



GET A JOB

LABOR MARKETS,
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, AND CRIME

Robert D. Crutchfield

GET A JOB

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Get a Job: Labor Markets, Economic Opportunity, and Crime

Robert D. Crutchfield

Get a Job

Labor Markets, Economic Oppor

Robert D. Crutchfield



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To Danielle, Rashida and Brandon

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faults and weaknesses of the book
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probation and adult parole, and the
rgh's Hill District, to add insights to
a our research. That means that this
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and making sense of our results in a
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conceptualization but he generously
st display results from some analy-
ably easier for me to go ahead and
each you how to do them.” I’ve now
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ncerned about proper academic eti-
do—retreat into writing about data
ne to write more accessibly, but she

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e that I needed to get things finished.
t only coauthored one of the impor-
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ation and crime thesis. She's read
anuscript than either of us wants to
agement, and editorial eye were crit-
ank the boys who long ago were on
d—those parolees and probationers
rned so much, when I was a parole
F Probation and Parole, as well as the
Erie and Sharon Pennsylvania, and
o were at the Mercer County Penn-
rked there. It will be obvious to any
e central to the development of my
or markets are connected to crime.
d women, and boys and girls of The
borhoods in Pittsburgh, and of the
y in Seattle. Their struggles, their
their resilience are where this book

*Modern Misérables**Labor Market Influences on Crime*

I heard the news first in a phone call from my youngest brother, Robby, and two of his friends who had been with a man during a holdup. Robby was arrested for an armed robbery and murder. The police had been looking for him and his crime had given the cops license to search for him. I'd put between my brother's world and mine a distance that had lapsed. The two thousand miles between my home in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, my years of flight and hiding, had not changed a thing. I had never run fast enough or far enough. I had never been with him. Wherever he was, running for his life, I had to go with him.¹

John Edgar Wideman's book *Brothers* is a story of two brothers; the younger Robby's early years in a Pennsylvania prison, convicted of felony murder. John himself, now a Brown University professor, was at the University of Wyoming when he wrote *Brothers and Keepers* is also a tale of their Homecoming ghettos, where the Wideman brothers grew up. It is a story of working-class neighborhoods w

from my mother. My
his friends had killed
fugitive, wanted for
e were hunting him,
e to kill. The distance
d mine suddenly col-
n Laramie, Wyoming,
s of willed ignorance,
simple truth: I could
Robby was inside me.
he carried part of me

Brothers and Keepers is the tale of two
life and incarceration in a Pennsyl-
rder and sentenced to life. The other,
sity professor, was on the faculty of
e wrote the above passage. *Brothers*
omewoods; one of Pittsburgh's black
ers came of age. John's Homewood
as peopled by blue-collar families.

Most of the parents and some of the South. But a dramatic change of age. Ten years after John, Robby place with a street life that was not a fabric of the community had changed. Robby became an adolescent, Hon dark side for many black boys and of the Wideman brothers. And while vania's Western State Penitentiary, the steel mills, which had employed Most of those mills were later dem the basis of a good economic life lies. Many of those families were in Nicholas Leman and others called the century ended, the once Promised many more stories of crime and suf

The objective of this book is an experiences influence crime. Both of individuals and variations in rate economy and people's relationship to the well-being of our families, and it live. Whether they are black or whican or immigrant, the chances of a is related directly to the employment them, or indirectly through the cha live and spend time. As a sociologi become convinced that the stratific: slotted into good jobs and not-so-g tor to where they live, the lifestyle to this understanding is consistent wit coworkers and in the streets when I officer and later as a parole agent for effect of labor stratification on you communities, including those like F

The notion that people become odds with the conceptions of the U hold dear, but even though it is incor

the children had immigrated from
occurred by the time Robby came
y's Homewood was an edgier, faster
always the most virtuous. The social
ged, as had its culture. By the time
newood's streets were a lure to the
young men, including the youngest
le Robby sat imprisoned in Pennsyl-
Homewood changed yet again when
thousands of her residents, closed.²
olished, along with the dreams and
for working-class Pittsburgh fami-
mmigrants from the South, to what
ne Promised Land.³ As the twentieth
Land of Homewood would produce
fering.

n exploration of how labor market
the violent and property violations
es of these crimes are affected by the
to it. Work is central to who we are,
t determines where and how well we
ite, Latino or Asian, Native Ameri-
person becoming involved in crime
ent and opportunities available to
racteristics of the places where they
st for more than thirty years I have
ation of labor—how people become
ood jobs—is a substantial contribu-
they lead, and their criminality. And
h the folk knowledge I learned from
worked first as a juvenile probation
r the State of Pennsylvania. Here the
ng men and women, children, and
Homewood, will be the focus.

slotted into positions is certainly at
United States that many Americans
nsistent with our national self-image,

it is the reality for most. To be clear, I do not mean to divide people into specific occupations, but rather to suggest that people in a particular tier have a good chance of staying in that tier. In the book, I will touch on how employment, social mobility, and criminal justice system exposure are related to these tiers in many ways.

The Economy and Criminals?

The hero of Victor Hugo's *Les Misérables*, Jean Valjean, is sent to prison for stealing bread to feed his starving family. His act of larceny is noble because of his motivation: he is driven by popular expectations that when economic conditions turn to crime in order to satisfy needs. He is not a criminal because he commits crimes because of need, but because he is more noble than Jean Valjean, he turns to violence. He can be satisfied by work and saving. It is not his criminal actions to material motives. Unemployment will lead to crime, and the more unemployed people will do more of it. We extend this idea to presume that the stresses of their lives, such as the stresses some of them experience, lead them to crime.

The general public easily, and wrongly, presumes that crime can be attributed to a person's economic status. Studies suggest that this may not be true. For example, during the Great Depression of the 1930s, crime rates declined, even though unemployment was at 25 percent for extended periods. Thirty years later, during the 1960s, with sustained economic expansion, crime rates rose in both property and violent crime. This suggests that the economy and crime more globally, and not just in the United States, that comparative poverty rates are not the best predictor of crime rates within western industrialized nations. The poorest nations of the world have high crime rates, while the richest have relatively low rates. At the same time, within nations, it is difficult to explain the

I do not argue that we are positioned
er that tiers exist. Those born into a
f remaining there. Although systems
h patterns are not the focus of this
ment opportunities, resulting crime,
e help to maintain the status quo for

Misérables, Jean Valjean, was sent to
is sister's starving children; a noble
ve. This imagery lies at the root of
conomic times are tough some will
s. Of course some people likely do
t then others among us, who are less
lainy simply for wants that will not
is intuitively appealing to attribute
es—and so many of us expect that
nd that the economically less fortu-
his conception of the poor when we
ives, and the brutal conditions that
n to engage in violence.

with little question, accepts the idea
oor economy. But recurring anoma-
least not always, be true. For exam-
f the 1930s the rates of some crimes
ent rates exceeded twenty-five per-
years later, during the 1960s, along
a the US experienced large increases
rates. Considering the link between
it is no secret among criminologists
e not highly correlated with crime
d nations. And while some of the
gh crime rates, many poor countries
ne time, even among industrialized
eir relative rankings based on their





Figure 1.1. US Homicide Rate, 1900–2002: Rate per 100,000
 *Includes 9/11 terrorism deaths
 Source: National Center for Health Statistics, *Health Data*

economies. The US continues to have a high homicide rate, even though it has one of the highest GDPs in the world and its people enjoy a comparatively high standard of living.

Consider the trends in homicide rates (see Figure 1.1). Murder is probably the best measured crime during this period. The sharp decline that occurred in the 1930s and the subsequent rise in deaths from homicide makes some sense in light of the economic depression of the 30s and early 40s. And more recently, the homicide rate has increased appreciably, at least since the late 1990s.

While the image of a desperate young man is a staple of the romantic imaginations of readers of *The Catcher in the Rye* and the Broadway musical, we should recognize that the most common type of homicide may be the teenager who mugs



Rate per 100,000 Population

Vital Statistics

ve astoundingly high rates of homi-
 world's most productive economies
 y high per capita income.

e during the twentieth century (Fig-
 best—but by no means perfectly—
 . Logically we would not expect the
 or the increases of the 60s, but more
 sense during the economic displace-
 now that the US has experienced the
 Depression, it is not clear that homi-
 ast not across the board.

vet heroic Jean Valjean may capture
 rs of Hugo's novel and the patrons of
 cognize that a more accurate stereo-
 s a schoolmate to steal his expensive

athletic shoes. Notice that here I include both the hero of *Les Misérables* and the present too limited pictures to convey. There are, to be sure, those who consider legitimate opportunities are closed long recognized this motivation. To reconcile or rationalize mugging as he have those shoes if I can't?" Another of this self-posed question is even sufficient might to force his will. The though, are also too limited to help economy and employment and crime.

The last half of the twentieth century major economic shifts that include tional manufacturing cities and regional graphic flows. Many migrants departed had attracted those looking for work people that follow them, moved out and Cleveland, Youngstown and Grandstantial portions of the industries to Rather than rebuild, retool, and modern corporations elected to open new markets they moved operations to Sunbelt states ultimately many producers moved operations out of the US in search of recognize the latter portion of this trend that is perhaps the most significant. Companies and workers everywhere that affect life everywhere.

Included among the products of rates. In some places the community tion might reduce the incidence of poverty, but at times the opposite occurs of what happens in desperately poor when jobs are lost as a result of de in crime.⁴ Emil Durkheim and Freud tions to social life that accompanied

clude this image too as a stereotype. And the thief of a pair of Air Jordans says how economic forces affect crime. He came to crime in desperation because they were sold off to them. Criminologists have said there are also delinquents who can be a schoolmate because, "Why should I steal? Of course, the neutralizing power of the law is more compelling for someone with a good job. These images and their explanations, however, do not help us understand the link between the crime and the economic conditions.

In the late twentieth century, the United States witnessed the deindustrialization of traditional manufacturing regions, and a reversal of some demographic trends in urban places that a generation earlier had been booming. Jobs, and not surprisingly the loss of them, hit Chicago and Detroit, Pittsburgh and Cleveland. All experienced the loss of substantial manufacturing that had given them their identities. As they tried to modernize in these industrial capitals, they lost their manufacturing plants elsewhere. First, they lost them to states with cheaper labor costs, and then they lost them to some or all of their manufacturing plants that moved to even lower-cost labor. We all now witness the trend as the process of globalization becomes a powerful force in the current world economy. Cities and regions are now linked together in ways

that the effects of globalization are changing crime rates. The social changes that result from globalization are increasing crime by bringing increased pressures on urban areas. William Julius Wilson's account of the decline of American urban neighborhoods during deindustrialization includes increases in crime. As he wrote of the disruption of communities during early European industrialization. It

is not hard to imagine that the disr the shift from agrarian to industrial France and Germany may now cha those nations where multinational today. Industrialization and urban mative systems of nineteenth-centu of social control that resulted from ance in general, including crime, to newfound prosperity in some form global economic forces cause comp cause crime rates to drop. The add nonindustrial areas will have both ing influences.

Two different processes are at wo the loss of jobs from industrial ec First World cities; second, the cha modern industrial concerns profou where jobs move to. Here I will foc will attempt to comment a bit on th

“Buddy Can You Spare a Dime?”

The changes that happened in Am twentieth century as a result of dei those experienced by people durin latter saw some declines in crime, t of violent crime rates. In actuality rates fell—notably homicide, which ure 1.1) but appears to have declin burglary).⁵ It is the case, however, t sion were not what we would simpl tions about the relationship betwe populace and crime. I suspect that c there was pervasive, widespread ur groups and segments of society. We this period. Life was hard. Families and people suffered. But when so n

rupting influences that accompanied industrial economies in nineteenth-century urban societies and increase crime in factory companies site facilities and job industrialization fractured cultural and normative agrarian societies. The reduction of normative disruption allowed deviance to increase. Conversely, there will be formerly destitute communities when companies to bring in new jobs. This may be a condition of industrial jobs to formally crime-producing and crime-reducing work as a result of globalization. First, industrial economies has dire consequences in changes that accompany the arrival of industry and affect social life in those places as much as on the former, but on occasion I see the latter as well.

or “Give Me Your Wallet!”

American cities in the last half of the nineteenth century industrialization were different than during the Great Depression. While the former saw increases, especially during the Depression some crime rates not only did not increase (note Figure 1)—but other rates increased (e.g., property crime rates during the Depression predict using the popular concept of the economic well-being of the community crime did not increase more because of unemployment, which affected many people. We should take care not to romanticize the struggle to function economically, but many were out of work it is possible

that the relative deprivation felt by
been mitigated. There was a sense
needing to pull together to support
the approach to life of Depression-era
ing excerpts from the manuscripts of
1940. This program enlisted writers
ple.” The quotes below are taken from

I've knowed people though that's I
couldn't get along. I know a woman
house, and took care of her sick mot
and she was out down to one day's
she didn't have money to bury her w
in the summer. Up to late Saturday
goin' to be able to bury her or not. I
and took up a collection to pay the
this woman made arrangements wi
mother buried Sunday mornin'. I he
place and I expect she has held it lon

A collection come hard back ther
tin' full time. I've been glad that Jim
we haven't had to draw any rockin'
the unemployment money, you know
these times when they'll be laid off. J
though.⁶

Here, neighbors themselves on hard
particular distress. Work is clearly a

The next morning I was at the mill g
I found all of my fellow workers and
asked the other what they had been
were they going to do with their first
ingly made that Fat's saloon would
But under all this gay jesting everyo
was finished in a few months, we wo
streets while we collected our unem

Depression-era families may have
of widespread struggle and people
t one another. One gets a sense of
era families and workers when read-
of the Federal Writers' Project, 1936-
to interview and describe "real peo-
m that effort.

been willin' to work and somehow
that had saved and bought her own
her too. Her husband got out of a job
work a week. Her mother died and
with. That was one Friday night back
they didn't know whether they was
Some of the neighbors went around
grave diggers and buy the lot. Then
th the undertaker and they got her
eard the other day she was losin' her
ag as she can.

n because so many people wasn't get-
n's got to work so steady. Up to now
g chair money. That's what they call
w. Of course nobody don't know in
im'll work as long as he can get work

l times come to the aid of a family in
scarce and valued commodity.

gates an hour before bell time. There
l I joined in their conversation. Each
n doing during the lay off and what
t pay? There were predictions, laugh-
do a rushing business on pay night.
one of us knew that when the order
ould again be laid off, to a tramp the
ployment compensation checks and

then back on relief we would have full time again. We had gone through ten years and each one of us knew times in the future. But that knowledge because we knew that while the misery what we wanted, we could dress our when meeting our fellow workers in one of us could stand up to the bar a

The boom and bust cycle described from 1929 until the start of World blame on everything from crooked bosses, but a fairly common theme that of working people struggling to

Clearly there were those during less and still others who thrived, but notion that Americans, as well as tized nations, were suffering together despair. While this period did not p there were political movements to and industry. The Communist Part est period of popularity. There was working people expressed their dis and the economy were going.

The 1960s economic boom time v omy was strong, crime increased, a That crime “boomed” along with t as a paradox. Our traditional theo made predictions to the contrary. forces contributed to this seemingly very important: the baby boom, and that took place in the US and in oth War II.

In the 1960s large numbers of pos hung out on street corners, and learn tutions. New schools had to be bui ment industry more broadly came

to go until the mill started running
with this routine many times in the past
that he would go through it many
edge could not dim our spirits today
all operated we would be able to eat
families and have a dollar left so that
a Fat's saloon on Saturday night each
and pay for a round of beers.⁷

ed here persisted for most workers
War II. Others' comments put the
d politicians to automation to the
running through these narratives is
together.

the Depression whose suffering was
but in general there was a collective
the populations of many industrial-
r. There was a broadly felt collective
produce especially high crime rates,
unseat the leaders of government
y in America experienced its great-
conflict during the Depression, and
pleasure with the way the country

was very different. Though the econ-
s did political activism and conflict.
the economy has been characterized
ories and explanations would have
It is likely that a number of social
y anomalous pattern. Two are likely
d the substantial social changes that
er western democracies after World

stwar baby boomers entered schools,
ned to drive. We overwhelmed insti-
lt; radio stations and the entertain-
to cater to us, we changed popular

music, and entered the crime-prone era. It is not surprising that crime and delinquency rates among a group of people of the most crime-prone age that western nations had experienced increased. But also the institutions of the day—schools, churches, community centers—were overwhelmed by the onslaught of crime. Other factors contributed to the 1950s crime boom, but more on that later.

To explain post-World War II crime, Cohen and Marcus Felson advanced the concept of routine activity theory, which explains how normal people who are motivated to commit crimes become victims in the absence of guardians. Cohen and Felson were explicitly concerned with increasing crime rates in the 1950s and 1960s. The conclusion was that changes in routine activities that increasingly moved social life into the public sphere, brought motivated criminals into the absence of effective guardianship, contributed to crime growth. The proliferation of portable electronic devices (e.g., televisions, radios, and stereos) in the homes of couples (no one at home to protect them) increased postwar crime rates. Perhaps the most important lesson we can learn from Cohen and Felson's theory is that economic conditions are not the only issue explanations (e.g., "the economy is bad") for crime. The economy is but one, albeit important, factor in crime. Our focus here is with economic conditions, specifically labor markets, and crime rates. It is a complex story.

In contrast to the Depression era, the economic conditions of the twentieth century seem to have led to a crime boom that was pushed to the margins of the labor market. Crime rates rose in the 1960s and 70s, but then leveled off. Economic hard times at the end of

the teenaged years. It should not be
ency increased. We were the largest
-prone ages, fourteen to seventeen,
ed.⁸ It was natural that crime would
that control adolescent behavior—
ers, and communities themselves—
ht. There were just so many of us.
60s crime boom that accompanied
at in a bit.

crime trends, sociologists Lawrence
ed their routine activities perspec-
atterns of daily behavior that brings
mit crimes together with potential
s increases criminality.⁹ Cohen and
with the paradox of growing crime
usion they drew from their analy-
ivities, in particular social changes
away from home and into the pub-
inals and potential victims together
ns. Other postwar lifestyle changes
presence of more cars, which facili-
ets for crime. The growth in posses-
(easy to steal) and more dual career
ct against burglary) contributed to
haps the most important lesson that
n's study is to beware of single-item
onomy") of crime that are popular
ought by too many politicians. The
nt, factor that contributes to fluctua-
h the linkage between the economy,
e. That linkage is one part of a very

a, job losses at the end of the twen-
very different feelings among those
or market. Crime rates grew in the
f and began dropping by the 1990s.
the twentieth century did not spark

considerable political social movement issues did not appreciably spark debate. Not until a mortgage crisis, gasoline prices, and the Great Recession began did a political race did candidates calling for change appeal to the electorate.

The shift from a manufacturing economy (to an information economy) has affected those working in ancillary businesses in many neighborhoods that have been there is both despair and anger, and powerful criminogenic forces. This is especially losses have been concentrated in select places exist within big cities where and in small towns where one or two employers or even the only large-silent from the Great Depression is the less widely distributed throughout, meaning disadvantage for some has come of a booming economy and growing negative consequences to communities effectively described by Wilson in his Blue-collar workers who lost low-skill capacity to roll with economic change but not like their old jobs with General their new jobs did not come with benefits, or the security that came jobs are less likely to be what politicians jobs.”

Wilson initially called communities “truncated and isolated from the social and class neighborhoods.” This label derived from the broader poor who are excluded and concentrated in geographically tact and interaction with nonpoor neighborhoods were hit hardest when numbers in the mid-1970s. When the

ment mobilization. In fact, these
date in national political campaigns.
e prices rising above \$4.00 a gallon,
ring the protracted 2008 presiden-
social change get traction with the
to a service economy (some say to
ted not just blue-collar workers, but
es and in corporate offices as well. In
n hard-hit by the shifting economy
d despair and anger can be power-
pecially so since the worst of the job
ect inner-city neighborhoods. These
e entire industries have downsized,
wo plants may have been the major
scale source of jobs. What is differ-
at the despair is more focused and
the population. In fact, the deep-
continued while others rode waves
ing income inequality. The uneven
ities of economic change have been
his book *The Truly Disadvantaged*.¹⁰
killed but well-paying jobs had less
nges. Some of them could find jobs,
eral Motors or US Steel. Frequently
a twenty-dollar an hour paychecks,
e with union contracts. Their new
cians have come to call “family wage
ities where the poor were concen-
and economic life of the city “under-
notes their fundamental difference
economically distressed but not iso-
ic areas, not as removed from con-
others.¹¹ The residents of underclass
en jobs began to disappear in large
e poor are not isolated, they interact

with people who might be conduits. A neighbor brings back to the block a few people to work on a loading dock. Nonunderclass poor children attend school, and though their parents don't see others going to and arriving home, whose neighbors have work can imagine families who have such lives. In underclass modeling of lives to hope for. Children substantially better off than less likely to receive that timely tip.

Already at the economic margins, occupying underclass neighborhoods combat dramatic drops in the employment. Worked in low-level service sector, were laid off from manufacturing, with these low-skilled service sector neighborhoods experienced the doing jobs and heightened competition. Wilson described a number of "when work disappears"—and one devastating for community is crime.

This approach to making sense of economic factors and crime in the come across as too ad hoc. Perhaps after exploring the important role of people and their communities, to try of these patterns.

In the first decades of the twenty is suffering through what many are have been shuttered, jobs lost, home enues are down. The latter means affected, and states are letting people would appear to be prime time for a why most criminologists I know have relatives, family members, and their crime increased?" This question to

toward that less ad hoc attempt to e
century.

And Then There's Race

The changes brought about by the c
writes should be seen in the historica
ing American social and economic
entering adolescence, another featur
likely contributed to more crimes v
mans, many black families joined the
ised Land, to find jobs, and to find
the mid- and late 1960s, their childre
promise and the basic failure of th
things occurred: political mobilizat
ment, and crime. And, as a consequ
guise of law-and-order politics came
eral and state government.¹² The lega
has had very real ramifications for A
the beginning, but they are especia
Law and order is also an increasingly
munities. The importance of the ma
of Americans will be discussed in a
recognize that these changes have be
population in cities and the civil rig
changes, it is very important to the li

In the late 1950s and 1960s Africa
watched with interest the events th
mingham, and Nashville. They care
to their brothers and sisters in Geo
when the movement came north,
after the northern front of the civil r
like those of Malcolm X, Stokely Ca
to young people left out of the eco
failure of the North to deliver on th
to the Promised Land to rise up. O
friends, and later like some of the bo

explain the patterns of the twentieth

deindustrialization of which Wilson
l context of other social forces shap-
c life. In addition to baby boomers
re of 1960s American social life that
was disappointment. Like the Wide-
e Great Migration to find their Prom-
better futures for their children. By
en were frustrated by that unfulfilled
e American promise to them. Two
ion linked to the civil rights move-
uence of both, crime control in the
e to be an emphasis for both the fed-
cy of this shift in crime control policy
frican American communities from
ully pronounced in recent decades.¹³
y determinative force in Latino com-
assive increase in the imprisonment
later chapter, but for now we should
een linked to the growth of the black
hts movement, and, like these social
nk between the economy and crime.
n Americans in the North and West
at were taking place in Selma, Bir-
d deeply about what was happening
orgia, Mississippi, and Florida. And
they joined in the effort. Not long
ights movement was opened, voices
armichael, and Huey Newton called
nomic boom and frustrated by the
he promises of the Great Migration
thers, like Robby Wideman and his
oys and young men on my probation

and parole caseloads, chose neither calls to organized resistance. Although of revolution, they turned to crime.

Labor market disadvantage cannot be denied. There is evidence that labor market conditions for both majority and minority populations have historically disadvantaged both groups, especially for preferred jobs, the result of joblessness, unemployment, and underemployment.

Americans seem to hate talking about race, but it is more important in American history than in any other. Between racial and ethnic groups, as well as between nations as well, one cannot really understand economic changes on social life without considering racial conflicts. European nations increasingly complicated their economic, social, and political life in former colonies. In those countries, the setting up of factories or contracting with local labor forces, of who benefits, who is exploited, and who is not, when industry arrives. These were the issues that, after the Revolution, they remained important. Many people moved out of the South in great numbers to the North and when Asians were exploited in the late nineteenth century railroads, and they remain important. In some places, they have been disappearing in some places. Arguments about immigration are often based on who works for whom.

We cannot seriously consider the history of Pittsburgh between the adolescence of the city and the adolescence of Robby without recognizing that the city was a community, profoundly affected by the economic changes of the postwar years, the hopes of the civil rights movement, and the decline of the steel industry.

In some places, early twentieth-century immigrants from among Eastern and Southern Europe. In Pittsburgh Czechs, Germans, Croats, and Slovaks.

church-led civil rights activity nor
 though frequently invoking the rhetoric
 14

not be reduced just to racial inequality.
 Market marginality is criminogenic in
 situations. But because racial and ethnic
 advantaged some in access to labor mar-
 these factors can aggravate the effects
 underemployment on criminality.

about race, but few factors have been
 y than our conflicts and differences
 and this has certainly been true when
 vment. As is the case in many other
 appreciate the dynamics of recent
 thout considering racial and ethnic
 singly find that ethnic differences
 and political lives at home as well as
 ries where corporations are setting
 local manufacturers there are issues
 and who controls decision making
 issues during America's Industrial
 ant issues when African Americans
 numbers to compete for jobs in the
 oited in the building of nineteenth-
 n contentious issues now that jobs
 aces. At the heart of contemporary
 questions about ethnicity and who

e changes in the Homewood section
 nt years of John Wideman and those
 it was and continues to be a black
 y migration from the South in the
 l rights era, and the loss of jobs that
 l industry in the 1970s and 80s.

th-century industries drew work-
 hern European immigrant groups.
 roats, and Italians worked the steel

mills. In Chicago Greeks, Italians, yards. There was competition and groups, and with native white work first streams of what became the G ment of the black population out of the North, South, and later the West of workers a new level of conflict ensued.

The Great Migration was propelled the South, the region's ongoing oppro tion of jobs and the promise of a bet ple flow continued into the 1960s a ern cities to an extent previously un established in New York's Harlem. Hough, Pittsburgh's Homewood and or industrial cities of the North, M before them, these beach heads, la munities, provided new arrivals wi ing place to begin their new, very for these particular communities—the ethnic neighborhoods populated was that they, like African America phia, Washington, and later Los A for the most part remain racially se heads for new arrivals. They did no ethnics, moving in succeeding gene economic circumstance improved. Nancy Denton have described in t African American urban experienc to and concentrated in tightly contr group.¹⁶ Where the restrictive, seg pattern has been a movement by a hooded adjoining the ghetto, which t be sure, at the turn of the twenty-fir cans who have successfully colonize remain predominantly white, but th tial segregation has lessened a bit in

and Poles found jobs in the stock-
at times conflict between immigrant
kers. With the First World War the
reat Migration—the massive move-
of the rural South to urban areas in
t—began. And with this new group
over who got to work which jobs

ed by the collapse of “big cotton” in
ressive race relations, and the attrac-
tter life up North. This massive peo-
nd introduced dark faces to north-
seen. Large black communities were
Chicago’s South Side, Cleveland’s
d Hill District, and in most other big
Midwest, and West. Like immigrants
rgely ethnically homogenous com-
th housing and a socially welcom-
different, lives. What was different
-black communities—compared to
d by Italians, Irish, Poles, and Croats
n communities in Detroit, Philadel-
ngeles and San Francisco, were and
gregated.¹⁵ They were not just beach
ot get to follow the pattern of white
erations out of their ghettos as their
As sociologists Douglas Massey and
their book *American Apartheid*, the
ce has been one of being restricted
rolled sections of cities like no other
gregating bonds were loosened the
ew, usually by integrating neighbor-
then usually rapidly resegregate.¹⁷ To
st century there are African Ameri-
ed areas that remain and are likely to
ey are relatively few. Racial residen-
n America, but for the most part its

cities are today nearly as segregated as in the 1950s. The success of the modern civil rights movement has not eliminated this reality.

Even though African American workers have generally achieved a more economically and socially secure life since the 1960s, they still face discrimination in the labor market. Some companies refused to hire African Americans for desirable positions, and until recently, African Americans had a lower membership in some industrial unions. While achieving membership in some craft unions, African Americans in skilled, blue-collar jobs began to displace whites. As a result, a higher proportion of African Americans are now in the secondary sector, where they have been shown to receive lower benefits than their brethren who were formerly employed in primary sector manufacturing jobs.

In African American communities, the combination of a higher likelihood of being displaced from manufacturing jobs, workers being displaced by displaced manufacturing employment, and the problems caused by racial residential segregation. Latino populations in the US suffer from similar processes. What this means is that the effects of the shifting labor market have caused a disproportionate impact on brown neighborhoods than they might have if they were displaced predominately by whites.²⁰

European countries are experiencing similar trends that include some similar racial and ethnic tensions. Of course they have very different histories from the Americas. Western European nations have a long history of the age of conquest increasingly leading to migration. People electing to seek opportunity in the Americas, such as the Netherlands, and others extending their reach through migration to those born in their former colonies. People have freely migrated in recent decades, and the need for workers brought on by World War II led to migration from the West Indies just as the hunger for

and as they were before the beginning of the century.

Workers were able to build economies for themselves and their families and avoid marginalization in the labor market. Others restricted them from doing so. In the late in the century they were denied the benefits of unions, and still today have difficulty organizing. Consequently, when low-wage jobs disappear from American cities and the burden disproportionately fell upon blacks. African American laborers have had a harder time in the American labor market, the sector they were in paid less and have had fewer benefits. Those fortunate enough to land blue-collar,

jobs today, the population faces the consequences of individual workers being laid off or being bumped from low-sector jobs to the service sector, and the concentration of social and economic segregation.¹⁹ To some extent, this is a result of lesser versions of these same criminogenic forces that result from economic downturns and increased crime in black and brown neighborhoods in the residential districts populating

cities. This is a result of financing two different migration patterns and ethnic dynamics, although the United States has a racial history that do nations of other nations that held colonies as a result of economic downturns. They have new black and brown citizens and a history of being a colonizing nation. Britain, France, and the United States granted citizenship or at least easier immigration to their colonies. As a result, more people have migrated to the United States in the past few decades. In the United Kingdom the end of World War II fueled immigration from the Commonwealth. For workers in the United States drew

blacks to Detroit and Cleveland. In Cardiff, the largest black settlement in Europe and the largest black community in the European Union, there to work in ship building. Today, the White Town section of Cardiff, and while the South Side of Chicago, it is set apart from the rest. Paris, Amsterdam, and Rome all have ghettos as a result of their nations' colonial history.

The other force "darkening" Europe is in the form of guest workers. In Germany, guest workers have come from Turkey; in Italy, they have resulted from reunification have led to anti-worker sentiments that have boiled over in a Turkish enclave where the dominant culture oppresses some Germans. There exists a tension between the larger community, with Turks who can never become German and Germans who do not want to really become German. Germany is a place where there are substantial anti-immigrant sentiments.

One can reasonably expect that the loss of jobs in manufacturing as a result of globalization will result in the problems seen in the US. The social stratification focuses the negative effects on the poor, which are increasingly people of color. The patterns that are similar to the problems in the Asian suburbs in 2005 were a response to the loss of some long-standing job protection. The workers who have long existed on the edge of the economy have the opportunity to object to being kept at arm's length. Spain has experienced riotous attacks on immigrants because natives perceive them as a threat. In the US, it is reported that one of the major problems in the same name as one of Chicago's long-standing problems.

America's job losses began early but have been largely steel and automobile manufacturing. The US will remain competitive with their countries if the US remains to be seen if Europe and Japan can compete.

Cardiff Wales, Tiger Bay became the and continues as the longest continuous Jamaican Union, when Jamaicans moved by Tiger Bay is subsumed in the Butte it is not as segregated as the South the remainder of the city. London, ve blacker and browner populations histories.

ope is the movement of cheap labor many, large numbers of guest workers from Africa. Economic strains e been exacerbated by anti-guest up in Germany. In Berlin there is a nt language is Turkish, which trou- sion between this community and complaining that they cannot really s complaining that the Turks do not many is not the only European state migrant sentiments.²¹

to the extent that these countries balization, they may experience the To the extent that racial and ethnic consequences onto ethnic popula- e of color, they may reproduce trou- ose in the US. French riots in Pari- e to the government's attempt to roll ctions for younger workers. Minori- conomic margins seized this oppor- m's length from the French dream. cks on Latin American immigrants pawning gang activity. Interestingly, gangs is called the Latin Kings, the y-standing gangs.

because some of its industries, nota- ring, did not reinvest, upgrade, and nterparts in Europe and Japan. It Japan can avoid the substantial loss

of manufacturing that continues to avoid the social problems faced by what happened in some European cities. The miracle that characterized that city in the EU (dubbed the Celtic Tiger because of the Great Recession), was desperate as manufacturing plants there just

The challenges of limited employment in industrial nations of the so-called global South have been complicated by the influx of immigrants from nations. Even with its problems, South Africa has become an economic force in Africa, and as have with the influx of Africans from throughout the sub-Saharan continent. Lives in the mines and farms of the apartheid era, the democratic government of South Africa has failed to deliver on the promise of improved living standards. It was the hope of liberation. That task has been complicated by the influx of these immigrants. Unlike European industrial countries, many immigrants are not legal residents.²² They do provide economic benefits but also ethnic resentments that are seen elsewhere.

What South African geography has changed in ways that allow native/immigrant coexistence. Historically the apartheid city was divided into a white/Asian (Indian) section on the periphery and a black section on the outside of the city limits. Transporting goods and people to districts to the city was difficult, especially for the poor. One could, with considerable effort, get to the city from the districts and to the places of some wealth. Many were lucky to have one. In spite of the apartheid laws and its pass and residential laws, urbanization continued. The apartheid city remains. Today, though, the townships have swelled because of immigration from other nations. Sometimes it is outside the city limits—from the long-standing black townships. Many have to relegate their residents. There is resegregation.

to occur in the US, and by doing so
 by the latter. Deindustrialization has
 Dublin, long before the economic
 since Ireland's initial entry into the
 use of its booming economy before
 ly bad off after Ford and other man-
 as they had in the States.

ployment are not restricted to the
 north. Since South Africa's libera-
 economic postapartheid reality has
 immigrants from poorer sub-Saharan
 South Africa remains the major eco-
 workers in the Americas and Europe,
 sub-Saharan region have sought better
 their prosperous neighbor nation. The
 Africa already had a daunting task to
 social and economic well-being that
 has become more difficult with the
 the movement of many workers to
 ny of South Africa's immigrants are
 oke some of the same nativist and
 elsewhere.

ers call "the apartheid city" has
 immigrant tensions to be observed.
 white within the city limits with an
 phery and black townships lying on
 port from black townships and Asian
 ecially from the former, but workers
 to service jobs in white residential
 what more substantial jobs, if they
 the demise of the apartheid regime
 surprisingly, the legacy of the apart-
 a new place has been added. Black
 desperately poor work seekers from
 ide of—and in some instances away
 nships, where squatters' camps seg-
 ntment among some portion of the

black South African population of
 seen as competitors and a drain on
 course, the same objections argued
 US and Europe). This resentment
 whom were Zimbabwean, riots that

In South Africa it is not the loss of
 but ongoing unemployment and im
 the hierarchical arrangements that
 is preferred in the labor market, th
 It remains to be seen how labor ma
 developing nations where manufact
 quences will occur as a result.

Gender

Persistent problems in disadvantag
 tion and uneven marriage markets
 support children alone with modest
 sider the consequences of labor str
 looking at women's work. First, eve
 evaluated the class standing of fam
 and occupation of the male head
 (if it was not always) very problem
 eth century. For decades now most
 children, have worked outside of th
 depended on two breadwinners to h
 class lifestyles, and in the case of f
 and counties, to keep their househo
 women begin working when they l
 if and when they have a family. Wh
 their expectations and frustrations
 likely that we have to take both into
 the effects of labor stratification on
 ing number of women are the heads

These changes are further comp
 that women have faced in the labor
 has had the characteristics of the se

these interlopers because they are already strained social services (of which I was behind anti-immigrant, most of which were rocked South Africa in 2008.

of jobs that is causing social distress, especially the stratification of labor, to decide who gets which jobs and who that is the source of social problems. Markets will be ethnically stratified in determining is moving to and what conse-

depressed communities are family disruptions, too frequently leaving women to low incomes. We cannot seriously consider stratification's effect on crime without men though traditionally sociologists families by focusing on the education of household, this practice became dominant in the second half of the twentieth century adult women, even those with small children at home.²³ Families have increasingly to have a shot at or to maintain middle-class families existing in depressed cities would heads above water. Second, many women leave school and expect to continue to work while we may not know as much about women as we do about young men, it is necessary to account in order to fully appreciate the social life and crime. Third, a growing number of their households.²⁴

exacerbated by the historic disadvantage in the labor market. Women's work frequently in the secondary sector. They have not been

paid as well, even when doing equivalent work. Women often do not have access to as many benefits as men. Women are often assumed to be the primary caregivers, and we all know about the gender pay gap. The likelihood of women's promotions is lower than men's, which may solidify bonds to work.

And then there are children. Employers do not promote women. For families, children are both a positive and a negative: A positive because of the utility that wanted children bring. When they are not planned or not wanted, children are a burden and social burdens of struggling families. For young children, children can seriously limit labor force participation. But for our purposes, children are an important source of bonding.

Labor market experience may well be a better predictor than we think that we do not have as many children. Children may affect potential criminality among men. This question needs to be taken seriously. We need to begin to at least build conceptual models. It is safe to assume that policies and practices that affect families, pay inequality patterns, and labor market conditions are important influences on the well-being of women.

Further, when we think about women's lives in distressed communities, the fact that so many women are now in prison or have a prison record is a major barrier to finding quality, stable employment, and economic and child rearing struggle. The decline in American births to single women is a major source of decline.²⁵

Latino women have some of these problems. The Latino male imprisonment rate is higher than for African Americans, and a smaller proportion of women are in prison. But they have other problems. Many are working in very low-wage, unstable jobs. They are often in conflict with the Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency.

ivalent work. They have frequently
 as their male counterparts, employ-
 be covered by their husbands' health
 class ceilings that have inhibited the
 —the promotions that help to solid-

employers have used them as excuses to
 children are (usually) both a positive
 e they are expensive, and a positive
 children bring when they are planned.
 wanted, they add to the economic
 nities. And, when the mother is very
 ner future options for education and
 en are something else as well. They

ell not predict female criminality. I
 good answers about how work will
 women as we do among men, but
 ously. Perhaps by doing so, we can
 models for considering the question.
 l practices that support women and
 nd welfare reform will have impor-
 children and communities.

omen of color, many of the difficul-
 nities are exacerbated. For African
 many young African American men
 a record, and that so many struggle
 makes family life an especially eco-
 And today, the proportion of Afri-
 en is increasing again after a period

se same challenges, but perhaps less
 t rate is lower than that of African
 n of children are born to single par-
 s: both men and women frequently
 e jobs, sometimes seasonally; issues
 ms Enforcement agents and their

practices if they are undocumented by employers and law enforcement.

What about Crime?

Imagine my surprise when I began work and crime and I found out that unemployment to be an especially more than a few years earlier, when in Pennsylvania, we “knew” that the best way of keeping our clients (agency speakers) out of prison was to get them a job. But we have sometimes found that unemployment but other analyses find the opposite something to the linkage between work

When initially writing about the helplessness, Wilson included among the factors. Likewise, Massey and Denton included negative results of racial residential segregation. Massey and Denton specified or suggested mechanisms by which crime would be influenced either work. They, like others before, argued that unemployment and social distresses are criminogenic.

Subsequently, in work with criminologists, Sampson has written about how a decline in social capital makes them less capable of preventing crime. This argument builds on Sampson’s theory of social disorganization that explains crime rates across neighborhoods.²⁷ My analyses of the project, are very compatible with his theory.

Others have offered accounts of how employment changes have influenced crime rates. Especially illuminating are analyses of the studied Philadelphia, New York, and Chicago. Sociologist Elijah Anderson’s study of black inner-city life on the consequences to local culture of very limited employment opportunities

; and perhaps increasingly, profiling even if they are documented.

in studying the relationship between that criminologists have not found a good predictor of crime. After all, I worked as a parole agent in Pennsylvania (though by no means foolproof) to keep parolees) from returning to prison. Now I realize that systematic analyses show employment significantly predicts crime, not vice versa. Surely, however, there must be a link between work and criminality.

The effects on neighborhoods of joblessness and the consequences increases in crime. Wilson included increased crime among the consequences of racial segregation. Neither Wilson nor Gottman speculated about the specific mechanisms by which crime increased. This is not a criticism of Wilson; he, reasonably assert that economic forces.

Criminologist Robert Sampson, Wilson's student, argued that social capital in destitute communities helps protect themselves from crime.²⁶ Wilson's earlier, and since extended, work on social capital explains the macro variation in crime rates. His arguments, which are central to this book, are part of a modern social disorganization theory. Wilson's work that begin to shed light on how social capital in poor communities and their crime rates. Wilson's group of urban ethnographies that include Chicago neighborhoods. Sociologist Robert Sampson's book *Street Life in Philadelphia* focuses on how social capital when people are poor and have limited opportunities. The cultural pattern that

emerges among a portion of the population that supports criminal lifestyles and the culture of crime. Anthropologist Mercer Sullivan's *Grounds for Men* in three Brooklyn communities. The areas have different unemployment rates, and consequently the reactions of young men to their activity, varies. Sociologist Mary Paton's study focuses on an African American neighborhood in Chicago. The economic circumstances are as desperate as those considered in the previous study, and the neighborhood is not the one that has focused on. It is very important to note that the site differs from white middle-class neighborhoods in many ways. First, it borders disadvantaged areas, and second, the fiscal life of residents is not that of the white middle class. The study also examines the continuing racial residential segregation in the community and its residents and how this affects crime than their white middle-class counterparts.

These studies begin to paint a picture of the social losses, community crime patterns, and the impact of quantitative research about work and crime. In the past fifteen years, we begin to see how the economy affects criminality.³⁰ While the scholarship specifically on unemployment and crime described above, at times we find that unemployment leads to a decline in crime, while others find that employment rates are directly related to crime.

An additional complication is provided by the work of Thornberry and R. L. Christenson, who argue that one of the problems with much of the research is that unemployment causes crime. In their study, they consider the reciprocal effects of crime and unemployment. Those who end up with a criminal record and unemployment are considerably less successful in the labor market. The literature amplifies this point. Deva

population—the code of the street—the use of violence in some instances. *Getting Paid* is a study of how young men adapt to their employment realities—employment rates, workers across the cities for different kinds of jobs, and young people, including their criminal records. Pattillo-McCoy's *Black Picket Fences* is a study of a middle-class neighborhood in Chicago. The residents she studied are not as distressed as some in Sullivan's study, but as distressed as those which Wilson studied. It is worth noting that Pattillo-McCoy's study is of two very important communities in two very important cities, underclass neighborhoods; and these are considerably more precarious than those in the other cities. These differences are a consequence of the segregation of US cities.²⁸ As a result, the residents are exposed to and experience more violence than their counterparts.²⁹

What is the structure of how, under the strain of job loss, people are affected. When combined with the literature on crime that has been published in the last decade, it is time to flesh out mechanisms by which job loss affects crime. We must remember, though, that the relationship between job loss and crime is quite mixed; as job loss increases crime, other studies show that it decreases crime in some types of crime, and still other studies seem to have no effect on crime.³¹

As presented by criminologists Terrence G. Shott and John Hagan.³² They argue that the extant literature is that it assumes that job loss increases crime. Both analyses show that we need to look at the relationship between criminal behavior on employment as a result of their criminal record as a result of their criminal record as a result of their criminal record on the job market. A growing body of research, as Pager has found in experimental

audit studies that both white and black records do less well in their job search than those who do not have a record.³³ Interestingly, searches for blacks without a felony conviction are less successful than whites with a record.

Parolees on my Pennsylvania caseload often lied about their status to get jobs. They were often fired. If they were found out, bosses could sue them for their job application. This happened to me once. On at least one occasion, I am convinced that a parolee's return to prison could be linked to his being fired for lying about his past conviction. This case presented me with a dilemma because I had to check employment and check up on their parole. I tried not to out them if I knew that they were on active parole supervisions. Fortunately, I was not their job prospects, I wasn't as close to them as the choice that their continued gainful employment was tant than the forms I was required to fill out. I and other parole agents, were that way.

Furthermore, we know that it is not just the crime that matters to their lives and their future. It is the work they do and their relationships with others. Back to the earlier description of Hirschi's theory, we must acknowledge that this link between crime and work leads to crime." In light of what we know, these simplistic notions about the relationship between crime and work have limited utility, yet the case is of substantial criminological importance. This study will trace out how the economy, the social structure, and individual criminality and collective crime are related.

Why Do They Do It?

At the heart of nearly all criminological research is the question, "Why do they do it?" Of course, criminologists might join the leagues of

African Americans with criminal records than others of their race who do not. He also found that African Americans are considerably less employable than

white men. In the early 1970s sometimes this presented a dilemma for both of us. I would fire them because they'd lied on their resumes. I told to several men that I worked with. I was convinced that a parolee's new crime was directly related to job loss after he was released. Men who'd lied to secure a job because I was obligated to verify their work attendance and work. Generally, I would fire them if they'd lied. This required a bit of creativity for me, and I think for them and they were closely monitored as they were. I made sure that meaningful employment was more important than a job to submit. That's how convinced I was that work matters.

It's not just whether people have work or not, but their involvement in crime, but the type of crime and their relationship to the labor market. If we think about Victor Hugo's Jean Valjean's desperate crime, it's not always as simple as "need makes do." Now we know, we should recognize that the relationship between unemployment and crime is a connection between work and crime is of great importance. In the chapters to come I will show how lack of employment, affects individual crime rates.

One of the most interesting sociological inquiries is the simple question: what if we knew that, many of us criminals are the jobless, but perhaps it is worth

beginning by thinking about crime, there are three basic crime types: crimes, and expressive crimes. By that are for immediate material gain of larceny. One might include robbery personal violence that is inherently think it better, like law enforcement of it as a crime of violence, much of all of it. Included among pecuniary lower and upper classes. It is important to distinguish these two categories, because the relationship to it is likely to propel motivation based on one's social position.

By entrepreneurial crime I mean where individuals engage in business for financial gain: drug dealers, organized crime, corporate crimes. These types of crime are like the other pecuniary crimes because, under the same forces, these entrepreneurial crimes are for financial gain. This makes them especially common in disadvantaged circumstances and among the lower classes. This is not a new idea; the concept was made long ago.³⁴ The average person can't make a living at it, and even when criminals obtain measurable financial success, drug dealers and organized criminals can make a lot of money, too, though, we should be careful not to overstate. Low-level drug sellers do not do very well, as reported that low-level—especially those who make less than minimum wage when their income is averaged and the cost of buying product and overhead—is considered.³⁵ The concept of disadvantaged street youth too frequently being drawn into drug markets is an easy way to do it. In their description of the low-level, it is not possible for them at places like McDonald's. The concept of growing up, sometimes on the way

nal motivation. We might say that pecuniary crimes, entrepreneurial pecuniary I mean those violations a. Classically these are various forms every here, but because of the inter- a part of this form of acquisition I t and most criminologists, to think f which is expressive crime, but not crimes are the larcenies of both the tant for our purposes that we distin- the economy and individuals' rela- ves for criminal behavior differently

n that subset of pecuniary crimes essional criminal practices for finan- iminals, those involved with certain crimes should be distinguished from while they may be motivated by the crimes are more likely to lead to real specially attractive to criminals from the greedy of the more prosperous compelling case for this distinction burglar or petty thief really cannot comparatively successful, they hardly . By contrast, a select few drug deal- ke a living with these pursuits. Here not to fall into popular stereotypes. very well. A study of drug markets entry-level—street dealers actually en the highs and lows of selling are oduct from their wholesaler—their rary is the stereotype that disadvan- uy into. They think that working in better than working a “slave job”— unglamorous options usually avail- d's. In his autobiographical account rong side of the law, Nathan McCall,

now a *Washington Post* reporter, r
 drug dealer was much different from

I quickly discovered that dealing w
 reefer was a round-the-clock hustle
 than I wanted to invest. Unloading a
 up to an hour . . .

. . . I finally had to admit that I
 dealer. Dealing drugs is harder than
 this day, I laugh when I hear folks s
 don't want to work. There's no job m
 It's the only thing I've really tried ha

In a story about a Seattle nonpro
 compete on the job market, a *Seat*
 who said,

Many of the jobs start at minimum
 apprenticeship and is looking for a j
 than he was making when he was se
 bad days and the time behind bars. 's
 is harder than a regular job and it's
 "The only thing is, it's faster."³⁷

Research findings affirm the val
 Peter Reuter and his colleagues, stu
 DC, found that two-thirds of thos
 they held jobs in the legitimate econ
 minimum wage from this side busi
 sociologist Sudhir Venkatesh, stud
 that although gangs make more mo
 native forms of income, the premi
 and illegal, and overhead. They too
 dealers make roughly minimum wa

Even though the reality of drug ir
 lar mythology suggests, I include d
 because for the few who work their

accounts how the reality of being a
in the mythology.

wasn't so easy as it seemed. Selling
that required more time and energy
a single O.Z. (ounce) sometimes took

I lacked the discipline to be a good
in any job I've had, then or since. To
say drug dealers are lazy people who
more demanding than dealing drugs.
rd to do, and failed at.³⁶

profit that tries to prepare offenders to
Little Times reporter quoted a source

wage, but [he]—who's completed an
job in construction—figures it's more
selling dope once you factor in all the
“When you really add it up, hustling
less than minimum wage,” he said.

validity of these accounts. Economist
studying drug dealing in Washington,
e selling on the street did so while
nomy and that few netted more than
ness.³⁸ Economist Steven Levitt and
ying in an undisclosed city, report
ney from drug sales than from alter-
um is cancelled by risk, both legal
conclude that individual street level
ge.³⁹

income for most is far less than popu-
ealing among entrepreneurial crime
r way up past the lower rungs of the

distribution ladders, it is possible that rivals or the police take you out. And for financial success, the hope that it will

Organized crime is the classic alternative for people from disadvantaged backgrounds. Many people take this route, but that is not how commentators see it. It is seen by commentators as an alternative to upward mobility.⁴⁰ As is the case with legitimate business or in illegal drug markets, one can climb up over time to positions that bring in

Other examples of entrepreneurial crimes that bolster the financial gain of upward mobility are corporate fraud and corruption. I might have included more in the past, but corporate scandals and fraud actually had the effect of deflating the economy, employment, and so on. These types of crimes. As we saw with the accounting fraud scandal (Enron, etc.), and most recently and vividly on Wall Street, these crimes negatively affected the economy—pricing—for example, the price of energy and their negative influence on stock markets, and retirees, and perhaps most of

Expressive crimes, many of which are in the “best” category. Here we simply include crimes by the FBI and most police departments. These are crimes of interpersonal violence against strangers, acquaintances, or family members. Various forms of vandalism, including arson. For our consideration of questions about crime and criminality, expressive crimes are typically (with the exception of robbery) not for financial gain, but the literature on expressive crimes are related to economic patterns

Answers to this question tend to show that popular fears of the poor are cultural. They assert that among the disadvantaged

to make a living at it—at least until and even if it usually does not lead to it. This motivates many entry-level dealers. It is an alternative route to “the good life” for many young people. By classic I do not mean that the organized crime has been described as a ladder to the standard paths for success with both employment in legitimate business. One can start low and work their way up for increased financial rewards.

White-collar crimes are acts by corporations and high-level management and the corporate stockholders in the last category. In recent years involving accounting frauds and defrauding stockholders. Any real dissent, and crime has to acknowledge the damage done with the savings and loan scandals and energy scandals (Enron, Tyco, Arthur Andersen) and vividly the Ponzi schemes on Wall Street. These crimes affect the economy via their effects on energy in the case of Enron—and by affecting the stock markets, the damage done to employment is clearly on workers.

White-collar crimes, are the “clean” crimes. They are the standard set of crimes counted as serious crimes: murder, assault, rape, and robbery. Personal violence whether committed against strangers or intimates. But they also include various types of graffiti-painting or “tagging.” The question of how employment affects crime may be the most interesting. People who are unemployed (and many are) do not engage in these crimes. It is clear that the occurrences of these crimes are different. The question is, why?

There are two types. Corresponding to traditional and subcultural notions which are being challenged are those who have developed

values and beliefs that allow or even justify others. The second type of answer is to look at the circumstances of individuals and their choices. It is not too far to allow aggression to be less checked than it is. There are too few writers who effectively bridge the gap between the question of how economic factors, in particular, influence crime.

Fundamentally, we must recognize that there are material motivations for crime. We should not blame offenders themselves, as well as the social scientists, who choose to explain the link between crime and income by saying that people do what they can. The empirical research literature, however, has shown a link between economic factors and crime, particularly in the areas of entrepreneurial and violent crime. To be sure, the economic system is the source of the fruits of their criminality, but it is not the only force that can explain crime. Some other force, such as social structure, is required in order to cause most people to commit crimes.

In this volume the focus will be on the crimes of the lower classes, violations of property laws, street crimes. To a limited extent I will also look at white-collar crimes as well. Why leave out the business crimes, the pecuniary and even violent crimes of the upper classes? After all, they are considerably more damaging to society. There are several reasons for the choice. First, the focus is on getting a better understanding of the economic conditions of the disadvantaged in society are far more important than the more preferred circumstance. The latter is a choice of options that include criminality, and the former is a choice of making choices, their choices are made with restricted freedom. The latter is likely to be a bit different from the latter. The proportion of greed in their motivation is likely to be different of the relatively wealthier criminal's motivation than that of the relatively poorer. The poor people are motivated by anger, hopelessness, and the utter lack of opportunity. It may not be contemporary Jean Valjean, but it is closer to Hugo's hero than the corporate executive.

encourage them to violently victim-
r focuses on the social structural cir-
communities that create violence, or
than in the wider society. There are
ge these two types of answers to the
ncluding jobs, cause violent crimes.
ze that research has long shown that
e are not strong predictors.⁴¹ Many
police, the media, and some crimi-
k between poverty, unemployment,
o it because they want or they need.
owever, finds weak and inconsistent
d property crimes, both pecuniary
ere are those who enjoy the material
unlikely that needs or wants alone
e, in addition to needs and desires, is
ple to commit crimes.

on violent crimes and the pecuniary
s frequently referred to as common or
ill touch on lower-end entrepreneur-
balance of entrepreneurial crimes and
es of the upper classes? These crimes,
aging to both economy and society.
oice, not least of which is my interest
f street crimes. First, the options for
more restricted than for those from
ter may more freely choose from sets
and while the disadvantaged too are
more constrained and their decisions
us the motivations for the former are
tter. One can distinguish them by the
tion. I would assert that much more
actions are propelled by greed than
erson is more likely to be influenced
r despair of those around them. They
eans, but they are considerably closer
ecutive raiders and reckless gamblers,

who likely enjoyed seeing *Les Miz*. The second reason for making this misguided, propel so much of our finally, it is simply because including one volume and for one research age.

The Coming Chapters

To make sense of how the jobs and rates of social collectives—nations, begin by considering the observed and how social scientists have tried to chapter I will describe in more detail between work and crime and be connection. In Chapter 3 I will focus has attempted to develop a more co markets and individuals' participatio nality. Chapter 4 focuses on delinque "criminals" who are not yet of worki less is influenced by the economy. C ecology and crime, and address que experiences of residents are condit neighborhoods and local labor mark and 7 I will expand these ideas, which tested using urban US data, to rural I'll draw some conclusions, speculat problems described, and consider ne

Revisiting Homewood

The Homewood of the 1950s, when cessful professor and writer, grew that were somewhat better off econ other black neighborhoods in The Certainly Homewood also had its b time Robby Wideman was a teenag that occurred in the 1960s were bei

on Broadway from opera-pit seats. The choice is that street crimes, perhaps for public policy and discussions. And the other crime types is too much for the reader.

And the labor market influence crime in cities, neighborhoods—we need to study patterns and distributions of crime to explain those patterns. In the next chapter we will begin an expanded explanation of this based on the findings of recent work that provide a complete understanding of how labor market conditions in the work force influence crime rates, in particular that large group of young adults whose behavior nevertheless is shaped by their economic situation. Chapter 5 will focus on community studies of how the work and school experiences of young people are influenced by the characteristics of the neighborhoods in which they live. In chapters 6 and 7 we will discuss research that has been primarily developed and conducted in the United States and other nations. In chapter 8 we will discuss policies that might mitigate the effects of these conditions and suggest new directions for research.

John Wideman, now a very successful author, grew up in a community that was economically less advantaged than most of Pittsburgh's Hill District and on the North Side. He grew up in the blighted, struggling sections. By the time he was a young man, the considerable social changes were being felt on Homewood's streets. John

describes Robby as growing up with a love for the streets and a desire to make a quick buck. The higher crime rate that hit Homewood, a poor urban area in urban America in the 60s, was in part a result of the fact that it was felt by the children of Great Migration who had learned during their youth that the American Dream exceeded the reality. Robby wanted more than the life the steel mills offered.

Then in the mid-1970s, Pittsburgh's steel mills began to close. In the 1980s some of them were dismantled. Politicians made stirring speeches and promised they would ride out the economic storm. But in the twenty-first century government leaders were disappointed. Pittsburgh had come back. There were new jobs, but the mills were gone. Millions of people had to find work elsewhere; those that could not were discarded by the steel industry and politicians who'd promised that they would bring Homewood, once the vibrant community, back. Now it had sections that are best described as a wasteland. There is no hope in Robby's Homewood of the future. There is even less hope there now.

An Up-Front Confession

Much of this volume is taken from my own work over the past two decades and the work of others. But some of the perspectives and insights are from no peer-reviewed journal, university press, or academic institution. Some of it will not come from my own observations that I have made as a sociologist. Some topics began with debates between me and others about the importance of poverty and income inequality in predicting violent crime. It was an exposure to the work of a sociologist that led me to seize on the idea of this work for understanding the creation of a new reality. Those same exposures helped me to see the

with a taste for the fast life of those
a buck. One can easily guess that the
od, as well as other communities in
part a consequence of frustrations
ion movers. This second generation
promise of the northern Promised
was a part of that generation that
mills promised.

gh's mills began to disappear. In the
led and sold for scrap metal. Local
about how Pittsburgh and its people
together. By the turn of twenty-first
proclaiming that the city of Pitts-
e new service sector and corporate
workers who could leave had pur-
ould not move were left in despair,
l apparently forgotten by those pol-
would ride out the storm together.
community of John Wideman's youth,
cribed as underclass. There was less
1960s than in John's of a decade ear-
ow.

work that I have been doing over the
thers that I have read along the way.
interpretations that I will offer come
iversity press, or conference presen-
om my data analyses or systematic
a sociologist. My interests in these
a sociologists over the comparative
inequality as factors that could pre-
that I had prior to being trained as
n dual labor market theory's frame-
n and persistence of social inequal-
me to develop what I later came to

call the labor stratification and criminal justice experiences affect criminality. growing up in Pittsburgh's inner city probation and parole.

I spent my adolescence in Pittsburgh. Big steel was the city's identity and the men and their families. The mills were layoffs, and strikes, but in Pittsburgh of Western Pennsylvania people believe in those dark, hot, dangerous, dangerous. Even so, there was crime in the city enclave just above Pittsburgh's city.

Robby Wideman, who I believe is from came of age a few miles away in another the Widemans, but one of Robby's (with him), Cecil, was for a brief time was probably eleven years old. Robby about in *Brothers and Keepers* were and neighbors. The hopes of the Protestant of our family's church and by the including my parents, had come from by the time so many frustrations and trialization, but my sociological view my hometown.

I did not plan to be a juvenile probation officer from college, but like many came spent one year working in a rural Pennsylvania. Within the county were two small up around steel mills. Some of the gritty sections of those towns, or A year after starting that job I moved worked for two years as a parole officer Probation and Parole. I learned a lot the streets of Erie, and from visits facilities (including a couple of treatment things I learned early on is considered parolee with a job is far more likely

the thesis to try to explain how labor
The two significant exposures were
ity, and working for three years in
burgh's Hill District at a time when
the source of a better life for working
went through boom and bust times,
gh and in the small cities and towns
ieved that over the long haul sweat-
irty mills would take care of you and
The Hill, a virtually all-black inner-
central business district.

is just a few years younger than me,
another such enclave. I did not know
y's "rap partners" (those convicted
me in my Boy Scout troop when he
bby's frustrations that we can read
e the frustrations of my classmates
omised Land were held by members
adults living around us. Nearly all,
om the South. I had left Pittsburgh
nd hopes were crushed by deindus-
ew has been profoundly affected by

robation officer (PO) when I gradu-
reer turns, that one just happened. I
county in northwestern Pennsylva-
small adjoining cities that had grown
kids on my first caseload were from
others from mostly poor rural areas.
oved to Erie, Pennsylvania, where I
gent for the Pennsylvania Board of
ot from our clients, my coworkers,
to prisons and jails and treatment
ining stints). One of the important
red a no-brainer for all POs: that a
to stay out of jail.

As I considered the debate over and found myself being drawn toward an explanatory tool for how both economic and labor market arrangements and how that my Pittsburgh and parole office were influential in my thinking. As I began to write an academic manuscript that would be different from that of others in a rather traditional style, I continued writing, it has gotten increasingly clear that there have been times that our data, if available to me will not allow me to draw conclusions, but I am confident that the case of The Hill who became a PO may add a new perspective on the and labor market's effects on crime.

I do not doubt that some of my colleagues will find that these personal interpretations are not. At times they may feel that we do not have the isn't research that supports a particular conclusion. The probability of such comments. I am confident that from these perspectives, we may enrich our understanding. John Edgar Wideman realized that was, Robby carried a part of John's story and that the people of The Hill carry with them and so I choose to enrich this account.

r poverty versus income inequality
ard dual labor market theory as an
onomic conditions are products of
w they are linked to crime, I found
ficer experiences were increasingly
gan writing this book I envisioned
d bring together my research and
l scholarly treatment. But as I have
creasingly personal. By that I mean
methods or the data that have been
o draw particular inferences or con-
he perspective of the kid from The
bit to my analyses of the economy

olleagues will read this and in places
ons go beyond what the data tell us.
ot yet know something or that there
cular position. I have accepted the
a convinced that by adding personal
bates and advance our understand-
d that no matter where his brother
with him. I have come to recognize
th them a bit of all of us who left—
unt with theirs.

“Get a Job”

The Connection between Work and Crime

My first encounter with Walter was in 1982. Walter was not too long out of prison after a burglary conviction. A skinny, sullen young man, younger than his early twenty-something years, he had a caseload from that of another agent, but it was a real problem but that he was having trouble finding so much of that first meeting focus was on what he should say his lack of a job search. I was terribly interested in, but both he was sitting and staring at me from across the room that he needed to find a job than I was interested in keeping him from being in violation, for failing to follow job search requirements. I was a supervising agent and now reiterated what he might generate. Walter came to me. I told him that he had to find a job. If he was going to be in Pennsylvania knocking on doors and he was to drop off, at the front desk, a list of the places that he'd applied to. Walter finding a job? Because even though he was just a year and was essentially the same

ime

in his mother-in-law's living room.¹ After serving a few years for a robbery, a young man who looked even younger than he was, Walter was transferred to my district. I had been told that he was not a good worker and was having a difficult time finding a job, and I was assigned to supervise him. Working was not something Walter understood. His recent bride and her mother, sitting in the living room, were more acutely aware of his situation than he was. I suspect that they were also aware of his recent return to jail for a parole violation. They had been returned to jail for a parole violation (from his previous parole, supervised by me), as they were in any income-producing activity. They compliantly nodded affirmatively when I explained the situation, and that beginning the next morning walking the streets of Erie, and submitting applications. Each day I would take him to the parole board's district office, and I would be there to that day. Why the emphasis on walking the streets, though I had been a parole agent for many years, same age as Walter, I recognized that

he would not remain out of jail if he lock him up for a parole violation, o

The robbery that sent Walter to most robberies it had a pecuniary c be painfully honest, even more stu ter had no more interest in work b once paroled. It all started one night ing with a buddy. They wondered h rolling when their money ran out. it been today, going to an ATM) li an old man out of the bar, mugged returned to the same bar to conti to the bar to seek help and call the apparently did not notice him), wh ture and conviction. No Jean Valje was motivated by money, how they complex tale than the hero of *Les relatives.*

I cannot remember a single trai parole agent, of the importance of p tainly part of the lore and my inform did not start working, the lifestyle th get him busted again. So, what mig crime look like today, should parole

What they would find is that mu on individuals' current or recent in ment. More recent scholarship, ho with how people or groups come to why they are poor, for example. W crime it is important to recogniz touches the lives of most people i labor market. They are poor becaus if they are employed their job pays bers of a group that has been histor stream of the labor market. They liv their irregular employment allows if any at all, and they have little or

did not find work. Either we would
or he'd commit a new crime.

prison was a violent crime, but like
quality to its motivation and was, to
rapid than most criminal acts. Wal-
before going to the joint than he had
t when he was sitting in a bar drink-
now they could keep the good times
Instead of cashing a check (or, had
like most of us might, they followed
him just down the street, and then
nue drinking. The victim returned
police and saw his assailants (who
which of course led to their easy cap-
an these crooks. While their crime
came to criminal behavior is a more
s *Misérables* quest to feed starving

ning session that told me, a novice
parolees having a job. But it was cer-
mal education in the office. If Walter
that got him busted once would likely
ht the research on employment and
e officers elect to consider it?

uch of the past research has focused
come, poverty status, or unemploy-
however, has included more concern
o be in a particular circumstance—
When we speak of the economy and
e that the way that the economy
s through their relationship to the
e they do not have a job, or because
too little, or because they are mem-
rically marginalized from the main-
re in slums or on the streets because
them to afford only very low rents
no hope of ever becoming a home

owner. They live in a city, state, or nation characterized by income inequality because the industrial core cities and suburbs consist of options for elite, high-income jobs, and the suburbs for those who serve the former. I would not have the energy pondering most of the reasons for why we, as a nation, was affected by his relationship with the economy, in his case it was his lack of employment in a tight labor market, and his minimal desire for a better life, his lifestyle and criminal involvement. If we want to understand what affects criminality we have to focus on the individual, who requires an act by an individual, and not the economy or the jobs or, in some cases, the lack of jobs.

The explanation of how work in the inner city here compliments some of the major theories in sociological criminology in recent years. It is a long-standing theoretical explanation of the inner city position, which I refer to as the labor market theory, focuses considerably more on the social structure than do traditional subculture of poverty theories. It is especially, and to a lesser extent Charles Tilly's theory of social structure seriously in his analysis of structural forces, but they essentially focus on the cultural values that individuals (or groups) espouse and their and their progeny's criminality. It is a "code of the street" to the long-term theory of segments of the populations.³ Better than the lack of jobs that are available in the disadvantaged inner-city neighborhoods, the labor market thesis is very compatible with his position.

