the social interaction be rational, and that the social actors be able to rank order activities in terms of how rewarding they are to them. However, these constraining conditions of rationality and utility are not always present, especially during violent situations.)

Yet another mechanism underlying the interaction pull phenomenon is that of **imitation,** first analyzed in detail by French social psychologist Gabriel Tarde. Imitation is facilitated by the suggestibility of disputing parties which makes them unconsciously receptive to new attitudes and modes of behavior. (The stress and tension of conflict probably accounts for most of this suggestibility.) A few illustrations will show how the imitation mechanism works.

Peacekeeper attitudes and actions regarding *strength* frequently elicit their equivalents from disputants in a conflict. For instance, when humanitarian peacekeepers refuse to use all their available strength, this refusal communicates an attitude of restraint and tolerance to disputants. Disputants may then imitate this attitude. Hence, a dominant person may decide to ease up on a subordinate spouse; a powerful street gang may decide to refrain from bullying a weaker gang, and so on. In effect, the example set by humanitarian peacekeepers provides a precedent which allows disputants to follow suit and still save face. Disputants might otherwise feel like weaklings if they failed to use all their strength. (Peacekeeper restraint of this kind resembles the nonviolence advocated by Gandhi. It is a nonviolence practiced out of denial rather than desperation: it emanates from a conscious denial of available strength—for tactical or philosophical reasons—rather than from a conscious desperation because there is no available strength.)

Peacekeeper attitudes and actions regarding *respect*—especially respect for life and limb—are frequently imitated by disputing parties. Respect (the lack of it) is often what conflicts are all about. Thus, disputants who receive respect from peacekeepers—and who then begin to respect each other—are sometimes well on their way to resolving their conflict.

Lastly, peacekeeper attitudes and actions regarding *fear* are also imitated by disputants. Humanitarian peacekeepers usually move slowly and deliberately in order to put disputants at ease and remove some of their fears. Peacekeepers know that violence

begets violence partly because fear begets fear. When humanitarians reduce the climate of threat by their calm demeanor and use of non-lethal weapons, disputing parties often follow suit by becoming less threatening themselves. Disputants are slower to punch, shoot, or massively attack when they know that they are not being backed into a corner. Confident that they will have time to talk things over, they are less likely to act (or react) impulsively.

In short, imitation, exchange, and the self-fulfilling prophecy are the mechanisms that facilitate the operation of the interactional pull phenomenon. The interaction phenomenon helps explain why humanitarian peacekeepers elicit fewer casualties than authoritarian peacekeepers, and in a larger sense why the former are able to handle conflicts more effectively than the latter.

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[PART III]

HOW TO KEEP THE PEACE

[CHAPTER 10]

PEACEKEEPING MANUALS: WHEN TO LOCK, LOAD & FIRE

WHAT EXACTLY SHOULD police and other peacekeepers do when confronting violence? How much physical force should they use during their conflict interventions? Under what circumstances are they justified in using nightsticks and firearms to keep the peace? Should they "Run after Runners" and only "Shoot at Shooters" as some police departments advocate? When they do fire, should they shoot to disable or shoot to kill?

One way of getting answers to these questions is to look at the manuals and rulebooks that peacekeepers use. They set forth the various procedures to be followed in different kinds of violent situations. (Since they give an indication of what the average peacekeeper has been trained and equipped to do; they also show the present "state of the art" of peacekeeping.)

For this reason, excerpts from typical peacekeeping manuals and rulebooks are presented in this chapter. Like the manuals from which they come, these excerpts have been selected to be as representative as possible. Manuals were obtained from numerous urban, suburban, and rural police departments, as well as from state police agencies, national guard organizations, and United Nations peacekeeping agencies. Among the *urban* police manuals were ones from the Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Dallas, Oakland, and San Diego police departments.

Three headings, "The show of force," "The use of nonviolent force," and "The use of violent force," are used to organize and systematize the material in the manuals, and to relate it to some broader concepts. *Force* is defined here as that which either compels or hinders action; it involves the exertion of energy to cause people to act or not act. This definition closely resembles sociologist Max Weber's classic definition of "power." (Power is what impels people to move, often against their will.) The

show of force consists of the displaying or bringing into view of either violent or nonviolent force (the massing of manpower, the patrolling of streets, the brandishing of firearms). It relies on "threat" to obtain the desired behavior from disputing parties. The *use* of force, on the other hand, consists of the actual exercise of force. It relies on "implementation" to obtain the desired response from disputants.

Nonviolent force is that behavior which compels action by means other than intentional injury and destruction. *Violent* force, conversely, is that behavior which compels action by means of intentional injury and destruction, usually through the use of weapons such as clubs and firearms. ("Lethal" or deadly force is force which is able to cause death. Firing a gun in the direction of a person constitutes lethal force, even though there may be no intent to kill.)

The preceding terms comprise a natural hierarchy of force for peacekeepers: *show of force* (utilizing displays of violent or nonviolent force); *use of nonviolent force* (employing arrests, formations, and nonlethal weapons); *use of violent force* (utilizing clubs, firearms, and other lethal weapons). These are the three basic force options peacekeepers have when dealing with serious conflict.

INTERPERSONAL PEACEKEEPING MANUALS

The Show of Force

Manuals dealing with interpersonal violence contain little specific information on shows of force. They do contain some general information though. One rulebook makes the following statement:

> Because domestic squabbling may range from disturbance of the peace to assault with a deadly weapon or worse, there is no safe generalization about how you should conduct yourself or what you should be prepared to handle. . . .Don't forfeit your safety to complacency or easy-going cheerfulness. . . .
>
> Approach every domestic quarrel carefully, with all your senses alert, and be ready to protect yourself immediately if necessary. Stay cool, calm, watchful, and (literally) have your eye on each antagonist.[1]

And a manual from the Los Angeles area recommends that peacekeepers responding to family fights:

1. Knock before entering, if the situation permits.
2. Talk in a slow, measured, calm and quiet manner.
3. Use "calming body language"—move in a non-provocative manner. Move slowly. Do not stand over a seated person. Hang loose. If appropriate, sit down with the participants and relax. Your own lack of tension will be communicated to everyone and will tend to lower the general level of tension.[2]

The New York City Police Department's manual on family crisis intervention stresses the importance of using a firm, yet nonabusive tone of voice. It also suggests that in questioning family disputants, officers should:

1. Understand and respect the ethnic and cultural background [of disputing parties]
2. Phrase questions [in a way that respects parties'] self-dignity and pride.
3. Request, not demand, information.
4. Use proper titles in addressing individuals.
5. Probe personal-type questions [regarding sex habits, etc.] only upon the willingness [of parties] to respond.[3]

Various interpersonal peacekeeping manuals recommend the technique of *facilitation,* in which peacekeepers offer themselves as "a bridge to better communication" between quarreling parties. As the New York City police manual puts it, the "facilitating" officer should:

1. Discuss the situations with disputing parties.
   a. Assist them in communicating with each other.
   b. Help them talk about problem calmly.
2. Be impartial, interested, and objective.
3. Assist them in reaching a decision regarding the dispute [and help them take the initiative for the next step].[4]

An officer engaging in facilitation should serve as a sounding board first, and then as a conflict diagnostician, if the parties wish it.

Many manuals mention the importance of protecting innocent parties (especially children) during family fights. For example, one rulebook says:

> Take whatever precautions are necessary to protect children who are at the scene, whether or not the parents request that protection. . . . Have a friendly neighbor watch the children until the squabble is ended.[5]

The Use of Nonviolent Force

Arrests, formations

Since interpersonal peacekeeping often involves the making of arrests, many manuals discuss arrest procedures. One counsels the following:

> —The peace officer must . . . not reduce the [arrest] transaction to a conflict of personalities.
> —All arrests should be immediately followed by a preliminary search.
> —The use of restraining devices should be left to the discretion of the arresting officer.
> —The peace officer should avoid unnecessary physical contact with the suspect whether the suspect is male or female, as to do so invites counterattack.
> —The three big killers in police work are carelessness, overconfidence, and lack of training.[6]

There are other things to be considered though when making arrests during family crises. Many times a person who has been assaulted, but not seriously injured, may try to have his spouse arrested out of spite. But as the New York City police's Manual for Family Crisis Intervention states:

> [An officer] should discuss with the complainant the involved ramifications of [an arrest]. . . . He should convey to the complainant, when the circumstances warrant, the unsoundness of an arrest as a method of solving a family problem.[7]

Arrests mean a loss of income while spouses are in jail and often a loss of community respect for a family as well.

Various manuals discuss the tactical moves or formations to be used during interpersonal peacekeeping. These include, among others, interposition and separation tactics. Regarding interposition, one big city police manual says:

> In intervening in a dispute of a violent nature involving physical contact or actual assault in any form, immediate police action should be effected. Physical intervention on the part of officers may be necessary in this type of dispute. The officers concerned must place themselves in such a position as to limit the possibility of personal injury.[8]

Another manual gives an illustration of a policeman who interposed himself between two belligerents and received multiple

lacerations for his trouble. The moral of the story: "A solitary officer never steps between two feuding parties, because they outnumber him."[9]

An alternative to interposition is *separation*. One manual recommends:

1. Separate the disputing parties out of sight and hearing of each other
2. Maintain sight contact with your [fellow peacekeeper]
3. Be alert for weapons or objects capable of inflicting injury
4. Render first aid or call an ambulance, if necessary.[10]

A suburban Los Angeles police manual elaborates further on the separation tactic:

> Physical separation of the disputants is usually advisable. Do this as soon as possible after your arrival to reduce the amount of yelling, arguing, and the possibility of actual physical conflict.
>
> For your own safety, control the movement of all persons involved. Attempt to discourage a disputant from going into another room or wandering about. You might suggest that it would be better to settle the dispute first. If the person insists on going into another room, for example, to put on his shoes or jacket before leaving for the night, accompany him to satisfy yourself that he does not arm himself.[11]

However, some handbooks argue against separating disputants:

> Get them to talk to you, one at a time, but each in the presence of the other. Making them talk to you about their individual complaints is often the key to unlocking the floodgates of their anger.[12]

Nonlethal Weapons

Not one of the interpersonal peacekeeping manuals examined mentions the use of nonlethal weapons, yet Mace and other tear gas agents could greatly assist police during family crisis interventions.

The Use of Violent Force

Impact Weapons

Very little is said about the use of impact weapons (saps, clubs, batons, nightsticks, truncheons) during interpersonal peacekeeping. One manual does stress the fact that clubs should be used with extreme caution:

Even though the victims of a family fight call the police and want the husband arrested and thrown in jail, the officer who uses a club on that person will more than likely find the whole family, victims included, climbing on his back.[13]

Firearms

The manuals reviewed have more to say about firearms. A San Francisco Police Department manual notes:

> In many . . . family disputes, bar room arguments, etc. the suspect is known to the victim and so the risk that the person to be arrested will cause death or serious bodily injury if apprehension is delayed may not be present. . . . However, where delay might bring harm to others, the officer is permitted to discharge his weapon after all other reasonable means of apprehension have been exhausted.[14]

And a Philadelphia Police Department manual tells peacekeepers:

> The following points must be kept in mind before deciding to shoot:
>
> 1. The importance of life.
> 2. The protection of one's self from imminent peril of life or great bodily harm. . . .
> 3. After all physical means are exhausted, and as a LAST resort, the officer may use his firearm. . . .
> 4. WHEN IN DOUBT—DON'T SHOOT. ALWAYS ASK YOURSELF THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS
>
>   —Are these the best possible conditions under which to shoot?
>   —Is it safe to shoot?
>   —How good of a shot [am I?]
>   —Am I under a strain from running or scuffling?
>   —How good are the lighting conditions?[15]

In general, though, interpersonal peacekeeping manuals seem more concerned about the safety of peacekeepers than about the safety of disputing parties. A New York Police Department manual suggests that officers continually watch disputants for hints of impending violence against themselves:

> The officer must be constantly on guard against danger. Emotional signs of fear, anger, hate, disinterest, depression, or embarrassment may be detected in facial expressions and bodily movements.[16]

Another manual puts it this way:

> A simmering quiet may only be the prelude of disaster. . . . Watch carefully for the smallest sign, a snatch of conversation or any clue

> such as a threat, which indicates the depth of feelings and how festered those feelings may be.
>
> A woman may have just decided to kill her husband when you walked in, but postponed the actual murder until the time you left. . . . Once a domestic crisis is recognized, most investigators agree, it is necessary to remain in the presence of the antagonists even though the argument seems to be over. Remain in their presence until one of the parties is removed.[17]

When are peacekeepers justified in using violent force during family crises? Although most interpersonal peacekeeping manuals fail to answer this question definitively, they all suggest something along the lines of this excerpt taken from a police rulebook:

> Match your enforcement techniques to the seriousness of the scene being investigated.
>
> Avoid force whenever possible. Try to prevent a physical struggle between the two parties. Disengage them if you safely can and then step back yourself. However, if you're attacked, protect yourself with an appropriate amount of force. In rare instances, it may be necessary for you to use judo, or even your weapon, to prevent serious physical injury to yourself or one of the fighting parties.[18]

INTERGROUP PEACEKEEPING MANUALS

The Show of Force

A manual used by a number of police departments states:

> An officer receiving a 'gang fight' call should find out what other units are responding to the scene with him. One officer can seldom stop a gang fight. He can get stomped into the ground very quickly though. If the officer finds that he is the only unit responding to the call . . . he should park in a spot that is not too noticeable and watch for leaders in the gang until the arrival of other units.[19]

Ideally, peacekeepers should not intervene in large scale fights unless they have enough manpower to mount a show of force. A Philadelphia Police Department manual makes this same point: always radio for assistance and wait for reinforcements before intervening. An interesting, but perhaps inadvisable, show-of-force tactic, is advocated in one manual:

> If the officer finds that he is the only unit responding to [a gang fight] call, he should proceed quickly to the scene and then slow down the last few blocks and sound his siren for all it's worth. When he

arrives, chances are the gang will have dispersed, and the peace will have been preserved.[20]

The problem with this tactic is that in extremely serious conflicts, it may tip off gang youths who have committed violent crimes and allow them to elude capture. Also, the sounding of sirens attracts spectators who can be injured or killed during the course of a gang fight.

A show of force tactic espoused by some handbooks is the use of a stern, confident voice. One police manual describes the pitfalls of not appearing confident during interventions:

> In dealing with a gang fight, the tone of voice is important. Next to that is attitude and posture. The officer who rushes up to a gang fight with his club raised, in a stiff posture and yells in a high-pitched and excited voice is bound to end up involved in a fight.[21]

However, peacekeepers should take care when speaking in a stern confident tone not to slip into reckless or threatening language. This can be very dangerous in violent situations. In sum, "stern" applies only to tone, not to what is said or threatened. (Incidentally, no threats should be made that cannot be carried out. Several manuals have noted this. One admonishes "Never make idle threats, avoid bluffing."[22])

The Use of Nonviolent Force

Arrests, formations

Very few intergroup peacekeeping manuals deal with arrest procedures. Those that do tend to be very straightforward:

> —In a minor [misdemeanor] arrest, the force that can be applied to overcome resistance must be short of that force which would result in death. . . .
> —Unless the suspect is known to be armed and dangerous, in the minor arrest the peace officer approaches the scene of the arrest with his weapon remaining in its holster.
> —In the serious [felony] arrest, the weapon is taken from the holster prior to the aproach to the scene of the arrest and remains in the hand [with finger on trigger] of the arresting peace officer throughout the arrest.[23]

Little is said in intergroup manuals about tactics, formations, or procedures for separating groups involved in serious conflicts.

Nonlethal weapons

Just one of the manuals examined mentions tear gas or other nonlethal weapons, and then only in passing. In discussing what a policeman can do while waiting for reinforcements, it suggests: "He can also advise radio control [headquarters] of the extent of the situation and whether dogs or tear gas might be needed." [24]

The Use of Violent Force

Impact weapons

Handbooks contain instructions about the use of nightsticks and other impact weapons. Several tell how to use variants of the standard police truncheon. One manual lists the following advantages of the Yawara stick, which looks like a cigar with tiny spikes at its ends:

> 1. Because it is small, it can be held in the hand and hardly noticed. . . . By folding the arms, it can be completely hidden. This reduces the possibility that the officer might have to fight. If an officer comes at someone with a police club in his hand, he can expect to fight, because the opponent often feels that he has no choice. [Thus] there have been fewer charges of police brutality in departments where [Yawara Sticks] have been used.
> 2. It cannot be grabbed from the officer's hand. The size and spikes prevent it.[25]

Firearms

Most of the peacekeeping manuals examined urge extreme care in the use of firearms—primarily because juveniles are usually involved in intergroup conflicts. A Los Angeles Police Department manual advises:

> An officer generally should not shoot at a fleeing felon whom he has reasonable grounds to believe is a juvenile. However, when the escape of such a suspect can reasonably be expected to pose a serious threat to the life of another person, then under these circumstances an officer may shoot to prevent the escape of such person.[26]

And a Philadelphia Police Department manual states:

> A police officer is permitted by law to meet resistance by using only as much force as is necessary in making an arrest. In handling *juveniles*, a police officer must realize that it is sometimes extremely difficult to justify the use of force at a subsequent hearing or inquiry.

> Force should be used only on rare occasions; only the arresting officer can make the decision as to when to resort to force, and when to avoid it.[27]

Caution in the use of deadly force against juveniles is the only moral and sensible policy to follow, given the fact that juveniles are not legally accountable for their acts as a rule. (If they cannot be executed for crimes by judges and juries, then they should certainly not be "executed" by policemen.)

Another reason for exercising caution during intergroup peacekeeping is that young children frequently come out onto the streets to watch gang fights. The use of deadly force threatens them, too. As one manual puts it, "Sooner or later the guilty gang member will be captured, but the dead child who is an innocent bystander can never be brought back to life."

Still other reasons exist for exercising care when using firearms around gang youths. One tough-minded manual points out:

> There are many times that an officer is completely justified from the legal standpoint in shooting at juveniles, and yet from the practical standpoint it is ill-advised.
>
> Some of the practical considerations regarding the shooting of juveniles are:
>
> 1. *Monday morning quarterbacks.* There are many people, including fellow officers who will question the wisdom of the shooting. . . . It is very easy for the "armchair strategist" who was not at the scene during the heat of battle, to evaluate the actions in terms of what is now known, and to condemn the participants for actions that they performed. . . .
> 2. *Social Pressure Groups.* Because the general public is often in sympathy with the protection of our youth, minority pressure groups seldom pass up the opportunity to make "political hay" out of [such shootings]. . . .
> 3. *Headline Happy Newspapers.* In large communities, there is usually one paper that builds up circulation by attacking the local police.[28]

To summarize, intergroup peacekeeping manuals make an effort, though by no means a sterling one, to deal with the tactical and ethical problems of intervening in gang violence.

Three Conventional Types of Peacekeepers

The interorganizational and intercommunal peacekeeping manuals that are referred to in the next two sections are drawn from different types of peacekeeping agencies. The three major types



Figure 10–1. Different Peacekeepers Responding to Newark Race Riot

—*local, state,* and *federal* peacekeepers—tend to arrive at different times during a campus or racial conflict. (See Figures 10–1 and 10–2 for illustrations of this.)

Some people feel there are no real differences in the functions of the three types of peacekeepers.* But since they intervene at various stages their tasks and responsibilities must necessarily

* For example, police handbook writers L. Schwartz and S Goldstein state: When military federal forces are called in to aid local police, their functions and responsibilities are essentially the same as the regular police. They act as emergency auxiliary police, providing the required additional numbers, arms, and force.[29]



(After U.S. Government, Kerner Commission Report (NACCD), 1968, p. 372)

Figure 10–2. Different Peacekeepers Responding to Detroit Race Riot

differ. As the following descriptions indicate, the three major types differ in other ways as well.

Local peacekeepers

CAMPUS POLICE AND SECURITY GUARDS. Campus police are usually the first peacekeepers to see action during interorganizational violence. However, their small numbers and limited resources force them (and/or campus administrators) to call for assistance rather quickly. A recent FBI survey showed that the typical American college or university has thirty-six special campus police.[30] These police often carry only walkie-talkies, though

some carry guns both day and night. Many are retired policemen.

Security guards who patrol public buildings, government property, and low income housing projects also find themselves dealing with violence and conflict from time to time. Yet their age—they are often semi-retired—and their lack of training tend to make them both vulnerable and ineffective during such crises.

URBAN POLICE. There are 268,750 full-time urban police in 5,921 US cities.[31] This amounts to an average of 2.0 officers for every thousand city dwellers. Most medium-sized cities have fifty or so officers in their police departments. A number of large cities, of course, have substantially more policemen: New York has approximately 31,000; Chicago, 13,000; Philadelphia, 8,000; Los Angeles, 7,000; Detroit, 6,000; and Washington, D.C., 5,000.[32]

The tasks and responsibilities of urban police vary widely, but they usually require a high degree of skill and preparation. Despite this, many urban departments do not provide adequate training or supervision, nor are they always politically neutral and procedurally up-to-date.

SUBURBAN POLICE AND COUNTY SHERIFFS. Across the United States there are 91,193 full-time suburban police in 3,022 departments, making an average of 1.5 officers per thousand suburban residents.[33] Some of these police are significantly better educated and trained than their urban counterparts. However, they generally see far less action, especially where major peacekeeping is concerned.

There are 62,949 sworn officers in 2,559 sheriff's departments throughout the country.[34] In some areas, sheriffs and their deputies have vastly different responsibilities from other kinds of local police, often including exclusively civil tasks such as the administration of county courts and jails. Peacekeeping skills vary greatly among sheriffs' deputies; in Alameda County (which is home to the University of California, Berkeley), deputies are relatively experienced in the management of violence while those in most other counties are not.

State peacekeepers

HIGHWAY PATROL AND STATE POLICE FORCES. Every state except Hawaii has a highway patrol or a state police of some sort. The sworn officers in all these agencies total 42,479.[35] The primary function of these organizations is traffic supervision. As a con-

sequence many of them do not have full police powers and most of them receive only scant training in crowd and riot control.[36]

Despite this lack of power and training, state police and highway patrolmen do a good deal of peacekeeping, as they are readily available for emergency duty. (Local police are often occupied patrolling beats and fighting crime, making them less available for campus and racial peacekeeping than state police. Because of the low priority of highway surveillance, state police can be spared and given over to peacekeeping for hours and even days at a time.)

Highway patrols and state police forces are relatively new; they came into existence with the advent of the mass-produced automobile. Their newness has enabled them to avoid some of the traditionalism and outmoded practices of many local police, but they are easily politicized as they are usually under the direct control of state governors. This sometimes cancels out their other strong points as peacekeepers.

The National Guard. The Army National Guard consists of about 400,000 soldiers organized into branch units in all 50 states. Guard units have been called in some 300 times to help local authorities deal with campus and racial disorders.[37] (See Table 4–I in Chapter 4 concerning Guard peacekeeping during industrial disputes.) The Guard was called out twenty-four times during some five hundred campus disturbances connected with the US invasion of Cambodia in May 1970. It was also summoned twenty-seven times to handle racial conflicts during the 1945 to 1966 period. (In 1967, moreover, the Guard was called in seventy-seven times during racial unrest; these calls involved 104,665 men.)

However, the Guard's performances in Watts, Newark, and Detroit—not to mention its actions at Kent State and numerous other campuses—have raised grave doubts as to its peacekeeping abilities. The Guard has had severe problems (now being remedied, fortunately) with training, racial composition, and leadership effectiveness. In addition, it suffers from a split personality.

On the one hand, the Guard has a mandate to assist the Army and Air Force in times of war and external crises. (Although this mission takes precedence over all else, the Guard played a minuscule role in the Vietnam War, thus raising the possibility that it is primarily maintained for internal rather than external

crises.) The Federal Government pays almost all of the Guard's bill, and the US Army sets its standards and directs training. *On the other hand*, the Guard has a mandate to maintain order and protect life and property during internal crises and natural disasters within states. For this reason, Guardsmen are kept together in hometown units, are asked to swear allegiance to a particular state, and are controlled by individual state governors.

This split personality has been partially responsible for the Guard's poor showing in many peacekeeping situations. Because its attention fluctuates between its two mandates, neither receives its full due. As a result, Guardsmen are frequently untrained, unprepared, and unequipped for peacekeeping during internal crises. They often enter conflict situations without face shields, gas masks, flak jackets, or even proper weapons. Lately some peacekeeping training has been added to the Guard's preparation program, and better equipment has been issued. This should give it more confidence and sophistication, and help prevent future cases of panic and over-reaction.

