

AMORY STARR, LUIS FERNANDEZ, AND CHRISTIAN SCHOLL

SHUTTING DOWN THE STREETS

Political Violence and Social Control in the Global Era



Shutting Dow

wn the Streets

This page intentionally left blank.

onally left blank

Shutting Down

Political Violence

Social Control in

Amory Starr, L

and Christ



NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

New York and London

own the Streets

Violence and

in the Global Era

Luis Fernandez,

Christian Scholl



UNIVERSITY PRESS

and London

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
New York
www.nyu.edu

© 2011 by New York University
All rights reserved

References to Internet websites (URLs) were correct at the time of writing. Neither the author nor New York University is responsible for any changes that may have expired or changed since the date of publication.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Starr, Amory.
Shutting down the streets : political violence in Latin America
Amory Starr, Luis Fernando Lopez.

P. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 978-0-8147-3062-0 (hbk.)

ISBN 978-0-8147-4111-2 (pbk.)

ISBN 978-0-8147-3061-5 (pbk.)

1. Social control. 2. Political violence. 3. Latin America—
4. Anti-globalization movement.

II. Scholl, Christian.

HM661.S7

306.209'0511—dc22

New York University Press books are printed on acid-free paper, and their binding materials are chosen for their strength and durability. We strive to use environmentally responsible materials to the greatest extent possible.

Manufactured in the United States of America

c 10 9 8
p 10 9 8

UNIVERSITY PRESS

and London

upress.org

York University

rights reserved

URLs) were accurate at the time of writing.

University Press is responsible for URLs

since the manuscript was prepared.

Cataloging-in-Publication Data

memory, 1968–

violence and social control in the global era /

de, and Christian Scholl.

. cm.

ical references and index.

4099–6 (cl : alk. paper)

00–9 (pb : alk. paper)

7–0873–6 (ebook)

ce. 3. Globalization—Political aspects.

at. I. Fernandez, Luis A., 1969–

n, 1980– III. Title.

S83 2011

3 2011017987

books are printed on acid-free paper,

chosen for strength and durability.

responsible suppliers and materials

able in publishing our books.

United States of America

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

To our wounds, and the crea
to get them
To our healing, and those wh
To the silence of fear, in com
To the global we have made
To the dream we demand wit
To another security
To affinity and trust and affe
To difference and dialogue, la
enough time for it
To the abundance that is our

tivity and courage it took

to protect the space for it
passion and combustion

with our eyes open

ction

ate into the night, and

s.

This page intentionally

onally left blank

Cont

- 1 What Is Going On?
- 2 The Geography of Global
Dynamics of Controlling
- 3 Toward a Political Economy
of Dissent
- 4 Policing Alterglobalization
- 5 A Taxonomy of Political Violence
- 6 Antirepression: Resisting
Globalization
- 7 Democracy Out of Order

Appendix A: Summits and

*Appendix B: Of Stones and
and Vittorio Sergi on Protest*

Appendix C: Suggestions for

Notes

Bibliography

Index

About the Authors

Contents

	1
Governance: Spatial Dissent	23
omy of the Social Control	49
n Dissent	62
Violence	91
the Social Control of Dissent	123
	146
<i>irectly Observed by Authors</i>	153
<i>ed Flowers: John Holloway</i> <i>rest Tactics</i>	155
<i>or Future Research</i>	171
	173
	191
	203
	207
	<i>vii</i>

This page intentionally left blank.

onally left blank

What Is G

We began writing this book as
Two and a half meters high,
with concrete foundations and was c
and barbed wire. Each bolt and hing
It looked like a fence around a priso
sported motion detectors and video
twelve kilometers, at €1 million per k
a small seaport town. It protected th
Eight (G8), expected to issue its ann
to “Make Poverty History,” except in
The fence (a “technical barrier”) was
coincidentally, those who had expr
the meeting, point out its hypocrisy
similar economic strategies in their
Africa, or other regions of the postco
by no fewer than eighteen thousand
the German military.

The fence imposed an exclusiona
lands—on a purportedly democratic
was funded mostly by provincial tax
willingness for such public expendi
currency the sociologist Barry Glas
Terrorists are over there, over here,
invading occupations and culture. Th
nally violent. The anxiety evoked by
whelms the quieter world in which c
increasingly “precarious.”¹ Media im
persons into sharp focus and offer gr
glacial melt of our economies is portr
and surviving is left to our own cleve

Going On?

As a wall was built in East Germany, it was composed of metal fencing designed to cradle a curlicue of razor wire of the wall was soldered in place. on or a military base, and, indeed, it had cameras. But this fence wound its way a kilometer, through forest surrounding the three-day meeting of the Group of Seven annual proclamations about intentions in Africa, or to stop global warming. It was employed to keep out terrorists and, it expressed their desire to participate in the world, or draw attention to the failures of their home countries, whether in Europe, Africa, or the Global South. It was guarded by German police, as well as contingents from

every geography—castle, moat, hinterland, nation and landscape. This security was paid by German citizens, whose anxiety was, in turn, purchased with a price that has been called “the culture of fear.” It is around the corner. Immigrants are everywhere and youth are increasingly and irrationally fearful of these probabilities somehow oversteering their jobs (or hopes of them) become unmanageable and public policy bring violent and, comforting solutions, while the world is perceived as natural or at least inevitable, and the future is uncertain.

This is the era of what we call “alter globalizations,” a term that refers to the diverse yet interconnected movements that not only oppose globalization but also offer alternatives, or *alter globalizations*, to the current phase of the centuries-long struggle against globalization’s targets. In this era, much is old, and much is new. Global elites use military force, political maneuvering, and rearrangements of the social order, the distribution of resources, labor, and markets of the planet to control and the productive parts of their households, and, lately, the creativity of their workers. Throughout the era of colonialism, the apparatuses of power delivered by this process are justified as necessary for improvements in the lives of the victims. The process takes every possible form and then some.

But today the world is supposed to be more just and rights. And the vast majority of people are now. The processes take place in a global social network connecting the points of violence, and the network is increasingly revealed by a resilient network of activists and the fierce protection of a web of geeks and hackers. The access to new communication technologies has led to the circulation of reports of suffering and structural violence. Critical interpretation of events gets pushed to the aside in favor of direct solidarity and action. The struggle is at every social position. In other words, the struggle is a sacred.

This book is about the social consequences of the current era. Global, preemptive, and violent. The charge is criminal. The charge is insurrection. The charge is that we must conclude that protesters are not just protesters. Democracies are not supposed to criminalize protesters.

A number of scholars have studied the interactions between police and protesters, and they are showing how they are changing history. The interactions are different. First, we see policing as just one of many ways that are far more subtle, indirect, and significant. Second, we do not limit our definition of protesters to those concerned with a much larger group—the

alterglobalization”—the multilingual synchronous solidarity movements in its current form but also propose to it. Alterglobalization is yet another between imperial powers and their little is new. As during colonialism, cal institutions, culture and ideology, and economic trickery to grasp the parts of the world with natural wealth some countries—the farms, the small their digitized teenagers. As through- rent damages and dehumanizations fied, even celebrated, as long-term tims. As with colonialism, resistance come.

to be a democratic one, with human ple expect it to be so. Now colonial ial fabric in which the invisible ink theft, and destruction is painstaking- of scholars and activists. Under the nd expert communities, widespread hнологies enables instant circula- ggle, often with pictures and video. s faster, and political parties are cast among movements and peoples of ds, it is getting harder to hide mas-

ontrol of dissent in the contemporary social control demarcates dissent as . The accused have no weapons. We not the ones who are “out of order.” minalize dissent.

l the policing of protest and the inter- s, defining models of interaction, and orically. Our concerns are quite dif- ne tactic of a system of social control ant than civil management of protest. n of dissent to protesters. We are con- hose people who *would* dissent. And

we shift the unit of analysis from individual actors to social movements that give life, sustenance, and meaning to the social order.

Because we are making a drastic shift in the conceptual territory of the *policing of protest*, the remainder of this introductory chapter will explore social control and dissent as they have been conceptualized. This section outlines the conceptual and methodological framework for the book.

Understanding Social Control

There are two conceptions of social control. The first, from Thomas Hobbes through George H. Mead and Max Weber to critical race literature, conceptualizes social control as a system intended to protect the health of society and to regulate normative social behavior. The second, from Michel Foucault and Noam Chomsky, sees social control as a system of power mechanisms ranging from the state's formal mechanisms to informal mechanisms, but both approaches and, further, showed how social control can be resisted—even showing how those who resist can be organized.

Political theorists such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke grappled with how to protect their citizens while still protecting their rights. For Hobbes, social control mechanisms were used to maintain stability so that society remains in a state of order (viewed as a “brutal” state of nature). In the United States, social control was a concept used by American reformers in their “common endeavor”³ aimed “toward an end that is humane, discipline, social control came to be understood as a humane society reduces coercion, eliminates violence. It was originally considered to be a means to social transformation. Indeed, the outcome of evolving social organizations were understood as failures of social control. In the 1930s, this perspective spread to the United States, leading philosopher Karl Mannheim to conceptualize social control (via parliamentarianism) necessary to maintain the rule threatened by social planning.⁵

individual (would-be) dissenters to the finance, and strategy to dissent.

and significant shift from the family to the *social control of dissent*, the book provides a review of social control conceptualized and studied previously and the theoretical bases of our study.