The labor stratification and criminality thesis taken by William Julius Wilson in his book *The Urban Underclass* at the end of the 20th century, resulting from deindustrialization, by Robert J. Sampson, and Ruth Peterson and Lauren Berke, on racial residential segregation in cities, is also compatible with his position.

ation characterized by high income composition where they live tends to some occupations and low-paid jobs could guess that Walter invested little these issues, but he, like the rest of to the legitimate economy, and in ment, his lack of connection to the ire to find a job that was central to nt. To understand how the economy s on work, because ultimately crime d individuals' points of contact with the case of juveniles, their parents'

influences crime that I will advance or arguments that have appeared in years, and will contrast with some ons. Regarding the latter, the current bor stratification and crime thesis, social and economic structure than r arguments.² Edward Banfield espe- es Murray, who treats some aspects analyses, give a passing nod to those y center their arguments on the cul- (ups) have internalized which drives y. These positions are very different rson, who links the emergence of “a n social and economic disadvantage ecause Anderson’s explanation cen- ailable to many residents of disad- s, the labor stratification and crime osition.

e thesis is also very compatible with Wilson, who ascribed the emergence f the twentieth century to job losses y Douglas Massey and Nancy Den- n Krivo, who emphasize the role of ausing and maintaining economic

disadvantage and crime.⁴ Much like *Paid* traces both life chances and crime opportunities that are available to people. I argue that the kind of work that people do, where they live, and their work and living conditions helps to determine their participation in crime. Criminologists Mary Pattillo-McCoy and Karina L. C. Spohn make particular characteristics of neighborhoods a central matter as central to their analyses, including the role of geography.⁶ Central to the labor market is employment and disadvantage in the labor market affects crime and crime rates.

What the labor stratification and the lack of endorsement of materialist explanation by Robert Merton in his classic “Social Structure and Social Theory” he argued that much crime occurs because of opportunity, in an effort to improve their situation. I acknowledge that at times people do what they want and needs—but alone, this is not enough.

That said, we should begin by acknowledging the role of the economy, and certainly employment, in crime. It is forward as common sense suggest. In general, individual criminal behavior and variations in crime rates are more complex than one would at first think.

Unemployment, the Economy, and Crime

Until recently criminologists focused on the role of unemployment was related to criminality, but the relationship is inconsistent; some scholars find a positive relationship and find that unemployment levels increase crime. For instance, Steven Raphael and Robert D. Wacziarg found a decline in property crime that was due to falling unemployment rates. For some types of crimes,¹⁰ while others show a negative association.¹¹ John Worrall concluded, after controlling for other factors that should be taken into account

ke Mercer Sullivan, who in *Getting* crime to the legitimate and illegitimate differentially to young people, I people have access to is conditioned by that of those who live around them in crime.⁵ And, just as sociologists Parker treat space, especially the neighborhoods and sections of cities that I too will emphasize the importance of stratification and crime thesis is how the context of disadvantaged places

crime thesis is *not* is a full-throated explanation of crime such as that proffered "Social Structure and Anomie," where crime is caused because of reactions to blocked economic and material wants and needs.⁷ Yes, people engage in crime because of such a too limited of an explanation.

knowing that just how the economic influences crime is not as straightforward as both the case of explaining individual differences in crime rates, it looks increasingly clear that we must expect.

and Crime

used their study on how unemployment, as I have said, that correlation is a positive relationship,⁸ while some studies show that unemployment increases some crimes but not others.⁹ Rudolf Winter-Ember report that the correlation observed in the 1990s was largely positive. Others report negative relationships and others find inconsistent or no association. After considering a wide range of factors, it is clear that when examining the association

between unemployment and crime are “slow moving,” its force being felt taken into account, he concludes that crime rates. One thing that we cannot consistently find the simple relationship between unemployment and crime (the former increasing the weight of the evidence does suggest some additional crime. Recognizing, however, the limited pattern—recently, the connection between the economy beyond the question of whether people in this research considers the types of characteristics of their employment. The economies of the US and other countries have changed, political conversations about the kinds of jobs that are available to workers, and the shift toward more “family-wage jobs” has paralleled a shift in the direction of research on the stratification of the economy. Both the politicians (sometimes) and the public have recognized the importance of not just a job, but a high-quality job.

Another important research strategy is to look at the factors that influence crime rates. Economists Philip Cook and Gary Zingales found that particular types of crime change with the economy. Burglary and robbery increased with better times, while auto theft increased with better times. Crime (with the exception of robbery) decreased during business cycles. Richard Rosenfeld found that consumer confidence is a more reliable predictor of criminal behavior than unemployment. When confident, they contribute to a more stable economy, and decreases in robbery and property crime. Many researchers believe that high consumer confidence is a key factor in the “great crime decline” that we witnessed in the late 1990s.

These and other studies have informed the development of a more complex understanding of the factors related to crime rates and criminal behavior.

e, that the effects of unemployment
 t over extended time.¹² When this is
 at unemployment rates do increase
 be sure of is that researchers have
 relationship between unemployment
 e latter) that the public expects, but
 ggest that unemployment produces
 ng these patterns—or more accu-
 work has more broadly examined
 my and crime, in particular moving
 ple have jobs or not. One strand of
 jobs that people hold and the char-
 is focus has been timely because as
 r traditional manufacturing nations
 ns have increasingly been about the
 orkers. The popular political call for
 eled the emergence of the publica-
 n of labor and its effects on crime.
 d the researchers now recognize the
 igh-quality job.

nd has used other economic indica-
 related to the economy. For example,
 arkin examined business cycles and
 s responded differently to economic
 eared when things were down, but
 mes.¹³ They also found that violent
 ry) was unresponsive to changes in
 and Robert Fornango reported that
 iable predictor of changes in crimi-
 rates.¹⁴ As consumers become more
 re robust economy, which leads to
 y crimes. Rosenfeld and Fornango
 ence explains an important part of
 tnessed during the 1990s.

creasingly pointed us toward devel-
 anding of how economic forces are
 ity. This is especially so for violent

crime. Does the economy or work rape? I think so, and in the coming

The Stratification of Labor

Part of what makes the Walters of and causes the Robby Widemans to is a combination of what's inside and beliefs, but also what their con nature of and amount of opportu role models, and network connect and opportunities are affected by labor market, and increasingly in economic and social forces come to are available to young people, and t react to those options, including wo

The labor stratification and crim are not created equal and that their Building on dual labor market theo why some groups, notably but not are persistently poor, disadvantaged economy more broadly, the labor s how joblessness, unemployment, a crime and criminality.

Central to dual labor market the distinction between primary and se tor jobs are characterized by relative good-benefits, and a measure of jo reasonable expectation of future em tion. Often workers in such jobs be with time and seniority their pay, tantly their job security, increases. range of occupations from the clas to the blue-collar industrial jobs th can families built middle-class life John Edgar Wideman grew up in, in Pittsburgh's steel industry.

matter for homicide, assault, and pages I'll try to make that case.

the world behave the way they do be frustrated by their circumstance of them—goals, aspirations, drives, communities are like—along with the options available, educational options, options to jobs. In turn, these options the local labor market, the nation's recent decades, global forces. These together to determine the options that they help to determine how they will work options and criminal options.

me thesis emphasizes that all jobs is not open competition for jobs. theory, which was developed to explain exclusively marginalized minorities, and in competing for jobs, and in the stratification thesis leads us to study and job quality together influence

theory arguments is an oversimplified secondary sector jobs.¹⁵ Primary sector jobs, higher pay (family-wage jobs), job security, where employees have a path to promotion and perhaps even promotion in low, entry-level positions and benefits, and perhaps most important. Included in this category are a wide range of professions of law and medicine that many twentieth-century Americans live on. In the Homewood that many men held primary sector jobs

In the case of professions, income, and the cost of training and credentials. In other cases, the characteristics of their jobs, the stability of their employment, the ease of job movement and the combination of their jobs with family life, the negotiating power of their unions, and the negotiating power of the classic professions and unskilled, blue-collar primary sector jobs are arrayed, but the benefits accrue because of characteristics of the individuals occupying them, and the characteristics of the social organization of workers and their unions. The loss of primary sector jobs that support these communities. In many instances, when there is increased competition for secondary sector jobs.

Primary sector jobs are the right kind of jobs for conforming lifestyles. They provide a sufficient incentive to get to work regularly and consistently, and we value enough that they influence our lives, and we build our lifestyles around them. They are not conducive to crime. People who have stable jobs and value are less likely to lead a life of crime, and in marginal company. In addition to the immediate consequences of crime, hangovers, jail, injury—the loss of a job, not regularly perform up to par, or incur additional cost to more reprobate lifestyles. People who have jobs have fewer motivations for involvement in entrepreneurial crime, and are less likely to be involved in the chance occurrences that typify crime. I was to one of these jobs that I hoped to get, but I fully expected him to instigate a crime if he found a job at all.

Such secondary sector jobs are low-paying jobs with few benefits. Secondary sector workers' jobs are frequently unstable, and therefore they are likely to be in and out of work. The wages are very limited opportunities for advancement. It is difficult to build a promising career in a secondary sector job.

ne, security, and benefits are a func-
 the case of many blue-collar work-
 s were a consequence of the labor
 the health of their employing indus-
 their union. Between the poles of the
 ue-collar unionized work the other
 sed on the extent to which positive
 ristics of the job and those of indi-
 aracteristics of the industry and the
 work. With deindustrialization, it is
 has hurt people, families, and com-
 primary sector jobs disappear there
 ary sector jobs.

nt stuff for building a middle class,
 y are the jobs that we value suffi-
 on time. They are the positions that
 e and structure our days and habits,
 hem. As a consequence they are less
 ve to be at work on a job that they
 carefree late nights in bars, on street
 engaging in questionable behavior.
 quences of such behaviors—exhaus-
 ss of a valued job because one can-
 s too often tardy, or a no-show, adds
 festyles. People with primary sector
 olvement in low-end pecuniary and
 likely to lead lifestyles conducive to
 much violent criminal behavior. It
 d my parolee, Walter, would find his
 tead end up in the secondary sector,

ow-paying, with few or even no ben-
 s have less security and employment
 re occupants of these jobs are more
 workplace is structured so that there
 advancement. One does not easily
 ary sector occupation. Examples of

these jobs are unskilled and nonunion, many of whom are picked-up for day work as janitors, gardeners; those hired temporarily as seasonal workers; low-end restaurant jobs (not professional eateries); and frequently retail work in “box” stores. The prototypical secondary sector job is a job in a fast-food restaurant—the “McJob” used popularly to denote low-end employment.

While primary sector jobs give workers a career, and something additional to their lives, one can be fired from a secondary sector job. Job holders are liberated from having to perform well or even up to par. Workers are being late or too often a no-show, but they do not have motivations, because of sparse supervision, to seize opportunities to moonlight and work elsewhere without the constraints of a job. Workers live a “street” lifestyle that increases the risk of violence.¹⁷ Steven, a parolee living in a McJob prior to prison. He and his brother share incomes with the proceeds from burglary. Steven needed more money, but a feeling of helplessness. “What the hell?”

It is important to emphasize that the term “secondary sector jobs” refers to a broad range of secondary sector jobs. Perhaps one of the most interesting findings has been inconsistently found to be related to crime is the concept of “secondary sector worker” or “unemployed worker.” The US census or the monthly Current Population Survey function of the current work circumstances. People who do not fill out the questionnaire or are in a “secondary sector” job. In earlier work I found utility in a model that did not distinguish between secondary sector workers and unemployed, and in that analysis the two groups were labor stratification and crime perspectives. The utility of employment (secondary sector

unionized construction workers, many
park; unbonded security guards; most
to unload trucks; piecemeal work-
professional waiters in swanky upscale
workers, especially those in some “big
secondary sector job may well be employ-
us the title “McJobs” that has been
employment.¹⁶

one a good income, a prospective
to lose, there is little to lose should
for position. In other words, McJob
to worry so much about being able
When the fed-up boss fires them for
little is lost. As a result these people
e wages, to dabble in larceny and to
s a street corner drug dealer. Also,
rth losing, they can more freely lead
eir chances of becoming involved in
n a rural Pennsylvania county, had a
buddies supplemented their meager
rglaries. It wasn't so much that they
of nothing to lose, of “Why not” or

instability is a characteristic of sec-
the reasons that unemployment has
ated to crime is that it is too limited
employed in secondary sector jobs
k. Whether a person is classified as
employed according to the decennial
Population Survey (CPS) is more a
instance of a respondent when they
interviewed by a census employee.¹⁸

study of Seattle neighborhoods in
secondary sector workers and the unem-
two variables were combined.¹⁹ The
pective argues that it is this instabil-
or work, unemployment, and being

completely out of the labor market) combined with the lack of desirability (which is criminogenic).

The traditional unemployment statistics go in another direction as well (in addition to excluding workers who cycle in and out of work) and reported statistic represents the number of workers who are not working and searching for work.²⁰ These workers are left unaccounted for in the wide range of categories used in research: those who are working but not in employment; discouraged workers who are not in the legal labor market and are no longer actively searching (such as Walter until I cracked down on them last); and those who, when employed, are off the radar of the state bureaucracy. Examples include a large number of men in many cities who work in the most understood places in the hope of finding work almost always off the books. Today, these workers are Home Depot and Lowes Home Improvement workers. Both the men hoping for work and employers know where prospective workers are. When a person hiring, will drive up in a pickup truck and pick up the guys. Either the first five into the truck will work that day for low wages and without the protection of systems such as workers' compensation and unemployment insurance.

Elliot Liebow's classic study *Taught Men* (1968) about laborers in Washington, DC in the 1950s and 1960s who worked irregularly in this system and who were not counted. The day worker system continues to exist in many places along Second Avenue, African American neighborhoods near the Millionaire Club in the hood. The Millionaire Club is an assistance program for low-income people.²² In upscale Santa Barbara, California, within a few blocks of the scenic beach, there are many men in Santa Barbara, Seattle's "marginalized" workers are marginalized workers, but many

, or labor market marginality, com-
value) of secondary sector jobs, that

rate statistic is too narrow in the
to failing to count secondary sector
work), because this frequently used
the number of people currently out

Three important groups of people
dely publicized unemployment rate
rking part-time but desire full-time

(people who have given up on the
er looking for gainful employment,
vn on him, though the effect didn't

red, work at jobs that are below the
mples of this last group are the large
are day workers. These men gather

being hired to work for a few hours,
, home improvement stores such as
mprovement Stores frequently draw

g to be hired and potential employ-
s gather. Typically a jobber, the per-
up truck and say that he needs five

truck or the five that he selects from
y wages, no benefits, and without the
men's compensation and unemploy-

Talley's Corner tells the story of day
early 1960s.²¹ Talley and his buddies
and in other secondary sector jobs.

o function in many cities. In Seattle
rican, Latino, and white men gather
pe of finding a day's work. The Mil-

m for unemployed or homeless peo-
ifornia, mostly Mexican men gather
eaches for the same purpose. These

llionaires,” and Talley and company
y of them do not appear in most of

our statistics, not even those reported to broaden our conceptualization of crime. Day workers frequently do not pay for survey workers to find (many are questionable immigration status); as money is paid into government systems for their pay, they are paid off the books, in cash. As a result, they are inherently conservative and their labor marginality on crime and crime.

A word about illegal labor market economy in general is in order. They are not synonymous. The underground economy includes off-the-books work, including the work described above; the large number of black, Latino, and Hispanic cleaners or, to use their vernacular, "jannies" (e.g., taxi drivers in Pittsburgh's black community, as in August Wilson's *Jitney*).²³ Also in the underground economy are those who labor as entrepreneurs (e.g., barbers who do hair in their homes, tutes, fences, and bookmakers).²⁴ Economist Richard Freeman, reviewing quantitative and qualitative studies, concluded that "people 'make up' by earning money in both the legal and illegal economies."²⁵ Fagan and Freeman argue that crime is not an either-or, but rather as a continuum. Indeed, a number of petty burglars are not just that. They worked low-wage, so they had opportunities to steal or fence some of the goods they stole. My parolee Steven, who was in prison for a long time, did just this. People move farther down the illegal end where wages are lower, just as they move farther down the legal end where the local labor market is less promising—where the local labor market is less promising.

The following example helps to illustrate the differentiation of labor works at the individual level. On a weekday night of two young Pittsburghers, a unionized steel mill worker. He has

ed in recent studies that have sought of the relationship between work and not appear because they are difficult e homeless, very mobile, or of ques- mentioned above, employers do not em; and many, when they work, are sult, even these broadening studies us may underestimate the effect of ne rates.

ets and the underground or shadow e later includes the former, but they ound economy includes all sorts the employment queues described latina, Asian, and white women who ular, who do “days work”; and jit- mmunities (for a vivid portrayal see ne off-the-books economy are those ack-ally mechanics, beauticians and s) and hustlers (e.g., pimps, prosti- criminologist Jeffrey Fagan and econ- a large number of both quantitative that many young criminals “double e legitimate and illegitimate econo- at these options should not be seen um used by some to gain income. s on my adult parole caseload did ometimes temporary jobs, and when ething came along, they took advan- n I introduced earlier, and his bud- er along this continuum toward the obs are less stable, and employment labor market is more stratified.

explain how I believe that the strati- idual level to increase the probabil- ccur. Consider the options on a 1975 rgh men.²⁶ The first is an entry-level, s been told that when he accrues six

months of seniority that he can “p
crew (sweeping, cleaning, and do
tasks in the mill) to an apprenticesh
skilled positions that pay better an
The union, long ago, negotiated a go
ries, even for those in entry-level job
of the United Steel Workers of Am
been successful at protecting the job

The second young man is emplo
typical of these employers there an
there is little or no expectation on th
of advancement within the compan
is lucky, he may someday become
marginally better than he currently
even as assistant manager and ever
will spend a considerable amount
fryer).

Both men are approached in the
to go out with the boys and have a fe
as he would like to join his friends
must be on time for his day turn shi
His job, with its present and potent
stake in conformity that leads him t
tion—not because he differs from h
because his job has value.

The second young man consider
friends and in the context of his Mc
or even fails to show, what does he
fast-food franchise across the stree
quality. Obviously the characterist
ment do not provide the same stak
man’s job does.

When the boys go out for the ev
engage in crime. But when they are
street corner having consumed alco
the increased probability of crime
of young males, the most likely grou

out in” to be moved from the laboring some of the most undesirable tip for one of the semiskilled or even and have better working conditions. good medical plan and generous salaries. Workers in the mill are members America, a union that historically had jobs and benefits of its members.

employed by a fast-food franchise. As is there few benefits, the pay is low, and the part of this or any other employee. If he stays around for a while and an assistant manager, which pays makes working the counter (though in perhaps someday as manager, he of time at that counter or over the

late evening by out-of-work friends new drinks. Our steelworker, as much, considers and declines because he left, and he cannot arrive hung over.²⁷ Potential future benefits, has given him a to a decision to not accept the invitation his friends on values or beliefs, but

ers the opportunity to socialize with Job. He accepts. If he is late for work lose? If fired he can simply go to the net and get a job of equally dubious ics of the second person’s employ- e in conformity that the first young

ening, there may be no intention to e in a tavern, or a pool hall, or on a hol, two of the routine elements for occurring are present.²⁸ This group up to engage in and to be victimized

by crime, includes both the motivation and the opportunity of crime. They may assault, even be mugged by others. Recall how the drinking buddy began ended: in prison.

For a contemporary version of the thesis, consider a young worker. To illustrate how the American dream is being lost, living in Seattle, would illustrate it well. A young worker at Microsoft or for one of the other high-tech firms in every state is trying to attract. But the high-tech jobs, unlike the low-skilled jobs that were the heyday of the industrial era, require a lot of human capital and frequently cultural capital. The young workers in primary sector jobs are, therefore, further away from their age contemporary than they are, being at all, on the margins of the labor market.

The example highlights three themes in the opportunity and crime thesis. First, it is in the context of being marginalized from the labor market that crime is most criminogenic. Being out of work in the primary sector alone can be correlated with a high rate of crime. Many of others so situated appear to be young men in this scenario did not have the opportunity or, to borrow a pejorative concept, they did not have the means instead have lifestyles that are conducive to crime as both perpetrators and victims. Second, in pecuniary crime when among the young, it is not so much to emphasize the spontaneity of crime as it is lifestyles that are in part determined by economic conditions. Third, are not two young men from separate backgrounds whose values are roughly the same; what differentiates them is a situational circumstance.

In the example above of two youths, the thesis is seen from an activities perspective developed by Liska and Gottman. This perspective was first developed by Liska and Gottman. The population were more likely to be victimized. The population were more likely to be victimized are more likely with a high rate of victimization, and an absence of

ted actors and the potential victims
kill one another; they may mug or
the night of partying Walter and his
son sentences.

In this example I would not use a steel-
American labor market has changed I,
t using a Boeing worker, or a tech
the biogenetics firms that every city,
t it is critical to recognize that these
at were available in abundance dur-
, require considerably more human
al than did those industrial jobs. So,
on even more dimensions, socially
poraries working, or not even work-
or force.

nings about the labor stratification
ompany of others who are also mar-
hat unstable work or joblessness is
work or employed in the secondary
crime, but this context of the com-
to amplify the effect.²⁹ Second, the
t set out for an evening of criminal-
pt from the 1990s, “wilding.”³⁰ They
ucive to becoming more involved in
tims. They also may elect to engage
their friends, but with this example I
of crime that can occur as a result of
d by labor stratification. Third, these
te cultures or subcultures. Their val-
erentiates them is only their occupa-

hful workers, I alluded to the routine
Lawrence Cohen and Marcus Felson.
l to illustrate why some segments of
be the victims of crime. Crime and
the confluence of motivated actors,
competent guardians. The motivated

actors do not necessarily *need* to have motivation may stem from a situation previously unanticipated. The guardian may be anyone, including members perceived to be able to act against the passing pedestrians or even watchful guardians. A classic example of the nature of why taxi cab drivers have their job (they are the potential victims) demands that they pick up people potentially motivated to commit crimes to a place designated by the passenger. In our example young men, going to bars or pubs if they are old enough (and if they cannot find a bartender will not look closely at a fake ID) are way places. Either in the case of bars the confluence of motivated actors, pedestrians are more likely to be present. As a confluence more likely will occur with marginalized workers not bonded to work.

The importance of the critical moment, underemployed, and discouraged to form the “situation of company” be emphasized.³¹ The reason that communities so much more than lost from a city, state, or nation accompany these losses are neither. They are concentrated among already population and they are geographically already weakened, communities theory, upon which this thesis is based to explain the continuing, not in advantage of particular segments of the certainly not limited to stigmatized nations such groups disproportionately ethnically inequitably structured labor

have set out to commit crimes; their
 n that presents an opportunity previ-
 ns do not *need* to be the police; they
 s of the general public, who may be
 e furtherance of the crime. Regularly
 l neighbors are at times very effective
 use of this perspective is the expla-
 a high probability of victimization.
 im, with proceeds from earlier fares)
 who are unknown to them (some
 mes), who then direct them to drive
 er (easily a place without guardians).
 out for an evening of fun, may go to
 a, or if under the legal drinking age
 willing to not card them or one who
 likely to drink in hidden, out-of-the-
 s or in these hidden drinking spots,
 potential victims, and a lack of guard-
 gain, lifestyle patterns that make this
 hen you have a critical mass of mar-
 rk, with no good job to lose.

mass of unemployed, secondary sec-
 ed workers that needs to be present
 ’ that is conducive to crime should
 deindustrialization has hurt some
 others is because the jobs that are
 nd the negative consequences that
 r randomly nor evenly distributed.
 ady disadvantaged segments of the
 ically visited upon particular, usu-
 s. Remember that dual labor market
 used, was initially developed to help
 frequently multigenerational disad-
 the population. Effected groups are
 d minorities, but in many western
 ably bear the weight of racially and
 oor markets.

Because labor in the US has been divided by race and ethnicity, labor marginalization has affected minority populations. For example, African Americans have historically been overly employed in secondary sector jobs. With globalization the competition for these jobs has increased. Consequently, some African Americans have lost their jobs, increasing the competition for the remaining jobs, which are less attractive (or at least less attractive) to them through black communities.³² Those who have not been as successful for the remainder of the population who had filled jobs at the margins of the labor market. Also, because the US is a segregated society, the combination of globalization and secondary sector jobs has been geographically concentrated in African American and to some extent, Latin American communities.

Similar patterns have been observed in other countries that have visible minorities. In the UK, Australia, and elsewhere labor markets are ethnically diverse. These countries have experienced industrial squeeze and globalization. Some believe that the economic crisis in some nations of Western Europe and the continued labor market marginalization in Africa. Perhaps crime, too, in addition to unemployment, is a result.

I should say a bit about the process of labor market marginalization when power and privilege is redefined. In South Africa, before and during apartheid, the labor market was divided. There a downtrodden black majority and a small, but economically more privileged minorities—(Africans, Indians, and Coloured parentage) and Asians—were lorded over. The labor market was maintained, by the threat of and from the loss of political power, a stratified system of labor market marginalization. This was socially and geographically even more pronounced in the countries of the northern and western hemisphere. The concentration of disadvantaged populations in these areas is the genesis of criminality.

One is struck when traveling in these areas by the widespread belief that crime has

en and continues to be stratified by
ity is a state concentrated among
e, African Americans have histori-
ndary sector jobs. With deindustri-
heretofore unwanted jobs increased.
ricans lost primary sector industry
r their neighbors' low-paying unat-
) jobs. Deindustrialization rippled
e displaced workers could compete
ng secondary sector jobs, so those
were frequently pushed out of the
s remains a highly residentially seg-
dislocation from both primary and
graphically concentrated in African
no communities.

rved in other western nations that
France, the Netherlands, Germany,
nically stratified. Those nations, too,
es as a result of deindustrialization
t the social unrest that has occurred
e is a consequence of such changes,
arginalization of ethnic minorities.
nrest, is or may soon be a result.

esses associated with labor stratifica-
served for a minority group—South
id, being the prototypical example.
ty and two stigmatized, very mini-
—Coloureds (people of mixed race
led over by minority whites who
requent use of force, economic and
of labor that concentrated disadvan-
n more efficiently than in the coun-
emispheres. As a result, there too the
ersons is critically important in the

in postapartheid South Africa by
as become a major social problem.

Bumper stickers and graffiti call for retribution for murders and rapists. In Johannesburg, and nearly everywhere you see a friend, acquaintance, or "someone" who has been the victim of a horrific crime, that they are linked to are told in the townships, and in the rural areas. I asked if they had been (the unlicensed, under apartheid) townships that continue to operate under a state of fear of crime and the get-tough-or-lose-it mentality related on walls and cars differed by race. In response, they strongly said "no" and that the fear was widespread among whites, Coloureds, and Indians. They perceived an increase in crime to the north and east from the shift from social control by the white government (the party of apartheid) to those of the new government established by the African National Congress. They also cited poverty and "all *those* people who come from other countries as criminogenic." They said that citizens of the new South Africa do not understand the racialized politics of the past, the policies that continue to reverberate through the people's lives. They have been patrons anxiously await change and are beginning to use the language of contemporary criminology to recognize that the legacy of poverty and unemployment and the labor market that were created under apartheid contribute to contemporary problems. They do not know if new policies and migrants from other countries led to real increases in violent crime. Their responses indicate that the people perceive the

The Stratification of Labor and Crime

The Homewood section of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, where Robby Wideman, was a place that saw a large number of prosperous African Americans moved to the suburbs. Homewood, which had black residents

reestablishment of the death pen-
 annesburg there is great fear of car-
 speak with has a story of a relative,
 that a friend of mine knows” who
 ime.³³ These stories and the feelings
 the cities and townships, the small
 d villagers and the patrons of a she-
 heid, pubs in townships and tribal
 der questionable legal status) if the
 n-criminals attitudes I saw articu-
 ace. After exclaiming surprise at my
 nd insisted that these feelings were
 eds, and blacks. They attributed the
 more relaxed enforcement resulting
 practices of the Nationalists Party
 f the criminal justice system estab-
 gress (the party of Mandela).³⁴ They
 ple” who have come to South Africa
 nic forces. So, while common citi-
 ot attribute the crime directly to the
 practices of the old regime continue
 perception of government. The sha-
 ge, but even though they don’t often
 sociologists, they nevertheless rec-
 nd unequal access to quality educa-
 e central to the system of apartheid
 ms. And while most people do not
 s from other countries have in fact
 es, the anecdotal evidence certainly
 is to be so.

crime

gh, the childhood home of John and
 some among the relatively few pros-
 o in the decades after World War II.³⁵
 ents as early as the mid-nineteenth

century, was one of several alternatives to Pittsburgh's black community, The Hill, in downtown central business and commercial district just up the hill; "uptown," as some people is popularly known, was organized by the African American community and included middle and working class. Among those who came to Pittsburgh in the August Wilson, legal scholar Derrick Bell, and your far less eminent author. The Hill was wiped away by America's first round of urban renewal, densely populated by very poor people. The Hill also ascended the class strata of the city, as did the federal housing projects, which were built on the eastern edge of the community—until the late 1950s and 1960s—of the city's few 1950s and 60s-era housing projects. In years, the bounds of residential segregation were weakened, allowing some African Americans to move to The Hill, Homewood, and the North Side. Among the places that bordered Homewood.

Even before the collapse of big industry, the problems of inner-city neighborhoods were family disruptions, and drugs. I was sent to a military couple of years out of school, where I worked in a federally funded training program. I was sent to workers from Allegheny County, where I worked. I went through her caseload, asking "_____ or _____?"

_____ was supervising on probation were _____.

Although Homewood, The Hill, and The North Side in Pittsburgh and in other American cities, the decline of blue-collar jobs has been a problem for individual residents, for families, and for the city. Homewood now has broad stretches of middle class neighborhoods (or alternatively, if the word is too pejorative, they are popularly known as the state of Pennsylvania in which it is _____).

atives to the older center of Pitts-
District, which sits just above the
commercial district (quite literally
have referred to it). The Hill, as it
d like the typical northern African
d sections for all of the black social
of age on The Hill were playwright
k Bell, jazz guitarist George Benson,
The Lower Hill, much of which was
ls of urban renewal in the 1950s, was
people. As one ascended the hill one
community—with the exception of
ran along two-thirds of the north-
l reaching Schenley Heights, home
black professionals. In the postwar
regation were not removed but they
Americans to find homes outside of
rth Side, another established black
t they moved to were suburbs that

y steel, these communities had the
ods including poverty, crime, fam-
stunned as a young parole agent, a
n I went to Penn State to attend a
There I met several probation offi-
e Pittsburgh is located. One of them
: “Do you know _____ or
A distressing number of those she
from my high school.

, and neighborhoods like them in
industrial cities were places of hope
obs has been catastrophic for many
d for those communities as a whole.
es that are best described as under-
ely, for those that think that con-
ulated by the ghetto poor). Like the
s located, Pittsburgh and its poorest

neighborhoods lost population in the 1970s, and if not most, of that loss is a result of the loss of manufacturing job opportunities in other parts of the city. These areas have prospects that are inferior to those of the middle class people who lived there in the 1950s. The economic decline stretches to those areas that were places of relative prosperity. Wilkinsburg and Penn Hills, both of which were prosperous in the 1960s, now have problems of unemployment that were historically associated with inner-city areas. Homewood has suffered as a result of the loss of jobs; they have high crime rates, and they have experienced an epidemic of the late 1980s and early 1990s that has had a negative impact on the social and economic lives of residents.

What happened during recent decades was the loss of jobs in the primary and secondary labor markets and those in ancillary industries. Many service establishments near the mills, which were once popular with customers, have closed or reduced their operations. Restaurants, coffee shops, and bars have closed, and the streets from mill entrances to downtown have become a fee and a sandwich at the beginning of the 1990s. (Iron City beer, a long-time Pittsburgh staple, lost its clientele to deindustrialization; many other businesses have failed, too. In recent decades there has been a shift in the economy that is called a "polarization in job quality.")

This polarization is not new, but the loss of jobs in the secondary labor markets has increased. The loss of jobs in relatively low-skill, traditional, middle-class jobs with benefits, job stability, and steady promotion opportunities has reversed the predictions of the 1970s. The 1970s predicted that the working class would move into the middle class. Due to their greater reliance on the secondary labor market, the American middle class has come to be defined by the loss of jobs. In particular, "subordinate primary jobs" are the most threatened by corporate restructuring. The middle class no longer enjoys the institutional protection of the secondary labor market.

the 1980s and 90s. Presumably some, if not many, people moving to find more promising parts of the country. Those left behind are those of the middle- and working-class of the post-World War II period. The suburbs that border Homewood, the epicenter for post-Great Migration mobility, are black middle-class communities in the grip of unemployment, crime, and drugs that have spread to inner-city neighborhoods. The Hill and West Hill, sites of job losses and at the same time the epicenter of the crack cocaine epidemic of the 1980s and 90s, were places where the crack cocaine epidemic of the 1980s resulted in considerable damage to homes, residents and businesses.

One of the problems of the past few decades is that jobs in the steel industry have dried up. Also, jobs in service industries that depended on steelworkers as customers have dried up. Fast-food restaurants, which frequently clustered across or just outside of these areas, lost their customer base. Places that afforded a cup of coffee, a hot dog, a shift, and a shot and “an Iron” (a Pittsburgh favorite) at the end, lost their customer base. Many of these places have now folded. This is what sociologists Arne Kalleberg and Robert Reich call “precarious” jobs. He writes:

...the duality between the primary and secondary labor market, along with the disappearance of middle-class jobs with good pay and benefits. The decline of the middle class is a new theory of embourgeoisement, which could be integrated into the middle class theory of increasing uncertainty, the new theory of the classic proletariat.³⁶ “precarious” jobs are among those that are being lost to restructuring and downsizing, and no longer provide the benefits once provided by unions.³⁷

There has been a net decline in the working-class sections of Pittsburgh, Detroit, Cleveland, and other industrial cities. Good blue-collar (primary sector) jobs, when they have been available, are being taken by people who could not leave the area are far more likely to be found in the service sector today if they have worked in the primary sector. A smaller number of people formerly employed in the primary sector now must compete with laid-off steelworkers and other workers in the labor market age who might have been employed in the primary sector. The end result is a shift of employment from the primary sector in communities from a higher proportion of the labor force in the primary sector to the service sector—and this is especially true in cities like Pittsburgh, which also have comparatively higher proportions of the labor force employed or discouraged workers. To the extent that the economy of the twenty-first century and the first decade of the twenty-first century are based on corporate and corporate service jobs, these jobs are not available to the traditional working-class Pittsburgh workforce.

Table 2.1 presents labor force characteristics for Pittsburgh, the state of Pennsylvania, and the nation. It shows that the entire state of Pennsylvania is experiencing a net loss of primary sector jobs. An important consequence of this is that a large number of those who could move to find work in other parts of the state are in all of these percentages have had to be removed. The City of Pittsburgh is doing better than the rest of the state in terms of the percentage of the labor force employed only with the percentage of secondary sector jobs. The state is doing slightly better off (a smaller percentage of the labor force in the primary sector jobs) than the state (column 2) in terms of its decreased number of jobs (column 3). However, because there are a large number of industrial jobs in the state,

But it is Homewood and The Hillside neighborhoods in Pittsburgh. There, general unemployment rates are high, and the number of people not working, the more than 60 percent of the labor force are men who are not in the labor force.

the number of employed people in Pittsburgh, just as there has in Chicago, industrial cities of the East and Midwest. Jobs have been replaced by second-hand replaced at all. Industrial workers are more likely to be employed in the work at all. This means that the large employed in available service sector jobs are workers and those now coming of sought mill jobs in earlier decades. The distribution in working-class concentration of blue-collar jobs to a largely so in black neighborhoods. They proportions of adults who are unemployed to be sure, the end of the twentieth and twenty-first have witnessed growth in jobs in Pittsburgh, but these positions, displaced, low-skilled Pitts-

characteristics for The Hill, Homewood, Pennsylvania. Readers should remember that Pittsburgh has been hard-hit by deindustrialization. The departure of many workers elsewhere, so the denominator of some of the most vital, competitive jobs in Pittsburgh is substantially worse off than the number of people employed. It is the primary sector workers that the city is a large percentage of employed persons in second-hand (column 4), and this is likely a product of (columns 1 through 3) rather than because of industrial jobs.

The Hill that I really want to focus on. The rates are twice the city's high rate. And the large percentages of adult men who are unemployed in Homewood and Hill District can only be called stunning. This

Table 2.1. Year 2000 Labor Force Characteristics of Pittsburgh, and Select Neighborhoods

	Percent 16+ Civilians Unemployed	Percent 16+ Male Civilians Unemployed
Homewood	18.7	21.4
Hill District	18.1	20.3
Pittsburgh	10.1	10.3
Pennsylvania	5.7	5.7

Definition of secondary sector jobs (following U.S. Census Bureau): Employed in six occupations with lowest mean wages: food preparation and serving-related occupations, building and grounds maintenance occupations, care and service, farming, fishing and forestry, and mining. Census tracts:

Homewood: 1301, 1302, 1303, 1304, 1207
 Homewood North, Homewood South, Homewood East
 Hill Districts: 501, 506, 305, 510, 511, 509
 Middle Hill, Upper Hill, Crawford-Roberts, The Hill
 Source: U.S. Census

table illustrates how concentrated the unemployment has been on these two already fragile communities.

What has happened is a concentration of people marginal to the economy. This has made Homewood socially look like Black Pittsburgh, The Hill District. A sense of poverty and despair. There are few of the amenities of urban residential communities. The streets are littered with abandoned apartment buildings, and weeds infest empty lots and vacant sites. For example, in The Hill District, there is no supermarket since the 1968 riots that destroyed the area. In the wake of the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, many of whom do not have cars, have to walk to the grocery shopping. Their only community center is a relatively poorly stocked corner grocery store.

Imagine the implications for young people. The prospects for the future of a middle-class future are reasonably dampened by seeing the

Characteristics for Pennsylvania, Pitts-

Percent 16+ Male Employed	Percent 16+ Male Civilians Not Working	% 16+ Employed Civilians Secondary Sector Jobs
	60.7	38.2
	60.2	30.4
	43.4	22.3
	34.8	24.5

(citing Peterson and Krivo. 2010.):

...incomes (health care support, food preparation grounds cleaning and maintenance, personal care, and transportation and material moving).

Homewood West

Terrace Village, and Bedford Dwellings


The effects of deindustrialization have been felt in these communities.

...concentration in Homewood, and communities in the labor market. This concentration is more like the older, earlier center of the city. They are communities of high poverty and low income. The services that one expects to find in these communities are abandoned houses and apartment buildings, empty lots that used to be housing, and so on. In this district there has not been a substantial economic shock this and many other cities in the Pittsburgh area. Martin Luther King Jr.³⁸ Residents, particularly young people, have to travel miles to do basic grocery shopping. Grocery alternatives are small, comparatively few.

...young people of these communities. Middle- or high-school aged children are the experience of parents and other

adults, and especially from watching their parents, are just a bit older than they are getting. The question is: What are the crime communities of these patterns?

Map 2.1 shows the distribution of unemployment in Pittsburgh census tracts. The tracts in the Hill District are noted.³⁹ If we define unemployment as “hyperjoblessness,” we see that the Hill District, only a sprinkling of others for the city, is the most affected. In other areas, the North Side, is historically the most affected. During the 1960s teenagers from the North Side viewed each other as rivals and so the rivalry between temporary media and police would be clear. It is at all clear that there were actual gangs in the Hill District (and Los Angeles). Recently the North Side and segments of it, where new stars like Andy Warhol (a Pittsburgh native



Map 2.1. Employment in Pittsburgh Neighborhoods

ing the kinds of jobs that those who
t—or far too often, do not get. Our
nsequences for people and commu-

of adults who are out of work in
that comprise Homewood and The
e adult joblessness above sixty per-
that except for these two neighbor-
falls into this category. One of those
ly much like The Hill and Home-
s from these three neighborhoods
ometimes clashed in ways that con-
call gang conflicts (though it is not
gangs active in the sense that gangs
ocial landscape, such as in Chicago
rth Side has been “urban renewed,”
adiums have been erected and the
) Museum has opened, along with



rhoods

restaurants and bars that cater to tourists have been dubbed “the North Shore.” I consulted residents of Manchester and other communities about this reinvention.

Homewood, The Hill, and the Northside are black neighborhoods within the city of Chicago characterized by hyperjoblessness, economic despair, which has been felt throughout the city into these three communities.

Communities and Crime

In recent years sociologists and criminologists have been addressing the importance of social structure on crime patterns. Modern criminology has its roots in Henry McKay’s and their Chicago School’s research on why some areas of cities had high rates of crime, though the populations and ethnic composition of these areas changed over time.⁴⁰ During much of the 20th century, criminologists did not put much emphasis on theory, the perspective developed in the Chicago School to explain distributions of urban crime rates. Social organization theory though have found some success. There has long been a gap between the one side for social disorganization theory explanations for crime, and those for cultural explanations. New variants of social organization theory have the job of bridging this gap. They have focused on social structure and community organization and how these systems (a hallmark of social culture) can either create, or at least perpetuate, high levels of crime. For example, in their effort to understand American violence rates, Robert Sampson and Laub state:

The basic thesis is that macro-social forces, such as deindustrialization, give rise to the social isolation and

the patrons of these attractions, has
 can't help but wonder what longtime
 North Side neighborhoods think

North Side, the three predominantly
 city, include census tracts that are
 Pittsburgh's postdeindustrialization
 about most of the city, is concentrated

criminologists have come back to
 al context in their explanations of
 gy's roots are in Clifford Shaw and
 School colleagues' efforts to explain
 ates of crime and delinquency even
 groups that occupied those spaces
 of the last half of the twentieth cen-
 uch stock in social disorganization
 by Chicago School sociologists to
 e. Contemporary variants of disor-
 nd new life among criminologists.
 en social scientists who argued on
 ion theory or other social structure
 that advanced primarily social cul-
 f disorganization theory do a good
 emphasized how variations in social
 ion lead both to crime and to belief
 re), which then also helps to gen-
 evels of social problems (including
 to explain persistently high African
 ampson and William Julius Wilson

al patterns of residential inequality
 eological concentration of the truly

disadvantaged, which in turn leads to a social adaptation that undermines social order and crime. The thesis is grounded in what is a technology that has been overlooked in the importance of communities.⁴¹

They go on to explain how joblessness is a result because of its damming influence on social information, which in turn contributes to high levels of violence. As I have written, joblessness and labor market marginality, the segmentation of labor, are important determinants of crime because of how they affect the day-to-day life of communities, also because of the way these forces affect the economy.

In a study of 1980 neighborhood crime rates, I found that residents' employment was more important, than either poverty or intellectual disadvantage of communities, in explaining dependence, disrupted families—a result that suggests that residents are jobless or have very low wages. In this analysis I used census tract data to simulate the effect of tracts that had relatively large proportions of workers defined as being in marginal work had on crime rates. Marginal workers were defined as those in the adult population that was either unemployed or in secondary sector jobs.⁴⁴ Marginal workers had higher crime rates after taking into account the effect of race, was nonwhite, families living in poverty, and so on. I do not conclude that my results mean that crime rates were spurious, but rather that labor market marginality is that those low-income neighborhoods have higher crime rates. The people in a neighborhood, their dependence on the function of their work and position in the economy, of income inequality that characterizes the neighborhood is a consequence of the overall stratification of the economy. I do not believe that the relationships be-

s to structural barriers and cultural organization and hence the control of what is actually an old idea in criminology—the race and crime debate—the impor-

ness contributes indirectly to violence through its effects on marriage rates and family formation, leading to community disorganization and social breakdown. As written above, I believe that joblessness and family breakdown—both consequences of the stratification of society—are the main determinants of criminality and crime rates, not the day-to-day lifestyles of individuals, but the conditions that change communities.

As for the high violent crime rates in Seattle, I believe that the level of income inequality was as important, perhaps even more so, than the level of poverty. After all, the conditions of poverty—poverty, low incomes, welfare dependence—are in large measure there because of low-end employment. In that analysis, the level of income inequality predicted violent crime rates in Seattle neighborhoods.⁴³ Seattle census data show that the proportions of adults who were classified as being in the lower end of the income scale had higher rates of violent crime such as rape, sexual assault, and robberies. The proportion of the population that was unemployed or who were workers in low-end jobs significantly predicted violent crime rates. In fact, the level of income inequality at the percent of the population that was unemployed or who were workers in low-end jobs predicted violent crime rates better than the percent of the population that was poor, the level of poverty, and income inequality.⁴⁵ I did not find that poverty and income inequality were the best predictors of crime. Stratification is an important reason why crime exists. After all, the incomes of individuals, whether they are poor or wealthy, is a function of their position in the labor market. And the level of income inequality in a city or sets of neighborhoods is a function of the local labor market. I do not believe that the correlation between crime and income indicators,

poverty and income inequality, are tied with the stratification of labor and create higher levels of violent crime and inequities that can lead to the kind of crime patterns that Sklar describes, where cultural patterns are a consequence of long-term collective

With colleagues, I replicated the study on neighborhood violent crime using 1990 data from the results in Seattle with parallel analyses of labor market participation and crime (specifically in Chicago and Washington, DC. These three cities represent three general dimensions: they represent different economic conditions, they are in different regions of the country, and they have different crime patterns.

The difference in local labor market conditions for individuals or groups of people within a community depends on the kinds of jobs that are available. My parole agent colleagues in Erie Pennsylvania noted that many of the men on our caseloads at the time were employed at the lake. Those employers, located there because of the extraction of raw materials along the Great Lakes, were built-in enforcers, increasing their security during the fully hot in summer and cold in winter months (often blowing off of the frozen lake front). Many of these jobs are gone now, casualties of deindustrialization. At all, unskilled parolees might find it difficult to find work today.

Earlier I commented that the Homestead, Pennsylvania population when jobs disappeared. The cities that were, as politicians sometimes say, 'left behind' were with more prosperous economies. The cities that were in the initial phases of deindustrialization were in the South and midwest. Those cities attracted workers from the southern and midwest because of the employment opportunities that were available. Old-style, heavy industry attracted workers because of wages that they had never dared to

spurious because they, in conjunction, lead to or exacerbate inequalities of crime. These are important structural conditions of neighborhoods that Anderson and codes of the streets emerge as a disadvantage.⁴⁶

The earlier Seattle study of neighborhoods.⁴⁷ In that study we also compared analyses of neighborhood labor markets (especially homicide) in Cleveland, Ohio cities provide useful contrast on several different types of local labor markets, in the US, and they have very different

labor markets is quite important. How individuals fare when they search for work is available. In the early 1970s, my father could find jobs for some iron foundries that existed near the shore because of the cheap transportation at Lakes, liked our guys because we had attendance at jobs that were painter (open-shed foundries with wind, dirty, and dangerous. Those foundries industrialization. I wonder where, if I had work in Erie's local labor market

The new section of Pittsburgh had lost those who fled the downturn in jobs “voting with their feet” for locations. The cities that suffered most during the downturn were the same cities that attracted western hinterlands earlier in the century and lost them later, because of the jobs were there and have now declined. The unskilled workers who could get a job dream of. This was a function of the

characteristics of the local labor market, the nature of industries located in the city. The same processes later drew software workers to California and Florida, and

Seattle, Cleveland, and Washington as local labor markets. Seattle, with Boeing software producers, biotechnology, is considered a twenty-first-century economy. Pennsylvania, is a Great Lakes port city for easy shipping from Minnesota to become a major steel producer. Like industries developed in Cleveland but ton’s industry is government. There there, but the city was founded as and the defining characteristic of the ment jobs that employ locals and at

Regarding two other notable differences Cleveland is in the industrial Midwest West in a number of ways, and Washington place unto itself. Selected as the capital land had belonged to Virginia), its crime same time eastern. Cleveland’s crime was high by national standards. Seattle rates, but high-recorded property crime city with especially high rates of homicide

Our analyses of these three cities several notable ways. Here the dependent homicide rates rather than violent measures of education (census tract they used data from the 1990 census statistics from each city’s police department violent crime in Seattle was comparable decline in the US, so by comparison this decline was well along. We included educational levels in these analyses about the labor stratification and crime more serious consideration of how p

market, which are a direct result of the
ities of what we now call the Rust Belt.
are engineers to Silicon Valley, farm
and theme park workers to Orlando.

ton represent very different types of
oeing Aircraft, Microsoft and other
, and shipping, has what might be
conomy. Cleveland, like Erie Penn-
that took advantage of its location
and Wisconsin iron ore mines to
e cities similar to it, a host of other
ecause big steel was there. Washing-
are, to be sure, many other business
the seat of the federal government
ne local labor market is the govern-
tract related businesses.

ifferences between the three cities,
lwest, Seattle is emblematic of the
ashington is, as the nation's capital, a
ital because it was in the South (the
character is both southern and at the
me rate at the time of that analysis
ttle has a relatively low violent crime
crime. Washington is a high-crime
micide and rape.

s differed from my earlier paper in
pendent variable was neighborhood
crime rates. These analyses added
ct high-school dropout rates), and
s of the population and tract crime
partment. The earlier study of 1980
ratively early in the manufacturing
the 1990 data give us a picture after
luded an indicator of neighborhood
s because by this time my thinking
ime thesis had progressed to include
patterns of employment might affect

juvenile involvement in crime. In the multivariate model, it was a key component, so it was included in the final model.

I should note the reason for using discretion as a control. Sociologists have long recognized that differences in police practices, and data collection procedures, can influence police as a dependent variable problem. In this case, how they categorize, classify, and code offenses is a problem that influence this discretion is the focus of the study. In the analysis comparing three cities and within those cities, we felt it best to control for discretion. Less discretion is likely used (there's less discretion for) and one of the most accurately measured.

Essentially, the results of the earlier analysis were replicated in the later time period. The same pattern of labor in 1990 Seattle helped to explain the homicide in the city. The labor stratification and the homicide patterns in Cleveland, Ohio, and the posthoc speculation was that the result was the existence of large areas of inner-city Cleveland, Ohio, which were abandoned, presumably in part because of deindustrialization and consequent depopulation.⁴⁹ In Seattle, the areas who form the denominator to calculate the homicide rate in these areas also have relatively large numbers of residents at times, but more frequently they are occupied by others taking advantage of the area. Our analysis found that in Cleveland, Ohio, relatively more marginal workers—single parents, women, and unemployed—lived had higher homicide rates.

The labor stratification thesis did not hold in the case of homicide in Washington, DC. The reason why. Homicide is significantly predicted by the same variables that is black in Cleveland and other violent crimes in other cities. Washington, DC, is so residentially segregated that the labor stratification is overwhelmed in the analyses.⁵⁰ Subsequent to the analysis, possible explanations. First, in both Cleveland and Washington, school dropout rates are normally d

that part of the story education is a
in the study of these three cities.

ing homicide rates here. Criminolo-
erent patterns of crime, police prac-
s can make using crimes reported to
lematic. Police exercise discretion in
unt crime events. One of the factors
local police culture. Since this is an
l focusing on census tract variation
o restrict the study to a crime where
s frequently a body to be accounted
counted violent crimes, homicide.⁴⁸
er study of Seattle were replicated in
rn of results was found. The distribu-
o explain where homicides occurred
d crime thesis also helped to explain
though not as well as in Seattle. Our
ults may have been weakened by the
Cleveland that were virtually uninhab-
eindustrialization, and the loss of jobs
such places the number of residents
ate a crime rate is unusually small, but
numbers of crimes, probably commit-
requently than in most neighborhoods
f the deteriorated depopulated state of
Cleveland, as in Seattle, places where
secondary sector employees and the
cide rates than other places.

not successfully explain the distribu-
C. There are several possible reasons
dicted by the percentage of the pop-
nd Seattle, just as it is in analyses of
ington's black population is so large
that other social variables are simply
tantly, though, there are two other
h Seattle and Cleveland, the high-
distributed, with the average number

of dropouts in the latter's tracts significant. But in Washington, the distribution of neighborhoods have very high dropout rates, some tracts with extremely low rates, and the level of education is inordinately high. This inequality that characterizes the social structure we have suggested that in terms of racial segregation be more like the apartheid cities of South Africa than the cities of the western industrialized world. The economic inequalities that are very tied to the social structure. But since nearly all American cities are to be characterized by hyperracial segregation, it is not to call Washington an "apartheid city." The reason for this organization is because the American nation is a land of contradictions and contradictions. The level of inequality is the shadow of monuments and monuments. The cities are communities with infant mortality rates that are in the Third World; there is hunger and unemployment do not work. The voters and officials are not interested in their own affairs. The Congress has not been interested in Washington's governance, yet her citizens only have a voice in the House of Representatives. Washington has a black middle class, but their existence does not counter the level of distress in the inner city neighborhoods in the District experienced.

This leads to the second potential criticism of the labor stratification thesis may not be applicable to Washington. Washington may show the labor stratification thesis perspective is useful in helping us understand the social conditions, but that is not the case where the thesis has less utility. In Washington, the thesis may be moot because so many have so much economic distress. It has been so very distressed for multiple generations.

Maps 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 provide yet another comparison between violent crime in Seattle and Washington. Employment data have been taken

ificantly higher than in the former's. This is bimodal. Most Washington neighborhoods, but there are a small number of them in these neighborhoods the level of inequality in the distribution captures the substantial racial structure of the US capital city. In the face of racial inequality, Washington, DC may be more like South Africa than like most other cities in the world.⁵¹ It has substantial social and economic inequality due to racial residential segregation patterns that have been and many continue to be. The level of residential segregation, isn't it unfair to say that? The reason I use this characterization is that racial inequality is palpable there. In the figurative sense, the monuments along the National Mall, there is a high level of inequality rates not appreciably better than in South Africa and homelessness, and schools that are underfunded. The city only marginally controls the economy and the final say over much of Washington is held by a nonvoting representative in Congress. The city has and has long had a sizable Black population in their communities and enclaves that are underfunded that people living in disadvantaged areas experience.

A more substantive explanation for why the current situation might help to explain homicide in Washington is beyond the limit of the thesis. It may be that this level of inequality to understand violent crime under conditions that a city may pass beyond a threshold where the situation in Washington, the high level of persistence of inequality simply make labor market marginalization and little hope and neighborhoods have been underfunded for generations.

Let's get another update of the association between neighborhood inequality and employment.⁵² Data from the 2000 US census and

violent crime statistics are from the “Reported to the Police.” Map 2.2 includes the percentage of the population working and the average annual violent crimes per 100 of the black ball in each tract. One of the earlier studies, from 1980 and 1990, levels of violence are based on the quality of work. Those earlier analyses did not focus on the quality of work or jobless, but rather what I called labor market marginality—combination of unemployment and secondary sector jobs. I have elected to display the total number of jobs because this is consistent with Wilson’s earlier work, *Poverty and the Urban Underclass*, that focused not on the quality of employment.⁵³ Map 2.3 is the same as Map 2.2, but the percentage of men in primary sector jobs is displayed. The pattern of violent crimes is similar. Violent crimes occur more often in tracts with high proportions of the men who live there in primary sector jobs, comparable to the earlier studies of Seattle and Chicago. Men who are not in primary sector jobs; men in secondary sector occupations, they are officially unemployed. Consistent with the notion that we need to look at the quality of employment, we see that men who are not in primary sector jobs—good jobs

Maps 2.5 (Cleveland) and Map 2.6 (Chicago) show the same as Seattle’s Map 2.4.⁵⁴ The neighborhoods with high primary sector jobs and violent annual violent crimes are similar. Cleveland had considerably more cores of labor market marginality than Chicago. The neighborhoods where those Cleveland men live have high unemployment—high-crime tracts. Cleveland is on the western shore of Lake Erie, near but not on Lake Erie—Cleveland is on the western shore of Lake Erie. Hough is the heart of black Cleveland. In the early twentieth century, it became primarily a residential area. In the years after the Great Depression, when migration movers arrived in Cleveland to work in the city’s mills and on its docks, the area was ravaged by riots, and now the good jobs that Cleveland residents had are largely gone and the

Seattle Police Department’s “Crimes” map indicates the distribution in neighborhoods of the population that was not employed. The highest crime rate is indicated by the size of the circles. As you can see that, just as was the case for the map of the highest where more people are out of work, the study people who were out of work in the labor market marginality, the combination of primary sector employment. In Map 2.2, the number of people who are out of work, the author’s analyses in *The Truly Disadvantaged* are of jobs, but rather the simpler question is the same as Map 2.2, but here the joblessness is the same, but they are starker. In those neighborhoods where large numbers of people are out of work. Map 2.4 is more about Seattle. Here is the percentage of men who are employed, that is, they are in secondary sector employment, or they are simply jobless. We must consider not only employment, but also crime. See again that those places where men are out of work—violent crime is highest.



Map 2.6 (Washington, DC) are the same as Map 2.4 and the distribution of men not in primary sector employment and crime rates are displayed. In 2000, the map shows communities with extremely high levels of violence in Seattle, but like the latter, the places with the highest levels of violence. Some of the highest levels of violence are in the section of east central Cleveland that constitutes the Hough neighborhood. This is an upscale community in the city of Cleveland, predominantly black and very poor in Cleveland. As large numbers of Great Migration people moved into Hough and went to work in the city. In the mid-1960s Hough was a predominantly black neighborhood with jobs that earlier generations of Hough residents had. There is a lot of violent crime there.


Map 2.2. Employment and Violent Crime in Seattle: Percent Civilians Not Employed in Census Tracts



Map 2.3. Employment and Violent Crime in Seattle: Percent Civilian Males Not Employed in Census Tracts








Avg. Yearly Violent Crimes per 1K


- 0-4
- 5-9
- 10-14
- 15-19
- 20+

% Males Not Employed in Primary Sector


- ▨ 30-44%
- ▨ 45-59%
- ▨ 60-74%
- 75+%



Map 2.5. Employment and Violent Crime in Chicago
 Primary Sector Jobs in Census Tracts




Map 2.4. Employment and Violent Crime in Seattle: Percent Males Not Employed in Primary Sector Jobs in Census Tracts



Cleveland: Percent Males Not Employed in


Map 2.6.
 Employment and
 Violent Crime in
 Washington, DC:
 Percent Males
 Not Employed in
 Primary Sector
 Jobs in Census
 Tracts




Washington (Map 2.6) clearly displays the relationship between the percentage of adult men who are unemployed and the prevalence of violent crime. In neighborhoods with very high percentages of men who are unemployed, there is a very high prevalence of violent crime. In neighborhoods with a very low percentage of men who are unemployed, there is a very low prevalence of violent crime. In neighborhoods with an insignificant number of communities with high unemployment, there is an insignificant number of violent crimes. In neighborhoods with very high levels of unemployment, there is a very high prevalence of violent crime.⁵⁵ By contrast, in neighborhoods like Georgetown, Foggy Bottom, and the Pentagon City, that houses Embassy Row, had very low unemployment and low rates of violence. This is a clear correlation. While there is correspondence between employment patterns and violence in other cities, Washington is different because of the large numbers of marginalized people living in the city. While other cities had large expanses of neighborhoods with high unemployment, Washington, more than the other cities, has a very high level of substantial inequality across its neighborhoods. In other earlier analyses of Washington, the percentage of men who are unemployed in a neighborhood was still the important



displays that the city has variation in
 the not in primary sector jobs. In 2000
 the marginal to the DC labor market
 l Southwest Washington, and a not
 es in Northeast and Northwest also
 much of Northwest, which includes
 the stretch of Connecticut Avenue
 y low rates of labor market margin-
 dence between these neighborhood
 as there was in Seattle and Cleve-
 use much of its land area had large
 ving in it, like Cleveland, but it also
 ds with few or no marginal workers.
 two cities, is characterized by more
 ghborhoods. As was the case in ear-
 percentage of blacks that lived in the
 ant predictor of violence. Maps 2.7



and 2.8 show the percentages of residents in the District of Columbia who defined themselves as African American in the 2000 census. Map 2.7 also includes data on violent crime incidence rates, and Map 2.8 shows the level of employment marginality—men not in primary sector jobs in the population that was African American. The strong correlation that can be garnered from these latter two maps is striking. It shows that once the percentage of black residents in a neighborhood is high, no other variable has a chance of explaining the high degree of correspondence between employment marginality, census tract African American population, Washington's socioeconomic inequalities, and violent crime rates. The same pattern exists for the proportion of adults who do not have a high school diploma. Maps 2.7 and 2.8 present a clear picture of the relationship between class. The capital of the United States of America is a city of the working class, and by violent crime victimization



Map 2.7. Percent African Americans and Violent Crime in Washington, DC Census Tracts

sidents in each Washington census African Americans at the time of the es indication of neighborhood vio- level of male labor market marginal- s—and the percentage of the popu- in those communities. Two things vo maps. First, it becomes clear why dents is included in violence mod- ance to be significant; and second, e between “black tracks” and high- acts illustrates the degree to which ality is cut very tightly along racial the distribution of poverty and the ve at least a high-school education. cture of an American apartheid city. America is divided by race, by social ation.


Map 2.8. Percent African Americans and Employment in Washington, DC: Percent of Males Not Employed in Primary Sector Jobs in Census Tracts



Broken Promises

Something that Washington, Cleveland, and Seattle have in common that like Pittsburgh, Detroit, Chicago, and other northern cities, they were the Promised Land for African American migrants hoping for upward economic mobility. It would produce a better life for immigrants. But in Washington, and Seattle differ, how they have different industrial histories.

Cleveland is a classic Great Migration city. Throughout the Midwest, it drew African Americans from the rural South. It also drew western whites and Eastern and Southern whites drawn to Cleveland and the hard work of the steel industry. Even today, the city remains ethnically diverse. But residents could count on good, low-paying jobs when the processes of globalization began to pull manufacturing jobs away from it and other industries. Before the resulting job losses Cleveland was a city of opportunity.



and, and Seattle have in common is
 go, and other eastern and midwest-
 Land for strivers: African Ameri-
 economic mobility, seeking jobs that
 individuals and families. Cleveland,
 ever, because of their varied indus-
 migration city. Like neighboring cities
 workers to its industries. Not only
 South, but also southern and Mid-
 uthern European immigrants, were
 work of the mills, plants, and docks.
 cally very heterogeneous. Cleveland
 w-skilled jobs until the mid-1970s,
 and deindustrialization began mov-
 ustrial centers in the Rust Belt. Even
 land had rough neighborhoods with

high crime rates, but it was not typified by violent leaders in either violence or property crime.

Washington, which I uncomplicatedly call an apartheid city—not to disparage the city's ongoing race relations and the work of its leaders, but to make it a not unfitting description of the city for African Americans. It was founded to be a city where industry remains government. Washington was founded by freed slaves flocked to after the Civil War. Before that, there had been a substantial slave population there too was stratified, during the Civil War, emancipation and the modern civil rights movement among African Americans as a place where they could go to strivers, those looking to work hard to better their lives and those of their children. In the century than in most cities, a black population. When the federal government began to create jobs that were not just the kind of jobs that were common in the 1950s and 60s), more possibilities also began to surge in Washington. In the century, the District suffered from having a high rate of homicide and rape.

Seattle is the Johnny-come-lately city, founded in the middle of the century, beginning to come of age until the 1950s (some would say not until after the 1950s). The first big, successful businesses was the mining industry. Prospectors on the way to the gold fields of the West eventually returned with it. It was World War II that made Seattle an industrial city. Boeing Aircraft and other parts of the country. Although the city's African American population before that time was small, it was war industries, and servicemen who were stationed in boring Tacoma when stationed there. The city's black community. Also, historical Japanese, and Filipino populations, and a more diverse than most eastern and midwestern cities.

typically among the dubious national
 ty violations.

mentarily refer to as an American
 e citizens of the District, but Ameri-
 way that DC is managed by Congress
 n—was early on a beacon to Afri-
 e the nation’s capital, and its major
 shington was one of the cities that
 l War, even though earlier in its his-
 slave market there. Although labor
 nearly one hundred years between
 l rights movement, DC was known
 ce of opportunity. Thus the appeal
 hard as they devoted themselves to
 eir families. Earlier in the twentieth
 middle class emerged in Washing-
 began to consider African Ameri-
 lowest end menial occupations (in
 es opened up. But in the 1960s crime
 By the turn of the twenty-first cen-
 ing among the nation’s highest rates

y of these urban areas. It is a young
 e nineteenth century but not even
 Alaskan Gold Rush of the 1890s (and
 1962 World’s Fair). Among Seattle’s
 timber, and also those that outfitted
 fields and fleeced the few who actu-
 War II that made Seattle a significant
 l the shipyards drew workers from
 gh there was a very small African
 me, those who came to work in the
 o discovered both Seattle and neigh-
 re, produced substantial growth in
 ically with relatively large Chinese,
 Seattle’s ethnic composition is dif-
 western cities. Today the aerospace,

hi-tech, and biotechnology industries working in manufacturing and in the service sectors are not unlike that of other cities.

The strivers who came to these cities for better job opportunities, included the young man and the men and women who were the youth. They found work that at the time promised better lives, but among their children were the Wideman, August Wilson, and many others, as those who choose less legitimate means. I remember Walter of my parole caseload, and many others, some of whom sought work in Pittsburgh only to have hopes and dreams dashed by the city's economic collapse. Among my parolees could leave the city for better opportunities, but it has been a continual struggle to find decent work, many strung out on heroin or crack, or turned to the drugs or sex markets. The labor market for many immediately after deindustrialization is an important part of the story of what happened on the main path—Robby and Walter, and others. The marginalization makes crime conditions worse, they never consciously decide to be criminals.

American cities attracted workers from all over the US, from Europe and Asia—because of the varying degrees these promises have been broken over time, and the promises have been kept.

In this chapter I have described how deindustrialization and how crime becomes more or less a function of the labor force and living in close quarters, out of work, or who toil at less than a living wage. In the next chapter I will dig a bit deeper into how crime becomes a market for individuals whose lives are lived in a market.

ies compliment older concerns still
the bustling port. Seattle's crime pat-
ies, but rates are comparatively low.
cities, as well as other places offer-
e parents of John and Robby Wide-
o populated The Hill District of my
time seemed to fulfill the promise of
en were the fortunate—John Edgar
ny more, including myself—as well
paths, such as Robby Wideman and
many of my high-school classmates,
Pittsburgh's steel mill based economy
ned with deindustrialization and the
y high-school friends are those who
tunities and others whose lives have
cent work, and still others who got
turned to entrepreneurial crimes in
r market marginalization that faced
alization and continues today is an
motivates those who choose a crim-
for those whose lives of economic
lucive lifestyles more likely even if
come criminals.

s from other places—sections of the
se of the promise of good work. In
ve been both kept and broken over
ept differently by race and ethnicity.
now employment influences lifestyle
ess likely when a person is marginal
e proximity with others who are also
n promising jobs. In the next chap-
w urban patterns make a difference
ed and negotiated within the labor

Why Do They Do It?

The Potential for Criminality

Many people ask, “Why do they do neighborhood rates of violence, but individual engages in crime. Why do I decide to shake down a fence, lead mug an old man? After all, I didn’t caseload. I had individual clients, b It is important to note that our unc social ecology of crime, and it is cle bers of the general publics’ reaction tice solutions, do not adequately co perpetrators live, work, and violate link that ecology to individual actio rate matter? How does the econom and local labor markets affect in can we connect Robby’s and Walter stances? Obviously the causes of th of their social circumstance or the certainly matters too. Sociological some individuals, in the context of crimes. After all, most people, even trodden places, do not engage in ful

to it?” They are not inquiring about
it rather they want to know why an
did Robby Wideman and his friends
ing to his murder? Why did Walter
have neighborhoods on my parole
because individuals commit crimes.
Understanding must take seriously the
ear that many politicians’ and mem-
as to crimes, as well as criminal jus-
consider the social context in which
the law. But it is also important to
ons. When does the unemployment
y affect behavior? How do national
individual actions? How specifically
r’s behaviors to their social circum-
eir behavior are not solely a matter
labor market; the individual actor
y we are trying to understand why
their social environments, commit
among those from the most down-
ll-scale criminality.