Federal peacekeepers

THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION. Although it is primarily an investigative agency, the FBI is about the closest thing to a national police force in the United States. Created in 1924 and made up of 8,500 agents working out of five hundred field offices, the FBI has jurisdiction over all federal crimes except tax and narcotics offenses. It has fingerprints of some 90 million Americans on file, and keeps special dossiers and files on six million citizens.[38] Many people worry about such Orwellian power concentrated in the hands of a single agency. (The FBI's flagrant political involvement in the Watergate cover-up has done nothing to alleviate these fears.)

During the sixties and early seventies, the FBI gathered intelligence on potential campus and racial disorders, especially those allegedly being fomented by radicals, black militants, etcetera. FBI agents infiltrated, among others, the Students for a Democratic Society, the Black Panthers, and the Ku Klux Klan to keep tabs on their activities and watch for conspiracies to incite rioting.

THE ARMY. The US Army has seven brigade-size task forces which are continually available for internal peacekeeping mis-

sions. The discipline, the team orientation, the physical conditioning, and the experience under fire of the soldiers in these Army task forces make them quite effective as peacekeepers.

However, Army troops are rarely called in to maintain the peace. They were used most recently during racial unrest in Detroit in 1967. (They were also embroiled in the historic intercommunal conflicts in Detroit in 1943, Omaha in 1919, and Washington, D.C. in 1919.[39]) Several interorganizational conflicts have also required Army intervention. Two well-known examples are the coal strikes in Colorado in 1914 and the Coeur d'Alene disorders in Idaho in 1892.

INTERORGANIZATIONAL PEACEKEEPING MANUALS

The distinctions among local, state, and federal peacekeepers will be utilized as excerpts from various interorganizational intervention manuals are presented.

The Show of Force

Manuals used by *local* police differ in their policies regarding shows of force during campus and industrial conflicts. For example, a Philadelphia police manual, *Procedures of Civil Disobedience Teams*, barely supports shows of force, saying, "The policy is to handle the situation with a minimum show of uniform strength."[40] Whereas, a New York City police manual strongly supports them:

> Crowds must be dispersed and prevented from regrouping. At the inception of trouble, a display of force, tact, and firmness will usually suffice since it is easier to disperse a threatening crowd at this time rather than later on.[41]

This disagreement is lessened somewhat by the fact that Philadelphia police frequently employ a strength-in-reserve tactic as part of their "minimum" shows of force. (This tactic consists of keeping a number of reserve police out of sight of conflict participants, while at the same time making them aware of these reserves.)

State police manuals are generally supportive of shows of force. One state manual says:

> As the name implies, this method concentrates the greater portion of available manpower at the scene. Generally, officers act as a

> barricade between two opposing factions. [The show of force method] has the following advantages:
> —May be used to gain immediate control of a bad situation.
> —Effective in discouraging misconduct among demonstrators. . . .[42]

However, the same manual lists some of the disadvantages of displays of force. They inform disputing parties of the precise strength of peacekeepers, allowing parties to evaluate their chances of overwhelming peacekeepers. In addition, extended shows of force cause fatigue among peacekeepers and expose them to harassment.

Manuals used by *federal* peacekeepers tend to endorse shows of force. One handbook states:

> The Show-of-Force can be based on either the surprise appearance of a large unit of riot-equipped police officers in a formation, or . . . the saturation technique massing large numbers of personnel at a given point in full view of the mob. To crowds, the psychological impact of witnessing the arrival of large numbers of police emerging from patrol cars, special riot vans, police helicopters, etc. can be very great.[43]

The Use of Nonviolent Force

Arrests, formations

Where arrests are concerned, one *local* police manual tells peacekeepers:

> Select the person who seems to be the ringleader. Tell him clearly and confidently what law he and the others are violating and command him to stop. If he does not obey, arrest him. Call for assistance and restore order by making any arrests that are necessary. . . . If a crowd seems dangerous, establish a well-defined line which no one can cross. Enforce this rule by arresting those who violate the line.[44]

A Philadelphia police manual points out that different formations and arrest procedures should be used for different places—streets, buildings, hallways, offices, and so forth. It also recommends that special procedures be used when arresting women, children, or intoxicated persons.

A handbook used by *state* police suggests:

> Mass arrests impose a severe strain upon the finances and manpower of both the police and the courts. (The objective should be to make as few arrests as necessary, not as many as possible . . .)

> Every arresting officer must be prepared to prove who he arrested, where and when and for what violation. . . .
>
> [Four different options regarding arrest are possible and some minimize violence more than others]: *Immediate Arrest* [apprehend at once] . . . *Delayed Arrest* [follow off the scene and arrest] . . . *Complaint and Warrant Arrest* [let escape and apprehend later]. . . *Citizen's Arrest* [let others arrest, freeing police for more important tasks] . . . . Insofar as is possible, the first persons subject to arrest shall be those who are leaders . . . [However, sometimes] it may be desirable to allow the leaders to remain so that they can restrain their followers who might otherwise pose a serious threat of violence.[45]

Many of the *federal* manuals examined describe the use of para-military formations to "sweep" an area free of disputants or "secure" a safe region for peacekeepers within the turmoil of a conflict scene. More specifically, squads and platoons of men can use the **line** formation to separate disputants. Peacekeepers can also use the mobile **echelon** formation to peel disputants away from walls, fences, or buildings so as to move them down a corridor or street. Finally, squads and platoons can scatter people by means of "v" shaped **wedge** or **diamond** formations. (The diamond consists of two wedges, back to back; it prevents disputants from outflanking or engulfing peacekeepers.)[46] All of these maneuvers can be carried out by foot, horseback, or by motorcycle.

According to the manuals, these formations have several advantages. *First*, they are effective in moving, containing, or dispersing crowds. *Second*, they help peacekeepers control their own emotions in the midst of chaos. Since the formations give each peacekeeper specific things to do, they enable him to forget his own fear or anger. And *third*, they help disputants control their emotions: that is, the sight of orderly, disciplined peacekeepers shows disputants how irrational they have become. It sometimes snaps them out of hypnotic or hysteric behavior.

Nonlethal weapons

Local manuals say almost nothing about the use of nonlethal weapons. One manual does discuss a small tear gas device:

> It can provide protection at close range against an assailant who assumes you are not armed. A flick of the thumb shoots out a charge of tear gas about 6 feet. Aimed at the face of an aggressor, it has a very potent effect, yet does not do any lasting damage.[47]

State handbooks pay much more attention to the role of nonlethal weapons. One manual states:

> Although gas is usually used to break up and disperse a mob, it may be used to achieve other ends:
>
> *Denying Areas to Rioters.* When an area is to be denied to rioters, a blanketing gas cloud may be produced over the area. Baseball grenades are especially well suited for use in denying small, confined areas to rioters. . . .
>
> *Splitting a Mob.* A narrow gas cloud thrown across the center of a mob tends to split it. This is good when there is no rear escape route or a limited supply [of gas].
>
> *Attacking a Building.* When rioters are barricaded within a building, the building itself may be blanketed with a gas cloud, provided that the windows have been shattered. . . .[48]

Federal manuals, such as the US Army's handbook on *Civil Disturbances & Disasters,* give some rather generalized advice on nonlethal weapons:

> The employment of [chemical] agents is an effective and humane method of riot control when a mass mob must be rendered physically ineffective for a limited period of time in order to impose the will of authority. . . .[49]

The Use of Violent Force

Impact weapons

Most *local* police manuals urge peacekeepers to employ caution when using nightsticks and riot batons to deal with campus violence. A Los Angeles Police Department manual notes one reason for being careful:

> *Police Action on School Campuses*
>
> The tactics employed by dissidents engaged in disruptive activities frequently include efforts to draw the police and other public officials into responses likely to produce violence and injury to participants and thus garner support for their cause. It is therefore incumbent upon the Department to cope with disruptive situations in a professional manner which will minimize the potential for violent confrontations.[50]

A manual used both by *state* and *federal* peacekeepers describes the characteristics of the riot baton:

1. The baton is not a club.
2. Proper use requires courage, footwork, strength, and good direction.
3. The baton is primarily an offensive weapon.

4. The baton, when carried in a military manner, is an emblem of law and order . . .
5. The baton is valuable for close-in as well as distance fighting.[51]

Firearms

Local police handbooks discuss when and where the use of lethal weapons is justified. Guidelines in a Dallas Police Department manual state:

> Life is sacred. A policeman's attitude should be such that in a stress situation his first reaction will be not to reach for his gun and fire, but rather to make the determination of whether his purpose can be accomplished without using the weapon.[52]

And a San Diego police manual advises:

> The Department considers that firearms are *defensive weapons* and to be used *only:*
> 1. To protect the life of an officer or another person or to prevent serious injury when there is no other alternative.
> 2. To apprehend a violent person who is *known to be armed and dangerous* and who cannot be apprehended without risking loss of life or serious injury.[53]

Manuals used by *state* police are rather callous by comparison. One counsels:

> The commander at the scene should make the decision regarding the use of firearms. The decision should be based on evidence that lethal force is intended or is being used by members of the mob. . . . Police and troops should never be sent into action without ammunition or armed only with blanks or with orders not to use their guns. . . . An officer should never fire a weapon while running. It takes only one carefully aimed shot to kill. When the target is visible, he should stop, take up a firing position and make the first shot good.[54]

The National Guard manual used by the *federal* peacekeepers who intervened at Kent State is equally callous:

> In any instance . . . when rioters to whom the riot acts have been read cannot be dispersed by any other reasonable means, then shooting is justified.[55]

It is not surprising that Guardsmen felt free to fire their weapons at Kent State. Their commanders read them the following section of the Ohio Guard training manual just before their intervention:

> When the Riot Act has been read within hearing and you are engaged in dispersing or apprehending rioters, using necessary and proper means, then you are declared by Ohio Statute (RC 3761.15) to be guiltless if any of the persons unlawfully or violently assembled is killed, maimed, or otherwise injured in consequence of resisting.[56]

In contrast, an Army manual (which is widely used by many National Guard units across the United States) specifies that deadly force should not be used unless *three* conditions exist:

> 1. Lesser means have been exhausted or are unavailable
> 2. The risk of death or serious bodily harm to innocent persons is not increased by its use.
> 3. The purpose of its use is one or more of the following:
>   (a) Self-defense to avoid death or serious bodily harm
>   (b) Prevention of a [dangerous crime, e.g. sniping]
>   (c) Prevention of the destruction of public health or safety
>   (d) Detention or prevention of the escape of persons [involved in any of the above] [57]

Since none of these conditions prevailed at Kent State according to the Scranton Commission, the Ohio Guard would not have fired if they had been following these Army guidelines.

Nor would they have fired in the way they did if they had followed the guidelines set down in the FBI's manual, *Prevention and Control of Mobs and Riots:*

> Under no circumstances should firearms be used until all other measures for controlling the violence have been exhausted. Above all, *officers should never fire indiscriminately into a crowd or mob.* Such extreme action may result in injury or death of innocent citizens and may erupt into a prolonged and fatal clash between the officers and the mob. . . .[58]

INTERCOMMUNAL PEACEKEEPING MANUALS

Distinctions among local, state, and federal peacekeepers will be maintained during the review of manuals in this section.

The Show of Force

Almost none of the *local* manuals discusses shows of force as intercommunal peacekeeping tools, perhaps an acknowledgement that local police usually lack the manpower requisite for such displays. One of the few exceptions is a manual used by the Chicago police:

> The mere presence of sufficient numbers of men in uniform is what is meant by a *show of force*. This awes the crowd so that it becomes unnecessary to *use* force in removing key persons. . . . The use of mixed squads of police, white and Negro, is often advisable.[59]

Similarly, only a few *state* manuals emphasize shows of force. A handbook utilized by state authorities in California talks of massing peacekeepers to display strength.

> Correct application of the principle of mass, in conjunction with the other principles of riot control, may permit numerically inferior police forces to achieve desired results.[60]

Manuals for *federal* peacekeepers discuss shows of force more thoroughly. For instance, the Army's *Control of Civil Disorders* notes:

> When the situation allows, the unit conducts regular morning physical training (PT) . . . specifically for its show-of-force effect. . . . PT normally concludes with a run through the unit's sector of responsibility, planned to be seen by as many people as possible, particularly in areas that have been hard hit. . . . The value of show-of-force operations cannot be overestimated. . . . *[M]ilitary professionalism* is the best possible show-of-force to the population, be they law-abiding or disorderly.[61]

The Use of Nonviolent Force

Arrests, formations

Regarding arrests, *local* intercommunal manuals recommend procedures that are essentially the same as those recommended by interorganizational manuals. With respect to formations, *local* manuals discuss cordons and other conventional formations. A Chicago police manual suggests:

> By means of the police cordon, individuals can . . . be permitted to escape from the crowd, but not to enter it. In the handling of mob situations, the police cordon prevents the riotous infection of great masses of individuals by preventing social contagion.[62]

US authorities have long used police cordons during racial unrest to separate communities in conflict. As race relations expert Allen Grimshaw notes: "Cordons of police [were positioned] along so-called dividing lines such as Wentworth Avenue in Chicago [in 1919] or around the Negro community, as in Detroit in 1943, and in Harlem in the same year." [63]

State manuals generally give advice similar to that given by

local ones. Interestingly, the *New York State Manual for Police* observes:

> [S]teps must be taken to contain the riot, and to seal off the area. . . . Detectives not in uniform, infiltrating among rioting groups, perform valuable service in singling out and identifying agitators and leaders for arrest.[64]

Manuals used by state peacekeepers also tell what warnings to give, what arrest charges to make, and what court evidence to gather during intercommunal peacekeeping.

Federal manuals tend to omit information about arrests entirely. Instead they present information about patrol formations, as this excerpt from a US Army manual illustrates:

> The key tactical element in the restoration of order is the *patrol*. Whether on foot or mounted in vehicles, the patrol moves through its area of responsibility frequently and in an irregular pattern [to keep disputing parties off balance]. Each unit must saturate (or give the impression of saturating) its area of responsibility with troops. This is done to reassure citizens and to deter prospective law-breakers.[65]

Nonlethal weapons

Handbooks used by *local* police forces have little to say about the use of nonlethal weapons during racial disturbances—which suggests that local police may be generally uninformed and ill-prepared in this regard.*

Manuals for *state* police also offer little information about the use of tear gas and other nonlethal weapons.

Federal manuals, however, are very explicit on the matter of such weapons, as this excerpt from a US Army manual indicates:

> Riot control agents are used in civil disturbance control operations because they offer a humane and effective method of reducing resistance, and lessen the requirement for the application of more severe measures or force. . . .
>
> Normally, each platoon may have one portable riot control agent dispenser. . . . The M79 grenade launcher firing the 40mm CS [tear gas] cartridge is used to engage selected point or small area targets at more extended ranges up to 200 to 400 meters. Within short ranges, the bursting or burning type grenades are normally used.[67]

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* Corroborating evidence for this conclusion comes from a recent survey of local law enforcement agencies. It found that while most police departments had some chemical weapons in stock, many did not have enough gas masks—the *sine qua non* for employing these weapons—to equip more than a third of their officers.[66]

The same Army manual discusses the use of water as a nonlethal weapon.

> (a) Water may be employed as a flat trajectory weapon utilizing pressure, or as a high trajectory weapon employing water as rainfall. The latter is highly effective during cold weather.
> (b) Harmless dye may be placed in the water for future identification of participants by staining their clothing or bodies.
> (c) The use of a large water pump mounted on a truck with a high pressure hose and nozzle capable of searching and traversing will enable troops to employ water as they advance. . . .
> (d) In using water as with other measures of force, certain restraints must be applied. Using water on innocent bystanders, such as women and children, should be avoided. Avenues of escape must be provided.[68]

The Use of Violent Force

Impact weapons

Here, *local* police manuals go into great detail about key issues regarding the use of impact weapons. One manual states:

> If there were a cardinal rule for use of the police club, it would be 'not to hit persons on the top of the head'. [This is because]
> 1. It can kill them . . .
> 2. You seldom knock them out . . .
> 3. If the club breaks, it is psychologically defeating . . .
> 4. The victims usually bleed profusely . . .
> 5. It brings 'police brutality' charges . . .
> 6. The victims can be left insane . . .
> 7. The officer opens himself for attack. . . .[69]

Instead, this manual advises peacekeepers to strike disputants on their shoulders, shins, and ankles, where nerve endings are close to the surface of the skin and serious injury is less likely.

State and *federal* manuals discuss impact weapons in detail too, especially riot batons. One describes how the riot baton can be used to break up fights when disputants wield knives or broken bottles.[70] It also suggests using riot batons in place of deadlier weapons when conflict disputants include women, children, clergymen, or senior citizens.[71]

Firearms

Local police manuals have a good deal to say about the use of firearms during intercommunal peacekeeping. A San Francisco Police Department manual instructs:

> An officer during a riot can use his weapon in self defense. He can also use it in the defense of others. He can use it when the rioters present a threat of death or serious bodily harm; however, the mere breaking of windows and damage to property does not permit an officer to use deadly force.[72]

Some handbooks used by local level peacekeepers are extremely straightforward on the use of firearms. For example:

> An officer should only fire his weapon when he fully intends to kill the person he is shooting at, or [when he] is willing to accept the responsibility of the person dying as a result of the action.[73]

However, this advice is exactly the opposite of that given by a manual used by the Los Angeles Police Department:

> An officer does not necessarily shoot with the intent to kill; he shoots when it reasonably appears necessary to prevent the individual from completing what he is attempting. When a firearm is used by an officer, it must be with the realization that the death of some person may occur, not necessarily with the intent that such will be the result.[74]

The *state* manual of the Mississippi Highway Patrol stipulates that each officer may decide for himself whether or not to fire his weapon during racial violence. It is understandable, then, why individual Mississippi highway patrolmen fired on their own—without being ordered to do so—when they responded to racial strife at Jackson State in 1970. They killed two and injured twelve in the process. The instructions of the Mississippi manual directly contradict a recommendation made by the Kerner Commission several years before the Jackson State tragedy *:

> No matter how well trained and skilled a police officer may be, he will be relatively ineffectual in dealing with civil disturbances so long as he functions as an individual.[77]

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*It is worth noting that the Mississippi Highway Patrol moved into the Jackson State crisis without adequate planning, discipline, or organization—something that should never be done according to the FBI's widely-respected manual *Prevention & Control of Mobs and Riots:*

> No aspect of [a peacekeeping] program is more important than planning. Unless the plan is organized. . .the operation will be doomed to failure.[75]

The same manual states

> Under no circumstances should firearms be used until all other measures for controlling the violence have been exhausted. Above all officers should never fire indiscriminately into a crowd or mob.[76]

Contrary to this, Mississippi police fired indiscriminately into the crowd at Jackson State.

Federal manuals go into substantive detail about the use of firearms. An army manual describes the assorted weapons that may be used in intercommunal peacekeeping:

> a. *Rifle*. The rifle with bayonet is the most practical weapon for general use by troops in riot control formations.
> b. *Shotgun*. One shotgun, riot type, should be issued to each squad. . . . It is used to cover breaches in a formation until supporting troops can be committed. . . .
> c. *Sniper Rifle*. When available, each platoon should have one sniper rifle which is carried by a selected marksman. . . .
> d. *Hand Weapons*. Hand weapons may be carried . . . when it is impractical to carry rifles. They are used primarily as defensive weapons.
> e. *Machine Guns*. Machine guns normally are not employed against rioters. Those not larger than .30 cal. may be mounted on selected vehicles in formation for their psychological effect and for availability should the situation deteriorate to the point where their use would be authorized.[78]

Another Army manual makes the following suggestions:

> —Soldiers who are fired on and who can identify the locations of those firing may return aimed, single-shot fire at their targets.
> —Soldiers entering areas known or strongly suspected to contain armed suspects may lock and load.
> —Detention of suspects who may be armed calls for a weapon locked and loaded.
> —Only on the explicit orders of a senior commander will troops employ automatic fire.[79]

INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING MANUALS

The Show of Force

Most international peacekeeping manuals agree on the value of shows of force. This agreement is not surprising since many of these manuals have a common source: the United Nations. (The United Nations has a show-of-force orientation; it derives in part from the UN Charter.)

An interesting show of force tactic, "manifesting the presence" of peacekeepers, is discussed in a manual used by the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP):

> Whenever a threat of violence develops. . . . [unit] commanders should approach the local leaders of both communities. Mobile patrols shall immediately be organized to *manifest the presence* of UNFICYP in the threatened or disturbed areas in whatever strength

is available. (All appropriate means will be used to promote calm and restraint.)

If all attempts at peaceful settlement fail, unit commanders may recommend to their senior commander that UNFICYP troops be deployed in such threatened areas.[80]

The same manual implies that firearms are more for "show" than for "use:"

The troops of the Force carry arms which, however, are to be employed only for self-defense † should this become necessary in the discharge of its function. . . .[82]

International peacekeeping manuals rarely specify the exact way in which shows of force are to be carried out, as other manuals often do. This is unfortunate because shows of force are extremely handy in the international arena where so much that goes on is symbolic and political.

The Use of Nonviolent Force

Arrests, formations

Almost nothing is said about arrest procedures in international peacekeeping manuals. Such matters are generally left to the discretion of the commanders of the various contingents. This is probably as it should be, since troop contingents from different nations have practices and procedures based on different national styles and cultural temperaments, which are difficult to change over to one standard format.

Regarding the use of formations, a manual used in Cyprus is very adamant about peacekeepers avoiding actions that might unnecessarily threaten conflict participants:

No action is to be taken by the troops of UNFICYP which is likely to bring them into direct conflict with either community in Cyprus, except in the following circumstances:

(a) where members of the Force are compelled to act in self-defense;
(b) where the safety of the Force or of the members of it is in jeopardy;
(c) where specific arrangements accepted by both communities have

† A manual used by UN peacekeepers in the Congo mentions one of the grounds for self-defense:

Any effort to disarm members of the United Nations Force is to be regarded as a legitimate cause for self-defense.[81]

> been . . . violated, thus risking a recurrence of fighting or endangering law and order.[83]

The same manual discusses the use of interposition formations:

> If UNFICYP units arrive at the scene of an actual conflict. . . , the commander on the spot will immediately call on the leaders of both communities to break off the conflict and arrange for a cease-fire. . . . In certain cases, it may be possible to enforce a cease-fire by interposing UNFICYP military posts between those involved, but if this is not acceptable to those involved in the conflict, or if there is doubt about its effectiveness, it should not normally be done, as it may only lead to a direct clash between UNFICYP troops and those involved in the conflict.[84]

Other actions and formations used in international peacekeeping are described in this excerpt dealing with International Control Commission (ICC) peacekeepers in Vietnam:

> [The ICC] shall fulfill the tasks of control, observation, inspection and investigation connected with the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, and it shall in particular:
>
> a) Control the movement of the armed forces of the two parties. . . .
> b) Supervise the demarcation lines . . . and also the demilitarized zones.
> c) Control the operations of releasing prisoners of war and civilian internees.
> d) Supervise at ports and airfields as well as along the frontiers, . . . regulating the introduction into the country of armed forces, military personnel and all kinds of arms, munitions and war materiel.[85]

Nonlethal weapons

Most international peacekeeping manuals ignore the subject of nonlethal weapons. This is regrettable, for nonlethal weapons can solve some of the problems ‡ that arise when the use of firearms

‡ General Carl Von Horn, a commander in the UN peacekeeping operation in the Congo, described one of the problems this way:

> The physical difficulties of sticking to the rules of peacekeeping became sharply apparent at Thysville. Our orders were specific; force was to be used *only* in self-defense, nor were we allowed any latitude however threatening the situation. . . . Orders like these present a commander with a distinct moral problem: whether to risk his men's lives by involving them in a situation where some of them are bound to get shot before having a chance to defend themselves—or whether to risk the failure of a mission (on whose success the lives of many civilians may depend) through a reluctance to expose his soldiers to what he considers an intolerable degree of risk.[86]

is severely restricted as it is in many UN operations. Nonlethal weapons allow peacekeepers more latitude in their conduct during crises as well as routine maneuvers. Among other things, they make the consequences of erroneous shootings less catastrophic. If nonlethal weapons were actively adopted during international peacekeeping, such operations would probably result in fewer deaths and less legal and political turmoil.

The Use of Violent Force

Impact weapons

Handbooks used by international peacekeepers say very little about the use of impact weapons, probably because such weapons are not normally carried by soldiers. International soldiers would be well advised to carry them, however, since they add versatility to their response repertoire and allow them to react to provocations with mild rather than severe physical force.

