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Observing Memories

3



DEEP VIEW

ANNE HERTZOG

Tourism and places of memory

PIOTR M. A. CYWIŃSKI

Memory of Tomorrow

INTERVIEW

Multidirectional Memory in focus

INTERVIEW WITH MICHAEL ROTHBERG

OVERVIEW

SIOBHAN KATTAGO

Lenin's Mausoleum: A Haunted House on Red Square

EUROPE INSIGHT

FILIPPO FOCARDI

The dispute over the past

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Observing *Memories*

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EUROPEAN OBSERVATORY ON MEMORIES

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Fundació Solidaritat UNIVERSITAT DE BARCELONA

UNIVERSITAT DE BARCELONA

WITH THE SUPORT OF

Europe for Citizens

The European Observatory on Memories (EUROM) is a transnational network of institutions and civil society organizations committed to research and promotion of remembrance policies and memorial initiatives. Its main goal is to promote collective and citizenship memories through a plurality of approaches and diverse perspectives. EUROM is led by the University of Barcelona's Solidarity Foundation with the support of the program 'Europe for Citizens' of the European Commission.
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SUMMARY

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3

COVER PICTURE

Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum Manel Clemente

EDITORIAL

This issue of Observing Memories represents the consolidation of a high quality multidisciplinary journal which explores the past from a permanent trans-European and international perspective. With each issue published, the Observatory's reputation has grown and we are delighted to present our latest edition, published just after the exhumation of the dictator Francisco Franco from the mausoleum of the Valley of the Fallen. The removal of Franco's remains is an important step for democracy both in Spain and in Europe. It means that we can now begin to consider this place of terror from the perspective of heritage and culture – perhaps even as a tourist destination, once tribute has been paid to the memory of the thousands of victims buried there illicitly by the dictatorship.

The use of sites of memory today is one of the main themes discussed in this issue of the journal. Places of memory are analysed from many points of view and presented in various ways: recontextualized, as sources of conflict, or simply reinterpreted in the present. These spaces and the discourses that derive from them, activated by either public or private projects, can help us to assess the extent to which the memory of the past can be transmitted and understood in the present. In this way, analytical approaches are combined with examples of places that "resist and reside" among us today, making use of the policies for the management of the past (if in fact they exist). As the reader will see, the nature of the sites varies widely. We have chosen sites, museums, monuments, mausoleums, ruins, and memorials that evoke episodes of resistance to barbarism and violence over the course of the twentieth century; and also other sites that imply a symbolic resistance in the sense that, in different ways, they refuse to be swept under the carpet or manipulated by the powers that oppress them.

Today, the emergence of new agents, new discourses and new public uses of memory encourages us to ask about its redeployment in Europe and further afield. This redeployment applied to a contemporary event modifies the memory of heroism or mourning, and gains strength as the expression of a "citizen's right" in a new form. In this situation, the new challenges include the continuous study of history and memorialization at local, national and international levels. New forms of memory emerge in a model that combines the transmission of history, public debate, and social education.

The experiences described in this issue help us to analyse transnational memories and discuss and compare their public uses, the development of museum design, social initiatives, reflection and experiences. Our understanding of places of memory and of recent history is based on two premises: first, the public's social and cultural engagement and their involvement in memory, and second, the ongoing analysis based on comparative and transnational models. In this issue, several authors provide theoretical and practical essays on how and where to activate these memories. We propose concepts such as cultural tourism and heritage for discussion with regard to these sites, through an assessment of the physical traces of memory of recent conflicts and of their capacity for transmission through different channels.

This transmission is analysed through a set of examples in a permanent debate on the uses that visitors, the general public, and the tourism industry make of historical memory. We explore spaces of memory and monuments of wars, resistance, genocides, and the perpetrators. The geographer Anne Hertzog offers us a theoretical introduction to the treatment of places of memory as tourist

spaces, while Piotr Cywinski, the director of the Auschwitz museum, reflects on the Nazi death camp. Marcello Flores and Carlo Giunchi address the problems that have arisen in Predappio, the town where Mussolini is buried, and the plan to create a museum of Fascism. Other places, with their own idiosyncrasies and complexities, are studied in the pages of this issue of Observing Memories: Lenin's mausoleum (Siobhan Kattago), the memorials of the former Yugoslavia (Aleksander Jakir), the Lipa memorial centre in Croatia (Carlota Sánchez), the 23.5 Hrant Dink memorial in Istanbul (Oriol López) or the remodelled Museum of Free Derry (Adrian Kerr), which is a member of the international EUROM network. Different channels of the transmission of memory are also assessed, in the form of artistic photography (Montse Morcate) or new technologies (Orli Fridman), and current debates also feature such as the management of the memory of slavery in Europe (Celeste Muñoz). In addition, in the section on European memory policy, we are lucky to have the contributions of two specialists of the calibre of Laure Neumayer and Filippo Focardi, and an interview with the specialist Michael Rothberg on the concept of multidirectional memory and recent research.

Some of these experiences provide positive examples of the application of a heritage policy with a balanced, unified perspective, avoiding any excessive spontaneity and on occasion making up for a certain lack of content. As is well known, the recovery of sites of memory in recent years has rapidly intensified the uses of the past (political, commercial and tourism-oriented) accompanied by more than a decade of commemorative events in the different countries of Europe. Memory becomes collective and plural, sharing knowledge with the discipline of history. Sites of memory are not restricted to monuments, spaces, landscapes or objects; celebrations, emblems, commemorations, and songs are also included – in short, any material or symbolic representation that transmits memory.

Matter and symbol are organized and form a system, an organic unit, building the memory of a group, a collective, a state, or a continent like Europe. So, sites of memory are not just physical places: they can also be immaterial, intangible or abstract. Their function in terms of memorial heritage, and the objective of memorials or memory institutions as guarantors of this heritage, is to make the memory of the past relevant in the present thanks to a collective exercise of reflection and acceptance of memory as a collective legacy, and of the right to memory as one of the pillars of contemporary democratic societies. The first of these reflections encourages us to think about projects all over the world (not only in Europe) for the recovery of monuments and places of memory for purposes of cultural tourism, as places of residence that we share, and as places of resistance holding out against oblivion. Increasingly, sites of memory are being classified as heritage assets. In some cities and countries they are even legally protected as places of local, regional or national interest. Others are catalogued by both UNESCO and the EU as cultural heritage sites, run by management organizations dedicated to the protection of historical heritage under the broader heading of cultural landscape. Heritage and territory emerge as key elements for local development strategies. It is therefore important to analyse the relationships established between history, cultural heritage, tourism and territory through the recovery of memory. The many different ways in which groups with their own professional interests, political views and emotional responses engage with historical memory – conducting historical research, lobbying for legislative changes, organizing commemorations, designing memorials and museums and even signposts – mean that public policy needs to exert some form of regulation.

Material traces of the past are not the only object of a memorial policy rooted in democratic referents. Evidently, wars have created a great many spaces that can be recovered, or even restored and rebuilt, but the heritage of war has many readings and great care must be taken with regard to the way it is transmitted and represented. It is all too easy to focus exclusively on the drama and trauma of the military events and miss important aspects such as the transformational values, for example, of anti-Francoism or anti-Fascism. Many military history museums reveal a certain nostalgic narrative that can be harmful to democratic culture and the educational work that derives from it, especially with regard to the younger generations. How should we respond to the huge proliferation of military museums in China or in Iran (more than 150 on the subject in four years)? How can we design educational projects in a museum on “German tanks” in the middle of democratic Europe? What do we say when we see that more than 300,000 schoolchildren have visited the Warsaw Uprising and Resistance Museum, full of weapons and tales of war, and housing a temporary exhibition about the Polish army in the Middle East? These are difficult questions to answer. We may well have serious doubts about the capacity of these spaces to transmit universal values, and may be concerned about the political and social messages that underlie these museum narratives. All this alerts us to the problems of portrayals of war and underlines the belief that visits to places of memory require some preparation: for example, the study of memory as a process of reflection. Thus memory tourism promotes education: not just to remember and to know what happened, but also to come to terms with it and recover values ignored in more repressive, less amenable times.

These issues participate in a great ritual necessary for social peace in which individual consciences join together with collective ones. Once the policy and its objectives have been established, the next step is the recovery of memory, a task that we have carried out on many occasions at the Observatory: through inventories of sites of memory, texts, signage, management plans for potential sites and itineraries to create new projects. This procedure allows us to choose specific objectives to be pursued as the basis for the transmission of memory, and thus avoid the risk of banalization due to errors of content, or the frivolous attitudes of uninformed visitors. The study of memory is a process in which conclusions drawn from comparisons and theoretical cases can help us to learn from history and the transmission of memory, and apply new formulas in which the general public are keen to engage. This is one of the many aims of the Observatory: to address the subject and all its intricacies, without inhibitions or reservations and free of any political pressure. We hope you enjoy our website and our review Observing Memories. Happy (and critical) reading!

Jordi Guixé
Director of the European Observatory on Memories

DEEP VIEW

Tourism and places of memory: exploring the political side of tourism and the spatial dimension of memory.

Anne Hertzog
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The "Martyred cities" of Vukovar or Sarajevo, the Ground Zero in New York, the Gallipoli battlefield in Turkey are just a few examples of places of memory that are among the most popular destinations for tourism. Nowadays, the Somme Battlefields in France, have become cosmopolite places where visitors from Canada, Australia or Germany may meet travelers from India, South-Africa or New-Zeland. Multilingual signs installed by the local administration of tourism allow them to interpret a landscape dotted with cemeteries, memorials and monuments of the Great War. Their tour may be organized by a guide of British origins, whose wife runs a typical English bed-and-breakfast in one of those typical rebuilt village of Picardy! These few examples show how tourism and places of memory interact in many ways, regarding cross-cutting issues, such as politics, economics or social and cultural practices. This contribution aims to draw a picture of the contemporary reflections and debates this globalized phenomenon generate, exploring different meaning of "memory".

The notion of places of memory was popularized by the French historian Pierre Nora in the 1980s. According to Nora (1984), places of memory were defined as remains: «The extreme form in which a commemorative consciousness remains in a history that calls it because it ignores it». Places of memory refer to material or immaterial objects, such as memorials, archives, associations, songs, etc. They also reflect a "work of memory", e.g. an active practice of remembering of a various range of stakeholders.

In this text, a *place of memory* relates to conflicts, trauma, violence, repression, confinement, and pain. This is a widely adopted approach, even if it doesn't cover the larger meaning of the notion. The strong connections between places of memory and tourism have been extensively and systematically studied, discussed and researched since the 1990s. As "remembrance tourism" or "post-conflict tourism" emerged as research fields, the studies

Visitors asking for informations at a tourism desk outside 9/11 Memorial in New York, 2013 | A. Hertzog

focusing on tourism associated with places of death have undergone a great development, discussing new categories such as “tragic tourism” (Lippard, 2000), “thanatourism” (Seaton, 1996) or “dark tourism” (Lennon and Foley, 2000).

Researchers have provided many interpretations of tourism associated with places of memory: some resituate it in a long history of fascination with ruins as traces of destruction or lost civilizations dating back to antiquity; others have seen it as a specific manifestation of the complex relationships between societies and death. By using the notion of “dark tourism”, Lennon and Foley want to stress «a fundamental shift in the way in which death, disaster, and other grotesque atrocities are being handled by those who offer associated tourist products» (Lennon and Foley, 2000, 3). Some researchers suggest it is a manifestation of the crisis experienced by societies, pushing communities or individuals to question their painful pasts. Others analyze it more as a new form of «commodification of emotions that is functional for the reproduction of both modern societies and of the market» (Bartoletti, 2010).



Page of a visitor book from Neuve Chapelle Indian Memorial, 2013 | A. Hertzog

This contribution aims to explore 4 aspects of the interactions between tourism and places of memory, which will be discussed on the basis of the literature:

1/ Tourism and painful memories: Tourism associated with painful memories has been a largely globalized phenomenon, which nevertheless reflects contrasted memory dynamics.

2/ Tourism, places of memory and politics: The tourist attractiveness of places of memory is part of complex processes where "memory work" (travail de mémoire) and tourism development interact, in response to numerous challenges, revealing the political dimension of tourism;

3/ Places of memory and tourists' contributions: Tourists inscribe their practices in the geography of places of memory officially produced and marketed. This is a process that questions tourists' motivations and experiences. Tourists also actively contribute to the production of constantly recomposed spaces of memory, through practices that can lead to a redefinition of the notion of a place of memory.

4/ The social function of "rememebrance tourism" in question: The rise of tourism and its massification in some places has given rise to many debates and discussions in the academic world and beyond, about the social functions of "remembrance tourism" and its efficiency in transmitting memory.

1/ Tourism and painful memories: *Tourism associated with painful memories has been a largely globalized phenomenon, which nevertheless reflects contrasted memory dynamics.*

Bosnia and Herzegovina, South Africa, Cambodia, Vietnam, Ireland, Armenia, Guatemala: for several decades, remembrance tourism has been globalized. The most visited sites have long been European or American sites (some historians locate the origins of "battlefield" tourism in Gettysburg during the Civil War) but today the phenomenon is global. Adopting a functionalist logic, some researchers explain it by the widespread presence of violence in the world: «few geographical areas escape memories marked by violence variously linked to dictatorships, mass crimes, totalitarianisms or genocides» (Chevalier, Lefort, 2016). However, this approach conceals the very contrasting dynamics that characterize the geography of remembrance tourism according to the contexts, the complexities of perceptions and practices that can be associated with it, the possible dynamics of transformation, forgetting and rememoration. The global scale of the phenomenon may refer to the analysis of the historian Henry Rousso: «All over the world, despite different political or cultural contexts, despite the extreme diversity of historical legacies, the way societies deal with the past has not only undergone significant structural changes in the last third decades of the 20th century, but it has tended to unify, to "globalize", to encourage forms of collective representations and public action that, at least in appearance, are increasingly similar» (Rousso, 2007). Other researchers emphasize "dynamics of memory", in the constant making, dependant on movement and circulation, suggesting to rethink social memory as a manifestation and result of globalization and global media culture. Astrid Erll

thus suggests to redefine memory as "travelling" or "transcultural", shifting «from stable and allegedly "pure" national-cultural memory towards the movements, connections, and mixing of memories» (Erll, 2014). In addition, some researchers insist on the emergence of a "global memory culture" leading to common memory regimes beyond national specificities (Zwingenberg, 2015).

The global diffusion of tourism associated with places of memory can be read as one dimension of this "global memory space". It is based on various factors, involving global geopolitical dynamics, global mobilities (information, migrant flows, etc.), economic globalization and the role of a global culture (cinema), and, of course, the global diffusion of tourism linked to the growing importance of this sector in many economies, the democratization of travelling and the modernization of transport. Major international organizations such as UNESCO and networks structuring certain diasporas are also involved in the globalization of certain memories such as the memory of the Shoah or slavery. Finally, the global scope of certain events linked to risks and threats now considered to be global (nuclear, terrorism) contributes to the rise of a "global" memory culture.

Admittedly, the numerous studies on national and local contexts reflect different modalities of tourism development and the uneven attractiveness of places of memory in the world. While some have gained global recognition and are visited by millions of tourists from all over the world, others do not (or not yet) achieve national or international recognition, but may be of great importance to a limited number of people. For example, the gulags or places of Stalinist massacres have long remained mostly invisible in the tourism geography of Eastern Europe (Bechtel, Jurgenson, 2013): it took many years and major geopolitical changes, such as the transformation of the Soviet political system and the opening of the Iron Curtain allowing new tourist mobilities, for some of them, become tourist

Arromanche, France, 2013, the commodification of memory at the sea side | A. Hertzog

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Rituals at Thiepval Memorial on the Somme Battlefield, 2013 | A. Hertzog

4

destinations. Some places of memory are very attractive for small communities: located outside the spaces of official or visible tourist enhancement, but invested with strong and identity-based meanings; without monuments or museums, but invested by discreet and often ephemeral memorial practices (flower deposits…), «turning them into attractions of sorts completely outside the vision of official tourism authorities» (Marschall, 2015), such as the villages of Silesia visited by german tourists or the ruins of Palestinian villages Israel, visited by Palestinians in exile.

The globalization of tourism associated with places of memory thus leads to new polarities, in constant evolutions. The research could investigate more of these global processes of recognition and dynamics of memory, which lead to an emergence of "mass destinations", as well as a growing fragmentation of geography of remembrance tourism. Some places of memory have become global destinations because of the unpreceted violence of which they were the theaters for humanity, but also according to the international recognition they benefit – which leads us to the second aspect of this contribution.

2/ Tourism, places of memory and politics: *The tourist attractiveness of places of memory is part of complex processes where memory work and tourism development interact, in response to numerous challenges, revealing the political dimension of tourism.*

A place can be characterized as a "destination" if actors invest on it with meaning, deploy mobility, and articulate it with tourism development practices. These can be very diverse and require a series of voluntary and intentional actions on the part of a whole series of actors to develop the visibility and the attractiveness of the place. By focusing on policies to enhance tourism in places of memory, some studies explore the explicitly political dimension of tourism, showing how tourism

discourses can contribute to the construction of a national "great narrative", help to impose an official version of the past or give a positive image of authoritarian political regimes. An example for this, among many others, comes from Alicia Fuentes Vega's work on the role tourism played in the rehabilitation of the Franco regime after the Second World War, and more specifically through the conversion of a fascist landmark, the monument known as Valley of the Fallen, into a tourist site through a heritagisation process (Fuentes Vega, 2017).

Tourism can thus be considered as one of the contemporary modalities (resulting from the spread of global capitalism) for producing public discourse on the past at many levels of scale. From the scale of states to that of cities, regions or departments, memory tourism policies are a way of producing official or dominant narratives in the public space and promote identities.

Patrick Naef has shown the role of tourism in the invention of some cities as "martyred cities" in the Balkans (Naef, 2016). The selective process of valorization of places (what is worth seeing) also makes it possible to promote a territorial ideology that allows inscribing the legitimacy of some dominant groups or powers. Maps, itineraries, tourist guides and, in recent decades, digital tools can be the vectors in the process of invisibility of certain social groups. In some cases, tourism accentuates the phenomenon of marginalization of minorities, as illustrated by the case of Israel, where the Arab-Muslim memories are often excluded in the tourism mediation of some places of memory; moreover, Arab visitors are no longer welcome on certain places of memory previously shared, as shown some works on Rachel's Tomb near Bethlehem (Selwyn, 2011, Bowman, 2013).

The French case of the construction of a policy of remembrance tourism is indicative of the plurality of issues at stake. Preferred to "war tourism" or "battlefield tourism", the use of the notion of "remembrance tourism" (tourisme de mémoire) suggests an acceptable, sustainable and positive vision of tourism, although associated with places that symbolize violence, destruction, and death. The challenges are economic development and the attractiveness of the territory. The promotion of France, a first touristic destination in the world, on the international scene as a "destination of remembrance" allows the State to promote civic values and to foster active diplomacy while encouraging tourisme as a tool of economical development. As shown by the french case, tourism and culture professionals, communication experts, marketing agencies scenographers, architects –not to forget the tourism industry – are from now on fully involved in the processes of remembrance tourism development. The promotion, marketing and tourism planification processes lead to new kinds of partnerships between these stakeholders and more traditional memory "entrepreneurs", such as historians, associations, veteran or political actors. New kinds of power struggles and conflicts of legitimacies thus characterizes these complex partnerships, as these stakeholders show divergent interests – not only because they do not all necessarily share the same version of history (conflicting appropriation of the past) but also because they do not develop the same relation and attachment to places, and objectives in their development (conflicting appropriation of the space).

The paradigms of peace, reconciliation, and resilience have become part of a global frame in contemporary mediation and tourism narratives. Wars and conflicts that have been largely reinterpreted through the narratives of "shared memories", which emerged at the beginning of the 2000s under the influence of UNESCO. Meaning that war leads to shared disasters and responsibilities for all nations and people involved, the "shared memories" paradigms introduce a new vision of war memory, in rupture with the patriotic, aggressive and militarized approach. It is often considered as a "denationalized" approach of war memory suitable for present diplomatic goals achievements and development of international tourism. Yet, this is not always the case. In some conflict areas, such as South Lebanon controlled by Hezbollah, tourism development is widely war-oriented, as

shown by some tourist attractions, where visitors can train to virtually shoot down the enemy. In some post-conflict situations, however, objectives of reconciliation can shape the development of remembrance tourism policies, as in Nothern Ireland, Rwanda (Dumas, Korman, 2011) or in the Balkans. For example, Causevic and Lynch have shown that some tourist guides in Mostar or Sarajevo wish to transmit messages of peace.

Studies raise the question of "counter-memories" and resistance to dominant discourses through remembrance tourism. In many countries, activists develop alternative forms of tourism, where mediation activities or itinaries connect places of memory of minorities or invisibilized communities in the public space. Again the case of Israel illustrates it, when Israeli NGOs propose alternative "political tours" including destroyed Palestinian villages (mostly followed by foreign travelers). In France, the promotion of a State remembrance tourism policy ("tourisme de mémoire") has been criticized by those who have seen it as the expression of a national, dominant and official conception, concealing the "plurality of memories" of conflicts (in particular those of the "dominated" or the "voiceless" such as colonial soldiers, women, etc). Thus during the 2000s, in a political – and academic – context marked by the challenges of "postcolonialism" and the new imperatives of minority recognition, the notion of "tourisme des mémoires" had been promoted by some activists, in a clearly decolonial perspective.

Expression of an official- or a counter-memory, tourism development appears to be one of the modalities of exposing public narratives about the past, yet in response to present or future challenges. How tourism relates to places of memory shows the political dimension of tourism. How power struggles for space interact with conflicting memory in tourism development could be an interesting perpective for further research. The "destination" making/invention gather different categories of stakeholders, at different levels of scales, who don't necesseraly share the same conception of space and time – starting with the visitors themselves, which brings us to the third aspect of this contribution.

3/ Places of memory and tourists' contributions: *There has been a growing body of work on tourism practices, visits and experiences. Many of them seek to understand the role of the place visit in the re-memory process.*

Researchers question the notion of collective memory (Halbwachs, 1950) by examining the collective and individual practices that take place in places built and arranged to honor the dead and recall painful events. Practices of mourning, commemoration, and homage to the dead often lead to long journeys for survivors, veterans, and relatives of soldiers or victims of deportations or massacres. Distance and remoteness have been inherent in the birth of remembrance tourism, as shown by many historians. After the First War, because most of the dead were buried on the battlefields and not repatriated to their homeland, mourning and homage to the dead was part of relatively long travel practices for veterans and relatives. In Verdun or on American necropole sites, "pilgrim hostels" were built in order to welcome visitors from far away. While many monuments and memorials were built in the countries of the belligerants nations, the international dimension of conflicts during the 20th century (WWI and WWII, colonial wars, Cold War...), explains the expansion of these long journeys to the battlefields and memorials often located abroad. The dispersion of Jewish communities throughout the world following the Shoah has led to international journey practices to the concentration camps located in Europe.