I have described how holders of primary sector jobs have lower stakes in conformity to the law than those in the example of two young Pittsburghers. Their relative feelings and attachments toward their jobs and their commitment to their jobs are different. I will carefully examine how individuals in the primary sector might presume that primary sector jobs are linked to crime in how these linkages are made and what the legal means for criminality, and the evidence.

First, I should be careful to note that the primary sector is chronically unemployed and disorganized. The stakes in conformity on average that primary sector workers do not know that we can make this a crime for these people, since, as was pointed out earlier, it is easy to move in and out of the ranks of the primary sector than primary sector workers and employees. In the primary sector jobs, there are spells of unemployment for the long-time unemployed or who have been out of the market are substantially different than those in the secondary sector or those who are employed (a reduction in force) from what they would be in the primary sector.² Consequently, I can reasonably presume that primary sector workers will have positive motivations for criminal acts (e.g., property violations), and with their low stakes in conformity that on average may be as conducive to criminality (e.g., crime) as secondary sector workers.

As I described earlier, primary sector jobs offer higher pay, stability, good benefits, and opportunities for advancement. According to Michaelson, primary sector workers are also more likely to develop and maintain strong relationships with coworkers and in occupationally specific social networks.³ Lawyers join bar associations, and are members of local, state, and national organizations. In contrast, blue-collar industrial workers historically have not.

In contrast, in the secondary sector, wages are generally low, benefits are few if any, there are few opportunities for advancement, and perhaps most important, there are few opportunities for

f secondary sector jobs will tend to
han primary sector jobholders. In
ugh men, I contrasted their respec-
d the places where they are working
s. Before going on, I need to more
ink to their workplaces and why we
and secondary sector workers differ
d perpetuated, what this potentially
ence for these connections.

e that it is reasonable to expect that
ouraged workers have even fewer
an even secondary sector workers. I
same distinction for all unemployed
rlier, secondary sector workers tend
f the employed far more frequently
even among those in some primary
employment.¹ Adults who are among
ave given up on the legitimate labor
han people who find periodic work
ho have been “RIFed” (fired due to
ey thought were high-quality posi-
oly assert that the chronically jobless
rime (both pecuniary and entrepre-
ower stakes in conformity, lifestyles
ve to criminality (including violent
and the inconsistently employed.

ector jobs are characterized by bet-
nd opportunities for promotion or
el Piore, primary sector workers are
ntain important social contacts with
based associations, organizations,
sociations, physicians routinely are
nal medical associations, and most
rically have belonged to unions.

ctor of the labor market pay is typi-
ere are little or no opportunities for
importantly, the jobs are unstable.

These jobs are not designed for people. Employers can easily replace workers with little or no training costs, and because of this instability, secondary sector jobs tend to be developed in their own right and are maintained with those who are young.

A number of scholars have reported that primary sector workers do in fact experience less job turnover than primary sector positions, but limited work has been done to examine important differences between the two. A recent survey was conducted to examine some of these differences. Primary sector workers are more likely to have been employed in the past ten years, and to expect that they will stay in their jobs for the next twelve months. They reported lower job satisfaction than their counterparts. Their jobs were a less important part of their lives than primary sector workers. Secondary sector employees are more likely to socialize with neighborhood friends and family members, and to spend their evenings in taverns and bars. Clearly it is not just the income differences that are very important, but other aspects of the jobs that are associated with particular living conditions.

A criminologist reading the descriptions of these job categories cannot help but think of social capital. People who are less likely to become employed in primary sector jobs are less likely to become employed in important institutions and units of value to lose if they participate in them. The workplace is such an important unit of social capital, and delinquency. Robert Sampson and Laub (1985) argue that employment is an important social bond that influences the transition from the roles of childhood to adulthood. Employment in the primary sector are important units with which people transition from the life course into more advanced years. Employment is important for this bonding process. A position that holds promise for the future, such as a family wage job—provides better social capital than does not.

ple to stay in them for long periods. ers because of the low-skill require- and frequently do. Perhaps because workers' close friendships and net- neighborhoods, and close contacts where they come from.

orted the results of research finding act tend to have higher incomes and people employed in secondary sec- been published that addresses other two sectors. I used the General Social other differences.⁴ Secondary sector n unemployed at some time during their jobs might end within the next r job satisfaction and indicated that t of their lives than did primary sec- oyes spent more of their off-hours ds, and the men were more likely to bars than their primary sector coun- ome and job stability, both of which ts of secondary sector employment festyle patterns as well.

riptions of these two occupation cat- cial control theorists' assertions that gaged in crime if they are bonded s of society: if they have something in criminal activity.⁵ For adults the t. In their life-course theory of crime nd John Laub describe employment hibiits criminality in young adults as ildren, where schools and family of ch to bond.⁶ As they move through years, jobs remain important.⁷ A job ss, but all jobs are not created equal. the future—a primary sector job or bonding potential than work that

Another important aspect of conformity is the “stake in conformity.” While some control their behavior through a commitment to a dominant norm, others are motivated by a sense of what is right, wrong, and appropriate. It is not necessary to go that far. When I say that a person has a stake in conformity, I mean that they have something of such significant value at stake that they have the potential when deciding on behavior. A person with something to lose will act differently than other times they may focus on the present. They may go to some effort to preserve the status quo. This is important for the labor stratification system. A commitment to the conventional norm is a way of saying that it is important to protect a valuable asset. In this case, conformity, their good job.

We must recognize that the modern world provides important stakes in conformity. The establishment of adult intimate relationships is a key factor in inhibiting criminality.⁸ The capacity to form such relationships is also tied to one’s labor market position. As noted, a major problem in underclass communities is the number of marriageable men who are unable to support a family, which leads to high divorce rates. The lack of jobs, when combined with high unemployment, can lead to high rates of crime. African American men who are in prison are more likely to die before their time, have a higher divorce rate and lowered marriage rates than the general population in black America.⁹ And dramatic increases in divorce rates over the past decades have increased divorce rates, which is tied to increases in poverty—especially in inner-city and underclass neighborhoods, and, not surprisingly, to crime and delinquency.

When young adults work in the labor market or are completely out of work, they are more likely to engage in crime that will lead to a life of crime and they are free to engage in life of crime in more conducive situations. In order for the

control theories is the notion of “stakes
control theorists literally mean by this a
normative order—conventional concep-
tually appropriate—I do not think it is nec-
essary that primary sector jobs provide an
employment simply mean that these jobs provide
employment and that their occupants weigh its loss
heavily. At times this will mean that the
individual will walk the straight and narrow. At
times it will mean a low probability of detection, or they may
appear to have a high appearance of conformity. What is
the central thesis is not their com-
mitment to a normative order, but their recognition
of a scarce resource: their economic stake in

employment into other adult patterns of
conformity as well. Notably the estab-
lishment of a relationship is a very important bond that
leads to such a relationship, how-
ever, market success. William Julius Wilson
argues that the decline
of the working class neighborhoods is the decline
of the man. When men do not have jobs on
the street they are not good marriage pros-
pects. Combined with the large numbers of Afri-
can American men and the relatively large number
of women, this has caused a consequent unbalanced sex
ratio to become a major social problem
in inner cities. Increases in imprisonment in recent
years, too.¹⁰ These patterns are related
to the rise of children’s poverty, the expansion of
the ghetto, and, not surprisingly, to increases in crime

in the secondary sector of the labor mar-
ket. If they have both affirmative motiva-
tion and they will satisfy material wants and needs,
they will adopt lifestyles that potentially create crime-
prone environments. For the latter to occur they must have, in

their proximity, others who are simply in search of conformity to pursue these lifestyles. The neighborhoods like The Hill and Homewood in Baltimore and in too many of DC's neighborhoods have already borne the weight of deindustrialization throughout American cities, and potentially other industrialized nations too, where historical patterns of segregation and sometimes amplified the ill effects of economic decline.

Susan Pitchford and I, using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), studied how the economic status of young adults were related to their involvement in property crimes. We found that those who were unemployed were more likely to have committed both violent and property crimes. Unemployment, measured here as the percentage of the labor force out of the labor force, is an important variable in the labor markets (or dual labor markets). Class is also high on this variable, but so too were family income, family size, and time and those who were employed were less likely to be involved in taking into account standard demographic variables such as marital status (all of which were significant predictors of race (not a significant predictor in these analyses when other factors are taken into account), as well as family size, and significantly negatively related to violent and property crime), income, and military service. In the NLSY sample engaged in property crime, marginally employed. Family income was a significant predictor after these other factors were taken into account. Unemployment predicted property crime involvement. Family size did not lead to more violent and property crime. Interestingly those who were better off financially were less likely to be engaged in pecuniary criminality (e.g., drug sales, were not studied in these analyses). The sample from lower income groups and those who were better off we should be cautious in concluding that middle-class young adults commit more property crime. The evidence suggests that income need is less a factor in property crime than popular conceptions suggest.¹¹

ilarly sufficiently free from stakes in
es as well. This occurs in neighbor-
d in Pittsburgh, Cleveland's Hough,
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ssibly those of other western indus-
patterns of inequality have focused
cts of economic change.

ata from the National Longitudinal
ow the work experiences of a sample
ir involvement in violent and prop-
with unstable employment were more
lent and property crimes. Unstable
e amount of time respondents were
tant byproduct of segmented labor
early those out of work would score
ould many who were working part-
l in the secondary sector. Even after
nographic predictors like age, sex,
gnificant predictors of crime), and
these analyses after the others fac-
l as measures of education (signifi-
crime involvement, but not prop-
ervice, we found that the men and
ged in more crime when they were
me was unrelated to violent crime
a into account, but it positively pre-
. That is, being from a low-income
t crime, but perhaps more interest-
more frequently reported that they
entrepreneurial crimes, such as drug
lyses). The NLSY oversampled peo-
African and Latino Americans, so
g that this finding means that mid-
re property crimes, but it does sug-
or motivating pecuniary crime than

A great many people believe that military service will make a man of him. In fact, when I was on the State Senate Committee on behalf of the National Commission, I was asked by a senator, "What do you think about 'all those darn treatments and things that come out by God, when I went into the Marine Corps, they made me out.'" Never mind that studies of military service that became popular policy in the 1960s and 1970s generally find them not to be true. In our analysis we found that the men who were in the military were more likely to have criminal records. We did not conclude that the military service itself does suggest that we might want to look at military and criminality before shipping young men to the military forces as a crime prevention strategy. Other characteristics of a job in the military—such as stability, stability—are very much like those in the hand courts, both juvenile and adult courts. Criminal charges might be dropped in some jurisdictions to enlist. This may be a practice of the military. I worked as a juvenile probation officer during the stages of the Vietnam War, this was a common practice in cases involving juveniles who did not have criminal records were no longer in school. With the military goals during recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it has again been practiced in some jurisdictions.

Young women were included in the military, but the labor stratification approach suggests that their criminality. The women in the military are, far less likely to have participated in violent crimes. The inability of labor market to explain the limited female criminality is a puzzle, since others have reported that social structure is superior to structural determinants in explaining criminality. Not being convinced that labor market is an important part of the story, I, along with others, looked more closely at women's employment and criminality.

at sending a boy off to the military when testifying before a Washington House of the State's Juvenile Sentencing Commission. He argued that boot camps and rehabilitation programs, because they are more expensive, boot camp sure straightened out the correctional system boot camps of the last decades of the twentieth century were neither rehabilitative or deterrents.¹² The NLSY respondents who were in the military committed crimes in the last year. The study makes them do it, but this finding is important to closely examine the military's impact on youth en masse to the armed forces. Though the pay is relatively modest compared to the military—benefits, future possibilities, and a primary sector job. On the other hand, it has been known to indicate that boot camps are not cases if a young man were to elect to join the pre-all volunteer army, but when boot camps were a major factor in Pennsylvania during the late 1980s and early 1990s, boot camps was not infrequently the outcome of boot camps for those who do not have an extensive record and who are in the military struggling to meet recruitment goals in Iraq and Afghanistan, this may have implications.

The sample used in the earlier analysis was not fruitful in explaining the sample were, as is ordinarily the case, but participation in either violent or property crime. The study participation to help us to understand the factors that was observed is not surprising, but the social psychological factors were superfluous. Explanations of female criminality.¹³ The study markets and social structure were not the focus. Along with my colleague Kristin Bates, the study employment, social structural position,

and some family factors.¹⁴ Expecting and stronger ties to families would be connections, we considered these very few violent crimes among the young respondents, we focused our analysis on use. The two types of violation are social ties used more drugs when the father, and when their spouse or partner is time out of work. They were less likely themselves spent more time out of work drug use among women with strong family ties. Women's drug use, we have to conclude is not what we expected, especially an out-of-work man in the house. One of these seemingly confusing findings picking up here is more recreational drug use (those with more education were also

Property crime is a little more common with weak family ties, in short-duration than others to have committed property crimes were also more likely to be involved more time out of work. None of the stronger family ties. It seems terrible that family ties make more difference for property crime than does their work experience—but the presence of their partners, does matter. So even though the labor market is a factor in female

Local Labor Markets

A feature of the NLSY that we took advantage of was the “geocoding” of cases. Individual respondents were linked to the county in which they reside, and we used these data in the analyses. These linked data allowed us to examine the economic context of the local labor market where respondents were working (or not working). No other studies offered so far are that the neighborhood

g that women with more obligations be different than those without these women separately. Since there were young women who were among NLSY cases on property offenses and drug use very different. Women with weak ties had better jobs, more job satisfaction, and a partner (if they had one) spent more time with them. Women were more likely to use drugs when they themselves were unemployed. None of these factors increased drug use among women with strong family ties. So when it comes to drug use, we can conclude that their labor market expectations matter, except for the negative influence of family ties. We elected to not make too much of these findings. It is possible that what we are seeing is that women with high drug use among better-off women are also more likely to have used drugs). These findings are consistent with expectations. Women with high education jobs were slightly more likely to be involved in property violations. Women with weak ties were more involved if their spouse was spending more time with them. These factors mattered for women with high education, probably traditional, but it appears that family ties matter for these young women's criminality. So, family ties, not their employment, and the work environment are not a strong determining force, but they do matter for criminality.

One advantage of in these analyses is the fact that respondents in the NLSY can be linked to census data and census data can be included in the analysis. This allowed us to consider the social and economic context in which these young adults live. Now clearly, the arguments that I have made about neighborhood social context matters. But

here the county of residence is the county of residence. There is no way that a county can reasonably be a sound proxy for a neighborhood or that a county reasonably does represent is the local labor market. Unemployment rates for counties of residence are a poor proxy for local economy and labor market in a county. If we were holding or seeking gainful employment, we would be looking for a county that was holding or seeking gainful employment.

We found that the criminogenic environment of the labor market did not occur even in counties that had above-average unemployment rates were high. The fact that a person works for more time does not appear to be a significant factor. This is an important finding. It is important to understand that an individual's employment status is a significant factor in criminality. This supports the contention that the company of others who are marginalized is an important factor. If we think back to the example of the young men encouraged by their friends to work in the primary sector job the other in a McJob, the importance of this finding. The primary sector job was not likely to join his neighborhood with the McJob appears to be a significant factor in becoming involved in violent crime. The example of the young men around him who are similarly situated in the primary sector work all together. For the negative effect of the primary sector work on real influence, we need the presence of the primary sector work invitation to our secondary sector work. The example of the young men in a circumstance that matters, but the importance of this finding.

Neighborhoods and Young Adults

So the conditions of local labor market are a significant factor in the likelihood of criminal involvement for young men who are not fully employed—but what about the young men who are fully employed? After all, in the example that I have given, the young men who are fully employed young men who attend school and his neighboring McJob worker

ontextual unit in the analyses. There can probably be considered a theoretically homogeneous community. But what a county re-creates a labor market. So here the unemployment rates are a measure of the health of the labor market in which the respondents to the NLSY were employed.

The effect of spending more time out of the labor market anywhere. The effect was only observed in areas with average unemployment rates. Where unemployment rates are comparatively lower, being out of the labor market is not likely to increase criminal involvement. In the context of others who are out of the labor market, the circumstance matters for their perception that it is in a situation of competition for the labor market that work is available. The example of the young Pittsburghers who go out drinking, one of them in a marginal job, we gain an appreciation of the difference between a primary sector worker employed in the primary sector and his friends, but the secondary sector worker is not more likely than the former unless there are others who live in the labor market or out of the labor market. The effects of marginal jobs to have their own social setting. It is not just the individual's social setting but the individual within the social setting.

Crime

Markets do matter in increasing the likelihood of crime for young adults when they are marginal. Do they matter? We have been using, it was other marginal workers who attempted to persuade our steelworker to go out on a work night. While

I didn't specify, the implication was... Do neighborhoods matter too? My NLSY97 to address this question.¹⁵ Research (CHRR) at the Ohio State Statistics (BLS) closely guard geoco information about each respondent live (appropriately, so to ensure the We were allowed access to these o participation and young adult crime analyses, as we and others have re to the labor market, either unemp were more likely to violate the law nality were sex (women of course v with age, as we have long known), th school earlier, and race/ethnicity. S factor that was associated with crim dents was racial composition, and would expect. Young adults who liv a larger black population were less *the other factors were taken into ac* borhood employment rates do not of adult criminality; what is import stance. Putting our past research to ses, we have to conclude that local condition the effect of employment circumstances of their specific neigh

What do these results do to our e the labor stratification and crime th tance of context? They require a mo of relevant environments and pe because neighborhoods, measured l when considering the situation of c men and women. For instance, in ir and bar named The Point. Its clie the African American community, l sity from that community there. B and women, and professionals rub s

as that these tempters lived nearby. My colleagues and I used data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) from The Center for Human Resources Research at Michigan University and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) to examine the linkage between employment and the census tract in which they lived (due to the anonymity of NLSY respondents). We used the BLS data to examine both labor market conditions and juvenile delinquency. In those studies reported, people who were marginal or underemployed or in secondary sector jobs, were more likely to be involved in crime. The other factors effecting criminal involvement were less likely), age (crime declines with age), and those who had been suspended from school. Surprisingly, the only neighborhood factor was criminal involvement by these respondents. In short, the relationship was not as most would expect in communities where there was a high rate of crime likely to be involved in crime *after* controlling for all other factors. So in these analyses, neighborhood factors do not appear to matter as a determinant of criminal involvement. What is important is the individuals' work circumstances. Together with the more recent analysis of labor markets at the county level do not appear to matter on adult criminal behavior, but the neighborhoods do not.

For example, and, more importantly, for the synthesis, which emphasizes the importance of a more nuanced approach to the notions of crime and crime. Perhaps this newest result is that, like census tracts, are too limited to capture the company that influences young adult behavior. In inner-city Seattle there is a restaurant where the clientele is not drawn exclusively from the middle class but one is subject to see great diversity in the clientele. Black political officials, businessmen and laborers shouldered with laborers, the jobless,

and a few more thugs than the owners frankly prefer. But, another dimension draws its patrons not just from the area even just from nearby tracts, but from a large portion of Seattle, the south end of the city. The same is true in Pittsburgh, where the neighborhoods of The Hill District congregated the drag of the black community. Adults are living immediately around them. The area is expansive; thus the null results found in the study on the relationship between adult employment and crime.

The county or local labor market is a more meaningful unit. Let's continue with the last paragraph. If King County's (Seattle) labor market or if the quality of work is low then the unemployed young man or woman standing on the street a bite is more likely to encounter a crime. For our steel mill worker in Pittsburgh, the steel mill on Avenue D for a social moment, he works with other primary sector workers whereas the unemployed or secondary sector or jobless workers are more likely to be holder of a McJob in either circumstance. The study away from crime-conducive lifestyles and environments in these and similar social settings. *the local labor market influences social settings and thus the incidence of crime among young adults.*

A word about our race results. The study controlled for demographic factors, family income, and education. We did not find that race was related to crime. This is consistent with the long and repeatedly observed correlation that African Americans committing more crime than Caucasians seriously taking employment and education. Also, NLSY respondents living in high-income neighborhoods committed less crime. While the correlation is a general public and may disappoint some, it is not a political wedge issue, it is not new information.

membership of the establishment would
tion of the diversity is that The Point
census tract where it is located, or
rather from throughout the central
of the city, and its southern suburbs.
ere adults from the multiple neigh-
regate on Center Avenue, the main
lt social life is not limited to those
Their territory, if you will, is more
r neighborhood/census tract effects
work circumstance and aggregate

, on the other hand, is likely a more
with the two examples used in the
(Seattle) unemployment rate is high,
ere for many workers, a marginally
opping in The Point for a drink or
thers similarly situated. Similarly, if
of the 1970s stopped off on Center
ould have been likely to encounter
n the mills were booming, or more
s after deindustrialization struck. A
stance will be influenced toward or
es by the mix of people encountered
In both circumstances *the health of*
cial life, and consequently the result-

re in order. Net of other social and
ne, and work circumstance, we did
iminality. These results suggest that
orrelation between race and crime—
more crime—may be explained by
educational differences into account.
predominantly Hispanic neighbor-
ile this may surprise some in the
politicians using immigration as a
news. In recent years criminologists

have reported similar patterns using net of other factors including individual disadvantage.

The Younger and the Older

In addition to the young men like the two other groups that must be considered in every population, teenagers (age thirty and up) adult men and similar jobs began disappearing from the group to feel the effects were young were there for earlier generations who those who did have jobs in mills and therefore the first to be fired. It was the US began that its effects started assumed that their jobs were secure endured downturns in their fortunes and layoffs. They also knew well the heavy industries that employed them times of hardships resulting from never, not prepared for the jobs to song "My Hometown," Bruce Springtown, says,

Now main streets whitewashed
Seems like there ain't nobody
They're closing down the texti
Foreman says these jobs are go
Your hometown, your hometo

Deindustrialization brought a new a of America's industrial regions.

There is an apocryphal story, poveys the pattern of disbelief that e period. As the story goes, a group ers were drinking their morning co

ng other data.¹⁶ This pattern too is individual poverty and neighborhood

those used in my example, there are considered: the most crime-prone por-
s, and the least crime-prone, older
women. When the good blue-col-
America's industrial cities the first
nger workers, because the jobs that
ere not there for them, and because
and plants were the last hired, and
not long after deindustrialization in
to reach longer-term workers, who
re. These workers, in the past, had
es when recessions caused cutbacks
at there was a cyclical nature to the
m. Too, there were in their histories
prolonged strikes. They were, how-
disappear and never return. In the
gsteen, singing of a New Jersey mill

d windows and vacant stores
wants to come down here no more
le mill across the railroad tracks
oing boys and they ain't coming back to
own, your hometown, your hometown.¹⁷

and ominous future to the social life

ssibly an urban legend, which con-
sisted in working men during this
of laid-off, middle-aged steelwork-
offee in a diner immediately across

the street from the Monessen, Pe
 been employed. The conversation t
 centered on when the mill would
 their coffee and talked of getting o
 they returned to work, the mill ac
 brought down by dynamite in smok
 they were unaware that it had been

Stress, mental illness, and marit
 laid-off workers in Detroit, Clevel
 across the Rust Belt, but it is very
 to crime to satisfy their material n
 stantially increased their criminal
 group are less likely than younger m
 they were not already so engaged, e
 dignity.¹⁸

Even among men less tied to hard
 is a powerful rehabilitating force. A
 new adult parole agent (after my s
 walked through the district office w
 of my new coworkers, "Give me y
 for was the face sheets of their clien
 was to be my initial caseload. At t
 oad of men who'd done time for m
 not known it, but the office's parole
 group least likely to recidivate, the c
 load was expanded to include Walt
 siderably tougher. Both the older p
 mill or auto plant workers are much
 younger men.

Their teenage children and youn
 a different story. The teen years ar
 most, kids engage in delinquency. S
 widespread law violating behavior a
 nicities. Parents recognize that ado
 when teenagers' friends and what
 have, supplants that of their paren
 need to explain the widespread del

... Pennsylvania steel mill where they'd
that morning, like it frequently did,
... reopen. While these men sipped
... out of debt and their plans for when
... cross the street literally disappeared,
... ke and dust. They had not been told;
... scheduled for demolition.

... al and drinking problems afflicted
... land, Youngstown, Pittsburgh, and
... unlikely that many of them turned
... needs or adopted lifestyles that sub-
... ity. Members of this demographic
... men to become involved in crime if
... even with the loss of jobs, hope, and

... d-working conforming lifestyles, age
... A scary moment for me as a brand-
... stant as a juvenile PO) was when I
... with my supervisor, he telling each
... our murders." What he was asking
... ts that POs carried in a binder. This
... twenty-two, the prospect of a case-
... murder was not one I relished. I had
... ed murderers were older men—the
... easiest to supervise. When my case-
... er and his cohorts my job got con-
... areoles as well as older laid-off steel
... a less likely to turn to crime than are

... nger siblings, on the other hand, are
... e a time when many, perhaps even
... Self-report studies have long found
... across social classes, races, and eth-
... olescence is a time of pulling away;
... they think, and the influence they
... ts. To some extent we don't really
... inquency of fourteen-, fifteen-, and

sixteen-year-olds.¹⁹ But we must be aware that they are more likely to engage in serious crime if we need to concern ourselves with the possibility of more serious crimes later in life. The focus here, what are the delinquent conditions—in the present case work-related conditions.

In a study of Cleveland, Ohio, Krivo and Ruth Peterson used arrest records to look for links between contract crimes so that they could look for links to different types of crimes. They found support for the labor stratification thesis, that young people who have been arrested for violent acts in Cleveland are more likely to be in labor instability, juvenile delinquency, and labor market conditions, and older people are more likely by joblessness but not by unemployment.

Regarding the question of the mechanisms through which labor market conditions influence teenagers'—people who are primarily expected to work—participation in crime, I will explore this more in the next chapter. (This is a part of its foundation), that for many young people, important determinants of their lives are family, schools, and peers. Criminologists have identified that family and school are the most pivotal for the regulation of child behavior, with family being the most important in the early years, school becoming dominant in the middle years, and finally the emergence of the broader community in adolescence. It has been shown that success in school and academic achievement are associated with delinquent behavior, and that students who are involved in school-sponsored activities and involved in school-sponsored activities are less likely to be up with a peer group that is less delinquent and are disinterested in school.

But what of kids and jobs? A great deal of research on delinquency prevention requires attention to the labor market.

are concerned first with which among various forms of delinquency. Second, the behaviors that may be a harbinger of their lives. Third, and central to our work, the economic and criminal consequences of social structure, the economy, and disadvantage?

On crime rates, sociologists Lauren Steinberg and his colleagues used census tracts as the indicator of census tracts. They looked at how age and employment were related to crime rates.²⁰ They found, consistent with the theory, that young adults were more likely to have higher crime rates in census tracts with higher levels of unemployment. This relationship appeared a bit less directly tied to unemployment rates and secondary sector

employment. The mechanism by which employment patterns influence crime below the age where they are ordinarily measured in delinquency is important. In the next chapter, but essentially the labor market theory recognizes (like control theory, which argues that for school-aged children jobs are less important than their families, and the theory of Joseph Weis David Hawkins, Richard Gottman, and others) that the societal unit that was important for childhood behavior shifts as children grow older. For younger children and early adolescents, the family is important and for older adolescents and early adulthood, the peer group and to some extent the labor market are important.²¹ A great deal of research has shown that children with strong attachments to school are negatively related to delinquency.²² Also, kids who are good students and participate in extracurricular activities are probably going to end up being less delinquent than those who have poor school attachments.²³

It is a common mistake that many people think that effective delinquency prevention is after-school employment. Presumably

this belief is based on the “idle hands delinquency.” Some criminologists are employment curious, since there are school aged children who work are, law than those who do not. These find a pause to those pushing jobs as the juvenile employment and crime, like than either the popular belief in its relations of observed positive correlation. While this complexity will be explained, suffice it to say that which is widely agreed important for kids when it comes to delinquency. And we are increasingly local labor market is important for children to school, teachers, and education groups.

Most readers heard from their parents say, something like “Do well in school, good future, and a good life.” For many rings true—even for teenagers who hear or believe that mantra. Now imagine employed parent in an underclass neighborhood jobs, and those who do are in McDonald’s then not hard to also imagine teenagers to themselves, with tongue firmly planted like you did!” Young people may not employment circumstances, but they are them played by the rules and still trying. How, in this situation, can one most of whom can at times be a bit more will be as likely to invest in school in communities? The argument is that parents and other adults are marginal to their well in school or develop positive relationships. As a result, delinquency is more

This problem is compounded in inner city education systems. Schools there are trying to are likely to come to school not re-

ls are the devil's workshop theory of find the popular focus on juvenile e studies that have found that high- in general, more likely to violate the findings should at the very least give e answer. The relationship between ke that of adults, is more complex necessity or of simplistic interpreta- on between work and delinquency. ored more fully later, for now suf- greed upon: school and not work is to determining their lifestyles and gly learning that the health of the determining how children will relate enerally.

arents, or can imagine hearing them ool if you want to get ahead, have a ny, maybe even for most, this advice o at the surface act as if they do not agine an out-of-work or marginally eighborhood where few adults have Jobs, offering the same advice. It is gers responding, or at least thinking planted in cheek, "Yeah, you mean ot know the details of their parents' ey can recognize when those around eir lives came up economically lack- e reasonably expect that juveniles, skeptical of parental points of view, l as their counterparts in better-off t children will, where their parents e labor market, be less likely to do attachments to teachers and educa- re likely to happen.

inner cities that have subpar educa- ing to educate student bodies who eady to learn as a result of hunger,

familial problems, language difficulties, and school administrators in such schools make do with severely underfunded budgets they are unlikely to deliver the pessimistic message sent to children in their communities and their own negative labor market experiences.

Fewer Good Jobs, Yet the Crime Rate Is Rising

Deindustrialization ravaged America during the last five years of the twentieth century, and that alone disconfirm any argument claiming that a lack of family wage jobs promotes crime? That is, what can be accounted for in this argument, and what factors do that do this. First, as was the case following the Great Depression, here we see a dramatic change in nations of crime patterns. Other than the changes happening in the US, and some of the reasons for it. Patterns of American employment have been negatively affected. As I described in my book, manufacturing affected some communities, and the age distribution of the population has changed, which means that a smaller proportion of the population is in crime-prone years (fourteen to twenty-four) and there has been a massive increase in the number of probably most—American communities that have seen a decline in employment during the final decade of the twentieth century to the Great Recession which began in 2007. It brought downward pressures on crime rates in some communities, benefited some, while others added to the crime. Sociologist Karen Parker described the social and economic changes in some communities to benefit from the changes and not.²⁵ Together these social and economic changes, and substantial income and social inequality, are not just economic; it also exists in the likelihood of living in crime-infested neighborhoods, and the likelihood that one's children will succumb to crime.

ties, and more. Some teachers and the valiant efforts, but frequently with likely to be capable of counteracting children as a result of the general dis- parents' and adult neighbors' nega-

Declines

an working towns in the last twenty- but crime declined. Might not this that job losses and a shift away from The crime decline certainly needs to and there are two important points r understanding crime patterns dur- should avoid single variable expla- ings besides deindustrialization are these social forces repress criminal- ment did change, but not everyone ed above, the decline of low-skilled nunities far more than others. Also, on has been shifting upward, which f the population is within the most ty-four); the crack epidemic abated; e in imprisonment. Second, many— nities benefited from a robust econ- last century and in the years prior an in earnest in 2008, and this has me.²⁴ The positive economic growth d to a growing underclass. Sociolo- al and economic factors that caused the crime decline while others did nomic changes have added to more ality in the US. This inequality is not kelihood of victimization, the proba- ghborhoods, and in the chances that e and delinquency.

With other forces pressing crime down, the decline in crime in these communities can help us to understand the crime decline in other communities. Even though Pittsburgh and other cities like them experienced declining crime rates in the 2000s, within them are communities that have not experienced the blessings of lower violence. In Pittsburgh, the crime decline has benefited the middle- and working-class communities far more than the inner-class neighborhoods most affected by the decline in labor stratification. It is within such communities that broadcasts too frequently are reported of young black and brown youngsters, being shot, in a wider city in which they live has declined.

Finally, there is a third and very important factor that public nor policy makers should be aware of. In the face of increasing distress in the inner city, as pointed out, the effects of the labor market decline should be delayed.²⁶ If the marginally employed population's crime rates not solely for material reasons, but for anger, unregulated lifestyles, and economic disadvantage, the current crime decline from the Great Recession may be just a temporary effect of labor market stratification on crime rates, but one that takes a while to catch up.

Broken Promises

Crime and delinquency become more prevalent where people are out of work or marginally employed. Where marginally employed adults have motivation, they are more likely to commit crimes, and where there is a situation of high concentrations of marginally employed people, crime rates, including violence, are more likely to increase because areas with high concentrations of people conducive to supporting an "educational system" resulting in poor school performance are more likely to have delinquent involvement.

...e down, increasing labor stratifica-
...current distribution of crime across
...gh, Cleveland, Washington, and cit-
...g crime rates between the 1980s and
...es that have to a lesser extent expe-
...nce and victimization. According to
...ted upper-, middle-, and even most
...re than it has those growing under-
...by deindustrialization and increased
...h neighborhoods that nightly news
...orting about young men, especially
...g shot down even as crime in the
...clined.

...y important reason why neither the
...complacent about the drop in crime
...a the labor market. As John Worrall
...r market on crime is very likely to
...ployed are more likely to influence
...reasons but also because of frustra-
...nd the long-term influence of social
...rrent labor market distress resulting
...ust beyond the horizon. The effects
...ime is very likely not a short-term
...develop—and then perhaps endures.

...ore likely when there are more peo-
...ployed. Crime occurs because mar-
...ivations for engaging in pecuniary
...ion of company created by concen-
...people lifestyles conducive to crimi-
...likely to develop. And delinquency
...levels of labor instability are not
...ation matters” message to children,
...nce and ultimately higher rates of

Again, the argument is that social conditions matter for adults, how those in the immigrant community, as well as the broader context, the economy, and certainly individuals have agency, and that we must also remember the young people who grew up in Brooklyn. Their choices were circumscribed by conditions in their area and the adult network. This section will explore the implications for children and young people in chapter 4.

Central to America's national identity was the promise of opportunity rewarded. When Americans moved westward in search of opportunity in growing industries, they did so with hope and belief, and built lives on the promise of a better life not only for them, but for their children. This was true for the African American migrants who fled Southern oppression and to the North in search of opportunity, and equality. Instead they found a different reality while many migrants did considerably better than they could have in the rural south, the promise of a complete delivery of the promise. My father's generation of Great Migration. All of us were children of parents who moved north in search of a better life, and that our parents and friends were a part of a larger demographic shifts in human history. The connection between their quest for a better life and the dream of living. We did not think of the Motor City as the dream of our fathers, though it certainly was. The dream of the dream not being delivered that we had come to the North because it was better than the South. Immigrants are not comparing their lives in the old country. Our frustration was not a failure in the Promised Land; our anger was not a failure. Robby Wideman and his friends were not the only ones who were better than their parents. The intergenerational differences made up the fabric of the American inner cities throughout the

al context matters. For children and immediate vicinity—the neighborhood, the local labor market—matters. Certainly we must remember that individuals in market circumstances have choices, but the choices of the men that Mercer Sullivan studied in the 1960s were inscribed by both the job opportunities and the networks that they had or did not have. I have written about children and the results of research on

the rhetoric is that hard work is justly rewarded. It was the promise that led men from farms and villages to pursue the American dream, they did so holding firmly to that promise and believing that their hard work would produce a better life for their children. For no group was the promise more sincere than for Americans who moved north and west to find their Promised Land of jobs, but they found cracks in the promise, and the dream was probably better than they and their families could have imagined. Their children soured on the income that was promised and I never knew the concept of a better life. Even after learning that part of one of the most substantial reasons why most of us did not make the conventional American dream was a consequence not of disappointment but of being excluded. We were not going to be satisfied by lives that were not our own worlds in the rural South. Those were the emotional landscapes of many in the 1960s and early 1970s.

At the start of the twenty-first century, a global wide economy led to broken promises and the Great Migration, but for many working-class communities. Crime is but one response to a broken social life, adds high cost to local, state, and national life harder, especially for those already struggling with and globalization. But we should re-examine the changing (damaging in the minds of many) alternatives, and it holds less real hope than those of those other alternatives might.

century, changes in the US and world-
promises for not only the people of the
working people of many races and eth-
to those broken promises; it disrupts
state, and federal budgets, and makes
already hurt most by deindustrialization
remember that crime is a less socially
(of some) consequence than some
hope for the downtrodden than some

“I Don’t Want No Damn Slave Job!”

The Effects of Lack of Employment Op

Most Americans, perhaps even most of the individual as endowed with both the ability to govern their behavior and to a large extent to be governed. Many non-social scientists read arguments in preceding chapters with some skepticism. They say, speaking of the poor, the disadvantaged peoples, “but they have to get up and go out and find a job for crime.” This is a sentiment expressed by many, but one that runs contrary to the individual responsibility philosophy. Some of these same people would not object to the individual responsibility philosophy if that consideration is changing of laws that punish as adults for a grown-up crime. Most of us believe that the young are influenced by themselves that guide and sometimes control. That their children will be influenced by the same. Crusaders demand laws that protect children from the evil influences of movies, music, and the Internet. We worry and struggle about how to protect them from that these, as well as other social forces, that hinder the development of children. Those who

opportunities

at residents of Western nations, view the capacity and the responsibility to a large extent, their destiny. As a result, arguments like those presented in the preface. "I know they have had it tough," chronically unemployed, and other people have to take some responsibility for their job, and there is certainly no excuse for the crime, as expressed by many voters and by politicians. There is a wealth of social science evidence that can make some significant exceptions to the philosophy for children, although even in the case of crime. Increasing numbers of juveniles are committing a wide array of crimes. Nevertheless, these juveniles are subject to forces external to themselves that compel their behavior. Parents worry about their children being influenced by the wrong set of peers. Moral education during the sensitive, formative years from birth to adolescence, through television, computer games, and the internet, are all factors that contribute to these things because we expect that these factors influence the behavior and the development of the child. With this viewpoint generally do not

accept that the young adults that I understood or in part pardoned for having questions here are, does work affect the economy matter for them? Does it a

It is easier to trace a link between unpromising employment to the crime if they do not have responsibilities for the future, frustration or the life reasonably lead to crime. But since work to work in most western industrial nations or changes in the labor market

For some, the same logic that is should work with teenagers (never so well for adults): "They have to there's the junior Jean Valjean explanation because they cannot satisfy need the discipline that comes from like sentiments, are the motivations weekend jobs are important feature tion programs. The problem with hands" explanation for delinquency do not have productive, supervised bad behavior occurs, has not been time does not reduce delinquency. 7 quency takes but minutes. Much of age behavior during the average tee on the way home from school because attractive targets (iPods, computers, conveniently inside a sliding glass door and open) that is shielded from the street by hedges or fences. Or on the ball, they find it more fun to get in directly home. Because delinquency it is spontaneous, it is not practical to an extent that it would make much kids jobs after school, which might kids, usually will do little to prevent

AVE JOB!”

have discussed so far can be underlying social forces influence them. The effect juvenile behavior, and does the affect juvenile delinquency?

between unemployment or marginal, criminality of young adults. After all, to occupy their time and a promise lifestyles that may emerge might realistically ordinarily do not expect children sized economies, why might fluctuate influence their behavior?

is popularly applied to young adults in mind that these ideas don't work so much time on their hands.” Then explanation: “Ghetto youth are delinquent basic needs and wants.” Or, “They are holding down a job.” These, and reasons for the belief that after-school and programs of successful delinquency prevention this point of view is that the “idle youth,” which argues that if young people have good things to do with their time, delinquency is not supported by research. Filling idle time with this should not be a surprise; delinquency occurs during the course of an average manager's day. They break into a house and use the homeowner left particularly (electronics, other easily carried valuables) concealed (notoriously easy to lift off the track) in the view of neighbors or others on the way home from midnight basketball to mischief with friends than to go to work takes so little time and so much of the day to sufficiently fill up youthful hours that it makes such a difference. So simply getting a job to be a positive experience for some youth might reduce delinquency by itself.

Midway through my tenure as a
 I, tongue firmly in cheek, called them
 after a group of desperados that from
 that I watched as a kid), were pe
 in. I dubbed them this because the
 criminals, and frankly it was hard f
 delinquents. They actually lived jus
 ern Pennsylvania county that emp
 area. They were placed on probatio
 crimes were committed in our cour
 described in the sheriff’s reports as
 a series of break-ins, usually barns
 didn’t take much, and sometimes d
 know the case and the “gang,” I conc
 dom; like those who climb the high
 they (in their case barns and not M
 not doing well in school, and they v
 They did not cause trouble at schoo
 “nerd group” if it had been a few d
 smarter. Their families were pretty s
 they looked more to their friends th
 influence. Had their crimes occurre
 it is likely that they would have be
 vided probation and then had their
 to be stuck with each other for a ye
 in the Wall Gang have avoided juve
 Obviously I cannot know that, but I
 another matter. I will return to the
 mer caseload, in the coming pages t
 jobs affect juvenile delinquency.

Working Kids

What about the other motivations
 grams, such as the junior Jean Valj
 a very good explanation for young
 credible for explaining some juveni

a juvenile PO, a group of kids that the Hole in the Wall Gang (named frequently turned up in the westerns mentioned to the court that I worked they were anything but desperados or for me to seriously think of them as st across the border from the West-loyed me, in a rather remote rural n by my county judge because their nty. The Hole in the Wall Gang was a burglary ring. Their offenses were and other farm outbuildings. They didn't take anything. After getting to luded that they broke in out of bore-hest mountains, they did it because ount Everest) were there. They were vere engaged in no school activities. ol, and in fact might have been the ecades later and they'd been a little stable, but poor. Like most teenagers an to their parents for guidance and d in even a slightly less rural setting, en given a few months of unsuper- r cases dismissed. Instead, we were ar.¹ Would the members of the Hole enile court if they'd been employed? 'm skeptical; but as for school, that's gang, along with others on my for- to explore how economic forces and

for after-school employment pro-ean theory of crime? It may not be adult crime, but perhaps it's more le delinquency. Conceivably, giving

young people jobs so that they can and have money in their pockets and the discipline of finding and holding and long-term benefits, if the lessons they will be more capable of holding

But these positive benefits must be weighed against the harmful outcomes of this employment. If, for example, during this time, it may harm their school performance. If a job is more attractive than school then they may lose interest in school, consequently their energies and effort may be spent on the money they earn finances a more comfortable life—a car and fast living—it may put them at risk of delinquent behavior. As I said near the end of the book, researchers have found that young people who work are more likely to be delinquent.² These scholars speculate that the source of this behavior I stated above may be the source of the problem. Getting a job is more likely to put a young person in close proximity to older youth who are more likely to be recognized, having one’s children to be influenced by is not a good thing. We should also note that the jobs they are likely to get are secondary sector. Most of the young adult coworkers they work with are likely to be their best influences.

A substantial body of evidence has shown that school is a very important orienting institution for the teenager. School is to the teenager as quality time is to the child. When children do well in school they are more likely to be teachers and to the school itself they are more likely to be frequent, and less likely to become involved in delinquent behavior. Schools not only provide an important source of social support for students to bond to and thus prevent them from becoming delinquent, they are the institution that gives them the hope of a better future.

We should be careful, however, not to put all these things in the same box. Sociologists Rob Weisburd and his colleagues found that simply examining the delinquency rates of teenagers who work and

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pay for some of their own expenses may have positive benefits. Likewise, having a job may provide both immediate benefits learned make it more likely that they will get good employment in the future.

This must be weighed against potentially negative effects. If a job cuts into study or rest, it may harm performance. If the job becomes more demanding, they may shift their focus and loyalty, and their efforts, away from their education. If a job leads to a more adult-like lifestyle—for example, living on their own—this may bring them closer to rather than farther from the goal. At the end of the last chapter, some research shows that people who have jobs are more likely to graduate. We speculate that some of the reasons that explain this finding. Also, they note that the benefits of fifteen-, sixteen-, or seventeen-year-old employment, and as most parents have long known, getting too soon involved with older kids is not necessarily a good idea. We note that the jobs that kids are most likely to get are often low-paying jobs, and as we have shown, many of the jobs they might encounter there may not be the best.

Research has been generated that tells us that the primary institution for adolescents is the school. The primary source of employment is to the young adult. They are more likely to bond and develop strong attachments to their schools, and they are less likely to engage in delinquent behavior or become involved in alcohol and drug abuse.³ The school is an important legitimate institution for teenagers. It may reduce their delinquency, but they also clearly need a strong basis for having a hopeful, positive outlook.

It is important to not cast all student workers into the same category. Warren, Paul LePore, and Rob Mare have shown a difference between the school performance of those who do not work and those who do. This masks important

differences.⁴ They asked a sample to keep detailed diaries of their daily activities. Analysis of those diaries to a larger data set revealed that students who were getting good grades improved their academic performance when they worked a part-time job. Their interpretation of this finding was that students who made it a habit of budgeting their time and resources for education, became even more successful when they took on employment. For those students who had poor grades or other problems, as they had not been involved in problematic activities.

Other scholars empirically examined the relationship between working hours that could be associated with academic and problematic behaviors.⁵ John V. Williams found that work did not affect the academic performance of students who were already considered high achievers. Policy makers to not think of employment as a solution. David Bachman and John Schlenberg concluded that the association between working hours and academic success were taken into consideration. In their conclusions, Matthew Ploeger, and his colleagues, report that the long-accepted belief that working and delinquency is due to students who do not want to engage in law violation were more likely to be involved in crime, and presumably more likely to be. Robert Apel and his colleagues found that students who were in their first jobs were not more likely to be involved in crime. Earlier research, those who had employment before getting their first job were less likely to be involved in crime. Apel and his colleagues found that work in the formal labor market was not more likely to have, did not produce more violations. Kids working in the informal economy, does produce more violations. and Susan Pitchford, I and also Ap

of high-school students to keep ties, and then they added the productivity set. They found that students who worked or maintained their academic achievement at a modest number of hours per week. It is that good students, who already work effectively and husbanding their time, are even more focused and directed when they enter group employment did not lead to delinquency. They were already less likely to have delinquent ties.

Work and delinquency directly. Cornbusch specified that it was long associated with lower investments in school. Wright, Francis Cullen, and Nicholas Johnson argued that an increase in delinquency in high-school students is associated with being at risk.⁶ They cautioned policy makers not to see work as the solution for these kids. Jerome Bruner, analyzing a national sample, concluded that work and delinquency was attenuated for children's background and educational attainment.⁷ Contrary to the earliest studies' findings, Raymond Paternoster and his colleagues reported a positive relationship between work and delinquency selection.⁸ Those already more likely to get jobs than those less likely to get jobs, the latter are doing better in school. They found that a group of sixteen-year-olds who were more likely to be delinquent. In fact, contrary to the earlier studies, those engaged in delinquency or used drugs were more likely to be involved in these activities. Paternoster and his colleagues' study reported that work, even including the McJobs that were available, did not increase delinquency, but that it did increase productivity, some of which is legally marketed.⁹ Finally, along with Margo Rankin, Paternoster and his colleagues conclude that

if juveniles are not positively engaged working, because it is those who are not working who are most likely to get caught.

Although these results should give us hope in combat delinquency by developing more jobs for workers, there is both evidence and theory to suggest that unemployment in a neighborhood is a problem in itself. In *The Truly Disadvantaged* and *Jobs for the Poor*, Julius Wilson argued that joblessness is a major factor in being unable to combat youthful waywardness. Wilson described the emergence of a "culture of poverty" that leads to crime and delinquency in areas with only low-paying, marginal work.¹² *Getting Paid*, Merrell Lykes, argues that in inner-city and marginal community economic conditions (usually not very good jobs) are a major factor in how the social structure and crime in these areas are shaped.

Recent empirical evidence also suggests that the causal link between unemployment and crime turns to that shortly, but first I should mention the empirical explanation offered by the labor market theory. This theory is based, like that for young adults, on the idea of labor market segmentation theory. In this theory, and what might be called a "culture of poverty" theory, Central to the thesis, as is the case with the labor market theory, is the importance of the social environment. When young adults who are not doing well in the labor market, these homes are also in communities where crime is high. If these adults be economically unsuccessful, their children's delinquency escalates. Several scholars have argued that social bonds that potentially shield children from especially delinquent peers are more important in these settings: attachments to parents and to other adults.

Three Important Messages

It sounds heartless, or perhaps even more so, to say that if their parents are not employed, children are not fully rewarded as much as children born to parents who are employed.

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ed in school that they had better be
re neither attached to school nor to
ght up in illegal behavior.¹⁰

e pause to those who would primarily
jobs programs for high-school aged
reason to believe that when employ-
n that youth crime will also be a prob-
nd *When Work Disappears*, William
ss leads to destabilized communities
ness and delinquency.¹¹ Elijah Ander-
code of the street” that is conducive
with high rates of unemployment and
er Sullivan’s description of how poor
es lead occasionally to legal employ-
and illegal work, clearly documents
a communities affects their children.¹³
supports this contention and I will
d explore in some detail the theoret-
or stratification thesis. This explana-
ult criminality, on the combination
ory—specifically dual labor market
a differential social control theory.¹⁴
e with young adults, is the impor-
n children live in households with
e labor market, and especially when
es where too many adults appear to
r probability for engaging in delin-
s have argued that two important
d juveniles from delinquency and
e likely to be weakened in such set-
o school.¹⁵

n a bit Machiavellian, to argue that
well and substantially and materi-
believe they should, that those same

children will be less likely to attack those parents. Nevertheless, this is part of the case in part. The argument is not that parents. To suggest such would constitute a balderdash foisted upon us by parents who undervalue their children.¹⁶ Instead, the lack of success makes them less capable of sending, in any way, some critical messages. Here agents cannot send these messages and the lack of success. The point is that their position in the labor market makes this parenting task, which is made harder by their position of class standing, even harder. What

There is the *Follow my path* message. Both “work hard” and “stay out of trouble” are messages that many children think that their parents are the last jobs they want to spend time on. The fifteen-year-olds dream of sitting in a car, the fifteen-year-olds dream of becoming a dentist, or even a professor, for that matter? But even if that high-school students find excitement in their work, it can day by day illustrate our ability to live in middle-class lifestyles; and our children’s frustration, anger, or generalized parental disapproval accompanies adolescences, recognized by our relative economic success. When parents are employed or constrained to low-end jobs in the labor market, children may not know what their benefits package contains, or worry about the instability of the work. It is not a good thing. Children do not want to be employed in an occupation that they find exciting, or to be employed in an occupation that they find exciting. A fourteen-year-old responding to the “what do you want to do” question by saying, “He works for the name of your favorite national or local company,” in these situations they are inhibited from sending a “follow my path” message.

h affectionately and respectfully to probably, even if not consciously, the that poor children do not love their institute the same kind of ethnocen- those who claim that poor parents d, the argument is that the parents' pable of delivering, in a convincing gain we are not saying that poor par- and send them with resounding suc- n in the economic and social struc- ch is hard for any parent regardless t, then, are these messages?

essage, which includes the themes of trouble." It is probably the case that ents' jobs are boring, and that those their lives doing; after all, how many a an office as an accountant, or day- ven fantasize about being a college a those of us not working in careers ting and gravitate to at career fairs y to relatively comfortably maintain dren, when not in the fits of despon- ental displeasures that frequently ize that their futures are enhanced When parents are frequently unem- jobs in the secondary sector of the ow how much their parents are paid ins, or even how much their parents ork. But they do recognize that it is need their parents to be employed iting, but they do want their parent at is respected. Imagine, if you will, the "What does your dad or mom the fryer at _____ [fill in the cal burger joint]." When parents are d in getting across the all-important

Obviously children do not need of their parents, but there exists a transition moves from childhood to adulthood teaching children how to navigate it. Progression to being healthy, well-functioning bonded to their children are more likely to regulate who they spend time with. This monitoring decreases delinquency. Work circumstance does not command between the two is weakened, there be perfectly clear: I am not saying that not have good parent-child bonding this bonding is hindered when the parent market. It is one more hurdle that the

My not-very-delinquent Hole in have bad parents; their parents simply of the value of working harder in school who was on probation for drug possession parents lectured him about school. like them; hell no."

Tim Wadsworth, using the National holds, examined parents' employment theorized that parents who are marginal social bonds with their children, and the bonds were weaker the children were more likely to have misbehaved. Interpretation of his findings is that child relationship is weakened with success.¹⁸ And, as other control the bonds to parents are weakened children develop strong positive bonds to the course associated with higher levels

No doubt many parents, struggle deliver the message to their children school "so you don't end up like me lesson is also hard to sell when other neither deliver the follow my path

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l to *literally* follow the career path template in each culture of how one should live. The modeling of this path and its importance is important for their successful professionalizing adults. Parents who are tightly connected are likely to know their children's friends, to be involved with, and to monitor their activities; to have a strong efficacy.¹⁷ I am arguing that when parents' lack of respect of their child the bond is weakened by allowing for delinquency. Let me see what working-class or poor families do. I am saying that the probability of delinquency for parents are marginalized in the labor market these parents have to navigate.

the Wall Gang probationers did not only had a hard time convincing them to go to school. Another of my charges, Gabe, during a session, just rolled his eyes when his father said to me, “They want me to be a professional.”

national Survey of Families and Households found that parents who are originally employed would have weaker bonds with their children and he found this to be the case. When children performed less well in school and were more delinquent in the previous year. Wadsworth's research found that the affective strength of the parent-child bond is weakened by the parents' lack of employment. Theorists have found, when the social capital of parents is low, children are substantially less likely to be connected to their teachers and school, which is of course a risk factor for delinquency.¹⁹

By modeling themselves in marginal jobs, parents are sending a message that they should work hard in order to get a job. But this potentially important life lesson is often missed by other adults in the neighborhood can't send that message nor model that education

makes a difference. Anderson, despite the disappearance of manufacturing jobs, is influenced by the “old heads”: adults who lived the street life,” would be listened to by the

But as meaningful employment became scarce for men of the neighborhood and the only opportunities for quick money, the streetwise authority. Streetwise boys are concluded that work ethic are no longer relevant and the streetwise embodiment of the street, this man is not a gang, and indifferent, at best, to the

Another parental message that is often heard in employment is, *It is important that you get an education key to success.* For a very long time this has been a message of families. Academic success usually means good things have changed dramatically in the world where poor and working-class families live. It is a very fundamental way in other societies. Some speculate that the current generation of children may be the first in which they are doing better than their parents.²¹

At the end of the last chapter I discussed what happens when a parent who is striving to be a middle-class or a secondary sector worker, implores their children that they can have a better life only to be met by disrespectful offspring. When parents who play by the rules, their lives are a testament that education pays off. When such parents live in a stratified poverty, joblessness, and labor market, the image of the parents are less likely to be a model for the neighborhood. A problem in understanding why they do not see the model of people getting ahead is that they do not see the model of people getting ahead, because too few adults

In a study of the juvenile responsibility of the National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth (NLSY), w

cribing consequences of the disappearance includes the diminution of positive role models on the block who, having lived "the old way," are being replaced by the younger set. Anderson writes:

...role models are becoming increasingly scarce for young people. The expansion of the drug culture offers a new role model. The old head is losing prestige and authority. The message is that his lessons about life and work are outdated and a new role model is emerging. The new role model is young, often a product of the street culture, and does not value law and traditional values.²⁰

...role model is hurt in the face of marginalization. The message is *you work hard in school; that is the way to success*. This was the case for generations past. It has usually led to workplace successes. Now it is not the case in some communities, particularly in inner-city areas. Families live in poverty. This may be changing in some segments of the population as well. The message to a generation of American parents and children is that on average the children do not do

...described what we can imagine happen. The message is that if you are not yet still out of a job, or a second job, you should try to work hard in school so that you will not be "chumped off" by ungrateful and irresponsible parents who are not succeeding even when they are not a good conduit of the message. The message in a family lives where there is concentration on education or market instability, the struggling message is to be mitigated by other adults in the neighborhood. The message in inner-city neighborhoods is that children should work hard in school, going out to work, and seeing that their children are gainfully employed.²²

...ponents of the National Longitudinal Study of the 1970s we found that when parents were

unemployed their children do less. Research also shows that as the number of unemployed parents increases their involvement in delinquent behavior decreases. Youth leagues used the Adolescent Health Survey to measure this. More recently, working with several inner-city schools, it has been confirmed using newer data from the same survey.

A third important message that has been discussed is, *Education is valuable*. But research shows that it is more valuable for some people than for others. It does not work when the parents do not value it, but we have seen that when parents value it, their education is positively affected. The problem is that the inequalities that exist in the US are not lost on adolescents.

Long ago, when my inner-city school visited the handsome campus of a suburban school, I was stunned not by the competition, but by the difference. On the football team played and practiced on a grass field (the field, which was as hard as concrete twice a year to control the dust; it had an oil residue), the suburban school had a grass field surrounded by a most pleasant environment. The academic facilities of the school were superior to any we'd seen. The equipment of our hosts left a lasting impression. When reading Jonathan Kozol's *Saved by Bell*, the day came back to me.²⁷

In little ways such as that just mentioned, transferred through the popular media, experience, parental messages of the value of education to portions of the population. A teen in Detroit, Miami, or Los Angeles sure can relate to the experience of the 1980s and 90s popular adolescent culture. The resemblance to their experience. We know of Chicago schoolchildren going to a teacher, or having days when they were where they could be managed because

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ss well in school, which in turn
nquency.²³ Paul Bellair and his col-
n data to find very similar results.²⁴
al colleagues, this finding has again
om NLSY data sets.²⁵

is clearly linked to the one just dis-
t this message comes with a caveat:
than for others. As indicated above,
? work circumstance does not con-
you hold parental employment con-
associated with children doing well
their participation in delinquency.²⁶
es of educational opportunities that
scents.

high-school track team visited the
school for a meet, we walked around
t by the facilities. Where our friends
racted on a grassless, oil-covered
s a blacktop road, was oiled once or
rendered Astroturf-like burns with
ol that we visited had a manicured
pleasant stadium. Even their practice
n in the city. We didn't see much of
ol, but the locker rooms, track, and
lasting impression on us. Years later,
page Inequalities, the picture of that

recounted, the images of education
media, and through common expe-
value of education are undercut for
ager coming of age in the slums of
ly knew that the high-school images
scent soap opera “90210” bore little
When Kozol writes of large portions
through the academic year without
ey are herded into the auditorium
use that day no substitute could be

found, the message that their education was for those children.

Kozol recounts the argument of the middle and lower classes, but then makes a strong argument when he asks why, if money is the answer, not transfer some of that money to athletic facilities, teachers, and education in poor and districts. Many children of the middle class are buying into the message that their education is not good enough. They recognize how little their education is worth, when their teacher, or when their books fall apart, or when they have all, because they have replicated the same situation. I can imagine an elementary school where a child has a spelling or math book because it is the only one they have—yet such schools exist. Education is not valued and appreciated by a child who cannot read, or who has the full book bags of other children.

Educational inequality is increasing, including suburbanization, racial residential segregation, and levels of joblessness. Each of these social conditions affects local schools depend on to support education. Inner-city schools are hampered because students come to school with reading difficulties, or having English as a second language, or with special needs. Schools have attempted to mitigate some of these issues, but they persist. Even where it appears, from a surface view, that suburban and inner-city schools receive the same amount per student, this is not true. The suburban budget includes considerably more money for special services, such as ESL and school lunches.³⁰ These services are not part of general education, so after this is subtracted, inner-city schools are, on average, getting less money for their students’ lessons in math, reading, and science than inner-city schools.

In the study I cited earlier, my colleagues and I found that students of academically and occupationally

ation does not matter is not lost on

f those who say that money is not
in academic outcomes between the
comes to the heart of the counter-
ney doesn't matter, will the govern-
tless money which provides superb
ational quality to inner-city schools
e inner city don't have a hard time
r parents are sending, but they do
a is valued when they do not have a
part, or when there are no books at
r. Kozol's analyses. Few Americans
where children cannot take home
t has to be shared with other chil-
ational inequality is easily observed
not take a book home when he sees

ased by a number of social forces
esidential segregation, and high lev-
cial forces reduces the tax base that
t local schools.²⁸ Additionally, many
ecause a higher proportion of their
iness to learn issues such as hunger
uage. Federal government programs
of these problems, but inequalities
a US Department of Education data,
ools are spending approximately the
t actually the case.²⁹ The latter's bud-
oney designated for programs such
dedicated funds cannot be diverted
s taken into account it is clear that
able to spend significantly more on
ding, history, and science than can

olleagues and I found that the effect
unsuccessful parents was especially

problematic among youngsters from does not come as a surprise. It is Joblessness, persistent unemployment and underemployment lead to social individuals and for families. When with other marginalized people in Wilson, Massey and Denton, and disadvantaged people and families occupational circumstance for their marginalized employment is the root cause sequences. So as we think of how delinquency, we have to include the economic disadvantage.

Not a Dream Deferred, but a Dre

Getting a good education and occupational upward mobility and success children of white, black, Native American immigrant and natives alike. When the “dream deferred” it was that of the American promise of opportunity since the Great Migration it has been young African Americans that the dream or put on hold, but that it will not including the US, struggle with poor children of white Americans increasing their parents’ occupational aspirations have been able to. Many of them a few generations removed from immigrants or great grandparents having emigrated from Europe. Only time will tell if America and Asia will experience the same south have, with frustrations and barriers within a generation or two of immigrants be more like those of earlier waves followed by working-class stagnation

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in central city neighborhoods.³¹ This is very consistent with Wilson's ideas. Unemployment, marginal employment, and economic disadvantage for individuals in the disadvantaged live substantially in the disadvantaged communities that Anderson write of, the problems for them are compounded.³² For children the problems of their parents matter, but that marginal employment and the economy affect them. The indirect effects on both social and

Dream Dashed

Realizing its fruits in the form of occupational success has been the dream for the children of African American, Latino, and Asian parents, of whom Langston Hughes wrote about the black man, not yet the recipient of opportunity and equality.³³ In the years since the dream has become increasingly clear to many, the dream has not simply been deferred but is being dashed. Now, as industrial nations undergo postindustrial economic changes, the children increasingly find that they will not leapfrog their parents' accomplishments as preceding generations. Those likely to be frustrated are but the children of immigrant experiences, their grandfathers having moved from Eastern and Southern Europe, more recent immigrants from Latin America as black migrants from the South. The locks to upward mobility occurring through migration—or if their experiences will be those of migrants to the US, of success or failure—that is likely for those without

high-end, valued skills in postindustrial America. Bonilla-Silva argues that some “visiting whites as the US moves beyond its industrial past more like Latin America in terms of economic structure today routinely defined as white (e.g. immigrants thought of as a part of that “in group” who they first arrived in North America). Education provided good work for earlier generations, but education will be critical to new immigrants in the US, and education will also be critical to how they are ultimately socially categorized.

What happens, though, when the promise of education a good life is not just possible but is communicated to the children of a community with alternatives—in youthful eyes that insist on more? We should also consider the view that some communities have of their job alternatives. “I don’t want no damn slave job” is a refrain that some community workers hear in the inner city. For some it is simply working for someone else is “the man.” But for many urban youth, the future is limited, and wages are low. It is not that education brings neither appreciable current income nor a foreseeable future in their youthful eyes. Some of that may be seen as adequate for teenagers and the like—but they cannot give a life that is a respect requisite for the lives that others live.

In *Getting Paid*, Mercer Sullivan describes the disadvantaged section of Brooklyn. The young men express his exasperation:

STAN WILLIAMS: I tried to get a job. I tried to get a job. It was like sweeping out a

INTERVIEWER: How much work do you do?

s.w.: Oh, about twenty dollars a week.

Every day when they get ready to go to work, they place out.

industrial America. Sociologist Eduardo G. Douthett's "honorable minorities" may become honorable only by breaking a black–white binary and becoming a part of racial classification.³⁴ Some groups (e.g., Irish and Italians) were not always "accepted" by some "real Americans" when they were needed.³⁵ Without the low-skilled jobs that have been available in previous generations, the availability of quality jobs is critical for their job prospects and is being redefined.

The message that by obtaining an education but likely is not effectively contributing to the community? For some, better-appearing jobs—arise and become attractive. We see that some residents of disadvantaged communities. They want "real jobs." "I don't want to be a teacher, counselor, and community worker."³⁶ What makes it a "slave job?" For some else, especially if that someone is a young man it is a job without respect, it is a job where investing one's labor for future payoffs (nor at least not the long time horizon). These are the jobs that managers—in fast food, janitorial work, and so on—offer young adult the income, future, and so on. Others seem to be entitled to.

He quotes a young man from a disadvantaged community, Stan Williams, expressed

... some jobs, but they wasn't like real jobs. Like a store, like that, not a real job.

... could you make?

... They used to pay me by the week.

... y to close up, I come by and sweep the

INT.: How did you get the job?

s.w.: I just walked by and said, "I want something?" I said, "Whatever you want, then the store burnt down."³⁷

It is important to recognize that the rejection of a "slave job" is not an arbitrary, they are expressions of a desire. It is a desire to have the kind of work one might enjoy.

When earlier generations of African Americans during the Great Migration, and when Eastern Europeans and when whites moved from the South between and after the world wars, pursued work that was sometimes dangerous and menial "slave jobs," nor did they turn away simply that, as some assert, that "they pay their dues? This is too simplistic.

Former field hands from Virginia moved to Pittsburgh's steel mills and popular places like the Widemans' Homewood were dangerous, but which gave them a future, and they put distance between Klansmen, and Jim Crow oppression on farms in the 1930s in the hope of finding work during the Depression, or who chose to leave after they mustered out of the war, it is not to understate it dramatically, glamorous jobs promised substantially better than what was left behind.

It is unreasonable to expect that the Homewood of the 1960s, would look at the framework as his father's generation. Wideman explains part of the difference between the latter having been drawn to the city to make it big, and hope for the big future for the then-young Robby, Wideman.