Firearms

International peacekeeping manuals deal extensively with the question of *when* the discharge of firearms is justified. They usually advocate firing only in self-defense. The manual for UN soldiers in the Middle East operation suggests:

> Men engaged in the operation may never take the initiative in the use of armed force, but are entitled to respond to an attack with arms, including attempts to make them withdraw from positions which they occupy. . . . The basic element involved is clearly the prohibition against *initiative* in the use of armed force.[87]

And the manual used by UN peacekeepers in the Congo states, in the "Use of Arms" section, "Under no account are weapons to be used except for sudden emergency." In the "Protection of Internal Security" section, it adds that troops must "exhaust all peaceful means" before firing and must "avoid harming people" at all costs.[88]

The guidelines for the UN peacekeeping effort in Cyprus spell out who should decide *when* firearms are to be discharged:

> The decision as to when force may be used . . . rests with the commander on the spot whose main concern will be to distinguish between an incident which does not require fire to be opened and those situations in which troops may be authorized to use force. [Incidents of the latter type include:]

(a) attempts by force to compel [UN troops] to withdraw from a position. . .
(b) attempts by force to disarm them. . .
(c) attempts by force to prevent them from carrying out their responsibilities. . .
(d) violation by force of United Nations premises and attempts to arrest or abduct United Nations personnel, civil or military.[89]

International peacekeeping manuals specify not only when, but *how* deadly force is to be applied. For example, the condensed manual instructions—printed on a wallet-sized card—carried by every Canadian UN peacekeeper while on duty in Cyprus—require that warnings be given before opening fire:

> A warning must always be given unless any delay might lead to the death or serious injury of yourself or the persons it is your duty to protect. The warning must:
> (a) Be as loud and clear as possible.
> (b) Include orders to stop attacking or to halt (Greek for halt is "Stammater", Turk is "Dur").
> (c) State you will open fire if the orders are not obeyed.[90]

These same abridged instructions declare further:

> If fire is opened:
> (a) Two warning shots will be fired before resorting to aimed rounds.
> (b) Thereafter, aim at ring-leaders and at their legs if possible.
> (c) Fire is only to be continued until the immediate aim is achieved.
> (d) Automatic fire is not to be used except in extreme emergency.
> (e) High explosive weapons will not be used unless personally ordered by the Commanding Officer, who has to obtain the Force Commander's authority.[91]

SUMMARY

It would be impossible to summarize the plethora of information presented in this chapter. The rules and regulations for police, riot troops, and soldiers regarding the hierarchy of response—from shows of force to locking, loading, and firing—are complex and diverse. Moreover, the "do's" and "don'ts" of peacekeeping vary according to the size of the conflict being dealt with. One point is clear, however; there is a paucity of information in peacekeeping manuals regarding the utilization of non-lethal weapons.

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[PART IV]

SHOWS OF FORCE

[CHAPTER 11]

THREATS, WARNING SHOTS & MASSED TROOPS

Most manuals used by police and other peacekeepers maintain that shows of force are useful tools for dealing with violence and conflict. Shows of force consist of displays of the potential strength that peacekeepers can muster; and they range from a single policeman speaking in a strong, stern voice to a large number of riot-equipped soldiers brandishing weapons in full view of disputing parties. Such displays enable peacekeepers to influence the behavior of disputants during a crisis.

Because shows of force usually involve direct or indirect threats, they place a decisional burden on threatened parties: their behavior, not the threatening peacekeeper's determines what happens next. The critical mechanism operating here is deterrence. According to political scientist Thomas Schelling:

> Deterrence . . . is concerned with influencing the choices that another party will make, and doing it by influencing his expectations of how we will behave. It involves confronting him with evidence for believing that our behavior will be determined by his behavior.[1]

Show-of-force threats are of two types. *Punishment* threats warn disputing parties that they will be harmed or injured if they do not comply with demands. *Denial* threats warn them that they will be prevented from doing certain things. (When peacekeepers, singly or in a cordon, keep disputing parties apart, they are implicitly making a denial threat.)

On the surface, shows of force would seem to be unfailingly useful peacekeeping tools. Many police manuals wholeheartedly endorse their use, and many social scientists, including some on prestigious commissions, do so too. To mention but one of the latter, sociologist Richard Lambert—writing on the experience of British peacekeepers during the Hindu-Muslim intercommunal conflicts in India—concluded that "a highly visible display of

overwhelming force at the command of third party peacekeepers [decreases the] likelihood of violence."[2]

However, shows of force are not always useful. They have disadvantages in some peacekeeping situations and can easily be abused. For one thing, they are provocative in certain circumstances. Show-of-force threats can provoke hostility and resistance if threatened parties feel they are equal or superior to threatening peacekeepers. In many cultures, to be intimidated by an equal or an inferior is to suffer a loss of face and a consequent loss of self-respect. Since this is psychologically painful, it is something to be avoided. In conflict situations this means resisting or even counter-threatening peacekeepers.[3] (Resistance and counter-threats do not occur when disputing parties see such responses as suicidal, however. Here parties rationalize their yielding to the threatener as necessary for survival; and thus they feel no loss of self-respect.)

An example of a provocative *small scale* show of force is the police peacekeeper tactic of firing warning shots over the heads of disputing parties to get them to obey an order. (Drawing the firearm, but not firing it, constitutes a similar but less emphatic display of force.) In theory, warning shots make good sense, but in practice they tend to excite and/or provoke the parties involved. Parties often mistake warning shots for the real thing and feel compelled to shoot back when they would not have done so otherwise. An equally serious danger is that other peacekeepers in the area may make the same mistake and fire at disputants or even at fellow peacekeepers. Furthermore, if warning shots fail, peacekeepers have an unfortunate, if natural, urge to follow them up with aimed shots, even when to do so is not legally justifiable.

Other practical considerations argue against show-of-force warning shots. They pose a risk to bystanders, especially in densely populated urban areas—"What goes up must come down" applies to bullets too. They also provide an all too easy excuse for reckless peacekeepers, who can say after shooting someone, "I only meant to fire a warning." (All these considerations apply doubly to firing from or at moving vehicles—a practice most police agree should be avoided.)

Examples of provocative *large scale* shows of force can also be cited.

A Tale of Three Cities:

In *Miami* peacekeepers brought shotguns and police dogs with them when they responded to a racially tense situation in 1968. According to the Campbell Report of the Violence Commission, this particular show of force provoked violence and was partially responsible for the turmoil that subsequently engulfed the city.

In *Chicago* in the same year police, Guardsmen, and Army riot troopers erected barricades, cyclone fences, and detention pens in anticipation of trouble at the Democratic National Convention. The Walker Report of the Violence Commission suggests that these actions exacerbated tensions on all sides and helped provoke later violence.

And in *New York* police intensified the atmosphere of crisis at Columbia University in 1968 by massing themselves on the campus to effect a show of force. As the Cox Commission contends, this caused many conflict participants to entrench themselves more strongly and escalate their destructive behavior.

Shows of force have other disadvantages besides provocativeness. They can tip the hand of peacekeepers by prematurely revealing their numbers and resources to disputing parties. Once disputants know these things, peacekeepers cannot use the uncertainty about their true strength to moderate the conflict. Also if shows of force require peacekeepers to be stationed for long periods of time among disputants, peacekeepers may be subjected to harassment or fraternization—both of which can eventually undermine their morale and effectiveness.

Sometimes shows of force simply do not work. This happens if rationality, credibility, or communicability—upon which show-of-force efficacy depends—are lacking in a conflict situation.

Rationality

For show-of-force threats to be effective, conflicting parties must be rational. They must be able to consider and reconsider their objectives and, if necessary, change their behavior when confronted with peacekeeper threats. Peacekeepers often assume that threatened parties want to maximize their chances of gaining their objectives. When the odds against this happening become too great, peacekeepers reason parties will rationally yield. However, the problem is that disputing parties are not always

rational or else circumstances prohibit their being so. Disputants do not always think through the consequences of their actions. Small, weak husbands may attack large, strapping policemen during interpersonal peacekeeping, and lightly armed soldiers may assault heavily armed UN troops during international peacekeeping.

Irrationality such as this may be caused by drugs, insanity, stupidity, emotionality, or intense devotion to a cause or a particular set of values. The value issue warrants elaboration. Disputants' values may genuinely differ from those of peacekeepers regarding the worth of human life, the importance of being victorious, or the merit in not letting oneself be told what to do. Such differences in values are likeliest to occur when disputants and peacekeepers come from divergent cultural backgrounds —something which happens most often in international peacekeeping, but which can occur whenever the race, religion, or ethnicity of disputants and peacekeepers differ.

Credibility

If they are not credible to threatened parties, shows of force can fail. At Kent State, neither activists nor administrators believed the National Guard would use deadly force. It seemed totally out of place on the quiet, tree-lined campus. Activists did not take seriously the helmeted Guardsmen who repeatedly aimed their rifles at them in a threatening manner. How could they open fire on students who were only jeering and throwing debris?

Show-of-force threats often lack credibility not because the threats themselves are unbelievable but because peacekeepers do not seem strong enough or committed enough to carry them out. (Most peacekeepers would rather not follow through on their threats; they try very hard, though, not to let disputants sense this reluctance.)

Peacekeepers can enhance the credibility of their threats by a number of tactics. They can announce their threats publicly, so that backing down is very difficult; they can make their threatened action automatic, to remove any chance for second thoughts; and they can give disputants a taste of what may come (by arresting or tear-gassing a few of them, for example), to underscore the realness of the threat.

Communication

Finally, shows of force can fail if threats are not clearly communicated. This is most likely to happen when peacekeepers and disputing parties speak different languages or come from different subcultures (e.g. *white* police dealing with *black* marital disputants; *adult* gang workers dealing with *adolescent* gang youths). A lack of communication is also likely to result if peacekeeper threats are extremely brief and subtle or if tension is very high, as it often is in violent situations. These things can cause threatened parties to misconstrue, oversimplify, or misunderstand the directions and intentions of peacekeepers.

SUMMARY

To summarize, the usefulness of warning shots, massed troops, and other shows of force depends on the peacekeeping situation and on the manner in which they are used. Although the "language" of shows of force is almost universally understood, there are still frequent "translation" problems involving ambiguity, distortion, and misperception. When shows of force fail because of these or other problems, the logical next step in the hierarchy of peacekeeper response is the use of nonviolent force. The following two chapters concern themselves with this: Chapter 12 examines nonviolent English bobbies and Chapter 13 probes nonlethal weapons.

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[PART V]

USES OF NONVIOLENT FORCE

[CHAPTER 12]

ENGLISH BOBBIES: PEACEKEEPERS PAR EXCELLENCE

THE ENGLISH POLICE, or bobbies, are extremely talented peacekeepers. Moreover, they rely almost exclusively on nonviolent force to perform their tasks. Thus, one of the best ways to learn about the use of nonviolent force during peacekeeping is to observe how bobbies deal with serious conflicts.

Numbering about 100,000, bobbies are also called constable, officer, or mate by their countrymen. They wear navy-blue uniforms with staybright buttons and distinctive bell-like helmets. These almost come down over their eyes so that they sometimes have to tilt their heads back to see the person to whom they are talking. (They wear flat-topped hats when they ride in patrol cars.)

Bobbies are probably best known for the fact that they do not carry firearms, except on rare occasions when they guard visiting dignitaries, protect threatened embassies, or pursue vicious criminals who are known to be armed. On such occasions, certain authorized bobbies check out guns and ammunition from senior officials and return them as soon as the circumstances warrant, with all ammunition accounted for. Only 5 percent of all bobbies are qualified for such duty. They become so by completing a rigorous firearms course which teaches them mostly "when not to shoot." They must maintain their shooting skills and demonstrate their marksmanship every four months at a firing range.

Most bobbies, then, are "armed" only with a softwood nightstick, which is kept out of sight in a long pocket running down the outside of the right trouser leg. (By contrast, some American police departments have redesigned patrol uniforms in recent years just to make weapons and paraphernalia more visible.)

One veteran bobby talked about his nightstick this way:

> I have never drawn my stick in anger. It's old-fashioned. We're taught enough self-defense so that if a chap comes at you with a missile or an iron bar, you should be able to handle him. Of course, if a chap comes up and gives you a real solid clout behind the ear, you may think of drawing the stick, but what you actually do is to give him a real solid clout back. . . . There are situations that might warrant drawing the stick. Say, you were surrounded by a group of real roughs—leather-jacketed chaps swinging bicycle chains. And they wouldn't listen to reason. If you had your back to the wall, your stick would be your last line of defense.[1]

Bobbies also carry a two-way radio (concealed in a pocket to avoid setting the constable apart from the general public). A small microphone-speaker unit is affixed to the left jacket lapel. This system keeps bobbies in touch with their station house from any place on their beat. Some bobbies carry handcuffs, but most do not, feeling they are "a bit too primitive." Few suspects try to escape once they are under the watchful eye of a bobby. If and when they do, bobbies rely on swift feet to catch them and full nelsons to subdue them.

About one in eight of the 21,000 bobbies in London walks a beat. (These beats were re-established recently to revive the old village patrol system, in which the bobby living on his beat knew everybody and everybody knew him.) Other bobbies ride in three-man squad cars with one of the three in the back seat wearing street clothes rather than a uniform. Still others patrol by horse, bicycle, or motorcycle.

A Policeman's Lot

What has been the result of the bobbies' practice of using nonviolent force and other humanitarian peacekeeping techniques in their day-to-day activities and efforts to moderate serious conflicts? The most obvious result has been that bobbies almost never take a life. On the average, not even one person is killed each year by English police. (By contrast, an average of 262 persons are killed each year by American police* [2].)

Moreover, until recently less than one bobby per year was killed while keeping the peace or performing other duties. (By comparison, more than fifty police per year were killed in America. Thus, the yearly total was more than the total killed in England

*The breakdown of these deaths is quite interesting:

between 1910 and 1966! Or put another way, between 1946 and 1966, nineteen bobbies were killed as compared to 1,014 American police.[4]) Lately, however, the number of both English and American police killed per year has almost doubled: nine bobbies were killed between 1966 and 1971,[5] while 425 American police were killed during the same period.[6] *

Bobbies are able to be quite humanitarian in their policework and peacekeeping because certain social and cultural factors in England make the use of nonviolence a viable and effective policy. Several of these factors are discussed at length below.

Civilian Control

The first factor is the traditional English concern about democracy and civilian control of the military. When the bobbies were created in 1829 by Sir Robert "Bobby" Peel, there was a wide-

Number of Americans Killed
by Police Intervention [3]

Year	*Total*	*White*		*Nonwhite*	
		male	*female*	*male*	*female*
1950	282	135	2	145	0
1951	227	115	0	110	2
1952	256	128	2	125	1
1953	255	124	1	130	0
1954	244	130	0	112	2
1955	227	111	0	114	2
1956	226	123	0	103	0
1957	228	119	0	109	0
1958	229	111	0	117	1
1959	227	109	1	117	0
1960	245	124	1	118	2
1961	237	132	2	103	0
1962	187	88	1	94	1
1963	246	111	0	129	2
1964	274	131	3	143	1
1965	271	154	0	117	0
1966	298	150	1	144	3
1967	387	200	2	182	3
1968	350	163	1	181	5
1969	354	160	2	190	2

*The differences in these casualty figures are similar to the differences in the general homicide rates for the two countries. In 1969, England had 213 homicides (a rate of 0.4 per 100,000) while the United States had 14,640 (a rate of 7.3 per 100,000).[7]

spread feeling that if they were armed they could easily become more of a military than a civilian force. Fiercely democratic Englishmen feared that too much domestic military power could result if armed police aligned themselves with armed soldiers, as they had done from time to time in France, Germany, and other countries on the Continent. A Parliamentary committee report issued in 1829 addressed itself to the threat that powerful police could pose:

> [I]t is difficult to reconcile an effective system of police with that perfect freedom of action and exemption from interference, which are the great privileges and blessings of society in this country. . . .[8]

Peel felt that the new police force had to be tailored to the needs of British society if it was to succeed. He therefore armed the original police, or Peelers as they were sometimes called, with only a truncheon and outfitted them with top hats to symbolize their nonmilitary character. He also arranged for civilians to hold high posts in the police administration. (This practice has persevered. Over the years top administrators, including many Commissioners of the London Metropolitan Police, have been civilians rather than career policemen. This has helped integrate the bobbies into British society, preventing the polarization of police and citizens.)

America solved the civilian control problem differently from England. In the United States the concern about democracy caused the same fear of excessive police power; but rather than keep local police unarmed, the American people forbade them to consolidate or become part of a nation-wide organization. The US Constitution stipulates in fact that state and federal legislative interference in local police matters be kept to a minimum to prevent the possible creation of a national police organization.

Gun Regulation

The second factor which facilitates the bobbies' use of nonviolent tactics is England's strict gun control laws. A tradition of civility and a fear that criminals might resort to firearms have made strict and effective gun control practicable in England. (Conversely, a tradition of frontier independence and a fear of being without an "equalizer" have made such control almost impossible in the United States.)

English citizens who want to own a firearm today must prove

to their local police chief not only that they need one but also that they have the character and integrity requisite for owning one.[9] Police extensively investigate each applicant for a gun license. Proving that one has a genuine need for a *hand*gun is extremely difficult, unless one must control vermin or wild animals on a farm. A permit for a *long* gun (sporting rifle or the like) is granted only on the condition that the weapon be kept in a gun club armory and not in a home. (While there has been a certain influx of illegal firearms into England since World War II, authorities have made a concerted effort to round these up by means of amnesty periods when people can turn weapons into the police without fear of being questioned or arrested.)

The upshot of all this is that English criminals and conflict participants are not likely to be armed, and—if armed—are not likely to shoot. According to a US Violence Commission study, guns are six times *less* apt to be used in robberies in England than in robberies in the United States.* And, when an English homicide occurs, guns are three times *less* likely to have been used.[10] These Violence Commission comparisons take into account (and control for) the fact that there is a greater incidence of these crimes in the United States, and that there are other contextual and statistical differences between the two countries. The comparison figures support the proposition—long denied by the National Rifle Association—that fewer guns means less gun violence; or, more formally, that legal regulations that decrease gun ownership can reduce the use of guns in violent incidents.[11]

Another major consequence of English gun control laws is that bobbies do not need to carry firearms. This is very much to their liking. In August 1966, after three bobbies were shot and killed in London, the issue of arming them was raised. The bobbies' own Police Federation claimed that half the police in England would resign if it was decided they had to carry guns. The issue was quickly dropped. When one bobby was asked recently whether he wanted to be armed, he responded in tones of pained surprise, "No, it isn't safe." [12] A veteran bobby—asked a similar question—replied:

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* In the armed bank robberies that are becoming more common in Britain, the general practice among English criminals is to flourish their guns rather than fire them. If they shoot them, they usually aim at the ceiling—only with the intent of frightening people.

> We would become just like America—the more guns we have, the more guns criminals will get. The result would be shoot-em-ups with bystanders and policemen getting killed just as often as criminals. I'd resign.[13]

And another veteran responded:

> If we were told that as of the first of next month the Met Police would be armed, I think there would be complete rebellion in the ranks. Nobody wants it. As a Police Federation representative, I know that it is the policy of the force as a whole. If the police were armed, that would give the criminals an excuse to be armed too. We don't want that. As it is, a really good professional thief wouldn't think of carrying a gun. That has always been true here.[14]

Allegedly, criminals frown on the use of guns by fellow criminals because of the dangerous escalation of stakes that might result.

Thus, a tacit understanding exists between police and criminals in England. Both want to maintain the *modus vivendi*. In a sense, police and criminals play a game which adheres to British notions of fair play and sportsmanship. The criminal makes his moves within certain boundaries, as does the bobby. If caught, the criminal says "OK, I'm out of the game." After serving his time in the penalty box, he may come back for another try.

This understanding extends to interactions between bobbies and average citizens as well. Since there is only a minute chance that the man-on-the-street will be armed, bobbies can use nonviolent tactics without compromising their own safety. Also they can approach quarrelling spouses, disputing groups of political demonstrators, and so forth in a friendly, unsuspicious way. By contrast, many American police feel they must approach such people—and even ordinary traffic violators—with holster unsnapped or gun drawn to avoid the possibility of an armed person getting the jump on them. Recurrent suspicion of this sort creates a psychological wall between police and citizens, decreasing contact between them and contributing to a breakdown of mutual respect.

Respect

The third factor that enables bobbies to use nonviolent, humanitarian techniques is the mutual respect that exists between them and the people they deal with. (As noted, mutual respect cannot develop when a barrier of distrust exists between police

and citizens. Once such a barrier has been erected, it tends to be perpetuated. As respect for the police begins to diminish, police may feel they have to use physical force to get the respect they are losing.† But this use of physical force may in turn cause further erosion of citizen respect. The use of physical force may also give some police a false sense of competence which may create a disdain on their part for additional training and self-improvement. This leads to a continuation of ineptitude, which causes citizens to lose even more respect for them. Police may then come to feel they must use even greater force to coerce respect. Eventually, they may feel they must fire their guns‡. And so it goes—a vicious spiral which is hard to reverse.)

In contrast to the lack of respect for police that exists in some cities in the United States, there is a great deal of respect for bobbies in England. A recent Opinion Research Centre poll found that over 90 percent of the English populace feels that the bobbies are "helpful, polite, friendly, efficient, fair, and honest." [18]

The majority of English police, like most American police, come from the ranks of the working class which is comprised primarily of skilled and semi-skilled laborers. However, this has not caused bobbies to lose the respect of the middle class; in fact, they gain better marks from the middle class than they do from the working class. Social anthropologist Geoffrey Gorer questioned a self-selected sample of 4,983 men and women in England about their feelings toward bobbies. (He labeled their responses: "Favorable," "Neutral," "Critical," "Hostile," or "No Answer.") The following percent in each class stratum felt "Favorable" towards the bobbies: Upper middle, 79; Middle, 74; Lower middle, 74; Upper working, 72; Working, 74; and Lower working, 65.[19] (These figures do not mean, by the way, that the bob-

† William Westley discovered that "disrespect for the police" was the most frequently cited reason for "roughing a man up" among the US police.[15] Moreover, researcher John McNamera found that 55 percent of all New York police with two years or more experience agreed with the statement that "respect for the police in a tough neighborhood depends on the willingness of patrolmen to use force frequently and effectively." [16]

‡ According to some analysts, this is what has happened in parts of America. If so, it is very much in keeping with American customs and convention, at least as British sociologist Michael Banton sees them:

> To the visiting European, it appears as if the revolver is the prime symbol of virility [in America]: a man without a gun who cannot shoot is a poor creature.[17]

bies are friends of the propertied class and enemies of the working class. As the percentages show, the majority of every class stratum respects them.)

Another indication of the respect bobbies elicit is given by the fact that the British public has seen to it that their courts severely punish anyone who assaults or injures a bobby. Although it is difficult to say precisely what the "average" penalty is for a given offense, the available evidence suggests that the English police are supported by court rulings to a significantly greater degree than their American counterparts. Some typical penalties illustrate this point: a Liverpool man was recently sentenced to seven years imprisonment for assaulting an officer, and a London man was fined and sentenced to a year's penal servitude for hitting an officer while being arrested.[20] In contrast, a man in Boston was fined only $40 for punching a police lieutenant in the face; and in many American cities, a man reputedly gets fined less for assaulting a policeman than for assaulting a civilian.[21]

One reason bobbies are respected is that they respect the public. The following remark by a bobby helps explain why they are so deferential:

> We are the servants of the public. That's dinned into us from the day we set foot in training school, and we're never allowed to forget it.[22]

As a public courtesy, bobbies do not smoke on duty, and they address nearly everybody as "Sir" or "Madame." This politeness is sometimes carried to such extremes that some bobbies appear to be cold and impersonal. (The British are often said to value order more highly than warmth; and this—like so many other things—may be reflected in the behavior of their police.)

Another reason bobbies are respected is that they exemplify the ideal English male, who is fair, impartial, self-controlled, and possessed of more strength than he ever needs to use. (American police, on the other hand, do not exemplify any ideal quite this clearly, in part because Americans agree less than Englishmen about ideal roles.)