These journeys' practices have different temporalities. WWI remembrance tourism on the battlefields declined after the Second World War, before undergoing a strong renewal from the 1990s

onwards, particularly accentuated with the centenary of the War. These journeys have been of various importance according to the countries and the significance given to war sites in collective memory and the great diversity in mourning, remembrance but also tourism practices around the world, which are socially and culturally rooted. There can also be significant contrasts within countries, as shown by the Australian or Canadian cases: these journeys only became more democratic from the 1960s onwards, with the lowering of travel costs. Remembrance tourism can often be part of highly organized arrangements, with a number of national public or private organisations providing travel and accommodation for veterans, survivors and, more recently, schoolchildren. The long-standing well-structured organizations of journeys to Auschwitz from all over the world are a well-known example. The British policy of financing school trips for British pupils to the Western Front battlefields has been reinforced in the context of the centennial of the war, testifying the political and civic finalities of the journeys. This kind of organization also participates in the concentrations of the flows on the most significant memory places, which are generally the most visited, and where interactions between various categories of visitors are the most intense.

As a matter of fact, as time passes (disappearance of direct witnesses) and borders open under the effect of the development of international tourism, the types of visitors tend to change. These changes raise the question of adapting memory sites to the increasing arrival of generations of visitors who have not experienced commemorated events. These visitors have very different relationships to the past and its traces. They do not necessarily share the same references, expectations or codes of conduct.

The common cleavage between the "pilgrim" and the "tourist" has been shaped during the interwar period in Western Europe, qualifying 2 types of visitors on the battlefield; the first, whose presence was legitimate, was characterized by practices of mourning linked to loss and homage to the dead; the second, whose presence was often considered illegitimate, referred to a set of inappropriate behaviors. These collective representations of the two "imagined" categories of visitors are anchored in some class conflicts of the afterwar, but yet, continue to frame ways visitors are sometimes categorized. In her work on German tourists visiting the villages in Silesia where their ancestors used to live before being forced to leave, Sabine Marschall emphasizes «many of the travelers do not consider themselves "tourists" and may even be offended when being referred to as such, as they perceive their journey as something more closely resembling a pilgrimage [...] also local residents may well regard them as "typical tourists", based on their behavior, needs and the impact of their journeys». (Marschall, 2015).

For many researchers, the search for authenticity (authentic places, landscapes, traces) plays a key role in the visit of memory places. Many studies question the diversity of motivations to visit places of painful memory, suggesting a broad spectrum ranging from interest in history to the choice of "alternative" tourism and the search for thrills. In his work on South Africa, Fabrice Folio suggests 6 types of motivations for visitors visiting places of memory related to Apartheid such as Robben Island Prison (Folio, 2016): «an attraction for knowledge and understanding of history. A mission of awareness in order to raise awareness to avoid the unspeakable and potentially reverse the course of events. A quest for identity, a return to the roots. The motivation of pilgrimage, a feeling of repentance or pride. A desire to discover an exclusive or incongruous offer. A less admirable attraction for violence or suffering».

Many studies seek to capture, through the detailed observation of tourist practices and discourses, the meanings visitors give to the sites and their visit. Winter's analysis of visitors books at Tyne Cot WWI cemetery in Belgium, for example, shows how visitors develop practices which are strongly ritualized during their visit; their written words in the visitor books express sadness, gratitude and promises never to forget the dead and very little critique about the war, which shows, she argues, a

"high level of formality"; while she detects some national preference for ritualized sentences, she concludes to the indication of a "globally shared memory" (Winter, 2015). Her analysis, among others, show how tourists' behaviors are socially shaped by codes of conduct and norms on these particular spaces, and suppose all kinds of ritualized and inherited practices (flowers, object repositories, photographs...).

Lately, many studies have been looking at the bodily dimension of the touristic experience (bodily memories, multisensory dimensions) studying the "performed" ritualized gestures, such as walks, prostrations, silence, while others focus more on the emotional complexities involved in these touristic experiences (Chevalier, Lefort, 2016, Truc, 2015). They suggest that places of memory are «tourist destinations are seen as nodes of reiterated performative acts». They are interested in traces and narratives produced by visitors touring places of violence and suffering, in order to understand the role of these visits in their personal transformations, and the construction of their familial, personal or even national identity and sense of belonging. «The journey and its practices of remembering play an important role in affirming and shaping the emptiness sense of identity. Study what effects journeys may have on emptiness lives, how memories are shared with other participants or family; how journey may foster introspection and induce a self-change, a transformed sense of identity through the experience of authenticity which allows the narratives of identity to be told» (Marschall, 2015).

There is an abundant literature on the travels of survivors or witnesses to places of destruction or traumatic events: Deported Jews visiting their former villages or camps in Central and Eastern Europe, witnesses or descendants of victims of terrorist attacks (Sturken, 2007), survivors of tropical storm Katrina return to see the remnant of their home (Thomas, 2009), veterans visiting battlefields, Palestinians in exile visiting ruins of their destroyed villages, Germans visiting former homelands in Central and Eastern Europe (Marschall, 2015, Bechtel, Jurgenson, 2013).
The growing interest in the travel of displaced and uprooted populations to a land of origin (or considered as such in individual or collective memories), in a context of widespread mobility and circulation, is manifested by the development of categories such as "memory tourism", "homesick tourism" or "roots tourism". Bechtel and Jurgenson point out that "memory tourism" concerns «places with which one maintains a strong personal biographical relationship, these places are also those of past suffering, loss, or oppression experienced personally or by members of the group to which one belongs» (Bechtel, Jurgenson, 2013). Sabine Marschall suggests designating "homesick tourists", «survivors and their immediate descendants who travel to places that were once their home, settlements from which they were forcibly removed through political forces, natural or human-made disasters and which are often damaged or even completely erased». She differentiates "homesick tourism" from "roots tourism" which «involves travellers who are removed by several generations from the ancestors whose traces they search. Homesick tourists are those who have experienced the migration and hold direct personal memories» (Marschall, 2015). As Marie-Blanche Fourcade points out, «many groups have suffered the vicissitudes of uprooting throughout history, both for economic reasons (famines, crises, slavery) and political reasons (dictatorships, wars, ethnic cleansing) and are gradually trying to weave or reweave the links that unite them to these abandoned territories. Root tourism is a symbolic return practice that establishes or restores concrete links, through the travel experience, with origins chosen because of their family or cultural nature» (Fourcade, 2010).

Root tourism is defined by researchers as a set of practices motivated by the desire to «go to see, soak up, confront one's imagination with reality, find the traces of life before told by a parent", among "tourists uprooted from their ancestral land [who] take the road in search of their past» (Fourcade, 2010).

Travellers and visitors actively and constantly

Visiting Lifta with a descendant of a displaced family in 2017. The destroyed village has become a natural reserve according to the Israeli environement law | A. Hertzog

contribute to the production of continuously recomposed memory spaces, which can lead to a redefinition of the very notion of a place of memory. About the villages of Silesia visited by Germans, Sabine Marschall points out: «The destination of their journey may not be declared heritage sites or dark tourism but rather they are idiosyncratic places of subjective meaning, associated with memories of trauma» (Marschall, 2015). These memory places are not recognized, branded and marketed by tourism authorities: «they lack all the hallmarks of heritagization, restoration, and touristic commodification, and there may not be guided tours, souvenirs sellers or other touristic services on offer». But precisely, the lack of explanations and interpretations leads to emptiness and silence that allows, according to Marschall: «the visitor imaginatively reconstruct the invisible parts and suggest the historical social formations of their genesis [...] For me, the deep sense of authenticity derived precisely from the silence of the ruins».

Tourist practices and experiences are shaped by many elements belonging to their personal stories but are also framed by national traditions and global cultures. The fact they develop ritualized practices and "performances" in places of memory often shaped by dominant stakeholders (starting with the state), doesn't alter the fact that their practices and motivations are of great diversity. Comparative studies about different categories of visitors could be extended in research, to better understand how touring is actually linked to memory transmission – which leads us to the last

part of this contribution.

4/ The social function of "remembrance tourism".

Like many other researchers, Sabine Marschall emphasises the strong link between tourism and remembrance: «Tourism is positioned as an extension of the process of remembering and as an act of resistance – against forgetting and, in some cases, against the erstwhile act of erasure» (Marschall, 2015).

Journeys and visits of places of memory may involve verification and consolidation of memories, corrections of memories distortion, and sometimes spontaneous recall. «What makes the touristic journey a unique mechanism of remembrance and act of memory work is that it entails motivation and organization, a commitment and determination to engage with the past» (Marschall, 2015).

Yet, the fact tourism may be an extension of the process of remembering appears to be an interesting point of discussion and of debate. Tourism raises many criticisms when associated with places of memory, denouncing the "suffocation of memory" by consumption practices, commercial exploitation and inappropriate behavior of tourists in search of the morbid and spectacular. The words of the French philosopher Alain Filkenkraut, son of a deportee, about Auschwitz in an interview given to the French newspaper Télérama in 2011, illustrate this criticism of tourism in a radical way, that goes as far as its rejection: comparing the transformation of Auschwitz concentration camp to a "Djerba of misfortune" invaded by "families", he denounces the "great tourist curse" and expresses his skepticism on the educational value of the trips to Auschwitz for younger generations. To respect Auschwitz, he argues, we have to stop going there. The question of the uselessness, violence - or indecency - that tourism constitutes in places of memory is also raised since the tourist experience of visit seems futile and ineffective in transmitting memory. According to the philosopher transmission of "what really happened" must be based on other means: «there are the works of historians, there are the works of filmmakers, and there are above all, books, through which the essential part of the transmission should take place». Elite vision? This radical criticism, which runs counter to one of the great justifications of tourism in places of memory, its pedagogical virtue, is relayed by other historians underlining the illusion of authenticity (Sophie Wahnich about Auschwitz, 2011), or the emptiness and silence of the places. What is the point in keeping trying to "see" and "experiment", when the «camp is naked, abstract, stripped of everything» (Alain Fielkenkraut, op cit, 2011)?

This reaction to the massification of tourism of the concentration camp of Auschwitz reveals, in an extreme way, the frequent criticism about tourism associated with places of death, war, and suffering, anchored in ethical perspectives, but also rooted in social representations of tourism and tourists: for many observers, tourism can lead to processes where tragic events may be trivialized or glamorised, violence and death may be presented as entertainment, which may prevent the visitor to connect to the horror of the tragedy. How can these places allow visitors or residents to link the past with the present? Does the touristic experience inspire only little reflection for the casual tourist? And, in another perspective, may tourism provoke resentment between previously opposed groups through the constant reminder of the painful past for whose living close?

This contribution ends with many questions that appear unsolved and demand further investigations and contextualized researches, involving reflexive and critical approaches about how researchers build their own categorizations and positioning themselves socially, politically and ethically. If memory has become a category of public action/ activism, it can also be considered as an individual and collective "resource" through tourism, certainly variously appropriated, yet deeply anchored in the contemporary dynamics of our globalized world.

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DEEP VIEW

Memory of Tomorrow

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Whether visitor attendance is good or poor, whether it grows or remains stable, is not the essence of the matter. Attendance seen in terms of a sacred, annual number is really just a museum fetish.

What is more important than admiring the attendance is trying to understand and organise it. This is where the external element, the will of a person or of a group of people to come to the Memorial Site, ends, and where the work of the people responsible for this Memorial begins. It might be why we keep comparing total attendance so much, but often fail to carry out an in-depth analysis of its composition or work consciously to develop it. But isn't this one of our basic tasks?

It is easy complain about the development of tourism, looking at what some have called 'dark tourism' with distrust and suspicion, and complaining that we are not alone as we walk around the post-camp area. Of course we would all prefer to be on our own at such a difficult moment. Everyone thinks that they are the most aware, that they know how to behave in the best and most sensitive way, what to ask, when to nod and keep silent. Other people are a distraction. When you are standing face to face with humanity, hell is indeed other people – especially those we suspect of being tourists or of having tourist intentions, tourist opinions, tourist needs. Those who, in our opinion, came to the Memorial Site by accident, on their way between the beach and the restaurant, the hotel and castle ruins, the canoe and the camp site. Those who were lured from their hotel by accident, brought in mini-buses, organised into groups. Those who, in our exalted opinion, can't have read Primo Levi or Elie Wiesel. Those whose sin is the fact that they don't know anyone who suffered or died here. By accident.

I am always amused and sometimes annoyed by this common high-flown treatment of the borderline between remembrance and tourism. Yes, even if we are talking about the

Visitors in the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum | EUROM

accident that makes a visitor to Kraków – instead of going to the medieval salt mine in Wieliczka, to the monastery in Częstochowa or to Zakopane – change their mind at the last moment, while looking through a cheap mass-produced guide at the hotel reception, and decide – maybe on an impulse – to come to Auschwitz. As if we had the right to judge such an impulse or even mock it.

Young people, high school and university students, are treated in a rather similar way. Because they are laughing as they get off their coach, because they are talking loudly, because they didn't go on a trip somewhere else. Because they are taking selfies, oh horrors! I remember a group of German local government officials who came to talk to me. At the end of their visit, one of them asked me: 'What are you going to do with this painful subject of selfies?' 'Too bad you can't see any more painful problems', I thought to myself, a little unkindly. And I said: 'I will take care of it as soon as I see the first politician visiting the museum without a personal photographer. It's the same thing. Young people don't have personal photographers, so they take pictures themselves. That's the culture...'

If you listen to some of the complaints or read some of the highly judgmental articles, written easily and (far too) quickly, there is no one quite so annoying as young people and tourists. But these groups may constitute 90% of our visitors.

Thomist philosophers like to repeat that if something happens by accident, you should pay special attention to it. Therefore, I am not that interested in why people come here, whether they're on a school trip or a tourist visit. I'm not that interested in their attitudes or backgrounds. Of course, ideally everyone should come to the Memorial Site well prepared, with proper knowledge and understanding of the topic, even perhaps with some memory of it. But it is not what the person arriving here thinks that is crucial to me, but what that person takes away with them when they leave. That is why it is so important to understand who they are. Attendance is not a question of annual numbers: it means groups, divisions, minorities, particularisms, sensitivities, exceptions. That's the only way to try to understand it.

So who visits Memorial Sites? After all, questions about the identity of visitors are

Former entrance of the extermination camp of Auschwitz-Birkenau | EUROM

important. Do we know for sure how different the January attendance numbers are from the May numbers, or from the numbers in August in the summer? How many of our visitors are young people, high school students brought by teachers? This question will allow us to answer another one: is our cooperation with teachers good enough to make them understand the meaning of a visit of this kind, and to prepare their students appropriately? What percentage speaks a foreign language? This other question will allow us to assess the level of language preparation of our guides, educators, the suitability of our book publications, audio-guides... But not only that! After all, every language reveals a different ethnic and national identity, a different historical and cultural background, a different set of concepts and symbols, and different contemporary challenges. And do we know how many visually or hearing-impaired disabled people visit our Sites? Are there any homeless people among the visitors?

It would seem that, without conducting regular surveys, we will never attain this knowledge and that only a spinning wheel or a counting camera will allow us to determine the number of visits per year. This is especially so in places without an extensive tour guide system (where even the tour guides' knowledge of the visitors is fragmentary).

The booking system can be of great help here. Due to the large number of visitors, the Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial was obliged to create such a system. Over the last decade or so, the number of visitors has increased four times, exceeding two million people a year. For the safety of both the monuments and the visitors, as well as for their basic comfort, there is an hourly maximum limit of a thousand people. Therefore, it was necessary to create a booking system, as in cinemas, concert halls or trains; even though entrance itself is free, booking a ticket has become a necessity. This allowed us to completely change the analysis of attendance both in terms of numbers (the reporting is basically done at an hourly rate) and the composition of visitors – their country of origin, language, whether they come alone or as part of a group, repeat visits by a given tourist service company, school, teacher, organisation, association...

The system is still far from perfect, that is for sure. We are continuing to work on making it more tight and efficient, but the 2018 reports were the first ever to include the exact number of people of uncertain origin. For the first time!

The analysis of this knowledge allows us to see

the trends; it provides us with obtain socio-economic data on our visitors and establishes where they come from. This information can show us which languages our tour guides need (although Auschwitz already offers tours in 22 languages) and which languages our main publications should use. It also indicates which countries or diplomats we need to work with more, and how we should improve our cooperation with the media or local governments.

These seem to be obvious solutions for products of all kinds, so why should we think that this analysis is inappropriate in a Memorial Site? That it might appear to be too 'market-oriented'? You couldn't be more wrong! This focus is an integral part of paying attention to remembrance. If we want to know the current state of this remembrance, who needs it, and who still thinks they don't need it that much; if we want to know what we should do to keep it alive, and last but not least, if we want to prepare the suitable tools, then there is no other way but to monitor the attendance wisely and carefully. And we must remember that when we see people coming in, it is our special task to think about those who are absent for whatever reason. It is this endeavour that directly sets the trends for our daily activities.

Understanding the situation of modern memory and the challenges facing it is one of the foundations for building the memory of tomorrow.

1. Visitors walking around the train tracks of the camp | Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum

2. Fences of Auscwitz-Birkenau | EUROM

3. One of the rooms of the permanent exhibition | EUROM

4. One of the warning signs at the camp fence | Manel Clemente

DEEP VIEW

Predappio and the memory of the dictatorship

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It was recently announced that the mayor of the town of Predappio had decided to use a large disused building, the former Casa del Fascio e dell'Ospitalitá, as a site for the study, dissemination and narration of Italian history under Fascism. The news sparked a debate and a controversy that is still alive and bears witness to the difficulty that surrounds any public discussion of Fascism. Instead of exploring how a museum on Fascism in Italy might have to be designed, the debate focused –exclusively– on the problem of the political and moral expediency of this choice. The main problem, in fact, seemed to be in the site selected for the museum, the town of Predappio. The events that helped to build the myth of Mussolini during the twenty years of Fascism in Italy (and in the post-war years as well, up until the most recent times) are closely linked to this small town. It is not simply the town near where, in a small village called Dovìa, Benito Mussolini was born on 29 July, 1883; nor is it just a town of houses leaning against a medieval fortress, similar to many others scattered in the hills of Romagna, a bustling region in the heart of Italy. Today Predappio's fame has spread beyond the country's borders. It is a new town that was built in twenty years, completely obliterating the preexisting one. So, if it was the old Predappio that gave birth to Mussolini, it was Mussolini himself that gave birth to the new Predappio.

The first stone of the new town was laid on 15 April, 1925, in the presence of the main authorities of the regime. From the beginning it was clear that the function of Predappio was to celebrate the myth of the origins of the founder of Fascism. These origins had to be rooted in the people, and so the need for sobriety was repeatedly stressed; indeed, Mussolini himself intervened on several occasions to tone down some aspects he considered excessively luxurious, even removing tombstones that were too ornate or demolishing the sumptuous staircase that had been built to approach his place of birth. Predappio Nuova can therefore be considered as the first of those one hundred or so cities and large districts

Souvenir shop in Predappio main street | EUROM

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built in Italy, mainly in the 1930s, to represent the regime's aspirations for modernity, from Littoria (now Latina) to Tresigallo, from the beautiful Sabaudia to the villages of Tuscany. But Predappio, unlike almost all the "new cities", was not built in a short time, but over a process that lasted almost twenty years; here there congregated a large number of architects, some of them of considerable renown, and an intersection of styles and architectural visions is still present today. Here Florestano Di Fausto, Cesare Valle, Cesare Bazzani, Arnaldo Fuzzi and others left traces of undoubted quality.

The town was destined to be a fundamental propaganda vehicle for the regime, designed to represent a kind of "Bethlehem of Italy", as Antonio Beltramelli defined it, and attracted waves of "pilgrims" during the twenty years of Fascism. Materially, the main destinations for pilgrimages were the birthplace of the Duce, the Palazzo Varano (which still houses the town hall today) the cemetery of San Cassiano with the family crypt and the vast Casa del Fascio. Military groups, professional associations and party organizations from all over Italy crowded into the streets of the city on several occasions, to mark anniversaries and to revere the leader. In essence, it was the construction of a "contemporary" memory which, more than anything else, demonstrates the particular nature of the town and which is vital to an understanding of both the postwar years and the events of more recent times. Many buildings, and the urban structure itself, were conceived as a "theatrical backdrop" for the masses of visitors. The Casa del Fascio added to its classic name the suffix of "e dell'Ospitalitá... (and hospitality)", the only building to bear such a name in the whole of Italy. It was far too large for the needs of the local population, and added functions explicitly intended for short pilgrimages, including a restaurant-bar and a day hotel. Few dictators' birthplaces have attracted as many celebrations as did Predappio during Mussolini's lifetime. Unlike many birthplaces, Predappio was also well known to

Details of the souvenirs sold in the souvenir shops of Predappio | EUROM

the opponents of Fascism, a fact that indirectly strengthened its image – so much so that when, on 28 October 1944, it was liberated by Polish soldiers who had waited two days to make their entry coincide with the date of the launch of the "march on Rome", the New York Times announced the event in large letters on its front page.

In the immediate post-war period, when the cultural and political legacy of the Resistance was still predominant, Predappio could hardly serve as a destination for those nostalgic for the Fascist past. All this changed in 1957, when Mussolini's body became a political bargaining chip for the constitution of a government under the Christian Democrat Adone Zoli. Zoli was also a friend of Rachele Guidi, the widow of the Duce, who had lived in his home. In his essay Il corpo del duce, Sergio Luzzatto describes in detail the political circumstances that led the government to authorize the transfer of Mussolini's body to the family tomb of the San Cassiano cemetery in Predappio, after obtaining parliamentary support from the notoriously pro-Fascist Italian Social Movement. And it was precisely the transfer of the body that reinstated Predappio as the symbol for which it had been built, opening up a period of mobilizations and clashes between supporters and opponents, and revitalizing the memory of the regime. Obviously, those who made the decision or who shared it, like the then Communist mayor Egidio Proli, underestimated the impact that the burial of Mussolini's body would have had on the world of his sympathizers – and also miscalculated the size of that world. The measures of public order designed to rein in the external effects of their presence were of little use. Throughout the 1960s, Predappio became a place of opposing memories which often ended in violent confrontations; the administrative and political hegemony of the left was not enough to discourage the presence of neo-Fascists. The tomb of the Mussolini family became a shrine for an unwanted "tourism" that caused considerable tension. The Fascist sympathizers knew they were not welcome; sometimes stones were thrown at their cars and restaurants were not always willing to serve them because of the risk of fighting. The year when this conflict came to a head was 1971, when the anti-Fascists joined together to form a large-scale popular mobilization. For a week, at the end of April, Predappio and Forlì were the scene of clashes, assaults, bomb attacks, and street demonstrations which were dispersed by the police. Shortly afterwards, a bomb was placed in the cemetery of San Cassiano. Checkpoints were organized to prevent unwanted visitors from accessing Predappio, passing cars were searched, and an "active surveillance" policy was implemented that often bypassed the official law enforcement agencies. This tension discouraged pilgrimages for several years, at least until 1983, the centenary of the birth of Mussolini, when thousands of nostalgici invaded Predappio.

Another fundamental step regarding the dictator's memory was the decision in the early 1990s of the left-wing town council to authorize

the opening of three souvenir shops, perhaps in an attempt to defuse the situation and to impose some legal control. But the move backfired: these stores soon became not just points of sale of the worst Fascist garbage, but they also turned into organizational centres for the revival of pilgrimages and for the attempt to build up a small tourist economy providing board and lodging for the nostalgici and allowing them to feel that they were the "majority" - at least on the three recurring dates of Mussolini's birth, his death, and the seizure of power on 28 October. All these events have left Predappio with the troubling legacy of a horrific commercialization: busts of the leader, uniforms with unrepeatable writings, pro-Fascist publications of all kinds, knives and clubs, and mementos of Hitler and the Nazis. The creation of a kind of ideological, if not directly political, "tourism", is concentrated on 28 October, the anniversary of both the march on Rome in 1922 and the liberation of Romagna in 1944. For some years this coincidence has transformed into a kind of conflict between Fascists and anti-Fascists. The opposition has not led to violent clashes and it expresses itself essentially in the field of singing and eating and drinking wine; nevertheless, more than a tourist phenomenon, it resembles a military invasion by small or large numbers of troops while the local population looks on in almost total indifference.