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"Yo, can I sweep in your yard, mop or
if you are willing to pay, I'll take it." But

the desire for a "real job" or the
unwillingness to work. To the con-
re to have work that has real value.
rk that pays a decent salary and that

can Americans moved north in the
n and Southern Europeans arrived,
e hinterland to industrial centers
people willingly accepted hard, dirty
us.³⁸ They neither labeled employ-
away from distasteful labor. So is it
ey" are unwilling to work hard or to
c.

a, Georgia, and Alabama who went
lated first its Hill District and later
ood, took jobs that were dirty and
them a living wage and the hope of
between themselves and stoop labor,
n. Young whites who left Dust Bowl
nding the all too few opportunities
ose a more urban or suburban life
, often accepted work that was not,
orous or even attractive. But those
opportunity than the options they

Robby Wideman, coming of age in
ok at opportunity through the same
on. In *Brothers and Keepers*, John
erence in his life and his brother's,
o the fast life of the streets, a desire
g score. Writing in the first person
man conveys his brother's thoughts

before the family moved back to Hill
of Pittsburgh.³⁹

Having a little bit of a taste behind
wood. In a way I got mad with Mo
like they just didn’t want me to hav
go on about my business. Do it my
a home. They still expected me to b
didn’t know I thought youns was s
and groovier than youns ever thoug
thing. Had my own territory and I
lowing in nobody’s footsteps but m
better believe it. Wasn’t a hipper thin
couldn’t wait for them to turn me lo

It is unreasonable to expect that
tions will be satisfied by what came
selves the ones who take on the har
lives in the new land, do not even
fied. A major motivation for migra
sacrifice their children will do bette
able to reach for a dream that here
like them. Little wonder then that t
ised Land for young black people in
to the streets and others to national
satisfied and angry sons and daugh
the Nation of Islam, the Student No
(SNCC), and the Black Panther Part
Robby Wideman, instead chose the

When informants told Elijah A
damn slave job,” it was not, as many
didn’t want to work hard—but inst
hard at jobs with little future, low w
quently very correctly, that they w
in secondary sector jobs.⁴¹ Children
no jobs or mostly secondary sector
referred to as “social dynamite.” Th

Homewood from the Shadyside area

me I couldn't wait to get to Home-
 mmy and the rest of them. Seemed
 ve no fun. That's when I decided I'd
 way. Cause I wasn't getting no slack
 be like my sister and brothers. They
 squares. Yeah. I knew I was hipper
 ght of being. Streetwise, into some-
 was bad. I was a rebel. Wasn't fol-
 y own. And I was a hip cookie, you
 g out there than your brother, Rob. I
 ose in Homewood.⁴⁰

the offspring of immigrant genera-
 to their parents. The parents, them-
 rdships of the journey and establish
 expect their children to be so satis-
 nts is that through their efforts and
 er, have more opportunities, and be-
 tofore exceeded the reach of people
 he reality, so far short of the Prom-
 n America's urban slums, sent some
 ist movements. It was from the dis-
 ters of Great Migration movers that
 n-Non-Violent Coordinating Committee
 ty drew members. Many others, like
 fast life of the streets.

Anderson that “they didn't want no
 in the wider society assert, that they
 ead that they did not want to work
 ages, and where they perceived, fre-
 ould receive little respect: in short,
 n coming of age where adults have
 jobs are what Marxist scholars have
 ey are available to be mobilized by

political leaders who offer them a r
 ogy that offers them dignity and h
 the turn of the twenty-first century
 organizations. There were of course
 are politicians and more of whom
 which could deliver on the promi
 street alternatives appeared able to c

I've just written a lot about mar
 want to emphasize that the crimin
 young adults and children are not u
 and neighborhoods. In fact, most
 including consideration of race and
 group, instead using data about larg
 resents large portions of the Americ
 examples that I have mentioned fro
 white kids. The story of African A
 tion is one compelling story about t
 inequality, but it is not the only stor

Labor Force Instability and Juven

What, then, is the evidence that ac
 ence delinquency? A number of rec
 My colleagues and I, using severa
 evidence of this linkage. We've fou
 and occupational experiences help
 school. Even after taking into acco
 both families and communities the
 they influence juvenile delinquency

Along with several colleagues, I e
 experiences, mothers' employment,
 hoods as predictors of general deli
 and property crime.⁴² In that study
 was used, because it has three valu
 reports of respondents' delinquency
 ers and their children, and the respo
 tract of residence. The Children of t

AVE JOB!”

rejection of the status quo, an ideological hope. Most American inner cities at the time offered few such political visions or charismatic leaders, some of whom were in the churches, but neither of them moved as expeditiously as charismatic leaders do.

of marginalized black communities, but I have studied the synergistic effects of labor instability on crime, which is unique to African American people. Much of the research on the issue, while acknowledging ethnicity, has focused on no racial differences in inner cities or various data sets that represent the African population. And, so far, all of the cases from my old juvenile PO caseload were African American, a result of labor market marginalization and the consequences of persistent labor market instability.

Child Delinquency

Adult employment experiences influence child delinquency. Recent studies have addressed the topic. Some of the data sets, have found supporting evidence that both the parents' academic achievement and income predict how well children do in school. In addition, the economic circumstance of the family and these parental experiences matter, and

we have examined the relationships of school achievement, family circumstance, and neighborhood violence and delinquency—a combination of violent crime and delinquency. The Children of the NLSY data set has several notable characteristics: it includes self-reported delinquency, it contains data about both mothers and fathers, respondents are geocoded to their census tracts, and the NLSY data set was created when

women from the original panel of NLSY at the ages of fourteen and twenty-one began having children. The staff at the Center for Human Development at Ohio State University collected the data sets, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics collected detailed data about the children. The data that they gathered from the mothers followed only the mothers and children, not as they became fathers and their children. This is a limitation since the paternal activities of fathers are not knowable to researchers, and, even if they were, it would be difficult to be actively involved in their offspring. This limitation does create one problem for the study of delinquency thesis. Scholars of stratification have argued that the role of the father rather than the mother was most central in defining the structure of the family. The NLSY data only contain some information on whether the child was residing with the mother, when one parent was there. Even though the role of the father in the family (especially when they are not present) is central to the traditional family conception, the NLSY data is the best possible test of the thesis. The nature of the female labor market: it is not as stable and structured like secondary sector jobs. This is a considerable limitation from the study. A portion of the results are shown in Figure 4.1. The figure uses standardized regression coefficients to show the relative importance of some predictors of delinquency. The complete results of these analyses can be found in the appendix to the right of the y axis are associated with delinquency; those to the left of the y axis are associated with reported misbehavior.

What is clear from Figure 4.1 is that the most important predictor of delinquency is the juveniles' attachment to their parents. It is associated with how well they are doing in school and how well they are employed. Also, the presence of a father does not significantly predict if the

NLSY respondents (who were between 18 and 24 when data collection began in 1979) at the Center for Human Resource Research, who collect and maintain the NLSY. The NLSY Statistics had the foresight to begin following children along with the longitudinal mothers. For pragmatic reasons they followed children and not the initial NLSY males and their children. This was a reasonable decision because the behavior of these young fathers is too frequently erratic. Even when it is good, they are far less likely to have a positive impact on their children's lives. This pragmatic decision was made in the study of the labor stratification and social mobility, which usually focus on the occupational status of the father, because traditionally the father's occupation determines the status of the family. The Children's Bureau provides information about an adult male who is present, and for many of the cases where the father is not (or where women as financial providers to the household or single parents) no longer conforms to the traditional model. Thus, we are not confident that this is a representative sample. We have this concern because of the fact that many of the more "women's jobs" are considered less prestigious than men's jobs. Nevertheless, we learned from our results that the coefficient of our results is displayed in Figure 1. The regression coefficients to display the relationship between the predictors of delinquency (the table with the coefficients can be found in the appendix). Bars with a plus sign indicate that increased involvement in the father's life is associated with less self-

delinquency. We found that the most important predictor of delinquency is attachment to school, which is very important. The next is doing in school according to their ability. The next predictor of delinquency is whether or not they have a father or stepfather. The absence of a father or stepfather is associated with more delinquency. Young people in the sample engage




Figure 4.1. Explaining Delinquency Using School and Work. The variables in this figure, with the exception of Experience, are statistically significant. Also included in the model are variables measuring respondents' age, sex,* race, ethnicity, school grades,* parental involvement in school, and neighborhood where they lived. The table that Figure 4.1 is based on is available in the appendix. *Indicates that this was a statistically significant variable.

in delinquent behavior. On the other hand, living in a neighborhood with more delinquency.

Using the geocodes for these data, we can see that the geographic location and ethnic composition of the neighborhood where these young people lived provides a context in which delinquency plays out, but not in the way we might expect. Those who live in neighborhoods with a high rate of delinquency were less likely to become involved in delinquency. Consistent with important research by others, we find that, contrary to some popular stereotypes, Latino youth are not more.⁴³ Interestingly, after taking into account neighborhood differences into account in the model, we find that residents who are African American are more likely to engage in delinquency and that also is negatively related to living in a neighborhood with more delinquency.

After taking other factors into account, we find that those who live in neither more nor less likely to engage in delinquency.

SLAVE JOB!”

ected Education

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nts' Marital Status

in Central City

0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20

chool and Neighborhood Variables

n of juvenile employment and father pres-
l in the regression analyses were variables
city, mothers' education and employment,
characteristics of the census tract in which
on is included in the appendix.
ant predictor of delinquency.

er hand, family poverty is linked to

a, we were able to see that the racial
hborhoods (census tracts) in which
an important context in which their
e way that many might predict. Those
higher proportion of Hispanic resi-
olved in delinquency. This is consis-
er scholars who found that contrary
communities are less criminogenic,
ng family, educational, and employ-
e analysis, the percent of census tract
an is nearly statistically significant,
delinquency involvement.

ccount, children who worked were
age in delinquency when compared

with others. In this study we could not replicate the work of Rob Warren and his colleagues, who found that parents associated with delinquency for good or bad are more likely to opt out of school than those not invested in schooling. This is related to delinquency, but not necessarily to academic success. It is likely to be a detrimental influence on academic success for academically marginal.⁴⁴ But the parents are consistent with their position because of their own status as marginal students.

What are not displayed in Figure 1 are the results of the regression that speak more directly to the effect of parental employment on youthful involvement in crime. The regression equation that speaks specifically to the effect of parental employment on secondary sector employment, we have not displayed. Ensuring specific aspects of parental job quality, such as parental job packages, because we do not believe that we can control for worry about such specifics. Rather, we are interested in their parents’ work circumstance; parents’ education aren’t. So we simply considered whether the parents were in primary or secondary sector employment. That their parents’ education and work circumstances are predictors of juveniles’ school experience and academic success indirectly influences their academic success. It influences their academic success because parental employment is associated with students’ involvement in crime here (school performance), as has been found in other studies. They are strong negative predictors of juvenile involvement in crime. Those who do well in school are more likely to be employed in the secondary sector workers get lower wages.

Paul Bellair and his colleagues have found that parental employment for children when parents are marginal. In a study of the percent Roscigno found that parents’ employment is associated with both fighting and crime. These are negative factors in families such as child abuse, child neglect, and child maltreatment, which harm juveniles’ attachment to school. Bellair and his colleagues report that parental employment is related to delinquency, but this effect

not test the results suggested by the figures: that employment is negatively related to delinquency for good students, work is a reasonable substitute for school (and potentially positively correlated with delinquency for necessary causal), and employment is negatively related to delinquency on students who were somewhat delinquent. The pattern of results that we found is consistent with the idea that our sample contained good, bad, and

Figure 4.1 are other results of the analyses that control for effects of variability of adult employment and delinquency. While the labor stratification literature has focused on the problematic characteristics of parents, we have not been concerned with measures of parental quality such as the income and benefit of parents. We assume that children are knowledgeable or that they have a global appreciation of their parents' situation. Parents are either doing well or they are doing poorly. Whether the parents of the children in the secondary sector jobs. What is critical is that the children's work history were very important predictors of delinquency; parents' school and employment history are important predictors of children's delinquency through how they affect school performance. Parental secondary sector employment is associated with lower grade point averages. Grades are lower for children whose parents have been the case in many other studies, such as the relationship between juvenile delinquency.⁴⁵ Kids who don't get in trouble, and the children of parents with lower grades.

We have examined the consequences of parental employment. Bellair and Vinson (1998) found that low-wage jobs and unemployment are associated with drug use, which they attribute to reduced income and increased disengagement from both family and school. Their findings suggest that marginal parental employment is associated with delinquency that is mediated by school performance

and attachment. They also report that parents may either encourage or discourage their children’s success. Kids whose parents have completed high school and whose parents themselves accomplished high school and are less likely to engage in delinquent activity independent of the families’ income. The more market experience of parents is more likely to predict performance in school, and these children are less likely to be participating in delinquent activity.

What each of these studies indicates is that, in a substantial way, a function of school achievement (and influences). Those who get good grades in school are less likely to engage in delinquency, as are those who are good students of teachers. The importance of school achievement in delinquency is a more robust result than that of employment and criminality. Of course, the grade point averages, is positive. As others have reported, those who are good students these children are less likely to involve in delinquent activity. In other words, said, this protective quality of good grades is not equally to all children. The effects are not the same in some important ways, depending on the context.

The results that I just described were based on a subsample of the NLSY sample. Fortunately, the NLSY has several subsamples: a metropolitan sample (which is not confused with inner cities). Central cities are metropolitan areas—for example, the City of Chicago is a larger metropolitan area that includes several surrounding towns. There was also a subsample of non-metropolitan areas when they were available. The results from which these subsamples are compared respects the people who live in them and the relationships between the social and economic conditions who they influence in terms of crime and delinquency.

Figure 4.2 displays some of the interesting findings of the leagues and I found in our analyses of the NLSY metropolitan areas. As in Figure 4.1, the results

SLAVE JOB!”

that the parents' work circumstance
children in the pursuit of academic
done well occupationally, like those
ish more academically, do better in
e in acts of delinquency, and this is
e levels. Conversely, when the labor
re marginal, so too is their children's
children are more frequently partici-

ates is that delinquency is, in a very
ool experience (along with family
grades are less likely to be involved
re affectively attached to school and
l performance in predicting delin-
n the association between juvenile
course, school success, measured by
ely correlated to school attachment.
o do well in school like it most, and
olve themselves in delinquency. That
l school experiences does not apply
of school on delinquency vary in
n community characteristics.

vere for analyses of the full Children
e data can be divided into interesting
and a central city sample (not to be
cities are the core cities of metropoli-
Pittsburgh is the core city of a much
s many suburbs and numerous small
of respondents who lived outside of
interviewed. Not only are the areas
drawn different; in some important
m are different as well, and the rela-
onomic factors that we studied and
e and delinquency differ as well.

important relationships that my col-
s of the NLSY respondents living in
, the relative strength (standardized





Figure 4.2. Explaining Metropolitan Area Delinquency Variables

The variables in this figure, with the exception of the juvenile delinquency variable, are statistically significant. Also included in the regression analysis are students' age, sex,* race, ethnicity, mothers' education, parental involvement in school, and character education. The table that Figure 4.2 is based on is included in the appendix.
*Indicates that this was a statistically significant variable.

regression coefficients) of factors associated with delinquency. Factors associated with frequent behavior to the right of the zero line indicate a higher probability of involvement to the left of the zero line.

For the most part, these results are consistent with those found in the analysis of the full sample. The probability of involvement too is predicted by parents' work and income. The probability of delinquency for young people in metropolitan areas, as is the poverty status of the family. The probability of involvement status is not. There are two notable differences. First, the probability of involvement in metropolitan, urban, young people. Here, the probability of involvement in metropolitan areas were significantly less likely to be involved in delinquency. So while fathers did not seem to be associated with delinquency in the urban sample. The association between fathers' involvement and delinquency was not statistically significant.

The other result that is different from the full sample is that in examination of the metropolitan areas, the probability of involvement



Delinquency Using School and Neighborhood

...n of juvenile employment, are statistically analyses were variables measuring respon- cation* and employment, parents' grades, ristics of the census tract in which they lived. ed in the appendix. ant predictor of delinquency.

...s predictors of delinquency are dis- d with a greater likelihood of delin- y axis, and those related to a lower ft.

...are similar to the patterns that we ple. School attachment, which here d school success, is a strong predic- le living in American metropolitan heir families, but their employment e differences in the analyses of met- re, those who had a father or stepfa- ikely to engage in delinquent behav- o matter in the full sample, they do on is quite modest, but it is statisti-

...from our analysis of the full sample olitan subsample, the percentage of

juveniles' residential neighborhood is significantly related to lower involvement. The relationship is close to statistical significance in the case of the percentage of Hispanic residential population. The percentage of Hispanic residential population is negatively associated with delinquency. The relationship between the percentage of respondents who are employed full-time school (indirectly, parents' employment characteristics are taken into account) and delinquency is unrelated to their delinquency. The relationship between the percentage of respondents who are employed part-time school is taken into account, but those living in high-crime neighborhoods, holding other factors constant, are more likely to be delinquent. The law, no matter what their race or ethnicity, is that the causes of higher levels of crime and delinquency are a result of the effects of disadvantage. The patterns are also consistent with other research that suggests a simplistic linking of race and crime. The relationship between race and delinquency appear to be more complex than race and ethnicity.

Labor Markets and Juvenile Pecuniary Delinquency

To a large extent the patterns that I report in this study both property and violent crime are consistent with the likelihood that a child will have delinquency because of parents' work and educational experience. The relationship is not so straightforward.

Robert Merton's "Social Structure and Social Theory" is a theory of crime and deviance that argues that people believe the economy affects crime and delinquency. Merton argued that when needs and desires exceed the capacity to satisfy, individuals adapt to the situation by crime and delinquency. If you ask someone on an elevator why some sections of the city are likely to answer that it is because of the high rates of unemployment and the "people" who refuse to work and the "people" I derisively referred to as "the Jean

SLAVE JOB!”

that is African American is significant in delinquency. This association was in the full sample, but here, like the effect sizes, higher levels of black population delinquency after other factors, notably (employment and education) and family environment. To be clear, the race and ethnicity effects on delinquency after other factors are not in predominately Latino or African American areas constant, are less likely to violate the theory of race or ethnicity. These patterns suggest that the theory of delinquency among minority youth is about disadvantage and its consequences. These findings support other research that indicates that our current theory of crime is fundamentally flawed.⁴⁷ Crime is about disadvantage than about race.

Primary Crime

The findings I have just described hold when we control for other factors. Education directly influences delinquency, and their experiences indirectly influence delinquency. Curiously, income is not a significant predictor of performance.

“Strain and Anomie” systematically stated that crime is consistent with how many layers of social norm violators’ behavior.⁴⁸ Meritocracy is not matched by legitimate opportunities; some of these adaptations produce crime. A person you meet at a bus stop or in a city have higher crime rates, they are poor, or that the people there are poor, or that the environment, or those places are full of “bad influences” therefore commit crimes. This is what I call a “Valjean theory of crime” earlier. I





Figure 4.3. Explaining Property Delinquency
 The variables in this figure, with the exception of ...
 are statistically significant. Also included in the ...
 measuring respondents' age, sex,* race,* parents' ...
 full-time employment,* and characteristics of ...
 that Figure 4.3 is based on is included in the ...
 *Indicates that this was a statistically significant

want to be clear that I am not equating ...
 of strain theory with the Valjean theory ...
 as a vulgarized, popular version of the ...
 specify a more complex explanation ...
 in coming to their conclusions. Nevertheless ...
 strain theorists, though they get the ...
 nations, would both expect higher ...
 frequency and that poverty, unemployment ...
 would increase pecuniary crime and ...
 case.

In our earlier study, my colleague ...
 was positively related to participation ...
 niles whose families had relatively high ...
 frequently than did more financially ...
 into account other factors, including



of expected education and hours worked, the regression analyses were variables measured: employment, parents' education,* father's county of the county in which they lived. The table is in appendix.

an important predictor of delinquency.

Testing Merton's theory or any version of strain theory, though the latter may be seen as a more complex version of the former. Strain theories in general are more complex than our lay brethren typically use. However, those at the bus stop and those at the bus stop are by less and more complex explanations of family incomes to suppress delinquency, unemployment, or marginal employment and delinquency. This is not quite the

same as I found that family income is a predictor of property delinquency.⁴⁹ Juveniles with higher incomes did it more, not less, than the more academically challenged kids. When we take into account academic success and parents'

education and occupation, this poor income and property or pecuniary base?” some might ask. Well, I sort of knew a new juvenile PO many years ago. One or seventeen-year-old middle-class kid; his parents were together, his father worked, his mother stayed at home to take care of him. He repeatedly got in trouble at school for petty theft and drinking. In one of my interviews the mother literally said, “We’ve given him everything he’s ever wanted. He’s got all the do-gooders would have, wasn’t sure why he was doing it.” I laugh (inside of course) at this cliché. Instead I asked myself, “How does this anecdote, this story reminds us that parenting, are likely more important than families’ position in the social structure to determine how they behave. We should make sure that we don’t neglect to consider poor families, who also have a high chance to perform high-quality parenting which can lead to better outcomes.”

To an extent these findings show that the same is true years ago criminologist Charles Titmuss found in the results of a meta-analysis that four factors were the best predictor of juvenile delinquency. These studies, like our analysis of late childhood predictors of delinquent behavior. Scholars who have countered that self-reports of delinquency, ignoring serious violations, are not a reliable measure in the small sample sizes used. They argue that when serious crimes are included in the data, most often arrest data, that the same individuals are more frequent violators. In their studies criminologists might measure delinquency in terms of leagues offered a sound interpretation of the research results.⁵² Self-reports of delinquency focus on more minor violations, taking into account frequency than police reports that focus on more serious

SLAVE JOB!”

positive relationship between family
crime still holds. “How could this
of had the same question as a very
One of my first cases was a sixteen-
s, suburban white kid named War-
rather was working a decent job, and
care of my client and his sister. He
and in the community, usually for
my early conversations with the par-
don’t know why he’s like this; we’ve
nted.” I, like I imagine many young
if I should be stunned or if I should
éd expression of middle-class indul-
ow could this be?” Though just an
at other factors, such as the quality
rtant than income, the economy, or
cture in determining how kids will
t this is also remembered when we
have the added burden of trying to
ile struggling to survive.

uld not come as a surprise. Thirty
tle and his colleagues published the
nd that social class was not a good
⁵⁰ Others found similar patterns.⁵¹
abor market effects, use self-reports
who have contested these conclu-
ort studies focus on minor forms of
ations because they are too rare to
bles that characterize many studies.
nes are studied, usually using legal
he economically disadvantaged are
udy of the various ways that crimi-
ncy Michael Hindelang and his col-
on of these apparently contradictory
elinquency, because they frequently
p into a different domain of delin-
s on the more serious violations that

are likely to provoke official reaction more evenly distributed among the likely to be some form of negative frequency and social class standing, all Farnsworth and her colleagues point as a linear progression, but instead when there does appear to be a link to

One of the virtues of the NLSY have been exploiting is that the enough to include questions about crime. The initial NSLY data set (collected oversampled lower income groups, positive relationship between family a higher incidence of overall delinquent behavior) among children from poor class kids engage in a substantial amount only tangentially related to their parents are more likely to be involved in serious their particular economic status.

Teachers of criminology know classic theories to a class only to have dispute Merton or Cohen or Cloward “the biggest boozers and druggies and worst graffiti writers and shoplifters.” We all respond to these delicious and systematic observation, but even a deal of delinquency occurs in middle. To some extent some of this delinquency kids’ lives of privilege. In my classes relief and amazement on the faces of grounds when suburban, middle-class “baseball”—driving along suburban the group half out of the passenger residential mail boxes as the car speeds “doing donuts” on someone’s lawn. are not possible without a car. In fact “given everything,” Warren, got in to

n. The minor acts of delinquency are in the juvenile population, while there is no relationship between serious delinquency and social class, albeit not a linear relationship. Also, as we point out, if social class is not measured, we consider who is living in poverty, and how that relates to delinquency.

Using data sets that my colleagues and I have analyzed (sample sizes are sufficiently large to include serious property and even violent crimes, a collection of which began in 1979) also supports this. We believe that our two findings, that higher income and property crime and delinquency (both property and violent crimes) are more common in middle- and upper-class families, indicates that middle- and upper-class families have a greater amount of "bad stuff" that may be associated with their privileged status, and that the poor have more serious violations largely connected to

As well as the experience of presenting these findings to have students raise their hands and ask questions of Gard and Ohlin because, as they say, "I was at my high school and some of the kids who were the upper-middle-class kids." We support these anecdotes by explaining the value of these findings. As we do, we recognize that a great deal of delinquency in middle and upper class neighborhoods. Delinquency may be a byproduct of these environments. As I always enjoy the looks of disbelieving students from less privileged backgrounds, I always hear middle class kids describe playing "mail box" on the streets after dark with a member of the family on the side of the car, smashing roadside speed bumps. Or when they describe "harmless" recreational acts like my juvenile probationer who was in trouble driving around and drinking

with his buddies. Without a car, a
 Conversely, fewer middle-class teens
 followed, as they try to shop in anon
 who are stereotypically pegged as
 the store or by their manner of dress
 an uncommon experience.⁵³

The reason that we do not find
 between family income and most
 violations occur not just in the low
 among the upper and upper-middle
 “working class” to distinguish them
 classic blue-collar industrial worker
 Teenagers from these groups as well
 forms of delinquency too as they
 are egged on by their friends. And
 lar from their more privileged age
 distinguished from serious involve
 preneurial crimes. Serious crime d
 neighborhoods, and research indica
 in poverty are somewhat more likel
 careful, however, not to assume tha
 not all of the crime that occurs in p
 by the poor or even by people who l

Paul Jargowsky and company’s
 scholars do not find a social class
 tion to the domain issues pointed
 colleagues, because we have typical
 when instead the association is bett
 There are higher serious crimes for
 the very poor, but no real observabl
 favorably situated.⁵⁶ And this fits wi
 Farnsworth and her colleagues.⁵⁷

Our finding is that even after
 school success and attachment, pa
 and neighborhood characteristics,
 involvement is consistent with the
 sonable to expect poor kids to do it

“GIVE ME A REAL JOB!”

at least the violations are different. Managers have the experience of being victimized, by store security, but for kids in the lower-class either by the location of the store, or because of their race, this is not

the case. A significant negative correlation between forms of delinquency is that minor delinquency is more common in the upper-middle and working classes, but not in the lower classes as well. Here I am using data from the poor; the families of those discussed earlier are in this group. All as poor children engage in minor delinquency to stretch their adolescent wings and learn to do it in doing so they are not dissimilar to their peers.⁵⁴ These behaviors should be distinguished from violent, property, or entrepreneurial crimes which occur more frequently in poor neighborhoods. It is true that children whose families are poor are more likely to participate in it.⁵⁵ We should be careful not to say that only the poor are so engaged, and that the rate of crime in poorer neighborhoods is committed by those who live there.

The paper argued that a reason that the relationship between crime and crime relationship is, in addition to the one pointed out by Michael Hindelang and his colleagues, is that they searched for a linear association rather than one represented by a reverse J-curve. The data shows that in the very lowest social class groups, the linear pattern among groups more closely resembles the results described by Margaret

the data. Taking into account measures of parental education and employment, family poverty predicts delinquent behavior in a reverse J-curve suggestion. It is reasonable to suggest that more. In addition to the motivations

that propel delinquents of other c
 anger, and despair, and they live w
 for serious offenses. Yes, drugs are s
 markets that existed in profusion
 demic tended to be in poor comm
 that emerge when multiple generati
 are economically and socially mar
 crime and delinquency.⁵⁸

In saying that the children of the
 need, anger, and despair, which wer
 description of juveniles in *Delinqu*
 paint a picture of morose, Dickens-
 middle-class suburbanites are more
 in television's situation comedies,
 underclass neighborhoods. Anger a
 of oppositional culture and propel
 more to life in the ghetto than tha
 borhoods are surprised when at w
 with middle-class people who all to
 to expressing their sympathy "for
 in some inner-city neighborhoods
 and dangerous, but that is not the s
 residents. They have joys, fun, and
 juveniles there engage in delinque
 middle-class counterparts do; it is
 most—people who live there do not

What, then, can be said about la
 crime? While it does not appear that
 families where the adults did not do
 doing well occupationally increases
 crimes.⁶⁰ As is the case for violent
 quency work through the school ex
 then, is not consistent with either
 or with the fictional Jean Valjean th
 labor force and educational experie
 of the family's income, turns some
 not a good thing for their involver

classes they are motivated by need, where there are more opportunities to find work in the suburbs, but the open-air markets during the height of the crack epidemic. Also, the cultural patterns and traditions of the residents of a community that has been racialized give rise to more serious

The poor are additionally motivated by the conditions of their lives. In the important parts of Albert Cohen's *Juvenile Delinquents*, I should be careful not to stereotype these characters.⁵⁹ Just as the lives of the poor are more complex than the images presented in the media, so too are those of the people of the inner city. Hardship and distress motivate the emergence of crime in some to serious crime, but there is also a sense of community. People who live in these neighborhoods or school; they become friends and neighbors who frequently eventually get around to helping you having to grow up there." Life is hard, and too frequently violent. The sum total of the lived experience of the poor includes diversions as well, and sometimes a sense of hope for the same reason that their lives are so hard at times fun. And a great many—many—do commit crimes.

Unemployment, labor force instability and pecuniary hardship are the reason for it, being in the inner city, not doing well in school or are not currently employed. As a result of juvenile participation in property crime, these influences on delinquency are the experience of adolescents. Our work, which has produced simplistic versions of strain theory and social control theory. There is something about the conditions of parents that, independently of their own, send the children off to school, and this is a major factor in pecuniary crime. Members

of the Hole in the Wall Gang of more such kids. Their families, though not in the market and hadn’t done well in school, were particularly attached to school. With school hours fill empty, boring hours by breaking

But what about the special case of crime different from pecuniary crime more general above, may be more likely to be a feature of inner city neighborhoods because of the high unemployment rates there. We should remember that the research over fifty years ago, taught us that crime exists in greater abundance not in the inner city where the social structure is more organized and desperate.⁶¹ These lessons have been confirmed in more studies.⁶²

The bottom line is that poor kids and their neighbors suffer labor market marginalization for utilitarian motivations at times. The motivation for delinquent behavior is, as Cohen and Gottman in the 1950s, nonutilitarian. In *Delinquency and Opportunity* Ohlin described what happens for a young person to the legitimate means of achieving a good life. The most available illegitimate alternative objectives is described by Ohlin. In the Philadelphia neighborhoods of the 1950s, and commanding respect are alternative objectives to the material good life pursued in the

Kids and Entrepreneurial Street Culture

It is important to recognize that there is a large set of a larger hidden economy that exists in inner city neighborhoods. Sudhir Venkatesh, in his book *Social Capital and the Economy of the Urban Poor*, described

“GIVE ME A REAL SLAVE JOB!”

Many juvenile probation caseload were not urban, were marginal to the labor pool. The kids themselves were not without this mooring they elected to go into buildings.

of entrepreneurial crime? Is this differential? These crimes, as suggested associated with living in lower-class higher density of illegitimate opportunities. Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin, real illegitimate opportunities would be in the poorest communities, but in those organized and things are not quite so simple as reaffirmed by contemporary field

work and those whose parents and adult relatives participate in property crimes— but also, some portion of their behavior is described of gang members of the inner city. In *Opportunity and Crime*, Cloward and Ohlin describe adolescents who do not have access to the good life. They can become frustrated with success and giving up goals, or they can find alternative definitions of the good life. Legitimate occupations for marginalized youth are a good contemporary example of the inner city economy that Anderson studied, being tough alternatives to the goals that are linked to the wider society.

Crime

Entrepreneurial street crime is a sub-economy that exists in many inner-city neighborhoods. In *Off the Books: The Underground Economy*, Anderson describes a side economy of hustles, both

legal and illegal, which spring up in the
mainstream economic activity.⁶⁴ From
freelance mechanics, carpenters, home
loan sharks, pimps, prostitutes, and
illegal activity in these neighborhoods
the same economic marginalization
criminal—underground economy.

We should appreciate Cloward
because an individual does not have
obtaining the good life, it does not
to turn to illegitimate means that
nity for buying cars, houses, and the
conception of having "made it." To
the images portrayed in so many
have to be very successful entrepreneurs
pursuits. Most have neither the skills
but some do. A most important reason
this route is successful, older criminals
lucrative illegal opportunities.

Criminologist Jeffrey Fagan has
good manufacturing jobs, the ancient
them, and declining incomes, new
have emerged because of expanded
I described earlier, these options do
people, but most are likely relegated
vide economic benefits inferior to
bottom end secondary sector leg
opportunity requires the emergence
move drug marketing and other illic
helter-skelter delivery systems that
disadvantaged neighborhoods. The
bution, because of the ease with which
the relatively low-profit margin by t
just such a market. When cocaine m
rooms, and nightclubs of the midd
with the development of technique
ence" in the form of crack, a major

in response to marginalization from
 Examples of this behavior include
 house cleaners, and painters, but also
 drug dealers. Illegal entrepreneur-
 s should be seen as springing from
 that produces the shady—but non-

and Ohlin's invocation that just
 re access to the legitimate means of
 mean that they can simply choose
 will actually give them the opportu-
 e clothing that may constitute their
 o live like the fictional mobsters or
 rap videos, young criminals would
 neurs in the most lucrative of illegal
 ills nor the opportunity to do this,
 necessity for adolescents who seek
 nals who provide skill and access to

s argued that with the decline of
 illary industry jobs that supported
 ew illicit economic opportunities
 ed street-level drug markets.⁶⁵ As
 o appeal to many desperate young
 d to low-level roles destined to pro-
 those they might obtain even from
 gitimate employment. Real illegal
 e of individuals or organizations that
 cit enterprises beyond the atomized,
 exist on the street corners of some
 street market for marijuana distri-
 ch a person can enter as a seller and
 the standard of some other drugs, is
 moved from the posh parlors, game
 le and upper classes to the masses,
 es to deliver the "freebasing experi-
 or new opportunity was created for

enterprising individuals and organizations, and the illegality of the trade.⁶⁶ With the rise of crack through glamorizing "the life" or the "game," it attracted marginalized juveniles and young adults to trade jobs. Criminologist Garth Davis has noted the occurrence of the economic restructuring, deindustrialization and the emergence of crack

New York like other metropolitan areas, experienced the depths of a restructuring that had economic, and socially. The effects were concentrated in inner cities and other historically disadvantaged areas. In terms of employment, these areas were hit hard as opportunities in the legitimate economy that had been concentrated in manufacturing, migrated to the suburbs and the country. Nonwhite residents were excluded from the benefits on a massive scale, as the loss of blue-collar jobs deprived African-Americans of trade skills, economic advance and social mobility (Fagan, 1990). Many communities were forced to depend on the informal economy for employment and income (Kasarda, 1990). The informal economy has always been a vital part of the illicit economy, and as illegal endeavors became more income-generating, did drug enterprises.

These, then, were the circumstances that led to the intensification of poverty and social exclusion, not only the most lucrative employment opportunities in the inner city neighborhoods, but one of the few existing

Labor Markets and Juvenile Violence

When I first began the study of labor market marginality, at some level, I must have expected a way to explain a link between employment and violence. What initially intrigued me was the possible connection between labor market patterns and violence. In earlier chapters, I argued that link labor market marginality

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organizations that were unconcerned with crack someone could step forward through the effective use of terror, and young adults to low, entry-level drug jobs. Davis described the unfortunate con- ditioning that accompanied deindustrial- ization markets.

... areas in the mid-80s, was in the devastated neighborhoods both eco- nomically and socially. The effects of this destabilization were concen- trated in historically neglected communities. In- stead, it witnessed the decimation of opportu- nities throughout the 70s. Jobs, particularly in the inner city and other areas of the coun- try, were lost to a constricting labor market that eliminated blue-collar and clerical jobs primarily through automation. (Davis, 1992). Increasingly, people in these areas had to rely on unregulated labor markets for employment (Davis, 1992). Given that drug dealing has become a major part of the economy, it naturally followed that, in these areas, drug dealing became an indis- pensible part of community life, so too

... places into which crack emerged. With the loss of social disorganization, crack became an alternative employment available in inner-city neigh- borhoods during a period of declining job opportunities period.⁶⁷

Drug-Related Crime

... labor markets and crime I think that at its core is a version of the Jean Valjean theory to explain crime and property crime. But what actu- ally is the connection between labor market conditions and crime? In the chapters I described the mechanisms that link labor market conditions and violent crime. A question that





Figure 4.4. Explaining Violent Delinquency
 The variables in the table, with the exception
 are statistically significant. Also included in t
 suring respondents' age,* sex,* race, parents'
 full-time employment, and characteristics of
 that Figure 4.4 is based on is included in the
 *Indicates that this was a statistically significant

remained was whether the connect
 delinquency in general and property
 economy is related to violent delinq
 my colleagues and I found for violen

With violence, as is the case for
 success in the form of grade point a
 Children who have good grades les
 And as is the case with property cri
 tional success influences school suc
 ents' success they do better in schoo
 to popular expectations, when othe
 lence is unrelated to family income,
 live in the central city of their metr
 engaged in violent delinquency.

Other education and employment
 lence should also be noted. Juven
 for education engage in less violenc



of parents' marital status and family income, the regression analyses were variables measured: employment, parents' education, father's income, and the county in which they lived. The table in the appendix shows the regression coefficients for each variable. The variable 'Completed Education' is the most significant predictor of delinquency.

Other factors that have been observed for children who commit crime could also explain how the frequency of delinquency. Figure 4.4 shows results that indicate that 'Completed Education' is the most significant predictor of delinquency.

Other forms of delinquency, school delinquency, and grade point average is one of the best predictors. Children who frequently participate in violence. In addition, parents' academic and occupational success. When children see their parents succeed and are less violent. Also, contrary to what is often said, other factors are taken into account violence. But, interestingly, respondents who live in a metropolitan area are less likely to have children. The variables' association with violence. Children who have greater expectations for their future. This should not be surprising, as

this is a measure of their stake in community and future by investing in education, and that young people who held part-time jobs were less likely to experience violence like they were with proper supervision. The hours that they worked did not matter.

Two factors strongly indicate increased risk of school suspension and being neither employed nor in school: people who were neither in jobs nor in school were more likely to have been in trouble. This is the case even when you take away the best of these predictors of success (another factor associated with past success). Yes, young people who are suspended are the ones likely to be suspended, and it is the ones who are suspended who are also the ones most frequently employed. The importance of these two factors are a cause for pause to school administrations in considering suspension as a disciplinary tool?

With violence and property crime happening in school is very important to understand how to become involved in delinquency. An important education and crime thesis, children who are not employed in the labor market and who themselves are not employed are more likely to become marginalized.

Implications for the Long Haul

Earlier I described—lamented—the lack of charismatic leaders who might move the community. Malcolm X, the founders of the Black Panther Party, and the SDS in the 1960s. Of course there are such people (for example the Rev. Martin Luther King and Desmond Tutu), but such people are rare in inner-city life when viewed through the eyes of the young people who are mired in rural poverty. There may be some charismatic leaders moving the marginalization, but few signs point to organized political involvement, but few signs point to organized protest and action. Many young people b

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uniformity; they are investing in their
and by staying out of trouble. Young
are not more likely to be involved in
city crimes, and again the number of
ter.

Increased risk of violent delinquency:
ner in school nor working. Young
nor school were considerably more
is the worst-case scenario. Far and
of delinquency is school suspension
parental academic and employment
e getting into trouble already are the
should not be surprising that they
engaging in violence. But when the
e taken together, should not it give
the use of suspension or expulsion

me, analyses indicate that what is
ortant for understanding who will
and consistent with the labor stratifi-
those parents are marginalized from
es do not have academic success are
l from school.

ne seeming absence of politically
ve disaffected young people as did
lack Panther Party, and the leaders
e, on the world and national stages
wo of my favorites, Nelson Mandela
ople live a figuratively stratospheric
f teenagers of the inner city or those
well be local level, grassroots charis-
lized young toward affective politi-
nt toward discernible mobilization
ecame engaged in and involved in

President Obama's run for the White House, to some extent this included the disaffected and the unemployed. There are too few such charismatic, positive leaders to counteract more than an overabundance of charismatic, negative leaders. Entrepreneurs and rappers who seized the opportunity to become celebrities get the attention and adoration of the masses and then they can't find a way to mandeer them for labor.

Three ethnographies that I have read about street gangsters who effectively "manage" the day-to-day service of illegal enterprises: Ray Mears, *Respect*, Lance of the Black Mobsters, *Fences*, and John Lenard, the Black Panther Party projects that Venkatesh writes about. These are the disaffected children of marginal communities, too removed from the influence of the mainstream. In communities, the popular media offers a counterweight to the glories of the "thug life" and the "hip-hop life" with books like *Monster: The Autobiography of Sanyika Shakur aka Monster Kody S*

Bourgeois's *In Search of Respect* is a detailed description of what happens in a desperate, inner-city neighborhood. Charismatic, entrepreneurial criminals like Ray Mears, an anthropologist, lived in the New York City neighborhood for two years in order to study the street house run by Ray, a person not liked by the middle class but who is very successful. Ray's street producing produces crime in several ways. First, the illegal crime of Ray and Primo, the middle-class entrepreneur and those running the street sale of drugs. Second, criminals, selling crack on the street. Third, with no real hope of ever doing much better, they have a habit and supplying pocket money to the street. Fourth, they are under the age of eighteen and are involved in burglaries, larcenies, and other "thug life" activities. Alongside them are other people who do not sell drugs but participate in crime for dope. Finally, depicted in Bourgeois's

te House, but it is not clear to what from the inner cities. There may be leaders today, but there seems to be charismatic leaders of corrupt enterprises created by the invention of crack to some disaffected youth, and com-

mentioned include descriptions of juveniles and young adults in the in Philippe Bourgois's *In Search of* ers in Pattillo-McCoy's *Black Picket* Kings leader in the Robert Taylor at in *American Project*.⁶⁸ Just in case lized families and communities are such people and so-called opportu- constant flow of images calling them l publishers happily jump on board *Biography of an L.A. Gang Member* by Scott.⁶⁹

paints a painfully vivid descrip- e inner-city neighborhood when a nal is added to the mix. Bourgois, w York's Spanish Harlem with his udy crack distribution and a crack ikely to be defined as charismatic y much so on the streets. This set- ys. First there is the entrepreneur- anager of one of his crack houses, s. Then there are other pecuniary eet corner with Ray's blessing, but ch more than paying for their own t. These same dealer-users, many of a, also become involved in robbery, hustles" associated with desperate r crackheads and junkies who do rime, from petty to serious, to pay rgois's portrait of *El Barrio* is the

situation of company—the profuse aggression is readily displayed—there. All that Bourgois observes is visible by the marginalization and is away from the world of quality leg

Another group of criminals regular who are important for the criminal and for the economy of *El Barrio*: Goods, services, and entertainment and minority areas. During the Ha sought out its nightspots to see bl New York to San Francisco do a bo the same is the case for the Cuban and of Mexican barrios from San A for illicit markets. They come for dr for prostitution in the same as well haunt Appalachia hoping to score s venir or a conversation piece at their

In the early 1990s the Seattle Poli arresting drug dealers in buy–bust in the heart of the city’s black com. They then replaced the dealers with arrest customers seeking to buy dru surprise to residents and merchant arrested customers were not from poor, and most were not of a racial drug purchasers were from the Un white suburbs across the lake, the so atively large minority populations), borhoods on and hovering above Se

In the mid-1970s an African A newspaper wrote a story about tw stabbed in The Hill District. After i the off-duty officers were assaulted prostitutes. The officers both survive the irate wife of one of the officers through the phone, “How dare you v

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tion of people whose potential for
that makes violent crime more likely
in this neighborhood is made pos-
sible by the isolation of so many who live there
in a degrading and dehumanizing
and degrading work.

It regularly passes through the community
of illicit life around Ray's operation,
and the purchasers who do not live there.
They have long brought outsiders to poor
Harlem Renaissance whites regularly
to the back entertainers. Chinatowns from
to the booming business in the tourist trade;
and Haitian communities of Miami,
San Antonio to Chicago. They also come
to the slums to minority neighborhoods, and
to the ghettos as in marginal white districts. They
come to "shine" to take home as a sou-
venir for their next dinner party.

The Police Department ran a "reverse sting,"
to expose operations at known open markets
in the community, the Central District or CD.
It was with undercover officers in order to
to expose the slugs. Of great interest—and not a big
thing in the CD—the majority of those
involved were from the neighborhood. They were not
from a racial or ethnic minority. The thwarted
in the University District, the predominantly
in the southern suburbs (which do have rel-
atively few blacks), and the rather comfortable neigh-
borhoods like Seattle's Lake Washington shoreline.

An American reporter for a Pittsburgh
newspaper, who interviewed two white police officers who were
investigating his story, he wrote that
while seeking the services of black
reporters had received their injuries. After the story ran,
the police officers called the reporter and screamed
at him: "How dare you write that? If you could see me you'd

know that my husband wouldn’t be even those charged with enforcing the poor, marginalized people struggle in market places. I and others wondered how not reacted) had she known that the black former resident of The Hill.

In Sullivan’s account of three groups sees varying levels of social class in African American and Latino groups marginal to the labor market. The adults white juveniles lived tended to have collar jobs. The boys from this neighborhood Hamilton Park, are mostly third- or They have some job options because the neighborhood, as well as a few of contacts to the labor market. Not boys in *La Barriada*, the Latino community broader society and how the adults market than those in Hamilton Park. The called Projectville, which is predominantly same situation that Wilson described underclass or the ghetto poor as being in this circumstance.⁷¹ Each group social structure of their neighborhood the labor market, and the labor market

We must be careful to distinguish entrepreneurial street crime from unpromising future of legitimate and glorious alternatives: professional sports in drug marketing. The former is but a scarce few. According to scholar Eric a high-school student will become Association or the NFL are substantial physician.⁷² According to the National high-school basketball players have any pro basketball, and that is likely NBA; high-school football players

looking for no nigger." It seems that the law go to the areas where young, to make their livings in illicit mar- now that wife would have reacted (or e reporter she was speaking to was a

roups of Brooklyn boys, one clearly isolation and responses to it.⁷⁰ The ps live where most adults are mar- s from the neighborhoods where the ve comparatively well-paying, blue- ighborhood, which Sullivan called or fourth- generation white ethnics. use their fathers and other men in r local employers, provide networks ot far away, Sullivan recounts how mmunity, are more isolated from the are more marginal to the labor mar- ne third group, living where Sullivan nantly black, is in very much the ed when he wrote about the urban e subsequently described people liv- oup's criminal behavior reflects the od, the relative standing of adults to ket prospects of those juveniles.

ish the reality of the promises of n its reality. Teenagers facing an work look, with false hope, to two ports and organized crime, usually out a hopeless pipe dream to all but Henry Louis Gates, the chances that a player in the National Basketball tially lower than that of becoming a onal Collegiate Athletic Association e a 0.03 percent chance of playing y to not be in the US playing in the have but a 0.08 percent change of

going pro.⁷³ Yet the myth and dramatic talent, or who recognize early and take them far, the lure of big fast money is alluring. Juvenile street dealers brag about the money they make. They flash roles of bills and cash they are certain that they are on their way to becoming a big money dealer in Bourgois's *In Search of Respect*. They are taken as their neighbor who is coming to be the next Michael Jordan. The reality is that most have modest incomes (see chapter 1) do not become the big money drug dealer that is often shown on news media. Most local television news programs are familiar with the "Live at Five" news coverage of footage of arrested drug dealers carrying stacks of working police officers. Frequently, the news shows stacks of bills and the drugs taken from them. The reality seen on popular television shows and news programs is reported via the street's effective but often misleading is that often the bills are small denominations. The attention of it is owed to the street dealer who is most likely to be arrested is the street dealer having made sales, including those who are making a big buy. At these times they will brag about the money they hide the many days and weeks when they are not described earlier, drug dealing is a constant activity for the street dealer.

Readers should also note that television news coverage today is less popular than it was when it was first used in the late 1980s. In fact, there is evidence that the use of the 1980s and 90s was more of a success than a failure.⁷⁴ It was a new way to deliver news on the streets where it was popular. The reality is that money selling crack are not doing well. The reality is to speculate that popular beliefs about the impact of crack addiction sowed the seeds of the street dealers' demise.

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ams persist. For those without ath-
y that their physical skills will not
oney in the drug trade may become
g to their friends about the money
and wear gaudy gold chains. They
way to becoming the next Ray (the
spect). Many times they are as mis-
vinced that he's destined to become
y that most street dealers have very
es not comport with popular images
are advanced by both popular and
news watchers in major urban areas
(or Six, or Eleven) remote camera
uffed and being searched by hard-
somewhere in that shot is the wad
he alleged dealer. This image is also
and in movies, and it is also trans-
t inaccurate gossip line. The reality
nominations, or a substantial por-
er's higher-level supplier. The street
when business is going well—just
e unwittingly to narcotics agents, or
be flush (thus the big roll), but this
hen things are not going well. As I
notoriously up-and-down business

ne heyday of crack has passed. It is
n it arrived in many American cities
vidence that the “crack epidemic” of
urge in media reporting than actual
cocaine, so it changed some things
. Those who may have made a bit of
so well now. Some street observers
at the devastating characteristics of
f both the drug's popularity and its

There are, to be sure, those who s
to the life of street “soldier” of a cri
the latter ascend and actually are a
Along the way, the lives of most, and
are usually laid to waste. Nicholas I
the hope with which early residents
ing projects moved into new apar
the Robert Taylor Homes, Cabrini C
them, residents of Chicago’s so-cal
racial residential segregation to liv
hazard tenement slums on the South
especially the residents of the proje
long. Venkatesh describes the relatio
dents and powerful gangs because o
of leadership and real care on the p
authorities.⁷⁶ The gangs took contr
trade, but while the upper echelon
the organization received limited fi
to the whims, sometimes violent, o
first neglected and later abandoned
are further abused by entrepreneurial

In a world likely to frustrate asp
NFL, or real ascension to the truly e
world, most young people, faced w
prospects, can either settle for the
themselves in alternative terms. Thi
lations of Cloward and Ohlin, who
sizes that not all who are denied
obtaining socially sanctioned goals
tives that offer actual potential of c
“double failures,” as Cloward and O
niary sources of defining themselv
they described how this social circ
“retreatist” gangs, the former focus
and protecting turf—the classic stre
latter composed of those living life i

successfully move from being a thug to a legitimate business enterprise. And a very few of them were able to make an illegitimate living. The social life of their communities, as Lehmann's *Promised Land* describes, was largely a result of Chicago's federally funded housing projects.⁷⁵ Until the construction of the South Side Green, and other developments like the South Side Black Belt were constrained by the lack of housing in overcrowded, blighted, fire-ravaged South Side. Observers of urban America, like Lehmann, know that the hope did not last long. The relationship that developed between residents and the vacuum created in the absence of housing projects, part of the city and federal housing program, was a mix of control and made money via the drug trade. Some made money, the rank and file of the community were subjected to financial payoffs and were subjected to the whims of their superiors. The communities were controlled by local and national bureaucracies and organized crime and gangsters.

Aspirations for careers in the NBA or other entrepreneurial reaches of the crime world were limited or even no quality job opportunities on the lower rungs of the latter or define the social life, of course, is not unlike the formulation of strain theory emphasizing the lack of access to the legitimate means of achieving the good life. These individuals, who have access to illegitimate alternatives, often culminating in the good life. These individuals, when they refer to them, turn to nonpecuniary means. In *Delinquency and Opportunity*, Merton's theory of strain gave rise to "conflict" and the emphasis on building macho reputations among street gangs of the late 1950s—and the result was often drugged or alcohol oblivion.

Updated versions of Cloward and Gottman's theory are in rich detail by the accounts of Anderson and Sullivan of the neighborhoods. They argue that young men from contemporary economic struggles turn to illegal careers because the opportunities for legitimate or other lucrative illegal hustles, such as drug dealing, are limited. The opportunity to succeed in this way is often seen as a more viable option than pursuing school and low-level jobs. These individuals develop lifestyles similar to those of the traditional street gangs: they spend their days in pursuit of small profits, hits of crack, a bit of heroin, or a bottle of alcohol.

Others, though, especially the young men who engage in violent play behavior more like the conflict tactics of the traditional gangs, are about. Gangs focused on reputation and status through illegal enterprise is the reality in many inner-city neighborhoods. We've fed us a steady stream of public relations images of these young men, those who are in actuality more like the traditional street crime. For most gangs it is the age-old struggle for power that concerns them: some members individually, some as a group, not as an organized crime or gang activity.

Social Context Matters

Crime for many in the most downtown areas is a result of cultural adaptations, like the street culture, and produced substantially by the people living in some of the inner-city communities. These adaptations are different from recent cultural explanations of crime, a strong link made by contemporary social scientists to the conditions that beget these adaptations. Other explanations focus on structural forces, but fundamentally on the individuals' impoverished circumstance to the social context. Crime and poverty were explained in the past as a result of times it was the inability of "low-class" individuals to maintain poor maintenance of norms demanded by the social context. These explanations blame the victim.

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and Ohlin's delinquents are described by Anderson, Bourgois, Pattillo-McCoy, and others they studied, which suffer severely from economic shifts. A few can pursue real illegitimate activities are at hand in drug trafficking but most will experience little more than they would have by conforming to conventional employment. Most others will be stuck in Cloward and Ohlin's retreatist position. A few will have the prospect of enough money to buy a few dollars' worth of Mad Dog 20/20.

The youngest of the disaffected, will disorganize the gangs that Cloward and Ohlin wrote about and protecting turf more than on most American cities. The media has different explanations for different kinds of gangs, but they are our traditional images of organized crime: the old protection of territory that conventionally engaged in the drug trade, but now more activity.

The rottenness of inner cities is a byproduct of the social codes written about by Anderson, and the persistent economic marginalization of the inner cities of major cities. What is importantly missing from explanations of crime among the poor is the connection of the social structural conditions to the social structural conditions. Scholars in the past gave a fleeting nod to the social structural conditions, but they very much attributed individual behavior to those poor people's own weaknesses. The social structural conditions are explained by a common third variable: some "class" people to defer gratification, or to engage in hard work and personal accountability.⁷⁷ As William Ryan articulates, the social structural conditions are explained for the social structural positions in

which they live, within a wider society perpetuates their marginalization from

What both the recent ethnographic and qualitative research points out is that it is not economic marginalization reaches full force. We have found some evidence that in some circumstance and family poverty context, more happens when marginalized people live where those around them are out of hope or despair for their future because they expect those around them to be making their own future. In the next chapter I turn to focus on the relationships between work,

“FORGET YOU!”—an in-your-face phrase that is an antagonist in The Hill District of my neighborhood. On the surface it tells the person you say it to that they are irrelevant and not worthy of consideration. Consider the first letter “F” and what it might be substituting for in this phrase. The phrase that was used in older black culture was in Lou Rawls’s “you jive time Maryla” referring to putting neither residents of Maryland nor the phrase but was a substitute for another phrase. For purposes, “forget you,” also has two meanings. For young people to those who try to get out of the jobs they define as slave jobs. The angry insult is that to work such jobs is a put-down. Second, it is what the businesses, the community seems to regularly say to those caught in a structurally stratified labor market. To explain how leaders, such as those of the community, say that we—a community, a country—can’t do anything when there are people chronically unemployed, sleeping in parks and cars and sleeping on the streets of children to whom we deliver an inadequate education, just as some young people say to those who work in the secondary sector, “Forget you!”

ty and economy whose organization
om work and their poverty.⁷⁸

ies and a growing body of quantita-
not solely within the individual that
its full potential as a criminogenic
nce that both individual work cir-
tribute to criminality, but something
people are in a situation of company
f work, employed in dead-end jobs,
they see little hope in the experience
em optimistic about their economic
the important contextual influences
school, and crime.

ace epithet dismissively aimed at an
y youth—has two meanings.⁷⁹ On the
o that they don't matter, that they are
eration. But it meant more than that.
at stronger word than "forget" might
It is similar to another replacement
communities: "Maryland Farmer," as
and Farmer,"⁸⁰ which really was seek-
land nor agricultural workers down,
ase whose letters were "MF." For our
o meanings. First, it is the response
o pressure them into taking jobs that
nvocation is a consequence of feeling
n, a relegation to a lesser status. But
e economy, governments, and soci-
onsigned to the bottom rungs of the
They are forgotten. How else can we
F Pittsburgh I wrote about earlier, can
ry, an economy—has or will recover
nemployed, homeless families living
e heating grates of our cities, or chil-
ate education? We have said to them,
e opportunity for a life toiling in the

“Life in the Hood”

How Social Context Matters

John Edgar Wideman did not explain his accomplished life as a scholar and writer as a result of being a life sentence, by blaming those who sentenced him or on the two brothers' intellectual and cultural differences. And vital and in the eyes of the broader community, his younger brother is very different from the community, which changed from the time he was in their parents and differences in how

Because Homewood was self-contained, because its people depended on each other for many of their needs, they didn't notice the net settling over their community until it was in place. Even though the strands of economic exploitation, white hate and racism were there, what people didn't notice or chose to ignore was being drawn tighter, that ruthless power to choke the life out of Homewood. The interests would do just that. During the 1960s, a fist around Homewood, my mother was a part of it. But instead of setting her free, the truth was as the iron bars of Robby's cell.¹

in the differences between his accom-
and that of his brother Robby, serv-
e differences on their parents, family,
abilities. The family remained strong
other on the faculty of Brown Uni-
intelligent. It was Homewood, their
the community that had nurtured
these two bothers interfaced with it.

ained and possessed such a strong
ended less on outsiders than they
most basic satisfactions, they didn't
community until it was already firmly
of the net—racial discrimination, eco-
fear—had existed time out of mind,
not to notice was that the net was
people outside the community had the
ewood, and as soon as it served their
the final stages, as the net closed like
ner couldn't pretend it wasn't there.
truth trapped her in a cage as tangible

They still expected me to be like my s
I thought yours was squares. Yeah
than yours ever thought of being. S
own territory and I was bad. I was a
footsteps but my own. And I was
Wasn't a hipper thing out there tha
for them to turn me loose in Homev

Mrs. Wideman, their mother, re
tions of the changes she observed i
Robby and his friends, including o
died, she said:

Out there in the street doing wrong
What else can they do, John: Someti
money in their pockets. How they s
better than most. Whatever else he v
Westinghouse and helped out his m

Sociologists have long emphasized
context as an influence on what th
of no sociologists who have argued
the notion that social contexts matt
theoretical tradition. To a social sci
bution that changes in the character
ble for the pattern of life that Robby
or seem unlikely; rather, we woul
changes did not affect the behavior
or dramatically changing places. T
and they are a part of the authorshi
write that script alone. Their social s

We know that the rates for the
higher in poorer neighborhoods th
comfortable people live.⁴ We know
individuals from poor families are
of serious crimes,⁵ and there is an
previous chapter, that people who

sister and brothers. They didn't know . I knew I was hipper and groovier Streetwise, into something. Had my a rebel. Wasn't following in nobody's a hip cookie, you better believe it. n your brother, Rob. I couldn't wait wood.²

cognized the problem and implica- in Homewood. Speaking to John of one named Garth who had recently

g, but that's where most of them are. times I can't blame them. No jobs, no suppose to feel like men? Garth did was into, he kept that little job over at other.³

zed the importance of community e people who live there do. I know d that social context is destiny, but er is fundamental to the discipline's ence student John Wideman's attri- r of Homewood are partly responsi- y pursued do not come as a surprise d be shocked if major community in some who came of age in rapidly o be sure, individuals have agency, p of their own lives, but they do not setting is their coauthor.

most serious common crimes are an in those where more financially w too that this is in part because more likely to commit some types ecdotal evidence, mentioned in the are not poor sometimes come to

distressed neighborhoods to find ill getting involved in others crimes as tors. There is, however, something text than simply the additive acco When marginalized people live with a difference. These differences need are. During the Great Depression t types increasing and others decreasing of work or otherwise struggling to look about them and see many other were in the same lifeboat together, help arrived or the economic circum may turn out that the same phenom sion of the first decade of the twenty

Until the economic crisis of 20 postindustrial economy there were Now the unemployed and underer stantially, and as those people look in the broader society suffering alor very well. After decades of steady in the US began dropping in 1999.⁶ An of CEOs’ to workers’ wages has gon four hundred to one.⁷ One cannot r Depression-era “lifeboat together” cidence of these trends. And it is r executives that causes comparative class jobs have disappeared, jobs for in formerly industrial centers (see c

The Great Recession has accelera by some the “hollowing out of the and the stagnation of other middle increasingly richer. In 2009 Americ est income brackets. There, income ployment rates stayed high and th stimulate economic growth.⁸

Early in the twentieth century, argued and offered data that, unlike

legal goods and services, potentially as well as both victims and perpetrators. More to the influence of social conglomeration of individual behaviors. With similarly situated people, it makes sense not to be negative, but some of the uneven changes in crime, some of which, was possible because people who could survive or feed their families could do so in the same circumstance. They were struggling together to hold on until the circumstance engulfing them subsided. It was a phenomenon that occurred in the Great Recession of the first century.

In 2008, as the US became more of a global economy, not as many people were put out of work. Unemployed ranks have increased substantially, but instead of seeing those struggling with them, they see others doing well. An increase in labor force participation in the US and in the past three decades the ratio of employed to unemployed has gone from about forty to one to nearly one to one. We really expect many to have the Great Recession definition of reality with the coincidence of the relative income of chief executives and the pain. While low-skilled, working-class and more educated people were created (see chapter 2).

There is another trend in the US, called the "hollowing out of the middle class": the decline of many middle-class incomes as the wealthy grow richer and lower-class incomes fell, except in the high-tech sector which grew substantially even as unemployment rose. The federal government struggled to address these issues.

University of Chicago sociologists have identified the fears popularly expressed about the future of the middle class.

the negative behavior and character
ior” was a characteristic of the neigh
of the people themselves.⁹ In rece
theory espoused by the Chicago Sc
and extended.¹⁰ Robert Sampson and
collective efficacy of communities.
hoods have that characteristic whe
for their neighbors and to act in fun
That might mean interceding if chil
police to report drug dealers. Collec
for effective social control of both r
Criminologists Robert Bursik and
what they call a systemic approach t
tion, the concept of institutional in
developed and fostered leads to mor
that in reality we have to see neigh
economic, political, and institutional
both versions of modern disorganiz
things, is the importance of social co

Labor Market Contexts

As I described earlier, we have fo
work and crime is influenced by
nearby.¹¹ In that study of young adu
who spend more time out of the la
in both violent and property crime
only observed where unemployment
county, which can be thought of as
tant context for adults who are work
likely very different for children wh
less mobile than their adult counter
may be the more important venue f
tances who influence their lifestyle
as teenagers grow older and learn t
areas” will expand, especially if the
tive public transportation.

of immigrants, “pathological behav-
 neighborhoods they inhabited and not
 nt years the social disorganization
 hool sociologists has been renewed
 d his colleagues have focused on the
 High-collective efficacy neighbor-
 re residents are willing to look out
 rtherance of informal social control.
 dren are acting badly or calling the
 ctive efficacy is a resource necessary
 residents and those passing through.
 Harold Grasmick emphasized, in
 to neighborhood social disorganiza-
 interconnectedness, which when not
 re criminal behavior. Their point was
 orhoods as existing in wider social,
 l environments. What proponents of
 ration theory agree on, among other
 ntext as a determinant of behavior.

und that the relationship between
 y the employment of those living
 ults, we found that men and women
 bor force are more likely to engage
 s. Importantly, though, this effect is
 nt rates are higher than average. The
 the local labor market, is an impor-
 king or seeking employment. This is
 o, even when bussed to schools, are
 rparts. For them, the neighborhood
 rom which the friends and acquaint-
 and behavior are drawn. Of course,
 o drive their “friendship catchment
 y have ready access to cars or effec-

Larger political entities such as nation state are important in that t and the smaller units constitute so In a discussion of how the econo the structure of labor markets, it is economies and the emergence of g makes requisite the consideration changes to labor markets resulting f nationalization of both capital and j

To a large extent the current c occurred because of a combination the United States' national econom short-term planning horizons, and appears to rule. Such a philosophy in predatory lending, for banks to bothering to take requisite legal step to CEOs and executives even when ment bailouts. These and other pat when they came to light in the Gr signs are evident that a new ethic culture, I mean that the focus on characterize both management and ment set the stage for what occurre Wall Street's quarterly profit expect ning for reelection as soon as the negotiate the biggest packages that when doing so threatens the comp times even entire industries. To full individuals to engage in crimes, or higher or lower crime rates, we ha cesses are occurring within larger n

What occurs at the national and mines how regional and local econ Rust Belt cities and states suffered We should not make the mistake o and lost jobs to globalization. T moved out of the cities and continu

counties, cities, states, or even the
the latter constitutes a labor market
me form of localized labor markets.
ny affects common crime through
important to acknowledge national
globalization as an economic force
of the worldwide economy and
from the migration of and the inter-
jobs (but less so workers).

circumstance of American workers
of the globalization of markets and
nic culture; where quarterly profits,
d a take-the-money-and-run ethic
allows mortgage bankers to engage
foreclose on homeowners without
os, and the rewarding of big bonuses
the company has accepted govern-
terns shocked the American public
reat Recession, but as of today few
is emerging. By national economic
short-term profits and payoffs that
d unions, corporations and govern-
ed. Corporations are driven to meet
tations. Elected officials begin run-
ey are elected. And union officials
t they can for their members, even
etitiveness of companies and some-
y appreciate how the economy leads
for neighborhoods or cities to have
ve to recognize that the local pro-
ational and international contexts.

d international levels in turn deter-
nomies fare. I wrote earlier of how
l as a result of deindustrialization.
f attributing all of the closed plants
rue, some American corporations
ue to move sizable portions of their

operations offshore to take advantage of tax incentives, and others struggled to find new locations, but there were domestic shifts in states as well. The Sunbelt states of the South and West coaxed executives to consider them as alternatives. A number of these states have "right-to-work" laws that remove restrictions on movements in some northern and western states, or there are rules disallowing close ties between companies and policies, and residents and workers. Consequently, unions that were crucial to industrial workers in the Rust Belt states have less influence on the economic welfare of workers in the industries moved. Also, these states could provide land in uncongested areas for new facilities, thus dropping their costs for land or shipping finished product. The region has good weather, cheaper workforces, and quality of life (for executives) in some areas, as some non-US locations, certainly. In the 1980s, both opened new plants that were closed in northern states.

The General Motors Corporation's new Saturn plant in Smyrna, Tennessee was the result of a number of possible locations, but the competition—a competition with many states actively bidding to lure the new plant—was lost out on a new Toyota plant to the west.

The open competition for manufacturing plants, though the nature of manufacturing has changed. Today it is more likely that states and cities compete to be the new hubs of manufacturing, bringing high-paying jobs and tax revenue, and pollute (another local cost averted). Consequently, many do not go to current residents, but workers from elsewhere, these new

ge of offers of lower worker costs or uncompetitively with non-US com- ts that cost jobs in the old industrial the South and West encouraged and as sites for new, modernized plants. ight to work” laws (and there are midwestern states to do the same): d union shops and other antiunion who believe less in organized labor. critical to the wages and benefits of states are less able to wield power or workers in some of the states where s tend to have lower tax rates. Many areas where companies might build costs for bringing in raw materials result of these states’ abilities to offer weaker unions, and other financial ncentives, made them, if not as easy y appealing. Big Steel and Big Auto cleaner and more efficient in South-

n’s sighting of its now-shuttered Sat- as a good example. After consider- GM made Tennessee the winner of ith a number of potential locations nt. And after a bidding war, Tennes- o neighboring Mississippi.

ufacturing facilities continues, even ng in the US has changed dramati- es are competing for modern “clean” ls have convinced their constituents new Silicon Valley. States, counties, ni-tech, biotech, or green industries and businesses that are less likely to And even though resulting jobs fre- nts but instead attract highly trained residents contribute handsomely to

local tax bases and enlarge governmental purchasing power—also a good

In the 2008 presidential election provide good, clean jobs in an emergency, as rising oil prices and global warming do promote the development of new industries. Free-market fevered competition to determine winners is a constant theme in 2012 presidential politics. It encourages, and might discourage the

Several years ago, when Boeing Aircraft Company moved its national headquarters out of Seattle, Washington, Denver fell over each other to land the company. Bids would come with the relocation. China, India, and other states and nations waiting anxiously to compete, upped their bids to obtain all or part of the next generation jet liner. The company relocated to the states within the US), where they had manufacturing plants to complete part of the assembly. The bid for the 787 aircraft was won by the State of Washington package to Boeing of tax breaks and incentives worth three billion dollars.¹² But then Boeing announced a bid for the 787 in South Carolina, with a bid of \$1.5 billion after receiving incentives from that state. Boeing decided to invest so much in such competition.