As exemplars, bobbies are made, not born. They undergo extensive training and socialization. Much of it harks back to Peel's Code for Constables, which exhorts them to "be civil and oblig-

ing to all people of every rank and class." Another time-honored guideline for bobbies is this advice drawn up in 1832:

> The Constable must remember that there is no qualification more indispensible to a police officer than a perfect command of temper, never suffering himself to be moved in the slightest degree by any language or threats that may be used. If he does his duty in a quiet and determined manner, such conduct will probably induce well-disposed bystanders to assist him should he require it.[23]

The last sentence is important. Bystanders in England come to the aid of the police quite regularly. A veteran bobby explains:

> The way things are now, it works like this: I'm walking down the street, and three chaps jump out and start punching me. Now, these traders see what's going on and they say, 'Well, look at old Tom. He's having a punchup. Do you reckon he can handle it, or shall we give him a hand?' Maybe they'll say, 'It will do him good to get a kickup.' But the chances are they'll say, 'Let's go along and give him a hand.' And the butcher will turn out, and the greengrocer, and it's all over. . . . But now say that I have a gun. These traders would have a look and say, 'Why should we bother? Tom's got a gun. If it gets serious, he can use it.' That is what we never want to happen. Never.[24]

There are instances when even criminals will help bobbies in distress, as in the following account:

> [A London bobby] was pursuing a burglar over a warehouse roof when he trod on a skylight, fell through, and remained there hanging by his hands. Hearing his shouts, the burglar returned, helped him up, and was arrested. In court shortly afterwards he received a lighter sentence in recognition of his action.[25]

In the United States, bystanders do not often assist police who are in trouble. One of many possible explanations for this is that because Americans live in a society of extremely specialized roles and occupations, they adopt the attitude: "The police are paid to do this. It's their job, why should I get involved?"

As a matter of fact, Americans seem reluctant to concern themselves with trouble or disturbances of any sort. The classic example of this was the case in Queens in 1964 when thirty-eight upper middle class residents watched from their windows as Kitty Genovese was stabbed three different times in the course of a half-hour late at night. None of the thirty-eight made an

effort to intervene and none of them took the time to call the police.

Accordingly, potential victims of muggings have been advised to yell "Fire" rather than "Help" because residents allegedly get involved only when their property is threatened. Auto tire manufacturers have even capitalized on American's unwillingness to be Good Samaritans; they urge women consumers to buy expensive puncture-proof tires because "No one will stop to help fix a flat anymore."

Of course, bystander involvement is a complicated phenomenon,* and it may run in cycles. Recently, several score New Yorkers apparently held a couple of robbery suspects captive by encircling their escape car until the police arrived. Urbanism seems to be a major factor in determining samaritanism. A new car "abandoned" in urban Manhattan was stripped bare within days and no one intervened, whereas the same make car "left" in suburban Palo Alto (California) was untouched for weeks, presumably because residents would have immediately intervened.

As a result of these and other considerations, many American police have come to believe that they are the sole agents of social control in society.† They believe that they and they alone stand between civilization and barbarism, order and anarchy. (Movies such as "Dirty Harry" express this notion.) In a few urban settings this belief may be valid. Churches, schools, and other in-

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* Criminologist Walter Reckless [26] notes that there are several desiderata which determine bystander involvement: whether the victim's plight elicits a sympathetic response, whether the victim has "egged on" the aggressor, and whether the victim's or doer's obvious characteristics (age, sex, race, etc.) elicit empathy from the bystander. Reckless also quotes L. S. Shaskolsky on the problem of "defining the situation" under such circumstances:

> The innocent bystander to a crime is often faced with a difficult and ambiguous situation requiring immediate reaction. The bystander must determine whether a crime is in fact being perpetrated, if so, what to do about it, and how to go about reacting.
>
> A cry for help, the suspicious movements of a stranger, a display of physical force—all of these are no more than warning signs of the possibility that a criminal act is taking place. Yet they contain no intrinsic demonstration of such fact. They form merely one aspect (albeit an important aspect) of an overall situation.

† Social control refers to those means—formal or informal—by which people are taught, persuaded, or compelled to conform to the norms and standards of social aggregates. *Formal* controls are exercised by police, judges, teachers, ministers, and the like; while *informal* controls are implemented through such things as gossip, publicity, and social pressure.

stitutions may not be doing their job; and so the police may be the only effective agents of formal social control. But even in these situations, police efforts are buttressed by informal controls: sanctions from individuals and families, pressures from business and community, to name only a few. However, for these informal controls to work optimally, the population in question must be fairly homogeneous.

Homogeneity

The fourth factor which allows bobbies to use humanitarian techniques is the homogeneity of England. England is homogeneous because it is relatively small (about forty-nine million population), and is situated on an island, giving everyone a kind of common identity and common fate. Because the English have not had to constantly fight off foreign invaders over the centuries, they have had time to work out their own differences and learn how to get along with one another. In addition, most of the English have internalized the same basic values and traditions; and not just for a given moment, but for generations. Many of the English come from families which have lived in the same communities for hundreds of years.

Of late though, an influx of immigrants from vastly different cultural backgrounds, plus an increase in geographical and social mobility, have begun to erode England's homogeneity. There are now about 1.3 million minorities—Indians, Pakistanis, West Indians, and Black Africans—in England. Minorities constitute 3 percent of London's population, (they constitute 35 percent of New York's population), and they have begun to agitate for better social and economic conditions. This has meant protests and demonstrations. Out of the turmoil have come charges of police prejudice and brutality. In fact, seventeen bobbies were injured during a recent demonstration by minorities against the "pig" police.

Despite these changes, England is still exceedingly homogeneous, which means that bobbies are helped in their social control task by both formal and informal constraints. It also means that bobbies enforce rules and laws that most everyone believes in; they do not have to impose things on citizens against their will.

Fortunately for bobbies, the English have not only developed a strong consensus on values, they have also chosen a set of values

which facilitates their peacekeeping task. Over the centuries, the English have come to value and venerate tolerance, compromise, and fair play. (According to George Orwell, "gentleness" should be added to this list.) In combination with self-discipline, this set of values has allowed the English to create a very orderly, yet free society.

Peacekeeping and Crisis Management

The use of nonviolent force and humanitarian techniques helps bobbies remove some of the explosive potential from crises. One bobby described how this is done:

> The first aim of a policeman is to take the heat out of the situation. He must do this whether it involves two people or two hundred. His approach is the same—the use of tact and conciliatory methods. He must *never* show himself as an authoritarian individual but always as a human being.[27]

The fact that bobbies do not carry guns actually enables them to defuse crises more efficiently. Disputing parties (as well as criminals) who deal with bobbies do not feel that their lives are in immediate danger. Therefore, a crisis situation is calmer from the start; no one is likely to see it as an "all or nothing" confrontation. Moreover, no one needs to be anxiously alert to every slight movement, every blink of an eye. As a result, even armed people are not likely to attack bobbies.

For the bobbies' part, they know that if people elude them, they can be caught later given reasonable effort and diligence on their part. There is very little of the "do or die," "now or never" pressure that often triggers reckless or dangerous behavior in American police. In short, bobbies and others share certain expectations about the behavior permissible during encounters, and they all tend to react accordingly. Without firearms, everyone is less of a danger to himself and to everyone else.

Like American police, English police must handle numerous family fights, or "house rows" as they call them. Unlike American police, though, bobbies do not usually dread this part of their work; they consider it a routine matter.[28] Banton describes one such intervention:

> [A very agitated woman beseeched a bobby:] 'Would you give me assistance please? My husband's lifted his hands to me.' She went

on to stay [that he had attacked her on several previous occasions too.] The husband [then ran up to them and told his wife—in front of the bobby—to go home and get her bloody belongings because he was kicking her out.] When he used the adjective 'bloody' the policeman promptly said, 'Let's cut out the swearing,' . . . . Suspecting they were about to come to blows, the constable . . . followed them to their flat to see there was no breech of the peace. At the flat the parties gave further details. . . . He spoke of how she had once gone for him with a poker; she said he had had eighteen different women; once she thought he had given her a venereal disease and she had taken an overdose of sleeping tablets. . . . [This venting of emotion by both sides calmed them. Since they seemed reconciled, the officer left.[29]]

The bobby in this episode was barely twenty years old, and yet he was regarded as a respected mediator before whom a thirty-two year old man and his thirty-seven year old wife could state their cases. The youth's status as a bobby gave him the authority to arbitrate quarrels and represent popular morality despite his relative inexperience with life.

Another example of the firm but tactful approach the English take to conflict management is provided by this account of a peacekeeping soldier who prevented a rock and bottle throwing spree between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland:

> It is a Saturday afternoon and the Protestants are marching past the Catholic flats on their way home from a football match. . . . A Protestant middle-aged woman with a florid, hate-filled face stands on the street corner in the midst of the mob, shouting at the residents of the Unity Flats. She is screeching at the top of her lungs:
>
> "Oh, we'll fuck the Fenian bastards. We'll fuck the Fenian bastards. . . ." A major of the British grenadiers . . . walks through the crowd and stops in front of the woman. He places his walking stick right on her shoulder to assure he will get her full attention.
>
> "See here, madam," the major says, "this is all going to be very low key here today. All very low key. Do you understand?" [30]

The English frequently amaze foreign observers with their even-handed, efficacious peacekeeping during small as well as large conflicts. Bobbies themselves do not wear protective clothing—except for their standard cork-lined bell helmets—and they even shun tear gas, water cannon, and conventional riot formations. Instead of traditional formations, they form human chains (by linking arms) to contain conflicts and protect people or property. While in such formations, bobbies talk freely with conflict-

ing parties, attempt to keep close to them, and try to ignore epithets and obscenities, being cognizant of the fact that the shouters are usually just letting off steam.

In sum, English bobbies are peacekeepers par excellence. They exhibit nonpartisanship and iron discipline during their peacekeeping efforts; and they always endeavor to use an absolute minimum of force.

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[CHAPTER 13]

NONLETHAL WEAPONS: RUBBER BULLETS TO TRANQUILIZER GUNS

STUN GUNS, Tasar guns, chemical Mace, and instant banana peel are just a few of the science fictionesque weapons that have been recently used—or contemplated for use—by police and other peacekeepers. In the three step hierarchy of force, the use of such nonlethal weapons ranks as nonviolent force, though it is not exactly the kind of nonviolence that King and Gandhi advocated.

Authorities define "nonlethal" weapons as guns, devices, or chemical agents which do not pose a substantial risk of death or serious harm when properly used. Most nonlethal weapons have been developed as improvements on the traditional peacekeeping device, the lead bullet. Despite its impartiality—it does not discriminate between first and second parties, between adults and children, between men and women—the lead bullet, does not really keep the peace very well. It is too lethal, too capable of causing serious injury and death. By contrast, nonlethal weapons, are more appropriate for peacekeeping tasks. (One of the many reasons for this is that they do not create sympathy for the people they are employed against, as lethal weapons often do.)

Nonlethal weapons are being used with increasing frequency throughout the United States and the world. (*Local* and *state* peacekeeping expenditures for nonlethal riot control weapons were $22 million in 1968 in the United States.[1] *Federal* peacekeeping expenditures for that period were large, too: the US Army spent $11 million for CS tear gas alone in one month in 1969. The National Guard spent $20 million for CS gas in 1971.[2]) However, nonlethal weapons could be used still more often and more widely. People continue to die needlessly in situations where such weapons could have replaced or supplemented lethal ones. It is increasingly hard to justify the taking of life in peacekeeping situations and in regular policework too.

More social and technological research on nonlethal weapons needs to be undertaken. In May of 1971, Senator Edward Kennedy personally encouraged the National Science Foundation (NSF) to support further research into nonlethals. (In addition, Kennedy and New York Representative James Scheuer sponsored *legislation* to promote nonlethals research.) As a result of Kennedy's prodding, NSF has begun to fund exploratory research into nonlethal weaponry needs and priorities. Other public and private organizations are also turning their attention toward nonlethals.

This is not the first time attention has been called to the need for nonlethals research. The Violence Commission urged that government and industry cooperate to mount an intensive research and development program for nonlethal weapons. Also, the Scranton Commission on campus unrest advised:

> We recommend that the federal government actively continue its research to develop nonlethal control devices for use in civil and campus disorders.[3]

And the Kerner Commission on civil disorders counseled:

> The federal government should undertake an immediate program to test and evaluate nonlethal weapons and related control equipment for use by police and control forces.
>
> Federal support should be provided to establish criteria and standard specifications which would stimulate and facilitate the production of such items at a reasonably low cost.[4]

Civil Libertarian Concerns about Nonlethal Weapons

Part of the rationale for nonlethal weapons is that they decrease the amount of physical force that police and other peacekeepers use. They cut down on the number of police clubbings and shootings. However, some civil libertarians feel that nonlethals are more likely to be *overused* than lethals since they have less serious consequences. Libertarians cite the fact that certain police feel no qualms about using, say, Mace against disputants or demonstrators who are not threatening anyone and who may even be sitting down. This borders on "curbstone justice;" and justice should be administered in the courts by judges and juries rather than at the curbstone by police.

Civil libertarians also worry about nonlethal weapons being *misused*, as when stun guns or rubber bullet guns are fired at

close range causing death or serious injury. Libertarians believe, and rightly so, that this constitutes police negligence as well as cruel and unusual punishment. The following newspaper account tells of an eighteen year old youth in Grants, New Mexico who was the first known fatality of a popular nonlethal police weapon:

> Grants Police Chief Edgar C. Bell said the death occurred when police tried to disperse about 150 youths involved in a gang fight.
> The youth was struck directly over the heart by a shot-filled bean-bag fired from a range of about five feet, Bell said.
> A spokesman for the firm that manufactured the weapon, Bell said, indicated the bean-bag projectile was designed to be fired from a range of sixty feet.[5]

"Human" problems of overuse and misuse are bound to be more complicated and vexing that "technological" problems regarding nonlethals. (The latter can usually be solved by further engineering and refinement of hardware.) Nevertheless, the human problems are solvable too. Strict accountability for all ammunition and for each discharge of every nonlethal weapon can prevent *overuse*. Some police departments, at the end of each day, weigh the Mace canisters their officers carry, and require them to thoroughly explain any quantity expended. As for *misuse*, training, practice, and strict sanctions for negligence can go a long way toward solving the problem. It must be kept in mind, though, that both these human problems also exist with regard to lethal weapons. (In many cases solutions that are used to solve the problems raised by lethals can be applied to nonlethals as well, e.g. filling out a report every time a weapon is used, and so on.)

Police Concerns about Nonlethal Weapons

Some American police feel that conflict participants are unafraid of nonlethal weapons and are thus tempted to escalate crises and violence. But the evidence does not suggest that this is true; and even if it were true, it would not matter as long as (a) the weapons did their job and defused the conflict or (b) the peacekeepers always kept participants in the dark as to whether they were carrying lethal or nonlethal weapons.

Many police dislike the thought of being loaded down with additional bulky weapons. (This is an important issue since a heavily laden peacekeeper might prefer to use a weapon—whether lethal or nonlethal—rather than go to the trouble of chasing after someone. Complete riot gear can weigh many pounds.) But not all

nonlethal weapons are bulky—some are far less so than lethal ones—and those that are have been getting smaller every year, the inevitable product of miniaturization and technological development.

Some police also feel that nonlethal weapons compromise their safety. This is not the case, though, since nonlethals are used to supplement, not replace, firearms. (However, if faster, more reliable nonlethal weapons are developed and if effective gun control laws come to pass, nonlethals may someday replace traditional firearms.) It goes without saying, however, that police must employ standard safety precautions when using nonlethal weapons during peacekeeping efforts. These safety precautions should include the use of protective apparel (such as bulletproof vests, blazers, helmets, and the like) which enable peacekeepers to use nonlethal weapons with complete safety.

A few of the concerns police have about the reliability and performance of certain new weapons are justified. Some manufacturers of nonlethal weapons—and lethal ones as well—have occasionally misrepresented their products. They have rushed into the lucrative police weapons field, developed new items and marketed them without adequate testing. Several manufacturers have irresponsibly advertised their weapons in police journals by appealing to the proclivity for gadgetry that some police departments have, causing them to purchase a lot of unreliable, unnecessary equipment.

Responding to concerns about weapons' reliability and performance, the International Association of Chiefs of Police has created the Weapons Center Data Service. Its function is to test, evaluate, and disseminate information about police equipment of all types, including lethal and nonlethal weapons. The goals of the Weapons Center—which sends information to subscribing police departments—are to:

–Reduce the risk of injury to police officers and the public.
–Acquire timely information regarding the equipment experience of other police agencies throughout the United States.
–Improve equipment training and utilization.

This is done by means of:

1. Evaluation and test reports. [Based on tests conducted at eleven different field "sites" which run the gamut from urban to rural settings, hot to cold climates, and wet to dry conditions.]
2. Basic reports and manuals. [Covering instructions, procurement, and tactical applications.]

3. Product data sheets. [Dealing with weaponry costs, specifications, and so forth.]
4. Caution notices . . . issued on any product which is found to be defective, substantially misrepresented, or dangerous to police personnel or innocent citizens.[6]

Nonlethal or Less Lethal?

There is probably no such thing as a totally nonlethal weapon since many so-called weapons can kill if they are incorrectly used. Too much CS tear gas in an enclosed room can be fatal. A wooden bullet or water-filled gelatin sphere can kill if fired at point blank range. Thus, if the term "nonlethal" did not already have a certain currency and conventionality, "less lethal" or "less than lethal" might be more appropriate terms to use.

The amount of injury a projectile-type weapon inflicts is a function of many factors: the *distance* from the human target the weapon is fired, the *place* where the projectile strikes the person, the *diameter* (or caliber) of the projectile, the *material* it is made of (wood, putty, lead), the *amount* of powder charge in the cartridge, and so on. All of these factors are taken into account in the design and use of stun bags, splatt shells, rubber bullets, and other nonlethal projectiles. Nonlethal projectiles tend not to inflict serious injuries because both their densities and firing velocities are substantially reduced. Again, this does not mean that they are harmless, or that they should be used carelessly.

Since nonlethality is relative and a question of degree, police and other peacekeepers should know the characteristics of the nonlethal weapons they carry and should follow instructions scrupulously when using them. Police departments should work up precise rules governing the use of such weapons and should spell out the advantages and disadvantages of using each weapon in various situations. As an illustration of the latter, the pros and cons of using tear gas during a riot situation according to one expert, are enumerated below:

Advantages of tear gas:

1. Creates confusion among rioters.
2. Disperses them and facilitates the making of necessary arrests.
3. [Breaks] up unlawful assemblies which cannot be dispersed without the use of force.
4. [Prevents] property damage, serious injury and bloodshed.

5. [Minimizes or eliminates] the hazards of hand-to-hand encounters between police and rioters. . . .

Disadvantages of tear gas:

1. [Arouses] resentment to otherwise acceptable police procedures [especially if gas is used indiscriminately].
2. Affects innocent [bystanders].
3. Impedes police operations, especially with change of wind.
4. Not generally effective if the rioting mobs are widely [scattered over many] city streets, utilizing hit and run techniques.[7]

AN ITEMIZATION OF NONLETHAL WEAPONS

There are numerous kinds of nonlethal weapons. The usual and the unusual are described in the pages that follow. Peacekeepers and citizens in general should be made more aware of the variety of nonlethal weapons available today. Nonlethals very much increase the range of options available to police, prison guards, night watchmen, psychiatric aides (dealing with the acutely suicidal), and others who confront violence and want to use less-than-lethal force.

Mechanical Agents

Nonlethal Projectiles

RUBBER BULLETS. Used extensively by British peacekeepers in Northern Ireland, rubber bullets are blunt and soft. They were developed in a nine-month crash program by British Army scientists who had the Catholic-Protestant intercommunal conflict specifically in mind. Rubber bullets have now replaced CS tear gas as the standard peacekeeping weapon in Northern Ireland, since they harm fewer innocent bystanders and are ideal for coping with the vexing troupes of children who frequently throw stones at British soldiers.

The oversized Webley and Scott pistols which accommodate the one by six inch shells make a distinctive dull sound when discharged and are capable of firing the rubber bullets at speeds of up to 160 feet per second. Shot at distances of eighty feet usually, the bullets deliver the equivalent of a hard punch with a fist. (It is recommended that they not be aimed directly at people, since they have caused one death and two cases of blindness this way. Instead, they should be aimed at the ground near a person so that they strike on the rebound, hitting the legs rather than the torso or head.)

WOODEN BULLETS. These are one inch in diameter (resembling quarter-inch sawed-off sections of broom handle) and are often fired five at a time from tear gas guns to control unruly crowds. Police in Hong Kong have reportedly made extensive use of wooden bullets, which—if fired in fivesomes—spread out in flight and tend to cause bruises when they hit. (They can break bones, if used at ranges shorter than the recommended 50 to 125 feet.)

Compared to tear gas, wooden bullets are very economical. On the Fourth of July, 1970 the Berkeley Police Department used $30 worth of wooden bullets to quell a disturbance that would normally have cost them $6,000 in tear gas canisters.[8] Wooden bullets are somewhat unstable ballistically; their end-over-end tumbling impairs accuracy when they are fired singly.

FABRIC BULLETS. The same size and shape as wooden projectiles, fabric bullets are made of blackboard eraser material. They have been used by the San Francisco police to keep the peace during campus disturbances and anti-war demonstrations. Similar kinds of bullets are constructed of hard and soft clay.

PLASTIC PROJECTILES. Various types of plastic projectiles have been developed. Polyethylene shot—about one-sixteenth of an inch in diameter—has been used instead of lead shot and has drastically reduced the damage done by shotguns during peace-keeping.

Larger, barrel-shaped plastic pieces have also been loaded into shotgun cartridges. (They are called Splatt® shells.) These pieces flatten upon impact; their plasticity, low density, and low velocity (300 feet per second instead of the 1200 feet per second of normal shot) cause them to bruise rather than break skin, even at close range. The San Diego Police Department—preparing for an onslaught of demonstrators at the 1972 Republican Convention in their city—considered using Splatt® shells before the convention was switched to Miami. There is no evidence at this point that plastic Splatt® pieces crack bones or damage internal organs. However, they can cause blindness or breathing difficulties if they hit a person in the eye or neck. The St. Louis police, the Maine state police, and other law enforcement agencies around the country have Splatt® shells in their arsenals.

There are also plastic-ball projectiles—shot from CO_2 pistols—which break on impact, emitting tear gas, stench agents, or colored dye for later identification and arrest of fleeing suspects.

Nonlethal Guns

Guns of all sorts have been developed to supplement the conventional lethal firearm.

STUN GUNS. These widely publicized weapons fire a four-inch square nylon bag filled with lead powder or birdshot which hits people flat—like a pancake—and is capable of knocking them down. The large impact area of the bag substantially reduces the risk of injury, but often leaves bruises. Stun guns are single-shot, large bore (40mm) weapons which can be reloaded in three seconds. Variants include Stun Burst® guns, which fire up to 250 bags per minute from a tripod mount; Stinger® guns, which are twelve gauge shotguns adapted to stun bag operation; and Prowler Fouler® guns, which are "un guns" that use high-energy gas cartridges rather than gunpowder to propel the nylon bags.

Stun guns are highly appropriate for police patrol, strike duty, prison work, and peacekeeping in general. Many security services, correctional institutions, military installations, and law enforcement agencies use nonlethal guns of this type. Stun guns have been used during violent disorders in Berkeley (February 1971) and San Francisco (December 1970, May 1972), among other places.

HIGH-POWERED WATER PISTOLS. Fact has caught up with fiction in the development of Selector System guns which can squirt a variety of substances depending on what has been selected. (Phasar guns in the Star Trek TV series had different settings for different tasks.) All types of liquids can be squirted from Selector guns: salt solutions, chemical vomit, red pepper irritants, sulfur stench compounds, and the like. Similar kinds of guns fire streams of freezing cold liquid or jets of mildly electrified water. "Squirt" guns of this sort are most suited to controlling riots and collective violence.

TASAR GUNS. These weapons shoot clusters of thin, five-hundred foot long wires with barbed ends that snag on people's clothing. Low voltage electric shocks administered through the wires incapacitate until the current is switched off or the barbs are removed.[9] Care must be taken that people suffering from heart trouble are not subjected to such electricity. Also, bola-type weapons are being perfected which fire nets—that are spring-loaded into tubes—to entangle fleeing suspects.[10]

Barricade Guns. Large "archolithic" guns—using compressed air and mounted on trucks—can fire nylon rope to block off strategic areas during disorders.[11] This "rapid rope" can also be used to barricade store fronts, staging areas, and so forth. Similar guns can fire barbed wire up to eighty feet to obtain the same effect. (It should be remembered, though, that all barricades lack flexibility and often hinder peacekeepers as much as disputants.)