Social Control

social control. The first, running from Herbert Mead to today's criminal justice system, views social control as a set of mechanisms that regulate society by enforcing (even eliciting) conformity. The second, running from Karl Marx through modern criminology, views social control as a tool of class struggle, in which the state uses force to ideological reproduction. Both approaches recognize both formal and informal control. Michel Foucault connected the two approaches, arguing that power is pervasive in control and that the two polarities interpenetrate.

As Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and other social contract theorists argued, governments could rule (or control) society by protecting their "natural" rights and liberties as well as by maintaining the ability of the state to maintain order. This concept of social control is civilized (counterposed to what he called the "state of nature"). According to Morris Janowitz,² social control is the means by which a society eliminates misery, and increases rationality. It is antithetical neither to pluralism nor to authoritarianism. In the 1920s, social control was understood to be a means of socialization. In the 1920s, social control was understood to be a means of self-regulation (social control). Durkheim's theory of social control influenced the philosophy of the 1920s and influenced the philosophy of the 1920s to conceptualize freedom as the social control of the individual to protect society from authoritarianism.

What Janowitz calls an “alternate process of socialization leading to control” was going on. Instead of being seen as a process of social control, it was seen that social control was wielded by the “mass of the population” (“the peripheral institutions and value systems. The mechanism of ‘self-control,’ and ‘disciplined culture’ calls ‘disciplinary power,’ internalized power. Janowitz concludes that force to ever ‘narrower limits in relations societies.’”⁸ Meanwhile, as parliamentary inequality has divided the population, movements have emerged as a methodical structures suffer crises of legitimacy and social value systems. It is here that he calls “biopower.” Rather than influence and morality, power operates in the “factured” not only through mass media production of insecurity, distraction,

While scholars in various other fields have seen control in new ways, the disciplinary power has moved to a narrow concern with management. P. Gibbs describes as the functionalist perspective to see conformity to consensual norms in social relations. The conflicting Marxist perspective operating in a context of antagonistic class relations means of enforcement and reproduction. The functionalist perspective was perhaps a little overdone, which are usually punished even in the most strict, such as traffic regulations, which become more and more, although still discriminating against the poor.

The functionalist emphasis on norms and values is enacted in subtle and indirect ways. The power of elites—a revelation that would make sense of the time, some actors have more capacity to influence social control.¹⁰ In 1977, Gibbs announced that the concept of social control has been “in the doldrums for several decades.” He offers a new definition of social control. In 1982,

the formulation of social control as a "conformity" was proposed by social scientists in the 1960s, sociologists reimagined what social control was as a benign process, they suggested that the nation-state to incorporate the "disciplinary power" (Foucault's term) into the society's central institutions of social control? "Civility," "cultural appreciation"⁷—what Foucault described and reproduced by the objects of surveillance and coercion have been restricted to the state, both within and between industrial nations. As voluntary participation declined, social control moved from interest groups, and social control became a tool of shaping society. As elite political power waned, they are less able to dictate moral norms. What we see the shift to what Foucault described as disciplining social relations through values of the consumer realm of desire. Consent is "mediated ideology but also through the state and consumerism."⁹

These subfields were understanding social control as a field of social control itself shrunk to the study of deviance and crime. What Jack Katz's Marxist approach of the 1960s continued to do was to see crime forms as delivering reciprocal social control. This perspective recognized social control as a tool of class inequity, viewing criminal law as a function of class relations. The Marxist approach was zealous, ignoring crimes like murder in noncapitalist societies, and laws that benefit all classes (of automobile users, bicyclists).

This approach helps us see how social control is exercised by *all* members of society, not only the state as Foucault in/famous. At the same time, it suggests that others for agency in shaping society. It is argued that social control studies had "died in the 1960s," and hence there was no clear direction. He rejected social control as a gen-

eral, collective process and insisted that the dimension of social control refers to the ability to manipulate others through “means of social control.” As normative consensus declined, Giblin argued, the state turned to law and to positive incentives. In 1981, he argued that the central object of sociological investigation is the state. E. Chunn and Shelley A. M. Gavigan argued that the “liberal” and “instrumental” conceptions of social control are attentive to the dynamic complexity of the state.

Meanwhile, almost all U.S. social scientists have followed the trajectory, criminal deterrence. Robert Sampson defined deterrence as “concerned with the threat of sanction), a signal (a threat) and a test, they concluded that extralegal forms of social control are more compliant as legal ones.¹³ Other sociologists have criticized the technology for failing to take a broad, systemic view of the law, imprisonment, social control, and the state in capitalist social relations.¹⁴

American sociology, devoted to the study of the capitalist state and still in the main excited by the idea of class struggle, fetters social control to the state. It is concerned with such matters as the maintenance of working-class and capitalist relations, but not their attempt to bring attention to violence and crime, or alone the larger issue of criminalization and capitalism. In contrast, European sociology views social control as the maintenance of the state, the state property and force. The state is the central object of study. In P. A. J. Waddington’s words:

Patrolling the boundaries of respectability and order—patterns of domination and subordination—is the exercise of largely invisible power. The state enforcers selectively exercise their discretion, not by neutrally enforcing the law and order, but by “keep people in their place” in quiet, unobtrusive manner when they suppress overt resistance. The political and economic conditions of the state are not neutral and impartial enforcers of order.

that it must have actors. The “social” is that process through which parties other than a chain of command.” As was expected social control to shift to the state. In 1939, he argued that control should be based on investigation.¹¹ Simultaneously, Dorothy S. Sayers urged critical scholars to abandon the concept of social control “in favor of one of history, struggle, and change.”¹²

Control literature hurtled down one path. Robert F. Meier and Weldon T. Johnson argued with a particular *source* (the legal system) and target (violators).” After one rigorous analysis, factors are as powerful in producing crime. Scholars have sharply criticized criminology’s systems perspective on the function of crime and criminology itself in the context of

the idea of a liberal/liberatory democracy. Exceptionally reluctant to acknowledge the link between crime and deviance. Critical criminologists note the discrepancy between law enforcement and crime. Most-class crimes remain marginal in criminology. White-collar and corporate crime, let alone crime as a dimension of class relations, are rarely studied. Mainstream political studies conceptualize crime as a reflection of existing class relations through which the state participates, taking the side of capital.

respectability—and thus reproducing crime, exclusion, and inclusion and exclusion of state power. Individual offenses on the street under the guise of crime, keeping the peace. But the police are not the only force, and much more visible, that dissent against prevailing social, economic, and political conditions. Here the notion of the police as the guardian of the law is exposed for the myth

that it is; since their first duty becomes the state, whose coercive arm they are. . . . The role of the police as custodians of the state's monopoly of coercion can be revelatory. . . . [P]olitical tensions between state power on the one hand and the other.¹⁵

Nicos Ar Poulantzas rejects the idea of the state as an instrument in the hand of capital. He argues that, of state institutions. Regardless of its form, the state today contributes to the social order by reproducing its hegemony, defending the consent of lower-class groups through

Social control can be understood in the context of the Frankfurt School and other Marxists' analysis of the subtle ways that political power is exercised through culture, ideology, and communication. A similar analysis has flourished in specific areas of media studies. Both European and American scholars have analyzed education as a social control mechanism that perpetuates inequality.¹⁸ More recently, American scholars have argued that institutions function to "manufacture" and "expedient" "illusions."¹⁹

Forged by fascism's popularity in the 1930s and the parties' own limitations, the sophisticated theories known as the Frankfurt School scholarship emerged as instruments that expanded the terms of "social control" and "lifeworld."²⁰ While movements proliferated that explored aspects of oppression, new concepts emerged that explored how the most subtle and internalized forms of power can be resisted. Perhaps the leading example of this is the work that individuals' gender performance and identity are binary and heteronormativity.²¹

The Frankfurt School built a set of theories that describe "informal" social control.²² Foucault's concept of "discipline" is one of the most popular and influential. Technologies of production aim at controlling objects and raw materials; technologies of power aim at the production of symbols and signif-

comes transparent—to protect the
. This exposure of the fundamental
the state's monopoly of legitimate
policing of public order exposes the
the one hand, and citizenship on

mplicit assumption that the state is
ists, stressing the relative autonomy
s degree of autonomy, it is clear that
smooth functioning of capitalism by
ng its property rights, and eliciting
h strategic alliances.¹⁶

as the central preoccupation of the
s, who undertook a systematic analy-
consciousness and criticism are pre-
ad institutions.¹⁷ In the United States,
cialized fields, such as education and
merican scholars have developed an
ontrol strategy that reproduces social
an scholars have traced how media
e consent” and reproduce politically

a place of socialism and by socialist
ticated analysis of what came to be
olars was matched by social move-
social struggle to “de-colonize the
liferated to challenge noneconomic
ts of power and struggle theorized
ed dynamics of social control could
mple is queer theory, which proposed
es could be subversive to the gender

f theories of what Erich Goode calls
's typology of “technologies of con-
sophisticated of these. In this theory,
ontrolling, transforming, and manip-
echnologies of sign systems involve
ication; technologies of power deter-

mine the conduct of individuals and attain ends or dominations; and technologies individuals use on themselves to modify their conduct and way of being. According to Foucault, these technologies function ever function separately. For Foucault, the difference between those between the technologies of power and "governmentality." By this he means the technologies of power and rules; it is also implicated in shaping the conduct of people. Indeed, governmentality is a technology of power such a way that they become governmentality. The difference between a mode of social control and a mode of social control of death and a mode of social control of life.²³

One aspect of governmentality is the technology of power that grasps the exercise of control over individuals at the anatomical and biological levels. Disciplinary technologies (e.g., abortion policies) are technologies of power control by classifying individuals and subjects in institutions like prisons, hospitals, and schools as a form of social control, according to Foucault. These technologies of power are based on coercion or force. These technologies of power (and subjects) ourselves; we internalize the power of a democracy and then police our own conduct. On the other hand, aims not only at controlling individuals but also at managing populations. Shifting its attention from the control of the flow of bodies and goods through territory to the control of the probability of an undesired event, Foucault shifts the focus of biopower to the ability of the state to manage and understand and study its citizenry. In the modern state, the state implements policies that promote economic growth and profit its economic agenda. Moreover, the power of the state is a chical relation of force or domination. The power of the state power circulates through discourse and is exercised by the dominated, who also participate in the exercise of power horizontally through society.