Several times I have returned to Seattle, Washington, invited by friends to spend an evening with them. One employee joins them and later is seen at work the next morning. Later I returned to Seattle, Washington, area as a twenty-first century city, in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks. Boeing is a major manufacturer and employer in the area. Boeing's investment in other modern-day industries, such as technology manufacturing, and biotechnology, has led to competition from Europe's Airbus and the Boeing's competition. In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks and the Pentagon, Boeing laid off in the Puget Sound region. Boeing's en-

ment coffers, and they bring substantial things for the local economy.

, candidates argued that they would bring green economy. If high-energy reduce the political will that leads to , we can look forward to increased where companies locate. An important factor was how the federal government the movement of jobs off shore.

Boeing announced that it would move to the cities of Chicago, Dallas, and the corporate prestige and jobs that Chicago won. In 2003 Boeing kept both while various locations repeatedly of the assembly facilities for a new rewarded several of the nations (and have major customers, with commitment in their plants. Final assembly of state of Washington, with an incentive and other benefits totaling more than ng opened a second production line a less skilled but cheaper labor force, state. Why are nations and states willing to do this? The answer is simple: jobs.

to the example of two young men who were socializing: the secondary sector is more susceptible to getting in trouble, while the primary sector, declines, citing the need to be competitive. I described the Seattle metropolitan area as a success story because of Boeing's presence as a major employer (there is also considerable employment in other industries such as software and computer technology). As a result of competition and a downturn for airline companies in the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center, the loss of an excess of thirty thousand workers in the primary sector employment has since bounced back.

If we change the example so that in-
worker, it becomes a good contemp-
tics, international competition, the
and the governments that comprise
ernment of the State of Washington
local level. In the city of Seattle and
our two young men live in, these far-
I initially used this example it was
investment that one young man was
2002 and 2003 he was more than li-
not unlike the laid-off workers of U-
Corporation several decades earlier.

Although the Seattle area econo-
as it once was (in the early 1970s was
extremely deep and prolonged slum-
Seattle-Tacoma International Airport
Leaving Seattle Please Turn Out the
times for airline companies and for
negative effect on the local economy
Boeing had not rebounded or if its
then the ripple effect through the ne-
hoods might possibly have increased
Boeing worker would have had to fir-

There are two issues that we must
employment or labor market distri-
ments such as neighborhoods condi-
forces of nations, and, how do vari-
condition the relationships between
their involvement in crime? The des-
two issues are not separable, but
analyses of the issues themselves are

Local Labor Market Conditions and Neighborhood Crime Rates

Our earlier analyses of the capacity
explain neighborhood homicide lev-

Instead of a steelworker it is a Boeing temporary example of how world policies of both the US government the Airbus consortium, and the gov- are critical for what happens at the in the imagined neighborhood that away occurrences affect lives. When to draw attention to the long-term as making in his entry-level job. In kely laid off—last hired is first fired, nited States Steel or General Motors

my is not as dependent on Boeing when aircraft production was in an mp, there was a billboard outside of t that read “Would That Last Person Lights”), the post-9/11 bad economic Boeing have not had as an extremely y (bad, but not catastrophic). But if high-quality jobs were not replaced, metropolitan area and its neighbor- l crime because our young would-be nd work in a McJob, if at all.

t now explore: how are the effects of butions on crime in local environ- tioned by industrial and economic riation in these local environments n individuals’ work experiences and scriptions above illustrate that these empirical links between them and e fairly new.

nd

y of labor stratification variables to els in the census tracts of three large

American cities, Cleveland, Seattle, to exam how three different types processes within their communities selecting these three cities was that departments collected and maintain the local neighborhood sized units Census. Law enforcement in few mu the time. Since then, interest on the crime hotspots and software and tec more departments to collect these d city's selection was to represent diff labor markets.

One of those cities, Washington characteristic: it was, until just the first a black city. One of the early large mayor, Walter Washington became elected mayor in 1975 after Congre to his years of service in the federal appointed mayor (prior to home rul of the large majority black populati did not get home rule until 1974; u like a colony of the rest of the cour today, the Congress has a very str social and economic structure of W from its blackness. Washington, wh in the nineteenth century, drew ma the Civil War. Government jobs ar city a popular draw for blacks durin usually only low-level jobs were op period African Americans continu by then it had developed the reput advancement because of the large black businesses, and a sizable black

As I described earlier, the labor dictated 1990 neighborhood homicid the same was not true in Washingto der rates using neighborhood emp

and Washington, DC, was designed to study how differences in local labor markets affect social inequality. ¹³ A not inconsequential reason for this was that in the early 1990s all of their police departments had crime statistics for census tracts, which were established by the US Bureau of the Census. Municipalities maintained such data at their own expense. In part of researchers and the police in the past. Technological advances have led many cities to collect such data. The substantive reason for each city's different kinds of local economies and

Washington, DC, has another very important characteristic. In the decade of the twenty-first century, many large American cities to elect a black mayor. In the District of Columbia's first election, the city council approved home rule. In addition to the mayor's government and his performance as mayor (see the next section), Washington was elected because of his long residence in the District. The city had been set up until that time it was governed, not by the city, but by the US Congress.¹⁴ And still a strong voice in DC governance. The city's history in Washington could not be separated from the city's history which had included slave markets early in the city's history. Many freedmen to "Lincoln's city" after the Civil War and civil service positions made the city a magnet during the Great Migration, even though it was not open to African Americans. After that, many people wanted to move to Washington, because of the reputation of being a good city for black people. The city's black community, the presence of a black middle class.

The social stratification thesis effectively predicts the murder rates in Cleveland and Seattle. But not in Washington, where we could not predict murder rates or employment variations. What explains

the variation in homicide rates in neighborhoods' populations that are powerful predictor that no other in-
sis can be statistically significant—
cational attainment, not communit
large numbers of young men, and
hand, the percentage of black resid
ful predictor of homicide rates, stro
cators as well. That is, the high-po
neighborhoods. The low-education
hoods, as well as those with high lev
tantly for our purposes, so too are
levels of unemployment and empl
important reasons for their high po

One cannot say that in Washing
in a distressed neighborhood; we n
black middle- and even upper-mi
borders of the District of Columbi
borhood or one where many people
and certainly to live among more p
market, is to live in predominantly
remember that Washington, like m
racially residentially segregated.¹⁵

Those who love the District, as it
who live there, no doubt took excep
of it as similar to the apartheid citie
matter is that few cities outside of th
inequality, which nearly parallels r
before recent gentrification change
of such a place predicated on a theo
ties in the modern industrial world,
ply be overwhelmed by Washington
inequality that also includes consid
not even measured in our study.

Unfortunately, a study of three c
the variations necessary to capture
markets condition neighborhood p

Washington is the percentage of the black. This one variable is such a predictor included in the same analysis—not poverty rate, not average education, not divorce rates, not the presence of labor instability. On the other hand, in addition to being a powerful predictor, it also predicts other important indicators: poverty neighborhoods are also black neighborhoods, high levels of family disruption and, importantly, those places with relatively high employment in secondary sector jobs—high poverty rates.

To be African American is to live in a distressed neighborhood. But to live in a distressed neighborhood does not mean you have not obtained much education, or that you are marginal to the labor market. It is a black census tract. And we must remember that in most American cities, remains highly

is affectionately referred to by many as the “ghetto,” in addition to my earlier characterization of South Africa, but the fact of the matter is that the Third World have had the level of racial inequality, as did Washington and the city’s complexion. An analysis of the city that explains persistent inequality is not a dual labor market theory, may simply be a reflection of the city’s level of racial social and economic inequality, and considerable political inequality that was

ities cannot really take into account the fact that the composition of local labor market patterns, but now that census tract

crime rates for a large number of cities. The Neighborhood Crime Survey (NCS) is a national survey of this multilevel process works.¹⁶ The survey tracks the crimes that occurred in each of the census tracts in 100 American cities. There were more than 8,000 census tracts (and census tracts) in these cities. Included were large cities such as New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago, but also some smaller ones such as San Antonio, San Diego, and Tucson, Arizona. Included were cities with diverse economies (Seattle, San Francisco, and San Jose) and cities with other industrial configurations (Cleveland, Pittsburgh, and Washington).

Recently my colleagues and I used the NCS data to study how variations in local labor market conditions, industries and jobs in cities and the neighborhoods affected the levels of crimes in their neighborhoods. We found that the neighborhoods (census tracts) with the highest rates of violent crimes in American cities included the neighborhoods with the highest levels of disadvantage and labor market characteristics such as labor instability of metropolitan (local) labor markets, high rates of violent and property crimes in neighborhoods, and high rates of unemployment. These are important things. First, neighborhoods with high rates of unemployment, where jobs are more likely to be low-paying and less stable, have higher average rates of violence than those with high rates of jobs. Also, neighborhoods in cities with high unemployment (typically offering jobs with second-tier wages and benefits) in the local economy, there are higher rates of violence.

Offering additional evidence that the labor market conditions that drives American social life, we found that neighborhoods with high rates of labor market jobs that were in these high-paying and stable industries had lower levels of violent crimes in neighborhoods (census tracts) than others) that this is evidence that the labor market conditions in American industry, and its consequences, have not yet been completed.¹⁸ That said, we know that the effects of the Great Recession most acutely felt are still suffering. Nationally, however, the effects of the recession appear to be as important as it was in the past. The effects of the recession in Cleveland, Seattle, and Washington

ities are available through National (NS), we are now able to examine how NNCS includes information on the census tracts of eighty-seven American individual neighborhoods (cent in the survey are many large cities, Fort Wayne, Indiana; Akron, Ohio; re cities of the old Rust Belt (Pitts-Detroit), thriving cities with diverse Boston, Miami, and Denver), and ations.

used multilevel modeling techniques for markets (the characteristics of the counties that surround them) affect neighborhoods.¹⁷ We used NNCS to study that are nested in the eighty-seven and that over and above the levels of characteristics of neighborhoods that (local) labor markets influences both neighborhoods. We discovered several oods in cities with high-level service ke primary sector jobs, have lower e in cities with fewer of these kinds es where low-level service industries ary sector characteristics) dominate levels of violent and property crime. t it is no longer just manufacturing e found that the proportion of local e industries had no real effect on the hoods. We think (and this is consis- ce that the transformation of Ameri- that Wilson documented, may have now that communities that felt the acutely because of plant closures are the level of manufacturing does not e when my colleagues and I studied in the 1990s.

We found the same patterns for property crime that had comparatively more people working in the service sector had, in addition to more violent crime, more neighborhoods in cities with more high-quality jobs that put more people into jobs that have the potential to pay more work, have lower property crime rates.

Interestingly, it is not just the displacement of secondary sector workers into neighborhoods with fewer high-quality neighborhoods that are within local labor markets that contribute to a disproportionate share of low-end, secondary sector jobs see their crime rates go to the next level of disadvantage and the kind of neighborhoods that matter, but the displacement of workers as well. Governments that want to reduce crime should recognize that maintaining high-quality positions to workers not only benefits the local economy, and the health of the community, but the maintenance of healthy, low-crime neighborhoods.

Neighborhood Context and Crime

What, though, of social context in neighborhoods? What is important is social context? Criminologists have been trying to empirically specify the effect of social context on involvement in criminal behavior, and it has proven to be a difficult enterprise. Often no effect is found, and when one is produced, it is often weak (prematurely in my opinion) conclusions that a person's life has little or no real effect on crime rates. It is obvious from that last sentence that I do not believe that social context is unimportant, but very important. At times we struggle with this because our means of measuring social context are limited, but they are improving. The most recent research techniques that show modest effects of social context on crime rates, but they offer compelling evidence as well.

property crime. Local labor markets
 e employed in secondary sector jobs
 me, more property offenses. Neigh-
 -level service industries, which hire
 e characteristics of primary sector
 tes.

istribution of the primary and sec-
 orhoods that matter. We found that
 al labor markets with a disproport-
 ry sector workers in low-end ser-
 o the highest levels. It is not just the
 of employment held by residents of
 e character of the cities they are in
 o improve the lives of their citizens
 and attracting employers that offer
 ot only benefit those workers—they
 y have important consequences for
 me communities.

Prison Involvement

which lives are lived? How impor-
 tants for some time now have been
 ffect of social context on individual
 but we have collectively found this
 o statistically significant effects can
 d the effect is small, leading some to
 ude that the environment in which
 effect on their behavior.¹⁹ It is obvi-
 do not share this belief, but instead
 is not just substantively significant,
 struggle to illustrate this statistically
 nd analyzing contextual effects are
 here are now analyses using regres-
 but theoretically important influ-
 , and recent ethnographic studies
 ; with the emergence of network

g techniques we have new tools that
solving this issue, but they are helping

chapters 2 and 3, that poor places,
have higher crime rates than do bet-
t we cannot attribute this solely to
perhaps the diminished social capi-
s poor communities, or simply the
o go for those motivated to commit
illegal activities, likely contribute to
ut while we do not want—as every
ows—to commit the ecological fal-
rrelations, it is reasonable to expect
te lives are measurably more likely
now that simply looking at individ-
es not necessarily predict crime in
ur expectations are based on simple
4 we saw that in some of our anal-
erty crime was positively related to
was humorously illustrated on the
riminology text, not even the most
to the poor side of town, obviously
with a bit of money, in the dark of
per saying that crime is unrelated to
e struggle to display it in our mod-
s when real poverty is concentrated.
t in which the individual's economic
environment to affect that person's
d where more such people live and
is is what Anderson observes when
pt “street” values and behavior as a
ats around them.

ial Context

employed during the last year were
mitted a criminal violation if they

had a solid job. Those working in service jobs had an elevated probability to have commuted to work in the previous year, and that this effect is present for those with unemployment but not those with a job. These findings make sense as a measure of social capital, so much of this theory as well as other theories. And counties cannot be conceived of as a neighborhood or community. Which brings us to the question of context affects the relationship between neighborhood social context, my own research on labor market participation and crime by individuals, and respondents' individual characteristics, measures of neighborhood composition (the percentage of black residents, level of social disadvantage.²¹ Social disadvantage scale that included the percentage of residents who were poor, the percentage on public assistance, the percentage over eighteen living in poverty, the percentage of residents who were in the labor force). Neighborhoods did not have the same composition of respondents' neighborhoods. Neighborhood disadvantage had only very small direct effects on individuals independently of the respondents' employment characteristics. The only significant was (and again contrary to what I expected) that net of individual characteristics, neighborhoods with blacker populations were a little bit more criminogenic.

Consider our results in the context of the contextual analyses summarized in Massey and Denton, who argue that the concentration of poverty defines the criminogenic circumstances. The result is that the resultant concentration of poverty in neighborhoods again that individuals who are more disadvantaged are more likely to become involved in crime. The effect of neighborhood context does not matter when we control for individual characteristics and circumstances. The percentage of the population that is black in a neighborhood that they will be less involved in crime if they are

secondary sector occupations had an admitted criminal action in the previous year in counties with higher levels of unemployment than in counties with a comparatively low unemployment rate. The findings are focused on neighborhoods, not on anything like a neighborhood effect. This raises the question of how neighborhood effects are related to work and crime. To examine this question, my colleagues and I have studied labor market conditions, including, along with the response variables, measures of their census tracts' racial composition (black and Latino residents) and the level of social disadvantage was measured by a number of indicators: the percentage of residents who were extremely poor, the percentage of the population who were single, the percentage not married, and the percentage of the workforce but not employed. The findings are in line with the effects that we expected. The ethnic effects were significant for neighborhoods and the level of social disadvantage had significant effects on the criminality of individuals. The effects of individuals' personal, educational, and neighborhood effects that was significant (contrary to most criminological expectations) are that, those who live in neighborhoods with less social disadvantage are less involved in crime. In the context of the findings of our county study, the findings in chapter 3 and those presented by other researchers that racial residential segregation magnifies crime in black communities because of economic disadvantage and disadvantage. Here we see that individuals who are marginal to the labor market are more likely to be involved in crime, but for these young adults their involvement in crime is better so much. After their individual characteristics are taken into account, only the percentage of black predicts crime, and it predicts that those who live in communities with more





Figure 5.1. Explaining Young Adult Crime Using... The variables in this figure are statistically significant. The analyses were variables measuring respondent's father's highest grade completed, parental income, ever suspended from school, several additional employment variables, percentage Hispanic and percentage disadvantaged. *Indicates that this was a statistically significant variable.

African Americans (readers should be aware of the race and ethnicity of individual NLSY respondents and their relationship to criminal behavior). What we find is consistent with Massey and Denton's findings. Segregation is high in inner-city areas, but that is a characteristic of inner-city areas, not of the individuals who live there.²² Our results do not support the idea that suggest that black culture in America is a result of living in inner-city areas. We find reason to believe that to live in inner-city areas is to live into a subculture that is crime-prone and characterized by social and economic disadvantages. Many of these individuals are unemployed.

Our next step was to create an individual-level variable with individuals' employment variable with the census tract where they live so that we could control for the potential effects of being out of work and

Neighborhood



ing Employment and Neighborhood Variables significant. Also included in the regression are respondents' age,* sex,* race, ethnicity, marital status, income, whether they were currently in high school, and neighborhood characteristics (perceived). The table that Figure 5.1 is based on is shown in Table 5.1. Neighborhood is the most important predictor of delinquency.

It should be noted that we found that the race of respondents was not significantly related to delinquency. What we have found does not contradict the idea that segregated places do have higher crime rates. It is not the places, not of specific individuals, that call into question those who would argue that race is itself criminogenic. We do not believe that a black community is to put oneself at risk of producing. Rather, it is the individual characteristics that come with being marginally

an interaction term combining the individual characteristics with the social disadvantage measure of neighborhood. It is that we could consider the condition of living with others who are socially

and economically marginalized. But to the predictions of the labor strain theory in our full sample—respondents reported more criminality was no conditional effect. Employment was not predicted by characteristics of the neighborhood. In general, we could discern very little about the individual criminality of young adults.

A more complex—and I think more interesting—picture to emerge as we explore subsamples of rural areas. Surprisingly, no contextual effects for rural areas. The characteristics of the rural neighborhood do not help us to understand their criminality. It is unlikely that we would have sufficient power to detect effects had based on their personal characteristics. It is also unlikely that we would have sufficient power to detect effects in rural areas that are characterized by poverty and deprivation. Clearly there are communities of concentrated poverty in rural areas, such as on Indian reservations or in pockets of Appalachia. These are desperately and some times more severely poor than the slums. A study of these places would be interesting, but that will not be visible from our analysis. We will use the NLSY rural subsample.

Social life, as everyone who has lived in a city can attest, is different in the metropolitan areas. For respondents who lived in metropolitan areas, individuals who lived in the metropolitan areas reported engaging in slightly more criminal activity. We took into account other factors, and the effects of metropolitan areas reported more criminal involvement, but they are significant. We again find a conditional effect in this analysis. The effect is significant in metropolitan areas, which of course includes inner cities and in more suburban environs.

Then there are the central cities, which we are referring to inner-city ghettos, but not the metropolitan areas. There we do find evidence of a conditional effect. More of those living inside the

But contrary to our expectations and the social disorganization thesis, in the analyses for the entire US as a whole—there was no significant effect on the dependent variable. In other words, the neighborhood situation was not conditioned on the neighborhood characteristics. In other words, the neighborhood situation was not conditioned on the neighborhood characteristics.

But a more interesting picture begins to emerge. There are, not especially surprisingly, no significant effects for urban residents. Knowing more about the neighborhood characteristics of NLSY respondents did not predict their behavior any more than we already knew from their individual characteristics. In a national sample it is not surprising that a significant proportion of the sample from the inner city are people living in socially isolated neighborhoods (for instance on Native American reservations in the South), where people live just as isolated as those of the worst of urban neighborhoods. We would likely find contextual influences in the analyses of the relatively small available samples.

When we moved from farm or village to the inner city, we found that those who moved from farm or village to the inner city had higher rates of crime. When we analyzed the data for metropolitan areas, as reported for the full sample, we found that the neighborhoods with more black residents had significantly less crime than others after we controlled for individual characteristics. Those living in more disadvantaged neighborhoods had higher rates of crime. These findings are modest, but they do not, however, find a neighborhood effect. The analysis of young adults living within the inner city includes those living in central cities and those living in the inner city.

As for the inner city, here again I am not surprised. It is to the core cities of metropolitan areas that the importance of social context is most evident. The inner city are worse off occupationally.

When ecological influences on the respondents are considered, we find because no work or low-quality work group of the people who live there who live in proximity to them. We as important because there are sufficient people—marginal to the labor market frequently criminality.

The net effect of living in community even after we take into account individual differences, increases criminality. We have interpreted the positive correlation between blacks and violent crime in analysis as the presence of a subculture of violence. These results indicate that that interpretation into account individual economic status with African Americans does not increase criminal involvement—while in communities it is tagged increases it. This analysis was not about the presence or absence of subcultures, but these results suggest to look anywhere for procrime values. We should look above and beyond individuals' own characteristics. If, in the law, we should focus on collective characteristics and their distribution. This is consistent with the idea of a subculture. Of course we should not forget that you are considerably more likely to be involved in crime than other black people and in disadvantaged areas.

Introducing the interaction term into the model increases the extent to which neighborhood characteristics influence the connection between respondent characteristics and criminality. It produces yet another complexity. Unlike the previous sample analyses, in the central city areas the effect of individual respondents' employment on their criminality in their neighborhoods is significant. Having a job, is most beneficial in an anticrime sense for the disadvantaged. Having work produces a significant and more deleterious criminogenic effects of

criminal behavior of city dwelling
that the environment matters more
is more likely to occur for a larger
and consequently for the people
we think that context shows up here
sufficient numbers of similarly situated
market—to affect lifestyles and conse-

unities that are more disadvantaged,
individual family, education, and occupa-
tional behavior. For a long time some
relations between the percentage of
residents across cities as a product of the
poverty in the black community. These
conclusion is erroneous. After we take
situations (e.g., employment), living
conditions induce, but to the contrary *reduces*,
contrast, living among the disadvan-
taged is not designed to assess the presence
of these data at least suggest that if we are
aware of the values and social influences that will,
in any circumstance, propel them to break
through their disadvantage and not on racial
differences. In other recently published research.
It is not to be black in America means that
to live in the sections of cities with
disadvantaged neighborhoods.

is included into our analysis, which measures
ecological characteristics condition
residents' employment and crime, intro-
duced in the full sample or other sub-
samples. In this subsample the interaction between
employment and the level of disadvantage
is positive and negative. Having a job, any
way, protects young adults from the delin-
quency. Living in the most disadvantaged

neighborhoods. This also obviously boost into crime for unemployed p
nominically disadvantaged neighbor
ered contextual effects for the qual
versus secondary sector) and found
most socially and economically dif
the criminal involvement of young a

Let's consider these results and
residents. For young adults in gene
good jobs are less involved in crim
important for those living in distr
this sounds like good jobs are impor
communities and that any old job
and ghettos. This is certainly not th
these analyses are necessarily conse
available to us. Not included in our
cator of the number of adults who
courageed workers (those who have
not included are those earning thei
the marginal world of off-the-book
So a young man or woman who is
tings is more set apart here, even w
That they are working at all may ind
to the world of work and to their
whether those who are in secondary
orientation after prolonged experie
paying jobs of this nature. But for n
not likely to be as frequently contr
presence as much as their friends w
on the corner.

Neighborhood Context and Delin

In chapter 4 we looked at the resul
quency. What is important in det
likely to become involved in delinq
school—in particular how well they

y means that there is a contextual people who live in socially and eco-hoods. In other analyses we consid-ity of employment (in the primary l that it did not matter; where life is fficult, simply having work reduces adults.

their meaning for cities and their eral, those with jobs and especially e, but simply working in any job is ressed neighborhoods. At one level rtant for those living outside of poor will do for those residing in slums e message. We must remember that ervative because of the data that are measure of social context is an indi- would officially be considered dis- given up on looking for work). Also r living in the illegal economy or in ks labor—day workers, for example. s marginally employed in such set- when they are working in a McJob. licate something of their orientation future. The question remains open y sector work will continue with this ence with the mind-numbing, low- ow, they are working, and therefore ributing to street culture with their ho have little else to do but hang out

quency

ts from our study of juvenile delin- ermining which children are most quent activity is their experiences in r are doing, measured by their grade

point average, and how, in the very beginning, before they go to school they are. Children with good attachment to school are less delinquent. The focus was necessarily on mothers' education because school affects delinquency; mothers who are more involved in their children's schooling. On the other hand, mothers who have children with lower grades, which is a predictor of delinquency. The other notable result was that so than neighborhood characteristics. Essentially children who are having good attachment to school are those whose parents are well educated. Children who are in school are, as most would expect, less delinquent.

The direct effects of neighborhood characteristics were, like those for young adults, mostly negative effect on individual involvement. Children who live where the Latino population is high were less criminal, after other factors are controlled. They live where the Latino population is high, but the extent in neighborhoods where the Latino population is high.

We used two strategies to see if neighborhood characteristics in a complex way in the determination of delinquency. We constructed path models to consider the direct effects of neighborhood characteristics, and we constructed path models by census tract characteristics in addition to individual characteristics into regression models. We did not find that the neighborhood characteristics of disadvantaged neighborhoods are having a negative influence on their children's delinquency. We remember that this is net of the influence of family poverty, which is a major factor if mothers are not working.

The results from the interaction models show that we created interaction terms for quadratic terms of neighborhood level characteristics. The results show that in how young people's school success is conditioned by social capital and attachment to school would be

macular of control theory, attached good grades and those who are more diligent. Also, their parents' (and here the education level) involvement in their children's lives. Mothers who had more education were more likely to be involved in their children's school, which reduces delinquency. Children who were more likely to have good grades of course increased the likelihood of delinquency. The result was that family poverty, more family stress, promoted violation of the law. Children who had a good experience in school and whose parents were more involved in their children's lives were less delinquent.

Other characteristics on delinquency were also included. Racial composition had a net effect on juvenile delinquency. Juvenile delinquency factors are taken into account, when race is larger, and to a slightly lesser extent when the black population is larger.

The social context mattered in a more complex way in juvenile delinquency: we controlled for the indirect effects of neighborhood characteristics and a series of individual characteristics. Interaction terms and entered them into the model. We did not find powerful indirect effects of neighborhood on delinquency. Mothers who live in high poverty are less likely to work, which removes a source of income that affects a child's school performance, but we must control for this. A comparatively strong criminogenic effect of neighborhood of course is not helped when those

analyses are more interesting. Here we included a number of individual level and neighborhood level variables. We were particularly interested in the effect of school stress, which generally reduces delinquency. We expected that good grades would be most important for children in

economically distressed communities, young adults in disadvantaged places surrounded by criminogenic influences populated by boys who were not doing well. I regularly implored them to work hard, but that it would cause them to be less successful. In that hood neighborhood, Pittsburgh's Hill District, kids who do really well in school were not necessarily less involved in troubling behavior than those who do poorly. This has given us a steady stream of movers and shakers who connect to school are the ones who do well and avoid trouble. Though all of the above is common stuff of urban knowledge, and I suspect that sociologists would have the same expectations.

The most important finding is that disadvantaged areas are not protected from crime (see Figure 5.2). Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show the relationship between children depending on where they live. The relationship between grades (on the x axis) and crime (on the y axis) for children in the NLSY sample. The solid line represents children who live in neighborhoods with the highest level of economic disadvantage (for most Americans, that would be the South with expectations, as their grades increase, the frequency goes down. This pattern has been found in other studies, some of which I described earlier. The dashed line shows those who live in census tracts where the level of disadvantage is probably lower than average (one standard deviation above the mean of disadvantage). Here, the effects are much more dramatic. Those doing well, living in advantaged areas, are most unlikely to get into trouble. This represents the relationship for young people living in areas with above-average levels of disadvantage (one standard deviation below the mean). There we see no relationship between grades and those who get good grades are not necessarily those who are poor students.


Something disturbing comes out of this analysis, not just in different kinds of neigh-

es, a protective factor like jobs are for
 es. After all, kids there are more sur-
 . My juvenile probation caseload was
 ng well in school. My coworkers and I
 rder, because we expected and hoped
 involved in crime. In my own child-
 ll District, those of us doing reason-
 rily all "choir boys," but we were less
 some of our fellows. And Hollywood
 vies where the theme is that the kids
 s who walk away from gangs, drugs,
 are only anecdotal data, they are the
 pect that many of my fellow sociolo-
 on. This is not what we found.²³

at the children who live in disadvan-
 delinquency by being good students
 tell dramatically different stories for
 ive. Figure 5.2 presents the relation-
 and delinquency for all of the chil-
 id line is the relationship for those
 he average level of social and eco-
 ricans, this is very little). Consistent
 mprove their involvement in delin-
 been observed in a large number of
 arlier. The dotted line is for students
 e level of disadvantage is consider-
 ard deviation below the mean level
 f doing well in school are even more
 with few if any people who are dis-
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 eople who live in communities with
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 p between grades and delinquency;
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
at when we look at juveniles living
 borhoods, but in different levels of

Figure 5.2.
The Inter-
action of
Grades and
Disadvantage
Predicting
Delinquency:
Full Sample





urbanization. In rural areas we did not find a significant interaction between grades and disadvantage among the rural NLSY subsample. In metropolitan areas (Figure 5.3) and on the whole, unexpected patterns emerge. When we look at metropolitan areas (leaving out rural respondents), people who are disadvantaged actually have a higher delinquency rate than those who do less well. And for the rural areas, the pattern is even stronger. Not only do rural juveniles living in disadvantaged neighborhoods have a higher delinquency rate, but for reasons we can only speculate on, they are more delinquent.

We observed similar patterns when we looked at metropolitan areas where relatively more of the population is employed, and in metropolitan areas where more have high-school diplomas.²⁴ It appears that we are not protecting juveniles there from delinquency.



not find any appreciable difference
 ls of disadvantage; there was no sig-
 and disadvantaged neighborhoods
 But when the analyses focus on met-
 those in central cities (Figure 5.4),
 n we studied only those in metro
 s), good students living where more
 report higher levels of delinquency
 r the central city subsample this pat-
 s school not appear to protect juve-
 hborhoods from criminal involve-
 speculate about, they appear more

en we consider those getting higher
 he adult population is marginally
 eas where more adults do not have
 that getting good grades is not pro-
 uency. Again, there does not seem






Figure 5.3.
The Inter-
action of
Grades and
Disadvantage
Predicting
Delinquency:
In SMSA
Sample




Figure 5.4.
The Interac-
tion of
Grades and
Disadvan-
tage Predict-
ing Delin-
quency:
Central City
Sample

to be a positive benefit afforded from the most distressed neighborhoods.

How could this be? It is so at v
 contrary to research that has been c
 ied types of communities. And thes
 with popular conceptions of how
 and delinquency in distressed neig
 these results may be wrong. That is
 NLSY interviewers, but those repor
 behavior of some children. Good s
 quency. While I don't know of any s
 may be that kids who do well in sch
 communities overreport their crim
 is their way of compensating for wh
 from many around them. Perhaps i
 glorifies "gangstas," they want to be
 imagination to also see how good st
 have some difficulties with their pe
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 ferent. But then maybe they are ju
 have guessed.

Perhaps they aren't just "represent
 they are actually compensating in
 good grades by doing crimes. Perha
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 else. There is, however, a more sinis
 it's possible that good students reco
 talents, they are not likely to achie
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 It is possible that their talents ma
 power for the illegitimate opportun
 supervised on probation for a few m
 around the age of five. Quite bright
 scored in excess of 150 and I'm sur
 the exam seriously), Stevie learned e
 with impunity because he was also
 dren also discovered this, and thro

m school success among children in
variance with what is expected, and
conducted on individuals and in var-
e findings are certainly inconsistent
we should go about fighting crime
neighborhoods. First, let me stress that
s, they are what respondents said to
rts may not accurately represent the
students may exaggerate their delin-
study that has found this to be so, it
hool and who live in disadvantaged
ninal involvement. Why? Maybe it
that they perceive as their difference
in the midst of popular culture that
cool too. It does not take too much
udents in bad neighborhoods might
ers; they may be more picked on if
to fight more because they are dif-
st more delinquent than we would

ntin” to NLSY interviewers. Maybe
the eyes of their friends for getting
aps they want their friends to know
ents, they are “down” like everybody
ster interpretation. In these settings,
gnize that even with their academic
eve the culturally legitimated good
w language from anomie theory).²⁵
ke these young people good man-
nities.²⁶ Stevie, a thirteen-year-old I
months, began his “criminal career”
nt (his school-administered IQ test
e, knowing him, that he didn’t take
early on that he could shoplift candy
“so cute.” Unfortunately older chil-
ughout primary school he stole for

them in exchange for the attention caseload when his mother petitioned for custody. He was "inflexible and rigid." He received good grades but his behavior was so bad that he got good grades just because he was just fun and entertaining for his teachers. I replaced the kid, Gary, from the PO that I replaced on probation for more than a year in a juvenile institution and Gary received a series of minor violations of his conditions. They weren't great, but they were better than what he was doing. I always believed that Gary's delinquent behavior was because his father had left, his brother had been in a juvenile institution, and the family was generally disrupted and dysfunctional. I was weak. I was able to place him in a more competitive environment, but his behavior was still bad.

These two stories are reminders of the importance of the social and economic notions about schools, performance, and the quality of schools and the disadvantages of the schools attended by children from disadvantaged communities. And it must be understood that the solution is within and cannot be held apart from the conditions that their students come from.

We have to consider that the schools in disadvantaged communities are not living in disadvantaged communities. Those in other neighborhoods. Politicians and colleagues, writing about the failure of a New York City student.

I classify myself as a good student because I am a good student 'cause academically I do well from home. But I do well 'cause I have a good thing is, a lot of kids go to bad schools and are not getting real learning. So they are good students. I just focus on getting good grades on exams. I do what I got to do, you know, I bust the exams out. I just do what I have to do.

he received. Stevie ended up on my
 ed the court because he was “incor-
 because, as he explained, the school
 s without even trying. Delinquency
 im by that time. I inherited another
 ced. Though just thirteen, he’d been
 . His older brother was doing time
 remained on probation because of a
 ourt-ordered conditions. His grades
 r than most others in his school. I
 ency was fueled by anger because his
 taken away, and because of his gen-
 family. His school, to be generous,
 n a foster home in a nearby commu-
 His grades suffered a bit in the more
 behavior also improved.

that we should be wary of simplis-
 ance, and delinquency. The unequal
 ntaged circumstance of many of the
 deprived communities complicate
 e remembered that all schools func-
 art from the conditions from which

hools that are available to children
 ies are not necessarily the same as
 tical scientist Gaton Alonso and his
 e of urban education, quoted Shawn,

trapped in an all right school. I am
 I am strong and I get mad support
 ave other things going for me. The
 ols and are doing bad too. Plus they
 hat’s what’s messed up. But I am a
 g through the classes and passing the
 now. Go to class, take my notes, and
 have to do and pass the tests.²⁷

Perhaps those many kids that still attend schools are getting good grades by attending schools that may not only be damning them but also are in places that students know are bad. The frequency protections that good students receive. Alonso and colleagues point out, that in stigmatized neighborhoods are frequently associated with poverty, and not an island from the desolation.

In addition to the evidence that low-SES and low-achieving teenagers' school performance is lower, we found that neighborhood conditions also affect juveniles' family lives as well. We know that parents are involved in their children's schools, and that this involvement is a protective factor against delinquency (see chapter 4 for discussion). We know that the involvement of parents who have not finished high school reduces the chances of avoiding delinquency. In one study, we found substantial correlations between parental involvement and delinquency. In both urban and rural settings, the negative influences of undereducation are reduced by demonstrating the importance of parental involvement in the schools. Research shows that when neighborhood adults were uninvolved, this would send a negative educational message. We take note that parents can counteract their own behavior that sends a message of low educational achievement.

Might the No Child Left Behind Act be changing this? Of course much has been implemented it, and which aspects may do some good to impress upon students to achieve a minimum level of competence before they leave high school. It is official to turn up the pressure on schools where too many children are failing. However, alone is insufficient to improve educational outcomes. It certainly not alone succeed as a delinquency

nawn is speaking of who go to bad
just marking time. Being in such
their futures, but getting good grades
d schools may not afford the delin-
dents get in stronger schools. As
the schools in inner-city, disadvan-
y a part of the troubled social ecol-
pair around it.

levels of neighborhood disadvantage
ormance and effects on delinquency,
tions interact with other features of
know that when parents were more
that this indirectly inhibited delin-
n of this finding), and we also find
ose families live where more adults
specially boosted their offspring's
nterestingly, this finding is the only
ntextual effects in our rural subsam-
gs parents can add protection from
ucated neighborhood environments
f education by maintaining substan-
remember that earlier I posited that
asuccessful in school or at work that
ion message to teenagers. Here we
act this negative modeling by their
that they care about their children's

program of the federal government
depends on how local districts have
of the program are emphasized. It
on students that they must work to
etency, and that a test must be hur-
with a diploma. It may also be ben-
hool districts, schools, and teachers
. But bringing the heat in education
ucational performance, and will cer-
quency prevention strategy.

There are environments outside account if we are to understand why from disadvantaged and distressed come to school not ready to learn.²⁸ to be from homes where they cannot that are sources of stress. They are do not encourage academic achievement right things about education, but the quite different.

The shameful little unspoken secret achievement is that the schools the determining students' academic home. We have known for quite a are also voters, and therefore a bit in cal leaders hoping to get their vote and the home life that they create actions and school programs.²⁹ School the learning atmosphere at home. ing? Are there books in the home be creative, and take academic character study? Do parents check to see if it is done well? It is very likely that relation between mothers' education dents' grades is that the answers to affirmative in households where parent. What this means, unsurprisingly tant context conditioning children's likelihood of becoming delinquent. lier, parental success in education a juvenile delinquency. We must real hoods, where families are already to day and where there will be few adults, that the environment will alone to overcome.

We know that there currently exist funding. In 2011 the Center for Analysis that documented both interstate and

of school that must be taken into account is what goes on in the school. Children from disadvantaged neighborhoods are far more likely to be absent from school.³ They are more likely to be hungry, to be tired, and not rest adequately, or from homes that are noisy. Children from neighborhoods where norms of respect and discipline are weak, and their parents may say the things that their actions may convey something

is the focus of the national debate on school success. What we ourselves are far less important in determining school outcomes than what takes place at home. It takes a long time that what parents—who are often immune from the criticisms of politicians and campaign contributions—do at home are more important than teacher quality. School success is, in part, dependent on what happens at home. Do children see their parents read? Do children see their parents encourage them to read? Are children encouraged to read, to do their homework? Do they have a quiet place to do their homework and make sure they do it? These are the reasons we found a positive correlation between parental achievement and our response to these questions are in the home. Children whose parents have higher academic achievement tend to do better. In short, it is that the home is an important determinant of success in school and in turn their parents' success. This means, that as argued earlier, that income and employment help to determine school success. It is clear that in disadvantaged neighborhoods, where parents are severely tasked with making it day after day, it is harder for low-income households with well-educated parents to do well. It is hard for children and teachers

to overcome these substantial inequalities in school success. The American Progress released a report on the impact of income and intrastate differences in school

funding.³⁰ As might be expected, in what is spent to educate a child that "the dramatic differences in per should give us pause. The education as New York that spends an average ferent than that of children in Ten pupil."³¹ Unfortunately, within state some districts receiving considerable author of the report, Diana Epstein,

Numerous studies demonstrate that not funded equitably; that is, within state and local money per pupil than on state and local funds because mo I) is designed to provide supplement state and district are already providing Education Trust demonstrated that states received less state and local pe erty districts. The differences varied while Illinois provided \$1,924 less p tricts, Minnesota provided \$1,349 m

If education reform is to have a recognize that adequate funding f left behind.³³ Although No Child I has not been put into place as a d should recognize that latent benefit reform may be to reduce crime fo are likely to develop stronger attac seen to decrease delinquency invol ond, improved education is likely that young people take with them t from student to young adult roles. not help them to get quality jobs t prepared to compete for such jobs i

The problem is that the emphasis performance may lead to student be

there are considerable differences across the states. The report states that per pupil expenditures between states vary widely. The amount received by children in a state such as California of \$15,012 per pupil may be double that of Tennessee who receive only \$8,507 per pupil. These differences are also dramatic, with some states spending nearly twice as much per pupil than others. The report also wrote:

...that school districts in many states are not equal. In a state some districts receive more than others. This paper focuses only on federal funding (for example, Title I) and other resources on top of whatever the state provides. An analysis of 2004 data by The Urban Institute found that the highest-poverty districts in 26 states receive less per pupil funding than the lowest poverty districts. This is true widely among states; for example, in California, the highest-poverty districts receive 15 percent less per pupil in the highest-poverty districts than the lowest-poverty districts.³²

If we have any hope of success, then we must ensure that for every child should also not be left behind. If the No Child Left Behind is not designed for and implemented as a delinquency prevention strategy, we will not have a lot of real and meaningful educational outcomes for two reasons. First, more children are not attending school, which we have seen a decline in most communities. Second, we need to also improve the human capital of the workforce to the job market as they transition from school to work. While improved human capital will be created, those that do not exist, they will be better off when they are created.

...analysis on testing and aggregate school behaviors or administrative outcomes

that promote estrangement from . . . Students who become convinced that there is little incentive to keep trying, and so give up is better than none if we hope to minimize the districts are at risk of facing real de . . . students fail, then who will be surpr . . . abilities of failure pressured out of . . . down the school or district average . . .

Journalists reported that children in the State of Massachusetts who were forced out of school to protect school the jobs and bonuses of administrators education researcher Linda McSpad . . . tresses the anecdotal evidence provi . . . students leave because of pressure a . . . indicates that in some communities . . . in delinquency are enhanced, and . . . secure jobs shortly after leaving sch . . .

Earlier I described the results of . . . when mothers worked their children . . . and were consequently more like . . . ity. There is an important exception . . . subsample, we found that the sons . . . living in disadvantaged neighborh . . . ken the law. We could only specul . . . of working mothers having poorer . . . in such circumstances children mi . . . poorer grades and higher probabilit . . . working mothers in disadvantaged . . . should not too hastily light on thi . . . ties for serious delinquency are pro . . . the distractions available to unsupe . . . communities are probably better (a . . . the opportunity for general delinqu . . . in disadvantaged neighborhoods w . . . working moms somehow seem to in . . . criminal involvement. While this r . . .

school and increased delinquency. That they will not pass the test have some involvement in school is likely minimize criminality. Also, when school increases in their budgets if too many are expected to see students with high probability of school so that they do not bring up their test score?

Children in Houston, New York City, and elsewhere were likely not to pass were possibly schools' overall test performance and predictors.³⁴ Research by Rice University's Golden McNeil and her colleagues buttressed by journalists.³⁵ Whether or not associated with testing, our research suggests that their chances of becoming involved in crime is especially so if they do not pass the test.

Some of our analyses that indicated that children who did not pass the test tended to do less well in school, were more likely to engage in delinquent activities, and were more likely to be involved in crime. In our central city and inner city neighborhoods and daughters of working mothers in inner city neighborhoods were less likely to have brothers and sisters. We conclude that the main effect of children's school performance suggests that children who do not pass the test are likely to be less supervised, resulting in an increase in the rate of delinquency. But the results for inner city communities suggest that we should be cautious in our conclusion. There the opportunity for supervision is probably greater, although admittedly less likely for supervised teenagers in more advantaged neighborhoods (as a result of cars, allowances, etc.), and the risk of delinquency are also inevitably present. But where serious crime is more present, efforts to insulate their children a little bit from the street may not make sense at the surface,

it does if we think about the models that parents offer to their children in the face of economic hardship. The models among such children may well be a mix of good and bad. The models commitment to the world around them is socially and economically determined. It requires even more of a leap of speculation for explanation. In the 1960s of my youth, many in the community worked outside of the neighborhood. In some of those families did run wild. The strict rules thought of as draconian rules put in place to ensure parental supervision. Recognizing the dangers of distressed neighborhoods, some parents were strict with their children; their motivation was to protect them from the palpable dangers of the streets.

While the results for working mothers are mixed, the indictment of them and of a society that marginalizes them I think that the pattern of these findings is a very simplistic interpretation. When talking about the mother must be seen within the broader context of the neighborhood in which a family resides. Perhaps it is the lack of resources whose importance is too seldom recognized. It is not the blame for delinquency to children of

Peer Networks, Social Context, and the Role of the Mother

Would my Hole in the Wall Gang be different if not for each other? Might Robby, if not for that matter, have engaged in the same behavior had he not been sent to prison, without a doubt. I have not have definitively answered the question of the Hole in the Wall Gang even as I supervised them on the streets. This was a case of mutually reinforcement. In my man's account of his brother's behavior, it is clear that point; it does seem that Robby was a product of that combination.

The criminology literature has long shown that exposure to peers substantially increases the chances of

el that these women are presenting economic hardship. Lower delinquency a byproduct of having a parent who of work even though the commu- economically distressed. And, though speculation, there is another possible with, numerous women in my project home. It was a necessity. Kids from l, but many more of us had what we in place to make up for the lack of the danger in some inner-city dis- nts elected to heavily regulate their protect their offspring from the pal- mothers generally may seem like an v where this is increasingly the case, ndings suggest this to be an overly ken in total, the role of the working broader context of the community in is that overall community context appreciated in our haste to attach or their parents alone.

and Delinquency

have broken into barns and garages y Wideman, or his rap partners for stling life and the robbery that ulti- the influence of each other? I could question about the Hole in the Wall probation, but I was pretty sure that ing peer influence. And John Wide- vior is not conclusive either on this th his buddies was a criminogenic ng indicated that having delinquent nces that a juvenile will get involved

in delinquency, and that literature on juveniles on my probation caseload to State Parole tells us that crime is a social phenomenon. This is the case for those from more distressed social settings where more people are marginalized, where school and work gives greater opportunities for peers to find each other. The context of adults are out of work or underemployed, and the influence of ordinary peer networks is significant.

This is not the place for true conflict in the city neighborhood of my adolescence. It is the place for law-violating behavior, because the adults and wayward youth around here are looking for "a bit of fun" or "let's go get [steal] a little money at our local basketball court, where they sell crack, craps, smoke dope,³⁶ and occasional marijuana. Different if they had had quality jobs to go to. Most of them would have been there still. They would have been.

What Then of Social Context?

There are those of my colleagues who argue that there is much of too little in the data in context matters. I confess that I have argued that my argument are modest and at best are made in a vacuum. Of course our capacities are compromised by the nature of quantification practiced by the social sciences of the last few centuries. Much of what we know is derived from survey data, necessarily the questionnaires. There is nothing wrong with this, but we cannot analyze processes that are supra-individual. We can sample, but necessarily the consequences are limited to respondents to our surveys. We need new techniques and technology make it possible.

and my anecdotal observations of old and young adults when I moved by the young is, most often, a group of middle-class delinquents as well as different economic backgrounds. But liv- ing close to important institutions such as schools and parks provides great opportunity for marginalized, unbonded young people in neighborhoods where more employment sets up a circumstance where the influence of delinquency is heightened. I have had many conversations, but I will say that the inner-city environment provided great opportunity for young people who were always nonworking young adults. I am urging me and my friends to “have a car.” How might the scene around these young adults gathered to shoot pool and play cards, have been different if they had a car to go to the next day? Of course some would, but many of them likely would not.

Who will conclude that I’ve made too much of this, coming to the conclusion that social influences are not so great. The results that I use to support my argument are suggestive, but they do not exist in a vacuum. The methods to measure social influences are limited by quantitative data collection as it is impractical to collect data on late twentieth and early twenty-first century social behavior is the result of the interaction of individuals. In and of itself, the current environment does limit our capacity to analyze social influences: those affecting individual people and the social forces around us and the current environment. I would like to remember that because current methods are difficult to measure these processes

does not mean that they do not open themselves up to the possibility of appreciating that they should be understood as sources of knowledge.

When I write that the modest research on the social context shaping the criminal behavior of adults do not exist in a vacuum, I am not writing along with recent ethnographic work that is not without appreciation of the ways that life makes as we move throughout lives. The evidence, is appropriately and notoriously anecdotal. I had family members or students discuss their experiences with a wave of the hand and a sentence. "It's true I know someone who . . ." Of course, this is not substitute disconfirming evidence, but it is a form of (observations) can assist us in understanding the world. I have modest empirical evidence.

I began this chapter recounting the story of Robby Wideman to the interactions of his younger brother and sister and changes in their neighborhood of Homewood as the two siblings came of age. Wideman is a keen-eyed social observer, it is not surprising that those things that he has witnessed and the differences in their lives. And it is not surprising that observations along with our modes of thinking about how social and economic forces influence individual behavior.

Envisioning the Homewood of the 1960s and bringing that picture forward to the present day in inner-city Pittsburgh during the last decade of the 20th century a way that we can connect the findings of this research that which we have learned from research on Homewood of the 1960s was not unproblematic. It is men that the promise of the Great Migration was tainted by the North's de facto version of segregation. Homewood, like Robby Wideman, was a young man in school and possibly go on to college and find a job after high school in either the service or industrial sector.

rate, so we should look at the results understood as companion to other results suggesting the significance of delinquent behavior of teenagers and young men thinking that they must be viewed as deviant. In the context of social theory, the value of observations that we each make is not clear. This last bit, this "personal" evidence, I seriously suspect. Too many of us have a tendency to discount empirically based knowledge in favor of anecdotal evidence that begins, "Well, that can't be true because of course such anecdotes do not count." At the same time some such tales do provide a partial understanding of social processes where we live.

John Edgar Wideman's attribution of the delinquent behavior of his brother Robby's personality, and the connection to the Homewood between the years when Robby was growing up, Wideman's account is one such anecdote. It is not inappropriate for him to bring this to bear in trying to account for the delinquency. It is also appropriate that we use those quantitative results to make sense of the ways in which communities influence individual behavior.

Robby Wideman's youth and then the migration to places like Chicago in the last decades of the twentieth century is consistent with the findings of our quantitative analyses with recent urban ethnographies. Home-coming was not prosperous, but it was clear to young men that migration to the Promised Land was not an option because of Jim Crow. Smart young men of that generation had options. They could work hard in the steel mills, their ancillary industries,

or in the secondary sector as restaurateurs, guards. Or, as Cloward and Ohlin described, as an adolescent, young men of Homewood could choose opportunity structures, elect to build a tough reputation,³⁷ or they could pursue a legitimate pursuit of the good life and choose the latter.

The difference between John's Homewood (that ten years separate them) is that the Great Migration was alive in postwar Homewood. He moved out of The Hill, but more frequently to other and pleasant neighborhoods, like the Hill, keeping alive the promise that had been broken by legally Jim Crow South. By the late 1960s, indistinguishable from The Hill and other communities in America, black people were tired of doing hard work and hope to be paid off. In the social context in which many young men went to schools and teachers, concentrated in Homewood and The Hill were places where unemployed young men could find a way to live. They were singing doo-wop, smoking reefer, and the streets of these communities provided a way for young adults to have the situation of alienation from the labor market to be less conducive to crime, because it could be shared. The collective alienation of others who were working at all.

John describes Robby as wanting to get out immediately than he himself had. Citing *Boyz n the City*, he writes:

I'd think, Go on and love those squares. I was one coming back with a suitcase full of money. I love them good grades. Robby gon come back.

See, in my mind I was Superfly. I was going to be half a block long and these fine boys

erant busboys or janitors or security
 escribed, just before Robby became
 wood could, in the face of Jim Crow
 ld a street reputation and maintain
 pursue the illegal alternatives to the
 that were available to them. Robby

Homewood and Robby's (remember
 at the hope that accompanied the
 war Pittsburgh. Black families could
 quently *up* The Hill, to nicer houses
 ne Homewood of the 1940s and 50s,
 motivated their parents to leave the
 e 1960s Homewood was not terribly
 in Pittsburgh, like everywhere else
 d of waiting for their investment of
 f as promised. Homewood became
 ough people did not develop attach-
 cluding instead, "What's the point?"
 ces where marginally employed or
 each other hanging out on the cor-
 fer, shooting hoops and craps. The
 ded the social context for teenagers
 tion of company that allowed their
 o find a ready setting for situations
 ld fuel its maximum expression in
 ho were also marginally employed if

ng things and wanting them more
 Quoting Robby in *Bothers and Keep-*

are turkeys, but one day I'll be the
 of money and a Cadillac. Go on and
 do it his own way.

'd drive up slow to the curb. My hog
 oxes in the back. Everybody looking

when I ease out the door clean and give to Mom. Buy her a new house back for the hard times. I could see t

Robby was of the streets and so a fellow hustler, ending in the killing account seems classically like a youth, the short-time horizon of the black men saying, "I'm tired of this s For nothing!"

Not many years after Robby W Western State Penitentiary, the steel the north and south of that prison hit Pittsburgh and surrounding cor felt in its segregated black ghettos higher in those communities and too many of them labored in second forty-year-old busboys of one dow cents more per hour than this high ning hours each day (and they had v be there still when I left for college) of work not only members of the U also the service workers who serve the plant and those who poured the ripple effect that caused former prim ary sector workers out of their jan with an even more marginal workf offer little reason for hope to the R this setting, the code of the street, w flower. The violence that Bourgeois c burgh version too, and black midd burg and Penn Hills, which borde proximity in the same way that Patt cago.⁴⁰ Those middle-class commu slide that Homewood took a gener Wilkinsburg and Penn Hills shifted middle-working-class enclaves to b

mean. Got a check in my pocket to
e with everything in it new. Pay her
that happening.³⁸

opted, with two friends, to rip off
ng of their victim. To Banfield this
ng person unable to defer gratifica-
lower class.³⁹ Instead, I hear young
stuff, always working hard, for what?

Wideman began his life sentence at
el mills that lined the riverbanks to
began closing. Deindustrialization
mmunities hard, and it was hardest
s. Unemployment had always been
among those who did have work,
dary sector jobs like the thirty- and
vntown coffee shop who made ten
a-school boy, who put in a few eve-
worked there years longer and would
. When the mills left they threw out
nited Steel Workers of America, but
ed them their coffee on the way to
eir Iron City Beer after the shift. The
nary sector workers to push second-
itorial jobs left black communities
force than the one that appeared to
obby Widemans a decade earlier. In
which had existed earlier, gained full
hronicled in Brooklyn had its Pitts-
le-class communities like Wilkens-
red Homewood, suffered from this
illo-McCoy's Groveland did in Chi-
nities subsequently began the long
ation earlier. In Pittsburgh, parts of
d in the 1970s and 80s from being
eing more like the urban ghettos.

When we consider modest statistics they should be interpreted within descriptions and in the light of this of Anderson's Philadelphia who, as cate in their children "decent values necessary for higher academic achievement result, make it out. But for some others only speculate about, the stories of success appear to lead to more delinquency academic promise led to him being Phillips Exeter Academy in Exeter, graduation from Exeter, Perry was kidnapped. The story was that he and a cop for their unplanned, heat-of-the-moment of that evening not ended in Perry's attending Ford University on a full scholarship. I conclude that you can take the kid out of the ghetto out of the kid, read Robert Kennedy and try to understand his frustration between two worlds after first being subjected

There are too the children, who academically distance themselves and the prodelinquency forces around the Oscar-winning *I Am a Promise*, brooding about the struggles of the children in elementary school.⁴² It included the story of a girl with a bad home situation, essentially a neighborhood as her grandfather. Her mother up, like a kitten that wouldn't go away, lived with him and was doing very well. It was recorded when she learns from the newspaper she'd written was to be published. My goal is to add perspective to our results and to understand. There are contrasting stories in understanding hidden in our statistically modest results.

In such circumstances it is not just the child who is also is complicated for the parents who

tically significant interaction effects, in the context of these ethnographic observations of urban history. There are families who, against the odds, successfully inculcate “values” and the passion and skills necessary for upward mobility. Some of these children, as a result of their families, for reasons that we can understand, have a sense of hope that comes with school success. In the 1980s, Edmund Perry was plucked out of Harlem to attend a boarding school in New Hampshire. Just days after his death in an alleged ill-fated mugging, his partner selected an undercover police officer to observe the moment robbery. Had the events of Perry’s death he would have attended Stanford the following fall.⁴¹ Before you conclude that life in the ghetto, but you can’t take the life of Sam Anson’s account of Perry’s life in Harlem, that accompanies living a life in Harlem and to a life of inner-city desperation. Some of their own accord manage to academically succeed, as a result insulate themselves from the violence of their environment. An HBO production, the first broadcast in 1993, was a documentary about the life and staff of one inner-city elementary school. The story of ten-year-old Nadia, who, faced with a difficult world, eventually adopted an older man in her life. She commented that “she just showed up and stayed.” At the time of the filming she was doing well in school. A touching scene is when the school’s principal that a short story about Nadia, too, is one of those cases that challenge the observations of ethnographers.⁴³ In inner-city neighborhoods, and they are the results.

It is just complicated for the children—it is for the adults who try to negotiate a difficult world

on their offspring's behalf. As I concluded that both when mothers are at schools in communities where more and that working mothers in centers inhibit delinquency, I was put in children in housing projects against the popular images. Sociologist Winona women battling not only the gangs Chicago Housing Authority, who don't from becoming involved in or victim mothers in Pittsburgh's projects who mind that there are no personal days to be at annual parent visitation days. Alex Kotlowitz's *There are No Children* Chicago mother raising her children in aging them in school, trying to keep instill positive values. At least one of some success at the time of the book.

It is easy to socially canonize such and to castigate others who do not measure. Women deserve all of the credit for using them to conclude that other hoods are failures is simply unfair. A range of human possibilities—from narrowly self-interested tenant representatives that Vankatesh describes, from the to those given over to the "street" the women of Pittsburgh's Hill District to their sons and daughters, to the who had children while they were young themselves.⁴⁶ The failures are not their social environment to shield from distresses and delinquency, but rather that requires superhuman Madonnas to protect their children even a chance.

Something similar may be said and should challenge those who lay the

considered our findings that demonstrate more involvement in their children's lives. These women, many of whom are adults who didn't finish high school, live in inner city distressed neighborhoods. The idea of women raising their children is not the odds and also at variance to some of the things that Raymond-Richmond writes about in the back streets of Chicago but the Chicago women don't "get it," to protect their children from the thug life.⁴⁴ I have witnessed women who gave up a day's pay (and keep in mind that a day's pay for women doing domestic work) to attend school days and parent-teacher conferences. *Children Here* is the true story of a Chicago woman living in the Henry Horner Homes, encouraging her children to stay away from trouble, and trying to protect her children seemed to be having a profound impact on the book's publication.⁴⁵

These women, and by doing so implicitly challenge the stereotype of inner city mothers, and by doing so measure up to these examples. These women are not the women that we can heap upon them, but rather the women of troubled neighborhoods. There is in the inner city the full range of women from the altruistic social activists to the women who are representatives of the Chicago projects and the women heading "decent" families. There are the women that Anderson writes about, from the women who are models and rule makers to the women living next door to them who have never had a chance to be anything but the women who cannot overcome the odds and protect their children from neighborhood violence. Whether the failure of the social system is the fault of the devils or saints of the ghetto to allow

to be held for the children themselves. We should not place the blame on teenagers who do not do

the monumental in the face of few or those who cannot find decent work or sort. Blame casting gets us nowhere means to fund schools that might give of work or additional education, an industrial policy that creates the good and their progeny may aspire to. Do ultimate antipoverty program.

The Poor Do Not Control Their Neighborhoods

Obviously, when we conclude that individual factors such as family structure, delinquency and criminality, the to the individual are important in determining how much crime a neighborhood, neither a new nor a particularly interesting routinely ignored when we consider educational policies. Those with the fewest come the most difficult social circles own—and they are the least capable communities to address the problem.

In *American Project* Venkatesh discusses councils in Chicago's now demolished was that the interests of families living to the Chicago Housing Authority to. But the unresponsiveness of the Housing tural contradiction that allowed the residents and eventually by the garbage tially control the projects. These were poor people everywhere, function where their ability to affect real change extremely limited.

As we have seen, important limitations neighborhoods in which they live and by label "local labor market" we indicate labor markets, which until recently of as nation states. Technological

or no opportunities and bad schools, work where there are few jobs of any kind. We should instead seek to find the best possible preparation for the world and dare to consider developing an industry of good jobs that inner-city parents need. Doing those two things would be the

Neighborhoods

Social context matters in determining who we are saying that forces external factors determine who violates the law and who a city, or nation will endure. This is an interesting insight, but it is one rather than criminal justice, welfare, and education. Fewest resources are expected to overcome these circumstances, and generally on their own, despite the rallying forces outside of their neighborhoods there.

describes the emergence of residents' organized bodies in Cabrini Green projects. The idea of having in the projects could be voiced through these representative bodies. The Housing Authority created the structures of these bodies to be corrupted by some of the gangs that came to occupy and essentialize the women of the tenant councils, like within social and economic contexts change in their own environments, is

developments are created by both the neighborhood and the local labor market. By the very nature of these too fit within larger urban history were frequently thought of as developments in communications,

transportation, and manufacturing frequently described as globalization, production and markets.

In a world of increasingly globalized economies, inhibited by international borders, manufacturing jobs moved from Detroit to other parts of the world. Workers could presumably pull up stakes and move to a new, now-shuttered Saturn plant. But what about the people who might have staffed such a plant? How do they chase the jobs.

This development has produced a new set of jobs described as primary sector jobs in the context of globalized economies. When they are not available or of lesser quality, we can expect negative consequences for communities and individuals. These consequences include changes in lifestyles and potentially, increased crime.

Globalization, however, does not mean that crime is new. The introduction of new industries and the changes that come with them affect communities as surely as the Industrial Revolution did in the United States, Germany, and Marx's Britain. I believe that these changes will influence crime in the future. It is time to begin to consider the limits of globalization regarding places both inside and outside the United States and that of most of my colleagues in the field of urban settings. In the next chapter, I will discuss globalization and other economic considerations.

have fueled the economic processes
on, the internationalization of pro-

alized economic forces workers are
but jobs are not. When auto manu-
to Smyrna, Tennessee, more mobile
stakes in pursuit of jobs at the then-
When call centers open in India,
n jobs within the US cannot elect to

a net decline in jobs that we have
the US and in some other industri-
not replaced or are replaced with jobs
tive consequences for both commu-
quences will include both a decline
es in crime.

not just affect states that lose jobs.
s, new opportunities, and the social
the places where these jobs land as
changed Durkheim's France, Weber's
cannot begin to predict how these
se new settings. A first step, though,
of the thesis that I have argued for
outside of the US. To date my analy-
ues have been limited to American
I will consider how this argument
might apply elsewhere.

Lessons from the Hole in the Wall C

So far, the labor stratification and support efforts to explain some important criminality and in crime and delinquency very important limitations so far. Most of this research has been done within the United States. While I have areas, the Hole in the Wall Gang, and perhaps some important aspects of this crime can be learned from a broader perspective, this same line, we may learn from areas outside the US that may not have necessarily worked as American scholars, but we search for understanding how jobs and

Another limitation is the failure to study Washington, DC. I think at this point, evidence toward disconfirmation of the thesis, that perhaps we can learn from our understanding of how work, employment, and economy affects individual criminality. I will focus on the rural US and the need for a broader consideration of employment forces may aid our understanding. I

Gang

prime thesis has been shown to support important variations in both individual frequency rates. But I should note two. The first is that the places where I have focused on metropolitan areas have used some examples from rural and my former parolee Steven, perhaps the relationship between work and crime under empirical consideration. Along with an examination of research outside of my study used the same theoretical framework which nevertheless may inform the relationships associated with crime. I do not seem to find support for the thesis in the data point, rather than taking that as evidence of labor stratification and crime theories. It is an empirical failure to improve employment, and perhaps the broader social inequality and crime rates. In this chapter I focus on cities, like Washington, where the relationship between employment, economic, and stratification will also consider some studies that

have been conducted outside of the Hole. I will take what we have learned and it will be discussed here and lay out a broad thesis.

Rural Places

Rural America is a good place to be doing crime research, like much of modern criminology focused on urban places, but how do rural hinterland affect criminality? In chapter 10, I talk about the Hole in the Wall Gang, the name I gave to a group of juvenile burglars that I inherited on my probation caseload. They were a small group of kids from school in Sharon and Farrell Pennsylvania, outside of the city Pittsburgh. But in some important ways, to naïve urban ears were surprised to find that their life was to be farmers. I had gone to other rural areas, but they had the same kind of kids in the Hole in the Wall Gang, in other words, working-class kids: they expected to be like their parents held. But they were different from urban working-class and poor kids who had to escape the mills (the hope of me and others was that they could get apprenticeships in skilled trades and crafts, work in the mills, make a solid wage, and root themselves in a community with similar aspirations to the Hole in the Wall Gang). The difference was that at the time, the urban areas had pretty good Pittsburgh working-class jobs. In the late 1960s and early 70s those options were still there. None of us expected that the mill jobs would disappear a few years later. The Hole in the Wall Gang was a problem. Yes, some of their contemporaries were in the Hole in the Wall Gang and others, and like their urban counterparts. But the equivalent of the mill aspiration was they lived in rocky, hilly

e United States. In the next chapter, in previous chapters and what will broader labor stratification and crime

egin. Much of the labor market and modern criminology, has reasonably might employment patterns in the chapter 4 I introduced you to the Hole to a group of unsophisticated juvenile Western Pennsylvania juvenile group of kids who were disaffected are like my city charges in industrial for the kids I grew up with in inner-rtant ways they were different. My o hear that what they wanted from to college with young people from inds of career aspirations as me. The n one respect, were like some urban to have the kinds of jobs that their ent from other kids in the city. The that I grew up with either wanted to d my friends), or longed for appren-, or they were willing to go into the for the Steelers; the latter group had he Wall Gang members. The differ- kids had role models who had that ss, root-for-the-Steelers, life. In the ns were available for my classmates. ds would begin disappearing just a all kids' options were more limited. escaped, like my college classmates ousins, who targeted skilled trades. rations for them was farming. The illy, Western Pennsylvania and not

the productive farmlands of Iowa or their own state. Farming in their own land gave up few rewards. Essentially equivalent of the steel mills of the time, the farming option did not hold the promise of a working-class life that steel mill work was more similar to those who could not find unionized mill positions. In a sense their situation faced by young people in some ways was even for the working-class children of Chicago. And these mid-twentieth-century children from Appalachia and tribal lands from the less developed regions of the West were common with the pre-Industrial Revolution. Many of us would like to admit.

I recognize that this last statement is an even justification. How can I say such things that I am not alleging that all Americans live a life that is even remotely like the conditions of the early nineteenth century. The reality for people who live on the margins in some parts of the US is very different. The Hole in the Wall clients' parents' families were different from the soybean, corn, and wheat farms of the West, and even from many dairy farms that are relatively close to them. Many of them were the hired help of others. For many of them, the farms were of modest size and they regularly confronted problems associated with oil drilling in and around Titusville and Crotchedon, and today, natural gas everywhere, even though a substantial share of the counties,¹ the politics tended to focus on the oil. So this particular group of Westerners, geographically a small group, with limited working land that has limited capacity to support any Mountains. This area is not con-

or Indiana or even other sections of
county was a hardscrabble life, and the
lly that farming option was not the
me before deindustrialization. Their
mise of an economically prosperous
kers enjoyed; their predicament was
ot land the good blue-collar, union-
circumstance was more like the situ-
me less developed countries than it
ldren of Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and
-century kids, other contemporary
l lands, and the offspring of peoples
the world sometimes have more in
Revolution children of Europe than

nt cries out for explanation, maybe
uch a thing? First, I want to be clear
rican farmers or rural area residents
Chinese villagers or European peas-
Second, it must be emphasized that
farms, in small towns, and villages
erent from others. For instance, my
rming reality was considerably dif-
wheat farmers of the Midwest and
farmers who lived and worked rela-
n did not own their own farm, but
most of those who did have their own
e and very limited production. They
ciated with nearby extraction indus-
Oil City Pennsylvania (coal mining,
xtraction). And they were in a state
hare of the population lived in rural
us on urban and industrial interests.
n Pennsylvania farmers was demo-
ted financial and political resources,
acity in the foothills of the Allegh-
sidered Appalachia by most, but for

some the life circumstances and children were not unlike farmers and West Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee.