Tranquilizer Dart Guns. One of the first tranquilizer guns was devised by Harold C. Palmer several decades ago. It was used to immobilize wild animals so that zoologists could tag them, administer medicine to them, or bring them unharmed to zoos. (The Palmer Cap-Chur gun is basically a pistol which uses a carbon dioxide cartridge to propel drug-filled darts. The darts are 3/4″ needles attached to spring-loaded syringes containing apomorphine or other sedatives. The darts have a range of thirty feet and inject automatically upon impact, without causing serious injury to tissue.)

Animal control officials and zoo authorities—especially those in regions where tornados or earthquakes threaten to set dangerous caged animals free—have long kept tranquilized guns on hand to use on escaped or rabid animals. In 1962 a tranquilizer gun was used on a human being for the first time. Police in Athens, Georgia employed sodium amytal, shot from a Cap-Chur gun, to incapacitate a prisoner who had escaped from his "cage."

And in 1966 a physician in Atlanta, William C. Conner, culminated several years of experimentation with the Palmer gun by "shooting" ten medical student volunteers at Emory University. Conner's tests showed that tranquilizer guns were indeed adaptable for further use on humans. The students, shot from a distance of twenty feet, "suffered no pain, experiencing only a sensation similar to a dull body blow." [12]

Dart gun research and development has continued into the seventies. Especially interesting is the work done at Carnegie-Mellon University in Pittsburgh. The Mechanical Engineering department has experimented with different ways of (1) powering the hypodermic syringe (spring, powder, compressed air, etc.), (2) reducing the size of the injector dart, (3) increasing the stability of the dart in flight, and (4) reducing the overall cost of the weapon.

In general, the larger the drug dose in the gun, the faster the immobilization. However, keeping the amount low minimizes the danger of an overdose, although it does mean that a person may have to be shot a second or third time until he has received enough chemical to be incapacitated. Drugs other than immobilizers (muscle relaxants) may be used: sleep inducers (anesthetics), pain inducers (algesics), and nausea inducers (emetics). Optimally suitable drugs and dosages are still being worked out, and this involves factors such as the viscosity of chemicals, their speed of action, and their stability over time and under different temperatures.

Chemical Agents

Delivered in appropriate amounts, chemical agents interfere with people's activities for strategically significant lengths of time after which they fully recover without medical assistance. Some of these agents are called *physio*chemicals because they cause physical incapacitation. Tear gas is the best known example, but there are additional compounds which incapacitate by causing temporary vomiting, paralysis, respitatory irritation, or loss of vision and hearing. Other chemical agents are called *psycho*-chemicals because they cause brief psychological disorientation. There are three types of these:

(1) *Depressants* (e.g. barbituates) are of known value to peacekeepers; they are used in tranquilizer dart guns and cause stupor and languor.

(2) *Psychedelics* (e.g. hallucinogens) are of less certain value to peacekeepers. When delivered like tear gas, they impair people's ability to engage in military operations. Thus, they are especially useful for international peacekeeping. They disorient judgments of time and distance, making the effective operation of military vehicles and weapons impossible. They can also induce mental confusion and a dream-like, hallucinatory state. Psychedelics could probably cause whole battalions to ignore orders and stop fighting for substantial periods of time.

(3) *Stimulants* (e.g. amphetamines) are of little value during peacekeeping. In fact, they seem to increase rather than decrease people's potential for violence because they cause tenseness, irritability, and assertiveness. For example, the amphetamine

"speed" was used by German, Japanese, and probably Allied soldiers during World War II to keep awake and in a fighting mood.

*Physio*chemicals will be examined in some detail here, since they are more widely used for peacekeeping than *psycho*chemicals.

Nonlethal Gas Agents

TEAR GAS. Ethylbromacetate was the earliest known lacrimator or tear-inducing agent employed by peacekeepers. Reputedly, it was first used by French police, who delivered it by hand to control civil disorders prior to World War I.

CN TEAR GAS. Alphachloracetophenone resulted from crash research and development efforts made after the efficacy of tear gas agents was demonstrated during World War I. Information about CN quickly disseminated around the world, as did the gas itself. US authorities used CN gas frequently in the twenties and thirties when gangsterism and labor unrest were rampant. A dry, powdery form of CN was developed during the forties to obtain longer-lasting irritation.

CN gas, which has an apple blossom odor, still sees frequent use. It has proved to be a reliable, nontoxic agent in countless incidents involving people of all ages and physical conditions. It has been used to control prisoners and mental patients and to ensure security in bank safety vaults, where its discharge is triggered by prepared releasing devices wired to vault doors.

Properly administered, CN produces abundant, uncontrolled tears. (These symptoms can be relieved by flushing the eyes and skin with water.) Prolonged exposure to CN (as inside an air tight room or building) can result in more extreme symptoms—choking, difficulty in breathing, and burning sensations of the skin, mouth, nose, and eyes—which may require special medical attention. CN dissipates quickly when fresh air sweeps into an exposed area.

CS TEAR GAS. Orthochlorobenzalmalononitrile was created several decades ago—apparently by Corson and Stoughton whose initials it bears. It has been used for everything from Greek-Turkish disturbances in Cyprus to soccer game riots in Peru. American authorities have employed it for campus and race violence and for clearing bunkers and tunnels in South Vietnam.

CS gas is approximately ten times stronger than CN gas. It acts faster, and less of it is needed to produce the same effect. Thus, it is generally used after CN gas has been found wanting. In fact CS is so effective that police in Washington, D.C., in 1968 found that they had only to throw beer cans—which resemble CS canisters—into crowds of demonstrators to disperse them.

CS affects different people in different ways. An almost odorless, tasteless chemical, it makes many people listless and apathetic. According to a US Army manual:

> CS causes an extreme burning sensation of the eyes, a copious flow of tears, coughing, labored breathing and tightness of the chest, involuntary closing of the eyes, stinging on moist skin, and sinus and nasal drip.[13]

Because it causes nausea and vomiting in concentrated doses, CS is useful for flushing out fugitives or snipers who have holed up in hard-to-reach places.

Beginning in 1969 CS gas was used regularly in Londonderry, Northern Ireland by the Royal Ulster Constabulary and later by the British Army. However, it eventually aroused strong protests from the local citizenry because it was rumored to have long-lasting harmful effects. As a consequence the British Himsworth Committee was set up to evaluate the gas. But since no deaths or permanent injuries were able to be attributed to CS with certainty, the Committee gave it a clean bill of health in November 1971.

Nonetheless, some controversy still remains about the safety of CS, especially for people with cardiac or respiratory trouble. Reports of serious harm continue to crop up from time to time. In view of this, CS should probably be used sparingly and carefully until medical research can pass final judgment on its short- and long-term toxicity.

DM Nausea Gas. Diphenylaminechloroarsine—used for only the most serious conflict situations—triggers severe vomiting, headache, and malaise. It can also cause sore throat, constrictive chest pain, and uncontrollable defecation. One deep whiff of the bright-orange, licorice-smelling gas can leave a person in agony for half an hour. Because it requires several minutes to take effect, DM gas is often mixed with faster-acting CS gas to obtain a more immediate punch. Medical treatment occasionally must be

sought for victims of DM, and food in the area where it has been used is usually contaminated.

The various nonlethal gas agents just described can be delivered by several different means:

By hand:

1. *Grenades (which are thrown):*
   (a) Fast release grenades: The size and shape of baseballs, these explode to release gas powder particles into the air. "Fast release" means that they exhaust their contents before they can be picked up and thrown back. Grenade casing fragments sometimes have a dangerous shrapnel effect, however.
   (b) Slow release grenades: These five-inch cylinders deliver gas into the air in the form of vapor. Some of them break into several parts to facilitate dispersion (e.g., Skat® grenades). Slow release grenades are safer than the fast release varieties because they do not explode. Gashopper®, Skitter®, and Jet Spin® grenades skip around erratically to make them difficult to pick up and lob back.
2. *Projectors (which are held):*
   (a) Fire-extinguisher dispensers: These large containers dispense a great deal of gas agent quickly.
   (b) Aerosol dispensers: Fifty shots can be dispensed in as many seconds from these devices, which shoot tear gas over short distances.
   (c) Fountain-pen dispensers: These deliver a single shot of nonlethal chemical agent.

By gun:

1. *Tear gas launchers:* Generally 37mm bore guns, these are capable of long and short-range delivery of gas agents.
2. *Regular handguns:* These can be loaded with special tear gas cartridges after being fitted with an adapter device.
3. *Regular long guns:* Shotguns and rifles can deliver tear gas after adapter devices have been attached to them.

By machine:

1. *Dispensers:* Worn on peacekeepers' backs like skin-diving tanks, these spray gas widely and rapidly.
2. *Bulk dispensers:* When attached to vehicles or helicopters,

these dispersal machines can deliver large amounts of gas over broad areas.

3. *Tear-smoke generators:* In minutes, these twenty-five pound machines can dispense thousands of cubic feet of "Pepper Fog"—a mixture of smoke and tear gas. Their portability makes it possible to adapt delivery to changing wind conditions. Also known as "street cleaners," these devices facilitate the cheap and efficient dissemination of billowy tear smoke.

Nonlethal Liquid Agents

CHEMICAL MACE. According to weapons expert Colonel Rex Applegate, chemical Mace is "the first significant breakthrough in individual police weapons since the advent of the handgun."[14] At the moment, officers in five thousand law enforcement agencies carry small containers of Mace on their belts for use against violent individuals and unruly crowds.

Mace is a highly concentrated liquid form of tear gas which is mixed with a nontoxic carrying and activating agent. It is ejected from hand-held aerosol cans and usually aimed at a person's face. It reacts with the oils of the skin to create intense tear-flow and burning around the eyes and nose. The fumes given off by this chemical reaction cause dizziness and/or instant apathy. Those affected often then fall to their knees or just sit down, waiting to be told what to do. The effects of Mace may last from five to thirty minutes. (Mace is vastly more potent, by the way, than the ammonia-based dog repellents that mailmen often carry.)

Mace is not the perfect weapon, though. It is said to have no effect on some people who are mentally disturbed or high on drugs. It is also somewhat affected by wind currents. If a peacekeeper uses Mace against someone who is grappling with a fellow peacekeeper, he can easily hit the wrong person in the face. Furthermore, there are occasional reports that Mace has permanently damaged someone's eyes or skin.

ADHESIVES. Gooey adhesives can be sprayed onto fighting disputants (especially if their numbers are small) to distract them and interfere with their violence. Sticky tape—a kind of human flypaper—and quick-setting "instant mud" can both be applied to the ground for the same purpose. "Instant cocoon," which consists of globs of adhesive strings, can be thrown onto disputants

to stick them together temporarily. (Instant cocoon derives from the new surgical adhesives used to seal wounds.) Large nets of entangling twine (fired from guns) or spring-loaded bolas can likewise be used to inhibit movement and violence. The nets—a kind of "instant jungle"—were initially designed to secure military prisoners who were attempting to commit suicide.

SLIPPERY AGENTS. "Instant banana peel" is a special powder which becomes very slippery when wetted down with water. It is almost impossible for people or ordinary cars to move on surfaces covered with this low-friction substance. Peacekeepers must wear cleated shoes and use studded tires to maneuver on this synthetic ice. (On a cold day, water can be sprayed on the ground to create natural ice, which will have the same effect.)

Among police equipment researchers, some thought has been given to putting slippery agents (such as "plastic confetti" and other Teflon polymers) in cartridges and firing them under the feet of fleeing suspects to trip them up. Injuries from falls are a real possibility with slippery substances; and decontamination after use is often quite difficult, too.

WATER. High-pressure streams of water delivered from firetrucks or water-cannon vehicles have long been used to "dampen" disorderly crowds and stop melees. When aimed directly rather than sprayed, streams of water can be used to knock people down. Visible dyes or invisible ultraviolet dyes can be added to water to mark disputants for later identification and/or arrest.

FOAM. Originally used by firefighters and airport personnel to cushion the landings of damaged aircraft, foam can be used to engulf belligerent individuals or groups in a disorienting sea of tiny bubbles. *Detergent*-air foams last from ten to thirty minutes and can be "laced" with tear gas or itching agents to further confound those blanketed. *Plastic*-air foams last for hours and even days. Peacekeepers can use foam throwers to create ten-foot high walls to keep belligerents apart or to protect staging areas or vulnerable property (e.g. stores with broken windows which could be looted).

Miscellaneous Agents

SMOKE. An ancient weapon, smoke was used as long ago as the Crusades to cover troop movements and to confuse an enemy. Hexachlorothane smoke does many of the things tear gas does, but

more cheaply and with less residual contamination. It is used to disorganize belligerents, to fragment them, or to keep them out of certain areas. Because it diminishes visual communication, it isolates individuals and decreases the chance of physical contact (and hence violence) between them.

Smoke has its drawbacks. When used indoors, it may panic people if they think it signals a fire or potential oxygen deprivation. It causes throat and nose irritation on occasion, too. Smoke comes in different colors (some of which are frightening), and it can be mixed with tear gas and stench agents if need be. It is delivered by means of pots, grenades, smoke-cords, or hand-held devices. (Smoke-cords are laid down and ignited; they allow fairly accurate placement of smoke even in a strong wind.)

SOUND. Though it has an eerie, futuristic connotation, sound was probably a weapon of sorts even before Joshua crumbled the walls of Jericho. The modern version of Joshua's trumpet is the Curdler,® which emits a pulsating shriek that disorients and scatters people. In big city streets flanked with massive concrete buildings, this super-sound is so effective that disputing parties (e.g. gang fighters, race rioters) will drop their weapons to cover their ears. The Curdler registers 120 decibels thirty feet away, the equivalent of the noise a jet plane makes when taking off. It is an "uncomfortable" sound. Above 140 db, sound is "painful," however, and not recommended for use on human beings.) US military police, New York City police, and Madrid police, among others, have Curdlers—or People Repellers, as some call them.

Curdlers and other acoustical devices can be used (a) to distract disputants; (b) to get their attention so that announcements can be made; and (c) to break up hypnotic trances which sometimes makes it hard for disputants to stop their violence. (Acoustical systems can be carried by individuals, vehicles, or helicopters.)

Similar tactics, on a smaller scale, are possible with noise grenades and teleshot cartridges. These burst to emit a harmless thunderous noise which can frighten and distract combatants caught up in violence. Grenades are lobbed by hand and cartridges are fired from regular twelve gauge shotguns.

LIGHT. Police have long used flashlights to dazzle suspects they are approaching, especially ones in parked cars at night. Intense lights—as bright as searchlights—can also be used to temporarily

blind and confuse combatants because they reduce their discrimination ability (by day) and dark adaptation (by night). Lights of this kind can be carried by individual peacekeepers—they come equipped with portable power sources—or can be mounted on vehicles or helicopters. Flash emitting grenades or cartridges can also be used to create momentarily blinding bursts of light that throw combatants off balance.

HEAT. Uncomfortably hot infrared rays from CO_2 lasers can allow controlled, but distressful amounts of heat to be applied to violent people from as far away as 1,000 yards.[15] Such devices, if used properly, can force rioters, combatants, et cetera to cease and withdraw to less warm locations.

ANIMALS. Horses, dogs, and other trainable animals can be used for a variety of peacekeeping tasks. As New York City Police Commissioner Kennedy has said, "The horse is worth 20 men when it comes to handling an unruly crowd." [16] New York has used horses since 1871, in part because horses have a strong psychological effect on crowds. They are not used to charge a crowd however; instead they are used in a line to slowly guide, channel, or disperse a mass of people.

First used for patrol, sentry duty, and message-carrying in World War II, dogs have become popular for all types of peacekeeping and police work (especially in campaigns against muggers and burglars). About five hundred man-dog teams (K-9 Corps) were in operation in two hundred cities in 1966.[17] Dogs can disarm combatants—or suspects in general—without seriously injuring them, thus eliminating the need to risk an officer's life. Such dogs, usually German shepherds, are only "on duty" when their collars are attached; and they are only as tough as their human masters order them to be. (They are generally trained to grab a person loosely by the arm or leg so not to draw blood.) A snarl keeps almost everyone at bay when dogs accompany officers attempting to quell barroom brawls, as the Washington, D.C. police have learned.

Dogs can protect injured peacekeepers and guard important equipment and facilities. They can locate hidden suspects and sniff out bombs and explosives, too. Like anything else, though, dogs can be misused or inappropriately used, as they were in the South during some of the civil rights demonstrations of the fifties and sixties.

Protective Apparel for Peacekeepers

It would be unrealistic to expect policemen to use nonlethal weapons if to do so meant putting their own lives in danger. Fortunately, because of recent scientific breakthroughs, extremely effective armor is available which renders wearers impervious to nearly every weapon that might be employed against them. The following protective items can and should be used in conjunction with nonlethal weapons:

PROTECTIVE HELMETS. Bulletproof helmets made of laminated fiberglass have been developed which protect wearers from projectiles moving up to 1,300 feet per second. (Most weapons that would be used against peacekeepers fire bullets at speeds of less than 1,100 feet per second.) For protection against even higher velocities, ballistic-resistant, ceramic helmets are available. Good helmets shield all the critical areas of the head: the temples, the forehead and the back of the neck. They are equipped with flip-up shatterproof face visors designed to protect the eyes, nose, and mouth.

PROTECTIVE GARMENTS. Medical data from World War II and the Korean War showed that the majority of fatal wounds came from injuries to the chest or abdomen. As a result, the US Department of Defense and other organizations have developed more effective kinds of body armor to protect these areas. (The old, heavy, steel-plate-and-titanium vests have been replaced by newer, lighter models.) Some vests, coats, and blazers weigh only a few pounds and can be worn comfortably all day. Made of ceramic and fiberglass materials, they resist or deflect most bullets. If even more protection is desired, Rolls Royce body armor (constructed of a fiber-reinforced plastics composite) is available which will stop a forty-four Magnum bullet fired from nine feet away. Peacekeepers should wear protective clothing of this kind whenever they deal with disputants thought to be carrying firearms.

PROTECTIVE SHIELDS. Hand-held shields of fiberglass and clear plastic give protection against rocks, bricks, and bottles as well as bullets traveling up to 1,100 feet per second. (Smaller versions of these shields are made in the form of everyday writing clipboards which can be used for spot protection if necessary.) Even better protection is afforded by barricade shields which can stop bullets

moving up to 1,500 feet per second. These twenty-pound shields are impervious to all shotgun loads. Unfortunately, they require that users crouch behind them, thus cutting down on their mobility. Good shields will not "spall"—that is, shatter around the impact area, threatening people nearby with flying splinters.

PROTECTIVE VEHICLES. During the 1967 race riots in Detroit, police used four "Commando" wheeled tanks, each of which held twelve men. Heavily armored vehicles of this sort offer peacekeepers 100 percent protection in almost any situation. (Some wheeled tanks can stop 30–06 rifle bullets at point-blank range.) The manufacturer of one armored tank describes it as follows:

> The body is designed to protect against Molotov Cocktails and the vehicle carries sufficient water and foaming agents to put out gasoline fires. Can be used to control riots or just to patrol the tough districts. Plenty of room in the back for stretchers. . . .[18]

An even larger model is a ten-ton tracked tank which carries eighteen men and can knock down brick walls. It has complete armor protection and numerous devices such as a water cannon and a foam thrower.

Despite their provocativeness, their militaristic nature, and their lack of versatility—they cannot enter buildings and cannot be used during non-crisis periods the way helicopters can—many of these protective vehicles have been purchased and used in New York, Detroit, New Orleans, and other cities.

SUMMARY

A vast array of nonlethal weapons is available for peacekeeping and other kinds of policework. They are of use during family disputes, gang fights, campus riots, racial disorders, and international conflicts, as well as during the apprehension of:

—suspects fleeing at night or in congested downtown areas,
—mentally disturbed people who are violent,
—aggressive, obstreperous drunks,
—people threatening suicide,
—youths joyriding in stolen cars,
—suspects with hostages who are cornered in banks, warehouses, or airplanes.

Bullet-proof vests, coats, helmets, and the like are almost as important as nonlethal weapons themselves. They give police and

other peacekeepers the security and confidence they need in order to employ nonlethal weapons effectively.

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[PART VI]

USES OF VIOLENT FORCE

[CHAPTER 14]

POLICE BRUTALITY: "BLUE COLLAR" CRIME

ENGAGED IN social control as they are, police and other peacekeepers often fail to engage in self control during their efforts to moderate violence. As a consequence, brutality frequently results. But this brutality usually involves more than just individuals losing control over themselves; it involves entire agencies losing control over their men because of improper training, supervision, or command structure.

Brutality generally consists of the use of excessive force on the part of peacekeepers. This means that authoritarian rather than humanitarian peacekeepers run the greatest risk of engaging in brutality. In fact, peacekeepers guilty of brutality and other forms of "malpractice" frequently display the machismo, projection, and hyper-conventionalism characteristic of authoritarian personalities.

Brutality often provokes violence from the victim(s) of the excessive force. (It thereby puts peacekeepers in the dubious position of generating violence instead of moderating it.*) As political scientist Ted Gurr says:

> The most fundamental human response to force is counterforce. Force threatens and angers men, especially if they believe it to be illicit or unjust. Threatened, they try to defend themselves. Angered, they want to retaliate.[2]

(S. M. Lipset has said approximately the same thing: People using violent force "tend to increase rather than decrease the aggressiveness of those they are seeking to control. . . ."[3])

Many average citizens also feel that violent force provokes violent counterforce. More than a third of three thousand randomly selected black respondents from Boston, Cleveland, Pitts-

* It is worth noting that police who have mishandled a situation or made false arrests—and thus provoked victims to attack them—are legally allowed to defend themselves, even by means of deadly force if necessary. US courts uphold such police provocation, unless police *intentionally* provoke people in order to be able to use physical force against them.[1]

burgh, San Francisco, Dayton, and Akron answered in the affirmative when researchers recently asked them "Do you feel that excessive force by police is the cause of race riots?" [4]

But police brutality—or "blue collar" crime—encompasses more than just excessive violent force. It is a generic term for a variety of actions and activities. According to sociologist Albert Reiss, it can include such disparate actions as:

—The use of profane and abusive language
—Commands to move on or get home
—Stopping cars and questioning people on the street or searching them and their cars
—Threats to use force if not obeyed
—Prodding with a nightstick or approaching with a pistol
—The actual use of physical force or violence itself [5]

Of course, these actions may be legitimate sometimes. However determining whether they are or not can be very difficult.† Complex problems of perception often arise, as in the situation noted in Chapter 7 where a policeman pushed a suspect into his car, slammed the door, and drove off quickly in order not to linger and risk precipitating more racial violence.

To some extent then, brutality exists in the eye of the beholder. As with all questions of perception, though, it is important to know whose eyes are doing the beholding or perceiving. Police by and large have too much at stake to perceive their own actions clearly. Thus, they are rarely aware of their own brutality. "Victims," on the other hand, are likely to be overly aware of brutality.

Some of the most frequent victims of police brutality in the United States are minorities, especially blacks living in urban ghettos.‡ In fact, *young* black men are the likeliest of all to be

† Reliable statistics on police brutality are hard to come by. Often one must look at available police department data and draw inferences. For example, in Detroit in 1964, police almost always seemed to emerge from physical encounters with citizens in better shape than their adversaries. Curiously, of the 1,207 police embroiled in such "altercations," 303 (of the 580 hurt) suffered hand, finger, and knuckle injuries—all decidedly *minor*. Of the 1,507 citizens involved, however, 690 (of the 1,048 hurt) suffered face, scalp, eye, nose, head, and jaw injuries—all decidedly *major*.[6]

‡ One reason this is the case is that relatively few policemen are black or nonwhite. Kerner Commission figures for 1965 to 1966 point up the disparity between the proportion of nonwhites in a city and the proportion of nonwhites on that city's police force.

brutalized. This is partly because they have far more contact with the police than the average citizen, which alone substantially increases their chances of being mistreated. Other minorities who are frequent victims of brutality include homosexuals, political radicals, and members of the hippie counterculture.

It must be pointed out that some minorities have themselves

TABLE 14-I
PERCENTAGE REPRESENTATION OF NONWHITES ON POLICE FORCES [7]

City	*Percent Nonwhites in population*	*Percent Nonwhites in police department*
Atlanta	38	10
Baltimore	41	7
Boston	11	2
Buffalo	18	3
Chicago	27	17
Cincinnati	28	6
Cleveland	34	7
Dayton	26	4
Detroit	39	5
Hartford	20	11
Louisville	21	6
Memphis	38	5
New Haven	19	7
New Orleans	41	4
New York City	16	5
Newark	40	10
Oakland	31	4
Oklahoma City	15	4
Philadelphia	29	20
Phoenix	8	1
Pittsburgh	19	7
St. Louis	37	11
San Francisco	14	6
Tampa	17	3
Washington, D.C.	63	21

(Adapted from Kerner Commission, *Report of National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders*, New York, Bantam, 1967, p. 169.)