Understanding social control means understanding the ways of repression encourage and discourage individuals into participation in social movements. The ways of social control of social movements have generated

d of flows and submit them to ceremonies of the self are techniques that modify their souls, thoughts, conduct, and behavior. In fact, these four technologies hardly exist in isolation. In fact, the interesting interactions are between those of the state and those of the self, termed *biopower*. In fact, that government not only legislates and regulates, but also disciplines, guiding, and affecting the conduct of those it constitutes people—and does so in a way that is not visible. Foucault recognizes a distinct form of control that depends on the threat of punishment that manages to produce a certain

effect, which he calls “disciplinary power.” This concept applies to the human body, specifically at the level of the individual (disciplinary power can emanate from various sources, such as prisons, capital punishment). Technologies of power and objectifying bodies, particularly in the form of prisons, and schools. The benefit of this concept, for Foucault, is the reduced need for force. It teaches us to produce docile bodies that internalize what it means to be a citizen in terms of their own behavior. Biopower, on the other hand, operates at the level of individual behavior but also at production from the individual body to the level of the population. In time and space, it aims at reducing the need for force. Foucault connects the emergence of biopower to the use of statistical technologies to manage populations. On the basis of these technologies, the state produces a productive population to which it subjects where coercive power uses a hierarchy of control to achieve its ends, disciplinary power, which is internalized and exercised by the individual in its reproduction and recirculation

of power. It is this understanding how various forms of power encourage the transformation of dissent into conformity. But scholars concerned with the question of power have generally not positioned their studies in

the context of social theory of social movements within the concepts provided by Charles Tilly defined repression as “raises the contender’s cost of collective action.” Richard A. Cloward argue that protest is not only by repression but also by channeling, cooptation and institutionalization on movements to assert institutional norms and moral decorum.²⁵ Waddington et al. provide a conceptual framework for social movements and social control, connecting the relational dynamics of “public disorder” to repression as “ways of reducing protest with repression” but recognizes that “anything which disrupts social cohesion and social networks through repression and people could organize . . . can repress.”

The bulk of literature on the repression of social movements is focused on the policing of protest, with a focus on social control. (We review this particular literature on policing in chapter 4.) Compounding this, the literature has paid little attention to the impacts of social control on dissenters and the dynamics of collective action. An exception is J. Oliver’s work on “control interactions among government officials and potential joiners” and asserts that “social control has a negative impact on the mobilization of potential dissenters (‘licking stamps’), noting that it may even lead to repression. His definition of social control emphasizes a discursive tactic:

Social control is exerted in the face of dissent and aims at revenge, restitution and punishment. In the context of protest action, social control is the process of labeling dissenters as deviants. This process of labeling is a *stigmatisation* . . . a denial of the political status of the dissenters as deviant character.²⁸

Oliver’s recent work provides another perspective on the *would-be* dissenters. Reviewing the organization of dissent among American people over the past three

l control. Instead, they have worked
criminology and social movements.
‘any action by another group which
tive action.’²⁴ Frances Fox Piven and
st is “structured” not only by repres-
ion, and direct and indirect pressure
l legitimacy and conform to behav-
propose a synthetic analysis of social
ceptualized together as integrated,
der.”²⁶ Pamela Oliver defines repres-
thout giving people what they want”
suppresses or disrupts . . . communi-
which collective action could diffuse
press protest.”²⁷

pression of social movements has
which is only one dimension of social
literature alongside our analysis of
g this limitation, social movements
to operationalizing and measuring
s who have not yet entered the realm
John Wilson, who analyzes the social
ment agents, protesters, and “observ-
that police action has its most direct
cial joiners (“whether by marching or
ncourage as well as discourage them.
asizes criminalization as a policy and

ce of an apparent norm infraction
nd/or deterrence. In the context of
e process of labeling and treating
s will be referred to as *criminaliza-*
tus of acts and affirmation of their

other rare focus on the repression of
outrageous criminalization of African
decades, she argues that

erties that they involve challenging that they are subject to social con-ings to define as crimes, authorities to the control of the different kinds what kinds of tactics and strategies ities decide which kinds of dissent e which categories of dissenters are inalize and whom to target are the ol system. The minute we recog-ople who are dissenters for control, cific illegal acts of dissent, we are and “dissent control” can never be

s recognition as a failure of the sub-ial movements scholarship:

agenda among social scientists in e treatments of social movements her forms of “deviance.” As part of the Black riots, many social scien- understood not as mere criminal-ession, but as extreme expressions ith these political concerns, a gen- d in a sub-disciplinary movement r in the study of collective behavior harp distinction between political ne that was important in the foun- ever revisited.³⁰

ts of social movement study, but no other criminalized transgressions by ine which ones should be treated as s.

unningham documents that the “nor- , before, during, and after the official ence Program, of 1956–1972, which ack Power movement, also amounted

to a kind of *counterinsurgency*, a concept from the literature on social control that we believe must be introduced to describe actions of the state identify social dissent with existing political authority; as such, dissent is suppressed through the use of force. Thus, advocates of dissent are monitored, and arrested. But we need to stop classifying dissenters as counterinsurgency.

From this review, we take several lessons throughout the book. First is the concept of counterinsurgency, and a few social movements susceptible for criminalization. Second is the social control that are interiorized in “technical consent.” Third is the historical record of counterinsurgency.

Understanding

Ever since corporations claimed rights under the U.S. Constitution in the 1970s,³² dissent has been in edgewise. Since dissenters now include environmentalists, racists, and violent anti-abortion groups, the current course on dissent has focused on identifying dissent as a crime. Questions such as how it relates to terrorism and hate crimes.³³ More dramatically, in the current “War on Terrorism,” dissent is portrayed as a self-inflicted wound on low citizens.

Thoroughly out of fashion, the idea of civil society say-so in their societies has been replaced by “civil society.”³⁴ “Civil society” is a strange concept, a society that is civil—inclusive, respectful, and so on. An odd euphemism for “the rest of us,” the concept is a making. Civil society is a pretrivialized concept, a society meekly, some consideration—never a challenge to global citizens. Note that civil society is a concept that seeks a vague and nonthreatening “path” to a better world.

The right to dissent has degenerated into a concept condemned, if only by the unfortunate definition. But this is a dispirited definition.

concept that has been strikingly absent
and social movements and one that
this discourse.³¹ Counterinsurgency
movements as direct threats to the
they are targeted for elimination
of Black Power were targeted,
to ask what are the criteria for clas-
s in a democratic society?

ral concepts that we will refer to
cern of Marxists, critical criminolo-
scholars with the political motivations
social theorists' attention to forms of
nologies of the self" to "manufacture
of domestic policing as counterin-

ling Dissent

nts to free speech protections under
it has been difficult to get a word
include the embattled tobacco lobby,
groups, much of the scholarly dis-
ts "social costs" and on interesting
legislation like that prohibiting hate
se years of urgent "wars on terror-
ndulgent and treasonous risk to fel-

ea that nonelites might deserve some
ebranded as something called "civil
e term. One might take it to mean a
ectful. Instead, its recent usage is an
those outside the circuits of decision
ed agglomeration of those who seek,
mind that these are the majority of
y does not dare to dissent; it merely
articipation."

erated into the last word of those
nate circumstances of impoverish-
nition. The legal scholar Cass Sun-

stein proposes that dissent ensure organization or society needs to move. Dissent is protected in democracies majoritarian, popular, or hegemonically wrong, dangerous, or unwise. Illustration of discontent or disagreement contract.

Under what conditions is dissent? William Gamson's 1968 *Power and Dissent* of feelings of trust (in one's government to organizations that encourage opposition that "salience"³⁷ is important, and Giotto added "entitlement," which to democratic governments should be "entitled generally," and "a high sense of trust that foster the expression of dissent." Dissent depends on hope.³⁹ Dissent is a complex and subtle concept that requires openness, flexibility, and visibility in order to flourish. Sunstein argues that dissent is suppressed by any conformity pressures.⁴⁰ Neoliberalism, attempting to replace it with market relationships.⁴¹ Possible dissenters, then, must be aware of the factors that influence their sense of entitlement, networks, trust in government, sense of responsibility, over, John Gaventa has pointed out that dissent) must be analyzed directly against power.⁴²

Dissent is usually conceptualized as an individual speaker, a space, and a legal articulation of the individual's needs. How do these elements arrive at this moment of dissent? What fears and risks? How did he have the opportunity to learn about the topic to be discussed? Were there meetings in advance of the speech? Were the conditions prepared the infrastructure for the event?