This is not to cast them as a collection of modern day strugglers, like those who are no more than are poor, urban, the stereotypic welfare cheats. It was to paint the poor in this way during it would be wrong for me to characterize Wall Gang delinquents and people. That said, many of us who work or in Pennsylvania know that when Barack Obama's campaign that some people in are not wrong. Many of them are, because the economy, they don't think they are state capital or in Washington, and under siege. Interestingly, the urban poor for Americans who are living on income. I write that in some abstract but is common with some people in less developed people of preindustrial Europe and that sociologists wrote about than we would like.

A lesson that we can learn from is underneath the macro economic changes in entire society, the social lives, including changes in very important ways, and for subsets of the population. Of course, some of whom are parents; but in our previous chapter, it also has very profound implications about the cities. We know that economic changes on the lives of schoolkids in the neighborhoods. We must remember that it is the other Hole in the Wall gangs in

In our analyses of the Mothers and that for the children in the rural population and metropolitan counterparts, their school attendance is a significant predictor of delinquency (except

chances for both the adults and the
and small-town people of the hills of
essee.

lective, uniformly despairing lot of
of Steinbeck's *Grapes of Wrath*. They
an inner-city dwellers uniformly like
s wrong for politicians and activists
g debates about welfare reform, and
terize the parents of my Hole in the
like them in some similar fashion.
who have worked in rural Pennsyl-
ma said during the 2008 presiden-
rural America were bitter, he was
ause they are left at the margins of
y are heard by urban elites in their
their way of life seems to be under
feel the same way, as do some Native
overished reservations. This is why
important ways, they have more in
s developed countries and with the
North America who early sociolo-
e to admit.

a the Hole in the Wall Gang is that
changes that are taking place for the
cluding crime, of individual people
and this change varies dramatically
urse this happens for the breadwin-
ut, as we documented in the previ-
nd effects on children. We know this
nomic collapse has wreaked havoc
jects and other inner-city neighbor-
oo happens to the kids that make up
rural America.

nd Children of the NLSY we found
ortion of the sample, like their met-
ol experience was the most impor-
ept for those living in central cities,

where gender was the strongest predictor. Girls were substantially less involved than boys in all three of the subsamples, but the difference was most pronounced in the rural sample. In the rural sample, academic performance was more important predictor of delinquency than it was in either the metropolitan or central city NLSY data. But most important for rural areas is significant family poverty is as a predictor of delinquency (see Figure 6.1). In our rural sample, family poverty is more important in helping us to understand delinquency than in the other subsamples, and fully explains 10% of delinquency than it is in central cities. The likelihood of delinquent involvement is higher in rural areas than it does in the cities, where poverty is less important.

In contrast, we do not see the correlation between economic disadvantage in rural areas and delinquency in areas and center cities. Remember that family poverty inhibiting the effects of good parenting in rural areas.





Figure 6.1. Explaining Rural Delinquency Using Family Poverty. The variables in this figure are statistically significant. The analyses were variables measuring responder characteristics, mothers' education and employment, parental involvement, and characteristics of the census tract in which the respondent is based on is included in the appendix.

*Indicates that this was a statistically significant relationship.

predictor, with of course girls being
 vs, which was also the case in all of
 was greatest there).² In fact, school
 predicting delinquency in rural areas
 an or central city subsamples of the
 for our purposes is how much more
 predictor of delinquency outside of cit-
 subsample, poverty was substantially
 understand delinquency than it was
 four times stronger as a predictor
 cities. That is, poverty increases the
 nt considerably more in rural areas
 erty was a more modest predictor.
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 hat is observed in the metropolitan
 r that in nonrural areas, the delin-
 d school experiences was attenuated




ing Family and School Variables

gnificant. Also included in the regression
 ts' age, sex,* race, ethnicity, father present,
 al involvement in school, juvenile employ-
 n which they lived. The table that Figure 6.1


ant predictor of delinquency.

Figure 6.2.
Interaction of
Grades and
Disadvantage
Predicting
Delinquency:
Not in
SMSA (Rural
Sample)



for kids living in communities where Figure 6.2 displays the same analyses that compare metro and center city subsamples, but from the NLSY. Readers can see that disadvantage does not significantly alter the positive effect of grades as an inhibitor of delinquency.

We can draw from these analyses to help us understand children like those in the rural areas where active engagement in school is critical. In rural areas, if we are to lessen delinquency, school engagement is more important than the broader social and economic contexts in the lives of rural kids. In urban areas there is not the residential concentration of disadvantage that exist in underclass urban areas. The Wall Gang were not as socially isolated as the children of Pittsburgh's Hill and Hillside. In contrast to those living in parts of Chicago's South Side, the school was all black and nearly all of the students were called junior high schools the



where disadvantage was high. Figure I showed in the last chapter for the but here for the rural respondents of variation in the disadvantage context itive effects of school experience as

resents several things that help us to e Hole in the Wall Gang. First, posi- everywhere, but especially in rural y. Second, the income of the family er social and economic community This is not surprising. In the rural concentration of poverty and disadvan- places. Members of the Hole in the ated from the middle class as are the omewood neighborhoods, or many s South Side. Where my elementary poor, and my middle school (they en) mostly the same (there was a

sprinkling of whites and some middle class “Sugar Top” section of The Hole in the Wall Gang’s school. The Hole in the Wall Gang’s school was mostly whites and many fewer people who were black. The Hole in the Wall Gang’s school was with whom they came into contact. The Hole in the Wall Gang’s school was substantially influenced by the economic conditions, even if not so much by their broader social conditions. Many members of the Gang became involved in crime as a result of their lack of engagement in school and as a result of trying to work marginal, unskilled jobs. I cannot say for certain, it is likely that the Hole in the Wall Gang’s school because it had middle-class students, unlike many inner-city urban neighborhoods.

What of adults in rural areas? Using the Survey of Youth 97 data, we examined school engagement and crime.³ For respondents who are employed, work does matter. Remember, for Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) and Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) and counties, students living in the central cities of MSAs and SMSAs are more unemployed as well as those working in the secondary sector were more likely to have engaged in crime. This is not the case for NLSY, young people in rural areas. Neither the unemployed nor the secondary sector jobs were any more likely than those in the primary sector places.⁴ The only substantial crime predictor was gender, women being less likely to be suspended from school suspension. This is also the case for the cities. We interpreted this variation as a result of behavior problems. So the less than 10% of young people more likely to turn out to be bad young people. That this is all that seems to matter for young people in their city cousins, work matters too. This is also reported by researchers Matthew Stark and others. Stark and others reported that in nonmetro areas secondary sector employment is linked to higher rates of violence. This is in contrast to findings that my colleagues and I reported in earlier chapters, Stark and

middle-class kids from the more middle-class (Ill), those schools today have fewer kids who would be considered middle class. These schools had a broader range of children. Nevertheless, their delinquency was not a function of the economic circumstance of their families, or the quality of their community. So it is likely that the kids who were involved in delinquency because of their families' poverty, the kids from the unproductive farmlands. And while it is likely that the quality of their schools, and the quality of their community, was probably higher than those in rural areas.

Using the National Longitudinal Survey, we tested the association between employment and delinquency for those who live within metropolitan areas, both those within Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas as well as the subsample of respondents who live in nonmetropolitan areas, both those who were employed in secondary sector occupations and those who were not. We found that delinquency in criminal behavior (see chapter 3). We found that delinquency among adult respondents who lived in rural areas was not higher than those working in secondary sector occupations. This finding is different from results reported by Mark and Tim Slack, who found that in rural areas, as it does in urban areas, delinquency is higher in nonmetropolitan places.⁵ In contrast to what I have reported and that I summarized in chapter 3, Mark and Slack find that jobs with low hours

of work and seasonal work represses crime. We speculate that there, these jobs structure ways that are similar to what we have seen in urban settings. So although we do not see the hinterland as much as poverty does in the city, it actually does, and that even jobs that are seasonal represses criminality. This is an area of research in need of additional study.

In chapter 2 I introduced you to Steven, whom I supervised on state probation. Steven is of a small rural village with his parents. He had a very modest job, but had come to me entering (the offense that placed him on probation, of course, hoped that this kind of work would allay doubts; in hindsight I suspect that Steven was convicted of burglary and done a little better than me to have been locked into the state prison for a year that got him in trouble before). Steven is somewhat dependent on his parents for support, but much beyond work on his car and house. His job didn't seem to matter much. Perhaps the seasonal jobs occupied by him and other young men in communities and the countryside around the state. Of course if jobs like Steven's are present in those in our rural subsample, then we can generalize our results based on major findings to predict who engages in criminal behavior. Our results and those reported by others suggest there is indication that we need a more detailed study of employment affects crime outside of the city.

Other American places, as well, have been studied comes to work and crime. The easiest to study are of Native American tribes, are semi-autonomous (some externally created laws), self-governing. Congress. Historically, reservations were established by the federal government, high levels of unemployment and jobs existed on or near many reservations.

s criminality outside of cities. They structure social life in noncriminogenic ways. We described for primary sector jobs. We did not find that work matters in the cities, these scholars' work indicates that jobs with lower hours and those that are part-time. The patterns of results suggest that this is a preliminary study.

Steven, a resident of a rural county, was on probation for a period. He lived outside his parents (he was in his twenties) and continued to engage in breaking and entering (I put him on probation). At the time I was a graduate student, his behavior was in his past, but I had a hunch that I was a bit naïve. He'd been convicted of the same crime over time. Looking back now, he seems to have had the same irresponsible pattern of behavior. He dropped out of school. He was a high achiever, and didn't seem motivated to do anything but hang with his buds. That he had a high IQ perhaps this is because so many of the young adults living in the small communities are secondary sector jobs. They are predominately what are available to them. We might be less likely to get statistically significant results on marginal employment when we try to study behavior there. Clearly, however, when Stark and Slack are taken together, they provide a more nuanced understanding of how crime is structured in cities.

They are unlike the urban word when it comes to the best examples, such as the reservations. They are sovereign entities (subject to only federal law) governed under treaties and acts of Congress. They have been marked by the neglect of the federal government, of unemployment, and poverty. Few reservations, so people were frequently

constrained to live on welfare or work on land nearby. Indians working for wages are generally in powerless relationships with a pool of nearby unemployed workers on the tribal lands (which means the reservation natives), and largely anti-Indian sentiments that many Indian workers have as a result of the place and working conditions as in the absence of labor unions. Their plight is often exacerbated in these settings. As a consequence, until quite recently, employment in or near the reservation was often jobs with secondary sector characteristics.

Some change has occurred in recent years in relations upholding the sovereignty of the reservation in old agreements with the federal government that ensured that Indian fishermen in the Northwest a share of wild fish stocks as agreed upon in Supreme Court decisions have also upheld the reservation's right. Indians are allowed up to fifty percent of the wild fish stocks in the Northwest. Both decisions allow Indians to participate more meaningfully in the seafood industry as wild fish stocks dwindled and pollution limited the industry. Indian fishermen, like white fishermen, have suffered from the decline.

The more important economic activity for many reservation tribes have been a series of decisions that have allowed them to open gaming casinos on their property in many states in a limited way. Although some tribes have casinos, some with but marginal success. In the states of California, Connecticut, and Nevada, tribes have been able to increase social and economic activity, and, importantly, make political contributions to state governments.⁸ Although the tasks of casino work are often secondary sector work, that the casinos have provided work for those who had little or no work opportunities on the reservation, tribes and their governments, it may be that the socio-economic effects of such work are mitigated. This is often reported for rural part-time and seas-

work for whites who owned or leased white ranchers or in small businesses with their employers. The large size, the geographic isolation of much of the existence of few employment alternatives of many neighbors means few resources to affect their work. Industrial workers prior to the existence is more akin to workers in colonial times. Quite recently nearly all of the limited options of American Indians has been characteristics.

Recent years as a result of court decisions of tribes and treaty rights included federal government. The Boldt Decision in the Pacific Northwest were entitled to land in a nineteenth-century treaty.⁶ Treaty rights providing that coastal Native Americans to participate in the industry. Unfortunately, as salmon and shellfish production, Indian fishermen suffered economically.⁷

and job related developments for the tribes that ensure Indians the rights to land, which can only be regulated by federal government. A number of tribes have opened casinos, but there are important exceptions. Nevada, and Washington, for example, tribal services, provide jobs, and, importantly with legally received gambling revenues. Workers have many characteristics of industrial workers employ people from a population of communities, and because of the link to the economy. It may be that some of the negative crime is mitigated. This may be akin to the results for seasonal workers by Stark and Slack.

A very interesting natural experiment occurred in North Carolina when a casino was opened on a reservation. The study, the Study of Youth (GSMS). Equalized income was distributed to adult members of the tribe. The study team's data show a substantial increase in income for one Indian adult. The expectation was that the windfall would result in a decrease in domestic violence, and crime more generally. This has happened. To the contrary, children living in the households with the windfall were more likely to graduate from high school, less likely to be involved in criminal offense, and were less likely to be in the juvenile justice system.

How employment on reservation affects crime is an empirical question that to my knowledge has not been studied by researchers. Similarly, the overall impact of alcohol on alcohol controlled industries have on alcohol consumption and social problems that have plagued rural areas is an opportunity for researchers who would like to study there. Those electing to do so are often drawn to the troubled relationship that has existed between communities and academic researchers.

Anomalies?

Rural America is not the only place where the relationship of how employment affects crime is anomalous. In Washington, DC stumped my analyses. In chapter 1 I stated that the question of how the economy influences crime was that most individuals have a positive relationship to the labor market, that is, the more they work, the less the lack of a job. In the past few chapters I have argued and marshalling evidence

Experiment occurred in western North Carolina on the Eastern Cherokee Reservation through the Great Smokey Mountains National Park. Profits from the casino were distributed to all tribal members regardless of their income. The study found a significant increase in families with at least one child (likely some of the same children) who had a great deal of effort worrying that some of their children (working at McDonalds while receiving welfare) had increased alcohol and drug abuse, and other problems broadly. There is no evidence that the GSMS team found that the children of the enhanced incomes were more involved in crime, had lower involvement in minor crime, or were less likely to become involved in drug sales.¹⁰ The study suggests that areas that have successful gaming operations and crime is an interesting and important area of research. Knowledge has not yet been addressed by the GSMS team on the impact that these and other tribally owned casinos, domestic violence, and other social issues in native communities is a rich opportunity for research. Approach tribal leadership about the impact of gaming that should take care to be sensitive to the issues that historically existed between native Americans and non-natives.

There are areas where a more nuanced consideration of crime is needed. As I described earlier, my colleagues and I a bit in our earlier work. At the beginning of my answer to the question of how to influence people toward or away from crime, I touch the economy through their employment through their job, or because of their family. In the chapters I have been articulating an approach in support for the thesis that

marginal employment and joblessness give rise to criminality. I have called this thesis. But Washington, DC's home using this approach. I speculated that people to the labor market and to such relationships in parts of the less other American cities, the nation as the industrialized world. To be fair point out that it is not alone in this city in New Orleans once pointed out tone, that living there was like living a few predominate industries—oil and as shipping, which was in a steady city was trying to make up for the loss said, it had the “added benefit” of being cities as well may be economically and like locations in the Third World that statement was before the hurricane hurricanes Katrina and Rita hit? Did where tourism's secondary sector was saw more death and property loss. as well, but the storms and the slow blacks and whites. Now, as New Orleans it was (remember, Third World-like inequalities that were there may well

We can take several things from Native American reservations, Washington the association between labor market the same as in cities where the population. First, racial segregation or racial important effects of employment or stratification effects may so dominant analyzed or considered within separate consideration of how the economy individual criminality or crime rates show racial categories and within. In Washington strongly with racial groupings because

ness creates lifestyle patterns conducive to the labor stratification and crime rates were difficult to explain. That the relationships of Washington's neighborhoods to each other may be more similar to those in the less developed world than to those in the First World as a whole, or to most other places in the United States, to the District of Columbia, I must leave to others in this regard. A colleague at a university in Africa wrote to me, in a surprisingly positive way, about the situation in the Third World in that it had abundant oil and natural gas production, as well as a growing but not expanding state—and the resulting economic gap with tourism. And he was talking about living in the continental US. Other US cities are more economically and occupationally structured more like the Third World than the First. And this colleague's prediction was wrong in 2005. Who suffered most when the economy collapsed and disadvantaged minority communities, inner-city workers disproportionately lived, and the economy collapsed? To be sure, many others were hurt. The economic recovery has fallen hard on poor communities. New Orleans crawls back to be more like the Third World (see, according to one sociologist), the economic recovery will be recreated.¹¹

From our observations of rural areas, Washington, DC, and other cities where the economic market patterns and crime may not be the same, this perspective generates good explanations. Economic stratification may not cancel the effects of crime, but there segregation and economic life that all else must be taken into account. Separate racial spheres—therefore any economic or employment affects either individual or community should take place at two levels, across geographic categories align with the use of racial residential segregation.

The extent of the correspondence of race varies on Native American tribes of whites living within the boundaries.

In segregated societies it is important to study the distribution of occupations across the broad spectrum of racial groups. The occupational distribution within black communities provides a useful example of how segregated that African American workers have been. They are likely to be in the secondary sector of employment within black communities more so than in the broader society.¹² When it is in the District of Columbia, a city with a large black population, observations, then so too are the local labor market conditions, even dual labor market theory (which explains the persistent economic disadvantage of some groups, but not limited to racial and ethnic groups). The theory does aid in understanding the social and economic marginalization of some groups. The theory does aid in understanding the social and economic marginalization of some groups on the national level, but in local labor markets its explanatory power to explain the economic disadvantage is overwhelmed by the level of racial segregation in the local populace. We need to be able to understand the local labor market in such a way that it can explain the allocation of jobs and the expectations of workers in the enclave as well.

To an extent, we have already read about the black middle class. As Friedson wrote in the 1950s of the “Negro middle class” that emulated the white middle class in terms of their jobs, their income, and certainly their aspirations. The black middle class of the 50s were teachers, municipal workers, and low-level government employees. Their incomes may not have been as high as those of their white counterparts, but of course in many places they were paid more from their pay. And if they had wealth, they would have equity in their homes (a great many

of geographical categorization with local lands depending on the number of people.

It is important to study not only the distribution of labor market, but also within the distribution in black American communities. As others have described, the jobs held have been disproportionately low in the economy, so the distribution of social life is as defined by race as well as on Native American reservation labor markets. Within such places, a theory was developed to explain performance groups within a society, notably (minorities) cannot adequately capitalize within racially marginalized communities explaining the experience of such people in these highly segregated local labor markets. To explain crime, as I am using it here, we must realize social inequality visited upon communities is able to take into account a redefined social structure in such situations. The relative position of people will be influenced by both the structure of society and within their segregated communities.

They recognized this. When Franklin Frazier described a group of "middle class," he described a group of people who in some behaviors although their wealth did not come close to the wealth of their counterparts.¹³ Members of the group frequently postal employees, teaching level managers in government or in business have corresponded to these occurrences they got "Jim Crow reductions" in wealth, it was ordinarily limited to the middle-class African Americans

rented their homes). The same is true for unionized industrial blue-collar jobs in Cleveland, and Pittsburgh also helped in the 1960s and 70s. Clearly today America's black population that is at the standards, as middle-class whites.¹⁵ The case that African American employees in departments enjoy a class prestige that white coworkers may not, and this is a relatively better-off employment circle living around them. Black professionals enjoy large incomes, such as teachers, and the status of their positions is more like the status of whites and more like the status of checks in the broader society. And they are accorded more standing than their white counterparts simply because their occupants have worked in that generation knew of elders in the community who had standing and respect and were respected. They'd held them for a long time, and they were Native Americans working in low-paying jobs. They may define themselves and be seen as a lower class situation because around them are high unemployment rates.

We must be clear, though, that this is not the context of the dominant society. In the class blacks and Native Americans receive within their communities, and in America. It is the positioning of social class in the American view of occupational prestige. For women to say, "I don't want no damn segregation settings, jobs and their hierarchies simultaneously. The relationship between incomes, quality of life, and stake in the prestige hierarchies, with individual status is the most emphasis. For example, the young people have not been tempered by racism."

to an extent true today.¹⁴ Also, the jobs of cities like Detroit, Chicago, need to establish a black middle class. There is an important segment of the black middle class, by the same token. But at the same time it is still the jobs of the post office or fire or police within their community that their status is simply a consequence of their circumstances when compared to those of professionals in occupations that do not. Teachers and nurses, enjoy a public definition of status inflated beyond similarly situated white people bringing home larger paychecks. Some secondary sector workers are valued for jobs ordinarily would receive similar pay. Many African Americans of my generation in our community or in our churches who are seen as having a good job because even if they were janitors. Similarly, high-level service jobs in tribal casinos are valued by others as in a more preferred position than neighbors living amidst 50 percent

of this internal status scale exists within the community's definitions of prestige. Middle-class blacks may enjoy the relative respect of their jobs but they know where they stand in the broader status scale. Secondary sector jobs in the broader status scale that leads young men and women to a "slave job." In high racial or ethnic communities, status occupants exist within two prestige scales. The relative value of people's jobs for their status conformity will depend upon both scales. Status scales varying on which they place the young whose expectations and hopes are more dependent on opportunity structures are more

likely to look to the broader society, but if there are good jobs there is a route to the prosperity of the individual in their immediate environment. Older generations are more likely to see the consequences of competing in a game where the rules are set by a more stringent standard of the segregated society. Wideman differed from his parents in that he was less likely to frame his expectations in terms of the occupational distribution of the inner-city South from which much of the old national labor market. To the extent that a prediction exists, when we are predicting the types of jobs that will include both the young and the old, the prediction is that the disadvantaged marginalization in the inner-city is placated by having lowered expectations. This is a simple way to explain our dependent variable (crime) in terms of the stratification of labor by a standard that is much larger at large than the more complex layers of the segregated communities.

If we focus too much on residential segregation, we run the risk of missing another important factor in the force of stratification. New Orleans, like other cities in the Southern US, has had a different history of segregation than other Southern places, and while Washington, DC, has different patterns are, and have for some decades. In the North, there was no residential segregation because of the rigid norms of the time that black children could play together. In the South, it was recognized that as they reached a certain age, they would socially prescribed social distance and geographic distance, places like New Orleans had a different pattern that allowed some of the black children to play near the white homes of their employers, and those being served. Thus today you can find black children quite near rather grand mansions, and in the inner-city boulevards and avenues and out of the inner-city. This cautions us against too lightly ag-

y's prestige allocation, for in valued
ous lifestyles that they see outside of
er people, worn down by the experi-
e the cards are stacked against them,
from success as judged by the less
d community. One way that Robby
' generation is that he was probably
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ial segregation, however, we run the
complexity of social life and labor
ke many cities, towns, and villages in
t pattern of segregation than north-
DC is a southern city its residential
ecades been, more like cities of the
t as much need for residential seg-
ns of social segregation. White and
when young, but it was universally
adolescence they would assume the
. Without the need for rigid geo-
Orleans developed a housing pat-
k servant class to live conveniently
oyers—that is, it was convenient for
a will see some very humble abodes
albeit off of the stately, tree-lined
f direct view. For our purposes this
regating residential districts in our

frameworks and analyses, because the social structures for those living close at hand are defined in such places.

A lesson from the shortcomings of the labor market opportunity thesis in multiracial or multiethnic societies is that racial and ethnic patterns are not just variables that need to be controlled, but are instead important determinants of labor market opportunity that is central to the thesis. For example, to explain the relationship between racial and ethnic patterns in South Africa, we would have to control for the effects of apartheid. Likewise, it will be useful to control for the composition of European states for the thesis. To understand the influences of these factors on the relationship between race and employment there.

Some may also see a shortcoming of the labor market opportunity thesis in the observed changes in neighborhood violence of the twentieth century. In each of the three theses effectively predicted violence. The labor market opportunity thesis predicted neighborhood violence. The labor stratification thesis predicted neighborhood homicide rates in 1990. The labor market instability thesis predicted neighborhood homicide rates in 1990. The labor market instability thesis was the central thesis. It was a thesis that predicted unemployment rates and the percentage of workers in the secondary sector occupation. The percentage of workers in the secondary sector in 1980 was higher than it was in 1990. This does not simply represent statistical mess. The Seattle labor market has changed, and the changes that have taken place through the twentieth century.

Twenty years ago secondary sector was a small margin of the city's economy and was located in the industry or on her docks, or in the city. People tended to live in the same census tracts as the employed people. This fit with expectations.

By 1990 more hi-tech, medical technology, and other industries were bringing new types of jobs, some of which were located in Seattle.

the social lives and opportunity and may be very normatively strati-

of our analyses thus far is that in s, racial stratification and housing must be taken into account, but they s of both patterns of social life and central to our conceptualization. For between the economy and crime in sider it in the context of the legacy eful to consider the changing ethnic r those who study crime there, and e relationship between the economy

g of the labor stratification and crime Seattle during the last two decades f three analyses the labor stratifica- lent crime. To be specific, the mod- crime rates in 1980 and 2000, and 90. In the first analysis census tract ntral variable used to represent the standardized combination of census percentage of employed workers who ns. But the correlation between the dary sector and the unemployment in the 2000 data. This change does siness over a twenty-year period; the nd these changes are emblematic of ghout the United States.

or workers—those employed on the not in Seattle's booming aerospace e city's manufacturing concerns— acts where there were a lot of unem- tions of dual labor market theorists. echnology, and the nascent biotech s of jobs to the metropolitan area, attle or, if not actually in the city,

employing people who lived there. Many industries were either drawn from or created by young, recent college graduates. High-tech and some companies dramatically changed the city as a whole. Boeing was gone, but the economy was nearly at full employment.

The 2000 census of the population and income that differed from those we observed in the primary sector workers living primarily in central business district rates. The two were still correlated, but a smaller portion of the city's workforce was in higher portion was in secondary sector. The city's place in the local labor market as well as its status as a city that I earlier referred to as a "two-tier city."

In earlier chapters I described how Cleveland went from a manufacturing city to one of Rust Belt cities attempting a regeneration of its central business district. I speculated that the labor stratification was worse in Cleveland than it did in Seattle. The city's inner city, just outside the central business district—abandoned—a consequence of declining manufacturing town Cleveland has since been revitalized. The Rock and Roll Hall of Fame beside new baseball stadium home to the Indians and the reestablished arena away is the basketball arena where LeBron James favorite and hometown hero LeBron James cannot say that the city has gotten it right. Investments in these facilities (cities routinely invest in these facilities critics are convinced that they do not work), one does see the reestablishment of these companies these developments. With the city decimated by the loss of population and the influx of new residents through the process of gentrification experiencing. Gentrification is certainly a process that certainly changes the residential distribution.

My colleagues and I (see chapter 10) have seen a shifted labor market nationally. To

Many of the people working in these areas were outside of the Northwest or were attracted by high salaries and the stock options of large corporations. Some neighborhoods as well as the city economy were strong, and the diversified local economy was a major factor in the early 1990s.

Johnson reported some housing patterns that were common in 1980. No longer were secondary cities with higher unemployment-related, but at the end of the decade workers were in manufacturing and a variety of service jobs. A subtle shift had taken place in the city as well as in some neighborhoods in this twenty-first-century city.”

Johnson now Cleveland had gone from a thriving Rust Belt decline, to a city that is now a central core area. My colleagues and I used Johnson's thesis model worked slightly less well because there were large sections of the central business district, that were largely empty and declining population and poverty. Downside of the model was that the city now sports the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame baseball and football stadiums that are home to the established Cleveland Browns. Not far from the stadium fans used to flock to see then-local stars like LeBron James and the Cavaliers.¹⁶ While I think Johnson's money's worth out of their investment, I don't necessarily believe that they do, but many don't know, but that issue is beyond the scope of this study. The restaurants and street life that accompanied the city in the 1980s and 90s have attracted a wave of gentrification that many cities are experiencing. It's not without its problems, but it is a sign of the distribution of employed people.¹⁷

Chapter 5) found consequences of the decline of manufacturing, the presence of manufacturing

workers has given way as a crime-high-end service sector workers. This is unimportant, and it is likely very different from the occupational structure of the United States. The effects of employment on crime patterns are complex.

In both Seattle and Cleveland we see a similar pattern in local labor markets. As it has in other cities, the economies and structural arrangements are changing, and the social relations that cause it, characterized by sociology, Emile Durkheim, predicted that a new social organization would emerge out of the Industrial Revolution.¹⁸ How might cities, and their labor markets, be changing as the shift toward postindustrial economies? Crime is responsive to the distribution of resources. Times of economic change, when both the economy and the disappearance of employment opportunities are high. Perhaps an enduring despair takes place, not only in the city, but in the larger national labor market. Local cultures and their values take root and persist, but in those places, like some of Seattle and Cleveland, there emerges an accommodation to the new conditions and the persisting disadvantage that comes with it.

This is not to say that people need to be in a disadvantaged position in the social structure. Some are resigned to it, others elect to fight it. Some, though at times not purposefully, adapt. These adaptations may contribute to the persistence of crime that allows for or encourages the emergence of crime. It may provide the situation of competition. Crime finds its fullest criminogenic influence in these systems like those described by Anderson. So far, it appears that a more fulsome influence crime needs to take into account is the disadvantage and the demography of the city.

My earlier discussion of our metropolitan areas and crime in rural places

inhibiting factor to the presence of this is not to say that manufacturing is important in some cities, but clearly the US has shifted and so too have the terms.

See evolving cities coping with changes earlier eras in response to changes in rents, social life, including crime and change in response. An early founder of that eventually a new form of social order to the social chaos wrought by the Industrial Revolution, their neighborhoods, and residents of industrial society continues? Perhaps the loss of employment most acutely during the 1930s when jobs and expectations are dashed by economic opportunities that had been expected. This is the case later in places relegated permanently to the margins of local labor markets. Maybe in these later places the street culture can and develop a self-persisting quality, like Chicago's and Cleveland's neighborhoods, to the new structure of labor markets that comes with it.

People do not necessarily come to accept their disadvantage, but instead that some become resigned to it, and still others react angrily, in response. People having any of the critical mass in a neighborhood can witness the emergence of street cultures, which is often the case where labor market marginality is high or the emergence of cultural systems like those of Ellison or Venkatesh or Jones.¹⁹ So thus the explanation of how labor markets can account both persistent economic inequality and the persistence of race and ethnicity.

More limited knowledge about labor markets and on tribal land also guides the

way toward a more nuanced version of the thesis. As in the inner cities, the mechanism for the wider national labor market is certainly a stratification of labor, but not the farming in particular areas. The agricultural areas are substantially producing yields less. Also, these areas work in two important ways. First, as in the service concerns within commuting. Second, the externalities of nearby industries and consequently jobs there in important. The Hole in the Wall Gang's parents work in nearby extraction industries. The same is true of producing regions of Appalachia and the West. The battles between Native Americans and environmentalists affects what industries in the west as well, and the arguments between environmentalists and the production of grizzly bears and wolves at some level about jobs.

These same factors influence the jobs on tribal land. But for those established thriving casino businesses that many of which have secondary sectors, tribes they have probably created a situation like what black urban communities that the wider America thinks less about how we rank occupational prestige class by locals. For those tribes where their lot likely follows the course of things are all right because of other things are very hard to come by. Of course, difficult because of isolation, poverty, and

From rural and tribal areas we are building in not just how we might create a secondary sector, but how the local jobs are available to them. If a job as a

of a labor stratification and crime meaning of work is different there than . In rural communities there is certainly much also depends on the nature of the local labor markets in productive different from those where farm- will be affected by nearby industries the case of cities, manufacturing or long distance provide additional jobs. industries can influence agriculture, important ways. The places where the worked were negatively affected by same has been true in the coal pro- will probably be increasingly the case National Parks and Forest advocates is happening in the forest products I would be surprised if a part of the ists and ranchers over the reintro- in northwestern states is not argued

the economy, and consequently the tribes that have successfully estab- they have introduced many new jobs, sector like characteristics. For those local labor market that is somewhat were like in the 1950s and 60s: jobs of (because of the relative pay and ous), but that are defined as middle- without successful gaming industry, of other rural areas; in some places r opportunities, but elsewhere jobs e for the latter it is all the more dif- and the racism that is the status quo. can find additional arguments for t classify jobs into the primary and cal populace defines the jobs that card dealer or waitress in a casino

restaurant is viewed as valuable, decent benefits, and if they are offered, saw few prospects, then those jobs may generate crime. Both in these areas and during the Great Migration it is important to consider individuals holding jobs, those in the process of losing them, and those trailing them will very likely define

Labor Stratification and Crime Over Time

Before more fully considering these issues, it is helpful to consider research that has been conducted in the United States, which might either raise additional questions or offer an improved theoretical approach. Studies from Italy are useful for our purpose. Paolo Bonanno's research on unemployment in two distinct regions—the North-Central and the South.²⁰ The North-Central region has historically had a more robust economy, while the South has been characterized by less economic growth and a heavy industry. Buonanno found unemployment rates were higher in the South, substantially increasing crime rates. In the North-Central part of the country, where unemployment is lower, there does not appear to be a strong association between unemployment and crime. Remembering that crime is not only about unemployment (see chapter 2) we should be cautious about drawing conclusions, but they are consistent with our theory. Unemployment of work is most problematic in settings where workers are also displaced or marginalized (see chapter 3). Researchers Luciano Mauro and his colleagues analyzed regional data and concluded that unemployment helped to perpetuate regional poverty and crime. In a study of violent crimes in Korea between 1990 and 2000, they found that unemployment increased both crime rates and the effects of income.²² Lorenzo Bonanno's research on the role of female labor force participation in crime in Mexico's Veracruz.²³ They found that labor force participation

if those positions are steady with people who not long ago will very likely inhibit lifestyles that and in the inner cities during the consider the timing element, because their community, and their offspring the jobs differently.

outside of the United States

se conceptual changes, I think it is as been done outside of the United additional questions or help to frame . Two studies of labor markets in olo Buonanno examined crime and ons of Italy between 1993 and 2002, The former is more industrial and onomy. The South, by contrast, has nic growth, more poverty, and less oyment had a large effect on crime ng crime there. By contrast, in the with lower overall levels of unem- o be a relationship between unem- g the inconsistency of studies which nemployment and crime in the US ous to not overinterpret these find- ur suggestion that people being out tings where larger numbers of oth- ed in the labor market (see chapter l Gaetano Carmeci also used Italian unemployment and crime together erty.²¹ Studying both property and 1982 and 2004, Kim Dongil found n theft and assault over and above lanco and Sandra Villa studied the tion on crime in the Mexican state, force participation reduces crime in

general. But while female labor force participation rates, both rape and serious violence distribution increases. What we can say with confidence is that the association between the two is robust and complicated.

Of course both my explanation and the research results are not the first time people have turned to labor market shifts to explain systematic social life. The discipline of sociology was born in the wake of the Industrial Revolution. Central to the idea of modernity in Europe and America were the changes that took place around them that resulted from the movement of populations from villages to cities where new jobs could be found. Today many are moving toward what some have characterized as a new industrial revolution and although a great deal of manufacturing still takes place there, substantial production is occurring in China and especially Asian countries in particular as exporters. To think seriously about the future of the world, other economic characteristics of the world, thinking just about the people who have lost their jobs and the jobs moved from. We must also think about the people who live where jobs have been created, the social and economic arrangements that have changed from agrarian to modern manufacturing. What are the challenges for countries that are on the receiving end of jobs and jobs across borders? And the challenges for the formerly rural areas within the older industrial economies to move production in. Finally, what are the challenges in new or old industrial economies that are not moving them by but they remain stuck, dead-end jobs and misery around them? This is the situation that the Wall Gang and their offspring face. The Wall Gang's deviance were byproducts of the first industrial revolution that the localized industrial revolution of the recent changes may well do the same.

ce participation reduces overall violence, but sexual assaults increase as women's wage participation increases. A lesson to draw from these studies is affirmative action in the labor market and crime are both important. The meaning and interpretation of these findings is one that social scientists have looked at for a long time. Social life, and sometimes problem-solving, is a process. Sociology was born during the Industrial Revolution. The ideas of the first sociologists in both Europe and America were taking shape in social life that were taking shape from economic transitions. The shift from agrarian to industrial meant the migration of people from villages and farms to urban areas where factories were built. In many western nations have or are moving towards being characterized as postindustrial economies, where manufacturing continues to take place in some areas but is occurring elsewhere. Latin American nations, in particular, are major producers and exporters of raw materials. The connection between employment, economic growth, and crime we must move beyond the idea that people live (or at least lived) in places where crime is so high so begin to think about those who are living in places and the consequent changes in the social structure there. How are the transitions from agrarian to industrial economies affecting the people of the world? The end of globalization's moves of plants and factories to the same needs to be asked about for developing and industrial nations, when companies move, what happens to people and places, both in the developed and undeveloped, where so-called progress passed on to the next generation dealing with the externalities of activities that the parents of the Hole in the Ground are facing. Just as increases in crime and social problems during the first Industrial Revolution, it is likely that similar changes are taking place with more and more people.

Obviously, important changes have occurred over the past few decades too. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the transition of Eastern European states from nation-states to membership in the European Union, the crisis of the EU and its debt crisis, the end of the Cold War, the rise of China, India, and Brazil, and the growth of emerging economies all constitute major social and economic ramifications, which we might expect to have a better or worse.

These transitions have an additional dimension: the move from totalitarian regimes to democratic regimes. The move from life leads to higher crime rates.²⁴ The popular expectations that the latter would lead to human fulfillment and the good life have not materialized. In such transitions independently of the transition in western nations, increases of crime rates are observed. Along with new opportunities to exploit the market entrepreneurially, there are increased opportunities for crime. One need not bother with troublesome regulations and due process of law in repressing crime. It is quite a bit easier to claim innocence than to prove it. Criminals as well as organized crime if possible exploit the law available to them, any and all sources of law. When the rights of the government are violated by the state then it becomes easier for crime.

For our purposes, this complicated relationship between economic changes or labor market patterns and crime. It is difficult to untangle the relationship between the opening up of societies from any of the changes in labor markets and the emergence of crime. Africa represents an interesting example. The industrial workhorse of Sub-Saharan Africa has been the draw for job seekers since liberation. In recent years migration has increased as well as from other nations of southern Africa, which is experiencing political and

have taken place elsewhere in recent years: the transition of some nations in Moscow's sphere of influence to democracy, the continuing evolution of the former Soviet Union, the continuing evolution of the apartheid system in South Africa, and the transition of many nations to become fast-growing, productive economies. These changes with very substantial economic growth are expected to influence crime for better or for ill.

One potential complication. Historically, the transition to democracy and more open social structures may run counter to the observation that crime provides greater opportunity for economic growth, but if we think about the nature of the rhetoric and propaganda of some nations in "liberated" states makes sense. In these states, the press one's self politically and entrepreneurial opportunities for crime. Police states that respect liberties like the rights of the accused and the rights of both dissent and ordinary common people tend to ramp down on common street criminality. Police are free to use any technology available, and preemptive measures of information, and preemptive measures of information become more respected by the public. Some among them to get away with

crime. This raises the consideration of how the economic changes in these countries might affect crime. The increased crime that comes with the transition to democracy might be the result of changes in the economic lives of the people. South Africa is a good example. South Africa has long been a part of sub-Saharan Africa, but as a result of apartheid, its crime rate was more limited than it is now, and many migrants from South Africa's hinterland in southern Africa (especially Zimbabwe, where there is economic turmoil) have moved in

order to find work in South Africa, at the same time the crime rates appear to be rising. I have no confidence in this last statement, but I think it will differ in a democratic state than in an oppressive regime. Certainly the perceptions of the Black and Coloured, are that the South African government is the source of their crime problems.

Two explanations are popular. Most especially those from other African nations, are that the crime problems in the townships outside of both the cities and the townships whose populations are growing, are the source of their crime problems. Economic inequalities within South Africa, the dominant political system, the Congress, the dominant political system, toward meeting the promises of liberation, of work or employed in unpromising conditions, that delivery on the promises will take time, and the nation for the perceived crime increase is insufficiently patient.

Summary of Work and Crime Studies

To summarize what is currently known about employment and crime is to say that (1) unemployment rates and crime rates are related; (2) employment is related to crime, especially in rural areas; (3) it predicts criminality in rural areas; (4) employment and crime has been observed in the US, and in both cases there is a strong correlation; (5) poverty is a consistent predictor of crime in rural areas, while neighborhood characteristics are important in urban areas; (6) race dynamics are an important factor in urban and rural areas, and especially in the context of gender patterns, especially the work patterns; (7) work as a criminological variable is different than it was during the industrial and economic, and industrial context of the past, and it is related to crime rates. These patterns

factories, farms, and mines. At this time, crime rates have increased. It is difficult to have accurate statistics because the nature of crime statistics is different from those produced by the preceding years. Perceptions of the people, white, black, and African crime rate has gone up.

Many blame the new migrants, especially those from the squatter settlements. They look to squatter settlements in historically black townships, or to those that have been swelled by immigrants, and blame them. Others blame the continuing economic stagnation in Africa. While the African National Congress party, continues to work slowly toward economic liberation, a great many people are out of work in these positions. Most people recognize that crime takes time. The second popular explanation for the increase is the actions of those who are

Study Results

What is known about the connection between crime and context is that: (1) the association between crime and context is inconsistent; (2) the quality of the association is especially in urban areas, and at times in rural areas as well; (3) an association between crime and context is observed both within and outside of the urban areas; (4) evidence that context matters; (5) crime, but it is especially important in urban areas; (6) disadvantage is important in urban areas; (7) context is an important part of the explanation, both in rural areas and around tribal lands; (8) the loss of life of mothers, should be taken into account as a genetic force in postindustrial economic development; (9) deindustrialization; and (10) social, economic, and cultural matters to how work affects criminal-justice systems and anomalies could spell the end

for the labor stratification and crime. We can provide opportunity for an expanded program of theoretical understanding, and make available social policy alternatives.

What occurred in the United States was a strong economy but increasing crime as well. It is to run counter to the labor stratification theory that migrants had, on average, better economic outlook than they had in the South, and that places like the Southside of Chicago and The Hill in Pittsburgh were by no means long-term disappointments in the reality. And there was a younger generation of the South, of Jim Crow, or cotton belt, and why crime increased during this period. So we have to remember that chronic unemployment was set in within many black communities. In the United States, American Northerners were not the exception, this has been the norm among migrants. Essentially the search for the good life, was not alone among migrants, and they as a group are not unique in the saga of America.

Now in the twenty-first century, we have persistent national unemployment rates for an extended period and are receding from a decline, which began prior to the recession. This is another anomaly that must be accounted for. Our understanding of how labor markets work in chapter I will propose an expanded program that does that.

e thesis, but instead I think they pro-
perspective that can offer improved
y point the way toward productive

ates in the 1960s was an expanding
ell. At the surface this would appear
ation thesis. After all, Great Migra-
er jobs and a better economic out-
nd new jobs were being created. But
, Harlem, Black Bottom in Detroit,²⁵
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Robby Wideman, in his impatience
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labor stratification and crime thesis

Toward a More General Explanation

A more general explanation—that labor stratification and crime theories address the apparent anomalies such as rising crime rates during economic distress—have moved beyond the industrial era to the end of the twentieth century. At the same time, the theory should retain the basic explanation of structured labor stratification and its causal mechanisms. This can be accomplished by integrating economic disadvantage into the theory. It is fundamentally what William Julius Wilson and Nancy Denton, Elijah Anderson, and others have shown. Please remember that in chapter 5, the theory is a central part of the contextual analysis of neighborhoods condition the relationship between economic experience and delinquency. What I mean is the ways that taking disadvantage into account explains the anomalies and provides the basic framework to explain crime patterns under industrial conditions, and in places other than the inner city.

In chapter 1 I wrote that nearly all crime is based on our relationship to the labor market.

n of Employment and Crime

is, one that is similar to the basic thesis—must be able to explain both rising crime during plenty and falling crime during recession, as well as crime in societies that have prospered and societies whose economies that began to falter at the same time, that more general theory model that holds that socially induced inequality is criminogenic. This intellectual direction is not new. William Julius Wilson, Douglas Massey, and others have argued. And the social and economic disadvantage argument that I used to examine how the relationship between juveniles' school achievement and crime. What I want to do here is be explicit about how the relationship between school achievement and crime helps to explain seemingly anomalous patterns of crime. This is for a thesis that can be used more broadly under different economic and industrial conditions than urban places in modern states. All of us interface with the economy or market, via the job we have or do

not have. Not just our incomes, but our lives are determined by where we work. And of course, if one does not have access to the economy is especially problematic for those we used in parole work. Encouraging people to get and hold jobs was central to our efforts to reduce prison. It was the sudden surge in job opportunities that an urban underclass was created in the American Rust Belt. Of course, according to market theory, it is still the case that people will move from sector jobs from not-so-good secondary sector jobs. The changes in US, European, and Asian economies is still worth making.

There remain jobs that are well paid, with benefits, and with greater security and stability than many others enjoy. Americans, and, though some political forces might argue otherwise, workers, but this new primary sector jobs are people employed in technology and services. Examples of the latter are the technicians in the service sector, call center workers, and manufacturing jobs in mature capitalist countries like Canada, and Europe, those who seek jobs with marketable skills and minimal education requirements in an expanded secondary sector. The characteristics of the McJobs that I wrote of are: low pay, no benefits, and workers there enjoy no opportunities for advancement. As a result, workers in the last decades of the twentieth century sought jobs with this set of characteristics to provide stability in their work and a future at the place they worked at the moment. Without such a bond to the future, workers can be expected to pursue lifestyle changes. There is no more reason to expect this of workers in earlier years, but now, in the postindustrial era, that young adult marginalized work

our benefits and future prospects,¹ and the characteristics of our jobs. We have a job that particular connection thematic. This was precisely the logic of finding and helping our clients to find jobs to keep them from returning to joblessness that drew Wilson to argue that the demise of the industrial economy is the course, as articulated by dual labor theory, that we must distinguish good, primary sector jobs from secondary sector jobs. Even with substantial growth in some Asian economies, this distinc-

tion is not paid, with decent and even good benefits and opportunity for upward advancement. Among these are still the professions, but we now want to roll them back, public sector jobs notably contains many high-paying upper-level service sectors. Examples are those who keep our far more technological world functioning. With fewer high-paying jobs in market economies like those of the US, workers are frequently limited to opportunities in the public sector. These jobs have the characteristics described in earlier chapters. They are poorly paid, often below minimum wage, there are few or no benefits, little job security and few if any opportunities for advancement. This was the case for secondary sector jobs in the nineteenth century, employees holding these jobs do not have jobs that bond them to the employer. The type of employment that pays them at the minimum wage, these employees, just like the jobless, are in lifestyles more conducive to crime. There are more young workers than there was in the nineteenth century industrial economies, we can expect that in the future, those who are unemployed, the

jobless, and those working in the exterior to have a heightened probability of engaging in high-risk, high-stress, and high-risk lifestyles and consequently crime in communities where there are communities that are marginal to the labor market, as we have seen in the past. In these environments that make it more difficult for people to be involved in delinquency. Of course this is a problem that was made earlier, with a bit of an adaptation to the service sector jobs, but I now want to make some changes: the new complexity of marketplace for social and economic disadvantage.

Manufacturing in the United States has changed. For the first three decades of the twentieth century, workers with few or no skills and training could find work in heavy industries. These jobs, were classic primary sector jobs and after workers achieved some security. Those willing to work hard in blast furnaces, foundries, factories, and meat packing plants could earn a middle-class life for their families. Fewer workers today. A growing number of manufacturing jobs are located in right-to-work states, where workers have no foothold. Workers there may have lower wages, lower salaries, and fewer job protections. Another fundamental change has taken place. In many companies there is no longer a need for low-skilled, hardworking employees. The cost of labor is cheaper—some say higher quality—because of automation. I recently had the opportunity to tour a car plant. The workers on the floor were skilled workers, not the workers which are actually building the cars,

So when my colleagues and I discovered that the neighborhood residents who worked in manufacturing were not negatively associated with crime, and that the crime statistics (see chapter 5), it shows that crime is a much smaller part of the problem in the inner city life than it was when I began testing

expanded secondary employment security of becoming involved in criminality. And, when adolescents live in concentrations of adults who are married as seen in the past, these are criminogenic environments. It is more likely that the young will become involved in crime. This is essentially the same argument as is made in the case of what are defined as primary and secondary manufacturing jobs, and a more explicit advantage in the thesis.

As a result of automation and in other advanced economies in the latter quarters of the twentieth century, there were jobs for those with no or minimal education. Those jobs, very frequently unionized, were well paid. They paid well, had good benefits, and seniority, they had a degree of security. Some of those jobs were in dirty mills, but many of those jobs are a part of our economy. Many manufacturing plants have elected to unionize. The unions have not been able to gain a parity of quality benefits, but sometimes lower than their unionized brethren. But they still have a place in modern manufacturing. There is still a place for the poorly educated, but it is a smaller one. Robotics and automation provides high-quality outputs. A colleague of mine who works at a European auto plant reports that there are still technicians who keep the robots working.

It was discovered that the percentage of neighborhood crime in manufacturing was neither positively nor negatively correlated with the rates using 2000 census data and this would not be a surprise.² Manufacturing is a part of the US economy and of neighborhood crime. It is a part of the labor stratification and crime

thesis in the 1980s. Some manufacturers of United Auto Workers Union and the European robotics technicians primary sector positions. Unfortunately manufacturing workers now are employed some characteristics of the secondary

The scholars who formulated did explain the ongoing disadvantage exclusively of subjugated minority groups but also of dominant group members by traits such as social class, to the position ladder. I have sought to use the position to explain how marginalization. This was in lieu of explanations that attribute. The latter was, in my view, too deterministic. To be sure, some people are motivated by a variety of concerns, but that does not, as expected, explain a great deal of crime, especially violent crime. The tenuous linkage between poverty and crime, a feature of poverty existed where people were different from the rest of us and that we should encourage who make such arguments to task for a more prominent place in their explanations, how people are motivated. It was generally argued that they became motivated to work. Never mind that among the poor, no jobs were available. Service sector jobs, generally do not pay a fair wage, and do not provide a living wage for the toilers to

In contrast, sociologists have argued that social conditions such as joblessness or unemployment lead to social conditions where customs, and practices can emerge that make crime and delinquency more common. In his description of inner-city Philadelphia, Richard Price described families who adhere to traditional values, and families that adhered to the code of the street. He argued to be more involved in both violent

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ame poor because of their failure to
that for many of the people counted
ole and the ones that were, secondary
family wage, and at times do not even
hemselves.

documented how social structural
racial residential segregation can
ltural patterns, values, norms, cus-
n disadvantaged communities that
e likely. This is explicit in Ander-
delphia where he observed “decent”
al norms and values, and “street”
of the streets. The latter are subject
nce and property crimes as a result

of internalizing beliefs that insist that one must be violent when faced with insults, or that one must be violent in one's own behalf, even if that violence is against children of decent families cannot ignore the fact that they will be subject to it when they are in the streets. Most importantly for our purposes, these beliefs are ongoing, deep, concentrated disadvantages that are jobless or otherwise marginal to the economy.

Wilson, Massey and Denton, among others, are the focus, but are exemplars of how the way that people live or remain that way as a result of structural conditions, joblessness, racial segregation, and concentrated disadvantages do emerge that perpetuate disadvantages and structural conditions. For example, these beliefs do not encourage remaining in schools, but these beliefs are a consequence of neighborhood, economic, and social conditions that perpetuate disadvantage. Two related critical structural conditions are joblessness and the cultural patterns of racial and ethnic segmentation and joblessness.

It is critical that we not simply think of disadvantage as being with low incomes or in poverty. Disadvantage is a set of circumstances and social conditions that include being in a single parent family, being teenaged parent, being in a stock market, whether people rent versus live in their own homes or homelessness), education (the proportion of people who dropped out of high school), and being disadvantaged from those living in poverty. These conditions are high levels of single parent families, high levels of drop out rates, and elevated levels of labor market disadvantage. Some of my colleagues who are African American in disadvantaged neighborhoods, but I choose not to call them disadvantaged. America can contribute substantially to the lives of the disadvantaged place and being black, being in a disadvantaged neighborhood, and absence of education and disadvantage, but absence of education and of itself does not constitute disadvantage.

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that one reacts strongly and quickly
e must be aggressively entrepreneur-
entails illegal activity. Also, even the
gnore the code of the street, because
are out and about in the community.
these codes emerge in a situation of
vantage that occurs when residents
o the labor market.

nd Anderson each have a different
poor or disadvantaged become that
of social structural conditions: job-
concentrated poverty. Yes, cultural pat-
isadvantage, but they emerge from
beliefs among young people that do
may be directly related to dropout
quence of the structural, neighbor-
ons in which some children come of
conditions that perpetuate such dis-
s that flow from it are labor market

think of the disadvantaged as people
disadvantage includes both economic
s. Factors such as family structure
ents), housing (condition of housing
ing in houses they own or are buying,
roportion of people in a community
nd so on help us to distinguished the
poverty. Neighborhoods where there
ies, substandard housing, high drop-
r market marginality can be thought
eagues include the percentage of resi-
a their calculations of disadvantaged
do that, believing that being black in
y to a person's chances of living in a
can cause one to experience discrim-
t the racism of society, being black in
advantage. And here I am especially

interested in people who live in circ
 concentrated disadvantaged. Sociolo

If I had to use one term to capture the
 income families who live in inner-cit
 who live in other areas in the central
tration effects. The social transforma
 disproportionate concentration of the
 urban black population, creating a soc
 the environment that existed in these

It is the residential concentratio
 disadvantaged that exacerbates the
 text where good jobs (see Wilson's
 class neighborhoods do not benefit
 opportunities⁴) and quality educatio
 petuating their status and unfortun
 advantage will be intergenerational
 when the people of such communit
 ety and their interactions are prim
 situated. Again, the base problem f
 is that too many adults are marginal

Most of the scholars who have
 focused on urban communities, but
 economic disadvantage is concentra
 it may not also create problematic
 in rural areas. Thus, in the US, on
 Appalachia, or in the black townsh
 sity" areas of Zimbabwe, the same
 and produce both oppositional cul
 base of the problems is the populat
 existent—relationship to the labor r

Labor Market Marginality in Post

The occupations that were in the p
 century in the US, Western Europe

circumstances that can be described as
 sociologist William Julius Wilson wrote:

... differences in the experiences of low-
 income areas from the experiences of those
 in the city today, that term would be *concentra-*
tion of the inner city has results in a
 the most disadvantaged segments of the
 social milieu significantly different from
 communities several decades ago.³

... of the economically and socially
 difficult situations, creating a social con-
 dition of how people in under-
 standing from personal network links to job
 opportunities are far less available to them, per-
 manently making it likely that the dis-
 advantage. This problem is made even worse
 when they are isolated from the wider soci-
 ety and rarely with others who are similarly
 affected for the people of these communities
 access to the labor market.

... we written about these issues have
 shown that there is no reason why if social and
 economic conditions are isolated that
 living and criminogenic conditions
 exist in Native American reservations or in
 townships of South Africa or the "high-den-
 sity" processes perpetuate disadvantage
 and crime and criminality. Here too the
 city's marginal—perhaps even non-
 market.

Postindustrial Economies

... primary sector during the twentieth
 century, and other modern economies still

are. Two things have changed. First, the mobility into the middle class for a smaller portion of the workforce. Second, high-level service sectors have emerged. Third, by the financial services companies that have sprung up to keep our more technical workers employed. Many of these jobs are different from the classic service sector jobs, many of which were classic service sector jobs, many of which were classic service sector jobs, many of which were classic service sector jobs. Many of these jobs have primary sector characteristics. Many of these jobs (some “workers” in these sectors and some “professionals”) have benefits, there are opportunities for advancement, and the jobs are comparatively secure.

What is important for a more general thesis is not the title of the position or the local labor markets occupy, but rather the conditions they are employed in. Just as the workers of inner-city Pittsburgh, Carnegie, and the early twentieth century, their jobs gave them some security, defined their lifestyles and repressed their children’s as well. The same is now true in the high-level service occupations of the twenty-first centuries. What remains to be seen is what is still available to people; what is still the quality jobs with primary sector characteristics and low-quality work or no work at all, which is criminogenic.

Not Just the Inexorable Effects of

We might easily fall into the trap of blaming the move to cheaper labor markets at home on the inevitable process of globalization in the current era. That tradition is that the emergence and increasingly sophisticated jobs, like many of the high-end service jobs, and the US’s heavy

t, at least in the US and in a manufacturing sector, the basis for upward mobility for many low-skilled workers, is a far more robust than in the past. Second, new occupations in high-growth sectors are emerging. These are services of the sort offered by the tertiary sector and the many concerns that have been expressed about biologically dependent societies operating in a world different from traditional service sector economies. Secondary sector jobs, because they are more secure, are reasonably well paid (and many are incredibly well-paid), they come with benefits, and positions are available for advancement, and positions are more secure. General labor stratification and crime rates are lower. It seems that people in either national or international markets, whether the characteristics of the position are good or bad, was the case with the manufacturing sector in Cleveland, and Detroit of the twentieth century. Something to bond to, jobs that condition people, not only their criminality, but their behavior. It is the case for the many who labor in the tertiary sector. It is the case for the many of the later twentieth and early twenty-first century. It is important is the quality of the jobs. The case is that a proliferation of high-quality jobs with good characteristics will inhibit criminality, and that labor market marginality—is

Globalization and Technology

It is not surprising that thinking that the movement of jobs and workers across national and abroad is simply a function of globalization. It is a function that is characteristic of the world economy. It is a function that would also include the presumption that the increasing prominence of technological innovation and the rise of those primary sector-like highly skilled jobs in a financial services based economy,

are also inevitable. This image ignores the US and state governments have the effects of both globalization and people and communities. The same industrialized nations.

It is widely acknowledged that a recession was deregulation of financial markets. A long set of changes that included squeezing the middle classes, the accumulation of wealth by the richest Americans in the belief that they were under pressure on labor unions, a power struggle between those that were exploiting workers early in the 20th century, and a major contributor to the growth of the economy. All the while, a growing number of workers were taking on the characteristics of secondary sector workers. During the Great Recession there was job creation in the primary sector jobs that were better quality job prospects for some, but not for the most trained among us. The stagnant economy was a challenge for most job seekers. The unemployment rate for college graduates was higher than the overall unemployment rate. The recession hit the hardest those who are less skilled and have less opportunity for employment if they were willing to accept it.

This has always been so. We can see how social hierarchies the vulnerable for the most part weather economic storms. Of course, the recession is a combination of many social factors, including the location of workers, importantly, where they sit in the labor market. Secondary sector workers in part because they are easier to shed than highly trained workers. Labor stratification and crime theories would contend that expansion of the economy would create more workers, and also their children would have different lifestyles. It also means that more workers are at a disadvantage, potentially falling into a worse position than their previously more vulnerable counterparts.

res policies and practice choices that made that encourage or exacerbate technological changes have had on can be said of some other Western

substantial cause of the Great Recession. This was a part of a decades-long shifting tax burdens increasingly to wealth among the already rich. They are the “job creators,” and negative force in turning industrial jobs in the twentieth century, to an important middle class after World War II. The jobs that have been created have not replaced employment. Yes, prior to the recession, but too few of them were like being replaced. In the US there are increasingly these are reserved for the US economy has made finding jobs during the Great Recession, but the number of graduates is less than half of the US recession, as we might guess, has hit hard, who used to be able to find quality work hard.

all folks residing at the bottom of the economy for a reason: they have less capacity to use this lessened capability is a function of less education and training, but, very important in the labor market as well. Firms employ that portion of the work force that is less skilled or more valued employees. The reason that has been our basic argument is that this portion of the labor market makes them, susceptible to crime-conducive environments. Communities exist on the margin of the economy, to the much more dire circumstances of the poor and vulnerable neighbors. More people become

like my urban parolee Walter or his children are subject to the delinquent Hole in the Wall Gang.

Why Do We Accept These Arrangements and Their Consequences?

One need only to listen to the rhetoricians at the national, state, or local level to find the foundational American values that underlie the more joblessness and labor market marginalization—a pride in—the dominance of individualism and concerns. Individualism is woven into the fabric of our culture, but it is especially so in the US. Sociologists Steven Messner and Richard Rosenfeld focus on material gain and wealth accumulation, which is allowed by our national values, but they argue that these are supported by heroic narratives of self-made heroes, people who by their own industry and hard work were able to accumulate great wealth. They do not realize the extent to which these successful individuals are dependent on the support of government. Cheap leasehold lands, agricultural practices that encourage family farmers (and help family farmers), and federal export subsidies for select companies and the military (think Boeing and Lockheed-Martin) are all examples. The Federal Aviation Administration, which requires airlines to have to pay the full cost of operations, is another example. Those who overly hype the American dream and success among many of today's established elites and politicians began via homestead acts, the gold rush, and the displacement of Native Americans. The country's economic success is so successful are there by virtue of the

Because of this belief system we often look down on those who have not accomplished

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rural counterpart, Steve. More child-like of Gary or the members of the

gements

toric of major political party candidates to get an important lesson in allow for policies that have led to marginality. First is a belief in—even individual rather than collective con—the fabric of many Western nations, second, as is argued convincingly by Richard Rosenfeld,⁵ our national focus on individual perseverance and hard work at nearly all costs is not just encouraged by them. These values of up-by-their-bootstraps economic individual perseverance and hard work such narratives rarely acknowledges were supported by family capital, education, or position; frequently our success, or, in the case of some, by the subsidies for mineral exploration on public lands, or rich agribusiness (many designed to encourage expenditures that provide substantial support to their stockholders (e.g., defense spending, and taxpayer support for the subsidies which keeps airline companies from going bankrupt) seem not to concern politicians). And up-by-the-bootstraps mythology. And the families are those whose landholdings were government giveaways of land taken from them. The narrative is that those who are not successful are on their own failings.

We are collectively deeply suspicious of them, and we worry that such

people might get more than they could from their investment of blood, sweat, and tears in a social welfare system that is designed to make sure that no one is ripping off anyone else that manufacturing has left the US and benefits were too good, even though right-to-work states have also lost jobs. A report that emerge in 2011 that blames teachers for the budget struggles in some states. I would not have even tried to praise enough our friends and neighbors in the name of their sacrifices. But teachers should not come to blame them, along with public schools and their shortfalls.

Of course it is not just values and the erosion of important institutions (banking and short-sighted local decisions, and policies that benefit some already well-heeled individuals) that may have deleterious effects on workers and ultimately they have real consequences for labor markets and these in turn affect the economy.

Political and economic policies adopted over the past decades have dramatically increased income and wealth. The Congressional Budget Office reported that from 1980 and 2007, for the top one percent (the top 100,000) incomes grew 275 percent, but only 10 percent for the rest of earners. Incomes for the bottom 65 percent over this nearly thirty-year period grew only 65 percent over this nearly thirty-year period. Increased income and wealth inequality over the past decades, but they have accelerated and become more so no small part because of fundamental changes in the American labor market.⁸ In large part, the decline is linked to declines in primary sector jobs and where jobs have been created, they are characterized by secondary sector characteristics. And these changes have important ramifications for income and delinquency rates, and for the lives of people constrained to these jobs, for the

deserve based on our perception of
and tears. How else do we explain a
ned less to help those in need than
that system off? Or that the reason
is because union workers' income
ough some important industries in
obs? Or how did a political narrative
s, firefighters, and police unions for
s?⁶ After the 9/11 attacks we collec-
first responders, and spoke in patri-
en years later, some politicians have
blic school teachers, for state budget

l attitudes; it is action. Deregulation
, media, etc.) at the national level,
are examples of such actions. They
individuals and companies, but they
king people and their communities,
quences for both national and local
ct crime.

nd choices made in the US in recent
d the concentration of both incomes
lget Office found that between 1979
(in terms of income) of households
ly by 18 percent for the bottom 20
se in between grew between 40 and
ear period.⁷ The processes that have
ality have been underway for several
as a result of the Great Recession, in
ntal changes in the structure of the
measure these processes have been
or jobs (especially blue-collar jobs)
a disproportionate share have sec-
as we have seen in earlier chapters,
fications for communities, for crime
individual criminality of some peo-
eir children, and for their neighbors.

The Walmart Contradiction

A concrete example of how this can be done is provided by The Walmart Corporation. Walmart, the largest retailer in the world, provides many opportunities and problems for local communities. On the one hand, it brings activity, and it brings a reliably increasing income to the community. On the other hand, Walmart is not known for the benefits provided to their employees. In fact, commercials featuring employees are rare, and the benefits they receive from the company.⁹ The proportion of Walmart's workforce is a very small subset of those who work in the retail industry. For most, low pay and minimal benefits are the norm. Walmart is the world's largest retailer. Consequently, it is not surprising that many people enjoy family wage jobs, and they are dependent on the state. A University of California study titled "The Hidden cost of Walmart programs by Walmart Workers in California" is making this contention.¹⁰ The authors of the study, David Jacobs, found that Walmart workers receive less health care benefits than other retail workers and were more likely to use state health care benefits. As a result many people are supported food stamps, Medicaid, and other state programs, shifting the employer's labor cost to the state. Jacobs report that the results cost the state more than the profits of the Walmart Corporation.

This, however, is not in and of itself a result of their low labor costs and their competitive advantage, the company is able to undercut potential local retail competitors. Discount retailers have tried to cut their own costs by competing with Walmart. In fact, many grocery retailers as a reason for their 2003–2004 strike by 70,000 members of the Commercial Workers union.¹¹ Those retailers were able to extract because of competition.

an happen may be useful for some. es just such an excellent example. world, presents an interesting set of al communities. It brings economic xpensive option for local shoppers. torious for the low pay and limited es, notwithstanding their television xtolling the wonderful benefits they blem is that this is only the case for work for the Walmart Corporation. nefits are the realities of working for ently, most Walmart workers do not re at times compelled to be depen- F California-Berkeley Labor Center Walmart Jobs: Use of Safety Net pro- ifornia” reported evidence support- the study, Arindrajit Dube and Ken rs received substantially lower pay ess likely to receive employer-based ny Walmart workers relied on state nd subsidized housing, functionally the citizens of California. Dube and e state \$86 million dollars annually. ornia are essentially subsidizing the

itself the Walmart contradiction. As combined with its global bulk buy- to drastically undercut the prices of ube and Jacobs point out that other n pay scales and benefits packages, In fact, this competition was cited he position they took that led to the bers of the United Food and Com- tailers cited union concessions that tion from Walmart as the basis for

settling the strike. The contradiction between the wages and benefits package are not only that the company's practices depress local salary and benefits, but also that who are in many ways similar to those of the company, that such workers are an important part of the economy, as their practices cut into the discretionary income of those they cut into their own customers' and similarly situated working people, and thus reduce the flow of Walmart's profits. Their practices also cut into their own long-term profits—thus, on a wider scale, this is a problem for the economy. The loss of secondary sector jobs will have a negative impact on the working classes, which negatively impacts the economy and has additional costs. Such a loss of jobs increases crime rates while decreasing local tax revenue, leading to increases in income inequality, increasing the need for government capacity to respond to that crime with welfare solutions.