Having police departments with proportionate representation of nonwhites will eliminate some brutality against blacks, but not all of it. Black officers are no more immune to the violence-generating pressures of police work than are white officers; and sometimes they are tougher on blacks than are white officers because they demand more from them. (When their high expectations for fellow blacks are frustrated, they become violent oftentimes.) Also, black officers frequently over-identify with the white establishment in order to protect their jobs. So much so in fact, that black youths in Bedford-Stuyvesant and other places have often yelled at black police, "Take off your black masks so we can see your white faces."

occasionally engaged in brutality towards police. (In a few cases, this *citizen* brutality has triggered *police* brutality. Generally the reverse is true, though.) Citizen brutality ranges from innocuous verbal attacks (calling police "pigs," "fascists," and "stormtroopers") to deadly sniping and bombing attacks. The number of sniper attacks on the police has generally been exaggerated—during the Newark racial violence of 1967 for example—but such attacks have made police jumpy. In 1973, the fear of snipers prompted the New York City policemen's union (the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association) to ask that every officer be armed with a shotgun (besides his usual sidearm) and that every squad car be alloted an extra officer.[8] Ironically, the original rationale for police carrying weapons was police protection *for* citizens; today, in some places, it is police protection *from* citizens.

In view of the perceptual complexities, some people recommend using a very broad definition of police brutality. Along these lines, one researcher has written:

> What citizens object to and call "police brutality" is really the judgment that they have not been treated with the full rights and dignity owing citizens in a democratic society. Any practice that degrades their status, that restricts their freedom, that annoys or harasses them, or that uses physical force is frequently seen as unnecessary and unwarranted.[9]

Regarding degradations of status and dignity, some are so subtle that they are well-nigh impossible to detect. Others are not subtle at all, as when police call people "boy," "bum," "whore," "hillbilly," "punk kid," "shitty wino," and so on.

Several years ago sociologists Donald Black and Albert Reiss arranged for neutral observers to ride in police cars in the ghettos of Chicago, Boston, and Washington, D.C. These observers found that police used abusive language at the start of 14 percent of their interrogations of alleged criminal incidents.[10] This verbal abuse was directed not only towards suspected offenders, but also towards victims, witnesses, and bystanders. The observers also found that police used physical abuse* on an average of

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* An act of physical abuse was recorded by observers only when force was used against a citizen under one or more of the following circumstances:

If a policeman physically assaulted a citizen and then failed to make an arrest; proper use involves an arrest.

once every 42 eight-hour patrols.[11] Besides minorities, the most frequent victims of this improper and unnecessary force—which occurred thousands of times each year—were winos, pimps, drifters, prostitutes, and other marginals who could not or would not stand up for their legal rights.

Illustrations of Brutality

Examples of brutality are presented below for the five types of peacekeeping intervention. These examples run the gamut from insults to out-and-out physical cruelty.

Interpersonal

To a telephoned complaint, "My boyfriend is mad at me and is going to beat me up," police dispatchers in one city responded curtly, "Call us again when he does." [13] (This suggests that some calls reporting serious violence are merely later calls regarding conflicts that police brushed off when they were first brought to their attention and still nonviolent.)

Intergroup

Several youths (identified as members of the South Streeters and the Clymers gangs) created a disturbance at a dance held at the Olympia Ballroom in Philadelphia. A policeman responding to the trouble immediately fired a shot in the air. Luckily, no one was injured. The officer then arrested eleven youths.[14]

Interorganizational

In only twenty-eight seconds at Jackson State College, approximately forty Mississippi State Patrolmen inexplicably fired 150 rounds—totalling four hundred rifle pellets, buckshot pellets, and armor-piercing slugs—into 125 taunting (but not threaten-

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If the citizen being arrested did not, by word or deed, resist the policeman; force should be used only if it is necessary to make the arrest.

If the policeman, even though there was resistance to the arrest, could easily have restrained the citizen in other ways.

If a large number of policemen were present and could have assisted in subduing the citizen in the station, in lockup, and in the interrogation rooms.

If an offender was handcuffed and made no attempt to flee or offer violent resistance.

If the citizen resisted arrest, but the use of force continued even after the citizen was subdued.[12]

ing) students. Two students were killed and twelve were injured.[15]

Intercommunal

A young black man was driving home one night during the Newark disorder in 1967. He was motioned over to the curb by white state troopers and Guardsmen who were keeping the peace in the city. A Guardsman asked him why he was so slow in pulling over, and then struck him in the chest with the butt of his rifle. Next a trooper hit him below the belt with his rifle and asked, "Didn't you hear?" The young man was then ordered to continue home with utmost speed.[16]

International

On one occasion, a number of UN peacekeeping soldiers killed several Katangans in cold blood. UN peacekeepers committed several other atrocities during their intervention in the Congo conflict. (International soldiers, then, seem as capable of battle excesses as any other soldiers.[17])

Aggressive Patrol

Less dramatic kinds of brutality occur routinely, and commonly in police interactions with citizens. There is a police procedure—known as aggressive patrol—where all "suspicious looking" people are stopped, questioned, and searched if police have time on their hands. Usually, people are not arrested. Recently in San Diego, 400,000 people were interrogated during a year of aggressive patrol. A disproportionate number of these were either youths or blacks. This brutalization of the spirit, as opposed to the body, explains why some people do not think very highly of the police in some cities.

A certain amount of brutality occurs because police feel that district attorneys, judges, and juries are too lenient. They feel they must mete out punishment themselves since no one else will. This is especially true when police deal with homosexuals, sex offenders, and certain "deviants," as Westley's classic study revealed. (See Chapter 12). It is also particularly true in the case of the "cop killer." In New York City, for instance, where twenty-eight police were slain between 1966 and 1973, almost none of the alleged killers survived long enough to be arraigned.[18] Most

of them were gunned down at the scene of capture, shot "by mistake" through the chest and head despite the fact that many of the apprehending police held sharp-shooter medals and conceivably could have disabled the suspects without killing them. Police become quite emotional when a fellow officer is slain. They regard an attack on one policeman as an attack on all policemen; and they feel that it is up to them to give cop killers their due, since courts "probably will not."

Every now and then, the men in blue are victims of their own brutality:

(1) A policeman shot and seriously wounded his next-door neighbor, a fellow New York City patrolman, during an argument which erupted because each of them had allegedly tried to shovel snow onto the other's property.[19]

(2) Three plainclothes Detroit policemen (part of the STRESS anti-crime unit that has killed thirteen people since its inception a few years ago) mistakenly shot it out with five off-duty sheriffs who were playing cards when they burst into their apartment. One deputy sheriff was killed and two others seriously wounded in the barrage of twenty-five shots. (All of the officers involved were black.)[20]

(3) A group of police beat a man with such frenzy during a recent riot in Chester, Pennsylvania, that they ended up fighting each other.[21]

(4) During the Newark and Detroit riots of 1967, there were indications that police, troopers, and Guardsmen often shot at one another, taking each other to be snipers.[22]

WHY DOES BRUTALITY OCCUR?

Weapons

There are many possible explanations for police brutality. (Some have been alluded to already.) One interesting explanation is that the weapons police carry are simply too handy and too tempting. As Princess Sita observed in *Ramayana*, an ancient Indian epic on nonviolence, "The very bearing of weapons changeth the mind of those that carry them." Apropos of this, films and eyewitness reports of the peacekeeping action at the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago indicate that police with guns used their *clubs* more frequently and brutally than did

TABLE 14-II
STANDARD POLICE WEAPONS IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES

	United States	*England*	*France*	*Germany*	*Italy*
Firearms	.38 cal revolver. (.357 Magnum & .45 automatic used in some places.)	None	.32 cal. pistol (Mab 7.65 mm)	.32 cal. revolver.	.32 cal. pistol (Beretta 7.65 mm)
Impact Weapons and Other Devices	24" hardwood club—displayed. Mace® carried in some locales.	15" softwood club—concealed.	White nightstick. Lead-lined cape which packs a clout when swung.	Hard rubber club which only bruises.	Billy club.

police without guns. This suggests that the availability of powerful weapons makes it easier to use less powerful weapons, because they seem so harmless by contrast.

Psychologists Albert Pepitone and Michael Harrison tested this "contrast effect" in a laboratory experiment and found it to be true. They concluded that "The frequency of punishment by weapons is partially a function of the range of punitive power in the weapons being carried."[23] Thus, to prevent the excessive use of clubs during a riot situation, police guns should probably be left at the station house.

With the "contrast effect" in mind, it might be profitable to look at the power of the weapons that police carry in the United States as compared to other countries. Table 14-II shows that the weapons of American police tend to be more powerful and more lethal than those of their European counterparts. (The larger the "caliber"—the internal barrel diameter in inches—the more powerful the firearm.) If the "contrast effect" operates universally, then, American police are likely to use their clubs and fists more often than European police.

The ammunition used by American policemen also predisposes them to brutality. Dum dum bullets (with hollow, slotted noses) are standard ordnance in many police departments, including those in Miami, Tucson, Nashville, and St. Louis. When these soft lead bullets hit a person, they flatten out to twice their original size and almost always tear a large, fatal wound in the vic-

tim. Although outlawed in international conflicts since 1899, dum dum bullets continue to be used in the United States.

Not so deadly, but still dangerous, are the extra-heavy grain loadings (200 rather than the standard 158) that many US police use in their .38 caliber shells. The heavy bullets used for the .357 Magnum—one of the most powerful handguns made—also facilitate brutality. (Magnum guns, which seem to be gaining in popularity among American police, are generally unsuited for urban peacekeeping because of their enormous power and lethal range—500 yards versus 150 yards for standard police guns.) As if all this heavy ammunition were not enough, US police occasionally use .00 loads for their twelve-gauge shotguns (which enable them to hit almost any target because the nine ball-bearing sized shot pieces fan out widely) and premium loads for their Stoner high-velocity rifles (which allow them to shoot through brick walls).

Returning to Table 14-II again, England's bobbies are not the only police in Europe that go without guns. Norwegian police are unarmed, and Danish police do not always carry their revolvers.[24] And except in Stockholm, Swedish police do not wear guns during the day. (They often wear them at night, however.)

Opinions differ as to whether American police should stop carrying guns. Criminology writer Sol Rubin, who has given serious thought to the question, favors disarmament:

> The removal of the [law officer's] gun would go a long way toward improving the policeman's image—with greater safety to the citizen and the police officer, and with no loss, with probably a gain, in police efficiency.[25]

Learned Hand, the well-known American jurist, noted the following with respect to the arming of police:

> If you are able to shoot a robber [are you] less likely to have a robber? I question that. I challenge it altogether. I don't believe that possibility figures at all in the commission of crime.[26]

Proponents of disarmament often cite the fact that there is no uniformity in firearms use for police across the United States—thus allowing inequities similar to those resulting from nonuniformity in capital punishment policies. They also point out that many, including the best, policemen refrain from using their guns altogether during their careers. For example, out of five

recently retired Berkeley policemen—accounting for 130 total years of policework—two never fired a shot while on duty, and the other three fired approximately once each during their entire careers. The following case is similar:

> John Cordes, who retired from the New York City police force as an acting lieutenant of detectives in 1949 and the only man ever to win the department's medal of honor twice, compiled what may be the best arrest record in the department's history. . . . He averaged 250 to 300 arrests a year. He had numerous run-ins with armed and vicious hoodlums during the Prohibition era and was often shot at. Yet he always refused to carry a gun. He claimed a gun made him careless, less alert, and generally less efficient as a policeman.[27]

However police researchers Samuel Chapman and Eugene Methvin have given police disarmament serious consideration also, and they oppose it. Political scientist Chapman states:

> The American custom of arming police officers is as strongly based on evident need as the British practice to the contrary.[28]

And writer Methvin declares:

> Sadly, mankind has not yet reached such a plane of civilization that any society can dispense with police use of force including—in the incipient and blooming riot situation—the use of deadly force.[29]

A compromise between the pro and con positions on disarmament may be possible nonetheless. It might involve disarming policemen who direct traffic, officers who ticket parking violations, police who watch over public gatherings, and any others who have no real need for a gun. (If they did develop a need for one, they could radio for a specially armed officer. Properly-trained police radio for assistance before taking action anyway.) Police in low crime areas, tranquil towns, quiet suburban regions, and settings where a decidedly nonviolent ethos prevails might also be disarmed. (In these cases too, police who are exhaustively trained in the appropriate use of firearms under various circumstances could be called in for assistance when necessary.)

A step that might be taken to test the feasibility of disarmament in a given area would be to reverse the policy (where it is in force) of allowing—or even requiring—police to wear their guns during off-duty hours. Statistics could then be kept to see if the incidence of crime, citizen brutality, or police brutality changes. (Off-duty guns have been the source of much trouble in some

places; they tempt policemen to "play cop" twenty-four hours a day—when they are relaxing in their front yards or drinking at their favorite bars no matter how tired or inebriated they are.)

Arms in *Armerica*

One reason American police have guns is that the American people have them too. Guns play a significant role in American life, and any serious discussion of police brutality and police weaponry must take this fact into account. To begin with, guns are "big business;" Americans spent $581.6 million in 1972 alone for arms and ammunition.[30] According to a recent government report, Americans own ninety million firearms. Of these, twenty-four million are handguns, thirty-five million are rifles, and thirty-one million are shotguns. (If police and military weapons are added to the 90 million, the figure comes to 200 million firearms, one for every man, woman, and child in the United States.)

Not surprisingly, between 1900 and 1967 firearms killed more than 800,000 Americans—not counting those killed in wars.[31] This is an annual rate of ten gun deaths per 100,000 people. Each year, then, 20,000 Americans are killed and 200,000 injured by firearms in homicides, suicides, and accidents.

Very few countries can match these figures; most do not even come close. (The rate of death by gunfire is 35 times higher in the United States than it is in England or Germany.) This is because few other countries allow so many guns in private hands. Table 14-III shows the rate of *hand*gun ownership in ten different countries. Only handgun figures are given, because researchers have found that *long* guns (rifles, shotguns, etc.) account for only a small percentage of US gun violence. Most gun violence is caused by handguns (pistols, revolvers, etc.) and especially Saturday Night Specials—the cheap handguns that flood into US cities at the rate of two million a year.

It is no wonder, then, that American police feel they have to rely so heavily on guns themselves. The frontier mentality that fosters private gun use fosters police gun use as well.

In most disarmament efforts, *both* sides must agree to lay down their weapons and simultaneously at that. De-escalating the domestic arms race in the United States will be no exception. If American police are to disarm, the American public must do so too. The number and availability of guns will have to be de-

TABLE 14-III

ESTIMATED HANDGUN OWNERSHIP PER 100,000 INHABITANTS [32]

Country	Handguns
Netherlands	<500
Greece	<500
Great Britain	<500
Ireland	<500
Finland	<500
Yugoslavia	750
Israel	1,000
Austria	3,000
Canada	3,000
United States	13,500

creased. This will probably mean the national regulation of handguns to reduce the anonymity of gun *owners.** (If necessary, the ownership of long guns could also be regulated, but this seems less urgent.)

Two different plans have emerged for regulating handguns. *Permissive* licensing would deny licenses only to youths, criminals, and the mentally unstable (including, perhaps, alcoholics and drug addicts). However, this plan can not guarantee that guns will not fall into the wrong hands. Unfit persons could still get guns through theft, smuggling, or private party sales.

Restrictive licensing, advocated by the Violence Commission, would deny licenses to almost everyone. It would seek to reduce by 90 percent all handguns in circulation. Target shooting sportsmen, small businessmen in high crime areas, and a few others would be allowed pistols, revolvers, and the like. Sportsmen would probably have to leave their guns in their club armories, with lock mechanisms on the triggers or in the barrels.

A significant feature of the restrictive plan is that it would remove the handgun from the bedroom dresser drawer in many American homes. (Half the 60 million households in the United States harbor one or more guns.) This would not be a hardship in most instances. Research has shown that loaded handguns in

* The anonymity of guns will probably have to be reduced too. There are various ways of accomplishing this. One might be to mark every bullet and every gun part manufactured in the United States—or imported—with a micro-dot number to facilitate later identification should it be necessary. Another might be to embed radioisotopes—or similar innocuous transmitting substances—in all gunmetal. A geigercounter device could then scan a stadium, an auditorium, or a conflict scene to determine if anyone was armed.

the home create far more danger than security.[33] Gun accidents and family fights involving guns kill five times as many people in the home as do burglars or robbers. (Burglars generally enter when no one is around, and robbers confront so abruptly—often after residents have opened the front door to them—that household guns are usually not handy. If they are this handy, then children can probably get to them.)

The Second Amendment to the US Constitution, which guarantees the right to bear arms, does not forbid either of these gun regulation plans. The US Supreme Court has ruled on four separate occasions that this Amendment guarantees only the state's right to have an armed militia, not the individual's right to have a gun. Federal, state, and even local governments have the legal authority to regulate gun ownership.

To decrease police reliance on firearms—and with it, some kinds of police brutality—strong federal and state laws should be passed which will keep guns out of the hands of both criminals and ordinary citizens. Oddly enough, policemen are not very interested in bringing this about, though they might reasonably be expected to be at the forefront of any movement to restrict handguns. While the International Association of Chiefs of Police has come out in favor of gun control, most police are indifferent and some actually oppose it. In fact, police in Detroit have encouraged citizens to buy guns; and police in Orlando, Florida, have taught citizens how to use them.[34]

Public Tolerance of Brutality

Studies and surveys suggest that the American public tends to support the use of excessive violent force by the police, especially during certain crisis situations. This support encourages police and other peacekeepers to believe that they can be brutal with impunity. (For years in some cities and some regions of the country they have been correct in believing this.)

A recent study by psychologist Robert Kahn revealed that Americans have few qualms about letting police use violent force in dealing with gang troubles, campus disorders, and racial disturbances. Kahn and his associates interviewed a random nationwide sample of 1,374 American males. The interviewees represented all races and creeds, and ranged in age from sixteen to sixty-four. They were asked to indicate how police should respond

TABLE 14-IV
HOW POLICE SHOULD HANDLE VIOLENCE, ACCORDING TO AMERICAN MALES[36]

	Gang Troubles		Campus Disorders		Racial Disturbances	
	Almost always/ Sometimes	*Hardly ever/ Never*	*Almost always/ Sometimes*	*Hardly ever/ Never*	*Almost always/ Sometimes*	*Hardly ever/ Never*
The police should let it go	13%	87%	16%	84%	12%	88%
Police should make arrests	80	20	87	13	81	19
Police should use clubs but not guns	80	20	76	24	80	20
The police should shoot but not to kill	64	36	48	52	61	39
The police should shoot to kill	32	68	19	81	30	70

to three different situations,* involving damage to property, but not injury to people.

Table 14-IV shows that American men clearly tolerate a tough approach to the handling of even minor intergroup, interorganizational, and intercommunal violence. Two out of three (64%) felt police should "Almost always" or "Sometimes" shoot, but not to kill during gang troubles. However, only one out of two (48%) felt police should shoot, but not to kill during campus disorders. (Apparently students are still a relatively favored social category, despite the fact that parents of some Kent State students amazingly felt Guardsmen should have shot even more students.) Lastly, two out of three (61%) felt police should shoot, but not to kill during racial disturbances.

While most of the respondents felt shooting to scare or wound was sufficient, a substantial number did feel that police should

* The three situations were presented to interviewees this way:[35]

1. "There have been times when gangs of hoodlums have gone into a town, terrified people, and caused a lot of property damage. How do you think the police should handle this situation?" (Check one answer in each row, i.e. "Almost always," "Sometimes," "Hardly ever," "Never")
2. "When you think about student disturbances on campuses and elsewhere, which involve a lot of property damage, how do you think police should handle the situation?" (Check one answer. . . .)
3. "When you think about big city riots (ghetto disturbances/inner city disturbances) involving Negroes (black people/colored people) and police, how do you think police should handle the situation?" (Check one answer. . . .)

shoot to kill. One in three felt police should "Almost always" or "Sometimes" shoot to kill in gang troubles and racial disturbances. One in five felt police should shoot to kill during campus disorders.

A Violence Commission survey found similar support for hard-line peacekeeping tactics. Of the sampled respondents, the following percentages agreed with these statements:[37]

Statement	%
"Some people don't understand anything but force."	78%
"Any man who insults a policeman has no complaint if he gets roughed up in return."	56%
"Justice may have been a little rough-and-ready in the days of the Old West, but things worked better than they do today with all the legal red tape."	51%
"The police are right to beat up unarmed protesters, especially when these people are rude and call them names."	45%

Certain police seem to be reading public sentiment accurately. One longtime policeman stated:

> If there was a real bad murder, you would get the feeling that the public wanted the killer and they didn't care how we caught him. We also used to have the feeling that the public wanted us to keep pushing around homosexuals and other perverts.[38]

This agrees with Westley's findings on the illegal use of force by police and brings to mind a statement from a *rookie* policeman he interviewed:

> One of the [*veteran* policemen] advised me that if the courts didn't punish a man, we should. He told me about a sex crime and then said the policeman has the right to use the force necessary to make an arrest, and that in that kind of crime you can use just a little more force.[39]

In sum, it seems evident that the American public tolerates certain questionable police practices; and this tolerance probably contributes to some degree to the police brutality problem in the United States.

Panic

Another explanation for brutality is police panic. Sudden, overpowering fright—often occurring when peacekeepers are untrained or unprepared for a situation—may cause them to

panic and use excessive violent force. Investigations indicate that some peacekeepers panicked during the Orangeburg, South Carolina incident, the Chicago Democratic Convention episode, and the Kent State University incident, to name but a few. Police panic triggered by physical and emotional stress has likewise fostered brutality during intercommunal conflicts, as the following suggests:

> Many of the deaths in Newark and Detroit were caused by the total disintegration of [gun] fire discipline. In *one* panicky moment a New Jersey Guardsman pumped more [than 15] rounds into a public housing building. . . . Many civilian fatalities and some of the police and Guard fatalities resulted from these hysterical barrages.[40]

Sadism

Sadism on the part of police is occasionally to blame for brutality. However, there is some question as to whether this sadism comes from occasional situational sadists or from inveterate, habitual sadists. Social psychologist Hans Toch doubts there are inveterate sadists in most police departments, but feels there are men "whose reactions to certain standard situations tend to involve the use of force." Westley, on the other hand, believes that there are out-and-out sadists "who frequently commit brutalities repugnant to the rest of the police." Westley may be closer to the truth. Given the fact that law officers are among the few people in society authorized to use violent force, this means that sadists, bullies, and so forth may be ineluctably attracted to police work.

Bona fide cases of sadism are difficult to prove because it is necessary to show that there has been intentional self-gratifying use of extreme violence. Nonetheless, it seems clear that sadism was involved in the 1967 Detroit riot, when a few white police held several blacks hostage at the Algiers Motel and allegedly killed three of them in cold blood. And during the Newark riot that same year, police became restless because they had been ordered to fire only blanks. They kept asking over their squad car radios for "the word" to shoot. When news came that police in one car were using real bullets, a policeman's voice was heard over the radio system: "It's about time, give them hell."[41] Another sadistic incident occurred during the particularly brutal Newark peacekeeping episode:

James Rutledge, 19, was inside a boarded-up tavern [hiding from the sporadic shooting in the street]. Troopers and police broke in. James gave himself up, and was shot pointblank by a trooper. Photographs show that James was hit by about thirty-nine bullets in the chest alone. [A witness claimed he was unarmed, and that a 'smiling' trooper took a knife out of his own pocket and planted it in James' limp hand.] [42]

Indecisiveness

Though not readily associated with brutality, indecision on the part of police and other peacekeepers can be almost as brutal as the use of excessive violence. Indecisiveness is the result of various factors, among them ignorance, inexperience, disorganization, and "Couldn't care less" attitudes. It occurs oftenest during intercommunal peacekeeping. The following cases show that indecision can have brutally fatal consequences.

Washington, D.C.

Law enforcement authorities were indecisive and inattentive during the first day of racial trouble in April 1967. On the morning of the second day, they let most of the police on the street go home and rest, despite the fact that violence was still rampant. They reasoned—quite wrongly—that violence would abate during daylight. In fact, it continued to grow, unchecked. Result: 12 dead; 190 injured.