In the following years, a new campaign led by democrats was launched to rescue the image of the town, which had become a kind of "free port" of neo-Fascism. In the late 1990s, the municipal authorities acquired the house where Mussolini was born with the fundamental aim of preventing its use as a shrine and of transforming it into a place of historical reflection, with the organization of exhibitions focused on understanding the past. The exhibition dedicated to the Young Mussolini was particularly important, curated by a qualified group of historians and enriched with a considerable amount of new material. But the most important measure over the last decade was the decision to restore the Casa del Fascio e dell'Ospitalitá and put it to new uses. This large building was the only one left derelict in the town centre, despite its undoubted architectural interest and the wealth of historical evidence it contained. It was also a building of great symbolic value due to the function it performed in the final years of the regime, that is to say, of a welcome centre for pilgrims, and as a social centre where party propaganda was created and disseminated. The first step was to approve a programme of assessment and promotion which allowed the transfer of properties by the State and laid out a precise strategy for its new functions, focused on the creation of a research and documentation centre on the history of Fascism, with a permanent historical exhibition – that is, a modern museum created with advanced multimedia technologies that would act as a kind of "counterweight" with respect to the original functions of the building. The programme involved a re-focusing of the building's symbolic value (rather than its elimination), and reaffirmed the importance of cultural projects in the dissemination of historical knowledge. The methodology implemented explicitly drew its inspiration from other situations in Italy and abroad, such as the restoration of the Victory Monument in Bolzano and the Obersalzberg exhibition in the Bavarian Alps – where Nazi sympathizers once visited Hitler's Eagle's Nest, but where the new museum on Nazism promotes cultural tourism and is currently visited by almost 200,000 people a year. Meanwhile, in Predappio, the presence of Fascist nostalgia persists, linked to the extreme right. Its sympathizers are disoriented by the legal wrangling between the various currents of neo-Fascism (some of which explicitly despise the "carnival" of Predappio, where black uniforms and shirts are still displayed today) or disappointed by the conflicts within the Mussolini family which led to the closure of the tomb for almost two years, except for the most significant days.

In terms of its content, the project of the conversion of the Casa del Fascio is unique throughout Italy, since no other institution in the country has set out to present a general history of

Fascism. Numerous museums had restricted their focus to the last years of the regime, the war and the resistance, but not its genesis or its historical setting in the context of the twentieth century. The project prepared by the scientific committee has several cultural and historiographic strengths. It begins by depicting what was happening in other European countries and, in particular, in Germany: totalitarianism – and Fascism, which is an integral part of it – is a historical phenomenon of contemporary Italy and Europe, which can and should be described above all to the younger generations, now separated from those tragic events by almost a century. Documentation and exhibition centres are the cornerstone of all memorialization processes. The more controversial the past, the more necessary they are, especially if, as is the case of all the important events in the twentieth century it has generated divided memories.

We have the historiographic knowledge needed to restore the complexity of that twenty-year period of totalitarian dictatorship, to penetrate its power mechanisms and the reasons for its mass acceptance without risking a confusion between the historical and ethical-political judgment or falling into an allegedly neutral objectivity. Today, the anti-Fascist perspective, that of democratic and constitutional values, is no longer an obstacle to the need to make the history of Fascism comprehensible to young generations; in fact, it represents the only possible way to understand it, as evidenced by similar experiences that are multiplying in countries that have had totalitarian dictatorships in their recent history. Telling the story of Fascism today is possible because we understand it much more than we did: we can answer questions about its meaning from people who want to know not only what the historical period was really like, but also why the totalitarian regime prevailed in Italy and why it had the strength to spread internationally as an alternative to democracy and Bolshevik totalitarianism. We live in a stable democratic society that has the strength to confront its past freely and consciously, even if its past is tragic – not just to know where we come from, but also to produce the cultural antibodies necessary to prevent that past from repeating itself. Certainly, in reflecting on the debate that has been opened among historians and intellectuals regarding the project of the "Museum of Fascism", we cannot deny that Fascism remains alive in the collective European consciousness, and in the Italian consciousness in particular. This is not due so much to the fact that the return of a "Fascist solution" is looming on the horizon of European politics but rather the fact that "dealing" with Fascism, both in terms of its historical interpretation and public recollections, has turned out to be a more complex operation than expected, due to the weight of the divided and opposing memories. By helping to creation of a shared and mature approach to the past, our project aims to consign it to the pages of history. The scientific committee knew that in designing a centre for the study of Fascism it would have to state explicitly the perspective it would apply, especially with regard to the exhibition. No narrative is neutral, not just in terms of the point of view of the values to which it refers, but also, and above all, in terms of its historiography. Our centre wants to propose a vision of Fascism that goes beyond the "anti-Fascist paradigm", a framework created by anti-Fascist militants during the fierce years of repression and exile, but whose flaws and conceptual doubts are now plain to see; but also beyond "revisionism", which after achieving notable innovations at the scientific level, lost its way in the meanderings of a supposed "Fascist" historiography and in the effort to reduce Fascism to "Mussolinism", a personal dictatorship that oversaw an inoffensive, kind-hearted police state, without the slightest connection with Nazism.

Beyond the heated discussions of recent years, this project is hardly original: in Germany, Russia, Poland, Portugal, to mention just a few countries, a similar path is being followed in which the construction of sites of interpretation and research is helping to activate a conscious memory, as an antidote to the temptations of nostalgia and any uncertainty about the judgment that a democratic community should issue on that past. In fact, in many aspects, the Predappio project fills a gap,

highlighting an area in which Italian culture and institutions are lagging behind. It focuses our attention on the relationship between Italian democracy and its Fascist past, standing on the frontier between the two and serving as an outpost where the weight of the divided memories can be measured.

In defining the purposes and uses of the Casa del Fascio, the local authorities were supported by research groups and an international scientific committee. Today a preliminary project dealing with both structural and museographic aspects has been approved, and the task of definitive planning is underway. The hope of the democratic sector of Italian society is that this great project can fill the gap in knowledge, especially among the younger generations, about a twenty-year period that was crucial to the life of the country, and at the same time can transform the perception of the cultural vestiges and symbols of the dictatorship into an opportunity for the reaffirmation of universal rights. In this way Predappio can undergo a profound transformation, from a place of celebration of a dictatorial regime to an international context of reaffirmation of the values of democracy.

1. Building of the former *Casa del Fascio e dell'Ospitalitá* | EUROM

2. Private mausoleum of Mussolini in the cemetery of Predappio | EUROM

INTERVIEW

Michael Rothberg
Multidirectional Memory on focus

Michael Rothberg photographed by David Wu, UCLA Alan D. Leve Center for Jewish Studies

Michael Rothberg is a Professor of English and Comparative Literature and the 1939 Society Samuel Goetz Chair in Holocaust Studies at the ***University of California***, Los Angeles. Working in the fields of Holocaust, trauma and memory studies, critical theory and cultural studies, postcolonial studies, and contemporary literatures, he developed the concept of ***multidirectional memory***. He is a founding member of the ***Advisory Board of the Memory Studies Association*** and a partner of the Network in Transnational Memory Studies and Mnemonics: ***Network for Memory Studies***. In this interview, he introduces the figure of the ***implicated subject***, a new category to analyze the political responsibilities in the past, and presents his latest research.

1. In 2009 you published Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization, forging this new concept that helped to analyse the transmission of the past by relativizing the competition between memories and allowing a new reading of the relationship between them. How do you assess the academic impact of your theory a decade later? How has this concept evolved since then?

My concept of "multidirectional memory" emerged out of the strong sense that I had in the first decade of the twenty-first century that both scholarship and public discourse were misunderstanding how public memory works. Much discussion of the clash of different memory traditions (say, African American and Jewish American in the US context) was premised on what I came to call a zero-sum logic of competition: the idea that different memories displaced each other from the public sphere. Too much Holocaust memory meant not enough memory of slavery, too much memory of slavery detracted from Holocaust memory, etc. My counter-proposal was that memories actually feed off of each other in a productive dynamic. That doesn't imply that there are no conflicts or competitions. Indeed, we are experiencing a similar moment right now in the US where we are fighting over whether "concentration camps" can only refer to Nazi camps or whether they might also describe the detention camps in which the US government is placing migrants and refugees from Latin America. What I was trying to get at with the concept of multidirectional memory was the underlying dynamic of memory discourses, which I continue to think are non-zero-sum and based rather on borrowing, cross-referencing, and

other kinds of echoes and ricochets. Thus, to stick with that one prominent example: the rise of a global Holocaust memory has led to more memory of other traumatic histories, not less.

I still stand by the fundamental argument of the book, but I also have seen the need to add some nuance and to stress other factors as well. Among those other factors are the question of power: memories are surely shaped by relations of power that are asymmetrical and contoured by political and economic factors, among other things. I have found Viet Thanh Nguyen's recent book Nothing Ever Dies, on the memory of the war in Vietnam, helpful in this regard: he talks about the asymmetrical resources and impacts of different national "industries of memory" that project their visions of the past at different scales. In the context of the various memory exchanges that interest me, the different memories at play are not equal: some obviously have more prominence than others. At the same time, what interested me in Multidirectional Memory was precisely how marginalized groups—marginalized because of political ideology, race, minority status, and so on—were able to create counter-memories that challenged hegemonic memory regimes. I suggested that memory's multidirectionality is a resource that less powerful memory agents can self-consciously deploy: mobilizing, for instance, memories of the Holocaust to challenge colonial or racist memories.

I've also tried to add nuance to the notion of multidirectionality by distinguishing different forms from each other. Although I see multidirectionality as a structural (i.e. unavoidable) feature of collective memory, not all multidirectional memory is the same. In my essay "From Gaza to Warsaw," which is also included in my new book The Implicated Subject, I "map" memories by placing them on a grid defined by an axis of comparison that runs between equation and differentiation and an axis of political affect that runs between competition and solidarity. Situating memories on this map allows us to think with greater subtlety about the ethics and politics of public remembrance.

My sense is that the concept of multidirectional memory has been enabling for many people around the globe. I've seen it taken up by scholars working on every continent in relation to numerous histories that I know nothing about! Translations of the book continue to appear—after recent translations into Polish and French, a German edition is in the works. Even if there is also plenty of criticism, as there should always be, I think I've helped move the debate beyond the deadlock of the zero-sum logic of competition.

2. This new issue of Observing Memories has focused on the "tourism of memory". Currently we see how tourism is affecting different areas of our daily life (from renting a flat to using public transport). How do you think tourism affects places of memory or ways of thinking about the past?

I'm not a scholar of tourism, but of course you are right to focus on the relation of tourism to memory because it is a significant, global phenomenon. From my non-expert perspective, I would judge it an ambivalent issue. First of all, there is no doubt that the promotion of tourism is an important factor in the commodification and reification of memory, as Enzo Traverso pointed out in an earlier issue of *Observing Memories*. Museums, memorials, and other memory sites have become well integrated into tourist itineraries and are clearly part of the way that cities in particular market themselves. One should certainly be skeptical about the depth of the historical memory that is accessed in packaged tours and quick visits to famous sites of memory. At the same time, such tourism is in no way new—think of religious pilgrimages or, in a more secular vein, the visits of school children to national capitals, such as Washington, D.C. In addition, I would not want to discount entirely the sparks of effective memory work that might be produced by an otherwise banal tourist visit. Who can say what seeds are planted for future reflection and action in children who are dragged to museums or in adults confronted with a Holocaust countermonument? If tourism is surely

disruptive of the urban fabric in negative ways (as your reference to rent and public transport implies), I think it can also be disruptive in positive ways: I would not underestimate the impact of coming across Stolpersteine [stumbling stones] dedicated to victims of the Nazis in the streets of European cities; I would be surprised if the historical consciousness of many tourists had not been deepened by such encounters.

3. You've recently published *The implicated subject*, in which you present a new figure that seeks to overcome the categories of victim, perpetrator and bystander in order to analyse political responsibilities. Would you care to elaborate on the concept of the implicated subject?

My new book arose from a sense that we have had an impoverished and non-systematic conceptual vocabulary for addressing some key issues regarding responsibility for violence and inequality. I believe we have been too fixated on the binary opposition between victims and perpetrators in both scholarship and public discourse. I became interested in figures who enable, inherit, benefit from, and help perpetuate violence and inequality without being perpetrators in any moral or legal sense. In my opinion, the concept of the bystander is also too weak to describe these kinds of issues because it implies not only passivity but a certain innocence. My book is about people (most of us!) who are not guilty of crimes or "perpetrators" of exploitation, but remain historically and politically responsible in different ways for atrocities and inequalities both in the past and present. There has been important work in recent years on related issues such as complicity by scholars such as Mark Sanders, Christopher Kutz, Naomi Mandel, and Debarati Sanyal, and on the figure of the beneficiary by scholars such as Mahmood Mamdani, Robert Meister, and Bruce Robbins, but I saw the need for an umbrella term that would bring together different forms of what I call implication: our indirect entanglement in injustices.

I distinguish analytically between diachronic (historical) and synchronic (contemporary) implication, but I also suggest that these two forms almost always appear together. To give an example of what I mean: white people in former slave owning and slave trading societies are diachronically implicated in slavery but the afterlives of slavery have also perpetuated inequalities in the present that render those same people synchronically implicated. It's difficult to untangle those two axes, but I think it's still worth making the analytical distinction for the purposes of conceptual clarity and in order to facilitate comparisons between different scenarios.

Among the other issues I tackle in the book are what I call "complex implication," which describes situations in which one may have strong ties to histories of victimization (what Marianne Hirsch calls "postmemory") and still be implicated in contemporary injustices. I explore complex implication by discussing the work of Jewish artists who evoke memory of the Holocaust while exploring implication in the Israeli occupation of Palestine and South African apartheid, respectively. Finally, I'm interested in how artists, intellectuals, and activists transform consciousness of their own implication into acts of what I call "long-distance solidarity," forms of internationalist solidarity that cross lines of identity, nation, and status. Long-distance solidarity is a vexed and difficult form of affiliation, but I see the kinds of alliances it makes possible as necessary to political transformation.

4. Together with Yasemin Yildiz you are writing a book about how the population that has recently migrated to Germany perceives and relates to the Nazi history of the country and the Holocaust. Could you share with us some of the working conclusions of your study?

We started working on this project about a decade ago when we noticed the emergence of a troubling discourse on immigrants—especially those from so-called Muslim countries like Turkey—and Holocaust memory. In a 2011 article called "Memory Citizenship," we came to identify a "migrant double

Arrival of refugees with a special train by Deutsche Bahn from the Austrian/German border at the station of Cologne/Bonn airport, October 2015

bind": the fact that people identified as racialized immigrants were simultaneously told that in order to be German they had to "remember" the Holocaust and that they could never remember the Holocaust because it wasn't part of their history. The double bind was summed up well by a Turkish-German woman who had participated in a civil society project on National Socialism and the Holocaust called the "Neighborhood Mothers." In reflecting on her experience with the group, she wrote, "We often hear that the topic of National Socialism is not for us because we're migrants. Just as often it's insinuated that in any case we are too anti-Semitic to be interested in this topic." Becoming aware of the migrant double bind led us to recognize another powerful social logic that we called the "German paradox," which finds expression in dominant society. This is the idea that in order to take responsibility for the Holocaust an ethnic notion of Germanness has to be preserved, even though this very notion of Germanness contributed to the committing of that crime in the first place.

A lot has changed since we first became interested in this topic—not least the large influx of refugees in the summer of 2015, which led both to inspiring examples of solidarity and, ultimately, to innumerable attacks on people perceived as foreign that persist to this day along with the strengthening of the far right in the political sphere through the rise of the AfD. But, from my somewhat distant perspective in the US, my sense is that the basic parameters of the migrant double bind and the German paradox remain in place. That is to say that despite increased recognition of the diverse nature of German society, a strongly ethnic definition of Germanness continues to reign and to have powerful shaping effects on cultural memory, not least memory of the Holocaust and National Socialism.

Our project, however, is not primarily a critique of these discourses about Germans, migrants, and Holocaust memory; it is an argument that despite those discourses there has been significant memory work across society by minorities, migrants, and postmigrants. We collect and analyze what we call a "migrant archive" of acts of remembrance that includes civil society initiatives, performance and visual art, music, literature, and theater. While we don't claim such remembrance is representative

Stolperstein at Verlegestelle Antwerpener Straße 32, Köln, 2018 | 1971markus@wikipedia.de

of all immigrants and minorities, we find very creative—sometimes multidirectional—acts of memory that open up what has become a ritualized and moralized Holocaust memory in Germany. Ultimately, we believe, these acts of memory are also democratic forms of "memory citizenship," that is, contestations of the paradigms of belonging and participation that determine who gets a say about the character and constitution of contemporary German society. I think this focus on migrant archives and memory citizenship has implications that go well beyond Germany.

5. How would you describe the policies on memory and remembrance that the EU has carried out so far? What would be the main challenges faced by the EU in this sense?

I don't usually focus on memory at the institutional level, so I don't really have much to say about the EU as such. However, I can say something about European memory as a heterogeneous social formation. Certainly, all of the projects I have described above—the books on multidirectional memory, the implicated subject, and migrant memories—have implications for thinking about remembrance in Europe as a whole.

Europe faces many challenges and many of them—though certainly not all!—do involve questions of memory. My own work on the Holocaust leads me to highlight four interlinked issues that intersect with memory of the war and genocide: the East/West divide; the colonial past; the reality of migration; and far-right mobilization. While in the last couple of decades the Holocaust has come to function as a founding continent-wide, "negative" memory, this fact has also opened up a field of tensions. First, it unleashed a new post-Cold War East/West conflict concerning the questions of how to remember World War II and how to calibrate memories of Nazism and Soviet Communism. Second, it raised uncomfortable questions about histories of racism and violence that predated—some would argue, fed into—the Holocaust and that continue into the present: colonialism, slavery, and their afterlives. The reality of racialization, produced in no small measure out of the history of colonialism and slavery, also shapes the European reception of migrants and refugees, who are persistently marked as other, as not belonging, as unintegratable. Various scholars, including Rita Chin and Fatima El-Tayeb in the German context and Françoise Vergès in the French context, have been drawing attention to the racialized notion of Europeanness, but in public life as well as in much scholarly writing, race goes unmarked and unspoken. This unspeakability has untold effects on European memory—for the memories of both those who consider themselves unproblematically European and those migrants who are also European (among other things), but are not recognized as such.

My hypothesis would be that all of these difficulties then converge in the rise of the far right. Of course there is much more than memory politics at stake, but I think the failures to adequately address these various tensions within public remembrance—unevenness within Europe, colonial legacies, histories of race and migration—constitute the backdrop for the current political crisis. I have no magic solution to solve this crisis—I wish someone did!—but I suspect that the cultivation of a greater sense of implication for Europeans in histories of colonialism and race would be a step in the right direction. That's a project that will demand broad forms of education and democratized cultures of memory that include multidirectional sensibilities and migrant perspectives.

The dispute over the past.

Political transition and memory wars in Italy, from the crisis of the First Republic until the present day.

Filippo Focardi
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The dramatic political changes in Europe since 1989, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the breakup of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of Soviet control over Central and Eastern Europe, had a significant impact on Italy. These changes ushered in a phase of political transformation, which has since triggered a fierce struggle played out in the field of collective memory. Today, thirty years later, the reference points of this public memory have been radically modified, with the crisis of the tradition of anti-Fascism and the Resistance, and the rise of two new narratives: the memory of the Holocaust, and anti-totalitarianism. The latter condemns the crimes of both Nazism and Communism and places them on the same level.

To evaluate the dynamic and the results of this process of change, we need to recall briefly the background to the creation of Italy's collective memory in the long earlier period, from 1945 to 1989. After the end of the Second World War, Italy, like other European countries that had endured the Nazi aggression, had built a national collective memory based on two fundamental pillars: on the one hand, the almost exclusive attribution of guilt for the suffering and the crimes committed during the war to Germany and the Germans, playing down the country's own responsibility in the affairs of the Axis; and on the other, the exaltation of the myth of the Italian Resistance as a struggle which engaged the entire population against the Nazi-Fascist oppressor. The merits of the "good Italians" were placed in stark contrast to the faults of the "bad Germans", who in reality had been allies of the Italian Fascists for three years. By the will of all the National Liberation Committee parties, from the Liberals to the Communists, who had led the struggle against Germany and the Republic of Salò created by Mussolini in September 1943, anti-Fascism and the Resistance movement became icons of the new democratic Republic and of the political multi-party system born after the fall of Fascism.

National monument of the *Foiba di Basovizza* in Trieste | EUROM

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This collective memory, based on the acclamation of the merits of the Italian Resistance after 1943 and on the glossing over of Italian guilt for the war of aggression fought alongside Hitler from 1940 to 1943, had suffered serious repercussions during the years of the Cold War. The most important perhaps was the questioning of the democratic legitimacy of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), one of the protagonists of the Resistance and one of the main signatories of the constitutional pact; for example, the Catholics and liberals repeatedly accused the PCI of being "pawns" of Communist totalitarianism led by Moscow. Nevertheless, the general framework of the national memory anchored in the Resistance was never doubted; in fact, it was re-launched in the 1970s as a common heritage encompassing all the democratic and anti-fascist parties in the face of the dual challenge posed to the institutions of the Republic by the terrorism of the extreme left and extreme right.

The period known as the "Second Cold War" in the late 1970s saw the reactivation in the Italian public debate of accusations against the Communists for having monopolized the Resistance. The situation would changed dramatically with the political upheavals of the early 1990s.

Since German reunification, Italy has probably been the Western European country most affected by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the international system of the Cold War. The transformation of the Communist Party in 1991 into a new political entity, the Democratic Left Party, was followed by a profound crisis of the entire system between 1992 and 1994, which imploded after the huge corruption scandal known as Tangentopoli, brought to light and fought by the judiciary. Therefore, in the early 1990s all the parties that had created the constitutional pact either found their influence severely reduced or disappeared completely: first the Christian Democrats and the PCI, marked by divisions and name changes, then the Socialist Party, the Liberal Party, the Social Democrats and the Republican Party. At the same time, new political movements with no roots in the anti-Fascist tradition gained prominence and some consensus. This was the case of Umberto Bossi's Northern League and Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia, and of the old Italian Social Movement (MSI), the

major Western European neo-Fascist party, now rebranded as Alleanza Nazionale (AN). The MSI-AN was especially a party with historical and cultural roots diametrically opposed to the heritage of anti-Fascism and the Resistance. Following a new electoral law in August 1993, the change from the proportional system centred on the constitutionalist parties to a majority system that favoured a bipolar arrangement, with one pole dominated by forces alien or even opposed to anti-Fascism, triggered a fierce confrontation that was based on an unprecedented use of history for political purposes.