Summary of Labor Stratification in the Contemporary Economy

Important economic changes have fundamentally changed labor markets in the contemporary economy. Globalization has moved manual jobs from developed to new, developing economic powers, increasing labor market inequality, with a growing labor market inequality, with a growing labor market inequality, with skilled professions and other primary sector jobs in an expanding secondary sector. Inequality is a consequence of both the economic and structural changes in national and international labor markets.

The Great Recession has accelerated the decline of the middle class, increasing the income inequality and the economic stratification pyramid. The loss of jobs from the middle and lower middle class has grown as a result of these changes. For more information, see the Center for Children in Poverty at the University of Alabama at Birmingham.

is created because Walmart's wages are low for their own employees; their benefits for other blue-collar workers, not their own employees. The problem is that market segment for Walmart, and the discretionary incomes of those workers, is their capacity to buy. It is those workers, not the people, who provide a substantial share of the profits. They are sowing the seeds of threat to the Walmart contradiction. On a global scale, the expansion of Walmart in the American economy. The expansion of Walmart to reduce the discretionary income of the middle class severely affects the consumer economy. The expansion of Walmart in this circumstance is likely to increase the tax bases. It is a recipe for long-term economic stagnation, increased crime, and decreased societal stability via either criminal justice or social

and

has taken place, which have substantial implications in the US and around the world. Globalization has moved from the formerly industrial world to emerging markets in Asia and Latin America. There is a significant amount of new jobs being created in highly skilled and high-paying sectors of the labor market and in the US continued high unemployment. The Great Recession and these fundamental changes in international economies.

has accelerated the process of hollowing out the middle class and the income and wealth of those on top of the economic ladder and growing the distance between the rich and the lower categories. Poverty in the US is increasing. Now, according to the National Bureau of Economic Research at Columbia University, more than 21

percent of American children are grown up in a household that is below the federal poverty level of \$14,730 a year.

Federal, state, and local governments have built a social safety net programs in the name of Keynesian economics in the need for austerity. So when more people are unemployed, a larger share of the labor force can only find work in the service or tertiary sector, the capacity of government to provide social services being reduced (keep in mind that welfare programs have stepped substantially back from providing social services). Unemployment compensation for much of the population, and states are cutting back on support for education, especially often through state colleges and universities. This is reducing our capacity to support those currently unemployed and looking for workers for primary sector jobs that have been stalled.

Labor Stratification and Crime in the US

According to the basic labor stratification theory, crime should be increasing. More unemployment is high, and state income is declining in many places declining. With these conditions, crime is a crisis that is a central feature of the current economic and economic disadvantage are likely to be high, too. But the US remains, by most measures, a leader in crime rates, referred to be crime rates. I know of no empirical criminological studies (and for that matter most subnational) that show a decline in crime rates in recent years. There have been brief periods of declining or flat crime rates in the 1990s (see 7.1 and 7.2 are taken from a 2011 Bureau of Economic Analysis “Criminal Victimization, 2010.”¹³ The decline in both violent and property crime victimization rates. This is on top of fairly steady declines in crime rates over a brief period in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and an upsurge in violent crimes that has been associated with competition for crack cocaine.

growing up in families whose income is \$22,000 a year for a family of four.¹² Governments are being asked to cut back on programs of “responsible budgeting” and the result is that many people are jobless and an increasing number find work in the marginal second economy. A welfare reform in the US has already been implemented (providing a safety net such as unemployment benefits for a portion of the population). Additionally, there has been a reduction in public education, from kindergartens to universities. So when it is greatly needed, the government is not only struggling or to prepare skilled workers, but the funding for these programs has

the Twenty-First Century

Our explanation and crime thesis that we began with is that marginal employment is expanding, investment in education is low and in the face of economic changes and the housing market crash of the Great Recession, measures of social inequality are likely to show that they are expanding. There are indications, in a long-term reduction in crime rates, that criminologists as “the crime decline.” There are criminologists who disagree that national (and state) rates of crime have been dropping in the last few years, but the long-term trend in crime rates appears to be holding. Figures from the Bureau of Justice Statistics Report titled “Trends in Crime Victimization” illustrate fairly steady declines in crime victimization between 1993 and 2010. There has been a slight increase since the mid-1970s, except for a dip in the early 90s when there was a bit of a decline. This has been attributed to conflicts associated with the crack cocaine territories and markets (other




Figure 7.1. Total Violent and Serious Violent Victimization Rates, 1993–2001. Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1993–2001. Author: Jennifer L. Truman and Michael...






Figure 7.2. Property Crime Victimization Estimates, 1993–2000. Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1993–2000, using the NCVS Victimization Analysis Tool...



Victimizations, 1993–2011: Rate per 1,000 Persons
 Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey,
 Michael Planty. Date of version: October 12, 2012.



1993–2011: Rate per 1,000 Households. Due to
 use caution when comparing 2006 criminal
 e: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Generated
 at www.bjs.gov. 12-Apr-13

sources indicate that homicide rose (see figure 1.1 in chapter 1). Thus there seems to be a pattern of joining the somewhat confusing picture of crime during the Great Depression of the 1930s with the picture during the economic boom years of the 1950s. The increase during the 1990s have been attributed to the economic recovery during that period, criminal justice system changes, broken-windows policing strategies, and the increase in the portion of the population locked in prison. The increase in crime during the 1990s seems to be with the continuation of social changes such as the increasing urbanization. The anomaly seems to be with the continuation of the trend since the start of the Great Recession in 2008.

But perhaps this anomaly is not unique. There are other anomalies in those first two earlier seeming anomalies. For example, if crimes (e.g., homicide) did not increase during the Depression, recall that economists find that burglary rates went up during the 1950s. The increases in crime in the 1960s occurred during a period of rapid social and demographic changes that drove the crime rate up. The coming of age of the second generation of the baby boom and the crime-prone age tsunami of the 1960s are indications that there was uneven economic growth. How the economy would have affected crime rates in the 1960s if these two simultaneous events were not present is an issue to address that below. For now, though, the lesson to take from those two earlier seeming anomalies is that they do not apply here. First, there were important differences in both cases. During the Depression, there was economic hardship and struggle in the population, and the crime rates were in the first Northern generation of young people who were by the realities of the Promised Land. The crime rates in the South then were not evenly distributed across the country. While crime rates went up in America during the 1950s, they did not go up to the same extent everywhere. The lesson from both of these lessons in the development of the economic and crime thesis, and, by extension,

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for a few years then too; see Figure 1. This may be yet another anomaly, seemingly at odds with the patterns of decreasing crime observed in the 1930s and the increases in crime rates of the 1960s. Dropping crime rates may be due to the generally expanding economic conditions (community policing, changes in law enforcement, and a massive increase in the number of prisons and jails), and likely other factors such as the rapidly aging American population. The continued decrease in criminal victimization in the late summer and fall of

1967 is more so than the actual realities of the crime anomalies. While it appears that some cities did increase substantially during the 1960s, as Phillip Cook and Gary Zarkin did in their study. And the seeming anomaly of the increase occurred in the context of two phenomenally changed American social conditions: the generation of the Great Migration and the baby boomers. Who is to know what would have affected the overall crime rates in the 1960s had not taken place? Also, there was an economic boom in that economic boom. I will argue that, there are two lessons that I tried to draw from the crime anomalies that are important to understand: first, the important collective emotions present in the 1960s were that there was a sense of shared burden and frustration in 1960s inner-city America, that African Americans were frustrated and angry. Second, the patterns of criminal victimization across the geography of the country in the 1960s, they did not occur everywhere. It is important to recognize the existence of a more general labor stratification. In doing so, I can make some sense of

the seeming anomaly of continual crime rates during the Great Recession. I will consider the

The crime drop has been attributed to a number of factors. To a large extent these explanations should be viewed as a set of social forces that contribute to crime rather than as a set of social forces that cause crime. Scholars have varying opinions about which factors are most important. Frequently mentioned factors (and especially drops in homicide rates) are: the more than quadrupling of the prison population; get-tough-on-crime strategies;¹⁴ changes in the drug market; decline in street crack cocaine markets; changes in the population during the 1990s when the crime rate was high; and, of course the decline has slowed a bit since the late 1990s. The Great Recession and its lingering aftermath have also affected the nature of the population, with a smaller population of crime-prone teenaged years and elderly people. The crime drop, likely has had an effect too.

While there is no contention among scholars that the amount of common or street crimes has continued to decline at least up to the present (available data (2011)), there is important variation in the pattern. The overall pattern hides important variation in the rates. Patterns are important for our purposes because they show criminal involvement and victimization rates during the drop, and variations in crimes are also important.

In her book titled the *Unequal Crime Drop*, Parker examines the lowering crime rate, and the variation in rates based on race and gender.¹⁶ Not only are the rates for whites and blacks, or for women and men, but the factors thought to be causing the drop are different for whites and blacks, or for women and men. The drop has been steeper than the white rate, which has been steeper and among blacks who live in high-crime areas. There has been a drop, but there the homicide rate has not. For other African Americans, and especially for women, it is important to note that Parker reports that the homicide rates in the first two years of the two

ly dropping crime rates during the crime drop first.

puted to a number of forces. To a could not be seen as competing, but complement each other. Researchers of these factors or sets of factors mentioned reasons for declining crime since the peak years of the early of imprisonment rates and other changes in drug markets, notably the markets;¹⁵ and the improving economy drop was most precipitous, though bit, and continues now in the Great th. Finally, changes in the age struc- ture portion of the population in the early twenties for the most violent of

among criminologists that in fact the s occurring within the United States to the date for which we have reli- able literature indicating that this overall within the country. Two such pat- terns: demographic variation in both tion that have been reported during cross micro social environments are

Crime Decline, sociologist Karen Parker paying special attention to the pat- terns of the decline nor the decrease in crime are the same for d men. The black rate of decline has which has been fairly stable since 1980, ly segregated places there has also e rate remains high compared to that specially high compared to whites. It reports increased black male homicide enty-first century, and this change is

masked by the overall homicide rate have tended to track fairly close to had a steady but comparatively low geographic categories.¹⁷ At the same time, other scholars whom she cites, including that began in the 1970s, shifting from a manufacturing base to a service-based economy. Other changes, too, like decreasing unemployment for a subset of African Americans, still behind in segregated inner cities hitting manufacturing jobs.

Parker emphasizes the point that we have a relatively good understanding of what caused the crime drop, but the decline is complex and that for a complete appreciation we need a more nuanced, multifactor consideration of a number of social forces on homicide. Parker writes:

Comparing these two cities brings up two points. First, no single indicator captures the complexity of changes in labor market structures. Though we can see the visible effects of the economy, for example, in crime rates, doing so may lead to a serious oversimplification of local economies and the potential relationships between them and the crime drop. Second, the decline is not uniform on an area's industrial mix and level of economic activity, though crime decreased in both Detroit and Chicago. The nature of the crime drop differed in

So the effects of the decline are not uniform. We need to develop a theoretical approach to explain crime rates, both more complex and more nuanced. We need a more nuanced approach to explain not only the crime rates but also the crime rates in inner cities. Also, there is the suggestion that in inner cities, crime may now be increasing. A more nuanced and complex consideration are bold

EXPLANATION

decline. Black female homicide rates, white male rates, and white women's rate compared to the other demographic, Parker's analyses, and those of others indicate that the industrial restructuring of the economy from a manufacturing-based to a service-based economy, disproportionately affected black communities, increasing racial residential segregation and shifting economic reality for those left behind, with the hardest hit by those losses in manufac-

ture. A number of factors—some that we understand, others that we do not—have influenced what has happened, and the burden has not been equally distributed. To understand what has happened we need a more nuanced explanation. After comparing the effects of economic restructuring on homicide rates between 1980 and 2000,

we want to light some important points. The complexity of racial stratification in urban areas. Many scholars tend to focus on the most visible factors, for example, poverty and unemployment, but there is a common misunderstanding with regard to the relationship between economic conditions and crime. The path inequality takes differs based on the level of ethnic diversity . . . Finally, even in Detroit and Dallas in the 1990s, the effects were not the same in each city.¹⁸

It is not the same for all groups; we need to be more nuanced in explaining these relationships that are being observed. We need a multiple factor explanation for the crime drop, but any real changes in crime rates are a question that in some segments of some cities is increasing. The need for more complex explanations is underpinned by research that indicates that

we need to look even more closely at neighborhoods as we seek to understand how to explain them.

Similar to the themes articulated in discussing the challenges before police, that the continued economic distress and higher crime rates than show up in the stories one hears from social service communities is not evidence of this problem increasingly wrong in the places where national crime decline. In an effort to reduce delinquency in their distressed communities, County Executive of Dane County will only improve if confronted by the end they have mounted an effort to intervene in the lives of entire families at risk. This includes efforts to find jobs unless something changes for the future, communities, delinquency will only continue.

In a conversation with Marvin L. Hill House Association, a nonprofit serving the area, he mentioned the continuing crime decline and "seeing on the street." He did not agree with any suggestion that there was a problem in sections of The Hill, and a distribution. While Prentice remained unconvinced that crime was dropping, he argued, based on what he saw, that if it is dropping than the form of crime in Hill House Association is attempting to use systemic interventions to address crime in the area.

There is evidence that the form of crime in communities. In particular, gang activity has been historically there have long been stories of sustained substantial gang activity in New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles, and an expansion into suburban counties.

within cities and even within neighborhoods and crime distribution patterns and

led by Karen Parker, John Klofas, distressed officers in the inner cities, argues that the stress in those communities is linked to the city wide police statistics.¹⁹ While service providers in distressed communities, they feel that something is wrong there they work that is contrary to the data to confront the problem of juvenile delinquency in those communities, Kathleen Falk, the former director of the Department of Corrections in Wisconsin, feels that the problems require a systemic intervention. Toward that end, not only improve policing, but to address the needs of the communities where children are considered at risk for the parents in the belief that the future outlook of families and communities continue to be a major problem.²⁰

Prentice, chief executive of the Hill District in Pittsburgh's Hill District, I mentioned. He responded, "Not from what I'm arguing with the city's data so much as the fact that the crime is not continuing high levels of crime and a disturbingly high level of gun violence. He noted that the overall crime rate was not what he sees on the streets of Pittsburgh, but the nature of crime has changed. The fact is, like Dane County, several systems are addressing crime and delinquency in their service

of crime has changed in some communities. The nature of crime has changed things in some places. "gang cities," places with long histories of gang activity. Notable among these are Chicago and Los Angeles. But recent decades have seen a rise in crime in cities and smaller towns.²¹ According

to data collected by the National Crime Agency gang problems declined in the early 2000s. While these patterns in smaller towns, still the lion's share of 50,000 residents or more.²² More to in the seriousness of gang activity. U of serious gang activity, James Howell level of youth gang killings in most ies, but substantial increases among set was Pittsburgh. Speaking gener between 1996 and 2009, while the the continuing crime decline, Howe

Overall, more than 7 out of 10 very high level or increasing proportion 14-year period. Second, a remarkable for gang-related homicides across t none of the trajectory groups found consistent with a decline in the prev

So in addition to variation in the have benefited more and others le form and nature of crime changed than others in recent years. What a Howell and his colleague document some suburban places.

Recent research clearly indicates erogeneity within cities and even much crime there is.²⁴ We have lon within cities contribute most of the fact is much of the point of some c. But we know now that even within cific hotspots, street intersections a occurs, and others where there is v colleagues studied crimes in Seattle 2002 and found stability in most group of places where crime declin

Gang Center from law enforcement in the 1990s, but increased steadily in the 2000s. Similar trends were observed in the suburbs and rural areas. The core of gang problems are in cities of 100,000 or more. At our point, there are also variations in the extent of gang problems. Using gang homicide as an indicator of gang problems, Kell and his colleagues found a steady increase in gang homicide in large (100,000 or more people) cities. In a smaller subset of cities, a small subset. Among that subset, there is a wide range of changes in gang homicides. The nation as a whole was experiencing a decline. Kell writes:

...large cities reported a consistently high rate of gang-related homicides over the past decade. A high degree of consistency in the rate of change in gang homicide trajectory groups is observed. Third, a high percentage of these cities displayed a pattern of increasing gang homicide.²³

To the extent to which some populations are recovering from declining crime rates, the extent to which the problem is more on the streets of some cities than others. About within metropolitan areas? As a result, there is a growing gang problem in many cities.

It is also clear that there is also great deal of heterogeneity within neighborhoods about how crime rates are changing. It is known that some neighborhoods have high crime rates to the city crime rates—that is, they are among the earlier chapters of this book. In some bad neighborhoods there are specific streets and blocks where a lot of that crime is occurring and very little. David Weisburd and his colleagues found that street segments between 1989 and 1994 had high crime in some parts of the city, but a distinctive pattern of crime in some and others where it increased.²⁵

There were increases in the downtown south (a nightclub zone and the star District, while decreases were observed in the historic heart of the African American areas of the city that have viewed as having experienced significant gentrification, which already had high-end housing. The gentrification of the CD and the increase in the south Lake Washington neighborhood increased the population, contributing to a view that it is important to consider those results along with the University of Maryland research team using a detailed examination of the maps that they produced. The downtown business district, most of which is now in the Central District (part of which was previously in the Valley ("The Valley"), which borders the downtown view neighborhoods where crime data indicate they contain some of the city's most crime.

An important exception to this overall trend is the high-crime street segments in the downtown south, a high-disadvantage area but is characterized by a life that is typical of high-traffic streets. It is clear that contained in the overall trend are different differential patterns. For instance, previous leagues have demonstrated that a significant factor is that substantially less crime in some areas contributed disproportionately to the overall crime in the years.²⁷

It appears that to an important extent, these changes are linked to changes in especially visible places, down to crime hotspots at the block or even an intersection. While these geographic changes, state imprisonment rates, and labor markets are no doubt important factors, it is clear that place forces that cause crime rates to change are factors that may have important effects.

own business district and just to its (medium district) and in the University District (UD), which is served in the Central District (CD), the African American community, and in south-central Seattle, south of Lake Washington. The former was the case during this period, and the latter, the University District, became even more so. Both the increasing high cost of housing in the inner city and the gentrification of the inner city shifted the characteristics of the inner city. The former local crime decline. It is interesting to compare this with others produced by the University District using the same data set. Interestingly, an unpublished study shows that except for the inner city, the highest crime street segments (which experienced gentrification and were disadvantaged) and in the Rainier neighborhood those high-end, Lake Washington neighborhoods decreased. Both the CD and The Valley were disadvantaged neighborhoods.

One observation is that there are several neighborhoods in the University District, which is not a typical inner city area characterized by the anonymous street grid and high density. This research makes it clear that trends in crime reduction are very different. For instance, Anthony Braga and his colleagues found that a major source of the crime decline in Boston was the reduction of some of Boston's major hotspots has been a major source of the city's overall reduction in recent years.

To a certain extent, fluctuations in crime rates are common in volatile cities and in especially volatile cities, which may be as small as a street block. However, large societal forces such as demographic changes, public policies, and the economy and culture are also important micro forces that can go both up and down. Among the factors that affect on within city efforts to lower

violence, drug behavior, and crime. Coalitions of activists, such as those in what's been called the "Boston religious leaders, worked to get "problems off the streets, and to broker nonviolent solutions that resulted in substantial decreases in violence.²⁸ Police officers in particularly problematic places and neighborhoods are often in such places. Klofas, writing about the impact of poverty on crime, argues for police departments as opposed to social workers that increasing poverty and racial inequality are a need to be of concern.²⁹ In particular, the impact of crime will increase crime, offers new characteristics such as schools, and calls for more attention to some segments of the population. The impact of crime into conflict with poor, minority communities, and from both the labor markets and governments.

To conclude this section, I believe that it has been obvious to social scientists that crime patterns, that a number of factors will lead to crime, not just one factor, such as the economic conditions that increase crime, and others will support crime. The latter category include an aging population, the proportion of the US population that is poor, and changes in interaction patterns that lead to crime selling. I and others who have conducted research on crime and crime believe that a sizable body of research indicating that joblessness, labor market conditions, and social and economic disadvantage lead to more crime. The empirical research will continuously weigh the effects of crime patterns, and criminogenic for the period just before and after the crime. While the requisite crime data will be available at the time of this writing. Further research on changes in disadvantaged communities and crime will take additional time to play out, and will be the subject of the next section.

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in general are efforts by citizens or groups that occurred in Boston, resulting in a "miracle." These groups, led by religious and "people's" jobs, to reduce guns on public settlements, resulting in quite successful strategies may also elect to target the people who live in or frequent these areas. Increasing metropolitan challenges add to classic urban challenges, notes the author. Residential segregation of core cities is still a problem. Further, he notes forces like poverty that challenge to important social institutions. More crime control on the part of police and courts. The latter is likely to bring officers from inner city populations who are marginalized by the power structures of metropolitan areas.

We believe that once we accept that which is true, we can start observing all manner of social forces that will effect changes in crime rates—both good and bad. Some important factors will be to address it. Important social forces in the inner city population, the massive increase in the number of people currently held in prisons and jails, and the social forces such as those associated with drug use. Extensive research on economic factors and the quality of evidence has now accumulated. Market marginality, a weak economy, and high unemployment are important social forces that challenge before us is to simultaneously address the reducing forces and those that are increasing. Before and during the Great Recession. The data will soon be available, they are not yet, and more, it is likely that the effects of the recession resulting from the Great Recession will be felt. Why that might be is the sub-

Labor Markets, Disadvantage, and

It is not new news to say that joblessness is the central point of Wilson's two *disadvantaged* and *When Work Disadvantaged*. Sampson, Wilson makes a strong link between joblessness and crime. What I and others have added is the connection between not just joblessness but also low-paying jobs, secondary sector jobs, and unemployment. I have some specification of the mechanisms connecting joblessness, and criminality. Here I would like to see employment and disadvantage affected by education. In his discussion in *Code of the Streets*, Sampson expands our understanding of this connection by adding four important factors: education and joblessness, neighborhood patterns, and imprisonment.

Education and Child Rearing

In chapter 5 I noted that research shows that children who do well in school are significantly less likely to engage in delinquency. Unfortunately my analysis and his colleagues have found this not to be true in disadvantaged neighborhoods.³⁰ Children in the lowest grades report more criminal involvement than those who do well. Of course, those who have done well are in the most crime-prone (see chapter 5). I would like to see if we are observing this pattern—why children who do well are not benefiting from the antidelinquency programs for other children living in more prosperous neighborhoods. I would like to see colleagues who qualitatively study disadvantaged neighborhoods to help us to understand what is going on in their school experiences.

What we do know is that education is generally not on par with what children need for success, and this has consequences for the future. Kirschenman and Kathryn Necker

and Crime

lessness leads to disadvantage. That two important books, *The Truly Disappears*. Also, writing with Robert link between urban disadvantage and led to this explanation is the con- ess, but also how work in low-end employment influences crime, and ms that link marginal work, jobless- like to elaborate a bit more on how ct crime and crime rates. Anderson, eet, has contributed significantly to ion. Here I would like to focus on nd child rearing, gender, residential

has long shown that children who r less likely to become involved in analyses and those of Paul Bellair and to be so for urban children who live There those who are getting better vement than those performing less ropped out of school altogether are 4). We do not really know why we hildren from disadvantaged places linquency force that education has prosperous places. I hope that my col- disadvantaged communities can begin going on with these youngsters and

tion in the inner cities of the US is hildren in affluent suburbs experi- r their job market prospects. Joleen rman found that employers in the

Chicago metropolitan area used to be. Many employers expressed that they felt that public schools would be lower quality. Most of the black applicants were rejected. Problems documented by Jonathan Kozol in *Schools in Crisis* and the district was eventually put in place to ameliorate the inadequacies.³² And Chicago. Urban schools have suffered from inadequate funding and substantial overcrowding. Therefore, the primary institution that prepares children to compete and change the world is underfunded, insufficiently educating the children, leading to criminal involvement as it does for the inner city situated.

This problem is further exacerbated by the lack of support for parents and their families. Think about the young girl who is pregnant (imagine a sixteen-year-old girl) she is criticized for her choice and blamed to condemn her parents. We presume that the lack of support contributed to this outcome, not the kind of behavior for their child, or the lack of support or stress the importance of getting an education. In other words, behold, we may be saying the very thing that we would say to a sixteen-year-old if her child becomes pregnant. We would say she have been at sixteen to parent a child. We would say if these girls do all right, and the world is not so bad, extended families that help them. We would say do not excuse these young women, but to recognize that they were inadequately parented and educated, and that they will be inadequately prepared to parent a child.

The point of using this example is to draw attention to a wholly different social problem, teen pregnancy, and to draw attention to one of the ways that social problems are perpetuated. If their families or schools fail, they fail young girls and the result is a cycle of poverty. If ready, we should recognize the cycle of poverty cannot parent well. If parents, schools, and society do not

race to sort who they would hire; those educated in the Chicago public schools, and they presumed that from those schools.³¹ Serious problems did exist in the Chicago schools, and they went into receivership in an attempt to solve these problems do not just exist in Chicago, but are the result of a wicked combination of social and economic challenges for a very long time.³³ The system established to help disadvantaged children in their circumstances is inadequately funded, and does not insulate them from the same problems as children who are already better off.

One reason for some disadvantaged children becoming parents is for a moment: if a teenager gets pregnant (and elects to have and raise the child), but as a society, we really contribute to their lack of guidance or lax supervision, or that they did not model the right behavior, or did not inculcate the right values through an education enough. But lo and behold, the same thing about that very same teenager becomes a parent early. How prepared will she be to parent well? Of course some very fortunate ones have parents or mentors. My point is not to either castigate or excuse, but to note that if they themselves were not disadvantaged, then it is likely that many of them would not have become parents.

It is not to take us into the realm of a teenage pregnancy, but I use it to draw attention to the fact that social and economic disadvantage is a problem in schools or communities, or their countries, and that becoming a parent before they are ready is a result of the complicity of all of the above if she becomes a parent. Schools, communities, and countries do

not take care of and rear their children, a higher probability of being subject to violence, including low educational achievement and crime. And today in America we are seeing children, especially disadvantaged children, themselves the victims of our collective failures. For their children's failures does not mean lessness and labor market marginalization and economic disadvantage. In doing so, educational institutions, families, and society are failing children, making crime and delinquency more likely.

Gender

In chapter 3, I briefly described a study by Martin Bates and I conducted where we tested the idea that social capital, social ties, and social support are important for crime prevention and crime explanation help explain criminality, but not most. The correlations we observed were different from those in the analyses. Women who are marginal and have few social ties are more likely to engage in crime. Remember that for men, the correlation between work and crime is not as strong as for women, work matters when they are not employed to a great extent without romantic partners. For women, work experience is not associated with crime. In the women in the NLSY sample we use, we could not reasonably assess this. One reason for a long time is that the work world is not as characteristic of secondary sector employment, with little opportunity for advancement, and little chance of finding that female responses to labor market conditions are very different from that of males, with different sets of job options.

Here, though, I would like to consider the role of women in disadvantaged communities. This is a consideration, because our earlier analysis

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men do has frequently had the char-
oyment: low pay, few benefits, scarce
limited security. So it is not surpris-
market stratification would be mark-
ho have enjoyed a much fuller array
onsider the particular circumstance
unities, which is a more narrow con-
yses of women using the NLSY data

included women in many different kinds of work, but this will be a broader consideration. In this chapter here I will consider not just the crimes of the disadvantaged communities, but how they are committed in circumstances. Necessarily, this will be a recommendation that readers look to the sources to gain a full appreciation of how women are treated that are marked by social, economic, and racial circumstances.

Women have historically been marginalized, and therefore, the women of economical means in the ghettos have been marginalized from the economy. I scratched out a living, if one can call it that, to as “days work.” My mother’s Hillside neighborhood seen each morning boarding streetcars to the Hill and upper-class communities where she earned a little as six or seven dollars a day. To get the benefits of a provided sandwich at lunch (which it cost each way on the streetcar). I remember The Hill, dead tired, to face the challenges of the neighborhood. Many of these women were supported and by their neighbors, but while they cared for their children, they could not model the kind of work paid off. No one worked hard enough to get a little that could be called a payoff.

Scholars have made important contributions to the study of how women experience the labor market, especially in terms of victimization,³⁶ but until recently there has been little attention regarding women’s labor market experiences if we keep our focus on disadvantaged communities. This limit is likely a product of much research on men and women in illegal behavior and crime, and that would appear in self-reported data. The limited involvement of women in the free market. The Uniform Crime Reports and the National Crime Surveys, has made studies of this topic. There are many scholarly treatments of female crime, but here I am especially concerned

kinds of communities. In one respect
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contrary to popular belief, few of t
long time. Most cycled on and off
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disadvantaged communities that are contemporary labor markets.

Ethnographers have substantially deepened our understanding of inner-city life and what has existed in our knowledge about the experience of an increasing number of ethnographically studied women's experience in coping with challenges in their lives, including work,

and after federal welfare reform, so this backdrop of changes in (as some might say) the economic safety net. The consequences were particularly hard on women.³⁷ Federal welfare reform in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, was passed by Congress under Bill Clinton. It was the ultimate triumph of the "no-blame" welfare for many social scientists and for some in the media—and too often blamed government spending cuts, or what they saw as the demise of the welfare state. They held out hope that the country was moving toward individual responsibility and the "no-blame" ideal. Of course that "better day" never came. Because of federal efforts to support the welfare system, many images of what things were like during the Depression; while it was much worse than the conditions that had been a regular part of life for many. To press the reality of what life was like during the Depression in being unable to feed one's children and to have a roof over their heads. With welfare reform, the system would be put back in place for the welfare recipients prior to reform was largely women with children (thus the Aid to Families with Dependent Children, or AFDC). And these women received welfare for a long time. They were on welfare, working at low-wage, seasonal jobs, or not working at all. They appear regularly.³⁹ Or the men in their

lives worked such jobs, and the work source of support was unavailable. Studied the effects of welfare reform, not system, caseworkers and many were some of the hype about problematic promise that would result from the poor mothers she studied, Hays says

They clearly understood the language many of them said that they thought other welfare mothers they were hearing on their butts all day," were reminding children and to hard-working, tax-paying themselves subjected to this pressure improperly targeted or unfairly administered.

Hays points out that as a result of economy in the years just after its were more than cut in half. But that in the first years of the twenty-first field work. Then many, many single no longer eligible to receive assistance, and trying to make it on less than half the line.⁴² These are the women who try to care for their children in the economically distressed neighborhoods produced by joblessness, marginality. It does little good to pay women work to take care of their families to get.

Jason DeParle, a *New York Times* accessible and compelling examination of lives of the people it was most supporting on three related women, their families warns us not to oversimplify the theory or the challenging lives of women with economic disadvantage.

men would turn to AFDC when that Sociologist Sharon Hays, who studies that even those closest to the old welfare mothers themselves, believed in “welfare queens” and the hope and the new changes.⁴⁰ Writing about the

age of “personal responsibility.” And might it was about time that all those hearing about, the ones who just “sit on their hands” of their responsibilities to their fellow-paying Americans. When they found welfare directly, however, it often felt like a slap.⁴¹

of welfare reform and a booming economy's implementation, the welfare rolls were still high. The economy was no longer booming in the 1990s when she was doing her research. Women with children were no longer the only ones who were still on welfare. The federally established poverty line was still too low for many to build lives for themselves and their children in socially disadvantaged neighborhoods. High unemployment, and labor market changes, and federal laws mandating that these families if there are no jobs for them

es writer, has written a particularly insightful history of welfare, its reform, and the impact it has had on the poor.⁴³ Focus on family history, and their children, he writes about the choices, the outcomes of reform, and the lives of those who struggle to deal with social and

There are inner-city women who have entered the world of entrepreneurial crime in the face of poverty, and violence around them. The only option that was available was the drug trade. Many of these women, trying to make it in the crack market, have entered the profession. In her book *Sexed Work: Gender and Race in the New York City Drug Market*, Lisa Maher reports on the lives of women confronted the realities of the drug trade in the context of very limited options. These women were not the passive victims of men, but rather, they were the expanding market that occurred in the inner-city scene a source of entrepreneurial opportunities. While some gains have been made, but the lives of these women are more complex than either of these. It is important to note that the dominant forces affecting the lives of these women are the same social structural forces that have disadvantaged and dispossessed peoples.

The street functions as a distinct culture with its own rules and precedences 'the same structures of gender and power relations has a division of labour, a structure of authority' (Connell, 1987:134). For the women in this study, the principal locus of social and economic relations is clearly linked to, shaped by, and reflects the broader cultural understandings of gender and power.

Comparing the lives of the women in this study to earlier generations of disadvantaged women, it is clear that

In addition to experiences of discrimination faced by earlier cohorts of minority women, these women were also confronted with a rapidly changing social environment. Unlike their parents, these women had received a formal education and those with the most extensive education were in their thirties. Many of the women in this sample had been in regular contact with the

no were thought to have turned to limited legitimate options, crushing And in the 1990s one option that Unfortunately many of the women et were themselves victims of addic- *der, Race and Resistance in a Brook-* ted on how a racially diverse group of addiction and tried to make it in s.⁴⁴ Maher found that these women n working the drug trade, nor was d when crack cocaine hit the street opportunity for them. Both argu- ed realities of Maher's subjects were options. Fundamentally, she found these women and their options were dominating the lives of other disad- She writes:

cultural and social milieu which evi- er relations as family and the state. It of power and a structure of cathexis' in this study, street life served as the nic relations. The patterning of these d by, and cannot be separated from, gender, race, and class.⁴⁵

a in her study with the struggles of l women, Maher states:

mination and occupational segrega- rity women, the women in this study declining job market. Compared to restricted employment opportunities work experience tended to be older e parents of the 36 minority women employment and often at least one

parent had held a secure job. The work was in a range of (mostly secondary sector)

The declining job market of which Wilson described in *The Tenth Muse Disappears*. Note that the “secure” secondary sector positions, not the people out of disadvantaged neighborhoods at the same intersection of racism, sexism, and classism, were the source of the problems for these women and all the other “hustles” they engaged in, and were the same forces pressing on the ghetto.

What about the girl children of Jody Miller and Nikki Jones have written autobiographies that are separated by a few miles. Their works tell the powerful stories. Miller’s research was set in St. Louis. Other scholars emphasize different aspects of their work, but they fit each other very well. Together they tell the lies of simple characterizations of crime and in political discourse.

In *Getting Played: African American Girls and Gendered Violence*, Miller does not see victimization in crime as she does their stories. They are a group of passive victims who are actively engaged in trying to pry themselves from the whammy of racial segregation and economic disadvantage, and they know that African American girls experience victimization that criminologist Jarrod Wilson has shown is present in the distressed communities they live in. Miller writes:

Research has consistently shown that victimization is at its highest in adolescence and is heightened further for young women

women's fathers had been employed in
jobs.⁴⁶

ch she writes is the same phenom-
erely Disadvantaged and *When Work*
jobs of the older generation were
good primary sector jobs that took
neighborhoods. Maher concluded that
sexism, and class stratification was
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aged in to live and feed their habits,
down on nonhustling women of the

disadvantaged places? Sociologists
written two separate compelling eth-
a few years and nearly a thousand
ful stories of life for inner-city girls.
is, and Jones's in Philadelphia. Both
s of the story, but they complement
humanize their subjects and expose
of these young women in the media

American Girls, Urban Inequality, and
t as much focus on female partici-
victimization.⁴⁷ She does not tell a
s. Instead, the girls she interviewed
protect themselves from the multiple
discrimination, high levels of social
the worst of a gendered society. We
experience a phenomenal amount of
net Lauritsen attributes to the acute
communities that too many of them

at women's risk of sexual victimiza-
e and young adulthood. This risk is
en in distressed urban communities.

Just as scholars have documented the gender ideologies, and situational context in high-risk groups such as college students and military, I show some comparable evidence of encouraged sexual aggression against women in *Code of the Street* interviews with men in disadvantaged communities. This violence, in part, through their empl

These young women go to school for education nor their safety is sufficient in communities where boys and men, beat them at school, the labor market, and by living encourages them to strive for status through violence, and especially sexualized violence who have to negotiate those same situations. One who was interviewed during her stu

Ricky said young women in the neighborhood in the context of parties: “They have to be careful they have to watch what they do. [When] they go out I mean, you got some smooth talkers who he thought the guys in his neighborh

I think it’s just to get a image, a reputation, a big. . . . I can’t really explain it. . . . The guys can be like, “Aw, man, he’ll be a real one for example, “We did this and we got a girl.” Most of ’em just do it for a moment to look like something they not.

Thus an important feature of girls’ sexual behavior provided within male

Girls who come of age in disadvantaged communities consequences of disadvantage just as they are probably exacerbated by the gendered id

the organizational characteristics, genres associated with sexual violence in fraternities, sports teams, and the effects of disadvantaged settings that affect young women. As Elijah Anderson notes, behavioral expectations for young men encourage cultural support for such a focus on sexual conquest.⁴⁸

Schools where too often neither their safety nor their well-being is even remotely cared about. They live in communities often battered down by their own struggles in life itself, adhere to an ideology that often manifests in negative ways, such as crime and violence toward the young women on the streets. A young man Miller quotes in his study explains this dynamic:

...neighborhood were particularly at risk in that they had to be extra careful about leaving. And [they had to watch their drinking] and getting high. ...in our neighborhood, so." Asked why this kind of behavior did that to girls he explained:

...a name. To make themselves look good. A lot of guys do it just so other guys will do this" or "He'll do that." Like ...he did that, and it was [so-and-so's] name, many, just for a image. Try

...sexual abuse was the status rewards sought by peer groups.⁴⁹

Disadvantaged neighborhoods suffer the same problems as their brothers do, but it is considerably different ideology carried by the men and boys

who live around them. And as both make a compelling case for, although stretch of the imagination they are they behave, due in significant ways lives resulting from inequality—including from joblessness and segmented labor the racial and gendered stratification

In *Between Good and Ghetto*, Johnson argued for young women who are navigating from real, substantial, and long-term with the realities of race and gender large.⁵⁰ She uses concepts that parallel families in *Code of the Streets*, contrasting behavior to adhere to traditional code behavior with girls who are “ghetto” parts, willing to fight in order to get an important way, the word that I use appropriate. While one can conceptually points out that the reality for these girls is frequently somewhere in between the natives. She writes:

Of course, real people—and perhaps neatly into only one or two conceptual girls about their experiences with violence of their actions and conversations with worked the code *between* the equal ghetto.⁵¹

The problem for these girls that Johnson their comments is that if their behaviors are more likely to be victimized in neighborhoods devastated by disadvantage, joblessness, and hopelessness. If their behaviors

Their efforts to protect themselves in formal institutional settings like schools

Miller and Anderson point out and it does not excuse these men by any who they are, and they behave how s to the dispossessed nature of their uding, importantly, that which results or markets. And this is overlaid with that affects the entire society.

nes also points to the problems cre- vigating thru communities that suf- term disadvantage, while also deal- ender stratification in the society at rallel Anderson's decent and street rasting "good girls" who try in their onceptions of appropriate feminine o," who are like their male counter- t and maintain respect. But in a very d, "contrasts," is not actually appro- y contrast these alternatives, Jones e young women is that they are fre- poles of these two behavioral alter-

os especially adolescents—do not fit al categories. My conversations with iolence, along with my observations ith others, revealed that girls astutely and opposing pressures of good and

Jones points out and illustrates with vior is closer to the "good" pole they n the hypermasculinized neighbor- labor market marginality, jobless- vior is closer to the "ghetto" pole:

put them at risk of losing access to ools or the church, where girls who

mirror normative gender expectations as good—can take some refuge. Themselves caught in what amounts to a predicament, they are often in circumstances to choose between the level of security that is generally available in rural areas and urban poverty.⁵²

Residential Patterns

Two contemporary features of urban crime are particularly important in any discussion of the ways that social structure influence crime: racial residential segregation, a feature consigned to US history, but still a major factor in life; and gentrification. The latter is the process by which upper-middle-class homeowners, professionals, and so on, moving into poor and minority neighborhoods. These forces are important for changes in crime rates, for the people who live in them, and for crime patterns.

Today, many young people believe that racial residential segregation was a byproduct of Jim Crow, and that the passage of civil rights and fair housing laws would have ended it. True. While in some cities segregation still defines the social geography of metropolitan areas, it is clear that American racial residential segregation is still a major factor in cities with relatively small African American populations. In cities segregation continues, despite the passage of legislation and the passing of time. Segregation is an important part of the social structure that shapes crime, including labor market inequalities, social inequality, and crime.

In what is certain to become a landmark book, Lauren Krivo explore the very different ways that Latino people live within America. While often segregated as African Americans, but often in distinctively Latino neighborhoods, segregation is important because of all the debates and concentrates onto margin

ns—girls who are perceived by oth-
 . . . Thus, inner-city girls find them-
 perpetual dilemma, forced by violent
 two options, neither of which offers
 taken for granted in areas outside of

an America are especially impor-
 that employment and disadvantage
 segregation, which is not just a fea-
 remains a central feature of urban
 the phenomenon of middle- and
 primarily whites, but not exclusively
 communities. Both of these social
 disadvantaged communities, for the
 time that occurs there.

ve that racial residential segrega-
 and that it disappeared after federal
 ere passed. Unfortunately that is not
 ion has softened, it still very much
 ost American cities.⁵³ To the extent
 regation has diminished it has been
 an American populations. For most
 e the passage of federal civil rights
 e. And that continuing segregation
 structural arrangements perpetuat-
 al and economic disadvantage, and

landmark study, Ruth Peterson and
 rent worlds where black, white, and
 n cities.⁵⁴ The latter are not as seg-
 a great many of them continue to
 rhoods. Racial residential segrega-
 other social problems that it exacer-
 alized populations, and the way this

pattern translates into differential
write:

Our key contention is that residential segregation connects the overall racial order with differentials in violent and property crime. It may be reinforcing the complicated web of inequality that privilege white neighborhoods, Latino, and other types of neighborhoods.

A key feature of segregation is that it isolates people because so many potential job connections are cut off in social networks. When a portion of the population is socially marginalized from the labor market, their networks are less likely to be working and who thus are the first to be laid off. And as many have demonstrated, this leads to economic disadvantage and all of its attendant consequences. Segregation marginalization from the labor market. How this disadvantage causes crime is the next question.

Neighborhoods that are highly disadvantaged have high crime rates for two broad reasons. First, the social and economic conditions that lead to crime are particularly prevalent. Second, the social and economic conditions that lead to crime are particularly prevalent. . . . Within a context of limited economic resources, property crimes may occur in an effort to obtain resources that are not otherwise attainable. In addition, drug trafficking, shoplifting, theft and other opportunistic crimes may become a means of acquiring wanted goods and services. In addition, violence may also be used in these crimes, or as a means of resolving conflict arises, as participants seek to protect their interests rather than engage the police or other authorities.

Segregation leads to differential social and economic disadvantage and thus to differential levels of crime and delinquency. Here

levels of crime. Peterson and Krivo

tial segregation is the linchpin that
 with dramatic racial and ethnic differ-
 ence across communities. It does this
 of social and institutional inequal-
 ities compared to African American,
 ghettos.⁵⁵

that it inhibits access to labor markets
 connections are made within established
 of the population has been systemati-
 cally excluded from labor markets and that population is segre-
 gated, so that they do not have contacts with those who are
 able to become aware of job opportuni-
 ties. A key force leading to social and
 economic attendant social problems is mar-
 ginalization. Peterson and Krivo are clear about
 this in select neighborhoods:

Disadvantaged have heightened crime
 rates, processes that encourage crimi-
 nal activity in areas where disadvantage
 and limited opportunities, theft and other
 effort to secure resources, and luxu-
 rious. Activities such as prostitution,
 and sale of stolen property, and other
 irregular sources of "income" and a
 range of services . . . Violence as "self-help"
 in other social situations where con-
 trols protect themselves and their posses-
 sions or other authorities.⁵⁶

access to the labor market, and to
 and both of these forces increase lev-
 els, we begin to see why the differential

levels of crime observed by Karen [unclear] and his colleagues occur, even if the overall trend is decreasing crime rates.

Gentrification is another important factor in changing the look of urban America. The patterns of both disadvantage and crime in the 1950s was marked by the increasing suburbanization of areas; the combination of GI Bill mortgages, modern highway systems, and concerns about school and residential integration in the suburbs. Beginning in the 1960s, middle class residents led to a number of problems in majority cities: their tax bases declined, leading to a loss of revenue right at a time when they were closing school districts, and this process continued. Some even continue to lose population. Examples of population decreases in Pittsburgh, and Detroit; these two cities are not all

But now a new population shift is occurring in cities: the movement of middle class residents back into central cities, or gentrification. Many cities are transitioning in such a way that they will look more like older European cities. Expensive urban core housing is frequent, and poor and minority populations are pushed to the outskirts and frequently in what Americans call the label of gentrification for this process. This process is accelerating because of more expensive housing, destruction of problematic housing, and the persistence of poor and social problems.

Just as suburbanization had major effects on gentrification. Anderson described the process in *Class, and Change in an Urban Core* as occurring in adjoining neighborhoods: Northtown and The Village, a racially and socially diverse area along in the gentrification process. The process is delayed by both the presence and the

Parker and by David Weisburd and the overall national crime pattern is one of the most important residential phenomenon that is changing in America and shifting the geographic pattern of crime. The post-World War II period of suburbanization of US metropolitan areas, the development of modern mortgages, the development of modern suburbs on the part of some city dwellers and the migration led to considerable expansion of suburbs. In the 60s and 70s, the movement of middle-class families out of cities becoming minority group cities, and their schools suffered from the same urban challenges were confronted. This process continues for some cities today.⁵⁷ Note our earlier description of the process, and the classic contemporary case of Chicago as one in having this problem.

There has been a process taking place in many US cities and upper-middle-class households. This is a process of suburbanization. With this process American cities are becoming more like suburbs. We may say that if it continues, these places will become cities in some respects. There, more and more people frequently occupied by better-off residential developments live more toward the outskirts. Americans think of as the suburbs—thus the process. In many cities this process is being accelerated by expensive oil and policies, such as the development of projects that concentrated both the

process and its effects on social life, so too does the process. These issues in *Street Wise: Race, Crime, and Community*.⁵⁸ There he described two places, a desperately poor black ghetto, and a socially diverse enclave that was well known. Residents of both places were described. The behavior of those living in the

other place. Perhaps most salient for me was the fact that the police provided a close, proximate target for the anger of the young youth of Northton. As a result, the police spent a considerable time and energy trying to solve the problem by attempting to increase safety and security. The streets were unsafe because of their proximity to the police, consistent with what other scholars who have studied gentrification have noted.⁵⁹ There is evidence that crime rates can increase with gentrification. Some studies, such as his colleagues found that crime rates in gentrifying neighborhoods have a racial component. In a study of white, black, and Latino neighborhoods in New York, the number of street robberies in African American neighborhoods increased as gentrification proceeded.⁶⁰ Generally, gentrification is a disruptive force that disrupts community infrastructure and social networks. It happens rapidly.⁶¹ And when it happens in neighborhoods or in close proximity to other neighborhoods, the circumstance is worsened. Additionally, the process happens consistent with what Anderson and Smith found in Philadelphia neighborhoods, the displacement of middle-class people. The network of social relationships that breaks down the social isolation of the former neighborhoods such as knowledge of potential dangers, and although they live in physical proximity to the dangers, gentrifiers and the disadvantaged residents.

And then there is Washington, D.C., a city that was once an apartheid city. I have to confess that the labels that I use to describe me to apply that label are still present in the city. In many very important respects it has changed. The demographics of the population, the District is no longer the same. The process has changed the demography and thus the social structure. Because the metropolitan area still has the same characteristics—residential segregation, income inequality, and crime—these problems are increasing. The problems are increasing along with the people who are being displaced. The process of gentrification. Today many residents are still being displaced. Visitors to be wary of going into P

for our purpose is that The Village for the dispossessed, disadvantaged “new” residents of the former spent long to “manage” the neighborhood and diminish perceptions that they are better than their nearby neighbors. This is consistent with what we have examined: the effects of gentrification on crime. Evidence shows that both larceny and robbery rates have increased in gentrifying neighborhoods, while homicide rates have decreased. Sociologists Andrew Papachristos and Robert Sampson have examined the effects of gentrification on crime. They find that gentrification is linked to reduced homicide for white neighborhoods, but is linked to increases in homicide for African American gentrifying neighborhoods. This should be seen as another social mechanism of informal social control, particularly if gentrification occurs in formerly disadvantaged neighborhoods. If gentrification occurs in formerly disadvantaged neighborhoods, an already criminogenic environment, then, if the circumstance usually associated with gentrification, the person described in his two Philadelphia neighborhoods do not benefit from the influx of new residents, but are the victims of the latter, which could break down social control and lead to important opportunities for employment, will rarely connect because of social distance, the social distance between the two groups remains as large as ever.

Washington, DC, which I earlier referred to as an example of gentrification, has some of the qualities that caused gentrification in the nation's capital, but in some ways it is different. As of the 2010 US census of the District of Columbia, the majority is black. Gentrification has been occurring in the social life of Washington. But it has some apartheid-like characteristics: income inequality, unequal education, and the middle class is increasingly moving into the suburbs. The middle class is being displaced by Washington's ongoing gentrification. The District of Columbia warns that the gentrification in Prince Georges County in Maryland

(PG County, as it is popularly referred to as) and its gangs.

Mass Imprisonment

And then there are prisons, which are a consequence of crime—and of course, crime may also be a cause of crime. That is, the crime convinced has happened as a result of imprisonment in the United States. The combination of the war on drugs, initiated by the states and the federal government, and the increase of the prison population in the United States far and away the highest incarceration rate in the world has moderated in the last few years, but it remains a major problem in many states. Mass incarceration has become an important factor for any discussion of labor market conditions.

This pattern is all the more problematic because of the patterns of racially disproportionate incarceration in the system. It is not new news that even in the juvenile or adult justice system, the form has changed, but the underlying problem is that the form has changed, and brown people still have different rates of incarceration than whites.⁶³ Like racial inequality in the criminal justice system, the passage of the 1960s-era civil rights legislation partially addressed the inequality by setting sentencing mandates that set the conviction rates for minorities (used disproportionately by minorities) and for cocaine (used disproportionately by minorities), or pharmacological reason for the high rates of incarceration are “only” eighteen times as high—eighteen times as high as the white population, but an improvement in every jurisdiction and some improvement in a substantial degree in general, but it remains a problem, and people of color are still a continuing problem.⁶⁴ What is clear

ferred to) because of the crime and

most citizens believe to be a consequence of the crime, to some extent. But they are not, and that is what many criminologists are concerned about. What is now being called mass incarceration is a now well-documented product of the combination of the war on drugs and get-tough-on-crime policies. The result has been the near quintupling of the prison population in the United States since 1980, which now has the highest incarceration rate in the world.⁶² This trend is, in part, partially due to budget struggles in the 1990s, which had multiple effects that are important: economic inequality, disadvantage, and crime.

It is problematic because of the continuing discriminatory practices in the criminal justice system. Everyone is not treated the same in the criminal justice systems, but what too many do not understand is that it has not changed somewhat, although black Americans have different experiences in the criminal justice system because of racial residential segregation, racial discrimination in the justice system did not go away with the passage of civil rights legislation. Congress has now passed legislation with earlier war on drugs sentencing guidelines, a mandatory minimum sentence for crack cocaine (used in sentencing) that is one hundred times that of powder cocaine (used by whites), with no legal, medical, or scientific basis for the difference. Now the penalties are still resulting in racially disproportionate incarceration. Police profiling does not happen, but we can argue that it does not occur to a large extent because there is some evidence that argues that people of color certainly perceive it to be a problem. One of the reasons is that the very large increase in

the number of people in prison has increased significantly for African Americans and Latinos. For instance, Black men are more likely than white men to be in prison, and a third of young African American men can expect to be locked up in a prison at some point in their lives. A high percentage of African American men will spend a significant portion of their lifetime be under the control or supervision of the criminal justice system.⁶⁵

First, we have to recognize that the impact of mass incarceration on men and women are released and most of them return to the same communities they were sentenced from. This makes it more difficult to find a job, especially for African Americans who have been previously employed people, whose work citizenship is often precarious, so that they will become involved in the criminal justice system and marginalized if their violations lead to further incarceration. Mass incarceration has led to underemployment and joblessness, but these people are not counted in these statistics.⁶⁷ Incarceration has led to a loss of income, for the marital stability, family life, and social connections. Many are behind bars. It substantially lessens their ability to participate in civic life, or to have access to government services, or to improve the lives of the poor.⁶⁸ While the US has masked the level of unemployment, there is white/black income inequality. The perception that African Americans have been historically and currently a majority economically and socially disadvantaged, and are locked up and uncounted.⁶⁹

In addition to the effects that mass incarceration has on men and women who are sent to jails and prisons, there are also devastating effects on those communities that are forced to withstand additional assaults: displacement, gentrification, and what sociologists Dina Rose, Todd Clear, and others have called coercive mobility, the churning of people in and out of communities to prison and back, which has led to the destruction of neighborhoods.⁷⁰ Criminal justice policies have further disadvantaged, and likely criminalized, the already disadvantaged communities worse.⁷¹

EXPLANATION

had grave effects on African American men. Research has shown that one-third of African American men who do not finish high school are in prison at any one time, and a majority of African American men will at some time in their lives be under supervision by the criminal justice system.

Nearly all of those imprisoned men eventually return to the very communities from which they came. Not surprisingly, a prison record increases the chances of being arrested, charged, and convicted, and this is even more of a problem for African American men who have been locked up.⁶⁶ Marginally disadvantaged African American men are more likely to be arrested, charged, and convicted, and this is even more dramatically true for African American men who are poor and have no education. Estimates of the number of people in prison are likely to be underestimated because those “in the joint” are not counted. Incarceration has negative consequences for the mental and physical health of those who are imprisoned, which in turn lessens their ability to fully participate in the economy and government services that are designed to help them. What’s more, criminal justice policy has contributed to the high unemployment, the degree to which it is concentrated among African Americans, and led to the erroneous perception that African Americans have begun to catch up to the white population. This is not true, because so many poor black men are in prison.

The effects of mass imprisonment have had on those communities that our corrections policies are having on African American communities that have the least resources and live in the most disadvantaged neighborhoods. Criminal justice policy and their colleagues found what they expected to find: the sentencing of people from disadvantaged communities is devastating to those neighborhoods. The high unemployment has made the labor market circumstances even more dire in already marginalized, disad-

Labor Market Stratification, Disa

I am not suggesting that it is only rearing and education, gender, residential and gentrification), and mass stratification, or the segmentation and thus to crime, but they are important continues to cause problems for those living in disadvantaged neighborhoods. Figure 7.3 provides a visual description leading directly from “labor market the preceding chapters have been able to produce individual labor market marginalization when sufficient numbers of workers are in the secondary sector jobs, crime and the city. Labor market segmentation also in disadvantage because marginalized workers have lower incomes, and when sufficient workers are concentrated in isolated places, the conditions that Wilson wrote about in *The Tragedy of Urban Stratification* contributes to labor market marginalization. Traditionally female jobs have been concentrated in these areas. As a result, this labor market pattern of gender segregation and, when men do not have primary sector jobs, they compete for such secondary sector jobs with lower wages and benefits that so many wo





Figure 7.3. An Expanded Labor Stratification

Disadvantage, and Crime

through these four factors —child
 residential patterns (including segrega-
 imprisonment—that labor market
 of labor, is linked to disadvantage
 portant examples of how this process
 substantial part of the population,
 neighborhoods, and for crime and crime
 description of the argument. The arrow
 “stratification” depicts what most of
 about. Segmented labor markets pro-
 nality that increases criminality, and
 s are unemployed, jobless, or in sec-
 crime rate of a location will increase.
 creases social and economic disad-
 kers have limited legal incomes or
 t numbers of people so situated are
 kinds of underclass neighborhoods
truly Disadvantaged emerge. Gender
 market stratification because so many
 structured as secondary sector jobs.
 n both perpetuates gender stratifica-
 primary sector jobs available to them,
 ctor jobs, bringing them the poorer
 men have already been subjected to.



Gender contributes to social and economic inequality. Women, who are paid less, are consigned to jobs where they receive inadequate or no child care. The lives of many victims of stereotyped driven welfare policies and violence that is an unfortunate byproduct of the advantaged places.

The other social forces affecting child rearing practices and education, and the consequences of and causes of social inequality, they are important determinants of child rearing practices help to create the conditions Anderson called “street,” who carry on the street. Of course this is certainly the case for many of the most children and families of color. Anderson acknowledge this. But instead of attributing fault to families that we are disadvantaged by their circumstance, he blames them in his book *Blaming the Victim*, which is a classic. He blames the victims, and the general public continue to blame all of the ills of modern society on a small segment of the population.⁷² Comparing the United States to other nations, Americans are substantially more violent than any of its own citizens.⁷³

As scholars have shown, segregation is a powerful ongoing force that shapes metropolitan areas, both quality education and jobs, child care, crime and crime rates. Segregation and economic disadvantage and the consequences of it, including crime. Gentrification and crime statistics of a neighborhood are a result of these problems, but it does not solve them and very likely shifts the burdens of these problems to metropolitan areas.

Mass imprisonment moves those who are the product of the marginalized labor, poverty, and community disruption that are integrally

economic disadvantage when women with less security and benefits, when support, and when they become the reform policies. When the options they suffer especially from the crime but predictable part of living in dis-

the life of the disadvantaged (child and residential patterns), are both social and economic disadvantage, and of crime. Educational inequality and the next generation of people that grow with them and act on the code of not only not so for all or even necessarily disadvantaged neighborhoods, and not educating children well, and know are already troubled and dis- is what William Ryan discussed in what he wrote in 1976. Pundits, politicians to assign responsibility for nearly this hardly supported—if at all—compared to other modern industrialized countries more willing to accept the poverty

urbanization and gentrification are power- metropolitan areas, influence access to change the face of poverty, and affect crime increases and exacerbates social the social problems that follow from can improve the social, economic, and good by displacing those who suffered to make the lot of those people better of these problems to other portions of

the whose crimes were in part a product of poor schooling, and family and community to coming of age and living in

disadvantaged places into institutions, and then, except to make them even less competitive labor market in which they can find work. And since nearly all of them leave poor neighborhoods the same or similar neighborhoods, they bring back labor market conditions that condemn many of them to labor market conditions of continuing disadvantage.

Back to Race, Labor Market Marginalization

It is my guess that more than a few people have said something to the effect of “he has moved from a racialized and nonracialized argument to a crime.” That was not a mistake, and the story is simply about how African Americans are in a segmented labor market. Many who are also marginalized from quality work are also jobless, unemployed, and in occupations they have a higher probability of finding their residential places will have higher crime rates. Earlier, this may well happen in rural areas with white poverty, such as in portions of the South. I know of research that has tested the thesis in Indian Country, I strongly suspect that it will show employment and crime patterns similar to those observed in inner cities.

In some fundamental ways, however, the combined effects of labor market marginalization, concentrated poverty, residential segregation, and education, and the continuing legacies of the Great Migration’s movements are not captured in the chapter by saying that an expanded labor market needs to be able to account for the conditions. Actually there are two, because economic historians have discredited much of what was said about the Great Depression.⁷⁵ The most recent

ions—most of which do little for
 ss capable of competing in the more
 h they were already handicapped.
 rison, most frequently returning to
 e that they lived in before they were
 market prospects that not only con-
 t margins, but their communities to

ginality, and Crime

readers by now have thought some-
 too casually back and forth between
 uments linking employment and
 it has not been casual. This is not a
 ericans suffer from the effects of a
 ites, Latinos, and Native Americans
 work, and when they live with many
 oyed, or working in secondary sec-
 probability of engaging in crime and
 igher crime rates.⁷⁴ As I described
 al places where there is concentrated
 of Appalachia. Also, while I do not
 e labor stratification and crime the-
 uspect that such an analysis would
 rns not terribly dissimilar to those

ever, this *is* about race because of
 ket discrimination and marginality,
 gregation, unequal access to quality
 cy of Jim Crow and the disappoint-
 e to the Promised Land. I began this
 labor stratification and crime thesis
 apparent anomalies; there are three.
 nomists Phillip Cook and Gary Zar-
 we believed about low crime rates in
 ecent apparent anomaly, that crime

rates have continued to decline due to a number of factors that could be an anomaly either. There are important questions that will need to be addressed by researchers in the coming period 2008 to 2013 about what effects these changes in rates, net of other important factors such as prison incapacitation and a number of other factors, have on crime rates. But perhaps more important, the data on crime rates, as reported by Klotz and Klotz, and by Weisburd and his colleagues, shows that crime is uneven across segments of the population, particularly within metropolitan areas. The third factor, the presence of a robust, growing economy, crime rates have declined in American cities. What that view means for the future of cities that received the Great Migration is a question that this story back to race, and in particular, the impact of the nation's economy was booming in the 1960s and 1970s. In ways the black population was concentrated in urban areas, decades, there was very high unemployment, particularly for young black males. Some estimates show that unemployment rates in some places in the 20 to 25 percent range, well above the national rate during the heart of the 1960s. This is a story about the disappointments experienced by young people whose parents brought them from the rural South, being told that life would be so much better in the Promised Land. These young people did not expect to make it in the rural South that kept them in a state of poverty, necks and their aspirations. So while there were new opportunities in the urban North, the young people with them—and to my contemporary ears, the young people of Rice (Wideman's rap partner and mentor) in the North—there was no comparable opportunity in a nation that refused to allow them to succeed in these circumstances, just as we have shown in the case of the consequential labor market marginalization in city ghetto communities, it helps to understand the situation there.

In the first of a series of talks that I gave in 2008, the Massey Lectures for the Canadian

ring the Great Recession, may not important empirical questions that chers when we can look back on the fect the labor market had on crime s which influence the level of crime changing age structure of the popu- ntly, it is the point made by Parker, colleagues that the current decline population and in particular, places d anomaly was that in the 1960s dur- ne rates did increase, particularly in asks is what was going on in those ion movers. And that is what brings ular to racial inequality. While the the 1960s and in some important siderably better off than in previous oloyment in the inner cities, particu- estimates place those unemployment 5 percent range, comparable to the e Great Depression.⁷⁶ Earlier I wrote nced by young African Americans the Jim Crow South to the North, h better in this cold but freer Prom- not have the experience of trying to ot a boot on the backs of both their le the parents may have appreciated orth, to their children who moved ries like Robby Wideman and Cecil ny Boy Scout mate), who were born rative improvement. There was just opportunities to thrive. In such cir- n the stratification of labor and the nalization of people in those inner- o explain why crime rates increased

at Martin Luther King Jr. gave for
ian Broadcasting Company in 1967,

he addressed the criticisms aimed at them in their communities after a series of riots. I described earlier who simply wanted to point them to socially structured economic leaders would do well to heed those of Victor Hugo, whom he quoted

For a perceptive and vivid expression of the sentences written a century ago by Victor Hugo: "The greatest sins will be committed. The greatest darkness, but he who causes the darkness." They have caused the darkness; they are in the slums, they perpetuate unemployment and deplorable that Negroes have committed crimes; they are born of the great

Robby, Walter, Steven, the Hole in the Wall Gang, and Their Peers

This expanded labor stratification and economic disadvantage fully introduced his brother Robby to you there you learned of Robby's wanton crime that led to a life sentence in a Pennsylvania prison and w my parole caseload. Frankly, Walter introduced you Steven, a white parolee living time in a state penitentiary, but before and moonlighted as a burglar. The rural white kids whose futures held the promise of dreams, engaged in delinquent

at African Americans and some of urban riots. Critics (like those that want to blame crime on thugs) argued of African American's inability or King's response to those critics was social and economic inequality. As social inequality and disadvantage can lead to crime; political, social, and economic inequality led the words of Reverend King and others:

...on of culpability I would submit two... Victor Hugo. "If a soul is left in darkness, guilty one is not he who commits the crime. The policy makers of the white society created discrimination, they created crime and poverty. It is incontestable that they committed crimes. But they are derivative crimes of the white society."⁷⁷

...n the

...and crime thesis, by bringing social... into the explanation, can help us to... in this book.⁷⁸ John Edgar Wideman... you in his book *Brothers and Keepers*;... s, dreams, and frustrations and his... a Pennsylvania prison. I introduced... black man who had done time in... whom I met when he was placed on... r did not want to work. I also intro... ving in a rural area. He too had done... fore that he worked in unstable jobs... Hole in the Wall Gang, the group of... d limited hope and less encourage... quency simply because they did not

have a good reason not to. They got
or from an economic future that the

Their peers—who in some cases
my peers—run the gamut of reac
vantage. Some of us made it out as
luck. Most continued on, some in a
prison, drugs, or early death, but m
gle against the odds that are stack
is that most are not like Walter, wh
who worked and dabbled in crime.
the Hole in the Wall Gang. They w
are willing to strive for it, but they
efforts will matter. Those who do
in crime or participate in lifestyles
who can no longer believe may not
Valjean, but they will be no less desj

EXPLANATION

no stake in conformity from school, they could envision.

s, like Robby and Walter, were also tion to marginalization and disadvantage as a result of good fortune and good angry desperation that led to crime, most have tried to continue to struggle against them. What is amazing no did not want to work, or Steven Most are more like the members of want something out of life and they need to be able to believe that their believe will be less likely to engage that make crime more likely. Those t be as heroic as Victor Hugo's Jean perate.

A Tale of My Two Cities

It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the season of belief, it was the season of incredulity, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way, in short, the period was so far like the present period, that noisier authorities insisted on its being called that, for evil, in the superlative degree of comparison.

—From *A Tale of Two Cities*, by Charles Dickens

The two cities that I have called home and Seattle, like the London and Paris of Dickens' tale, alike in some ways and very different in others, will, I believe, point us in directions that a crime thesis will lead us for both regions. The question that should be asked. And as was true in Dickens' story, some of our noisiest authorities insist on the state either the best of times or the worst of times, but we have turned the corner toward

st of times, it was the
ness, it was the epoch
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nparison only.

Charles Dickens, 1859

ome for much of my life, Pittsburgh
ris of which Dickens wrote, are both
t in other ways. A brief look at them
ns that the labor stratification and
research and public policy questions
he case in the mid-nineteenth cen-
ies—politicians—see in our current
worst of times. To hear some speak
d a brighter future with significant

challenges ahead, but ones which we must address if we will only summon the courage to face the same social and economic realities that have been going to heaven, instead our society is going to hell, as Dickens called it, “the other side of the looking glass.”