The archetypal image of an isolated and distracting. Significant political dissent is often an institutional, social, and cultural

the flow of information that an individual can make sound analyses and decisions.³⁵ This is because of the basic idea that the dominant view might be factually or morally wrong. Dissent needs to be a *valued* register within a political community or

content translated into dissent? Willpower emphasized the importance of (political participation), personal efficacy, and access to information.³⁶ David Schwartz suggested that political participation, as Stephen Craig and Michael Maghway operationalize as “a belief that individuals are responsive to the demands of citizenship and a sense of internal efficacy” to the conditions of political participation.³⁸ Henry Giroux has argued that political participation also relies on “discursive space,” a concept that means that there is some realm of public space in which discussions and dissent can take place. This space is endangered not only by laws but also by the rise of post-liberalism, which also undermines citizen participation. Post-liberalism, much more entertaining consumer culture, may be preemptively silenced by tacit consent, a sense of entitlement, efficacy, organizational structure, a sense of hopefulness, and space. More importantly, it is that powerlessness (or the failure to act) that is distinct from the operation of

as a speech act, a discrete event with a specific content of speech. This concept is based in the traditional notion of the right to free speech. But how did the act of dissent occur? Was he alone? What were his motivations? What gave him the courage to be there? How did he organize the act? How much time did he spend in preparation? Who developed the plan and prepared the content at which he spoke?

The act of political speech is both rare and risky. Political speech almost always takes place in a specific context. Dissenting speech depends

on a social network of resistance and provides at least a little (just enough) of entitlement, salience, and efficacy places the dissenter in the context ofifestation. These noninstitutional forms protected by law as “assemblies” in events” in Europe. Assemblies are and protected as an “association.” A major democratic theory promotes and evidence of democratic society, tions, operating in different political (and sometimes unexpected) ways networks of resistance to meaningful analysis for dissent must be collectivefestations arising from and depending and solidarity—a social movement. are the appropriate unit of analysis defending it.

What, then, is a social movement question, about which scholars do not of the most basic points shall suffice *tentious*.⁴⁶ This means that they are ness, at least) to advance their ideas movements are *collective*, participations are *processes* through which changing context.⁴⁷

Much social movements scholars movements do what they do. This because social control seeks to interfere ing the impacts of) movement actions cerned themselves with *what* social societies. This work is also important for elites in the contentious project help us understand *why* expensive, implemented. It also reveals the laws which delays or deprives society of challenges.

The first approach to social movements *of collective behavior* (at first conc

and/or an external environment that (n?) encouragement to create a sense of community. A more accurate image of dissent and some kind of mobilization or manifestations of contentious interaction are found in the United States⁴³ and as “protest movements organized by a legal entity known as a social movement.” Archon Fung points out that every form of social associations as both enhancement and challenge, although different kinds of associations in different contexts, exert influence in uneven ways.⁴⁴ Recognizing the importance of social dissent, we believe that the unit of analysis should be the movement. But associations, too, are manifesting on a larger network of meaning and action. We believe that social movements are important both for studying dissent and for

understanding dissent? This turns out to be a difficult question to answer. We do not agree.⁴⁵ For our purposes, some distinctions are important. First, social movements are *confrontational*—they are engaged in conflict (disagreeable) and they are for social change. Second, social movements engage in contentious activities. Third, social movements are dynamic—ideas and organizations evolve in a

dynamic relationship seeks to explain *how* social movements work is important to this study. We do not want to disrupt that “how,” reducing (or reductionist) to a simple explanation. A minority of scholars have concluded that social movements do with and to their environment because it reveals what is at stake and the stakes of social movements and might be used to justify illegal, or unusual social control is a result of larger social costs of social control, and the importance of social movements’ insights and

social movements, *in an effort to make sense* of social movements, concerned with crowds and panics in

the context of American exceptionalism has focused on individual participation mechanics:

- ✦ Why do people participate in movements, and psychology of activist movements are understood as the
- ✦ How do social movements mobilize (effectively) to win their struggles? meeting rooms, underemployed students, satellite time, paint, celebrities, free status or staff.⁵⁰
- ✦ When and where do social movements operate in a political context that may be recursive, and social space, manipulation, irony, compassion or information between elites, or moments where other way. This context, with all of *political opportunity structure*.⁵¹
- ✦ How do social movements communicate? They must conceptualize what they are trying to do, and *framing* their problem or p

The second approach, forged by scholars, sees social movements “as carriers of ideology more concerned with the *content* of social logics.”⁵³

- ✦ Social movements’ ideologies are analyses of social problems and future participants to have an empowerment they are facing, to envision a different way of struggle. Much more than “meaning” are “learned” through works.⁵⁴ A movement’s ideology through struggle and dialogue about society.
- ✦ Refracting the impacts of modernization, experience, culture, and social change to new social “interests”⁵⁵—i

alism) *and to predict its impacts*,
 nts' motivations and on movement

movements? The histories, motiva-
 ts who dare to take part in social
 e matter of *political consciousness*.⁴⁸
 ilize *resources* effectively (or inef-
 Resources include bank accounts,
 s unfilled hours, abandoned build-
 ties, and organizations⁴⁹ with tax-

ments act? Social movements oper-
 provide more or less physical, dis-
 able signs and symbols, historical
 a overload, shifting power relations
 en the authorities are looking the
 of its various contents, is called the

municate with the larger society?
 they are about, simply and effec-
 project for public campaigns.⁵²

olars who recognize class struggle,
 of political projects." Thus there is
 social movements, their "themes and

their beliefs, including their anal-
 istic visions. Ideologies enable
 ed understanding of the problems
 erent future, and to invest in a vec-
 n a frame, ideologies' "systems of
 social structures and social net-
 takes a position in a historic strug-

nity and urbanization on the self,
 life, social movements may give
 identities⁵⁶ and ideas, "themes and

logics,”⁵⁷ cultures of resistance,⁵⁸ rely upon afflictions of modernity: professionalization, and bureaucratization.

- ✦ In the past few decades, this approach has shifted its focus on individual subjectivities and their conditions⁶³ as sites of resistance and protest.

The diagram in Figure 1 contextualizes these phenomena. Dissent (and its social movements) is expressed through public contestations through a series of zones. Each zone provides an increase of visibility and organization (organizations, networks, culture, and space) and a diffuse arena of contemplation. These contestations take many forms, from furtively written letters to a human shield, *resistance* is dissent through non-violent action. When that action becomes visible, it is protest. Melucci proposes, established a “world of dissent” has become a *social movement*. As social movements learn how to sustain contentious politics, they assemble networks. *Protest*, the focus of this book, is that subset of dissent in which it becomes visible. It may emerge as part of contentious politics or spontaneously and independently. Protest even requires resources, cultures of resistance and organization, perceptions of entitlement, outrage, and grievance. Tests should be seen as the most public form of dissent. A continuum of social phenomena of contestation from invisible “structures of abeyance.”⁶⁶


Our point is that an exclusive focus on protest is not actualized. Understanding (and protecting) social development and sustenance. Most social movements cannot be protected without protection. They require ever-changing networks of discursive and organizational coherent organizations and ideologies. This means that there are many opportunities for protest. At the same time, movements are more robust than hierarchical ones and are more difficult to control.

⁵⁸ and networks.⁵⁹ They may also
y, such as charismatic leadership,
racy.⁶⁰

approach has identified an increas-
ties,⁶¹ including bodies⁶² and emo-
politics.

alizes our use of the concept of dis-
ment/s) develops into collective and
es of zones of political involvement.
f intimacy, intensity, and resources
nd social space). Dissent is a large
, talk, and action. Although it may
iting graffiti to placing oneself as a
hat involves some kind of transgres-
es collective (when it has, as Alberto
e")⁶⁴ and acquires some process, it
social movements become organized,
us action, launch campaigns, and/or
s of most social movement analysis,
becomes public and visible. Protest
campaigns and projects or spontane-
ents are nurtured by "submerged"⁶⁵
d networks that imbue and sustain
and possibility. In both cases, pro-
ic, visible, yet rare manifestation of a
dissent, many of which exist in often


us on protest is static and decontex-
ting) protest requires attention to its
significantly, we believe that protest
cting social movements, which are
e spaces and disruptions, not always
cal polarities.⁶⁷ Among other things,
opportunities to interrupt and redirect
ts' network forms are in some ways
and may have more elastic responses



Dissent in the Era of

What is alterglobalization, and what is it doing? Alterglobalization is old. It is a complex of struggles, incensed by cultural and economic revolutionary re-imagining of power. It consists of increasing solidarity and their threat of simultaneous disruption. Alterglobalization is a degree, in the extent to which the battles and tactics that operate in global space multiply over economic concepts and persistently breaking the “routine” of it.