One of the main factors behind the struggle for memory in the country was the need of the centre-right to legitimize Gianfranco Fini's MSI-AN as a force fit to sit in government, after its electoral victory under Berlusconi in April 1994.

With varying degrees of conviction, all the parties in the governing coalition converged on a course of action aimed at neutralizing anti-Fascism as a factor of political legitimization and replacing it with anti-totalitarianism as the new point of reference. Anti-Fascism and the memory of the Resistance were depicted as politically obsolete and even dangerous ideals for Italy's "new Republic", a country in need of a somewhat "patriotic" renewal. From this point of view, the Italian case bears similarities to the processes in Central and Eastern Europe which, at roughly the same time, erased the previous memorial structure based on the cult of the Resistance and on the role played by the Communists and built new memories that cultivated the traditions and values of the homeland.

The traditional criticism of the Resistance, described as being a "fratricidal civil war" sought by the Communists, quickly led to the demand for an alternative public and institutional memory. For this purpose, the right wing called for "pacification" between Fascists and anti-Fascists with the aim of creating a new "shared memory". A traditional demand of the far-right MSI, notably the idea of national "pacification" was invoked with a rhetorical emphasis on the recognition of the "good faith" and "ethical patriotism" of the young Italians (benevolently called "the boys of Salò") who, after 8


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1. Silvio Berlusconi during a meeting in March 6, 2008 | Lorenza e Vincenzo Iaconianni via Wikimedia Commons

2. Gianfranco Fini during the closing of the Fiuggi Congress in January, 1995 | Wikimedia Commons

Fosse Ardeatine, Roma | Anthony Majanlahti via Wikimedia Commons

September 1943 had taken sides with Mussolini for the "defence of the nation's honour". Underlying the repeated call for the construction of a "shared" or "reconciled memory" independent from the Fascist/anti-Fascist dichotomy was an attempt of the right to achieve "parity" between the parties in the name of a patriotism that did not make distinctions. Proof of this is found in the draft laws equating the fighters of Salò with the Partisans, and the explicit proposal, also advanced in Parliament, to abolish the national holiday of 25 April (the day of liberation from Fascism and of the victory of the Resistance) and to replace it with a date with an anti-totalitarian significance. The date proposed was 18 April 1948, the day when the Christian Democrats led by De Gasperi defeated the coalition of the Communists and Socialists in the Marxist-inspired Popular Front. Strongly supported by the Berlusconi governments, these measures were never passed but they represent relevant example of the intentions of the new Italian right in relation to politics of memory). Until 2009, Berlusconi himself was conspicuously absent from the official commemorations on 25 April, conducting a constant anti-Communist polemic (for example, by widely publicizing the Black Book of Communism) and on several occasions he has presented himself as a spokesman for a sugar-coated vision of Fascism, in line with a widespread popular feeling. In an interview with the English newspaper "The Spectator" in August 2003, Berlusconi stated that "Fascism was a benign dictatorship" that sent people on holiday to confine them". in January 2013, on the occasion of the commemorations of the Holocaust, Berlusconi mentioned Mussolini's alleged merits, saying that his only fault was to have been an improvised ally of Hitler and to have passed the racial laws.

Gianfranco Fini, the last secretary of the MSI party and instigator of its transformation into Alleanza Nazionale, an alleged post-ideological and anti-totalitarian modern liberal force, played a major role in the politics of memory promoted by the right-wing elites . At the time, this effort carried little credibility seeing that in an interview with an Italian newspaper in April 1994, Fini called Mussolini "the greatest statesman of the century". Moreover, after introducing the category of anti-totalitarianism as a point of reference, the post-Fascist right considered the German Nazi regime and the Communist dictatorships to be totalitarian, but not, according to historian Renzo De Felice, Italian Fascism. For a final reckoning with the experience of the Fascist regime, it seemed enough to condemn only the most flagrant link between the dictatorship of Mussolini and Nazi totalitarianism: that is, anti-Semitism and the persecution of the Jews.

So it was in relation to the memory of the Holocaust that Fini's journey towards democratic legitimization began at the end of the 1990s. After a visit to Auschwitz in 1999, and after the establishment of the second Berlusconi government in 2001, as Deputy Prime Minister he gave an

Erich Priebke process, 1996 | Unknown author, via Wikimedia Commons

interview in September 2002 to the Israeli newspaper Ha'retz in which he asked for forgiveness for the racial laws; finally on his trip to Israel in November 2003, he visited Yad Vashem in Jerusalem and condemned the "infamous racial laws of 1938 enacted by Fascism", calling them an "absolute evil" for their co- responsibility in the Holocaust.

Fini's stance on the fascist anti-Semitism led to a rupture with the more intransigent wing of the party, starting with the Duce's granddaughter Alessandra Mussolini. At the political level this change contributed to the "democratic legitimization" of the leader of AN. He was named Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2004 and President of the Chamber in April 2008. Yet, at the level of public debate this has indeed worked as a sort of "purification rite" of Fascism; it paved the way for the rehabilitation of Mussolini's regime by the media during the 1980s under the influence of the revisionist currents. Considering Fascist anti-Semitism as the only "stain" to be erased, many members of the post-MSI right thought they had now, so to speak, a "free hand" for promoting Fascism's alleged historical merits – from the modernization of the country to the fight against Mafia – obscuring or even denying the dimension of violence and coercion of internal opponents and other peoples invaded in the country's forays abroad.

It is not surprising that centre-right local administrations in Italian cities promoted the renaming of streets, squares or public buildings to honour a large number of Fascist figures, and the "martyrs of the foibe": Italians captured and killed by Tito's Communists in the regions of Venice-Giulia and Istria after the Italian armistice in September 1943, and especially after the end of the war in May 1945, when Yugoslavia had annexationist designs on what at that time was Italian territory. The

Anniversary of the Liberation of Italy in Milan.
April 25, 2007 | Pino via Wikimedia Commons

name *foibe* comes from the name of the sinkholes where the bodies of the victims were thrown.

The memory of the foibe, with its strong anti-Communist imprint, has become one of the strongest icons of all the Italian right, including the League of Bossi and Salvini. In March 2004, on the proposal of AN and with the support of all parties except the extreme left, the Parliament approved a law that introduced a "Day of Remembrance" in the civil calendar in memory of the victims of the foibe and of the 250 thousand Italians expelled from Istria and Dalmatia.

Always a key element in the memory of the war cultivated by the neo-Fascist right, the martyrs of the foibe have thus become part of the national public memory. There can be no doubt that it was important to raise awareness about these dramatic events, but it is also true that it was done without any critical reflection. Indeed, the neo-Fascist narrative of the immediate post-war period which denounced the foibe as the fruit of Communist Yugoslav expansionism and hatred of Italy has now been revived, without including any historical context: that is to say, without any reference to the twenty-year oppression of the Slovenian and Croatian populations by Italian Fascists in the territories annexed to Italy after the First World War, or to the Italian occupation of Yugoslavia in 1941-43, which was stained by serious war crimes.

The institutionalization of the Day of Remembrance has provided the right with a very effective channel to spread its version of the phenomenon of the foibe, decrying it as an act of "genocide" committed against unarmed victims – it became, in other words, a campaign of "ethnic cleansing" against Italians hunted down for no other reason than their nationality. This supported a process of equating Communist violence with the German one, to the point that the rightist mass-media are currently labelling the foibe as the "Italian Shoah".

How did the forces traditionally linked to the different cultures of anti-Fascism react? Three distinct attitudes can be identified: full-blown opposition, "change of allegiance", and a willingness to compromise. As a reaction to the new offensive of the right wing, an energetic movement of opposition emerged in defence of the

anti-Fascist foundations of Italian democracy. The defence of the memory of the Resistance fuelled a vigorous protest movement at the street level. The celebrations of 25 April became an occasion for great popular demonstrations, starting with the 1994 protest in Milan against the newly elected Berlusconi government. This movement demonstrated the existence of a social memory of the Resistance with very deep and vital roots, already palpable in the 1960s and 1970s and which now re-emerged to face the challenge posed by the new right of Berlusconi. The media mogul's political enterprise was actually seen by many sectors of the opposition as a threat to democracy. In this sense, anti-fascism can be rightly seen as a mobilizing "tool" to defend the whole overall democratic system.

The late 1990s saw another mobilization of public opinion with the resumption of judicial proceedings against Nazi war criminals, starting with the trial of the former SS captain Erich Priebke in Rome, followed by some twenty trials (in absentia) against the men responsible for the worst massacres of Italians carried out by the Nazis after September 1943.

The attention to the memory of the massacres promoted the re-introduction of the traditional anti-Fascist narrative focused on the representation of Italians as victims of Nazi-Fascism. This representation had favoured, albeit indirectly, the assuaging of Italian guilt and the affirmation of the self-absolving image of "good Italians". However, this comfortable alibi started being questioned in the second half of the 1990s when a new series of studies brought some of the darkest pages of Fascist Italy to the attention of public opinion, including colonial violence, the persecution of Jewish rights and lives, and the crimes committed in the territories occupied by the regime during the Second World War.

Shaken by the investigations of historians's new analyses , in 1996 the myth of the "good Italian" was officially rejected by the Ministry of Defence which acknowledged the use of chemical weapons by the Italians during the Ethiopian campaign – a reality instead long denied by the conservative press despite the evidence presented by scholars. The criticism of the stereotype of an Italian colonialism "with a human face" was led by the historian and journalist Angelo Del Boca, who inspired the 2006 legislative proposal by the Italian Communist Party to dedicate a day of remembrance for the victims of Italian Colonialism. A little later, another draft law was proposed by the Communists with the aim of dedicating a day to all the victims of Fascism, but the electoral defeat of the radical left in the 2008 elections put an end to the plan.

Efforts made in defence of the anti-Fascist public memory and the attempts to reinforce it have managed to contain the anti-Fascist crisis but have not reversed it, failing to construct a "regenerating reading of the Resistance paradigm".

This process was also made evident by numerous "migrations", not only by politicians, intellectuals and journalists of the old PSI but also by the former members of the PCI and extra-parliamentary left-wingers who ended up on the right-wing side of the political spectrum – especially in Forza Italia, where they played an active role in the revisionist battle on memory. The famous left-leaning journalist Giampaolo Pansa was, without any doubt, a protagonist of this battle. He did not choose to be politically tight to the right, but with his books, which sold hundreds of thousands of copies, he was one of the main architects of the controversy against the Resistance, which was conducted in an increasingly acrimonious atmosphere.

Alongside the two opposite poles of opposition and "betrayal", the tendency to revise the anti-Fascist memory has also appeared on the left, in the form of a willingness to compromise. Support for an agreement with the right was manifested above all in the former Communist party, which first became the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS), then the Democrats of the Left (DS), and finally merged with the Catholics of La Margherita to form the Democratic Party (PD). With this transition, the post-Communist leadership of the PCI was particularly responsive to the invitation issued by the right wing with regard to the construction of a "shared memory". In this dialogue the AN was

the privileged point of contact; each side sought recognition of its legitimacy from the other in order to cement the new bipolar political structure born in the 1990s in which these two parties took centre stage after being excluding from government under the First Republic.

One of the leading promoters of the move to reconcile the "opposing memories" was the ex-magistrate and member of parliament for the PDS, Luciano Violante, who, as President of the Chamber of Deputies, engaged in a close dialogue with Fini on the subjects of the foibe and the "boys of Salò". The compromise between the two political leaders was cemented on the controversial memory of the foibe, as evidenced by the DS's support for the establishment of the Day of Remembrance in 2004 and the decision of many left-wing local councils to name streets and squares after the martyrs. Rather than proposing its "critical" version of this memory, the left has accepted the strong nationalist version favoured by the right wing describing the Italians of the foibe as the "innocent victims" of a frantic "ethnic cleansing" and thus absolving the Fascist regime of its guilt.

The search for a political compromise also underpinned the legislation of July 2000, which introduced the Day of Remembrance in memory of the Holocaust on 27 January. This is the most important of the commemorations recently established in the country. Promoted by the left to remember "the Italian persecution of Jewish citizens" and other victims of deportation, the law never uses the word "Fascism". Among its purposes it includes the recognition of the aid given to the Jews by the Italians of all political persuasions.

The commemoration of those who helped the victims of persecution was also one of the aims of the declaration of the 2000 Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust. In Italy, however, the commemoration has had significant consequences. Among the many tributes held since January 2001 dedicated to the memory of the Jews persecuted by the Nazis and the Fascists and of the deportation of Italian military and politicians to German concentration camps, there is a clear tendency

Giorgio Perlasca bust in Budapest | Hollósy József via Hungarian Wikipedia

Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, Giorgio Napolitano and Augusto De Luca, opening of a photographic exhibition of Augusto De Luca in the Chamber of Deputies. December 6, 1995 | Ferdinando Castaldo via Wikimedia Commons

(especially on the right) to favour the celebration of acts of solidarity and aid made by Italians.

One figure highlighted in particular was Giorgio Perlasca, a former Fascist volunteer in the Spanish Civil War, who claimed to be the Spanish consul in Budapest in 1944 and managed to save thousands of people. For this act, he was awarded the "Righteous among the nations" honour. The recognition of Perlasca and other "saviours of Jews" has thus revived the image of the "good Italians" among public opinion. The danger of this policy is that it provides a comfortable smokescreen behind which the national conscience can hide – and thus avoid coming terms with the country's involvement in the persecution of the Jews.

In the Italian "war of memory" – with all its battles, its ceasefires and its compromises – a crucial role was played by the Presidents of the Republic, Oscar Luigi Scalfaro (1992-1999), Carlo Azeglio Ciampi (1999-2006), Giorgio Napolitano (2006-2015), and lastly Sergio Mattarella, the present incumbent. Ciampi and Napolitano in particular chose memory as a privileged area of intervention to hold together a country which had long been divided by the bitter political clash between centre-right and centre-left under Berlusconi and whose national cohesion was under threat from the separatist Northern League. Both Ciampi and Napolitano sought to construct an "all-encompassing memory" which included new elements that were not part of the earlier anti-fascist narrative such as the memory of the foibe, the victims of Allied bombing of Italian cities, and the rapes committed by the French expeditionary force in Italy. But, above all, they revived and defended the memory of the Resistance by protecting and defending it against the revisionist campaign.

Thanks to the presidency of the republic, the demand that the boys of Salò should be placed on the same footing as the Partisans has been rejected. The same happened with the proposal to abolish 25 April as a national holiday. Ciampi and Napolitano placed the recognition of the Resistance at the centre of the institutional memory interpreting it in a neo-patriotic fashion and as a struggle for national liberation resulting from the union between people and the army. Both presidents limited the explicit references to anti-Fascism and supported the idea of the Resistance for the armed forces who remained loyal to the king and stood up to the Germans. It is no coincidence that the Greek island of Kefalonia, the scene of the Wehrmacht's worst massacre of Italian soldiers, has become a key site of memory. The Presidents of

the Republic have underlined the bond that unites the Risorgimento (the birth of the national state in the nineteenth century) to the First World War and to the Resistance, which is traditionally described as "the second Risorgimento". And they have consistently stressed the European significance of the Resistance, identifying the foundation of today's united Europe in the struggle against Nazism and Fascism waged by Italy and the other populations of the continent. From this European perspective, we should also underline President Napolitano's attempts since 2010 to transform the foibe from a nationalist memory into a memory of European reconciliation between Italy, Slovenia and Croatia, based on the mutual recognition of wrongs that the parties have historically inflicted on each other and on a fruitful future collaboration inside the European Union. This policy has helped to avert a potentially dangerous political confrontation between Italy and its eastern neighbours, marked over the years by diplomatic crises and by the neo-irredentist positions of the Italian right. Italian nationalists were keen to redefine the territorial agreements signed by Italy and Yugoslavia in 1975, claiming that the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation rendered them invalid. Even the Presidents of the German Republic's numerous visits made in Italy to the sites of the Nazi massacres were a clear sign of a process of ("bilateral") reconciliation in the name of their common EU membership.

In other words, Italy since the 1990s represents a particularly interesting case with reference to the changes in public narratives and cultures of memory. The new coordinates of European memory promoted by the EU institutions in Brussels – the memory of the Shoah and the anti-totalitarian paradigm – have gained considerable ground inside the Italian public opinion. The memory of the Resistance, bedrock of the First Republic, came under great pressure from two sides: competition from the Shoah on the one hand, and the antagonistic memory of the foibe on the other. Thanks to the steadfastness of the country's presidents, the memory of the Resistance has not been undermined or replaced and has remained a fundamental pillar in the national institutional memory. The celebration of the 70th anniversary of the Italy's liberation in 2015 showed, if anything, some signs that this memory is being recovered, thanks to the committed support of the new president Sergio Mattarella. In such context, an analogy can be noticed with the relaunch of the memory of the Resistance that took place in France, where in July 2013 the Assemblée Nationale voted to establish a National Resistance Day.

All the main contemporary Italian public memories (the Resistance, the Shoah, the foibe) remain linked to the experience of the Second World War. With the demise of the parties that created the now disappeared First Republic, their political cultures, rooted in anti-Fascism, faded away. Now Italians citizens tend to collectively identify themselves as victims - either at the hands of the Nazis or at the hands of the Yugoslavs. At the same time, they identify themselves as the "righteous" and cultivate the memory of the "good Italians" who helped the peJews. A more conscious memory, one more aware of the events of the past and better equipped to deal with the dark pages of the history of a country that was the cradle of Fascism in Europe, is still struggling to make its way.

Debating communism at the European institutions

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Since their inception, European organisations such as the Council of Europe and the European Union (EU) have celebrated the common past of their member states in order to provide a historical grounding for the European project and thus consolidate its legitimacy. After the Cold War, Europe's 'dark past' was included in this heritage, and the Holocaust became the 'negative founding myth' (Leggewie, 2008) of the Council of Europe and the EU. Both organisations imposed a 'mnemonic accession criterion' on their future member states, which were required to critically evaluate their own complicity in this genocide and to give greater visibility to the commemoration of its victims. Meanwhile, in the former Eastern bloc, a historical narrative centred on the equivalence of Nazi and communist crimes was gaining ground. From the mid-1990s onwards, numerous anti-communist circles criticised the 'incomplete' character of the regime change which, they claimed, had allowed former communist leaders to evade justice and to maintain comfortable positions in society. In line with the paradigm of totalitarianism, a variety of politicians, academics and activists made crime the essence of the communist ideology. They portrayed the communist regimes as tyrannies kept in power by constant terror and devoid of any popular support, across all national contexts and historical periods.

Against this background, European organisations became venues where bilateral and domestic disputes over the past could be continued or amplified. One of the most conflictive issues was the retrospective assessment of communism, which sparked heated discussions in both the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and the European Parliament (EP). Although the legacies of communism had been debated as early as 1992 at the PACE with respect to policies of lustration, the enlargement of the EU to include ten post-communist countries in 2004-2007 created new institutional venues in which to extract memory issues from their national frameworks. Representatives from

Tunne Kelam MEP (EPP Group, Estonia) speaking in the commemoration of the Baltic deportations at the European Parliament in Strasbourg | EPP Group

the former Eastern bloc set out to renegotiate the boundaries of the legitimate European historical narrative by seeking equal treatment for Nazi and communist crimes in terms of historical reckoning, collective remembrance, and legal accountability. In debates at European level their interpretation of 'Nazism and communism as equally evil' started to compete with the Western European narrative that had made Auschwitz the standard of persecution and asserted the unique nature of the Holocaust (Littoz-Monnet, 2012).

In the literature, these mobilisations have been analysed as 'claims for recognition' (Closa Montero 2010) or attempts to set a 'Gulag memory' against a 'Shoah memory' (Droit 2007). Despite the indisputable 'politics of recognition' involved in these demands, these interpretations may suggest a binary opposition between 'Western' and 'Eastern' readings of the past. This would obscure both the ideological dimension of the conflicting assessments of socialist legacies across the continent and also the fact that the condemnation of communism provides conservatives with a strong symbolic advantage over the Left not only in Eastern Europe but in Western Europe as well. In addition, a detailed analysis of European-level debates on communism shows that they were not just the natural extension of the 'memory boom' that has affected Western countries since the 1980s, but the result of the combined action of a variety of memory entrepreneurs, who made specific claims in the national political arena as well as in European institutions (Neumayer, 2018).

Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov signs the German–Soviet Treaty of Friendship in Moscow, September 28, 1939; behind him are Richard Schulze-Kossens (Ribbentrop's adjutant), Boris Shaposhnikov (Generalstabschef der Roten Armee), Joachim von Ribbentrop, Joseph Stalin, Vladimir Pavlov (Soviet translator). Alexey Shkvarzev (Soviet ambassador in Berlin), stands next to Molotov | National Archives & Records Administration, nara.gov, via Wikimedia Commons

Two competing visions of communism

During the numerous historical debates held at the PACE and in the EP after their respective enlargements to the East, two divergent ways of assessing communism and its comparability with Nazism were defended by representatives with distinct biographical characteristics and ideological references.

The first interpretation underlined the singularity of the Holocaust and historicised the analysis of communism. It distinguished several phases in the history of the socialist regimes, characterised by varying degrees of violence and different ways of enacting Marxist ideology. This was the line of argument of a group of representatives of the Left and the far Left from the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats and the European United Left groups, which rejected any similarity between fascism and Nazism on the one hand and communism on the other. This was also the prevailing discourse in the Russian delegation at the PACE, which defended a heroic vision of the 'Great Patriotic War' and of victory over Nazism, as well as among the communist representatives from southern European countries marked by recent dictatorships such as Portugal and Greece.

A second vision characterised communism by what was seen as its essence: namely, violence. It was considered an ahistorical project of great brutality, comparable with other outbursts of mass violence,

notably genocidal, and demanded equal treatment for the victims of Nazism and of communism. This interpretation was mainly advanced by Central European representatives of the conservative Europe's People Party and the liberal Alliance of Liberals and Democrats in Europe, joined by some Green representatives. The group brought together former dissidents and younger representatives who had entered politics since the transition to democracy. Its members placed particular emphasis on the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, under which the two dictatorships had shared out Central and Baltic Europe between them. From their perspective, this alliance placed Stalinism and Nazism in a league of their own among twentieth-century dictatorships and made their crimes equivalent.

This analysis of communism, loosely based on the totalitarian paradigm, became hegemonic in both the PACE and the EP, which adopted several official parliamentary resolutions centred on the equivalence of Stalinism and Nazism. The most important of these texts are the PACE's resolution of 2006 on the 'need for international condemnation of the crimes of totalitarian communist regimes' and the EP's resolution of 2009 on 'European conscience and totalitarianism'. In addition, the EP declared a new day of remembrance: 23 August, the date on which the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed in 1939, became the 'Day of remembrance for the victims of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes' in 2009. The requests to use criminal law to penalise the denial of 'communist crimes' and to establish an international court based in the EU to judge those responsible for these crimes were not met. But remembrance served as a substitute for the legal treatment of socialist mass violence with the creation, in 2007, of a new policy consisting in sponsoring projects that maintained 'the main sites and archives associated with deportations as well as the commemorating of victims of Nazism and Stalinism'.