Before my consideration of my two cities, I must first consider the world they exist in today. On July 7, 2005, London was attacked, as they had Madrid a year earlier, and New York City before that. In the aftermath heads of state from all over the world landed for the G8 conference made statements about fighting against the “uncivilized” acts of terrorism. But are these attacks really the work of extremists? The answer from most states is a resounding “no.” It is unpopular in the US to say “they hate us?” It is in fact defined by many as a national perhaps even treasonous to ponder such questions. We are to ever make real, lasting headway if we do not ask these questions seriously. In earlier chapters we have seen what can happen if the disaffected, marginalized, and alienated cities came under the influence of a radical ideology, harnessing or focusing their anger and frustration. The answer to that question. If we do not act, what will? While some would say unluckily (and perhaps irrationally), perhaps revolution would follow. The acts of terrorism that have occurred in the last few years are the products of alienation. The attacks in London, as those elsewhere in Europe and in the Middle East, are byproducts of global economic forces rather than the purely domestic. But the marginalized and disaffected are often the most vulnerable in their particular social circumstances to global forces. The “they” in the question is not just many who were born here or in other countries. They are the dispossessed. When we have little or no regard for segments of our population, it is no surprise that they resent those who benefit from them? Relegating

we, as a society, have the capacity to
will. While others, considering the
, are certain that rather than us all
and nation is perched on the edge of
er way.”

two cities, I want to briefly consider
y 7, 2005, terrorists attacked London,
and New York and Washington, DC
of state who were gathered in Scot-
atements about standing united and
ctions of those who perpetrate such
e acts of some uncivilized group of
social scientists would be a resound-
to ask the question, “Why do they
ny as unpatriotic, un-American, or
such a thing. But we really must, if
dway in antiterror efforts, take such
ters I speculated about what could
zed people living in American inner
charismatic leader, capable of mobi-
eir efforts. In fact we already have
are lucky, social movements begin.
nd others would respond more posi-
ulminate. Most would agree that the
d are among the worst possible out-
ttacks on those major cities, as well
n Africa, Russia, Asia, and the Mid-
conomics, politics, and social forces
ut as I hope has been made obvious,
f American inner cities are as well,
nce, in part because of those same
stion “why do they hate us” includes
ther modern industrialized nations.
e choose policies and practices that
s of populations, why should it ever
e who make these choices or those
g segments of society to the social

and economic margins is bad for the poor, and the negative consequences for others as well.

Searching for the motivations of criminals in the pursuit of such questions allege, some criminologists explain the causes of criminal behavior, as too often some of our social scientists are in search for the causes of crime, useful to others, as well as frequently to the criminal behavior. The sources of these, like the others, lie in complex interactions of biological and the social forces that are the focus of their research. I wish to simplify the behavior of either the common criminals and argue sometimes that they are just different," I think they are wrong. If you focus on one set of causal forces, it is not enough. Biological and economic forces, as well as the social forces, are important too.

To the extent that culturally supported norms are possible for crime, or for that matter are the cause of movement involvement, revolution, or social change, I like to suggest that we stop thinking of crime as a problem, instead seriously consider "cultures of crime" as the answer to the question, How much crime is there, and for what?

Within the cultural system of every society, there are norms and justice. And unless one subscribes to a theory of inborn, innately centered notions of justice, we form will develop norms that develop (and are a competing set of beliefs) about what is just. If you want to thought to develop justice norms of a society, you must be culturally supported conceptions of justice. The people of that society is acceptable. Societies develop such conceptions and norms, and the result of competitions between groups with different norms. Inequality will be allowed. Of course, the norms are complicated further because these conceptions of justice define people, or at least those who are part of the society.

those people—and it can have very well.

terrorists does not, as critics of the seek to excuse the behavior. When of crime we do not make excuses for students conclude. In both instances of human behavior that are harmful to the person who engages in the other human behaviors, no doubt y, psychology, and social forces. It is of consideration here. For those that ther terrorists or of run-of-the-mill thing to the effect that “those people wrong by oversimplifying. Although I is with recognition that other social insights of biology and psychology,

ported norms and values are respon- re one possible motivation for social s, or even possibly terrorism, I would ng about “cultures of poverty” and s of inequality.”¹ By this I mean the nequality does a society have a taste

ry group are conceptions of fairness ribes to notions that we all contain f fairness and justice, the groups that fine our collective beliefs (or a com- fair and just. Societies then may be r fairness norms, among which will s of how much inequality between ble. More likely, groups within soci- the larger society becomes the scene ith different ideas about how much e, these rather simple ideas are com- peting groups also differ in how they no are deemed worthy of concern.

Some may worry about equality for boundaries of societies, while others for their or other select groups; that is, between in-group and out-group preferences exist, and this is an important view on inequality as long as it is based on merit. For many Americans such inequality is based on competition in an imagined meritocracy because many who hold such views do not see any cally observable obstacles to real opportunity.

What I mean by “a taste for inequality” is political acceptance (and those two things are unequal outcomes or unequal opportunities within a political unit. Popular taste is a general consensus, or when a community holds their view among members of the community. Acceptance of inequality will have some effect on policy, but that really is an empirical question. The very restricted, low-value welfare benefits era Southern states were a consequence of blacks and most poor whites as de facto citizens where during that same period—especially the Midwest, which were not the halcyon days of Great Migration travelers—there were no welfare benefits. What is the difference? Of course there are many important differences: states versus free states, largely agricultural states versus large black populations versus places that would suggest that there is yet another factor: a relatively higher historic taste for inequality.

To be fair, we should not engage in a narrative characterized much Northern thinking about the civil rights movement. Northerners saw the TV news footage of white cops putting fire hoses on marchers. They saw the grisly visage of a man who wondered who could do that to a child. They saw the faces of and Lester Maddox and Bull Connor.

For all who live within the understood norms, those who believe in equality for members of the community, their norms can justify inequality for some people. Even still, norms frequently exist in the US, that allow for great inequality under some set of acceptable criteria. For many, this is acceptable so long as it is based on meritocracy. Obviously I say “imagined,” because many do not like to accept that empirically proven competition exist.

“Equality” is the level of popular and (which do not always coincide) of either the opportunities available to those living in the South. Causes for inequality can be produced by a competing group is successful at pushing its agenda on society. One presumes that popular opinion has some substantial relationship to public policy on this question. For example, it seems that the absence of the benefits policies of the Jim Crow era is a consequence of the willingness to define all as equal in the absence of their deep poverty. Especially in the Northeast and Upper Midwest, the Promised Lands of the dreams of the North, as more racial openness and better relations between those two locations? There are significant differences: former slave-holding culture versus industrial economies, where it was comparatively small. I think there is another important difference, and that is the level of inequality in the South.

Even in the simplistic South-bashing that was common in the North during the height of the modern civil rights movement, they watched horrifying black and white photographs of German Shepherd dogs on black and white film of Emmett Till in his casket and the murder of a child. They watched George Wallace and the segregationists put seemingly human faces on the

hatred of the South. They watched and learned that we are different from them; we are better than they are. There is evidence that Northerners are in fact more violent than the South. And today many of the latter have lost their own moral superiority because they have learned from the North.

Southerners saw how white supremacists treated Martin Luther King and his followers when they tried to integrate the ghettos and neighborhoods. They were appalled when they saw a black man on the ground in front of City Hall in Birmingham, Alabama, on which an American flag flew. And when they saw a black man being spat upon by ugly faces outside a school in the late 1950s and early sixties, the news brought Southern whites to their knees, spitting Northerners in the late 1960s. So neither region has cornered the market on violence. So neither region has cornered the market on people. What differentiated the two regions was not their dominant conceptions of proper citizenship, but the extent that racial prejudice, discrimination, and a part of “acceptable” individual and social behavior to which politicians and officials could not speak openly. What I am arguing is that the South is a place where inequality can develop. In such a place, race, social class, religion, immigration status, and other markers are widely and publicly part of collective identity.

Just as some scholars have argued that the South is a place where behavioral patterns among have-nots are more likely to commit crimes, so the South is a place where the social structural conditions create a criminogenic atmosphere. Where racial or class inequality is a part of the social structure, the market segmentation and labor inequality are a part of the social structure. After all, we hear the phrase “if they were as talented as we are,” or “if they were as hard working as we are,” or “if they were as intelligent as we are,” or “if they were as motivated as we are,” or “if they were as hard working as we are,” or “if they were as intelligent as we are,” or “if they were as motivated as we are.” In this last statement we can see the phrase “deferred gratification,” or “were as motivated as we are.”

all of this and smugly thought, “We’re better people.” Well, we have pretty good people, but not better people than Southerners. I like to point out their belief in their superiority were less hypocritical.

Suburbanites greeted Martin Luther King Jr. who tried to integrate segregated Chicago. I liked to see a black Boston business district, City Hall being impaled with the staff of a spear, and just as we watched black children being bused out of Southern schools in the fifties and sixties, Southerners updated images of ugly, backward Southerners in the 60s and early 70s who opposed busing. The South had the market on morally superior to other regions was what came to be the defining factor in public life. The two factors that distinguished Southerners and Northerners were differences in attitudes toward discrimination, and segregation were differences in collective identity, and the degree to which they would embrace such ideas officially and in private. There was a higher taste for inequality in the South. A high taste for inequality, a culture of accepting substantial inequalities based on race, education status, or any number of social factors were perceived to be not only okay, but a

belief that a culture of poverty leads to behaviors that make them less likely to work hard. A culture of inequality sets the stage for conditions that are allowed to persist that foster the conditions that I described in earlier chapters. If conditions are allowed to flourish, then labor market inequality is more easily tolerated by officials. “Those people are different from us, they are, then they might have what we don’t have. We can substitute “worked as hard as,” or “as moral as” in place of “as talented.” In

ostensibly democratic states when for inequality (that is, they have a liberal cultural definitions that are expressions of inequality, the ideological pillars that fester are in place.

Along with two colleagues, David I used data from the World Value Survey national variations in attitudes about would be consistent with the culture could be connected to national welfare of our findings are pertinent here. First attitudes about how much the poor, be assisted, with less developed countries fare state. And second, among industrial is an outlier to the degree to which those on the margins of society. What to less developed countries in Africa as diverse as European and other industrialized nations that we most frequently widely known, the US is also far and citizens. This is the context in which Seattle.

Two Cities

People know Pittsburgh, the steel and Penguins. Its history as a city, and me as we grew up there, began with a young Virginia surveyor, George Washington that thought the confluence where the rivers came together to form the Ohio would become the British Fort Pitt. The allegedly first saw the three rivers is Fort Pitt was captured by the French and be renamed Fort Pitt again when the and financiers Andrew Carnegie, I

more people buy into justifications (high taste for inequality), these cultures of norms and values of cultures of that allow criminogenic inequality to

did Pettinicchio and Blaine Robbins, Survey to see if we could find cross about minorities and immigrants that re of inequality, and if that variation are and imprisonment policies.² Two first, nations do vary substantially in minorities, and immigrants should ntries being more hostile to the wel- strialized nations, the United States ch citizens do not favor supporting hile US attitudes are not comparable a and Asia, it is also not as progres- rialized nations. The US scores con- lity than the other western industri- tly compare ourselves to. And, as is d away the greatest prisoner of its n we should consider Pittsburgh and

city, home of the Steelers, Pirates, as it was taught to my classmates n in the eighteenth century when a Washington, was a part of a group he Allegheny and Monongahela riv- o would make a good site for what t. Today, the hillside from which he named Mt. Washington. Later, Fort d renamed Fort Duquesne, only to e British took it back. Industrialists Henry Clay Frick, Thomas Mellon,

and others led the creation of a powerful economy based on the ready access to natural resources, manufacturing, and outputs, and the strong backs of immigrants and later, Great Migration migrants.

Pittsburgh today is a city that, as a result of its proximity to the decline of American industry in the twentieth century. It lost population, buildings, and homes, razed, demolished, or left as silent reminders of a vibrant city that was once a major industrial hub. It had rich educational and cultural resources, including universities and colleges, first-rate museums and theaters, and a vibrant urbanized at the expense of the downtown. Pittsburgh's remained alive. When other cities were giving up their trolleys and streetcars, Pittsburgh's remained theirs in service. Now streetcars are a part of public transportation. When I was a child, streetcars were seen on nearly all of the major routes. Many routes have given way to buses, but streetcars service some sections of the city.

The Hill District was filled with vibrant life. The Hurricane Lounge on Central Avenue on Wylie Avenue featured the stars of the era, including Duke Ellington, Billie Holiday, and Duke Ellington. Horne, Miles Davis, Sara Vaughn, and Duke Ellington were there. The Negro League baseball team, the Crawfords, featured future Hall of Famers like Cool Papa Bell. The community was one of the nation's most influential. You can know The Hill and its people of the past or see playwright August Wilson's testament to the past.

Today Pittsburgh is a city whose economy is based on the University of Pittsburgh Medical Centers or UPMC, and the steel industry. In general Pittsburgh is among the best cities in the country for work as the nation's recovery from the recession. What has changed is who works in the steel industry in and around the metropolitan area. Today medical, technical, and corporate jobs are providing opportunities for employment.

powerful manufacturing center built on the banks of the rivers to transport both inputs and outputs of recently arrived European immigrants from the American South.

As I described earlier, suffered substantial decline in industrial production at the end of the nineteenth century and its steel mills were shut down, reminders of a bygone era. But before long it was not only attractive to migrants, but also a source of resources. It has excellent universities and libraries. While other cities suburbanized, Pittsburgh remained a business and retail core. Pittsburgh cities were convinced to modernize streetcars, the people of Pittsburgh kept them, and they were trumpeted as a “new” green form of transit growing up on The Hill, streetcars were still on the streets throughout the community. They are gas powered now, but still electric powered in parts of the city.

Pittsburgh was a poor people, but it had vitality to it. It had the Phipps Hotel and the Crawford Grill, the best of the day; Louis Armstrong, Lena Horne, and Dizzy Gillespie, and others played there. The team sponsored by The Grill, the Pittsburgh Pirates, Famers Josh Gibson, Satchel Paige, and others was home to the *Pittsburgh Courier*, one of the best black newspapers. If one wants to understand the twentieth century, you should read the Pittsburgh Courier, one for each decade.

The largest employer is the University of Pittsburgh (UPMC), as everyone in town knows. Pittsburgh is one of the best big cities in which to search for jobs. The Great Recession continues. Pittsburgh. There is still some heavy industry in the metropolitan area, but it is not like it was. Corporate headquarters jobs are the leading source of jobs, rather than steel and iron. Housing

prices are comparatively affordable, not stand out compared to cities of encing some gentrification on its m
 characteristic when traveling through it
 grown lots where once stood occup.

But Pittsburgh's recovery, as ind
 employment that is available to resi
 where a strong back and willingn
 changes are reflected in the city's ne
 the Pittsburgh Police Department
 the distribution of the city's 2010 h
 eight percent of murders occurred
 area of high homicide extends from
 the city, through East Liberty to Th
 Allegheny River onto the North Si
 tunate communities that experienc
 life, they are also the places where b
 neighborhoods where residents are
 burgh's medical, technical, and corp
 quality jobs that are offered in thes
 levels of joblessness, unemployme
 ment—that is, marginal employme
 advantaged neighborhoods. So it is
 experienced by the nation, the State
 a whole is not benefiting the residen
 to the same extent.

Earlier I mentioned that Marvin
 House Association, a nonprofit loca
 that the crime decline was news to
 what he sees on the streets. He co
 said that it appeared and felt to ma
 on The Hill that there was still a su
 And according to the Pittsburgh Po
 rate when he perceives a great deal
 that his agency serves than in much


An important contributor to Pitt
 gangs. As a high-school kid there I

and the overall city crime rate does comparable size. The Hill is experiencing high unemployment rates, and a very noticeable characteristic now is the number of vacant, over-occupied apartment buildings.³

As indicated by the shift in the nature of crimes in the Hill District, the distribution of crime is uneven. Gone are the days when a job and a bus ride to work were enough, and the neighborhoods are struggling. Map 8.1 is taken from the Hill District's 2010 Annual Report. It displays the number of homicides across census tracts. Sixty-three homicides occurred within the highlighted area. The area includes the Hill District, Homewood, on the eastern edge of the Hill District, and then across the city. In addition to being the unfortunate area where most of the city's criminal lost of life occur, these are the areas where black and poor people live. These are the areas where people are less likely to be employed by Pittsburgh's corporate labor markets, at least in the areas of concern. They are places of high unemployment, and secondary sector employment. These are Pittsburgh's most distressed areas. It is little wonder that the crime decline in the Hill District is one of the lowest in Pennsylvania, and Pittsburgh as a whole. The residents of these struggling communities


John Prentice, an executive at the Hill District's Hill District, commented on the crime rate in the Hill District because that did not fit with what he had heard. He confessed to not relying on data, but on the experience of many of the people who live and work in the Hill District. A substantial amount of violence there. As a member of the Hill District Police Department, Prentice is accustomed to seeing more violence in the neighborhoods of the Hill District than the rest of the city.

Pittsburgh's violence and homicides are not unique. It did not have a sense that Pittsburgh



Map 8.1. Pittsburgh 2010 Homicides by Census Tract. Source: Bureau of Public Safety, Bureau of Police, Pittsburgh Police Department, pittsburghpa.gov/pghbop/10_Police_Annual_Report.

was a gang city, and later this was linked to criminal justice reports while I was there. Of course there were periodic appearances of gangs as an enduring feature of the city. This change was noted by sociologists George Tita and Jacquelyn C. Tita, who linked gang activity to involvement in the drug trade. They have also linked drug marketing and distribution to homicide. By late in the decade Pittsburgh's homicide rate was dominated by crack cocaine trade and guns, and many of the homicides were gang related. Crime rates declined and virtual disappearance of gangs was attributed to a crackdown effort by the Pittsburgh Police Department.



us Tracts. City of Pittsburgh, Department
PA, Annual Report 2010 p. 51, http://apps._Report.pdf.

s supported when I became privy
worked as a State parole agent. Of
nce of gangs, but gangs were not an
anged in the early 1990s. Criminol-
Cohen attributed the emergence of
e drug trade.⁴ Other criminologists
nd gangs in other American cities.⁵
gangs were heavily involved in the
l a substantial portion of the city's
nologist James Howell attributes the
of gangs at the turn of the millen-
Pittsburgh Police Department, which

brought a Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) indictment against one of them. That in turn had a chilling effect on gang activity in the first decade of the twenty-first century. It was a vengeance to Pittsburgh's community. It was a message to the sees and is referring to when he says that it was a decline to him.

The Hill House Association is a community organization that addresses violence problems by focusing on prevention through a comprehensive program aimed at addressing how to avoid it. A very important part of their work is with parents in an effort to help them deal with their children on the streets. But much of their focus is on community performance and engagement. When they talk about investments for the long haul. When they talk about a hard-working program (and I expect that such efforts too) cannot change the current situation for parents, other adults, and ultimately the community front. That segmented labor market, the lack of marginal work, and unemployment are all part of economic disadvantage and ultimately the need for criminal justice and nonprofit efforts.

Seattle is a much younger city. The story of the landing of the Denny party on what is now West Seattle. That or the rain that gives Seattle its reputation (and the Denny neers), and they found that they did not like the place. Elliot Bay, the portion of Puget Sound that modern downtown Seattle sits on, was where people lived, fished, and enjoyed a life. The first whites encountered was Chief Seattle. The city named for him, but it was. (The city did to Chief Sealth's name.) Seattle was named after the Skid Road (now Yesler Way) where logs were skidded down the hill to the water. The Puget Sound in an area that is now downtown Seattle in addition to performing this function.

anced and Corrupt Organization Act
the more prominent gangs and that
g activity.⁶ But by the middle of the
tury, gangs had come back with a
ties.⁷ This is probably what Prentice
ys that it does not look like a crime

ctively trying to address inner-city
children in their K-12 years with a
teaching them about violence and
element of their program involves
al with and counter the influences of
is on the school and how to improve
at is critical is that their efforts are
that is unfortunate is that one very
ect that there are others engaged in
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ly their children will have to con-
et, creating joblessness, low-quality
t, will continue to cause social and
ately limit the effectiveness of both
ts.

Its urban history is traced to the
at is now Alki Beach at the base of
riginal group of settlers found the
n (and terribly dismayed those pio-
d not “discover” or even “settle” this
get Sound on which their settlement
s, was already a place where native
a good life. Among those that early
th, who, it is said, did not want the
e city’s name was what white settlers
e’s first major industry was timber.
was the road on which freshly cut
Henry Yesler’s sawmill, which sat on
v part of the downtown district. In
on for early industry, the Skid Road

was where hard-edged men and women lived (‘‘Skid Row,’’ the name of the section of the city where down-and-out people are still housed on the original road.) Not long after early 1890, the Territory established the Territorial University, which was in Washington, in the hope that it would attract students. The county where Seattle sits was once the property of a slave-holding vice president of the United States. The hood aspirations (in the late twentieth century, they changed to Martin Luther King College) of the settlement did not really begin until the Alaska gold rush of the late 1890s. For prospectors, Seattle thrived by ‘‘entertaining’’ them when they returned from the north with any gold, and by selling them with their riches.

Modern Seattle is said to have been born out of the consciousness of the rest of the country. In actuality the city had already become a major center of considerable industry anchored by the timber and fishing, both of which were boosted by World War I. A major time feature of Seattle was the international trade, but this was not the first time that Seattle had been a neighbor. Earlier Seattle was the scene of a major anti-Filipino protest movement in 1908, which ended up with local whites burning the docks in an effort to forcibly control the city.

Like Pittsburgh and other cities, Seattle was a major center, and like many other American cities, it was a major electric-powered mass transportation center. Now the city is constructing, at a cost of \$1.5 billion, lines to compliment a fledgling attempt to build a light rail. Seattle of today is the home of some of the most important companies. In addition to Boeing, Nordstrom’s, and Microsoft, Amazon, all founded in and around Seattle, the city’s economy, which only a few decades ago was based on logging, is now diversified by the inclu-

women lived, drank, and struggled. Thousands of cities throughout the country were found, is a variation on Seattle's story. When white settlers arrived they established a city which later became the University of Washington. This would help them toward statehood. The county was also named King County, named after a king, to curry favor for the same statehood. In the 19th century, the name was officially changed (to King County). But in spite of these efforts in moving toward being an actual city in the late 1890s. As the jumping-off place for selling outfits to prospectors and miners, few returned. It is said that few returned and most who did, did not leave Seattle.

Seattle was launched, at least in the country, with the 1962 World's Fair. In the 1960s it became a thriving port city and it had Boeing Aircraft and ship building, which met World War II demands. Another war-time event was the internment of its Japanese population, and Chinese and Asians suffered at the hands of their neighbors. There was a scene of anti-Chinese, anti-Japanese, and anti-Japanese riots, which on at least one occasion were forcing Chinese residents down to the streets and compelling them to return to China.

Seattle had cable cars and streetcars, but in the 1960s Seattle was convinced to give up on cable cars in favor of gasoline-powered buses. At considerable expense, a few streetcars were replaced by a light rail system. The city is home to some of the US's most iconic businesses. Amazon, Microsoft, Starbucks, Costco, and Nordstrom are all in the city, still call it home. The local economy was primarily Boeing and shipbuilding, but now a large portion of many software and biotech

companies. Like everyplace else, Seattle is segregated, but not nearly as bad as many cities.

As is obvious from my comments, Seattle is not pristine. It remains today one of the most segregated cities not been too many decades since the city was bound by racial covenants restricting who could live in certain parts of the population restrained to the Central Business District. In Pittsburgh, that neighborhood, which was once one of the most disadvantaged parts of the city, was the center of a jazz scene centered along Jackson Street. In New Orleans, Charles, Quincy Jones (who grew up in New Orleans) and Louis Armstrong were nurtured, and even though they never left the continent Dave Brubeck, Charlie Parker, and Duke Ellington found their way there. Before Seattle began to flourish, jazz performers arrived as vaudeville performers in the city, and a flourishing jazz scene. Today, the political offices (mayor, council positions) have been held by whites. In Seattle, in spite of the small minority population, the political offices have been held by whites.

Seattle today is 75 percent white. The city has a relatively small African American population, a rapidly growing Latino population, and significant populations from Asia, the Pacific Islands, and East Africa). The population is segregated where it lives beyond the Central Business District. Whites (a very small portion of the population) populate neighborhoods mostly in the Rainier Valley and into the near-in suburbs. The Chinese have moved out of China Town/International District, but Beacon Hill, immediately Asian. One zip code in south Seattle, 98148, declared the most diverse in the city. The population is African Americans, European Americans, Asian Americans, Filipinos, Samoans, Ethiopians, Vietnamese, Cambodians, Burmese, and others. The Lake Washington, some of which lie in the suburbs, are predominately white, but with some diversity.

Seattle suffered with the Great Recession like other cities.

As noted above, Seattle's ethnic history is different from the whitest cities in America. It has many neighborhoods where people of color have lived there, keeping the small black Central Business District (CBD). But as was the case with Los Angeles, which was earlier and remains one of the most diverse cities in the country, Seattle, like many other cities, had its own charms, including the Pike Place Market. There the early careers of Ray Charles (who grew up in Seattle), and Ernestine Anderson (who grew up in Seattle) were launched. Seattle was off on the edge of the map when the likes of Parker, Stan Getz, and others found their way there. And like Los Angeles, where Jimi Hendrix, whose grandparents moved to Los Angeles in 1911, and grunge music, Seattle had a rich cultural heritage. People of Seattle are justly proud that they have had a county executive, and city and county commissioners, and city and county people of color for multiple terms, and that they have a rich cultural heritage.

Seattle also has a substantial Asian population, and a growing African population of about 8.5 percent, and a growing, and sizable, relatively recent immigrant population from the Pacific Islands, and Africa (primarily from the Caribbean). The diversity of color in Seattle has expanded significantly in the last decade. Blacks, Asians, Latinos, Native Americans (about 10 percent of the population), immigrants, and people of color are moving south from the CBD, down the coast, and into the suburbs. The Asian population has expanded from the International District (the ID) to many parts of the city. The neighborhood immediately south of the ID, is predominantly Asian. The zip code 98118 in Seattle (98118) was, after the 2010 US Census, the most diverse zip code in the US because it is home to Native Americans, African Americans, Latinos, Asian Americans, Ethiopians, Eritreans, Somalis, Vietnamese, and others. Neighborhoods bordering the ID are also among the most diverse within that most diverse zip code, and are a testament to racial and ethnic integration. And as is the case in

other American cities, although all where people of color live are not dis-neighborhoods of the city are located

As I described in earlier chapters to many other cities, including Pittsburgh important patterns are the same. Map 8.1 the Seattle Police Department. It shows 2010 in Seattle census tracts. Map 8.2 number of reported violent crimes. Since low, Map 8.3 may facilitate easier displays the distribution of Pittsburgh not quite as concentrated as Pittsburgh where they occur, for the most part. Most homicides in Seattle occur in the Rainier Valley and up across Bellevue Southwest Seattle, another area populated by whites, and the highest concentration in the city. Murder occurs in Seattle, as in Pittsburgh of color live in disadvantaged neighborhoods frequently marginal to the city's core. In these high-violence neighborhoods are high joblessness, and secondary sector employment

Recent high-profile murders, robberies neighborhood activists to try to begin making neighborhoods safer. They have met with the police department, and are actively discussing crime and violence. Popular thinking about the consequence of renewed gang activity of serious crime that takes place


Like Paris and London that Detroit Pittsburgh and Seattle, are very different but similar. Pittsburgh is much older, but the result of their locations on the water. Pittsburgh to be educational and cultural center. Seattle is a relatively healthy downtown business district. Pittsburgh first century industry town, but Pittsburgh Pittsburgh has a considerably larger

of the south Seattle neighborhoods disadvantaged, most of disadvantaged and there.⁸


Seattle's crime rate is, compared to Pittsburgh, comparatively low. But Map 8.2 is taken from the website of the Seattle Police Department and shows the number of homicides in 2003. Map 8.3 does the same for the total number of homicides. The city's number of homicide is compared to Map 8.1, which displays the number of murders. Seattle's homicides are comparable to Pittsburgh's, but the maps document that in Seattle, they conform to the same pattern: they occur in the CD and down through Rainier Hill. The other high area is in the north, populated by poor people of color, poor people, and a high concentration of the Latino population in the north. It does in Pittsburgh, where people live in the same neighborhoods. People there are more employed in a comparatively robust labor market. In Seattle, one finds higher unemployment, lower wages, and lower employment.

Robberies, and assaults have led neighborhood organizations to make south Seattle a priority. They have organized, held meetings with the police, and are discussing what they might do about the problem. The concern is that some of the violence is a result of gang activity, but it is unlikely that the majority of the violence there is gang-related.


As Dickens wrote of, my two cities, Pittsburgh and Seattle, but in some ways they are very similar. They both have an industrial history. They have both been and continue to be vibrant, competitive cities, and to have vibrant, competitive districts. Seattle is more of a twenty-first-century city than Pittsburgh is no slacker in this regard. Seattle has a larger African American population than




Map 8.2. Seattle Homicides 2010 by Census Tract
<http://web5.seattle.gov/mnm/statistics.aspx?t>



Fracts. Seattle Police Department website,
abId=3.



Map 8.3. Seattle Violent Crimes 2010 by Census Tract
<http://web5.seattle.gov/mnm/statistics.aspx?t>



us Tracts. Seattle Police Department website, abId=3.

Seattle, but the latter, though having a population that is white, has substantial nonwhite populations. Pittsburgh had significant immigration from Southern Europe; Seattle had significant immigration from Asian and Pacific Islander countries and, of late, from African American nations. Immigrant populations that might really be called unacculturated are one takes seriously important characteristics that have been excluded from the mainstream and concentrated in ghettos. Seattle has neighborhoods that would qualify as ghettos. Much of Seattle's black population is from the South. Pittsburgh was a destination for German immigrants from World War I into the early 1960s. Homicide rates in both cities follows social and economic conditions. The level of disadvantage can be traced to the social and ethnic composition of the city's residents, and the structure of the local labor market. Pittsburgh's high homicide rate is traced to its social and demographic conditions and the structure of its local labor market. Though the conditions they are the same in that the distribution of disadvantage follows disadvantage in both cities, and the social and economic advantage takes in both places reflects the patterns of each city's demographic conditions and local labor markets.

I said that Seattle's crime rate is higher than Pittsburgh's. This fact is a critical and important factors that lead to the high homicide rate. The marginalized and disadvantaged populations are maintained in their circumstances by the structure of the local labor market structures. The people in Seattle say "we are different up here"—and in Seattle the ethnic composition, as I have described, is not be especially threatened, allowing for the fact that Seattle is more culturally tolerant. Perhaps part because of the demographic conditions.

The defining feature of Pittsburgh is its history of big steel. Seattle suffered no such history. In the East, the Pacific North-

g a larger proportion of its popula-
racial and ethnic heterogeneity too.
ration streams from Eastern and
ficant immigration from Scandina-
sia and Africa. Seattle has few sec-
derclass neighborhoods, especially if
characteristics of such places as isolation
trated poverty. Pittsburgh certainly
qualify for this dubious designation.
arrived after World War II, while
reat Migration movers from World
le and crime more generally in both
disadvantage. Seattle's relatively low
to the educational, racial, and ethnic
and importantly to the nature of the
ner level of disadvantage can also be
ic composition and the characteris-
h they are different in many respects
bution of serious violent crime fol-
d, predictably, the form that disad-
their respective economic histories,
aphy, and the characteristics of the

, year after year, substantially lower
cal difference between the two cities,
this difference are worthy of note.
ed in my two cities come from and
e by different histories and different
e of Seattle are fond of believing that
some respects we are. The racial and
cribed, allows the white majority to
ng for the widespread belief that the
haps it is, but if so that is no doubt in
composition.

gh's recent history was the collapse
n lost. In fact, while that was occur-
nwest weathered downturns in the

timber, fishing, and paper industries and Microsoft was being founded. In Pittsburgh, with its iconic steel mills, it's hard to imagine the generational disadvantage that plagues there are those young people unable to be educated. So in both places, current labor market forces are pushing people toward marginalizing portions of the population, but Seattle has fewer of them and fewer structural disadvantages. It may be useful to think of labor market disruptions and chronic disruptions as acute injuries can become chronic social problems produced by labor market forces. Negative effects interact with other forces. Among these forces are Pittsburgh's circumstance for working-class people. Seattle's is more acute for most of the population. That the crime difference between Pittsburgh and Seattle is due to these factors and their racial and social and economic disadvantages.

Today in both cities, new generations like my parole clients Walter and Steve, Gary and Hole in the Wall Gang, are marginalized. The adult population is marginalized to the point that children are marginalized from schools. In neighborhoods it is possible that even children are engaging in delinquent activity and poor school performance. And not enough positive role models that inspires children or structures that they are less criminogenic. In both cities, we conclude that there is work for people who are doing well. How dramatically different jobs can be in the bonding value of employment. People were struggling even before the Great Recession. People are happy to have even a secondary sector job. In the media, some politicians, and for some people, it's easy to write off the crime as a result of bad people and thugs. We do not like to recog-

es, but Boeing was moving forward. In the city that no longer has those, we see what will break up the intergenerational ties in some neighborhoods. In Seattle, we see people competing for the jobs being created. Market conditions are conducive to population, particularly young people, moving in and around suburban areas. We think in terms of acute labor market dislocations. As is the case with our bodies, we have chronic problems, and the same is true of market dislocations. Of course these are social forces influencing social life; we see migration and racial conflict. Pittsburgh's working-class people is more chronic, while Seattle's is more acute. I suspect the difference between Pittsburgh and Seattle is largely due to their ethnic composition (and all of the problems faced by minorities) differences. The conditions of Robby Widemans, or others like him, and my juvenile probationers are being created because too much of the labor market and too many children are in the most disadvantaged neighborhoods. Children who are doing okay in school, but not even being protected by their parents, though adults hold the kind of employment that creates young adult lifestyles so that in both cities it is too easy for some to consume leisure who want work, without recognizing that leisure can be not only in terms of salary, but also in terms of leisure. Still, there are adults there who were laid off in the Great Recession who would have been able to find a job. It is too easy for some in the suburbs to come of us around the water cooler to talk about crime in our midst because of gangs, but we don't recognize that crime around us and the

thugs and gangsters that may be cornered by these arrangements less of their doing and more of what we allow. Crime—and many other problems of the inner city—will continue as it is until we change the causes, institutional arrangements, and policies that perpetuate criminogenic conditions. We must recognize the criminogenic effects of labor market arrangements and, of course, draw a complete picture of the system, not just though it is certainly part of it. Pittsburghers are well advised to move beyond simply blaming individuals for their actions. Yes, they are a part of the problem, guilty for what they do, but so too do we.

What Is to Be Done?

These are big problems, which are not going to have any easy fixes. The crime and disadvantage of labor markets cannot be conveniently solved. People who are marginalized from those structures cannot pick themselves up by their bootstraps. We need to stop drugs. Structural causes will require structural solutions. Problems of inequality and the crime problem are intertwined. That said, we need not, as some would argue, wait for the revolution. Efforts to change the system, some positive changes.

I believe that the first thing that needs to be done is to focus resources on strategies that have little or no effect (e.g., the DARE program). Those resources should be used on programs that have been effectively shown to produce desired outcomes. I do not mean to discourage people to be creative and try some new things, but if we are to decrease social and economic disadvantage, they should be evaluated—keep what works and drop in programs and fixing aspects that do not work. We should be dropping when research demonstrates that a program does not produce the desired effects in the field.

contributing to it are products of social and more of what we all collectively problems, like drug abuse and poverty take seriously the social structural and resulting cultural patterns that s. Here I have focused on the criminangements, but that does not, obviously the sources of contemporary crime, Pittsburgh and Seattle and other cities simplistic blaming of the perpetrators of the answer and bear responsibility.

not likely to be amenable to short run advantage consequences of the structure currently dealt with by telling those who are to “get over it and get a job” to stop drugs, or work harder, or stop doing more structural change to address the crime and disadvantage which results. With very strong feeling in the 1960s efforts large and small may result in

what must be done is to stop wasting pre- we have good evidence is likely to Drug Abuse Resistance Education or should be deployed on projects and evaluated and found to produce the say that we should not be inventive. Good ideas to reduce crime and to disadvantage should be tried. But as they find what works, making adaptations are found to be wanting, and stop that our good idea in theory did not field. Evaluation research is neither

free nor necessarily cheap, but through good is ultimately the most expensive.

With those caveats in mind, I would like to address the problems that I have seen in my own work. Community-based efforts, like those undertaken in the Homeboy Industries antiviolence efforts in Boston, which focus on young adults but includes activities that help them find jobs, programs and to get adults into meaningful work. Such approaches have shown to have success. Such approaches have shown the individual as if they exist in a vacuum. There is an appreciation among academics, social scientists and others who live the street life that jobs in the primary sector jobs being created in the city are not crime reduction. Homeboy Industries is a not-for-profit aimed at helping gang members find jobs. Its mottoes is, "Nothing stops a bullet."

There are things that businesses, government, and institutions, notably the schools, can do to address the current labor market structure. Much of the focus is on private sector job creation, but we delude ourselves that all jobs are not created equal. It is not better than no job, but the growing literature suggests that too many secondary sector jobs are created. It is less to wait for most businesses to create jobs with primary sector characteristics (e.g., benefits, promotion opportunities, etc.). But, more businesses might take a long-term view of resources policies and ask two important questions: Is the compensation package for employees profitable in the long term business and profits (e.g., the Homeboy Industries)? might it make more sense for the Homeboy Industries? practices? Costco Corporation is a good example. Costco has opted to treat most of their employees as if they were permanent. We have reasoned that doing so keeps a steady stream of employees which is good for their bottom line. Many other companies have made similar decisions. It is not good for their long-term profits—it

wing money away for no observable
ve waste of time and resources.

would like to offer suggestions that
have written about here. First, holis-
n Dane County, Wisconsin and the
ch not only directly deals with kids
ve efforts to confront family prob-
gful employment, are the most likely
ave the virtue of not trying to treat
social vacuum. There is a growing
ome in the policy world, and oth-
s and adequate preparation for the
s central for the long-term hope of
ries is a Southern California non-
ers get out of “the life.” One of their
like a job.”⁹

governments, and community insti-
o to mitigate the effects of the cur-
is made of the importance of pri-
ude ourselves if we fail to recognize
Yes, nearly always any job is better
ture is making it increasingly clear
s are criminogenic. It is likely point-
decide to endow all or even most of
acteristics (decent salary, good ben-
) for the sake of the collective good.
long, serious look at their human
ortant questions. First, is their com-
possibly contributing harm to long-
e Walmart contradiction)? Second,
bottom line to adjust employment
good example of a concern that has
ees as primary sector workers. They
a more stable and quality workforce,
. There is no doubt that other com-
s. If more do so, perhaps it will be
is certainly good for their workers,

their workers' families, the communities, local and state governments, because they pay taxes and are less likely to use as many welfare resources.

To really make the difference that communities need, we need to think in the way leberg calls "a new social contract":

We are in dire need of a new social contract because of the growth of polarized and precariously held jobs. A new social contract requires the coordination of business, and labor. The example of flexible labor institutions matter; some countries are doing better at the challenges and consequences of globalization and the tendencies toward polarized jobs. We need to understand the sources and consequences of the polarization of the labor market both the competitiveness of the American economy and the work experience by Americans themselves.

State and local governments should consider the breaks they have given or may give to the economy. Do these give rise new jobs in exchange for those that are lost? What jobs will they bring? I am not suggesting that we should give to those that produce just primary sector jobs. But policy makers must make in the context of the local labor market is so stressed. The creation of new jobs will help people and communities. It is a choice to make. But they should not increase their taxing capacity up by treating primary sector employers as if they are the same as other employers.

Local governments might also consider the impact of their systems. In some places a spatial mismatch exists between jobless workers and job opportunities. This is a difficult or perhaps impossible time to find a job where they might work. When this happens, it is important to help the public and the employers. We need to find ways to use resources. Local officials should make

nities those workers live in, and for
se primary sector workers pay more
many government-supported social
t that workers, employers, and com-
terms of what sociologist Arne Kal-

contract to address the consequences
precarious employment systems. This
inated efforts of government, busi-
xicurity¹⁰ suggests that labor market
are better able than others to address
posed by the global division of labor
d and precarious work. Tackling the
larization in job quality will enhance
merican economy and the quality of
nselves.¹¹

uld make critical assessments of tax
going forward to entities that prom-
expensive incentives. What kinds of
esting that tax breaks only be given
sector jobs. That is the choice that
ontext of their local labor market. If
d that an infusion of secondary sec-
nunities, then that may be the wise
ot make the mistake of using their
pective primary sector and second-
he same.

look to their public transportation
mismatch happens: empty jobs exist
y available, but the latter have a very
ne getting from where they live to
takes place, smart governments can
with effective use of public transit
ake sure that potential workers can

efficiently get from where they live. It's a little good to tell people that they should. Disadvantaged communities do not have the money, and even if they can, they may not want to. For the mortgages close to where they live. The increasing number of colleges and universities are cutting back on their faculties cannot afford to live in the city. Lack of housing.

I wish that I had a ready suggestion for the lot of inner-city children, especially in the most disadvantaged places. But we don't, because we don't understand why those performing in more delinquency in the poorest areas. It's not that the solution lies in the wisdom of the ancients. I was counseled that if money is not the answer, then we should counsel children are attending very well-learned schools. More money to the schools teaching them. Class size reduction efforts have not worked. Should we expect modest reduction in delinquency in the face of the abundance of money being poured into inner-city schools? Would more money and other investments aimed at addressing the problems in many inner cities make the difference? If we can't get children better than we have, we can't expect to solve the problem of dropping out of school and struggling to survive. We perpetuate problems like social and economic inequality and delinquency. If they are not educated, they can't compete in the labor market of the future. We need the next Robby Widemans, Stevens, and...

What about jobs for kids? I do not know. But I know the Garys and the members of the Future Teachers of America to delinquency. If we want to make a difference, we need to develop efforts to do two things. First, we need to do more for their children. Second, we need to do a single thing that we can do. Second, we need to get high-school kids, that work should be done. It's not so simplistically by saying they have to...

to where they work. And it does little to help them live closer to their jobs. People of color do not necessarily have the luxury of moving. They may not be able to afford to pay the rent in a better neighborhood. They might find a job. Even an increasing number of universities have recognized that members of the working class live near campus because of the cost.

There is a question of how to use schools to improve the lives of especially those living in the most disadvantaged neighborhoods. Because we do not have a good understanding of how to do better in school are also engaging in the lives of these neighborhoods. I suspect, though, that the solution offered by Jonathan Kozol, who has argued that the answer, then why won't those whose schools are underfunded send substantially more money to educating disadvantaged children?¹² Yes, that might have made the promised difference, but it is not enough. It is not a reduction in class size to make a major difference. It is not a reduction of challenges faced by those teachers who are not getting substantial reductions in class size to make a major difference. Addressing the challenges to learning in these neighborhoods. If we do not educate these children, we can expect them to continue the cycle of economic disadvantage and crime. We need to be educated so that they can meaningfully participate in the twenty-first century, they will be the next generation of Walter.

I do not believe that simply giving jobs to the members of the Hole in the Wall Gang is the solution. It might make a difference, I believe that we should first, get their parents good jobs. That would be a better solution than any other. We need to get their parents and their communities than any other. And, if we are going to give work to these children, it should be tied to school performance. Not just to get a particular grade point,

but make having and holding the job or maintaining a clear standard of performance.

Undertaking efforts such as these under the current policy an efficient use of either segment of the population are not possible. A phenomenally large portion of the US population is in prisons—more than 1.6 million in 2008. The cost is estimated to be \$35,000 per man per year, but more expensive because of the lack of rehabilitation. We lock people in Supermax facilities at \$100,000 per man per year.¹³ Since they do not return to their community, they do not bear the additional financial and human costs. They are less employable than they were when they were released. It is not clear that other western nations have fallen into the policy trap of believing that locking up their problems, but the tough talk by politicians should give their citizenry pause.

Of course, there is an alternative. As the earlier chapters warned that the status quo is perhaps growing portion of the population is the *status quo*. Then there might occur the possibility that some believe is the ultimate solution. What America is waiting for?

After serving a bit more than six years in prison, Wideman received an associate's degree from a program that had been running an education program for inmates (the program was discontinued just before the Department of Corrections budget cuts). He was asked to give the commencement address for the program.

The theme of our program today is "Education: The Key to a Shaped Future." I find this to be very appropriate. The program raised in has helped to shape many of our graduates today. Most of us grew up in the ghetto. The program in the ghettos. There the emphasis was, get an education.

job contingent on their improvement in performance in school.

It will not be cheap. But is our current money or human resources? Large amounts are productively used in the economy. The American population is locked in incarceration by 2010, at a cost that is conservatively \$10 billion per year (women and children are included because of economies of scale), and when the costs are estimated to exceed \$100 billion, the most who are imprisoned eventually die, their communities, and the public pay the human cost of them being even less productive than they went in, and in most instances are law-abiding members of society. In industrialized nations will follow the lead of the United States, believing that they can incarcerate away the crime problem. I have heard from some of their politicians

that they have on several occasions in earshot of the public who runs the risk of a substantial, angry population rejecting that state solution to labor stratification. Is that

the case? After seven years of his sentence, Robby completed a degree from a community college program in Western Penitentiary just after Robby's completion because of budget cutbacks). Robby was selected to represent the inmate graduation.

It is "The world shapes and is to be appropriate. Because the world we were born into is the attitudes of us graduates here in the ghettos of Pittsburgh and the surrounding areas. Get the most you can get with the least

amount of work. My education helped
ing worth having comes without having
being shaped by the world through
seeing that this concept was folly, it
world into our own hands and shape
citizens and our children that education
make a world where men and women
destinies and work hard and learn
reality.

—Robert Douglas W.

ed me to realize, though, that nothing is achieved by hard work and concrete effort. But in this “quick get-over” concept and in this now time to take our lives and our lives for the better. To show our fellow men that the means by which we can live can truly be free to dream our own dreams well and see those dreams become

ideman, from *Brothers and Keepers*¹⁴

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APPENDIX

Data

Table A.1

Table for Figure 4.1 Regression of Delinquent, and Neighborhood Variables – N=1497: Standardized Coefficients & St Errors

	Model I
Background Variables	
Female	-.163*** -.225 (.035)
Age	-.035 -.018 (.014)
Black	.007 .009 (.043)
Hispanic	.003 .005 (.047)
Father or Stepfather Present	-.030 -.044 (.039)
Parental SES Variables	
Family Poverty	.080** .166 (.054)

*Delinquency Index on Respondent, Par-
Mothers and Children of the NLSY,
Standardized & Unstandardized Coef-*

	Model 2
	-.165*** -.228 (.035)
	-.036 -.018 (.014)
	.031 .043 (.054)
	.045 .074 (.059)
	-.026 -.038 (.039)
	.079* .165 (.054)

Table A.1 (continued)

	Model I
Parental SES Variables	
Mother's Education	-0.051 -0.044 (.023)
School Variables	
Attachment to School	-.182*** -.225 (.032)
Grades	-.067** -.023 (.009)
Parental Involvement in School	.022 .035 (.042)
Youth Work Variables	
Employed	.013 .017 (.038)
Mother's Employment Variables	
Mother Employed	.002 .003 (.039)
Neighborhood Variables	
% Black	
% Hispanic	
Disadvantage	
% Marginal Work Force	

	Model 2
	-.052 -.045 (.023)
	-.184*** -.228 (.032)
	-.065** -.023 (.009)
	.020 .032 (.042)
	.011 .015 (.038)
	.005 .007 (.039)
	-.058 -.134 (.097)
	-.083* -.262 (.114)
	.036 .023 (.029)
	.005 .002 (.015)

% of Population over 25 with no High School Degree	
Constant	— .803 (.226)
R Square	.080

$\wedge = p < .1$

* = $p < .05$

** = $p < .01$

*** = $p < .001$

This table is taken from Crutchfield, Robert I. and Kevin Drakulich. 2006. "Labor Force Participation, DC. National Institute of Justice. www.nij.gov. This work was supported by the National Institute of Justice." www.nij.gov

Table A.2

Table for Figure 4.2 Regression of Dependent Variable on Background, Individual, and Neighborhood Variables – Model 1, 1998 Wave, In SMSA Sample N=1167
Coefficients & St Errors

	Model 1
Background Variables	
Female	-.150*** -.203 (.039)
Age	-.025 -.013 (.016)
Black	.002 .003 (.049)
Hispanic	-.008 -.013 (.051)
Father or Stepfather Present	-.065* -.092 (.043)

	.018 .131 (.203)
	— .822 (.228)
	.084

D., Tim Wadsworth, Heather Groninger, and
 opation, Labor Markets, and Crime.” Washing-
 cjrns.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/214515.pdf. This
 e of Justice, grant number 2000-IJ-CX-0026.

*Delinquency Index on Respondent, Par-
 Mothers and Children of the NLSY,
 r: Standardized & Unstandardized*

	Model 2
	-.154*** -.209 (.039)
	-.024 -.012 (.015)
	.049 .068 (.059)
	.042 .065 (.064)
	-.058 [^] -.083 (.044)

Table A.2 (continued)

	Model I
Parental SES Variables	
Family Poverty	.065* .127 (.059)
Mother's Education	-.051^ -.043 (.025)
School Variables	
Attachment to School	-.157*** -.194 (.037)
Grades	-.048 -.016 (.010)
Parental Involvement in School	.007 .011 (.047)
Youth Work Variables	
Employed	.031 .043 (.042)
Mother's Employment Variables	
Mother Employed	.008 .012 (.044)
Neighborhood Variables	
% Black	
% Hispanic	
Disadvantage	

	Model 2
	.063* .123 (.059)
	-.055^ -.042 (.026)
	-.159*** -.197 (.037)
	-.045 -.015 (.010)
	.004 .006 (.047)
	.019 .069 (.043)
	.012 .018 (.044)
	-.105* -.224 (.103)
	-.108** -.324 (.125)
	.045 .028 (.031)

% Marginal Work Force	
% of Population over 25 with no High School Degree	
Constant	— .786 (.255)
R Square	.068

$\wedge = p < .1$

* = $p < .05$

** = $p < .01$

*** = $p < .001$

This table is taken from Crutchfield, Robert I. and Kevin Drakulich. 2006. "Labor Force Participation, DC. National Institute of Justice. www.nij.gov. This work was supported by the National Institute of Justice." www.nij.gov

Table A.3

Table For Figures 4.3 and 4.4 Employment and Property Crime Involvement

	Violent Crime
Basic Model Variables	
Age	-.092c
Sex	.276c
Race	.016
Family Income	.018
Parents' Marital Status	-.011
Central City Resident	-.041b
Macro Variables	
Population Size	.012
Percent Black	.010
Percent in Poverty	-.077b
Median Family Income	-.075b
Percent Single Mothers	.056a
Unemployment Rate	.026a
Unemp/Cent. City	.004
Interaction	

	.027 .012 (.017)
	-.013 -.092 (.231)
	— .819 (.256)
	.076

D., Tim Wadsworth, Heather Groninger, and
 oation, Labor Markets, and Crime.” Washing-
 cjrns.gov/pdf/files1/nij/grants/214515.pdf. This
 e of Justice, grant number 2000-IJ-CX-0026.

ment, School, and Juvenile Violent

	Property Crime
	-.024
	.181c
	-.055c
	.046b
	.117c
	-.045c
	.018
	-.096c
	-.015
	.039
	.091c
	.003
	-.045c

Table A.3 (continued)

	Violent Crime
Education and Work Variables	
Been Suspend From School	.165c
Out of School and Work	.053c
Part-Time Employment	.005
Hours Worked	.027
Amt of Education Exp.	-.047b
GPA	-.113c
Parents' Characteristics	
Parents' Job Quality	.005
Parents' Education	.018
Father Full-Time	-.013
R Square	.179

a = $p < .05$; b = $p < .01$; c = $p < .001$

Crutchfield, Robert D., Margo Rankin, and S. A. Desmond published in Jargowsky, P. A., S. A. Desmond, and S. A. Desmond. "Sprawl a Juvenile Justice Issue?" In *Our Children: Ethnic Differences in American Criminal Justice*, edited by J. Kempf. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Table A.4

Table for Figure 5.1 Regression of Crime Level Variables – NLSY97, Wave 3, Female & Unstandardized Coefficients & St

	Model I
Background Variables	
Female	-.142*** -.033 (.004)
Age	-.043* -.009 (.004)
Black	-.037^ -.010 (.005)
Hispanic	-.026 -.007 (.006)

	Property Crime
	.161c
	.038b
	.054c
	-.005
	-.006
	-.116c
	.024
	.093c
	.104b
	.129

usan R. Pitchford. 1993. This table was also
, and R. D. Crutchfield. 2005. "Is Suburban
ren, *Their Children: Confronting Race and*
e, edited by Darnell Hawkins and Kimberly
s.

me Index on Individual and Tract
ull Sample N=2934: Standardized
Errors

	Model 2
	-.142***
	-.033 (.004)
	-.045* -.010 (.004)
	-.002 -.000 (.007)
	-.011 -.003 (.007)

Married	-.003 -.002 (.011)
Parental SES Variables	
Father's Highest Grade	.030 .001 (.001)
Parental Income	-.009 .000 (.000)
School Variables	
In High School	-.028 -.008 (.006)
Ever Suspended	.185*** .044 (.005)
Work Variables	
Weeks Worked in Last Year	.010 .000 (.000)
Unemployed	.069* .036 (.014)
Secondary Sector	.052* .012 (.005)
Occupational Status	.001 .000 (.003)

Here and in subsequent tables the first entries are coefficients and the second entries are standard errors

^ = $p < .1$

* = $p < .05$

** = $p < .01$

*** = $p < .001$

This table is taken from Crutchfield, Robert I. and Kevin Drakulich. 2006. "Labor Force Participation, DC. National Institute of Justice. www.nij.gov. This work was supported by the National Institute of Justice.

	-0.003 -0.002 (.011)
	.028 .001 (.001)
	-0.008 .000 (.000)
	-0.030 -0.008 (.006)
	.184*** .044 (.005)
	.010 .000 (.000)
	.069* .036 (.014)
	.053* .013 (.005)
	.001 .000 (.003)

s are Betas, the second b, and the third are

D., Tim Wadsworth, Heather Groninger, and
 opation, Labor Markets, and Crime.” Washing-
 cjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/214515.pdf. This
 e of Justice, grant number 2000-IJ-CX-0026.

Table A.5

Table for Figure 6.1. Regression of De
Parent, and Neighborhood Variables
NLSY, 1998 Wave, Rural Sample N=
ized Coefficients & St Errors

	Model I
Background Variables	
Female	-.166** -.241 (.078)
Age	-.056 -.029 (.030)
Black	.016 .025 (.104)
Hispanic	.016 .035 (.120)
Father or Stepfather Present	.085 .133 (.096)
Parental SES Variables	
Family Poverty	.159** 4265 (.144)
Mother's Education	-.069 -.067 (.053)
School Variables	
Attachment to School	-.276*** -.342 (.067)
Grades	-.118* -.047 (.022)
Parental Involvement in School	.065 .111 (.092)

*Delinquency Index on Respondent,
 – Mothers and Children of the
 330: Standardized & Unstandard-*

	Model 2
	-.172** -.249 (.079)
	-.059 -.031 (.030)
	-.104 -.163 (.142)
	.054 .120 (.155)
	.082 .127 (.096)
	.158* .425 (.145)
	-.064 -.062 (.058)
	-.284** -.351 (.068)
	-.114* -.046 (.022)
	.065 .109 (.093)

Youth Work Variables	
Employed	-.047 -.068 (.084)
Mother's Employment Variables	
Mother Employed	.003 .004 (.084)
Neighborhood Variables	
% Black	
% Hispanic	
Disadvantage	
% Marginal Work Force	
% of Population over 25 with no High School Degree	
Constant	— .753 (.495)
R Square	.166

$\wedge = p < .1$

* = $p < .05$

** = $p < .01$

*** = $p < .001$

This table is taken from Crutchfield, Robert I. and Kevin Drakulich. 2006. Labor Force Participation in the District of Columbia. Washington DC. National Institute of Justice. <https://www.ojp.gov/ncj/volcontents/crutchfield-drakulich-2006.pdf>. This work was supported by the National Institute of Justice grant number 2000-IJ-CX-0026.

	-041 -059 (.085)
	.005 .008 (.084)
	.149 .506 (.326)
	-.047 -.198 (.325)
	.005 .004 (.092)
	-.024 -.014 (.043)
	.02834 .203 (.445)
	— .738 (.507)
	.177

D., Tim Wadsworth, Heather Groninger, and
ation, Labor Markets, and Crime. Washing-
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/214515.

l Institute of Justice, grant number

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NOTES

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

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4. Wilson, William Julius (1987), *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
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referring to the "ghetto poor" (1990, "Study-

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Ap

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27. There is a long tradition of social disorganization criminology that in recent years has found support in Sampson and colleagues and Burskik. This research is discussed more completely in a discussion of how it affects neighborhoods.
28. Massey and Denton, *American Apartheid*.
29. Sullivan, Mercer L. (1989), *Getting Paid: Street Life, Street Style, and Street Values*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press.
30. Pattillo-McCoy, Mary (1999), *Black Pioneers: The Black Middle Class, Chicago, University of Chicago Press*.
31. This research will be discussed in subsequent chapters.
32. Readers should see Cantor, David, and Richard A. Cloward (1987), "Crime Rates in the Post-World War II Era: An Empirical Analysis," *American Sociological Review* 52(1):1-24.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

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12. Worrall, John L. (2008), "Racial Composition and Crime: Dealing with Inconsistencies in Panel Data," *Journal of Crime and Sociology* 37(3):787–800.
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15. Critics of dual labor market theory such as Robert J. Gordon, University of California at Berkeley have argued that the theory is oversimplified, but in published research they use a broad categorization of occupations to test the theory.
16. In the early 1990s when I presented at a conference for county officials I titled the talk "McJobs." I was using an ethnic slur, but my definition of the term cast aspersions on the characteristics of a particular national group. Then in early 2004, the publisher of a popular dictionary sued me against the publishers of a popular dictionary for an entry. I, along with the publisher, felt that the publisher was the plaintiff.
17. See Anderson, Elijah (1990), *Street Wars*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
18. The Bureau of the Census does not classify occupations into sectors, but instead divides occupations into two groups. It subsequently impose the dual labor market theory on the survey conducted by the US Census Bureau. The survey is a good and useful aspects of the work force. Information can be found at www.census.gov/cps/
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rectly argued that this dichotomy is an

rch criminologists have found even this

o have utility in explaining crime rates.

arly research on this topic to a group of

bs.” One official issued the challenge that

ence was that the title was intended to

of the fast-food jobs, not on an ethnic or

he McDonalds Corporation lost a lawsuit

ctionary for including “McJobs” as an

vindicated when the courts found against

ise: *Race, Class and Change in an Urban*

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assify jobs as primary and secondary

s into categories upon which researchers

market categorization. CPS is a monthly

Bureau for the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

t, unemployment, and a wealth of other

orce and the labor market. Information

Stratification and Violent Crime,” *Social*

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23. Wilson, August (2011), *Jitney*. New York.
24. Venkatesh, Sudhir A. (2006), *Off the Map: Urban Poor*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard.
25. Fagan, Jeffrey, and Richard B. Freeman. *Justice* 25:225–90.
26. Pittsburgh is a good location for this industrial center where unskilled blue middle-class life. Obviously I could have cities during that period, or a contemporary weathered the shift to the twenty-first in the old Rust Belt.
27. “Day turn,” as mill workers called it, would end at 3:00 p.m. In actuality, most would be unlikely to have this shift; most to 7:00 a.m.) or the swing shift, sometimes 11:00” shift by steelworkers.
28. Cohen, Lawrence, and Marcus Felson. *Trends: A Routine Activity Approach* 608. Cohen and Felson argue that crime occur with the convergence of motivation of potential victims, and an absence of
29. Crutchfield, Robert D. and Susan R. P. “Effects of Labor Stratification,” *Social*
30. The now infamous case of the central was brutally raped, beaten, and left for believed to have been a victim of a paying, mugging, and assaulting people and served time, but as we now know the jogger was assaulted by another kids.
31. Crutchfield, Robert D. (1989), “Labor *Force* 68(2):489–512.
32. Wilson, *When Work Disappears*.
33. None of the many people that I spoke selves been a victim of a violent crime in constant danger.
34. Totalitarian governments have historically check because they and their police for niceties as civil liberties and human rights

A Study of Negro Streetcorner Men, Boston,

Millionaire Club Charity at [www.millionaire-](http://www.millionaire-club.org)

Club, Samuel French, Inc.

*Books: The Underground Economy of the
Millionaire Club*, University Press.

Johnson (1999), "Crime and Work," *Crime and*

example because of its history as an

blue-collar workers could build a good,

they have elected to use a host of other Rust Belt

temporary city whose local labor market has

outperformed the rest of the century global economy better than most

was the shift that began at 7:00 a.m. and

newly hired workers on the labor crew

most end up on the night shift (11:00 p.m.

times simply referred to as the "3:00 to

(1979), "Social Changes and Crime Rate

" *American Sociological Review* 44(4):588–

crime and victimization are more likely to

involve street-to-commit-crime actors, the presence

of guardians.

Witchford (1997), "Work and Crime: The

Forces 76(1):93–118.

park jogger, the young woman who

was killed in New York's Central Park, was

attacked by a pack of young men out "wilding"—attack-

at random. Five teenage boys confessed

to the crime (and has been confirmed with DNA test),

and not a pack of "wilding" minority

"Social Stratification and Violent Crime," *Social*

with during a six-week visit had them-

self, but nevertheless, most felt that they were

generally been able to keep street crime in

check. Police forces do not need to worry about such

incidents.

35. We should take care to remember that what was historically meant something very different than what we mean today. Lin Frazier (1957), *Black Bourgeoisie*, New York: Basic Books. The middle class was characterized by people who had white-collar jobs, black middle-class men most frequently worked in professions or if really fortunate may have served in the postal service.
36. Gray, John (1998), *False Dawn*, New York: Basic Books. Kalleberg, Arne (2011), *Good Jobs, Bad Jobs: The Rise of Precarious Employment Systems in the United States*, Harvard University Press.
37. Kalleberg, *Good Jobs, Bad Jobs*, 14.
38. Planning is now underway to open a new park in the area.
39. Pittsburgh's North Side, another traditionally working-class substantial portion of the North Side has been redeveloped.
40. Shaw, Clifford R. and Henry D. McKay (1942), *Disorganized Areas*, rev. ed., Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
41. Sampson, Robert J. and William Julius Wilson (1997), "Race, Crime, and Urban Inequality," in *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, 88(1):7-45.
42. Crutchfield, Robert D. (1989), "Labor Segmentation and the Forces 68(2):489-512.
43. While many researchers use census tracts as a proxy for neighborhoods that they are not perfect proxies. Tracts are defined by the Bureau of the Census that are designed to be roughly the same size and shape; that is, they attempt to be roughly square and manmade obstructions such as water bodies, highways, but they certainly do not correspond to the boundaries of their communities. This is particularly true in areas where the boundaries is closer than in others. In Seattle, tracts often do not follow neighborhood boundaries.
44. The census occupation categories we use are based on the market theory. The secondary occupations include machine handlers, equipment cleaners, and repair-persons, machine operators, and material-moving occupations (see "Violent Crime").
45. Other control variables included in the model are the percent of the population (the percent of men who are in the twenty-five years age range), the divorce rate, and whether or not the tract was within the central business district.
46. Anderson 1999.

t prosperous or middle-class has historically within the black population (see E. Frank-
New York, The Free Press.). While the white
people in professional occupations or office
frequently worked in blue-collar occupa-
secured a post with the railroad or with the

ork, The New Press, 111, cited in Kal-
bs: The Rise of Polarized and Precarious
es, 1970s to 2000s, New York, Russell Sage

supermarket; the area is gentrifying.
tionally black area, is also noted. A sub-
now been “urban-renewed.”
y (1969), *Juvenile Delinquency and Urban*
Chicago Press.

s Wilson (1995), “Toward a Theory of
n Crime and Inequality, 38.

Stratification and Violent Crime,” *Social*

tracts as neighborhoods, they recognize
acts are official designations by the US
ed to approximate neighborhoods in
to draw the boundaries by using natural
waterways, highways, and major streets,
perfectly to residents’ perception of
. In some cities the correspondence
acts are reasonably well-aligned with

re divided using the logic of dual labor
ational categories were service work-
eanners, helpers, and laborers. Categories
roup are managers and professionals,
upport, precision production, crafts,
assemblers and inspectors, transporta-
ns (Crutchfield, “Labor Stratification and

he analysis were the age distribution of
ho were in the crime-prone fourteen- to
rce rate, residential mobility, and whether
l business district.

47. Crutchfield, Robert D., Ann Glusker, and Howard Anderson, *Code of the Street*.
48. Vehicle theft is also accurately counted in this paper was on violence, thus the use of this measure.
49. Downtown Cleveland has since underwritten the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame, new stores that typically pop up around such areas.
50. Since these analyses were done using 1990 data in Washington. Likely as a result of gentrification, the city is no longer—for the first time in 1990.
51. Though referred to as “apartheid cities,” the apartheid era continue to have social arrangements of apartheid’s residential segregation arrangements. Asians were required to live in separate areas, and were not permitted into white areas without government approval.
52. Unlike the previously published analyses, this study not taking into account other social factors such as race composition, age distribution, education, and income, even without controlling for these other factors, violent crime and employment are related to gentrification.
53. Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged*.
54. All of these maps use 2000 data rather than 1990. The crime statistics are taken from the National Longitudinal Study (NNCS) that was conducted by sociologists (Peterson and Krivo, 2010).
55. Southeast Washington is one of the sectors that has experienced substantial gentrification since the 2000s.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

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and for insurance purposes, but our interest in the rate of homicide as a dependent variable. The city has undergone a renewal with the construction of new sports arenas, and restaurants, bars, and other such attractions.

1990 data, things have changed dramatically. In the case of gentrification, the 2010 census found that the city is now majority black.

Like these South African cities in the post-apartheid era, the geographical patterns that are products of these laws and pass laws. Under these laws blacks and whites were segregated into specific areas, and they were not legally permitted to cross without passes—most often for work. Comparing these maps to 1980 and 1990 data, these maps are strikingly similar to features of the census tracts (e.g., racial composition, divorce rate, poverty). Nevertheless, when we consider other factors, the geographic distribution of crime is remarkably the same.

More than updated 2010 data, because the National Neighborhood Crime Study led by sociologists Ruth Peterson and Lauren Krivo

focuses on sections of the city that has experienced the most change since the 2000 census.

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21. Hawkins, J. David, and Joseph G. Wei "An Integrated Approach to Delinquency *tation* 6(2):73-97; Haggerty, Kevin P., El and F. Catalano, J. David Hawkins (199 Program for Community Reintegration
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

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show how a suburban school spend time at a much better

school than the city school. The city school's students go to the Chicago urban

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t, since on average white families incomes
 k family incomes. But even when increased
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a Juvenile Justice Issue?"

kes in Conformity") should emphasize
 what we typically label inner-city neigh-
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 This will of course include slum or ghetto
 quite well-off residential areas as well.

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early all white Shadyside, before moving

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Of course some ghetto residents do not

, but any casual or even cynical but honest

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NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

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that drug use is pretty evenly distributed
US. In my own personal history I wit-
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ed to America and sociology the split
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Robert D. Crutchfield is Professor of Criminology at the University of Washington. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a winner of the University of Washington's Distinguished Teaching Award. Crutchfield served as a judge on the National Academy of Arts and Sciences and as a parole board member for Allegheny County Pennsylvania and as a parole board member for the State of Probation and Parole.

er of Sociology at the University of
American Society of Criminology
Washington's Distinguished Teach-
juvenile probation officer in Mercer
le agent for the Pennsylvania Board