It may also have novel kind of a concept. Negri, looking to find a population that is not a proletariat, find “the multitude,” replacing the proletariat, which rely on a centralized command. “The multitude . . . is legion; it is composed of many who remain different, one from the other, but who can act in common.”⁷¹ What is “common” is not a material situation but instead out of the shared subjectivities that recognize both sing



of Alterglobalization

What is special about its social movements? The continuation of cross-class anticolonial economic invasion. It reignites socialist ideas and draws on the best of labor movements' traditions of large-scale, perhaps international, mobilization. This mobilization is new, if only as a matter of scale. It is transnational, involving networks of activists; discursive, competing for hegemony; and creatively unruly, embracing ignorable dissent and protest.⁷⁰

What is the activist. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri argue that what can challenge postmodern capitalism are concepts like "the people" or the "proletariat" that challenge the conception of power and distinct classes. This "people" is composed of innumerable elements that do not meet, and yet communicate, collaborate, and share. "Common" arises not out of some unifying force but out of the information society, which shapes a new regularity and collaboration.

Action within the alterglobalization conditions. One of them is characterized by “non-violence.” As early as 1552, Étienne de la Boetie argued that civil disobedience by demonstrating how consenting means ultimately being obedient. Boetie’s theory of disobedience was further influenced by the refusal of the Aztecs to pay taxes because that would mean supporting a war against México.⁷³ It was developed by the non-violent resisters, including Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. Civil disobedience is based on the principle that laws and government actions are illegitimate. It amounts to a refusal to obey laws without, however, questioning the legitimacy of the laws themselves. In fact, being arrested or prosecuted is an integral part of civil disobedience. In the past, people were consciously violating a law because they considered it unjust because they challenge the system as a whole.

Stemming from radical syndicalism of the late nineteenth century (especially in France and Italy), direct action intends to prevent the implementation of laws and create autonomous social structures. Voluntary direct action methods describes autonomous direct action, direct representation and mediation.⁷⁴ Direct action is a way to want to act on their own terms to achieve their goals. Direct-action forms are interconnected with the concept of direct action, a concept popular in the alterglobalization movement. In its natural form, DIY refuses mediation and professional intermediaries. Instead, people organize themselves to share resources and exchange. They authorize themselves to act on their own terms.⁷⁶ Tilly and Tarrow view direct action as a form that has vanished from the political arena. Their definition is based on the common assumption that a nation-state is inevitably mediated and that direct action is influencing governmental practices.

During the 1990s, however, European and American direct action tactics and circulation of direct action tactics were revived by anti-globalization and antiglobalization activists who revived direct action campaigns of the antinuclear movement of the 1970s.⁷⁸ Since the Seattle 1999 WTO Ministerial, at which participating nations

on movement is inspired by two tra-
ed by the concept of “civil disobedi-
Boétie elaborated the importance of
ruling is based on consent and why
obedient.⁷² The tradition of civil dis-
y Thoreau in 1849, when he refused
ean supporting slavery and the U.S.
ped into a strategy by activist theo-
and Gandhi and Martin Luther King
e refusal to obey a law seen by dis-
an intentional trespassing of the law,
general legitimacy of sovereign poli-
cuted for the trespassing is often an
this way, activists can show that they
ause of a particular injustice and not
such.

st struggles at the end of the nine-
nd the United States), “direct action”
on of undesired policies and to cre-
oltairine de Cleyre’s 1912 account of
onomous political action that rejects
ct action is employed by people who
resolve a situation. In this respect,
cted with the Do-It-Yourself (DIY)
ation movements.⁷⁵ As a general cul-
by representatives or anointed offi-
selves autonomously to produce and
es and encourage others to do like-
action tactics as premodern action
“modern repertoire.”⁷⁷ Their conclu-
mption that collective action within
d and aims to create change only by

ope witnessed a notable emergence
ics by environmental, animal-rights,
revived the experience of the direct-
r and antimilitaristic movements of
World Trade Organization (WTO)
ations’ intention to negotiate global

trade agreements for the new millennium, the repertoire of direct action and globalization movement.⁷⁹ (See Appendix 1) This shift to premodern action repertoire and action tactics point to a different model that relies on the necessity of disruption.

Both civil disobedience and direct action exist between legitimacy and legality. From the perspective of civil disobedience, when a law is considered illegitimate, actions to combat it are considered legitimate. In direct action, laws are seen as part of the problem insofar as it prevents people from acting. In civil disobedience and direct action, there is a tension in seeing them as legitimate, even necessary, and as illegitimate. This is significant because the traditional form of rule relies heavily on the formal rules themselves, backed up by the threat of force.⁸⁰

What is also central to both traditions is the challenge to power structures and bringing about a new concept; the Greek philosophy of the body, James Scott's history of resistance and the idea of increasing the power of the body.⁸² France's history of resistance as requiring the experience of bringing about a new concept of violence against the colonizer.⁸³ Harsh conditions of globalization insurrections have a peculiar quality. Foucault's theory of biopower (the power over the production of living daily life).⁸⁴ Many forms of protest and mobilizations use the body as a political tool.

The civil disobedience tradition and the direct action tradition recognize the importance of disruption. Disruption functions as a costly intermediate between laws and to the reproduction of social and economic norms. Piven and Cloward argue that people act only when, by using disruption, they can bring about a point at which it becomes in the interest of the state.

Most forms of protest rely on the ability to disrupt and complain about what their represent

...nium was frustrated by street block-
 ...has been a hallmark of the alterglo-
 ...ix B for a discussion of the “violence”
 ...ement is sometimes accused.) Why
 ...roires? Civil disobedience and direct-
 ...ode of practicing resistance, one that

...action contain an important tension
 ...n the point of view of those engaged
 ...s experienced as illegitimate, illegal
 ...to be legitimate. In the tradition of
 ...of a regime that is itself illegitimate
 ...organizing autonomously. Both civil
 ...efore, accept illegal forms of acting,
 ...ssary, methods of expressing dissent
 ...se, as Max Weber notes, the legal-
 ...the perceived inherent legitimacy of
 ...up by the state’s monopoly on the use

...tions is the use of the body for chal-
 ...ng about social change. This is not a
 ...of sovereignty included the body.⁸¹
 ...mphasizes the use of masquerade to
 ...nz Fanon understood decolonization
 ...ng one’s whole being to the point of
 ...dt and Negri argue that alterglobal-
 ...dimension of embodiment, echoing
 ...roduction of “docile” bodies and ways
 ...f action visible in alterglobalization
 ...ical weapon.

...and some forms of the direct-action
 ...of disruption to effective dissent.
 ...ervention to the enactment of illegiti-
 ...of the current scenario and its hege-
 ...onclude that social movements win
 ...raise the costs of an elite project to a
 ...rests of elites to obey dissenters.⁸⁵

...he notion of representation. People
 ...ntatives are doing or not doing and

ask them to change their policies, or their own representatives included in the negotiation goes further, challenging the very heart of liberal democracies. In fact, representation itself as part of the process of control over their social environment is a source of conflict. Acts of disruption are often carried out by a third party, a representative, to take action. Rather, they constitute a direct and unmediated grasp of the institutionalized power structure through disobedience or direct action/disruption, which is being implemented. In the altered global context, what is disrupted is the flow of official discourse.

From this review of the literatures, we identify several key concepts throughout the book: the process and that it has collective dimensions; the development and articulation of new public spaces. Melucci best describes the nature of this experimentation. Third, dissent in this context is both public and personal. It is carried out by actors who we need to be concerned with how they are able to get a group of would-be dissenters to participate. This process requires access to disruptive possibilities.

Method

This book is based on multimethod research covering the period 1999–2009. We have conducted research at a collective total of twelve sites in North America and Europe, beginning with the 1999 NATO protests in Washington, D.C. (See Appendix A for a complete list of sites.) We conducted participant observation at a number of domestic events, often relevant to the global context. The authors conducted a research project on the surveillance on activists in the United States. We also conducted several interview-based studies on activists in the United States, from which we draw. We analyzed relevant literature to understand the shifting control tactics of a

they try to build power to get their decision-making structure. Disruptive project of representation that is at the heart, those taking disruptive action see this as a problem, since it robs people of direct participation and contributes to the pacification. They spurn appeal to or dependence on a central authority on the demands and find solutions. They seek an autonomous collective entrance into the political sphere. The methods of civil disobedience attempt to prevent policies from being implemented. Globalization movement, what is disruptive that legitimizes new policies.

As relevant to dissent, we will use several books. The first is that dissent is a process of negotiation. Second, dissent depends for its effectiveness on a series of different kinds of social spaces and the needs of these social spaces for secure participation. The era of alterglobalization is direct action, not by representatives. Thus, social control affects the capacities to act and act bodily. Fourth, effective dissent is a process of negotiation.

Methods

This research by three sociologists during 2005-2010 was performed participant observation at twenty international protests in North America and Europe, with the WTO meetings in Seattle in 2000, the protests in Strasbourg, France, in 2009, and the 2010 protests.) In addition, the authors have participated in a collective total of more than fifty protests in the international movement. Two of the authors were part of a project that examined the effects of surveillance in the United States.⁸⁶ Each author has conducted research on related aspects of social control, on the effects of policy and legal documents to capture and control authorities. Finally, in preparing this

volume, we examined relevant archival materials on the antiwar/peace movement, and other

For reasons discussed earlier, our approach (including its resources, space, and time) led us to approach our analysis of social control in a way that focuses on the impacts on the formation of social control structures.