Before its expansion to the East, the EU's main response to the legacy of dictatorships had been as part of heritage protection, via the provision of financial support for the conservation of Nazi death camps. A critical juncture came in 2004-2005, when the combination of low electoral turnout at European elections, the prospect of an unprecedented enlargement and the rejection of the Constitution project were understood as signs of the failure of earlier policies in the fields of culture and citizenship. The drafting of the programme 'Europe for citizens' by the European Commission provided a window of opportunity for Central European representatives eager to challenge the EU's Holocaust-dominated official narrative by calling for the programme's remembrance strand to cover not only Nazism but also Stalinism. After intense negotiations in different segments of the European institutions, the new public policy, designed to foster 'active European remembrance', began to address this previously ignored painful past.

This handling of the communist crimes at a symbolic rather than at a legal level prevailed because the commemoration of victims of mass violence was invested with different purposes by the actors involved. Whilst the European Commission and the EU Council saw it as an instrument supporting the development of democratic European citizenship, the EP considered it as a tool to build a common identity. For the anti-communist memory entrepreneurs, the extension of the scope of a pan-European historical memory was the

Entrance of the Katyn Museum in Warsaw (Poland), opened in 2015 to recognize the victims of the massacre perpetrated by the NKVD in 1940 | EUROM

Joint Statement: Ministerial Conference on the European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Totalitarian Regimes. Bratislava, August 23, 2016 | sk16.eu

recognition of the socialist experience as a 'relevant past' of Europe. All these interpretations were in line with the standards supported by the European institutions, such as overcoming historical antagonisms and protecting fundamental rights. Moreover, focusing on victims avoided controversies regarding the definition of totalitarianism and the ranking of different painful pasts, even though the steps to preserve the memory of the socialist crimes were largely modelled on those already in place to commemorate the Nazi atrocities.

The rationales of anti-communist mobilisations

Anti-communist mobilisations were led by a small group of representatives, primarily from the former Eastern bloc, who participated in all the debates on communism at the PACE and the EP, drew up official texts condemning communist crimes, and contributed to awareness-raising actions in the European assemblies or at their periphery. How can we explain the ability of these newcomers, who were still relative outsiders at the European assemblies, to impose an interpretation of communism that altered the dominant approach to historical memory in Europe?

Focusing on their sociopolitical profiles sheds light on the memory entrepreneurs' biographical, partisan and ideological motivations, but also on the constraints placed on their mobilisations. The calls for remembrance of the socialist crimes and justice for their victims launched by mainly conservative or liberal representatives, some of whom had actively opposed the Soviet-type regimes, can be considered

as an extension of their struggle at national levels to impose their view of communism, expose their opponents, or send a signal to Russia. However, most of these politicians were rather marginal members of the PACE and the EP when they entered these assemblies, and some of them were aware of the wide gap between their strong political capital at home and their relative insignificance in European arenas. The new representatives from the former Eastern bloc had to absorb the rules of the European parliamentary game in order to fully assume their role in the European assemblies. To acquire institutional credit and to influence parliamentary work, specific know-how was needed, such as the capacity to build coalitions, the ability to present admissible arguments and the willingness to comply with legitimate rules of interaction.

This initial marginal status was actually one of the driving forces of a project designed simultaneously to strengthen individual positions within European assemblies and to reshape European historical memory. Anti-communist mobilisations were a trial-and-error process characterised by a series of struggles and compromises with dominant Western conservative allies and left-wing opponents. The memory entrepreneurs' gradual mastery of European roles, acquired i.a. through their engagement in the anti-communist cause, exemplifies a broader process of professionalisation of the newly elected PACE and EP members. European assemblies were therefore an echo chamber for demands, related as much to the memory entrepreneurs' militant backgrounds and their political affiliations as to their decision to embark on a European career.

The analysis of this unlikely mobilisation provides three main insights into the politics and policies of the European memory.

First, despite their geographical and ideological homogeneity, anti-communist memory entrepreneurs present different sociopolitical profiles depending on their previous national and European political trajectories. Some of them were former leaders of the opposition to communism, others belonged to an 'anti-communist young guard' who had come into politics during the regime changes, while a third group comprised peripheral actors who had begun their European careers with little political experience. Their respective political resources entailed different ways of approaching their European term of office, while the importance they attached to their European mandate, depending on the point in their career at which it occurred, defined their commitment to the anti-communist cause. Only the representatives initially equipped with considerable resources, such as well-known former dissidents, or those combining strong national political capital and relevant European expertise, managed to achieve re-election as MEPs. This circumstance shows that the mobilisation of memory as a source of political capital is insufficient on its own; a contender wishing to make their mark on the European stage must also possess the requisite political skills.

Second, the rationale of European-level political debates and policies for managing painful pasts diluted the anti-communist cause into a broader condemnation of all types of dictatorships that befell Europe in the twentieth century. The rules of European political competition entail attempts to mitigate ideological conflicts and to denationalise issues, in order to build broad coalitions across parliamentary groups and national delegations. But anti-communist representatives, who overwhelmingly belonged to the Europe's People Party, faced fierce ideological opposition from their peers in the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats and in the European United Left. In 2008, the Social Democrats even set up a History Working Group at the EP with the explicit goal of 'countering any attempts to rewrite history'.

Anti-communist memory entrepreneurs were also forced to adjust their claims to the normative beliefs that underpin the existing EU policies for managing painful pasts. Their demands were at odds with the patterns of remembrance established in the West in the 1970s and consecrated by the EU in the 1990s. Their request for the acknowledgement of their own suffering, in their view wrongfully ignored, was at odds with the 'politics of regret'

favoured by Western governments (Olick, 2007), which amounted to admitting past wrongs and asking for the victims' forgiveness. The will to impose a single narrative as a historical truth across the whole continent collided with the 'multi-perspective' history promoted by the European organisations, which admitted the plurality of points of view on the past as long as they were founded on an objectively established factual basis. Moreover, including historical episodes other than World War II among the relevant pasts of Europe questioned the significance of the Holocaust as the founding event of the continent's history. The memory entrepreneurs' vision of socialist crimes was structured by a 'mimetic rivalry' with the Judeocide (Laignel-Lavastine, 1999). Denunciation of the 'amnesia' and the 'amnesty' regarded as surrounding communist crimes called into question the unique character of the Nazis' attempts to exterminate the Jews, which allegedly obscured the full comprehension of other mass violence. As a result, anti-communist memory entrepreneurs were regularly accused by their political competitors and by militants of the Jewish cause of trivialising Nazism and of minimising the complicity of Eastern European societies in the Holocaust. Last but not least, their mobilisations also prompted calls for the recognition of the acts of other non-democratic regimes, such as Francoism in Spain and other southern European military dictatorships.

To comply with these many constraints, anti-communist memory entrepreneurs adjusted their cause to the human-rights paradigm that structures the politics of memory at European level. They called on European institutions to assess socialist legacies with the same criteria as those applied to other dictatorships, which would entail denouncing the crimes against humanity that were perpetrated and commemorating their victims. However, moving to this level of generality to some extent diluted the anti-communist cause into a blanket condemnation of 'all forms of totalitarianism' that had existed on the European continent, thereby tempering the communism-Nazism equivalence.

Third, the existing European remembrance policy and the segmentation of the European political space devalued the parliamentary resolutions outside the PACE and the EP, thus diminishing the national political benefits and the legal and judicial implications of the anti-communist discourse endorsed by these assemblies. European remembrance policies drawn up by the EU and the Council of Europe in the 1990s had left member states free to manage their painful pasts by means of law, without imposing any legal instruments regarding the fight against denial or the prosecution of perpetrators. Besides this lack of a legally binding legislation, anti-communist mobilisations were further hindered by the fragmented nature of the European political arena. Their attempts to extend the effects of anti-communist parliamentary resolutions to national political contexts and to convert them into European-level public policy and legal action were only partially successful.

The fading of European-level anti-communism?

In 2006, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe refused to give any specific content to the PACE's condemnation of communist crimes. This prompted the memory entrepreneurs to intensify their involvement in the EP, which picked up the anti-communist discourse developed at the PACE and called on the EU to give it the support the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe had denied. Several unsuccessful attempts were made, between 2008 and 2010, to have the PACE and the EP label the Ukrainian Great Famine of 1932-1933 as 'genocide'. But the anti-communist cause undoubtedly lost its prominence, even in the EP, after the adoption of the Resolution on European conscience and totalitarianism in April 2009.

No parliamentary resolutions have been adopted since then. In 2013, the report on 'Historical memory in culture and education in the EU' tabled by the Polish representative Marek Migalski was rejected by the EP Committee on Culture and Education even before it could be discussed in the

Memorial to the victims of Communism in Prague | Vip Ciacci via Wikimedia Commons

plenary session. Although the remembrance strand of the programme 'Europe for Citizens' epitomised a shift in the official understanding of Europe's 'dark past' to encompass Stalinist mass violence, it fell short of the ultimate goal of most anti-communist memory entrepreneurs, namely the adoption by the EU of legal steps to prosecute former high-ranking communist leaders. In 2013, the citizenship programme was renewed and its remembrance strand was strengthened. This institutionalisation of Community remembrance policy can be seen as a success of the anti-communist memory entrepreneurs. But its scope was extended to initiatives that 'reflect on the causes of totalitarian regimes in Europe's modern history (especially but not exclusively Nazism which led to the Holocaust, Fascism, Stalinism and totalitarian communist regimes) and to commemorate the victims of their crimes. The strand will also encompass activities concerning other defining moments and reference points in recent European history'. This attenuation of the symmetry between Stalinism and Nazism highlights the contraction of the memory entrepreneurs' room for manoeuvre: the controversy over communism had lost its intensity in European assemblies, while the European Left had capitalised on the condemnation of communism to obtain the same for an ideology against which it primarily defined itself, namely Fascism.

In order to keep the issue of communist crimes on the EU's agenda and to prevent the dilution of the cause into a broad anti-totalitarian discourse, anti-communist representatives still carry out awareness-raising activities (exhibitions, film screenings, conferences and hearings) about socialist crimes. They created two overlapping transnational networks, the EP informal groupings 'Reconciliation of European Histories' and the 'Platform of European Memory and Conscience', in order to coordinate claims for recognition and prosecution, at the EU level, of gross Soviet-era human rights violations. Geographically and ideologically, however, the membership of these networks is very homogeneous, and this low representativeness limits their capacity to turn their demands into politically audible requests in the broad European political space. Because their vision of Europe's experience of dictatorship is heavily centred on the socialist



Memorial to the Victims of Communism (Prague, Újezd) | Paddy via Wikimedia Commons

period and does not allow for the confrontation of different interpretations of communism, their activities appear politically biased. As a result, their impact in the EP is limited to a very specific segment – the post-communist conservatives – while their symbolic resonance in the general public is restricted to the former Eastern bloc.

On the European continent, the remembrance actions dedicated to the victims of socialist crimes are far less visible than the tributes to the victims of Nazi atrocities. It is very telling that 23 August, established in 2009 in the EU as 'Day of Remembrance for the victims of all totalitarian and authoritarian regimes', failed to gain the same symbolic significance as the 'International Day of Commemoration in memory of the victims of the Holocaust' on 27 January. Although the EU Commissioner in charge of remembrance makes a speech every year on 23 August, official commemorations are organised in only nine member states, most of them countries directly affected by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Despite their ongoing mobilisations, therefore, the vision of history put forward by anti-communist memory entrepreneurs will have a regional, rather than pan-European, significance.

Almost 30 years after the fall of socialism, mimetic rivalry still permeates European-level historical debates, which remain structured around two diverging accounts of the past. In the first, the Holocaust is seen as a unique form of mass violence and as the negative symbol of a 'new Europe' based on protecting human rights; while the second demands, in the name of the universality of human rights, that the gravity of socialist crimes be recognised as equivalent. In an attempt to find a middle ground between these two narratives, the EU and the Council of Europe have produced a historical memory based on a broad denunciation of 'all forms of totalitarianism that existed in Europe in the 20th century' and on the commemoration of their victims. The very fact that this under-specification was necessary to avert controversies over the rankings of different painful pasts confirms that the European-level discussions have not put an end to the heated debates on the comparison of the Holocaust with other forms of mass violence. Quite the opposite, in fact: the controversy over communism, which tests the European institutions' capacity to produce a consensual historical narrative while integrating new states, illustrates the persisting difficulties of establishing common ground for a shared culture of memory on the European continent.

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The art project as a tool for reflection on historicalmemoryand genocide

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The contemporary photographic art project has incontrovertible value as a tool for transmitting and reflecting on historical memory and genocide. In this respect, teaching in the field of arts and art practices can create contexts for discussing and reflecting on a diverse range of aspects from various perspectives. These include the mechanisms that allow the complexity of individual, collective and historical memory to be transmitted, as well as the role of image as a mediator, as both a work of artistic expression and the document of a historical event. With this in mind, the paper aims to provide a brief overview of different art projects that not only review and reflect on the historical event they portray or allude to, but also question the role of documentary photography as a hegemonic resource for bearing witness to, recovering or reconstructing historical memory itself. Moreover, the paper examines other aspects of image as a medium that challenge the capacity of photojournalism to generate a reaction and raise awareness of tragic events in the present. In this respect, photographic art projects offer an infinite spectrum of visual content in which the image used is created, appropriated or transformed within its numerous contexts, including family or home photography, staging or simply the evocation of the image itself. The objective of these practices is not simply to be creative and experiment with the visual; rather, they aim to offer cross-disciplinary perspectives that make extremely complex and sensitive issues approachable in such a way that they expand and question the limitations of photography within the framework of documentary, photojournalistic or archival practice.

Many contemporary artists have directly addressed or alluded to the Holocaust, the diaspora and the survival of the Jews. Key examples include the work of Christian Boltanski and his archival perspective with installations such as La Réserve des Suisses morts (1990) (The Reserve of Dead Swiss), in which photographs appropriated from obituaries in a



Christian Boltanski. Réserve des Suisses Morts, 1991

Swiss newspaper are enlarged until the faces shown are obscured, altering their context and meaning, thereby managing to evoke the Holocaust without referring to it directly. As Van Alphen states, there is a clear Holocaust effect in the work, as evidenced in "the sheer number of similar portraits, which transforms the sense of individuality typically evoked by that genre into one of anonymity". Indeed, he continues, "the work can thus be seen as a re-enactment of one of the defining principles of the Holocaust: the transformation of subjects into objects". (Van Alphen, 1997, p. 106).

Other particularly relevant examples include the works of Art Spiegelman and his graphic novel Maus (1991), which recounts the experiences of his father, a Holocaust survivor, as well as his own story as a son; David Levinthal's Mein Kampf (1993–1994), which recreates scenes from the atrocity using toy figures; and Shimon Attie's project The Writing on the Wall (1991–1992) in which the artist retrieves archive images of the everyday lives of the residents of Berlin's Jewish quarter and projects them onto their location sixty years later, superimposing them in both time and space. Moreover, all these works share the same distance in time from the events and, as such, the artists do not portray their own experiences in their work, but rather approach the subject indirectly. As James E. Young explains, for these artists, "their subject is not the Holocaust so much as how they came to know it and how it has shaped their inner lives". (Young, 2000, p. 3). It follows, then, that the work of these artists was inspired by a range of direct and indirect sources, including media publications and images, testimonies, documents, and family accounts, and that it deals not only with the Holocaust but, more specifically, with the transmission of historical memory. Many artists' work also addresses their own identity as descendants of survivors, and the responsibility to keep their memory and history alive. In this sense, the main theme of many of these projects is 'postmemory' (Hirsch, 1997), referring to memory transmitted by the preceding generation that has had such an importance, presence and influence in a person's life that they embrace the memory as their own.

Rafael Goldchain's photographic project I Am My Family (2008) is an excellent example of an art

project that brings together issues of family, identity and history in a deceptively simple way.

I Am My Family features a series of portraits in which Goldchain transforms himself into his own relatives through the elaborate use of makeup and clothing to recreate old photographs from the family archive. While it may first appear to be a simple and playful exercise in emulating and recreating the traditional family album, there are other far more complex interpretations hidden underneath the surface. Firstly, the artist experiments with recreating his direct family members and ancestors through the medium of the portrait, blurring the limits of the concept of self-portrait and, as a result, the brutal connection established with family identity in this way and the genetic inheritance that they have passed down to the artist himself. In this respect, it makes perfect sense for Goldchain to try and explain his origins and family lineage through his own person, challenging the observer to imagine the likely similarities and differences between the relatives represented, just as we do when browsing through traditional photograph albums.

However, *I Am My Family* also goes far beyond depicting an average family. Each portrait is accompanied by the relative's name and their date and place of birth and death. It is this aspect that takes the family portrait to a new level, representing the origin of a Polish Jewish family, the terrible fate many of them suffered and the subsequent diaspora of the survivors, who would end their lives in places as far-flung from one another as Argentina, Chile and Israel, their surname undergoing various transformations, but they themselves never losing sight of their common origin. And at the same time this sensational project tackles a topic as huge as



1.Book cover *I am my family* | © Princeton Architectural Press 2008. Essays by Martha Langford and Rafael Goldchain

2 / 3 / 4. Alfredo Jaar, *The Silence of Nduwayezu,* detail, 1997. 1 million slides, light table, magnifiers, and illuminated wall text. Table 36 inches × 217 34 inches × 143 inches. Text 6 inches × 188 inches. © Alfredo Jaar

the Holocaust in an apparently playful way, using the family album and its representation as a vehicle for observers to connect with the subjects in the portraits in the same way as they do with their own family images. Meanwhile, the photographs serve as a tribute to each relative, portraying them as individualised and irreplaceable people, while also transforming them into just one of the millions of families who suffered a similar fate and whose legacy endures today through their descendants. Moreover, the work directly portrays survival against all odds, symbolised through the artist's face and the play on words in the title of the project.

As a counterpoint to the abovementioned works, it is worth highlighting, albeit briefly, *The Rwanda Project* (1994–2000) by the artist Alfredo Jaar, about the genocide in the country. In contrast to the other artworks, Jaar's work presents the genocide as a fact produced in the present, as is its representation. This large-scale project comprising more than twenty artworks is remarkable for offering different standpoints on what happened during the Rwandan genocide, while also questioning the capacity of photojournalism and its distribution and exhibition mechanisms as an effective tool for mobilising the population in the face of an atrocity of this magnitude. In this respect, not only does Jaar expose the weaknesses of the medium but, through his artworks, he proposes other potential strategies for generating visibility, reflection, reaction and emotional response through art. He manages to represent the genocide and its aftermath without directly showing the literal nature of the brutality, violence or death, without exploiting the victims, yet reflecting the complexity of an event of this scale. As the artist himself states, «If the media and their



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

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

Alfredo Jaar. *Rwanda Rwanda*, 1994. Public intervention in Malmö, Sweden. Offset print. 68 1/2 x 46 1/2 inches. Edition of 100.
© Alfredo Jaar, courtesy of Thord Thordeman, Malmö, and Galerie Lelong, New York.

images fill us with an illusion of presence, which later leaves us with a sense of absence, why not try the opposite? [...] People were already shown a great quantity of images, but they did not see anything. No one saw anything because no one did anything. Then I thought, this time I won't show the images so that people can 'see' them better » (Jaar, Gallo, 1997, p. 59). This approach is particularly clear in of the project's installations, Real Pictures (1995), in which a number of black filing cabinets containing images of the genocide are placed around the exhibition space. The observer can see the description of the images on the outside of the cabinets but the photographs are kept hidden. One of the descriptions reads: «Benjamin looks directly into the camera, as if recording what the camera saw. He asked to be photographed amongst the dead. He wanted to prove to his friends in Kampala, Uganda that the atrocities were real and that he had seen the aftermath».

In this way, the installation becomes a space that evokes what is invisible to the eyes, while the very structure envelops the observer in a kind of memorial. «The theatrical staging here with its resplendent light functions both as a memorial to the victims of the Rwandan genocide as well as a conduit or means to persuade and sustain consideration of this brutal event» (Bricker, 1999, p. 25).

Another large-scale installation that forms part of Rwanda is The Eyes of Gutete Emerita (1996), consisting of a long passage of text introducing the observer to the context of the genocide, before continuing with the following testimony: «On Sunday morning at a church in Ntarama, 400 Tutsi men, women and children were slaughtered by a Hutu death squad. Gutete Emerita, 30 years old, was attending mass with her family when the massacre began. Killed with machetes in front of her eyes were her husband Tito Kahinamura, 40, and her two sons, Muhoza, 10, and Matirigari, 7. Somehow, Gutete managed to escape with her daughter Marie-Louise Unumararunga, 12. They hid in a nearby swamp for three weeks, coming out only at night in search of food. Gutete has returned to the church in the woods because she has nowhere else to go. When she speaks about her lost family, she gestures to corpses on the ground, rotting in the African sun. I remember her eyes. The eyes of Gutete Emerita».

In an adjacent space, a large heap of thousands and thousands of slides all contain the same image: a close-up of Gutete Emerita's staring eyes. The work is moving not only because of its physicality, which alludes to the million victims of the genocide, but also because it evokes all the survivors of the tragedy, giving value to their history rather than merely representing it (limited here to recording her stare but preserving her anonymity). At the same, the observer connects with the image in a brutal way.

The above works are just a few examples of projects that, through art, manage to ask questions about such issues as the transmission of history and the testimony of its survivors. At the same time, their photographic discourse proposes alternative forms of representation that break away from the traditional conventions associated with memory, history and documents.

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Colonial Memories and National Memories:
An Uneasy Encounter between Africa and Europe

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In 2006, then British Prime Minister Tony Blair caught the world by surprise when he issued an unprecedented apology for Britain's part in the Atlantic slave trade, which he characterised as a "crime against humanity".[1] This conceptual category, according to William Schabas (2012: 51-53), developed precisely in the context of the abolition of slavery and early colonialism, and even though it is now accepted by the United Nations to describe the slave trade and apartheid, the nations involved have rarely voiced a mea culpa. A year later, in 2007, the city of Liverpool, which had been the epicentre of the Crown's slave trade in the eighteenth century, opened the International Slavery Museum to commemorate the bicentenary of the Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade (1807) as a way to acknowledge this uncomfortable past. Step by step, Britain moved forward from words to deeds. These actions, however, were not nearly enough for many African nations and especially for Afro-descendant communities, who have called not only for economic reparations for the families of victims of racism and structural socioeconomic exclusion, but also for more forceful condemnation.[2] In this respect, it is legitimate to ask: if British slave-owners received compensation after abolition in the form of a multi-million pound loan that was not paid off until 2015, paradoxically with taxes collected from many of the descendants of the slave trade, then why not pay reparations to the victims today?

[1] "Blair fights shy of full apology for slave trade" in *The Guardian* (27 November 2006).

[2] Kuba Shand-Baptites, "While the US debate heats up, why won't the UK even talk about reparations for slavery?" in *The Independent* (17 July 2017).



View of the room Rituals and Ceremonies, *Musée royal de l'Afrique centrale* | © MRAC, Tervuren, photo Jo Van de Vijver

In these processes, the Afro community has certainly played a key role and is now a political subject in the construction of "transnational memories" (Assmann, 2014), which also call for a major review of the colonial past in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. One aspect made visible by the controversial remarks made by a later British Prime Minister, David Cameron, when he called Nelson Mandela a "hero" on the day of his death, is the omission of the Tory Party's backing for the apartheid regime and for the South African leader's labelling as a "terrorist" under Margaret Thatcher. A petition demanding a public apology was then signed by thousands of people, headed by decolonial activists intent on showing this nationally uncomfortable past to Europe. The decolonial trend of the twenty-first century, however, is not confined to British soil: it is a global movement that is becoming increasingly more vocal (Reyes, 2016).