Detroit

At the beginning of the Detroit riots of July 1967, Mayor Jerome Cavanagh was desultory and indecisive. When Governor George Romney took command police were standing around idly, watching buildings burn. But Romney himself did not get desperately needed federal troops into Detroit for days. (This may have been partly because as a presidential aspirant at the time, he was being extra cautious. Moreover, President Lyndon Johnson may have delayed authorizing the use of federal troops in order to hurt a potential political rival for the White House.) Result: 43 dead; 2,377 injured.

Los Angeles

Although serious trouble in Watts started on a Wednesday in August of 1965, it was not until late Friday afternoon that Lieu-

tenant Governor Glenn Anderson dispatched the National Guard. Meanwhile, there were countless attacks on people and property, including a hospital and a police station. No police were seen in some areas of Watts for days on end during the rioting. Result: 34 dead; 1,032 injured.

Methvin, who has studied police responses to racial disturbances, suggests that inaction and indecision were a problem in other cities as well:

> The price of inaction was needless bloodshed—innocent lives lost. The toll in Detroit, Newark, Washington, Baltimore, and Chicago was inflated by the inaction of authorities sworn to preserve the peace and good order of those communities.[43]

SUMMARY

Peacekeepers intervening at any of the five levels of conflict—as well as officers engaging in police work in general—constantly run the risk of being brutal and committing "blue collar" crime. Some of the many reasons for this include public tolerance of excessive force and the four horsemen of brutality: armaments, panic, sadism, and indecision.

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[PART VII]

BREAKING, MAKING & KEEPING THE PEACE

[CHAPTER 15]

CONFLICT: *PEACEBREAKING*

A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF violence and peacebreaking grows out of situations where people are in a state of conflict. (Most of the violence and strife discussed in this book emanates from serious conflict between parties.) Accordingly, it is important to learn as much as possible about the phenomenon of "conflict." The word, by the way, derives from the Latin *confligere* which means to clash or to strike together.

Conflict is a phenomenon of immense variety and complexity. It has sociological aspects since it involves scarcities of status, power, and resources. And it has psychological aspects because it involves feelings of hate, fear, and distrust. Conflict can cause death, disorder, and social disorganization. But it can also have positive effects, as sociologists Georg Simmel and Lewis Coser have shown.

There are several basic types of conflict. *Emotional* conflict occurs as a state of tension caused by discrepant tendencies active within a person's mind. *Social* conflict by comparison occurs when the goals, values, or practices of various parties are incompatible—or are perceived to be so. In serious conflicts, this causes parties to try to neutralize, injure, or destroy each other. (Conflicting parties may derive from wholly different social units or from the same one, as in a civil war or any other *intra*-unit conflict.) The incompatible goals, values, or practices involved in conflicts may be rational, instrumental, and tangible (as in *realistic* conflict); or they may be irrational, expressive, and symbolic (as in *non-realistic* conflict). To quote conflict theorists Raymond Mack and Richard Snyder:

> Realistic conflict is characterized by opposed means and ends, by incompatibility of values and interests. Non-realistic conflict arises from the need for tension release, from deflected hostility, from historical tradition, and from ignorance or error. The two types differ in origin and in the ultimate motivation behind opposed action.[1]

While most conflicts are realistic (e.g. arising from a fear of a weakened economy) or non-realistic (e.g. arising from a fear of sinister forces), some conflicts are both. For instance, Nazi Germany's conflicts with others were fueled by a realistic fear that certain countries were trying to weaken her economy combined with a non-realistic fear that "sinister" internal forces were gaining undue influence in Germany.

Quite complex definitions of social conflict have been proposed from time to time. In their definition, Mack and Snyder set forth the properties which, taken together, define and identify conflict:

> 1. Conflict requires at least two parties or two analytically distinct units or entities. . . .
> 2. Conflict arises from "position scarcity" and "resource scarcity". . . .
> 3. Conflictful behaviors are those designed to destroy, injure, thwart, or otherwise control another party or other parties, and a conflict relationship is one in which the parties can gain (relatively) only at each other's expense. . . .
> 4. Conflict requires interaction among parties in which actions and counteractions are mutually opposed. . . .
> 5. Conflict relations always involve attempts to gain control of scarce resources and positions or to influence behavior in certain directions; hence a conflict relationship always involves the attempt or the actual acquisition or exercise of power. . . .[2]

While unwieldly, this definition is useful in determining what is and is not genuine conflict in the sociological sense. This is important if one wishes to distinguish conflict from closely related phenomena such as competition, opposition, rivalry, hostility, or antagonism. Of these, competition is the one most frequently confused with conflict.

Competition is a milder form of social interaction than conflict. It consists of "simultaneous pursuit of goals by two or more persons . . . where goal-achievement by one person . . . precludes identical goal-achievement by the other."[3] The rules and norms surrounding competition forbid physical attacks on fellow competitors, and allow only single-minded concentration on goals. Businesses compete for the same customers; universities compete for the same athletes; and nations compete for the same "firsts" in outer space. Competition is sometimes totally impersonal; parties are often not aware that they are competing with each other. If the rules governing competition break down, then it

turns into conflict. Thus, football competition is transformed into conflict if players—motivated by a fear of losing—start grabbing facemasks, committing personal fouls, and generally breaking the rules that prohibit physical assault.*

Most conflict and peacebreaking occurs at one of five levels, ranging from interpersonal to international. (Conflicts at each of these levels were examined in Chapters 2 through 6.) The system † characteristics of the five types of conflict and the parties involved are reviewed below.

The lowest level is conflict between individual *persons*. Individuals are the basic building blocks of all social units, and they are generally spared the problems social units face regarding value consensus, internal communication, and division of labor. (Table 15–I itemizes the main characteristics of the five different kinds of conflict participants.)

The next level is conflict between *groups*. Because they are small, groups allow easy communication among all members. This makes for closeness and cohesion. Rules for behavior are generally unwritten, and there is a minor differentiation of roles (e.g. leader, follower, tension manager). Gangs, cliques, juries, councils, and families are some of the more common groups.

The middle level is conflict between *organizations*. The size

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* In addition to conflict and competition, there are three other major "social processes" which are present in all societies: cooperation, accommodation, and assimilation. (The analysis of social processes has been an important concern in sociology ever since they were popularized in Robert Park and Ernest Burgess' influential textbook, *An Introduction to the Science of Sociology.*)

Cooperation occurs when parties work together in situations where goal-achievement by one facilitates goal-achievement by another. Parties that cooperate usually share the same values, beliefs, and sentiments. *Accommodation* takes place when antagonists agree to disagree. A kind of low-level truce obtains; differences are not resolved, but there is a mutual adjustment while both sides continue to seek their former goals. *Assimilation* occurs when more than just mutual adjustment takes place. It is the process by which differences between parties disappear, usually through acculturation and incremental change over time.

† "Systems" are composed of parts or elements that are interrelated in a certain way. Systems have specific boundaries and internal mechanisms that cause the whole to be greater than the sum of its parts. The parts or elements of the social systems dealt with here include rules, roles, and communication channels.

"Systems theory"—which tries to understand social phenomena by focusing on systems—attempts to identify patterns, mechanisms, and regularities in *conflicts* which exist regardless of the size of the social units involved. (It also attempts to discover patterns and regularities in *conflict regulation* which exist regardless of the size of the conflict.)

Table 15–I
CHARACTERISTICS OF CONFLICT PARTICIPANTS

	Person	*Group*	*Organization*	*Community*	*Nation*
Number of members (usual range)	1	2 to 20	20 to 5,000	5,000 to 500,000	500,000 to 50,000,000
Communication among all members (interaction)	Instantaneous	Easy	Difficult	Very difficult	Impossible
Rules for behavior (norms)	Not applicable	Informal and unwritten	Informal and unwritten, plus formal and written	Formal and written	Formal and written
Agreement on values (consensus)	Not applicable	Very high	High	Low	Very low
Division of labor (role differentiation)	Nonexistent	Very low	Low	High	Very high
Cohesiveness (pressure to conform)	Not applicable	Very high	High	Low	Very low

of most organizations makes full communication among all members difficult to achieve. Therefore, rules are created which spell out the communication channels that members must use, from leaders down to the rank and file. Sometimes rules are formalized and written down. Elaborate hierarchies of authority are often developed to coordinate all the roles, subunits, and communication channels that exist within an organization.

The next level of conflict occurs between *communities*. Communities are more than just large numbers of people connected by sewer pipes. They are collectivities living in fixed locations bound together socially, politically, and economically. Communities—whether they are villages, towns, or sections of a city—tend to have a homogeneous racial, ethnic, or religious make up. They provide for a substantial amount of their members' daily needs, and they may create schools, churches, and townhalls for this purpose.

The last level is conflict between *nations*. Nations encompass

every one of the aforementioned social units. In them, all manner of groups, organizations, and communities are arranged in a complex network of interdependence and hierarchical authority. Most nations have populations of three to thirty million people,[4] and most are characterized by a distinctive culture, a measure of political autonomy, and a system of regeneration and socialization. (However, the formerly clear boundaries between nations—and communities too, for that matter—have been broken down somewhat by jet travel, cultural exchange, electronic communication, and the multi-national corporation as well as by ICBMs, pollution, and the need to share the world's food, energy, and natural resources. "Spaceship earth" is one delicate biosphere; in a sense it is a world without borders.)

There are good reasons for categorizing conflicts in terms of the levels of the parties involved rather than in terms of something else. One is that the levels tell a great deal about the factors that come into play in each type of conflict. The nature of the disputing parties or aggregates determines the nature of the conflict. For example, different numbers of people, communication channels, and rules for behavior may cause different amounts of violence, different degrees of intractability, and so forth during a conflict. All these factors—social structural factors—help determine not only the intensity but also the possible outcomes of conflicts. In short, to fully understand a given conflict (or conflict regulation episode), one must be aware of the structural factors of the social aggregates involved.

This is also true if one wishes to understand a given person's behavior during a conflict. In fact, all people's behavior—whether it is conflict behavior or not—is affected by social structural factors. It is a basic tenet of sociology, moreover, that "the way men behave is largely determined by their relations with each other and by their membership in groups."[5]

The pressures exerted and the rewards offered by various social units account for much of the behavior that occurs during conflicts. However, members of social units or aggregates engaged in conflict belong to other aggregates which also influence them. Luckily for conflict analysts, though, people respond first and foremost to the social aggregate that is the most important, involving, and proximate to them. In this regard, sociologists Leonard Broom and Philip Selznick have written:

> A member of a street gang . . . is also a member of groups that touch him less closely, but in his everyday life it is the proximate membership that has the greatest effect.[6]

Much can be learned from structural analyses of conflicting parties. The information in Table 15–I suggests that conflicts between increasingly larger sized parties are characterized by increasing *complexity, destructiveness*, and *impersonality*. This is due partly to the fact that social units at higher and higher levels have more and more rules, members, rank-hierarchies, communication channels, and the like.

The enhanced complexity and destructiveness of larger-sized conflicts are obvious. The enhanced impersonality may be less so. However, a look at the highest and lowest of the five levels makes this clear. Fights between individuals are usually characterized by intimacy and intense self-involvement. This is because individuals act primarily on their own behalf, and are motivated by irritations, ego-slights, and love-hate emotions that they personally feel.

Fights between nations, on the other hand, are characterized by anonymity and detachedness. People act on behalf of large social entities whose goals, beliefs, and values may not be the same as their own. Impersonalization in international conflict is epitomized by the practice of dropping bombs from thousands of feet above targets, engaging in super-secret missions where even the enemy is unknown, and fighting against soldiers whose uniforms render them identical and faceless.

The impersonalization of conflicts has implications for certain kinds of peacekeeping. For instance, humanitarian peacekeeping is probably harder to conduct as larger and more impersonal conflicts are encountered because humanitarian techniques rely on personalized, non-role behavior on the part of everyone involved—including peacekeepers.

One of the advantages of using the five levels to categorize conflict is that there is a large body of theory and research associated with each of the five. Entire courses are taught on the sociology of the group, the sociology of the community, and so on. Hence students of conflict and violence can build on an immense amount of work already done. (Cumulativeness is important in the social sciences, and it is especially so in a fledgling field like conflict studies.)

A few representative hypotheses from each of the five levels serve to suggest the scope and nature of the research literature on conflict and peacebreaking. (No assumption is made as to the worth or correctness of the hypotheses quoted.)

Interpersonal Conflict

Hypothesis:

Tensions increase in the relations between people if either, or both, has a set of expectations which are mutually inconsistent, so that the satisfaction of one expectation leads to a violation of the other.[7]

Hypothesis:

Conflict which threatens the self-esteem of the parties involved is more difficult to resolve cooperatively than conflict which does not threaten self-esteem.[8]

Hypothesis:

Conflict between parties that mutually perceive themselves to be equal in power and legitimacy is more difficult to resolve cooperatively than when there is a mutual recognition of differential power and legitimacy.[9]

Intergroup Conflict

Hypothesis:

Conflict with other groups contributes to the establishment and reaffirmation of the identity of the group and maintains its boundaries against the surrounding social world.[10]

Hypothesis:

Group conflict arises in part because it satisfies certain individual or group needs. Unless these needs can be eliminated or greatly diminished or satisfied through other means, there will remain a possibility of conflict, no matter how skillfully formal techniques of diversion and control are applied.[11]

Hypothesis:

Continuous conflict between groups leads to routinized interaction and to standardized modes of conflict: i.e. to institutionalization of conflict.[12]

Interorganizational Conflict

Hypothesis:

Whenever two organizations are expanding into a common field so that possession of part of the field by one excludes the other, conflict is possible.[13]

Hypothesis:

Mild power disparity between the parties to collective bargaining is functional in maintaining stability of the industrial institution because it serves to reduce the amount of total conflict between them.[14]

Hypothesis:

Conflict may arise out of the tendency of industrial managers to believe that labor leaders have more understanding and acceptance of good supervisory practices than they actually do. Conversely, labor leaders underestimate management's tendency to accept the human relations approach.[15]

Intercommunal Conflict

Hypothesis:

The higher the level of prosperity, the less intense the conflict between ethnic and racial majorities and minorities.[16]

Hypothesis:

The intensity of positions taken in religious conflict is a function of guilt and insecurity feelings over having taken such positions.[17]

Hypothesis:

The more compartmentalized and restricted are the claims of a particular faith to define and regulate religious values, the less likely is religious affiliation to generate conflict.[18]

International Conflict

Hypothesis:

Geographically adjacent nations are more likely to go to war with each other than are nonadjacent nations.[19]

Hypothesis:

Nations which are highly centralized and/or lack a constitutional form of government are likeliest to become embroiled in violent international conflicts.[20]

Hypothesis:

Change in the relative power position of nations is a major source of tension leading to violent international conflict.[21]

POLARIZATION AND CONFLICT ESCALATION

An additional advantage in using the five levels for categorizing conflict is that they help stimulate insights into conflict and peacebreaking. To illustrate how they do this, the five levels will be interrelated with two sociological concepts, polarization and escalation, which will be discussed at this point in some detail.

The amount of polarization that exists in the social environment where a conflict is being waged affects the seriousness of the conflict and the chances of it escalating. Polarization occurs when different ideas, values, or interests become strongly opposed. (These things may eventually become opposite rallying points for great numbers of people if they are embodied in symbols and ideologies.) In such situations, the sentiments of most people do not converge and consensus does not grow. Instead, sentiments diverge into opposing camps. The identities and allegiances of people keep referring back to the same two poles (e.g. black or white; establishment or counterculture) or the same two people representing them (e.g. Bobby Seale or George Wallace; Ronald Reagan or Timothy Leary). As a consequence, even the most trivial conflicts become identified with these poles or people. Conflicts tend to reinforce rather than neutralize each other under such circumstances. The result is that polarized environments are more likely to be host to conflicts that grow and escalate until they explode in full-scale violence.

In *non*polarized environments, by contrast, identities and allegiances refer back to numerous ideas, values, and interests. Here conflicts do not reinforce one another; rather they neutralize and cancel each other out over the long run. That is, at one moment Joe will be a laborer, in conflict with managers. The next moment he will be a Catholic, siding with Catholic man-

agers against all Protestant laborers and managers. And at yet another moment, he will side with both Catholic and Protestant whites against both Catholic and Protestant blacks. (The United States can be regarded as fairly nonpolarized, at least in comparison with most other societies.)

A piece of paper can be used to show how polarization and nonpolarization affect the escalation potential of conflicts. If the paper is *folded* repeatedly in the same pattern, the cleavage (conflict) lines reinforce each other with every refolding. (This illustrates the polarized situation.) Sooner or later the paper will rip apart ("explode") along the fold lines because the reinforced cleavages have weakened the paper. However, if the paper is *crumpled* repeatedly, the cleavage (conflict) lines run every which way, neutralizing one another. (This represents the nonpolarized situation.) The paper is not likely to ever rip apart ("explode") because the criss-crossing cleavages have not weakened it.

What causes polarization that leads to conflict escalation? Isolation, among other things. For example labor-management conflicts have been most serious and most frequent over the years in those industries which are geographically isolated (mining, lumber, textiles) or socially isolated (shipping, fishing, longshoring).[22] Conversely, they have been least severe and least frequent in industries such as hotels, clothing, restaurants, construction, food processing, and general manufacturing—none of which is particularly isolated from society.

How does isolation polarize people? Laborers—as well as managers—in the coal patch, the logging camp, and the textile town tend to create their own myths, heroes, and codes of conduct. They develop their own subcultures and world views. (With respect to laborers, because they all experience the exact same situations and grievances it is easy for them to unite in anger over wages, hours, and job-related issues.*) But most important, there are very few neutrals or diversions in these isolated places to dilute the solidarity of each party and moderate their con-

* The isolation and limited skills of laborers often prevent them from changing jobs to resolve their dissatisfactions. Also loggers, miners, and others accustomed to hard physical work may be more disposed to physical or violent solutions to their problems than less-active, less-isolated waiters, sales clerks, or assembly-line workers.

flict. (In nonpolarized, less-isolated industries, laborers and managers have many other outside interests and concerns. Their countless cross-cutting allegiances tend to mitigate their conflicts.)

In general, polarized social environments tend to produce people who would rather not deal with conflicts, even conflicts of their own making. Instead of shouldering some of the responsibility and endeavoring to work things out, they prefer to pass the buck. This can cause conflicts to escalate. To show how this might happen, racial friction, say, between two *persons* might be used as an illustration. The people involved might refuse to face their problem or be unwilling to change, compromise, or accommodate. They might then pass their problem off—unresolved—to two *groups* that they belong to, causing the groups to become hostile towards each other. These groups might then try to resolve the conflict, absorbing some of the burden; or they might in turn let two *organizations* pick up the respective causes. These organizations might also refuse to deal with the issues and the tension. The conflict might then be passed on to two opposing racial *communities*. These two might eventually explode into violence, which would be far greater than any violence the smaller social units would have engaged in. Such violence would also be far more difficult to manage since the larger the conflict, the harder it is to deal with as a rule. (This illustration is intended to show how the people produced in polarized environments can cause conflicts to escalate. It is not intended to suggest that conflicts at any level can always be traced to a problem at the interpersonal level. This would be sheer reductionism.)

By comparison, in *non*polarized environments, people are less likely to pass the buck. Small amounts of tension are more apt to be absorbed at each level. Trouble is not shunted aside only to burst forth at a higher level. This is one reason why nonpolarized societies can tolerate much more conflict than polarized ones.

Sometimes escalation occurs *naturally*, without any conscious buck passing. When this happens, the initial parties to a conflict may be completely forgotten. During the Civil Rights period of the fifties and sixties, the first persons or groups to be involved in an incident were often dwarfed by organizations (black churches, white citizens' councils, chapters of SCLC,

SNCC, KKK) which subsequently entered the conflict. These organizations themselves were often forgotten when even larger organizations (the Alabama State Legislature, the US Department of Justice) came upon the scene. In effect, when large social units enter conflicts to go to bat for smaller ones, the latter frequently get lost in the shuffle. Ironically, the antagonistic small ones sometimes make peace on their own, while their respective champions keep on battling.

Another natural process that commonly occurs at all levels of conflict is the escalation of issues. The original issue which triggers the clash usually brings other ones to mind. These other issues may have come up before and were suppressed, perhaps because they were not worth pursuing. Now, however, the pressures of the conflict may cause disputing parties to dredge them up.

Stress, emotion, and escalation processes encourage each party to see the other as entirely bad. (The ambivalence of normal interaction—where good and bad are balanced and in-betweens tolerated—gives way to black-white thinking during conflict interaction.) This in turn causes opponents to dig even deeper for issues and differences that divide them. Often the initial issue is totally forgotten or abandoned for bigger bones of contention.

The flow diagram below shows how the two natural escalation processes operate during conflicts at all levels, from interpersonal to international.[23]



The next-to-last stage deserves further comment. The urge to win may cause the original conflicting parties to solicit support not only from larger-sized social units, but also from equal-sized ones (i.e. peers). When this happens outsiders may have a hard time staying neutral, regardless of whether the plea is for real or symbolic support. This situation is particularly apparent when married couples begin to split up. Each spouse asks mutual

friends to take sides. Neutrality is discouraged, causing a dilemma which is notably agonizing for friends who like both spouses. Eventually, true neutrals may be distrusted and even excluded by conflicting parties. Similar pressures are put on neutrals during other conflicts, especially racial ones. Phrases such as "You're either for us or against us," and "If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the problem" epitomize these pressures.

In conclusion, conflict or peacebreaking—be it at the personal or national level—is as complex as it is troublesome. Nevertheless, structural factors, research findings, and insights from theoretical analyses all help to clarify some of the "bloomin', buzzin' confusion" that is conflict.

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[CHAPTER 16]

CONFLICT REGULATION: *PEACEMAKING & PEACEKEEPING*

CONFLICT REGULATION INVOLVES managing or moderating conflicts so that violence and other destruction exact as little toll as possible. The two major kinds of conflict regulation are peace*making* and peace*keeping*. (The less active of the two, peacemaking, will be examined; and then some generalizations and a five-stage model regarding peacekeeping will be presented.)

Even before peacemakers and peacekeepers begin their work, though, several internal and external constraints encourage the regulation and moderation of conflict. Among others, these constraints include: (a) the functional interdependence of the conflicting parties (husband and wife must cooperate to some extent to run a household; blacks and whites must communicate to some degree to run a city); (b) the human inclination to cut short the physical, emotional, or financial suffering which parties are inflicting on each other; and (c) the inevitable exhaustion of energy and resources such as supplies, ammunition, and managerial efficiency.

These and other constraints can cause some serious conflicts to become institutionalized. ("Institutionalization" means that specific procedures are followed—sometimes ritualistically—every time a certain type of conflict arises.) Labor-management conflict in the United States is an example of institutionalized conflict. Complex Taft-Hartley protocols are followed whenever serious industrial conflict threatens (whether annually, biennially, etc.); all sides are saddled with legal and contractual red tape. Special provisions are built into the ritualized protocols to deal with changes in the goals and strength of different parties over time. Usually, the more stable and evenly matched the strength of the parties, the higher the degree of institutionalization.[1] Successful institutionalization of conflicts requires that the regu-

lating procedures be internalized (believed in) by all parties, be stated in writing, and be backed up by firm sanctions.[2] Mack and Synder note:

> Out of institutionalized conflict come new social policies. As conflict is partially resolved at various stages through time, certain issues disappear, and a common law governing formerly disputed matters is built up. Ways of measuring power relations and correcting imbalances without aggressive conflict or violence are developed. Institutionalization requires the combination of conflict and cooperation, since rules and procedures cannot function in the absence of voluntary obedience or enforcement through sanctions. . . .[3]

PEACEMAKING

Peacemaking consists of efforts to moderate violence and conflict. It is generally less active than peacekeeping since it often involves having conflict parties come to third parties instead of vice versa.

Negotiators

Negotiators confer with opposing parties in order to facilitate the moderation or settlement of conflicts. They engage in diplomacy, inquiry, and other conflict management techniques so subtle—and yet so common—that they themselves are often unaware of their operation. These techniques include voting, forgetting, discussing, and bargaining. (Some negotiators act in behalf of a conflicting party they belong to; others are hired from the outside to serve as advocates. In either case, negotiators often promote one party's interests rather than remaining impartial.) Depending on the circumstances negotiators may help locate broad areas of agreement or narrow areas of agreement. Likewise, they may help arrange tentative settlements or help hammer out permanent ones.