An important point to understand is that we do not seek to understand the social control structure in a narrow, broadly, we take as our sampling frame. First, let us point out that each episode of social control encloses not only the multiday protest but also the months or even years prior to the demonstration and afterward. Summit meetings are laboratories in which participants act to reduce the risk of undesirable outcomes. We explain why these events are a particular part of the data. We believe that summits are a snapshot of an entire social movement, capturing a wide range of activities. These diverse participant groups and social control are extraordinarily well documented before, during, and after. We can study the effects of these diverse groups for which the effect of the demonstration out the year would not normally be expected. These activities of more pacific sectors of these movements do not conflict with the police, nor are they disruptive. We are asking about their satisfaction with the demonstration. For consistency and brevity we refer to these groups in a style: City Year Organization, for example.

We have studied social control with a focus on the data. This book you find data reported with a focus on the work, they are from our primary data. In the appendix you will find excerpts from our field notes.

Toward a New Framework for Studying Social Control

Contemporary empirical research on social control movements, which is focused on policing and the impact on "protesters"; any impacts on the

val material on alterglobalization, the current movements.

r unit of analysis is the social move-
aces, cultures, and identities). We
ontrol of dissent by considering its
movements, not individual dissent-

nd about our methods is why, if we
ol of dissent—not just protest—most
frame protests of summit meetings.
ode of summit-centered social con-
protest itself, but activities that begin
ays of action and continue for years
oratories for examining how institu-
sired discourse. But this still doesn't
cularly important or valuable source
e especially useful because they are a
ent and its diverse participants and
s and their experiences with social
ocumented throughout the event,
study the effects of social control on
f that control on operations through-
e documented. Moreover, the activi-
social movements do not ordinarily
y generally saturated with journalists
ne expression of their political rights.
r to the summits using the following
mple Seattle 1999 WTO.

th our own bodies. This method pro-
lements aggregate data. Wherever in
without a citation to another author's
ata. In addition, throughout the text
notes. These are in italics.

Studying the Social Control of Dissent

n the social control of social move-
of protest, reduces social movements
broader group of dissenters are left

unstudied. A more thorough approach to the mental dimensions of social movements includes models of participation. Different kinds of sites and stages in the life of a social movement provide a framework for examining both the tactics and the control. We identify three sites of study: the global economy of control, and violence.

We begin with the crystallized in the late 1990s, an era in which ideological hegemony was challenged in a democratic world, the struggle for a new global order. In 1998, alterglobalization movements emerged. They proposed that the marches take place in public spaces where dissenters are not allowed in, blockades, and other forms of action to the existing repertoire of dissent. This included a whole repertoire of technologies of dissent: conferences, human chains, unarmed marches, and so on.⁸⁷ Protesters' lumbering and diverse forms of dissent have been met with a new form of control and a remapping of the social space. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization trade agreement negotiation. Geography and palpable the collaboration among movements that is behind economic globalization. The World Bank has become a fragile symbol of its control. The World Bank has built to intimidate would-be dissenters. The World Bank clearly the loss of legitimacy of the World Bank is obvious to every newspaper column.

Chapter 2 advances a systematic analysis of the governance of space. After introducing the concept of spatial interactions, drawing on recent developments in political theory, and philosophy, we analyze the governance of space and the incapacitation of movement. The World Bank of the governance of space. Various tactics of control of dissent: the selection of the location of the protest; the spatial surrounding; tools for dividing space and tools for separating protesters from the police. The preemptive character of control which is the World Bank assembly and the transnationalization

th requires awareness of the develop-
ents and their various forms and lev-
f social control affect developmental
al movement. This book proposes a
tactics and the effects of social con-
the geography of control, the politi-

mage of dissent today—the fence. In
ny is a serious front in a purportedly
legitimacy is serious and brittle. In
reconceptualized protest marches.
e as a goal entering the meetings or, if
ding them. This was a brilliant addi-
dissenting public speech and birthed
s for blockading—educational fora,
ed but armored citizens, and public
erse physical assaults on global-gov-
th increasing expenditures on police
around each meeting of the Interna-
nk, the WTO, the G8, and each free
aphic intervention has made visible
ng states, corporations, and institu-
lization. The summer meetings have
ested hegemony. Stronger walls are
ers, yet the strength of the walls indi-
the institutions huddled inside. This
nist.

approach for the analysis of the gov-
g central concepts for the study of
ent innovations in social geography,
e advance a systematic approach for
ce. The control of the flow of bodies
are revealed as the central objectives
ools are available for the spatial con-
cation and the remapping of the spa-
pace; tools for controlling movement;
from one another. We highlight the
ch deflects, redirects, and interrupts
n of tools for governing space.

A public contemptuous of dissent
ful of them and is willing to pay for “
rity expenditures indeed protect cit
examines the political economy of s
dramatic civil repression in the natio
institutions of social control. Over t
transnational protest has skyrockete
national law enforcement engage in e
struction projects. Security for each
placing a contentious burden on the c

The operations of police are dive
definition of the maintenance of vig
crimes, the militarization of events a
tions activities with the media. All o
entitlements of the police and prison
these tactics. In chapter 5, we analyze
bodies, dissenting minds, social spac
We find that police tactics are in eff
cal operations, serving to marginalize
dissenters and dissent. We argue that
political violence. Historical studies
to maintain social control document
(disappearance, assassination, tortur
has a social control effect, as it uses
minds and psychology, and to affect t
ity (suppressing dissent). This social f
to totalitarian societies and has not b
tinuum, with applications in democr
tics in democratic societies have not b
their effects (on bodies, minds, and so
on persons other than the immediate
similar behaviors. We begin this cons

Much of what is known about so
tracked through activists’ own work
Methods range from legal collectiv
rights and help people with criminal
draw attention to surveillance, to cre
to media projects focused on these i
work for further insights into the soc

t and dissenters is easily made fear-
 ‘protection” (although whether secu-
 zenship is questionable). Chapter 3
 social control. We follow the traces of
 nal economies, as well as in the state
 he past decade, the cost of policing
 d. Preparing for a summit, local and
 xtensive planning, training, and con-
 protest costs governments millions,
 city or region hosting the meeting.
 erse and complex. They include the
 ilance over, and the prosecution of,
 nd interactions, and even public rela-
 of these activities refer to the violent
 n system. In chapter 4, we inventory
 the interrelationships among activist
 es that nurture dissent, and policing.
 fect mass and individual psychologi-
 e, isolate, delegitimize, and demonize
 t these effects ought to be considered
 of totalitarian regimes’ use of terror
 the social fact that physical violence
 e) directed against some individuals
 terror to influence other individuals’
 he social fabric of associational activ-
 fact has been analytically applied only
 een conceptualized as part of a con-
 atic societies. As a result, police tac-
 een considered in the multiplicity of
 (social space) or in their indirect effects
 victims of policing, surveillance, and
 sideration.

social control at the moment was first
 k to protect and defend themselves.
 es that work to teach people their
 l charges, to art projects intended to
 ative ways of interacting with fences,
 ssues. In chapter 6, we draw on this
 ial control of dissent.

Our concluding chapter does not go beyond the analysis in the chapters. In Appendix C, we provide ideas.

We do believe—and, as activists, we struggle.⁸⁸ Although this book is focused on the Global North, we write it suffocated in the South and surrounded by tactics and ever momentary, partial, and insecure.

not recapitulate the book but instead
offers to offer further theoretical pro-
posals for future relevant research.

As we know—that hegemony is a strug-
gle on the mechanisms of social control
used with the struggles of the Global
South and interpretations of our wins, how-
ever.

The Geog Global Ge

Spatial Dynamics of

*Standing on a balcony above the
look suspicious. The road down
still early, about 10 p.m. Only a
ing at the crossroad. I am sure th
to look in their direction, althou
else worthwhile to look at. We a
the red zone. Tomorrow, the offic
eth anniversary will take place.
summits being held in cities, NA
sary in Strasbourg. Instead of t
sengers were confronted with a
zones in three colors indicating
readjusted at any moment. As w
of Strasbourg's historical center w
Since only a few bridges offer ac
from the protest camp at the ou
all the bridges would be cordone
ing hours onward. Therefore, sev
ing places at houses in the centr
entered a living room where abo
themselves comfortable for a sho
and backpacks. At 5 a.m. we wo
and be at the meeting place at 6 a
a few streets without being noti
the pink and silver dresses we w
plan. And we hoped others woul*

ography of overnance

f Controlling Dissent

*On the sixth floor I am trying not to
n there is empty, although it is
e small group of men are stand-
ey are undercover cops. I try not
ugh it is hard to find something
re only a few meters away from
cial celebration of NATO's sixti-
After a few years without major
ATO decided to hold its anniver-
the usual perimeter fences, dis-
"flexible security zone concept":
r security status which could be
usual, the red zone covering most
would remain a prohibited area.
ccess to the center of Strasbourg
tskirts, protesters reckoned that
d by police from the early morn-
veral groups had arranged sleep-
e. Retreating from the balcony, I
ut twenty persons tried to make
rt night next to drums, costumes,
uld get up to hit the road at 5:45
a.m. We hoped to be able to cross
ced. Given the instruments and
ould wear, not the most realistic
d make it as well.*

(April 2009)

In 1975, few people took notice when the G6 first met to promote economic growth in developing countries. Even fewer people saw the potential for protest. Global summit meetings were held in Bonn for several years, until movements in the Global South confronted the International Monetary Fund. In the early 1980s, “food riots” (some in many developing countries, and some in developed) developed a critical analysis of the continued dependent development of the Global South. The meeting attracted its first mass protest to the streets of Bonn, accompanied by the president, Ronald Reagan, traveled to Bonn. Fourteen years later, in 1999, Bill Clinton visited the city of Cologne. However, he was stopped by protesters to have a beer and a steak in a local bar. In June 2007, the G8 meeting was held in the east of Germany. This time, the summit was transformed into a mobile fortress, including a perimeter of approximately €12 million. In addition, a concentric three kilometer wide “security zone” area. This was reinforced with eighteen police units in the region, along with three thousand riot police, boats, and several “observation” tanks.