The city of Bristol, which still has a controversial statue in honour of the slave trader Edward Colston, woke up one morning in 2017 to find unofficial plaques calling attention to its past history with the slave trade | Sam Saunders

In France, Emmanuel Macron, the President of the Republic of égalité and fraternité, set off a political firestorm when, in February 2017, he declared that French colonisation had been a

"crime against humanity" and issued an apology to Algeria, where he was on tour, for past acts. His statements disturbed a portion of the French political class. Even though a decade had passed since Tony Blair's remarks, the intervening years had clearly not resulted in a normalisation of imperial mea culpas, which still wounded a European identity built out of acting as a guardian of democracy and human rights.[3] As the historian Pascal Blanchard (2019) has sharply criticised, sixty years have gone by since the independence of France's colonies and France still has not engaged in any reflection on its colonial past, nor has it opened spaces dedicated to the subject in a country with well over 10,000 museums and a host of collections brought from its overseas colonies.

On the other hand, the case of the Musée Royal d'Afrique Centrale, which was opened on the outskirts of Brussels in 1897 during the reign of Leopold II, recalls other heated debates on heritage and its use. The museum is located in an ostentatious palace that contains over 120,000 items plundered from the Congo, and it has been (and still is) one of the leading spaces for the glorification of colonialism and racism. Not until 2018 did Belgium conclude a critical review of the museum's collections and galleries, which had remained unchanged since the nineteen-fifties and therefore continued to uphold painful racial hierarchies and discourses of black "primitivism". The review, however, was not enough for the United Nations, which urged the Belgian government to issue a public apology for atrocities committed in the Congo and linked the country's present-day racism against Africans to its meagre review of its past, publishing a report with 72 recommendations (United Nations, 2019). In addition, thousands of kilometres from Belgium, the Congolese themselves continue to argue that decolonisation will only be possible through restitution. To this end, Joseph Kabila, the controversial former president of the RDC, has repeatedly called for the return of the museum's objects to Kinshasa. In this respect, restitution and economic reparations, together with symbolic apologies, are becoming the key pillars of today's demands for historical memory of the colonial past, both in Africa and in Europe.

Portugal, too, waded into controversy in 2018, when it announced that a new museum slated to accommodate the history of Portuguese colonialism was to be called the Museu das Descobertas [in English, Museum of Discoveries]. In response, historians and civil society nationwide came out staunchly against the initiative because the

[3] «En Algérie, Macron s'excuse pour la colonisation, une 'faute grave' pour la droite» [in English, «In Algeria, Macron apologises for colonisation, a 'grave error' for the right»] in *Le Parisien* (15 February 2017)

View of the Introductory Gallery: A Museum in Motion, *Musée royal de l'Afrique centrale* | © MRAC, Tervuren, photo Jo Van de Vijver



Current display in the Darder Museum where the Bushman known as the "Black of Banyoles" appeared on display until 2001. The Bushman's remains are now replaced by photos and no explanation is given of the controversy surrounding his restitution | EUROM

language evoked the authoritarian reign of Salazar and because it perpetuated a history of putting the Eurocentric subject at the centre of the story, since surely the first people to discover Africa or the Americas were their original inhabitants. Indeed, the Portuguese case has been defined as "amnesiac memory" (Cardina, 2016) arising from the social trauma caused by the bloody colonial wars that raged between 1961 and 1974. The lack of public and institutional initiatives, however, has not impeded the literary boom of the past decade, which has contributed significantly to the recovery of the "history" of Portuguese Africa. In the end, the political silence has been overtaken by the proliferation of publishers, output of academics and initiatives of civic engagement, which once again have come primarily from migrant and Afro-descendant groups. In 2017, for example, the Djass Associação de Afrodescendentes successfully launched a popular legislative initiative to gain approval for the construction, in Lisbon, of the country's first memorial to the victims of slavery, which has yet to break ground as a consequence of political resistance.

The Spanish case shares many parallels with the Portuguese case. In Spain, however, the amnesia is not only institutional, but also collective. If Spain had a colonial past in Africa, it is generally unknown even in academic circles as a consequence of a policy of "reserved material" (1969) and a well-established Americanist tradition (Muñoz, 2017). The Spanish colonial enterprise has always been linked to the Americas, underpinning an identity of "hispanidad"—the "Spanishness" of the whole Spanish-speaking world—that was prevalent during the Franco dictatorship and remains so even today. Not only has no political apology yet been issued, but the glorifications of Spain's colonial past have become normalised. Only a few months ago, Spain's current foreign minister, Josep Borrell, made the following statement:

«Spain is not going to offer the untimely apologies that are being requested, it seems a little odd now to call for apologies about events that happened 500 years ago».

[4] «Borrell on the letter from López Obrador: 'España no va a presentar esas extemporáneas disculpas que se piden'». [in English, "Spain is not going to offer the untimely apologies that are being requested"] in *ABC* (26 March 2019).

Borrell's remark came in response to requests from Latin American leaders and reflected his own bafflement.[4] At the same time, revisionist theses proliferate under the auspices of public institutions. These include arguments put forward by the philologist Elvira Roca in her book *Imperiofobia* [Empire-phobia] (2016), where she depicts Spanish colonialism as humane and claims there is no need to undertake any national self-questioning. For the African case, it will be necessary to wait for the decolonisation of the archives and for educational socialisation in order to examine Spain's role in the Atlantic slave trade and the contemporaneous occupation of the territory. Doubtless, this process will also be pushed forward by Afro-descendant communities, for instance, through legal challenges such as the one instigated almost thirty years ago in Banyoles (Girona). The case in question, which involved the desiccated remains of a Bushman on display in the Darder Museum in Banyoles, was the focus of a decade-long battle between a Haitian physician Alphons Arcelin along with other Africans and a Catalan society reluctant to examine its own racism. The Bushman was not removed and buried in Botswana until 2001, when he was given a veritable state funeral that was mounted as a symbol of restitution for the sorrow and grief of colonialism. The Darder Museum, by contrast, did not undertake any critical reformulation of the space.

Obviously, Europe's past involvement in the slave trade and colonialism is today a history of festering wounds. The continued existence of the trauma is a direct consequence of a management approach that still falls short in terms of reparations for victims and political accountability. The narratives of this latent conflict are closely bound up with the growth of xenophobia and the rise in populist discourses of hate. The structural omission of this "uncomfortable" past has confronted European identity itself, which has been challenged by diaspora communities calling for a decolonial review of public space, of representations of otherness and of national histories (Huyssen, 2003). The issue is one of "transnational memories", which are built out of multiple geographical and social experiences that include the slave trade, colonial occupation and post-colonial Africa on the move, and which have given shape to subaltern identities. Coming out of this dialectic are demands that challenge the normalised colonial heritage of our museums and streets, while also calling for justice for crimes that are still kept quiet. These demands have been answered with varying degrees of success by the institutions and political authorities that are directly concerned, situating any progress or resistance on a battleground where, based on the trend of the past decade, voices will continue to be raised in support of a colonial memory that is both critical and unvarnished. Discussions and solutions need to happen with greater speed, involving every social agent, in order to look together at the past and build a better social harmony in the present.

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OVERVIEW

'Hashtag Memory Activism' Online Commemorations and Online Memory Activism

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In these times of new media ecologies and hyperconnectivity, hashtags have become an integral part of our everyday communication. The hashtag symbol (#) is often used as a way of marking a conversation on social media platforms. Hashtags can function like a filing or retrieval system when looking for updated news on unfolding events.

In recent studies of digital protests and digital activism, attention has been given to the hashtag symbol, suggesting that the hashtag itself can become a field site (Bonilla and Rosa, 2015). Hashtag activism emerged as an important category of analysis, since online social platforms now function as sites of activism for various issues worldwide. Among some of the most prominent current examples are hashtags such as #MeToo, in the fight for gender equality, and #BlackLivesMatter, in the struggle for racial justice. Hashtag activism, as opposed to routine hashtags, has a recognisable narrative form with a beginning, a crisis/conflict, and an end (Yang 2016). In many influential cases of hashtag activism, hashtags appear in the form of complete sentences rather than single words, as in the cases of #JeNeSuisPasCharlie, #MuslimsAreNotTerrorists, and others.

In the new digital ecology of participatory media, digital media users take a stand, interact, show their disagreements, and condemn or support daily occurrences, politicians' statements, and recent news. They rapidly produce content, communicate back, share, like, tweet, and retweet. A review of some prominent Balkan-generated hashtags in 2019 reveals this dynamic. To mention only a few: #literallyjustemergedfromthewoods appeared in May 2019 in the communications of many digital media users from Kosovo and the Kosovar Albanian diaspora following a comment made by Serbian PM Ana Brnabić, who referred to Kosovo's leaders as people who "literally just came out of the woods." Over the next days, hundreds of users uploaded and posted their images, with comments and the hashtag itself, which marked the discussion and the reactions to the PM's statement (see image 1). Similarly, in reaction

to a comment made by Croatian President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, who on her official state visit to Israel in July 2019 allegedly referred to neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina as an unstable country taken over by militant Islam, many twitter users included the hashtag #undercontrolofmilitantislam in their tweets, to protest and mock the president's comments (see image 2).

Approaching the internet as a cultural space in which meaningful human interactions occur (Markham 2018: 657) allows us to connect the study of hashtag activism and hashtag memory activism to discussions of frameworks such as digitally mediated connective action (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012) and mediated mobilisation (Lievrouw, 2011).

Memory activism has been the focus of my research for more than a decade now, and in my recent work I explore and discuss the noticeable turn towards online platforms for purposes of online commemoration and advocacy, and the growing use of hashtags by memory activists in their memory work. In light of the 'connective turn' (Hoskins, 2018), the field of memory studies is undergoing developments and changes. According to Hoskins, "digital technologies and media have transformed remembering and forgetting". Here I aim to shed light on the ways these technologies and changes have also nuanced, enriched, or otherwise affected mnemonic practices and the ways memory activists use hashtags in their memory work, which I refer to as **Hashtag Memory Activism**.

The use of hashtags has become prominent in the growing phenomena of online commemoration and online **memory activism**. In my current research

Left, Kosovo ambassador to the US tweet, May 30, 2019

Right, Emir Suljagić tweet, July 31, 2019

on memory politics and memory activism in Serbia, as related to the memories of the 1990s, I have observed an increase inthe use of hashtags on social media platforms by local memory activists addressing the contested pasts in the successor states of the former Yugoslavia, as well as the appearance of online commemorations. These online activities almost always supplement rather than replace onsite activism and onsite commemorations.

Employed as a strategy of peace activism, memory activism is discussed here as activism oriented towards the past, a knowledge-based project promoting consciousness-raising and political change, undertaken outside the channels of the state (Gutman, 2017). Memory activism can appear in times of an ongoing conflict, as well as in its aftermath. As I show in my discussion below, through cases of both post-conflict dynamics of memory politics (as in the case of Serbia and the post-Yugoslav successor states) and ongoing conflict (as in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict), memory activists utilise hashtags to engage with forbidden ideas and commemorations, with disputed or silenced memories and terminologies, and with topics from concealed pasts. I define hashtag memory activism as the online commemoration of a contested past on social media, which entails the use of hashtags as a mnemonic practice; Hashtag memory activism can be employed as a mnemonic tactic which enables the creation of alternative platforms for remembrance, with the aim of sharing and disseminating alternative knowledge about a contested past among societies in and after conflict (Fridman, 2019). The hashtag as a mnemonic practice is thus being appropriated by activists as part of their memory work and advocacy campaigns. The choice of the hashtag's language is interesting as well. It may indicate the target population for the action itself, as well as the identities of those who initiate hashtag memory activism campaigns, and those who participate in them.

In what follows I introduce the analysis of two of a number of hashtags I am currently studying. The first is related to mnemonic battles in the post-Yugoslav space: #NisuNašiHeroji (#NotOurHeroes); the second is the #MyNakbaStory hashtag, related to the memory of 1948 in the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Among various questions, I explore the genealogies of each hashtag, its initiators and users, its significance to the study of online commemorations and local or regional dynamics of memory politics.

#NisuNašiHeroji (#NotOurHeroes): Generational Mnemonic Claims, Online Memory Activism, and the Post-Yugoslav space as a Region of Memory

With the closure of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in late 2017, across the successor states of the former Yugoslavia, ICTY convicts who completed their sentences (or following early release) began to return home, where they were and still are often received as heroes. In Serbia, as well as in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo, prominent convicts reclaimed roles in public life. This was when the young generation of memory activists from Serbia began to engage with these returning convicts, attempting to obstruct their public appearances and protesting at their rehabilitation and return to public life (Fridman, 2018). Among other actions, they began using a hashtag to accompany with their social media appearance and memory activism: #NisuNašiHeroji (#NotOurHeroes). The activists, members of the Youth Initiative for Human Rights (YIHR), used the hashtag as they positioned themselves through the choice of the word Our/Naši,

[1] In a counter-demonstration in Zagreb against the erection of the Tudjman monument on the 19th anniversary of his death on December 10, 2018, activists of the Zagreb YIHR office (joined by a number of other groups from Croatia) held up a sign with the hashtag #NisuNašiHeroji. See http://hr.n1info.com/Vijesti/a354523/U-Zagrebu-prosvjed-protiv-postavljanja-kipa-FranjiTudjmanu.html?fbclid=IwAR1jcCsrejc2KE1YzU8ZzG1mI1ylJTgzRhAm2LVTFFWDzOpuklW6kp2B0MA and https://balkaninsight.com/2018/12/10/the-greatest-monument-of-former-croatian-president-unveiled-in-zagreb-12-10-2018/ (accessed on June 10, 2019).

[2] See the YIHR Kosovo and Serbia joint statement http://www.yihr.rs/bhs/ratnim-zlocincima-nije-mesto-u-vladi-kosova/, where they condemn and protest the appointment of Sylejman Selimi as an advisor to the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Ramush Haradinaj. In July 2019, Haradinaj resigned from office on being summoned to the Special Tribunal in The Hague for questioning.

to indicate their belonging to a specific generation. As a regional NGO that was first formed in Belgrade (Serbia) in 2004 and today has offices in Prishtina (Kosovo), Zagreb (Croatia), Sarajevo (Bosnia-Hercegovina) and Podgorica (Montenegro), they make a generational claim, as they form a region of memory of the successor states of the former Yugoslavia, in relation to the contested memories of the wars of the 1990s throughout the region. They argue they are 'too young to remember but determined never to forget' and that these ICTY convicts are *not* the heroes of *their* generation.

On December 10, 2017, which marked International Human Rights Day, as the ICTY was closing its doors following the verdict in the Ratko Mladić trial, the group posted a composition of five pictures of their activists standing in well-known public locations in the capitals of five Yugoslav successor states, where they engage in local and regional mnemonic struggles, holding banners with their hashtag #NisuNašiHeroji [in Kosovo translating the hashtag into Albanian]. The post read: "In 2018, the [youth] Initiative will continue to fight for a society where war crimes perpetrators are not role models, and denial is not considered top-level patriotism. On this Human Rights Day, once again from the entire region, we say [war] criminals are #NotOurHeroes" (Image 3).

In utilising hashtag memory activism, these activists are making their generational claims visible and more public. Additionally, they claim theirs is not only a national struggle but a regional one, by using the same message and the same hashtag, in both their online and their onsite actions, throughout the region. As such, their campaign includes demonstrating against actions such as the erection of a monument honouring the late Franjo Tudjman in Zagreb[1], and calling on heads of state and government officials to refrain from including convicted war criminals in public positions.[2]

#MyNakbaStory: Hashtag Memory Activism and Online Commemorations as an Advocacy Tool

The #MyNakbaStory hashtag appeared prior to the May 2018 commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the 1948 Palestinian Nakba. In Israel/Palestine

A post from YIHR Serbia's organisational Twitter account, December 10, 2017.

The IMEU tweet April 30, 2018

Yousef Munayyer's tweets, with the hashtag #MyNakbaStory, May 14, 2018

(on-site), in the weeks building up to the 2018 commemoration of Nakba Day, the situation on the ground escalated with the move of the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and the large-scale demonstrations at the Gaza border (referred to in Arabic as the great March of Return), which resulted in the shooting of a large number of victims by the Israeli military. At the same time, responses began to appear online to an invitation from the US-based Institute for Middle East Understanding (IMEU) calling individuals to share their personal family Nakba stories and use the hashtag #MyNakbaStory (Image 4).

The Nakba, a source of bitter resentment among Palestinians since 1948 (Abu-Lughod and Sa'di, 2007), was thus given an online platform, used mainly by diaspora Palestinians based in the United States, who shared their family stories of loss, migration, and flight, ignored by the state of Israel and by Jewish Israeli society in its memory regime and memory laws.

"The Nakba was not only the past," as one prominent activist for Palestinian rights explained to me, "but is still an ongoing phenomenon and is part of an ongoing process... it may have been in its infancy in 1948, but has continued in a number of ways on a singular historical trajectory since then" (Interview with the author, Skype, May 7, 2019). Nakba is about the present, as the various commemorations of Nakba Day emphasise each year. Nakba Day is now firmly established in the Palestinian calendar, among Palestinian citizens of Israel (joined in smaller numbers by Jewish Israeli activists), as well as in the West Bank and Gaza (Sorek, 2015), and around the world. Just like on-site commemorations, online commemorations of Nakba on May 15 have grown and evolved in recent years.

In 2018, the initiators of the campaign at the IMEU decided to add the word 'my' to the previously used hashtag #NakbaStories. For them, this was a way for Palestinians to push back against what they see as ongoing attempts to erase their culture and history.[3] As such, on digital social platforms, people are able to share their family stories and narratives without restrictions, physical borders, walls or

[3] This corresponds to other campaigns on social media. See for example the #TweetYourThobe campaign that was launched on January 3, 2019, to celebrate Palestinian culture and the induction of Rashida Tlaib to Congress. Susan Muaddi Darraj, https://972mag.com/palestinian-sumud-tatreez/141238/; As Rashida Tlaib Is Sworn In, Palestinian-Americans Respond With #TweetYourThobe January 3, 2019 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/03/us/politics/rashida-tlaib-palestinian-thobe.html; NPR January 6, 2019 https://www.npr.org/2019/01/06/682607997/viral-hashtag-celebrates-palestinian-american-representation.

[4] Munayyer and others with whom I spoke define themselves not as memory activists but rather as advocacy activists for Palestinian rights. For them, at the present, remembering and reminding people about 1948 are part of a broader struggle for justice and rights. Here I refer only to their online activism and use of the #mynakbastory hashtag as memory activism.

checkpoints. By doing so, it allowed them to place Palestinian heritage, the memories of expulsion and the narratives of the refugees themselves, at the center of the story, and of the commemoration of the Nakba 70 years later.

Situating these narratives and images of the Palestinian presence and culture from the early 20th century in Palestine, participants assert not just their membership of a culture but also their political mnemonic claims. As Yousef Munayyer, a US-based Palestinian rights advocacy activist put it:[4]

> "there is a tremendous amount of ignorance and misinformation and even myths about Palestinians in general, and Arabs and Muslims more broadly... as being uncivilised cave-dwellers who only came to existence once Israel did... when I posted my thread, I placed a picture of my family, of my grandparents wedding day in the 1920s... in the popular imagination, such images of Palestinian civilisation comes as a surprise to so many people... an image that does not fit the limited stereotype of Palestinians as terrorists...."

(Interview with the author, **Skype, May 7, 2019) (see Image 5).**

The decision to use the hashtag only in English and not in Arabic reflects the effort to target the campaign at a Western audience and, more broadly, to help people better understand the Palestinian struggle. It allows diaspora Palestinians, mostly from North America, to connect and act together in the digital sphere.

These very short excerpts from my current research on Hashtag Memory Activism highlight the importance and innovation of this framework of analysis in the study of memory politics. This framework can be used for the examination of mnemonic struggles both in and after conflict and helps to retrieve a rich body of empirical data through social network analysis methods. Each hashtag has its own genealogy, political and mnemonic context, and various creative uses as a mnemonic practice. Each one thus reflects processes of participation and articulation as well as dynamics of change, and highlights the importance of the study of memory activism and online commemorations and its contribution to critical peace and conflict studies.

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Lenin's Mausoleum: A Haunted House on Red Square[1]

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"Lenin lived, Lenin lives, Lenin will live!"
Vladimir Mayakovsky

Much has changed since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. An empire has vanished from the maps, while economic and social changes have proceeded quickly but unevenly. Yet, in spite of such turbulence, one of the most iconic places of Soviet memory still remains. Vladimir Lenin, the first leader of the Soviet Union, died in 1924 and has been lying in an open coffin in the centre of Moscow for over ninety years. More than a Soviet curiosity for the occasional tourist; Lenin's Mausoleum, as the literal embodiment of state sovereignty, demonstrates the uneven patterns of commemorating and dealing with the Soviet past in contemporary Russia.

Before he died, Lenin asked to be buried in a cemetery next to his mother in Petrograd. Immediately after his death, opinions were divided as to where and how to bury him. Although Lenin's widow was opposed to embalmment and public viewing in Red Square, Stalin prevailed. Lenin's body was embalmed and prepared for his unusual afterlife. The idea of a temporary mausoleum changed in an unprecedented way when the Funeral Commission was renamed Commission for the Immortalization of the Memory of Vladimir Ulyanov Lenin. With this bureaucratic change in July 1924, Lenin's body was transformed

[1] This is a shortened version of «Haunted House: Memory, Ghosts and Political Theology in Lenin's Mausoleum,» that was published in *Constellations: A Journal of Critical and Democracy Theory*, Vol 24, No 4, December 2017, 555-569.

People queue in front of the Lenin Mausoleum on Red Square, in the background St. Basil's Cathedral and Kremlin. March 1925 | Bundesarchiv via Wikimedia Deutschland

from being prepared for burial to having his remains preserved for immortality, remembrance and veneration. The Mausoleum assumed a life of its own in the power vacuum that immediately followed his death. After Stalin's death in 1953, his body was also embalmed and interred next to that of Lenin. However, after Khrushchev's speech in 1956 denouncing Stalin, his etched name was removed from the marble façade of the Mausoleum, and he was buried at a gravesite in front of the Kremlin wall in 1961.

Remarkably durable, Lenin's remains have survived the various permutations of the Soviet empire and its subsequent collapse. With the exception of his removal for safekeeping during the Great Patriotic War, and regular periods of re-embalming, Lenin's preserved body has resided continuously in the Mausoleum since his death. Throughout the twentieth century, and into the twenty-first, Lenin lives. Although it was possible to bury Stalin's embalmed remains in 1961, burying Lenin proves to be more difficult because his removal from Red Square entails a re-thinking of the October Revolution of 1917, Leninism, the role of the Communist Party and the creation of the Soviet Union. As a place of memory and long-standing artefact on the necropolis of Red Square, it is an iconic part of the memorial landscape of the capital city.



Lenin's Mausoleum from Gum galleries | Grebol9 via Wikimedia Commons

Warped mourning for the victims of communism

Alexander Etkind argues that individuals in post-Soviet Russia are characterised by a particular type of 'warped mourning'. State recognition of communist crimes, while not absent from contemporary Russia remains deeply distorted. Suppression of citizen initiatives such as Memorial Society and Perm-36 Museum, dedicated to the victims of communist oppression, in conjunction with the continued veneration of Lenin's grave indicate the complexity of coming to terms with the Soviet past in contemporary Russia. If Germany's transition from fascism to democracy entailed defeat, division, occupation and criminal trials, Russia's transition to democracy has taken different paths that include collapse, implosion, popular uprising and reinvention of the sovereign state.