There is some question about what conditions are necessary for successful negotiation. According to a US Senate Judiciary report, success depends on whether:[4]

(a) the issue is negotiable (that is, you can sell your car but not your child);

(b) the negotiators—interested not only in taking but also in giving—are able to exchange value for value, and are willing to compromise;

(c) the negotiating parties trust each other to some extent

—if they didn't, a plethora of safety provisions would render the "agreement" unworkable.

However, Gerald Nierenberg, an expert on negotiation, disagrees with these conditions, feeling they are overly restrictive in what they require.[5] He notes that all issues are theoretically negotiable (there are black market adoption rings in America, for instance, where children can be sold). Furthermore, he points out that a willingness to compromise is not essential to the success of negotiation. Since no one knows at the outset what the result of a negotiation will be, most people cannot guarantee that they will be willing to compromise. Nonetheless, many negotiations succeed without this willingness to compromise. Lastly, Nierenberg suggests that most parties involved in negotiation do not trust each other. This is why one of the primary skills of an accomplished negotiator is knowing how to handle other people's distrust.

Conciliators

Conciliators try to bring seriously antagonistic parties together by means of meetings, conferences, and gatherings where demonstrations of goodwill can take place. Conciliators encourage antagonists to adhere to standards of fairness, integrity, and justice. They help parties think through possible courses of action and alternative conflict outcomes; and they attempt to win over the hostile and placate the angry. (When conciliators fail, arbitrators and mediators usually try their hand.)

Conciliators skilled at conflict resolution take to heart the literal definition of "resolution:" to break into constituent parts or elements. They break down large, complex conflicts into smaller, simpler ones which can be dealt with more easily; and thus they reduce the chance of dangerous deadlocks occurring. Legal scholar Roger Fisher calls this process conflict "fractionation."[6] He believes that *issue* control is just as important as *arms* control in managing conflict. For this reason, Fisher recommends that peacemakers get parties to talk in terms of specific issues ("We got a bad deal *this* time") rather than general ones ("We get a bad deal *all* the time"). He likewise recommends that peacemakers get parties to argue over the application of a principle, rather than over the principle itself. (Conflict fractionation can also involve fragmenting parties themselves into smaller social units

—i.e. breaking disputing communities into disputing organizations, or quarrelling groups into quarrelling individuals.)

Arbitrators

Arbitrators have been around since time immemorial. Tribal priests arbitrated disputes among primitive men, and a while later ecclesiastical authorities performed similar duties. Arbitrators were used extensively to resolve conflicts among the Greek city states.

Arbitrators are frequently brought in to deal with conflicts which have reached an impasse. They carefully assess the issues and then pass judgment by formulating a solution. Disputing parties are then compelled—often by their own prior consent—to accept the decision of the arbitrators as final and binding. Thus, arbitrators resemble judges (or juries if there are several of them) who hear all sides of a dispute and then reach a verdict. (In fact arbitration is often used in place of court litigation; it saves time, money, and effort.)

There are two major ways arbitrators get involved in conflicts. They may be asked to intervene—over the objections of the parties—by some local, state, or federal statutory authority. Or they may be invited to intervene by the parties themselves. When invited, especially if an arbitration panel is needed, they are commonly chosen as follows. Each party to the conflict selects an arbitrator. Then the two arbitrators that are selected get together and choose a third, thereby ensuring a truly impartial panel. Depending on the size and importance of the conflict, the arbitrators selected may be *amateurs* (common citizens), *professionals* (members of the American Arbitration Association), *notables* (royal heads of state), *agencies* (courts of justice), or *nations* (neutral countries).

Arbitrators play a major role in today's industrial conflicts. Because most US courts are not equipped to deal with such conflicts, both labor and management use arbitrators to resolve their disputes over wages, working conditions, and interpretation of contracts. State or federal arbitrators listen to each party and then formulate decisions, called awards, which are binding. Advisory and non-binding forms of arbitration—sometimes called fact-finding—are occasionally used in industrial peacemaking. (Arbitrators are made available to labor and management be-

cause the general public has a stake in obtaining swift resolution of most industrial conflicts.)

For the most part, labor and management see arbitration as a necessary evil. Labor feels it is giving up its right to strike by bringing in possibly unsympathetic outsiders. And management feels it is entrusting its fate to outsiders who will not have to live with their decision day in, day out. Yet both labor and management agree that arbitration is preferable to the alternatives: explosive violence, protracted strikes, or perpetual domination by whichever side happens to start out strongest.

Mediators

Like arbitrators, mediators have had a long and important history. They help disputing parties settle their differences, often by suggesting solutions to them. But these solutions are not binding or compulsory because mediators rarely have the power necessary to enforce them. As a consequence, mediators are not as threatening—nor as rigid and formal—as arbitrators. Also, unlike arbitrators, mediators are usually invited to intervene in conflicts. (Mediation, therefore, is a diplomatic approach to the resolution of conflict whereas arbitration is a judicial approach. This is why mediation is often more successful at achieving permanent, high-quality resolutions.)

Mediators sound out all sides to a dispute to learn what outcomes and arrangements each one prefers. They help disputing parties work out solutions, compromises, and graceful retreats. In addition mediators try

—to inform parties of their relative strength so that faulty assessments of strength do not lead to unnecessary bloodshed.[7]

—to establish norms for rationality, mutual respect, open communication, and the use of persuasion rather than coercion.[8]

—to change the value or factual premises of one or more parties, so that workable solutions acceptable to all will result.[9]

—to make agreed-upon solutions appear attractive and prestigeful to all parties and to interested audiences as well.[10]

Individuals, boards, agencies, and countries can serve as mediators. In respect to individuals, several examples come readily to mind: Carl Rogers or Virginia Satir mediating between family

disputants; Theodore Kheel or George Taylor mediating between industrial organizations; and Henry Kissinger or Gunnar Jarring mediating between belligerent nations.

Regardless of the size of the conflict they confront, mediators need certain personal qualities: patience, independence, respectability, physical stamina, and a good sense of timing. Further, they must be able to analyze changing social data rapidly and get disputants to devise imaginative solutions to their conflicts. And mediators must be able to break up fixations, mental-sets, and other psychological log jams in the problem solving process as well as be able to distinguish *material* issues in a conflict (the need for resources) from *emotional* ones (the need for status).

Industrial conflicts have required the services of a great number of mediators. Labor relations experts Paul Prasow and Edward Peters describe the role of the interorganizational mediator:

> A mediator is a go-between, a confidant of both parties, whose exploratory conversations on disputed issues are off the record. His public pronouncements are largely on procedural aspects of negotiations, such as expressions of foreboding that not enough progress is being made or optimistic observations that the parties are trying very hard, that some progress is being made, and that round-the-clock sessions are being scheduled.[11]

When mediators enter conflicts—especially industrial ones—interaction between parties usually increases. (When arbitrators enter conflicts, the opposite generally occurs.) Interaction increases because mediators establish new lines of communication and provide fresh impetus towards resolution. (This increased interaction is crucial since parties must arrive at their own solution in mediation; it is not in someone else's hands, as it is in arbitration.)

International conflicts have also required considerable mediation over the years. The Declaration of Paris (1856), the Hague Conference Accord (1907), the League of Nations Covenant (1919), and the United Nations Charter (1945) all recommended mediators—and in many cases provided the necessary machinery —for moderating serious international conflict and violence. The League and the United Nations have mediated numerous international disputes; their efforts have led to many cease-fires, truces, and treaties.

The United States has mediated numerous international con-

flicts too, including those between Bolivia and Chile in 1882, Russia and Japan in 1905, Pakistan and Afghanistan in 1961, Netherlands and Indonesia in 1962, and Egypt and Israel in 1974. Paradoxically, the United States itself has refused a great many offers from other countries to mediate her own quarrels: most notably, offers from Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina to mediate the US-Cuba conflict and offers from France, Cambodia, and Pakistan to mediate the US-North Vietnam conflict. (Switzerland and Great Britain have served as mediators in a few of the disputes the United States has been embroiled in.)

Both industrial and international mediators often use the same procedures for bringing parties together, establishing basic facts, deflating exaggerated claims, raising doubts about positions already assumed, discovering alternative solutions, and getting parties to agree.[12] Also, mediators intervening in industrial and international conflicts use a variant of the Pat and Mike technique. They warn conflicting parties that if cooperation is not forthcoming, they (the mediators), will be replaced by arbitrators, who are less amiable and more threatening. (However, mediators are sometimes deliberately sent into a conflict to smooth the way for arbitrators when it is known that the latter will be needed anyway.)

Observers

The primary task of observers dispatched to a conflict scene is to record, investigate, and verify facts. Their secondary task is to moderate violence and hostility. (Their mere presence often inhibits and constrains belligerents who might otherwise feel no restraints on their behavior.) Observers act as the eyes and ears for outsiders interested in a conflict; in an international conflict, this may mean being the eyes and ears for the entire world.

Observers customarily issue periodic "official" reports and assessments of conflict situations. (These are to be distinguished from the "unofficial" reports of media reporters who may be at the scene too.) Like other types of conflict regulators, observers occasionally perform other peacemaking functions—such as conciliation and mediation—besides their primary ones.

Observers are frequently employed during violent international conflicts. "Men with binoculars" observe cease-fire lines, demilitarized zones, and infiltration routes as well as keep tabs on tense

situations which might threaten global peace and security. Extensive international observation has been conducted by the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), the UN Presence in Cambodia and Thailand (UNCT), the International Commission for Control and Supervision in South Vietnam (ICCS), the UN Mission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), the UN Mixed Armistice Commission in Palestine (MAC), and the UN Truce Supervision in the Middle East (UNTSO).

PEACEKEEPING

Peacekeeping is usually more active than peacemaking because it almost always involves third parties going to the scene of a conflict, interposing themselves, and taking other similar actions. Since so many of the *concrete* things peacekeepers do were presented in Chapters 2 through 6, an effort will be made here to note some of the *abstract* things they do. Thus, what follows is a brief enumeration of some of the functions peacekeepers perform, regardless of the size of the conflict they are confronting.

(1) Peacekeepers point out to disputing parties the dangers they face if their conflict is not resolved. (The larger the conflict, the more important this task is.) The most dramatic danger is the intolerable bloodshed will occur if resolution does not come about. Unfortunately, there is a tendency among disputants to become preoccupied with strategizing and maneuvering during their conflict, thus forgetting the dangers courted. As conflict resolution expert Elmore Jackson notes:

> Disputes are very difficult to solve in which one or both of the conflicting parties believes that, because of the comparative power which lies at their command, there are no substantial risks in a failure to reach agreement.[13]

Experienced peacekeepers, then, constantly remind disputants that they are neither immortal nor invulnerable.

(2) Peacekeepers influence disputants' notions of what is acceptable conflict behavior. If they are highly esteemed peacekeepers can sometimes persuade disputing parties to be civil to each other. The mere presence of peacekeepers may go a

long way toward reducing rudeness, hyperbole, and inattention on the part of disputants. Peacekeepers often foster trust and honesty among disputants by encouraging all sides to honor promises and speak the truth.

(3) Peacekeepers keep channels of communication open between disputing parties, and constructively influence the interaction process during serious conflicts. They serve as go-betweens who will not intentionally distort messages entrusted to them for delivery. If necessary, however, peacekeepers may *temporarily* (a) delay delivery of a message, (b) emphasize some facts and not others, or (c) suppress information considered disruptive. They may also feign ignorance if required. Because peacekeepers can exert pressure towards certain outcomes by manipulating communication, they must always resist the temptation to "play favorites" and exploit situations.

(4) Peacekeepers provide information and clear up confusion during conflicts. This is especially important if disputing parties have an incomplete picture of their conflict. (They may not know all the issues at stake, all the choices available to them, or the true nature of their opponents.) Peacekeepers also provide a common referent or standard for perception during conflicts. Disputants can compare their perceptions and interpretations of events with those of clearer-headed peacekeepers. This enables disputants to correct the delusions and misperceptions which often result from the stress of conflict. (Of course, some conflicts are so complicated that almost no one can untangle all the variables involved. The Vietnam War is a case in point. It was a highly frustrating conflict—to rationalistic Westerners, at least—because full and reliable knowledge of the variables was nearly impossible to obtain.)

(5) Peacekeepers help disputing parties find and identify salient conflict outcomes. These outcomes are solutions toward which the expectations of disputants naturally converge; i.e. they are natural focal points or areas of agreement in the resolution of a conflict. Game theorist Thomas Schelling has described salient outcomes thus:

> [There is an] intrinsic magnetism of particular outcomes, especially those that enjoy prominence, uniqueness, simplicity, precedent, or some rationale that makes them qualitatively differentiable from the continuum of possible alternatives.[14]

Salient outcomes trigger and coordinate the responses of disputants when they ask themselves, "What would we settle for if we were the enemy?" Examples of salient outcomes are fifty-fifty splits or round whole numbers in *monetary* settlements (as when Russia and the United States agreed on $7,200,000 and not $7,213,456 for the purchase of Alaska); and parallels or geologic features in *boundary* settlements (rivers, mountains, or narrowings such as the 38th parallel in Korea).

(6) Peacekeepers facilitate face-saving maneuvers on the part of disputants. They allow disputants to declare that they are "retreating" because of third-party pressure, not because of weakness or softness. Peacekeepers give disputants an excuse for being flexible and for backing down from previously held positions. In addition, if a conflict outcome turns out later to be disastrous for one party, it can always tell its constituents that third parties were to blame. Peacekeepers can also suggest solutions which may have occurred to one party but which were not proposed by it out of fear of looking irresolute. Moreover, solutions suggested earlier by one party and rejected by another can be reintroduced by peacekeepers. These are often accepted the second time around because they are no longer "tainted."

The Five Stages of Peacekeeping

Different activities occur at various stages of peacekeeping. (Figure 16–1 illustrates the five stages typical of most peacekeeping efforts from interpersonal to international.) The itemization below sets forth the things peacekeepers do at each of the five stages, for all types of peacekeeping from interpersonal to international. *Pre*vention, *inter*vention, and *post*vention refer to the time at which peacekeepers come ("vention") upon the scene, calculated with respect to when a conflict becomes extremely serious or violent.

STAGE 1. Non-serious Conflict.
Prevention
Peacekeepers—treat and remedy underlying causes of conflict
—mediate or arbitrate
—disarm disputing parties



Figure 16–1. The 5 Stages of Peacekeeping

—remove potential weapons
—watch for signs of impending violence.

STAGE 2. Serious Conflict (VIOLENCE present).
Intervention
Peacekeepers—take safety precautions before intervening
—protect innocent parties from violence
—secure vital facilities
—bring violence under control and terminate it if possible.

STAGE 3. Serious Conflict (No violence present; *but* parties not able or willing to reason).

Intervention

Peacekeepers—allow parties to express their hostilities nonviolently
—keep new participants and new weapons out of the conflict
—disarm disputants if not done so already
—separate parties if required
—gain as much control over situation as is necessary.

STAGE 4. Serious Conflict (No violence present; parties able and willing to reason).

Intervention

Peacekeepers—give a hearing to all disputants
—help disputants discover alternate ways of coping with problems
—moderate the conflict by appealing to disputants' individual or collective interests
—refer parties to institutions that can help them resolve their conflict permanently
—disperse parties if required.

STAGE 5. Non-serious Conflict.

Postvention

Peacekeepers—keep on top of situation by maintaining contact, patrol, or surveillance
—remain alert and mobilized for possible repeat interventions
—mediate or arbitrate if necessary
—study peacekeeping episode for insights that will improve future efforts.

As is evident from the preceeding itemization, peacekeepers encounter a substantial challenge at Stage 2 because violence is present and must be dealt with. (If peacekeepers become involved in a conflict at Stage 1, they may be able to prevent violence from breaking out.) It is clear from Stages 3 and 4 that peacekeepers must be able to recognize when disputing parties are able and willing to reason. (Training and experience enable peacekeepers to recognize this point when it comes. This recognition is critical because it helps them decide which peacekeeping tactics and techniques to use.

The Role of the Peacekeeper

Further insight into what peacekeepers do can be gained by using the sociological concept of role. A role is the recurrent pattern of behavior (and belief) that is associated with being, say, a parent, teacher, waitress, peacekeeper, or member of any interactional, occupational, or organizational network. Roles usually have counter-roles which complement, reinforce, and essentially make possible the performance of the role. When certain counter-roles are added to the above roles, the following dyads are formed: parent-child, teacher-student, waitress-customer, peacekeeper-disputant. Roles are part of the division of labor which is necessary for social units to function smoothly. Each role has its do's and don'ts, its rights and responsibilities which tell a person what is ideally expected of him while performing the role.

The ideal role for peacekeepers requires that they be truly impartial, among other things, during their conflict interventions. They must have no personal interest in whether a given party triumphs or not. In order not to tip the balance in favor of any party, they must resist efforts to win them over.*

The ideal peacekeeper role also entails doing some of the tasks mentioned in previous chapters (interposing, patrolling, instructing, observing, protecting). It also entails doing the more abstract things just noted: dramatizing the dangers of continued conflict, establishing norms for civilized conduct, keeping channels of communication open, identifying salient outcomes, and facilitating face-saving maneuvers.

Like other role players, peacekeepers often fail to enact their ideal roles fully. Some of the reasons for this were discussed in Chapter 14—panic, indecision, and the like. Another reason is that occasionally the peacekeeper role clashes with other roles being acted out. Chapter 2 discussed the strain that some people feel results when a person tries to do both police work and social work at the same time. In short, the ideal role may not be fully enacted because the role player is being pulled in too many different directions.

* At all levels of conflict, parties normally try to influence and win over peacekeepers. At the interpersonal level, for instance, spouses sometimes try to manipulate peacekeepers just the way they have previously manipulated in-laws, children, or neighbors, getting them all to be tools in their battles with one another.



Figure 16–2. Interpersonal Peacekeeping Agency: Part of the New York Police Department.[15]

An additional reason why real role and ideal role behavior sometimes differ is that a person's role and his personality may be incompatible. For example, many of the Chicago police at the 1968 Democratic Convention probably felt tension between their peacekeeping role (which called for calm and tolerant responses to insults from demonstrators) and their "red-blooded American male" personalities (which called for quick and vehement responses to provocation).

Performance of the ideal peacekeeper role is also frequently modified by bureaucratic structures. The larger a peacekeeping agency is, the more it tends to limit the flexibility and efficiency of its peacekeepers. In general, the size of a peacekeeping agency is proportionate to the size of the conflict social units it usually deals with. But even the agencies which handle interpersonal conflicts are large and complex these days, as Figure 16–2 shows. (The two circles that stand for conflicting first and second

parties at the bottom of Figures 16–2 through 16–6 are really shorthand notation for the organization charts representing the two social units (groups, organizations, communities, etc.) that are in conflict. Thus the interaction during most peacekeeping episodes is actually among three or more complicated social aggregates—all with organization charts.)

The five charts in Figures 16–2 through 16–6 suggest that complexity, bureaucratization, and division of labor are more extensive in peacekeeping agencies that deal with larger conflicts.† As a consequence, peacekeepers who intervene in, say, *interorganizational* campus conflicts usually find themselves acting as part of a massive operation. Police Chief Jerry Wilson of Washington, D.C. testified before the Scranton Commission about the change in working conditions this represents for some peacekeepers:

> A police officer goes out alone or with a partner and is expected to take action based on his own judgment. . . . But in handling a demonstration you are in a considerably different situation. The police officer who just yesterday was out there more or less his own boss . . . is in a squad with a sergeant directly over him.[21]

Moreover peacekeepers who intervene in *intercommunal* racial conflicts are often briefed en masse, commanded en masse, and treated as small cogs in a huge peacekeeping machine. When they in turn deal with conflict participants they sometimes treat

---

† Complexity and division of labor are manifested even in such small-scale efforts as keeping the peace at professional football games. Today there are six peacekeepers at each football game, not including an alternate, a boxman, and two rodmen. (When football was first played, there were only three officials; in 1947 the number was increased to five, and in 1965, to six.) The current division of labor among gridiron peacekeepers is quite interesting: [20]

Referee	—puts ball in play; starts clock; tells team about time outs; announces penalties; watches for roughing the kicker and passer.
Umpire	—checks equipment; watches lineman downfield; wipes off ball; watches for holding.
Field judge	—covers punts, fair catches, field goals, and deep passes; watches for pass interference.
Back judge	—counts the number of defensive players at the start of each play; watches field goals; keeps alert for clipping and out of bounds.
Line judge	—times the play; watches for out of bounds, offsides, and backward passes.
Head linesman	—supervises chain gang; overseas substitutions; signals touchdowns.



Figure 16–3. Intergroup Peacekeeping Agency: Part of the Philadelphia Police Department.[16]

them the same way, thus failing to perform the peacekeeper role fully and ideally.

Large agencies also modify the ideal peacekeeping role when they try to standardize peacekeepers' behavior. Agencies do this to make them more reliable and more accountable for their actions. Thus hierarchies of control are created to prevent too much deviation among peacekeepers. This causes some peacekeepers to be rigid, bureaucratic, and lacking in initiative at a conflict scene.

Peacekeepers who intervene in international conflicts encounter numerous bureaucratic and coordination problems. (This is due in part to the fact that international peacekeeping usually involves troops from vastly different cultural backgrounds and military traditions.) The UN effort in the Congo, for example, was



Figure 16–4. Interorganizational Peacekeeping Agency: Part of an Urban Police Department.[17]

beset with coordination problems as Burns and Heathecote have noted:

> During the Congo operation the chain of command that deployed the UNF seems to have been most tangled between the first and second links of civilian control and between national headquarters in Leopoldville and provincial headquarters. . . . The most serious of the confusions arose . . . in Katanga during September 1961. . . .[22]

The larger the peacekeeping agency, the larger the communication problems. As the number of people increase in an agency,



Figure 16–5. Intercommunal Peacekeeping Agency: Part of an Urban Police Department.[18]

so do the number of communication channels. Limits and hierarchies are set up to determine who can talk to whom.[23] When this happens it takes longer and longer to get information from one person to another within a peacekeeping agency.

As the broken lines in the five organization charts show, agencies dealing with successively larger conflicts have more intermediaries (communication links) between the top and the bottom peacekeepers. The smallest of the typical agencies diagrammed in Figures 16–2 to 16–6 has five; the largest, ten.

The more links there are, as a rule, the more inefficiently decisions are made and intelligence is utilized. This need not be so. Communication systems and modern decision-making tech-



Figure 16–6. International Peacekeeping Agency: Part of the United Nations.[19]

niques can prevent inefficiencies from happening, such as peacekeepers in the field not knowing what their superiors at headquarters want them to do, or agencies not being able to get intelligence—already gathered—to peacekeepers when it is needed. The interorganizational peacekeeping agency chart (Figure 16–4) illustrates the latter problem. When this agency

intervenes in campus conflicts, getting the right information to peacekeepers in the field at the right moment is made triply difficult by the three-way division of "communication" labor among an Intelligence Division, an Intervention Division, and a Negotiation Division.

There are still other factors which prevent peacekeepers from always performing the ideal peacekeeping role. These include:

—Too much cost in terms of physical or emotional injury to peacekeepers. While they can usefully serve as scapegoats for disputing parties (siphoning off some of their hostilities), this can be carried too far if peacekeepers are constantly vilified or attacked.

—Too much frustration on the part of peacekeepers. This may be due to disputants' ignorance, intransigence, or deceitfulness.

—Too much risk of losing prestige in the event of failure. A damaged reputation for peacekeeping may reduce future invitations to keep the peace.

—Too much expense in terms of time or money. This may be the case even if peacekeepers handle a conflict rapidly and well.

If enough of these factors are present, peacekeepers may quickly abandon their intervention efforts or may refuse to intervene in the first place.

To insure that police, guardsmen, soldiers, and others will be motivated to intervene and will perform their ideal role as fully as possible, authorities concerned about conflict and violence should provide peacekeepers with the following:

—Ample financial reward—including extra pay for outstanding service—to acknowledge their important contributions to society.

—Sufficient resources—manpower, equipment, and sanctions—to allow peacekeepers to do their job safely and efficiently.

—Adequate short-term recognition—through ceremonial tributes and the like—to show gratitude for their vital work.

—Enough long-term recognition—through promotions and special privileges—to make peacekeepers feel valued and respected.

It is hoped that authorities will provide substantial incentives and resources to police and other peacekeepers in the future. It

is hoped, too, that a concerned public will support the research and experimentation which will enable peacekeepers to improve their ability to handle the conflict and violence that abound today.

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

KARL SCHONBORN
(At Peacekeeping HQ in Cyprus)

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