This chapter focuses on the spatial dimensions of global governance. To understand the role of geography in the discipline of geography. Henri Lefebvre argued that space is political and ideological. Space is not a neutral container. Rather, it is produced through social relations. Closely connected to social stratification and power relations. Further, examining the role of space in capitalist societies. Like other locations (e.g., schools), the rearrangement of space reflects the interests of different social groups.⁴ Social conflict is a constant interaction and struggle to define and control use of space. Edward Soja, suggesting that injustice and space are inseparable. The struggle of class differences involves spatial control.

n the G8 (at the time it was only the stability and expansion in member meeting as problematic or worthy went virtually unnoticed for several South (especially in Latin America) Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.¹ (sometimes called “IMF riots”) emerged Global South scholars and activists role of these institutions in the con- postcolonial world.² In 1985, a G8 protest; twenty thousand people took by ten thousand policemen. At the so unthreatening that the then U.S. with only two personal bodyguards. Clinton visited a much more fortified ill able to sneak out of the meetings ar. Eight years after Clinton’s visit, in n a tiny and isolated village in north- phy of the hosting town was trans- ing a twelve-mile-long fence costing on, the national authorities declared “no-protest zone” around the fenced en thousand police officers stationed sand army soldiers, two U.S. Marine s.

l transformations that occur around these spatial dynamics, we draw on Lefebvre argues that space is always not something fixed, given, or even ough social relationships and intri- ion.³ David Harvey takes this insight in social arrangements in late capi- of social production (e.g., factories, e can produce conflict between dif- ts have a spatial dimension; there is between competing forces seeking to ard Soja makes a similar claim, sug- useparable.⁵ That is, the reproduction onfiguration and arrangements. As a

result, this spatial arrangement can help uncover the dialectic of control that spatial relations are important to processes of contention, since space, like and structures social relationships and

The social dynamics of space, however. Doreen Massey even proposes between time and space; in her perspective, they are intertwined. Therefore, she introduces the concept of "space," constituted through its verticality and temporality.⁸ This is an important concept of legitimacy and the social control of space, since it means that the content of space is not fixed. For example, summits not only are held in specific locations but are also timed to occur during the work week of professionals and students, who would need space to dissent.

Space, Legitimacy, and the Control of Space

In order to make clear why space is important to the social control of global dissent, we first need to identify a spatial form in challenging global governance. It is that manifestations of dissent do not occur in isolation but engage social relations.

International meetings of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Union (EU), the Free Trade Area of the Americas, and the World Economic Forum have become key sites of global power relations.⁹ However, the only possible crystallization points for dissent are not widely perceived in this way, as sites of contention can be revealed, is a result of activists organizing and to do so *spatially* (as opposed to temporally, of course, popular education, or other means).

In 1999, something happened that challenged the legitimacy of global governance. A group of thousands of dissenters blocked the entrance to the center in Seattle that was the site of

develop into contentious politics that
 and resistance.⁶ Charles Tilly argues
 for a contextual perspective on pro-
 e political opportunities, constitutes
 and networks.⁷

wever, also have a temporal dimen-
 a break from the analytical dualism
 perspective, they are necessarily inter-
 the concept “tetradimensionality of
 icality, horizontality, deepness, and
 oncept for analyzing the production
 of dissent through the manipulation
 of time is also a spatial practice.
 held in remote locations but also are
 k, limiting the mobilization of work-
 several days’ holiday to express their

Contestation of Global Governance

became such a central aspect of the
 first want to explain how dissent takes
 governance. The first important note
 not just use physical space but also

World Trade Organization (WTO), the
 , the World Bank, the G8 and G20,
 Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA),
 have become crystallization points of
 these meetings are certainly not the
 or global conflicts. That they are now
 s where hegemonic power structures
 ts’ choice to *confront* summit meet-
 sed to doing so through media dis-
 means).

at fundamentally changed the strug-
 governance. On November 30, tens
 intersections around the convention
 of the WTO ministerial. What was

later referred to as “the Battle of Seattle” (Northern) alterglobalization movements and ministerials had occurred in previous years, this one managed to produce grievances against globalization. Was suspended because few delegates could protest unmasked global governance disruption of space. The protesters functions of space and used space to legitimacy of global governance.

The spaces surrounding summits are spaces of the city. While not all of part of it is generally accessible and under surveillance technologies are already in space is not only a space of rights but also a fabric of social life of the city. Disruption and severely changed, curtailed, militancy affects not only the free and semianarchical but also the formal and informal exchange. The normal spatial functions of the city are suspended, affecting not only participants but also ordinary citizens and activities.

Lefebvre makes a threefold distinction between dissent and space: perceived space. *Perceived space* (or spatial production of space in daily life. *Conceived* representations of space, for example, discourses and meaning. *Lived space* is the action of the first two categories. It is its engagement, establishing space of “counter spaces” or “space of resistance” to the conceived space of world cities. In the city, social movements usurped the space of normal reproduction of flows in the city, the flow of traffic and commerce, replacing familiar uses such as the presence of shops with surprising punctures of the purported institutions such as banks. Attempting to create special maps over the city, maps that

ernance

ttle” was the coming-out party of the
ment. While protest outside meet-
in other parts of the world in previ-
duce a global broadcast of resonant
Then the WTO meeting had to be
uld reach the convention center, this
e and did so primarily through the
in Seattle reappropriated the public
o question the very foundation and

ts are normally ordinary multiuse
this space is legally “public,” a large
used anonymously and freely, even as
y encroaching on that reality. Urban
t also an infrastructure of commerce
uring summits, this space is abruptly
tarized, and made impenetrable. This
onymous use of the space for dissent
changes and circulations of the city.
social geography of the hosting area
rticipants and dissenters of the meet-
activities.

ction that helps to explain the rela-
rceived space, conceived space, and
ial practice) relates to the social (re)
ceived space concerns the (dominant)
e a map, related to the production of
e, finally, is the product of the inter-
is in lived space that dissent makes
on its own terms (sometimes called
nce”). As summits attempted to use
as a proper setting for their author-
mmits’ entitlement by disrupting the
ose spaces. Movements violated the
ng normalized hegemony with unfa-
puppets, dancing in the streets, and
tedly inviolable boundaries of insti-
o reassert control, summits asserted
at asserted their need for “security”

while purporting to “respect” democracy for it. Again, movements refused to be contained and flooded the map with creative counter-protests, turning the summits’ conceived space into a site of contestation.

Since the first mass protests during the 1990s, movements have needed to show that their talks are a form of “democratic governance.” As dissent intensifies each year, movements have become ever more convincingly that they talk for the people, not just protesters and that they are working on social issues such as poverty, AIDS, climate change, and human rights. The focus of these social problems by the G8 is often overshadowed by financial concerns that originally dominated the social agenda resulted primarily from the 1990s. Social movements placed on the agenda of the G8 to appear legitimate and beneficial to the world. Countries must keep one eye on their own interests and on seemingly humanitarian endeavors. The G8 risks losing its legitimacy to direct global affairs if it does not work relatively well until 1999.

The visibility of social conflicts has led to a new role for movements to appropriate spaces of public life. John Agnew calls this the “globalization of protest.” With Seattle 1999 WTO, protesters’ actions have always been connected to imagery of social movements, including blockades, tear gas, skirmishes, and other tactics. It is effective that these global institutions have to simultaneously defend their own legitimate place as part of democratic governance. Institutions have to control challenges to their authority and tolerate protest in order to appear legitimate. Governing forces, then, must be seen to be on the streets. We argue that, to solve this dilemma, the G8 must be seen as one of the primary locations for contestation. If the G8 is to continue, these institutions have to appear open and democratic. Several protesters’ claims that the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank are undemocratic and have led to the protests that have proved so effective at undermining the institutions’ appearance of authority.

cracy by demarcating special space to participate in this reproduction and the redefinition of boundaries, transforming a network of spaces of resistance.