Taking his cue from Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich's (1975) study of the inability to mourn the Nazi past in post-war Germany, Etkind traces a post-Soviet 'inability to mourn' similar to that of West Germany during the 1960s. (2013: 207). The memory of Lenin as father of the Russian Revolution and founder of the Soviet Union is distinguished from the memory of Stalin, associated with terror, the Gulag, modernisation and the Great Patriotic War. Indeed, while official German acknowledgement of the Nazi past began in military defeat, Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945) continues to influence how the communist legacy is remembered in contemporary Russia.

The maintenance of Lenin's embalmed body in a temporary state of waiting for burial illustrates Etkind's concept of warped mourning. The artificial embalming and corporal adaptations have created a hybrid body that is neither fully human nor artificial, but something in between. Moreover, the protracted period of state mourning for the first leader of the USSR has blossomed into a theatrical staging of commemorative rituals. In venerating the sacred image of Lenin as a quasi-godlike sovereign, the criminal nature of the Soviet regime that he founded is obscured. Instead, the prolonged period



Lenin Mausoleum outside the walls of the Kremlin in Moscow (2011) | CaritasUbi via Wikimedia Commons

of state mourning suspends Lenin's body in between revolutionary time and that of post-Soviet Russia. At present, Lenin is waiting for burial, yet is viewed as if buried in an open coffin. Lying in state, in an extended wake of more than ninety years, his body has a ghostly liminal presence.

The grave as a sacred and haunted place of memory

If the grave marks the passage from life to death – what could a body that is perpetually waiting for burial signify? Moreover, if the regime that the leader founded no longer exists, why is he still revered as a modern-day relic? After all, Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov was not just any political leader, but the first leader of the USSR and father of the Russian Revolution. Graves are one of the most primal places of memory, linking generations together and reinforcing the social need to commemorate the dead (Ruin 2019). Although many statues to Lenin have been torn down, Lenin's Mausoleum is different. As a grave with human remains, it is not easy to dismantle or relocate.

Jacques Derrida's attention to the unintended ways that the past haunts the present is relevant for understanding how the commemoration of Lenin's role in the Soviet Union is a complex mixture of restoration, borrowing, rupture and continuity. Complementing the work of Etkind and Oushakine, Derrida reflects on the spectral legacy of Karl Marx and the relationship between past and present generations. Of particular importance is Derrida's argument that living in the present means living with the inheritance of the past. «And this being-with-specters would also be, not only but also, a politics of memory, of inheritance, and of generations» (1994: xviii-xix). In reflecting on the complex legacy of Marx, Derrida suggests there is a different kind of relation to the past. If ontology is concerned with presence and existence, hauntology focuses on the presence of that which is absent.

«All the questions on the subject of being or of what is to be (or not to be) are questions of inheritance... That we are heirs does not mean that we have or that we receive this or that, some inheritance that enriches us one day with this or that, but that the being of what we are is first of all inheritance, whether we like it or know it or not» (Ibid: 54).

Of particular importance is Derrida's argument that living in the present means living with the inheritance of the past. Since we are heirs to the past, the way in which the past is received is very much open to interpretation. We do not choose when we are born. Our sense of self is first of all inheritance. Traditionally, an open coffin is the last instance when mourners bid farewell before burial or cremation. However, visitors to Lenin's Mausoleum have been in a state of warped mourning for over ninety years. Instead of burial, his artificially preserved body has become a life-like hybrid monument, a pure sign and symbol.

Political theology of the Soviet and post-Soviet state

Immediately after his death, Lenin's Mausoleum functioned as a kind of 'pilgrimage site of the Lenin cult' and was quickly associated with sovereignty (Tumarkin 1997: 267). Nikita Khrushchev's decision to return to the purity of Lenin during the period of de-Stalinization conjured up Lenin's spirit against Stalinist excess. Stalin had deviated from the foundational doctrine of Leninism and the spirit of revolution. Lenin was higher than Stalin; hence his physical presence suggested the continuity of state sovereignty and the Communist Party, regardless of changes in the political leadership.

As a place of memory, the tribune on Lenin's Mausoleum was the most important place where party leaders gathered on revolutionary holidays to commemorate the October Revolution and the Great Patriotic War. The Mausoleum was the iconic site for viewing parades, especially those held on Victory Day so that the spectral presence of Lenin accompanied Soviet leaders as they stood over his preserved sovereign body. As Alexei Yurchak argues, Lenin «literally transcended every individual body of party members, leaders, and even Lenin himself; it was, in fact, the immortal body of the sovereign» (2015: 147).

Scientists at the Mausoleum Lab (Centre for Scientific Research and Teaching Methods in Biochemical Technologies) preserve the physical remains of Lenin's body. While only his face, hands and dark suit are visible to the viewer, the Mausoleum group maintains the flexibility and life-like quality of Lenin's body. Once every eighteen months, his body undergoes lengthy re-embalming procedures lasting for up to two months -with treatments include attention to joints, hair and the skeletal system. Throughout the decades, doctors have developed new techniques for preserving his body, requiring regular re-embalming, baths and the substitution of organic material with artificial ones (Yurchak 2015).

While the modern secular state continues to sanctify relics with the internment of remains in tombs of the unknown soldier, the cult of veneration

The grave of Joseph Stalin at the Kremlin Necropolis | aydenSoloviev via Wikimedia Commons



Aleksey Shchusev's granite structure incorporates some elements from ancient mausoleums, such as the Step Pyramid and the Tomb of Cyrus the Grea | Jorge Láscar via Wikimedia Commons

surrounding Lenin's Mausoleum is different. If the cults of Stalin, Mao Zhedong and Tito were 'cults of a living leader' the cult of Lenin was anchored in his sovereign dead remains. (Tumarkin 1997: 3), In the Russian Orthodox religion, a person is considered a saint if their body does not decompose or putrefy. The fact that Lenin's body does not decompose suggests his peculiar association with sainthood.

The cult of Leninism helped to shore up the continuity of the Soviet state. Lenin is not only venerated as the first leader of the Soviet Union but is symbolically linked to the October Revolution of 1917 and the continuity of the Russian state with the Soviet Union. He is associated with revolutionary time, as well as the lineage of the state from Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, through Stalin and present-day Vladimir Putin. Moreover, the extraordinary circumstances of his afterlife link him with religious relics and the immortal presence of the sovereign. His preserved body has become a state-sanctified relic linked to the legitimation of the Soviet Union and its warped mourning for communist repressions.

The breakup of the Soviet Union, coup d'état and transition to democracy left a power vacuum in 1991. After the city of Leningrad returned to its original name of St Petersburg, Boris Yeltsin removed the honour guards from the Mausoleum in 1993. He also suggested that Lenin should be buried, and raised the issue again in 1997; however, political forces were opposed to his burial for the sake of tradition and continuity.

In 2001, Putin argued against the removal of Lenin by suggesting that because many people in the older generation continue to identify with Lenin and Communism, his burial might dislodge their sense of stability. The Mausoleum, like the Soviet melody to the Russian national anthem, maintains national continuity and social stability during times of loss, difficult transition and political

change. In contemporary Russia, legitimized by the Great Patriotic War and antifascism, there is little political will to bury Lenin. In 2010 Putin again argued against the removal of Lenin's body from Red Square. During his presidential campaign in 2012 he linked the preservation of Lenin's body to traditions within the Orthodox Church (Birnbaum 2013, Ponomareva 2012). In his speech, Putin echoed the sentiment of the leader of Russia's Communist Party, Gennady Zyuganov, who argued that the preservation of Lenin's body 'complies with Orthodox canons and traditions.' Appealing to the immense loss of continuity after the fall of the Soviet Union, Putin called for a return 'to our historic roots.' (Putin quoted in Ponomareva).

Lenin's venerated remains sustain the continuity of the Russian state throughout its various permutations as tsarist, Soviet and sovereign democracy. As a place of warped mourning, his open coffin is a reminder of his political presence and mythical role in the Russian Revolution. Lenin's Mausoleum merges the functions of gravesite, place of memory and symbol of Soviet state power. While there is indeed official recognition of repression during the Soviet Union, as long as his Mausoleum remains open, Lenin's role in this state-sponsored violence is played down. His physical and spectral presence near the Kremlin highlights veneration rather than critical reflection. Lenin's Mausoleum demonstrates that the past is not at all past, but has been rearranged according to contemporary political interests. If Soviet leaders could bury Stalin in 1961, they could not bury Lenin because of his founding role in the 1917 Revolution and the canonization of Leninism as a doctrine. The first leader of the Soviet Union has an unusual afterlife. He is undead.

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Memorial Monuments as Hangovers of the Socialist Yugoslav Past

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In all modern societies, monuments play an important role in the process of construction of the historical or collective memory. During the times of socialist Yugoslavia, the state and the society were no exception. For more than four decades after the end of WWII, throughout the lifespan of socialist Yugoslavia, an exceptionally large number of "socialist monuments" were built, and numerous sculptors and other artists participated in this endeavour. Public monuments are probably the most visible examples of a country's culture of memory, and are therefore also often at the centre of controversies during periods of political transition.

In Croatia alone, over 6000 partisan monuments and memory sites were erected between 1945 and 1990. As early as 1961 inventories already included more than 14,400 monuments and memorials throughout Yugoslavia. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in the south-eastern part of Europe, was a federation of six republics – Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia (including Kosovo and Vojvodina), Montenegro and Macedonia.[1] Thanks to the internet, the pictures of these monuments are easily accessible.[2] However, as Owen Hatherley recently stated, photos of Yugoslav monuments known as spomeniks (the south Slavic word for monument) are often shared online, exoticised and wrenched from context; he stressed the importance of trying to

[1] See Aleksandar Jakir: „Spomenici su prošlost i budućnost". Politički i administrativni mehanizami financiranja spomenika za vrijeme socijalističke Jugoslavije, in: Časopis za suvremenu povijest 2019. br. 1, 151-182. https://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=321808; and Aleksandar Jakir: Memories in Conflict. Remembering the Partisans, the Second World War and Bleiburg in Croatia, in: Tanja Zimmermann (ed.): Balkan Memories: Media Constructions of National and Transnational History (transcript) Bielefeld 2012, 187-205.

[2] https://www.bing.com/images/search?q=socialist+monuments+yugoslavia&qpvt=Socialist+Monuments+Yugoslavia&FORM=IGRE

[3] https://www.calvertjournal.com/articles/show/7269/spomenik-yugoslav-monument-owen-hatherley?utm_medium=website&utm_source=archdaily.com

Monument to the Revolution (1967), World War II memorial in Podgarić, Croatia, one of Džamonja's best-known works | Plamen at Serbian Wikipedia

understand what they truly represent.[3] An exhibition at The Museum of Modern Art in New York in 2018 under the title *Toward a Concrete Utopia: Architecture in Yugoslavia, 1948–1980* introduced the exceptional work of socialist Yugoslavia's leading architects to an international audience, highlighting the importance of this significant but neglected body of modernist architecture, whose forward-thinking contributions still resonate today.[4] It has been stated that the architecture that emerged during the period of socialist Yugoslavia — from International Style skyscrapers to Brutalist "social condensers" — is a manifestation of the radical pluralism, hybridity, and idealism that characterised the Yugoslav state itself.[5]

[4] https://www.moma.org/calendar/exhibitions/3931, see also the article by Niall Patrick Walsh: https://www.archdaily.com/908777/an-expert-guide-through-momas-toward-a-concrete-utopia-architecture-in-yugoslavia-1948-nil-1980

[5] https://placesjournal.org/article/concrete-utopia-architecture-in-yugoslavia/?cn-reloaded=1&cn-reloaded=1; https://www.archdaily.com/796770/jonks-photographs-depict-the-abandonment-and-beauty-of-yugoslavian-monuments

Above, there is a picture of the Monument to the Revolution of the people of Moslavina, a region in Croatia, by the sculptor Dušan Džamonija: Since the break-up of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, thousands of these monuments dedicated to anti-fascist Partisan fighters and victims of Croatia's World War II Ustasa regime, or representing other symbols of socialist Yugoslavia, have been vandalised or demolished, and many activists in Croatia are now determined to halt the destruction.[6] But one could add that in spite of the collapse of the old state and the wars of the 1990s, in some parts of Croatia at least a significant number of these monuments have remained untouched.

There is a complex relationship between commemorative sculptures or monuments and the formation of a collective memory. Today it is widely accepted that historical memory neither reproduces past events nor is an expression of past facts; rather, it is a construct through which past or present events are filtered, interpreted and then re-interpreted. Collective memories always represent an act of reconstruction and design, and are therefore inseparable from the social context. Collective remembrance changes, and so memorial architecture changes as well. The construction, destruction, restoration, or censorship of a country's monuments allows scholars to analyse how political elites seek to transmit their ideological worldview and the mechanisms they use to mould the past in order to obtain contemporary political legitimacy. Both institutionalised memory – the interpretations of the past constructed by political elites, their supporters, and their opponents – and individual memory are primarily subject to the needs of the present.

The political structures in socialist Yugoslavia were well aware of the importance of monuments as the most visible expressions of the socialist interpretation of history. The design of the memorial complex at Sutjeska is an outstanding example of the creation a desired memory culture from the perspective of the Yugoslav state.[7]

The proposal for the monument at Tjentište (in Bosnia-Hercegovina) by the sculptor Miodrag Živković was accepted as a perfect symbol and artistic expression of the "inescapable meaning" of the Battle of Sutjeska in 1943. The battle exemplified the struggle of all the Yugoslav nations against "foreign occupiers and domestic traitors". The battle was defined as "a glorious historical example with far-reaching consequences, exalted and unique". Živković's work is still the most famous Partisan monument in the territory of the former socialist Yugoslavia. It was mentioned as a place of memory and as a site for a memorial complex for the first time in 1954. After Josip Broz Tito personally endorsed the ultimate design concept, he played a crucial role in adopting the law on financing the works in the memorial complex in Sutjeska. The design of the memorial complex at Tjentište, a place where it was claimed that "5,000 soldiers were buried", cost approximately 57.8 million dinars, and was financed entirely by federal funds. Officially the monument was unveiled in 1971 in the presence of Josip Broz Tito under the title "Monument of Victory". However, in an increasingly decentralised system, actors such as the Union of Partisan Veterans feared that the building of the memorial complex might meet with opposition on financial grounds, and so they quickly unveiled the monument, even though it was not yet finished. So by the beginning of the 1970s, although "brotherhood and unity" remained the official motto of the Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia, the demands for "transparent accounting" within the federation were applied to all financial issues, and the financing of monuments and memorial complexes of common Yugoslav significance was

[6] https://balkaninsight.com/2019/05/21/the-struggle-to-save-croatias-vanishing-anti-fascist-monuments/

[7] https://www.bing.com/images/search?q=tjenti%c5%a1te&qpvt=Tjenti%c5%a1te&FORM=IGRE

no exception. And as far as the cultivation of the socialist memory is concerned, it is also clear that the members of the victorious partisans during the war and the representatives of the governing structures after 1945 were unable to pass on their conception of the memory to new generations, not even through the imposing and artistic monument to the Battle of Sutjeska. Nevertheless, the dominant interpretation of the battle in the post-Yugoslav context, as recent examples show, reflects the intentions emphasised at the time when the monument was erected in Tjentište. In the eyes of many in the Balkans, Sutjeska continues to represents the symbol of the sacrifice, brotherhood and unity of the heroic anti-Fascist struggle, marking a milestone on the path to victory of Tito's partisans in the National War of Liberation of 1941-45.

But at the same time it must be stressed that socialist monuments did not reflect plurality, nor did they attempt to integrate dissenting views: it was the struggle of the communist-led partisans under the command of Tito that was glorified. The official culture of remembrance during the times of socialist Yugoslavia promoted memories that endorsed the regime and its ideology, and repressed other narratives. After 1990, partisan monuments, and public spaces in general, underwent an ideological and ethno-national transformation in order to excise the Yugoslav past from the dominant historical narrative and to replace it with new national accounts. Today it seems that we have competing narratives of the past in the societies and states that emerged after the break-up of Yugoslavia. Research and scholarship that will help to deal with this "difficult heritage" by contextualising controversial events and interpretations of the problematic *Age of Extremes* (Eric Hobsbawm) seems to be of crucial importance in all the countries of the former Yugoslavia.

Tjentište War Memorial | Thierry Figini via Flickr

REVIEW

CINEMA

The transmission of memory in the struggle for justice: The silence of others

David González
Historian, project manager
at the **EUROM**

The documentary *The silence of others* (2018) describes the personal and collective struggle in Spanish society to denounce and prosecute the crimes of the Franco dictatorship. Directed by Almudena Carracedo and Robert Bahar, and produced by, among others, the Almodóvar brothers, the movie has been presented at numerous international film festivals and has won several prizes, among them the Spanish Academy's Goya award for best documentary in 2019.

The film tells the story of the *querella argentina*, a lawsuit brought in the courts of Argentina against the crimes of the Franco regime. The film overlays the two processes: the recording and structuring of the documentary, and the legal process itself. In both cases, the protagonists give real-life testimony of the events. The suit was presented in an Argentine criminal court in April 2010, by Judge María Servini, based on the principles of universal justice and the imprescriptible nature of crimes against humanity. In Spain, Judge Baltasar Garzón had earlier opened an inquiry into the crimes of the dictatorship, but was forced to abandon the investigation after being denounced by several ultra-right organizations for breach of trust. Although he was later acquitted, his removal signalled the end of the case in Spain and the termination of any attempt by the Spanish courts to judge the crimes of the Franco dictatorship. So the decision was taken to appeal to international justice: initially, the lawsuit had only two plaintiffs, but they were soon joined by several hundred more thanks to the social mobilization and media campaigns launched in Spain. This mobilization led to the creation in 2013 of CEAQUA, a nationwide group coordinating support for the *querella argentina*.

The silence of others shows the complexities of an even broader process in which both the film and the lawsuit are inscribed: the process known in Spain as the "recovery of historical memory". The starting point of this process was the first scientific exhumation of

El silencio de otros (2018).
Directed by Almudena Carracedo and Robert Bahar.
Produced by El Deseo. 95' | ©El Deseo

a mass grave from the Franco period, carried out in 2000 in Priaranza del Bierzo in León. Over the years, the historical memory movement gradually acquired the scope and the size necessary for the pursuit of its objective: to seek out the truth and to bring justice and redress for the victims of Francoism.

This background is important in order to understand why a trial became the subject of a documentary. The first archive images that appear at the beginning of the film evoke the events that make up the "historical memory" in Spain and highlight the existence of a pacto de olvido (literally, a "pact of forgetting") of everything that happened before the legislation passed in 1977. Popularly known as the Amnesty Act, it was well received by the political prisoners of the dictatorship, although it also provided protection for the people responsible for state crimes under Francoism. This became known as "the Spanish model of impunity": the documentary shows the Basque politician Xabier Arzalluz using this term in the Spanish parliament to describe the legislation.

Although the story is told by several people, the film's real protagonists are all of Franco's victims: relatives of people murdered by the regime, who are now fighting to give them a proper burial; the women whose babies were stolen at birth; and the people who were tortured at police headquarters. It was the victims' families who planted the seed of the movement for reparation, in which the symbolism of a dignified burial would bring the peace that many relatives sought through this process. María Martín and Ascensión Mendieta, two old women, represent the tireless struggle of all those who work to honour the memory of their relatives killed by Franco. María has fought all her life for the right to move her mother's remains from a roadside ditch to the town cemetery, a dream that sadly she had not seen fulfilled by the time of her death in 2014. She gives chilling testimony of the response of the local Francoist authorities to her request to be allowed to bury her mother in the cemetery: «you'll take her to the cemetery when the frogs grow hair so stop bothering us – you don't want us to do to you what we did to her». Ascensión, who died in September 2019, was able to give her father Timoteo a decent burial in 2017.

The number of babies stolen by the dictatorship

is estimated at about 30,000. Justified in the early years of the regime on pseudo-scientific grounds, newborns of women considered unfit to raise them were given to families with links to the regime, a practice that persisted until well into the post-dictatorship period. María Mercedes Bueno gave birth to her baby on 24 December, 1981 at the Municipal Hospital of La Linea, province of Cádiz. Sedated and unconscious during the delivery, she was told upon waking that the baby had died and that the hospital would take care of everything. Twenty-eight years later, reading about several cases of stolen babies in the press, it dawned on her that her baby might be among them. The practice of stealing the babies of left-wing mothers had been instigated at the beginning of the dictatorship by Doctor Vallejo Nájera, a follower of Nazi eugenic theory, intent on eliminating an alleged "red gene" from Spanish society. Over the decades, the stealing of babies became an issue of "morals" more than an ideological one. It lasted well into the 1980s, a symptom of a corrupt plot whose eradication would have required a high-level purge – something that never happened during the transition.

The people tortured by the regime's security forces have been able to provide firsthand accounts of their experiences. Some of their tormentors are still alive, and the testimony of the victims means that the names of torturers such as Jesús Muñecas Aguilar and Antonio González Pacheco, alias "*Billy el niño*", have come to light. Among the torture victims who feature in the documentary is José María "Chato" Galante, whose narrative brings home the reality of state violence and abuse of power so typical of the Franco dictatorship. Galante is also one of the main instigators of the lawsuit.

Whatever the verdicts passed on the defendants in the lawsuit, *The silence of others* draws attention, on a social level, to an impunity that is still enjoyed by many people close to the Franco regime. Memory, so often projected in a kaleidoscopic way, serves in this film as a bearer of justice. Its infinite nuances are manifested in several moments: for example, the discussion between Luis and Mª Ángeles, the children of María Martín, about the point of delving into the past, or the interaction between the campaigns in Spain and Argentina for the recovery of stolen babies, highlight the complexity of the processes of historical memory and their importance as an instrument for redress. The story of the film is accompanied by impressive photography, as well as several archive images that complement the narrative. Particularly powerful are the images in the trailer, where we see María Martín sitting at the foot of a ditch where the bodies of the unknown victims were deposited, or the panoramic view of the Mirador de la Memoria in the town of El Torno in Cáceres. In this beautiful enclave in the Jerte Valley, since 2008 a sculptural ensemble has paid homage to the victims of Francoism. The monument was made by Francisco Cedenilla, an artist whose grandfather was shot in October 1936.

The silence of others is, in the strict sense of the word, an extraordinary documentary. The quality of the production, the participation of many historical memory associations, and the single-minded dedication of a process that matured over the six years of recording mark the film as a unique achievement. Perhaps most significantly, it is able to reach new audiences which had never seen a depiction of historical memory in Spain. Its airing on state public television in prime time and the high audience figures bear witness to the interest it aroused.

In the face of this media impact, it is not surprising that some critical voices have been raised. It has been said that certain specific data are not presented accurately in the documentary, that the cases of the different victims are not sufficiently differentiated, or that the narrative is excessively fictionalized. Perhaps the term "documentary" is not the most appropriate to name a film whose protagonists, despite being real people experiencing real situations, appear in a story where it seems that the temporary persona prevails over the person. Obviously *The silence of others* is a subjective reading of the events. Perhaps the important thing here is to distinguish between a possible caricaturization and a legitimate use of fiction in the interests of creating a more attractive audiovisual language able to achieve

the desired aim: that is, to give a voice to Franco's victims in the laborious and sometimes thankless task of fighting for truth, justice and reparation in a country whose transition to democracy was not accompanied by a clear break with the dictatorial regime that preceded it. Perhaps it is a case of the classic dichotomy between the scientific and the non-specialist, and in this situation the only assessment available to us is a subjective one in which each individual can decide what is more important – whether to be radically faithful to the truth or, whether, without distorting it, to customize it in order to increase its impact. Undoubtedly, there will always be detractors of one or the other option.

The fact that the film prioritizes the sentimental over the documentary is corroborated by the directors themselves. In the many interviews granted by Almudena Carracedo and Robert Bahar, they talk of their main objective: to place the focus on the human element, on small personal stories rather than on large-scale quantitative data. This vision is potentially accurate as long as it manages to reach the public, arousing a personal empathy that transcends abstract discourses and, thus, perhaps, penetrates the collective account.

Can an individual reaction of empathy and solidarity with the victims of the documentary arouse interest in a specific social movement such as the campaign for historical memory? Is the "sentimental" vision the directors bestow on the documentary justifiable? The answers to these questions depend on how we respond to their strategy. We return once more to the field of subjectivity. In my humble and subjective opinion, it is impossible not to empathize with María Martín and her reflections on human injustice, just as it is impossible not to be moved by the sincerity of Ascensión Mendieta. The connection that we feel with these old women in their struggle should encourage us to watch the film without wondering about other issues of a more technical or narrative nature. Through the perseverance and dignity of María Martín and Ascensión Mendieta, the historical memory movement can only be reinforced. And this is memory in its purest form – not data, not clinically exact accounts, but the transmission of a past history for which closure will only be found when amends are effectively made. And as part of a collective process, the attainment of this goal inevitably enhances the value of memory as a means for ensuring that justice is done. All this, always, from the present and into the future.

REVIEW

MUSUEM

"Twenty three and a half" Hrant Dink Site of Memory

Oriol López Badell
Historian, **EUROM** coordinator

In June 2019, Istanbul welcomed a new site of memory very close to Taksim Square, the epicentre of contemporary Turkey's pro-democracy demonstrations. The venue, which bears the enigmatic name of "Twenty three and a half", is dedicated to the figure of the Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink, who was assassinated in 2007 in front of the building that now houses his memorial. The venue's space, which is relatively small, modern and ingeniously designed, occupies the former offices of the newspaper Agos, a prominent publication for Turkey's Armenian community, where Dink served as editor-in-chief. Agos was founded in 1996 as a newspaper whose various subjects included pursuing investigations into the conflicts of the past, such as the Armenian genocide instigated by the Turkish government in 1915. The paper's articles often sparked controversy among the more conservative sectors of Turkish society and eventually became a pretext for death threats against its founder, Dink.

The turning point came in 2004 when Dink published an article revealing that the adopted child of Kemal Atatürk, who is regarded as the father of modern Turkey, was an Armenian orphan. Based on statements from relatives of the girl, the article brought to light that Atatürk's daughter, Sabiha Gökçen, a national symbol and a role model for Turkish women, had been adopted from an orphanage in Armenia. The news was taken as an affront by a large part of the population. A few days later, the deputy governor of Istanbul summoned Dink and demanded that he "be careful" with what he published, and a number of anti-Dink protests took place outside the Agos newspaper offices. The courts issued a stream of threats and rulings until three years later, on 19 January 2007, a seventeen-year-old man made an arrangement ostensibly to meet with Dink and then shot him to death.

Since then, there have been a host of initiatives to remember Dink: every year on the anniversary of his assassination, thousands of people gather in front of the newspaper's

Atlantis Civilization Room | Mıgırdiç Arzivyan



Corridor | Hrant Dink Foundation

1. Hrant Dink's room | Hadiye Cangökçe

2. Salt and Light-Installation by Sarkis | Hrant Dink Foundation

offices, and in 2012 a commemorative plaque was laid in the pavement on the spot where Dink was murdered. At the same time, a group of Dink's family members, friends and co-workers began to consider the possibility of creating a memorial site at the Agos offices that might serve not only to remember Dink, but also to uphold and defend the history and culture of the Armenian population in Turkey as well as the rights of all minorities. As work began on the project, they decided to create both a local advisory committee and an international one made up of artists, historians and university professors, from Turkey and from other countries, who would oversee the entire process of creation. One of the recommendations from the two advisory committees was to learn from the experience of museums and monuments around the globe. Over months of intense work, the team at the Hrant Dink Foundation paid a visit to 65 museums and more than twenty monuments in ten countries in Europe, Africa and the Americas.

Their visits certainly enriched the conception of the memorial to Hrant Dink and may have even inspired the design of some of its rooms. Beyond doubt, though, the new memorial bears its own individual stamp. The space is neither strident nor shrill and the utmost respect has gone into its installation within the former newspaper offices. Nor is the museography intrusive. Rather, it is well-suited to the environment, incorporating the most modern techniques, such as cameras that can record a visitor's personal message, while at the same successfully preserving the newspaper's work environment, making any visit a pleasant experience. Even the small kitchen where the Agos staff heated up their lunch is now an open space where visitors can stop for a coffee or take a short break. Going through the memorial, the visitor will find out all about the life of Hrant Dink, learn about the diversity of Turkish society and gain an in-depth knowledge of the reality of Turkey's Armenian community. In addition, each of the small rooms contains printed copies of short press articles that can be taken home for further study and reflection. The last room on the visit is Hrant Dink's office, a space frozen in time, which remains exactly as the journalist left it and now features a major work of contemporary art by the French-Armenian artist known as Sarkis.

And where does the name of the new memorial come from? It takes its name from an article that Hrant Dink published in 1996, entitled "23.5 April", in which he described the importance of two significant dates: 23 April, Turkey's national sovereignty and children's day, and 24 April, the day commemorating the start of the Armenian genocide. In his article, Dink as a Turkish-Armenian citizen chose a number midway between the two dates in order to put across the idea of a shared future lived in peace and constant dialogue.

REVIEW

BOOK

Melancolía de izquierda. *Después de las utopías.*

TRAVERSO, Enzo (2019) Barcelona: Galaxia Gutenberg, pp. 415 [original title. **Left-Wing Melancholia: Marxism, History, and Memory**. Columbia University Press, 2016]

Ricard Conesa
Historian, project officer at the EUROM

Enzo Traverso (Gavi, Italia, 1957) is a well-known figure to scholars of historical memory and readers of this journal. The previous issue of *Observing Memories* contains a brief and thought-provoking interview in which the Cornell University professor speaks on a variety of current issues: the effects of the victim/aggressor dichotomy, post-fascisms, the complex legacy of dictatorships and European policies on historical memory. Traverso's internationally renowned body of work is wide and varied, covering topics such as the Holocaust, intellectuals, policies on historical memory, and historiographical debates on violence and revolution. As a historian, Traverso has never sought to hide his political commitment to the left, and his latest volume, in the words of the philosopher Josep Ramoneda in the Spanish edition, is a "libro militante"—a militant, activist book.

The contents of Left-Wing Melancholia include a foreword, an introduction and seven chapters (some of which have been published earlier in different formats) that set out to rethink the history of socialism and Marxism through the lens of melancholia, connecting the intellectual debates to their cultural forms. Following this approach, the book shifts constantly back and forth between concepts and images, drawing its source material from paintings, photographs and films, that is, from what Walter Benjamin called Denkbilder (in English "thought-images" or "thinking images"). Traverso examines the emotional universe and cultural footprints of the melancholia of missed opportunities, lost struggles and battles for emancipation, and future utopias that were never realised yet remained in the memory of the left, providing a self-critical knowledge of its past and keeping alive a "horizon of expectation" that vanished with the end of communism. It was a forward-

looking memory that disappeared at the end of the twentieth century with the eclipse of utopias, when the idea of the "vanquished" faded away and the paradigm of the "victim" took hold: «The memory of the Gulag erased that of revolution, the memory of the Holocaust replaced that of antifascism, and the memory of slavery eclipsed that of anti-colonialism: the remembrance of the victims seems unable to coexist with the recollection of their struggles, of their conquests and their defeats».

Not only does Traverso pursue the melancholy universe of the left with the aid of a robust body of theoretical works (Siegfried Kracauer, Walter Benjamin, Sigmund Freud, Reinhart Koselleck...), but he also reconstructs an entire genealogy of Marxist thought, delving into the (few) relations that the Marxist school has retained with studies focusing on historical memory. Traverso also goes on to examine a wide range of films (movies directed by L. Visconti, G. Pontercorvo, T. Angelopoulos, K. Loach and others), using them as a barometer of left-wing consciousness to reveal the left's dilemmas and changes over time. Employing the concept of "sites of memory", Traverso distances himself from Pierre Nora, instead highlighting the films' storylines that pertain to the private, intimate, emotional and sensitive realm in which collective experiences intersect with individual fates and which Traverso describes as hidden, secret, "Marrano memories" with which everybody can identify in spite of their irreducible uniqueness.

In his investigation of the left, Traverso continues with a thought-provoking analysis of the figure of the bohemian—from the artiste maudit, or accursed artist, to the scheming or conniving intellectual—and trains his eye on K. Marx, Gustave Courbet, W. Benjamin and L. Trotsky and the role that bohemians have played in revolutionary movements. Traverso also analyses Marx's ethnocentrism within the context of the epistemic framework of the German's times and how it affected his view of colonialism, an influence that would persist in later Marxist schools, such as the Frankfurt School, and that Traverso has dissected here in the form of a "missed dialogue" between Theodor Adorno and the historian Cyril L.R. James. Traverso stays with the figure of Adorno and delves into his complex relationship with Benjamin, their theoretical commonalities and their differences, especially in their respective views of history and the conception of fascism. Lastly, Traverso sets out Daniel Bensaïd's rereading of Marx and the influence of Benjamin in order to confront "the end of history".

This work of Traverso stands at a distance from his earlier books. His investigation into the memory of the left, incited to action by the explosive tension between past and future, together with his genealogy of Marxism, serve as a theoretical recharge or reloading for the left, placing value on a left-wing melancholia that «does not mean to abandon the idea of socialism or the hope for a better future; it means to rethink socialism in a time in which its memory is lost, hidden, and forgotten and needs to be redeemed. This melancholia does not mean lamenting a lost utopia, but rather rethinking a revolutionary project in a non revolutionary age».



REVIEW

MUSEUM

Lipa's commitment The Memorial Centre Lipa Remembers

Carlota Sánchez Vidal
Historian, **University of Barcelona**

The small village of Lipa is located in the municipality of Matulji, in the north-eastern part of the county of Primorje-Gorski Kotar, just five kilometres from the border between Croatia and Slovenia. This fact is a defining aspect of the identity of the residents of Lipa, as demonstrated by a popular expression in the region: «We are not from Mount Ćićarija, Istria, or from the Brkini Hills, whose citizens are our neighbours from the Slovenian region; we are right on the border».

Throughout history, the village of Lipa and the surrounding region has been a strategic territory because of two important routes that used to split there: the road that linked the coast of Croatia to the inland and the road that joined Croatia to the European continent. As a result, the region gained great geopolitical importance and has been the subject of disputes at various times in its history.

The museum building itself also demonstrates Lipa's geographical significance. In 1756, it became home to the region's first post office. In 1885, the building became the village's first public school. By the end of the nineteenth century, the road that joins inland Croatia to the coast no longer ran through Lipa and the village's strategic importance waned.

The Lipa museum has three floors and a basement. As a whole, these spaces were designed in line with the principles of the ecomuseum concept, being seen as a community museum. The local community's cooperation in creating the programme or defining the regional identity represented in the museum has constituted the essential mission of the project, with the aim of creating new development opportunities for the region.

The white walls of the ground-floor room symbolise life, before and after the massacre that took place on 30 April 1944. They tell the tale of the region's cultural background, with a continued settlement in the area from prehistoric times right up to the present day. In



Memorial exhibition | EUROM



Ethnographic exhibition of the Memorial Centre Lipa Remembers | EUROM

addition, the space contains a small replica of the permanent exhibition run in Lipa's first memorial museum, which was founded at the initiative of the local community and inaugurated in the 1960s.

Going up to the first floor, the atmosphere changes completely. We enter the War Room, a dark, unsettling space that begins narrating the account of the events that took place in Lipa on 30 April 1944. In the middle of the room, there is a large table onto which the geographical region of which Lipa forms part is projected. The animated projection with a voiceover recounts the events that preceded and caused the tragedy.

The second floor is certainly the most complex of all. It contains the memorial of the massacre committed by Nazi soldiers in Lipa on 30 April 1944. At the entrance, there hangs the Order Nº 9 issued by the man who led the operation, General Kubler. The crimes against humanity committed there were carried out under this order.

Hanging on the left-hand wall of the large room, the photographs bear witness to the murders committed by the Nazis, alongside some chilling figures: in just a few hours, 296 people were killed, mostly women, children and the elderly. The Nazi soldiers took photographs to demonstrate that they had completed their mission and also to use as propaganda. The images were preserved thanks to Suzana Maraž, a worker in the photography studio to which the Nazis took their films to be developed, who decided to make copies and keep them until after the end of the Second World War, as evidence of the atrocities committed in Lipa. However, the photographs not only show the murders, but also how the Nazis stole anything of value. The last of the snapshots shows

the public execution of the President of the National Liberation Committee in Lipa and his daughter.

Opposite the photographs that record the massacre committed on 30 April 1944, a number of small house-shaped structures represent each of the homes that were burned down that day in Lipa. On the front of each, the house number and the family's surname are written, while, on the back of the house, the names of the murdered family members are listed, alongside their dates of birth. In the middle of the room, we can see the family trees of the residents of Lipa, showing the victims of the massacre from each family.

The last space on the visit is the basement, which exhibits a series of objects collected in the 1960s from villages in the region. These objects show some of the features that define the region's identity, including its folklore, agriculture and cuisine.

The Memorial Centre Lipa Remembers should not just be seen as a platform for chronicling the massacre, but also as proof that Lipa lives on and remembers, conveying a message of peace to ensure that history does not repeat itself.

Above, the village of Lipa and an exterior view of the museum | EUROM

Tourists are just students from somewhere else... The Museum of Free Derry

Adrian Kerr
Curator of the **Museum of Free Derry**, the Bloody Sunday Trust project to create a museum in the Bogside to tell the story of the civil rights and Free Derry eras in the late 1960s and early 1970s from the point of view of those who were most involved in and affected by events of that time.

The Museum of Free Derry tells the story of how a largely working-class community rose up against the years of oppression it had endured. The museum and archive has become an integral part of Ireland's radical and civil rights heritage...

...the museum is a public space where the concept of Free Derry can be explored in both historic and contemporary contexts. Free Derry is about our future together as much as it is about the past. The struggle of Free Derry is part of a wider struggle in Ireland and internationally for freedom and equality for all...

Phase II of Museum of Free Derry was completed in the Bogside in February 2017 | The Museum of Free Derry

These are among the first words that are read by visitors to the Museum of Free Derry. They set out the aim of the museum – to educate people on what happened here and on the impact of those events on the decades of conflict that followed.

But these words do not seek to define or delineate who we want to educate. They don't impose any restriction on who we seek to educate based on age or background, political opinion or religious affiliation or, for the purposes of this essay, where they come from.

The Museum of Free Derry was set up by the Bloody Sunday Trust to tell the story of the civil rights and Free Derry eras of the late 1960s and early 1970s. These were years that had massive local, national and international impact, and the events of these years, and the differing perceptions of these events, had and continue to have a major divisive effect on the different communities in the north of Ireland. The issues raised in these years still have to be dealt with, and our museum was set up as a way of resolving them, not just recording them. It was set up to be an active part in the process of resolution and reconciliation, not just a passive window on the past. It was set up as part of a campaign for justice.

The history we tell in the museum is a contested one. When Ireland was partitioned by the British government in 1921, the Unionist Party set about creating their planned "Protestant State for a Protestant People", arming themselves with a range of repressive legislation and security powers that even the apartheid regime in South Africa expressed envy about, and for the next forty years nationalists in the north of Ireland were forced to endure extremes of political, religious, social and economic discrimination.

At the beginning of the 1960s nationalists in the north of Ireland, taking very direct inspiration from the civil rights movement in the USA, decided that enough was enough. Taking to the streets in peaceful protest they demanded change and they demanded equality. Their peaceful demands were met with a violent reaction, as the Unionist government sensed a threat to their comfortable position of power.

Photographs on walls of the museum show events around the time of the Bloody Sunday, 30th shootings exhibit | The Museum of Free Derry

On 5 October 1968, at a small civil rights demonstration in Derry, a single television camera captured the violence used by the state against the peaceful protest. The police assault on the march splashed the truth of Unionist misrule onto television screens around the world. In the aftermath of 5 October the civil rights movement grew, as did opposition to it. Extremes within unionism opposed any changes and called for even more repression. A student civil rights march was attacked by extremists, aided by the security forces, and in the ensuing riots Free Derry was born.

When, in August 1969, the police again attacked the Bogside, the community there resisted for three days, and in the end, with the police pushed beyond their limits, the British army was sent back onto the streets of the north. They took to the streets of the north as the new armed wing of Unionism, using tactics honed in Kenya, Aden and elsewhere, tactics that had aggravated rather than solved the violent problems there. Clashes with the nationalist population became an everyday occurrence, and support for violent resistance grew.

In August 1971 the British and Unionist governments decided on the reintroduction of internment without trial, a tactic they used almost exclusively against the nationalist population. And it was at an anti-internment march in January 1972 that the British government showed just how far they were prepared to go in the face of peaceful and dignified protest.

As 15,000 people made their way through the streets of Creggan and the Bogside in Free Derry members of the British Army's elite Parachute Regiment were waiting. When the marchers reached the barricades, most turned to peacefully make their way towards Free Derry Corner for a rally. The paratroopers followed them, firing indiscriminately into the crowd.

In the next 10 minutes or so the British army killed 13 unarmed men and boys and wounded 18 others,

View of the interior of the museum and satelite map of the Bloody Sunday shootings | The Museum of Free Derry

including two women, one of them a mother of 14 young children. One of the wounded died from his wounds just a few months later.

The British labelled the unarmed dead gunmen and bombers. They concocted a judicial cover up for their actions. It took them 38 years to admit some of the truth, that Bloody Sunday was "unjustified and unjustifiable" and that all the victims were innocent.

In the early hours of 31 July, the British Army launched Operation Motorman, using 21,000 troops to smash Free Derry and other no-go areas.

By daylight Free Derry was under armed occupation. For the next 22 years it was one of the most heavily militarised areas in western Europe.

The Museum of Free Derry has been developed through three distinct phases. It first opened in 2006 with a basic display on Bloody Sunday, then reopened in 2007 as a museum covering the full period that we felt we needed to, from the years of government oppression, through the civil rights struggle and into the early years of the conflict here. The second phase proved successful enough to attract the support and funding necessary to reach the third phase that we have today – a multi-award winning museum in the heart of the Bogside.

The new Museum of Free Derry is now in a purpose built two-storey building, with a dedicated core space designed to host the permanent display. This multi-media exhibition covers an introduction to the history of the Bogside, then focuses on the key years from the birth of the civil rights movement, through the early years of the conflict here to Bloody Sunday and Operation Motorman, the British attempts to violently crush the civil rights movement and Free Derry. We also have a more flexible space on the first floor which we use for temporary exhibitions, conferences, films, debates etc, which has enabled us to greatly expand on the work of the museum and create more events aimed at our local audience,

Most items of the museum exibition were donated by local residents | The Museum of Free Derry

events with a more international flavour and also events looking at wider civil and human rights issues. The new building also has an archive and research area so we can make our collection more widely accessible, and much improved reception and visitor service spaces. The building is enveloped in a stunning public artwork, which shows a soundscape of the moment on the Bloody Sunday march when the crowd was singing 'We shall Overcome."

The new museum hosts almost 40,000 visitors every year, all here to be educated about our story. We take a very clear stance on how we tell this story – it is our story, the story of our people and our community, and it is told unashamedly from that perspective.

The museum is on the site where many of the key events of the story occurred, including Bloody Sunday. The story is told to visitors by people who were directly involved in and affected by this history. The artefacts on display in the museum reinforce this, with many personal artefacts chosen to reinforce the human element of the story, giving identities back to people who had become mere statistics in many histories of the conflict.

All these elements together – the story, the artefacts, the staff and the site – make a visit to our museum a very emotional and moving experience. Visitors don't just get information on what happened here; they get a true feel for what happened, why it happened, and how it affected our community. They get an understanding of how these events shaped the years of violent conflict that followed. They get a feeling for the full impact of these events.

And in our experience, with over a quarter of a million visitors to date, that is what they want.

So how do we reconcile the fact that what we set up, with clear educational and conflict resolution aims, has now become a must-see destination for visitors to this city? With the fact that the majority of our visitors would be classed as tourists? That we have an educational aim, but rely on a tourist income,

which includes grant funding heavily reliant on the service we provide for visitors to the city?

The simple answer is that we don't. We don't feel the need to. We are providing what we want to provide, and that happens to be exactly what visitors come here to see.

Anyone who visits this museum is here to learn about what happened here, they are all educational visitors. They want to learn the story first-hand, in the place where it happened and from the people who were involved in it. They don't want a compromised version, tailored or softened for a perceived audience. They don't want something that they could read on the internet or in a book. The fact that this is what we provide is one of our greatest strengths.

But this does not mean that we can or should ignore the fact that the majority of our visitors are tourists. There are plenty of things that we as a site can do to facilitate their needs which do not involve compromising on our core story or objectives.

When writing the current narrative for the museum we decided to take a layered approach, with key information in headline paragraphs and the more detailed information below. This keeps the narrative accessible for those with less knowledge, but still interesting for those with a greater familiarity with the subject. We also provide translations of the full narrative into the main European languages, and partial translations into 20+ more. But this was an exercise in how to write a good narrative, not a compromise in the narrative.

And there is also plenty that we can learn from our visitors. Every year we get visitors from places with stories to tell and with experiences that can add to our own. We get visitors from the US, where the civil rights movement was such a direct inspiration to ours. We get visitors from other areas who have suffered or are suffering through their own conflicts, like the Basque Country and Palestine. We meet current and former activists, here as 'tourists', who can share their experiences with us. It is not a one-way experience; we can learn from our visitors as they learn from us.

There has been a lot of bad press in the north of Ireland in recent years about people coming here to learn about our recent history, and about places and organisations set up to help them do that. It has been labelled as 'terror tourism' by those who wish it would stop happening. But the reality is that people from all over the world have an interest in what happened here and in why we had a 25-year war at the end of the 20th century. They know that the version given to them – through a British filtered media – was an outrageously distorted one, and they now want to see the other sides to the story. And this is what the Museum of Free Derry and others provide. The part of the story that couldn't get to an international audience before, but now that same international audience is coming to it. Coming to learn of it and about it. Those who label it as 'terror tourism' are the ones who want it to be seen as such, as the simple story of a terrorist campaign, not as a conflict that requires and deserves a much deeper analysis.

So we see all our visitors, no matter where they are from, as being people who are here to learn about our story, to find out what really happened here, and not just accepting what they had previously been told. And we want to help teach them.

In short, they may be tourists when they are on the beach, but in places like the Museum of Free Derry they are students.

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