In the 1980s, the G8 countries have become a legitimate part of “responsible governance.” Each year, the G8 countries have to prove that they take seriously the concerns of the poor countries’ debts. The G8 has become a diversion from the economic and political issues that dominated its gatherings. Of course, the G8 has responded to the demands that civil society organizations have made for the entire globe, the G8 countries have their own economic objectives and other interests. Without this balance, the group would not be able to address global development. This balancing act

has to do with the capacity of social movements to challenge the production of hegemonic space and the visualization of space.”¹⁰ Beginning in the 1990s, global meetings would be met with mass protests in the streets, including the use of police violence. This tactic was so effective that global institutions were left with a serious dilemma: how to maintain the legitimacy of their agenda and their operations in democratic societies. That is, global institutions have to maintain their legitimacy and at the same time appear to meet the basic ideals of liberal democracy. In order to meet the need to allow protesters access to the global institutions, global institutions use space to control. In order for global meetings to simultaneously repress dissent and appear to be open, the repression could reinforce protest. For example, the World Bank, the G8, and other global institutions are harmful. Yet, welcoming the very protesting and disrupting meetings puts at risk the

The G8 does not constitute an official central office or commission. The group consists of the leaders of the six (now eight) most powerful nations. Its ambitions for influence and visibility are often at odds with the rules of legitimacy. Each year, the summit is chaired by one of the eight countries, and the location is a matter of contention on the choice of location. When the summit becomes a space for contesting global governance, the G8 cannot admit that they would be better off as a nonmember nation (such as Qatar, which was invited to return to the remote mountains of Kananaskis in 2002). This spatial decision is a matter of legitimacy. No, every year the meeting is held in member countries. Since it is clear that the summit is no longer in a major city anymore and since the summit is no longer available in Europe (at least not remotely), the G8 is confronted with a challenge.

The geographical moves of the G8 are a matter of the legitimacy of the G8 itself and of the world. It is about us how the struggle over legitimacy is played out, how global governance needs to manage the immense effort and cost involved in the summit, the media attention paid to the protest, whether the protest is synthetic or dismissive, and despite the protest, the protest is unnecessary for achieving practical results. The fact that having summit meetings is not an option for the G8 is equivalent to admitting that their legitimacy is in a state of decline.

This weakness of global governance (the lack of legitimacy) is rarely mentioned in either the G8 or the media debates about the possible decline of the G8. The fact that summit protests influence the content of global governance is rarely mentioned. The fact that the protests influence the content of global governance is rarely mentioned.

So it seems that a very practical way to challenge front global governance institutions is to challenge their legitimacy. The struggle for legitimacy is a struggle for legitimacy. The little island in Italy become contested

ernance

cial institution with any kind of cen- started as an informal meeting of the prosperous industrialized countries. ility require it increasingly to follow meetings are prepared, hosted, and s, placing a certain logic and restric- ever the meeting is held, the place al power relations. The G8 members tter off meeting in an undemocratic (where the WTO met in 2001) or of Canada each year (the G8 met in ision would mean losing the struggle eeting has to take place in one of the at the members do not dare to meet here is no really remote countryside ote enough to prevent thousands of blocking the summit), the G8 is con-

G8 summits mirror the struggle over global governance in general. It tells is organized spatially. And it shows anifest itself geographically. Despite d in securing those meetings, despite testers' arguments, whether sympa- e fact that the summit meetings are results for the countries involved, not option. For the G8 countries, it would meetings and policies are not legiti-

ance institutions (the geography of her the literature on globalization, or f the nation-state, or commentary on d to focus on the way protesters can nance rather than to the vulnerabili-

and seemingly effective way to con- is to leave them no space for actually eets of Seattle, Genoa, Calgary, or a ed spaces of global governance. For

the authorities, in turn, one question: how can they govern space more effectively?

The remainder of this chapter explores how space is spatially controlled to produce legitimate and illegitimate four mechanisms of control: deciding where to hold and imposing regulatory controls on incoming and outgoing person location. These four mechanisms are examined during summit protests. As we will see, we do not suggest that they are about the territory itself, but we propose to think of each mechanism as a way of turning situations into predictable, and thereby controllable, and events.

Selecting a Summit Location

The selection of a summit location is a key element in the geography of global governance and international relations and power relations. This tactic first became prominent at the 2001 G8. The Canadian prime minister announced that the summit would take place in a small mountain town. It was also the case when the European Union decided to stick with Brussels as a permanent meeting place for its meetings to the presiding member state. The World Trade Organization (WTO) nor the IMF nor the World Bank have held meetings in Europe since 2000, instead holding meetings in Asia (where protest has become less robust) or in places difficult for protesters to access. However, moving summit meetings to remote, authoritarian, or island sites is just one of many considerations reviewed by the authorities before a summit.

Already at Genoa 2001 G8, the decision to hold the summit building in the city center but on a hillside was justified by referring to the security concerns of George W. Bush, whose security the summit would be in the city center. While there are no reasons to think one should keep in mind that allergies and asthma are a world had by this point demonstrated to be a significant close to the meeting sites of summits.

has become crucial: how can police

explores empirically how dissent is spatialized in global governance. We identify mechanisms of control on locations, dividing the space, disciplining individuals, and militarizing the choices. We cover the spatial operations before we examine these mechanisms, we do not see total suppression of dissent. Instead, we see dissent as a way of *channeling* confrontation into controllable, flows of people, ideas,

Location

Location is an important aspect of the geography of global governance. It mirrors the contestation of global governance. It became apparent shortly after Genoa 2001 when the G8 Ministerial Council decided to hold the next meeting in a mountain resort, Kananaskis. This was a departure from the traditional meeting place instead of rotating the location to a different country. At the same time, neither the World Bank has held a major gathering in a mountain resort either in the United States (since the aftermath of 9/11, 2001) or in a remote location, such as Qatar or Hong Kong. The preference for cities in favor of remote, rural, locations is one of the rather broad spatial contestations when selecting a location for a

major gathering. Delegations were hosted not in a royal palace but in a boat in the port. The authorities justified the contested presence of President Bush by saying they would not be able to guarantee in a mountain resort. Reasons to doubt this official account, the globalized movements around the world, and the fact that both the capacity to come very close to the event and a total lack of interest in endan-

gering heads of state. The careful selection of venue can be related to the alterglobalization movement's challenge to and to have a disruptive effect on themselves and the spatial flows involved.

The attempts of authorities to avoid the use of a certain venue can be understood as a strategy of territorialization. Deleuze and Guattari¹¹ introduce the concept of reterritorialization to explain the mechanism of closure of a political field. Whereas state power is based on rigid segmentarity, social movements are based on favoring connectivity. Deleuze and Guattari distinguish "striated spaces" and the deterritorialized connections "smooth spaces."

The networked and decentralized movements¹² provides a good example of the challenge to state power and hierarchies. The alterglobalization movement's challenge to state power through borders to conjure a dispersed global movement. In 2002, Korean farmers were beating drums in protest against the hegemony of the United States; as Derrida's territory has been shattered from within, no matter how it sought to isolate itself, global governance has had to face the "smooth spaces" of cooperation.

Moreover, the action repertoire of the movement is disrupting the material flows necessary for the state to maintain extensive spatial preparations, then, to exercise social control through segmentarity. The selection of the location is a first step in the disruption through decentralized blockades that are difficult to access and easy to protect.

After Seattle 1999, the next WTO Ministerial was held in Qatar, a nation ruled by a monarchical family. Qatar has a constitutional ban on mass protests. Thus, protest was preemptively limited. The protest was both far from the networks of organizations and from the protest itself. Protesters created other protests, such as blockading European airports and other venues in their countries for the Ministerial. In

ection of locations within cities thus on movement's ability to pose a visi-ve effect on summit meetings them-in their organization.

id disruption through careful choice uggle to define and control territory. e concepts of deterritorialization and hannels behind the opening and the tates try to control territory through s challenge these rigid boundaries by Guattari call these rigid segmentation lized areas with open and decentral-

character of alterglobalization move- he challenge of territorial boundaries on movement has spirited represen- o form a loud encircling apparition, ent all in one place. Suddenly peasant in downtown Seattle. The territory of Deleuze and Guattari put it, "the ene- om within"¹³—and would continue to e itself. The "striated space" of global ooth space" of global solidarity and

of blockading explicitly aims at dis- r for a smooth summit meeting. The can be seen as a way to reterritori- ation of space into functional units. st step in this. In order to avoid dis- ades, authorities choose sites that are .

Ministerial was Qatar 2001. A Mus- Family established in the mid-1800s, ass demonstrations and open dissent. ited through selection of a country ized protest and totally hostile to pro- olitical territories for confrontation, s to prevent delegations from leaving n this way, they deterritorialized the

spaces of a summit meeting of the WTO. To visualize it—at least for one Ministerial—in

While the selection of Qatar for the summit had the desired effect of reducing disruptions, the WTO was undemocratic and illegitimate. Global institutions need to balance the need to ensure uninterrupted meetings with the need across the globe view them as legitimate. If institutions are viewed as undemocratic, the summit over the global regulation of markets in Qatar was another strike against the WTO as a democratic institution.

Two years after the Qatar meeting, the summit in Cancún. While presenting a more open nation, the summit presented significant obstacles for protesters. It is little history of political organizing and mobilization resources for mobilization. Cancún is a city of 1.5 million after days of road travel for Mexican protesters and those living outside the country. Finding a meeting place to defend. The Cancún hotel zone is a 15-kilometer long, with water on both sides and two bridges, one at each end. During the summit, police closed down the bridge nearest to the meeting, thirty-three kilometers if they wanted to reach the meeting location. In addition, police established checkpoints on roads leading to the open bridge. Vehicle checkpoints and activists were denied entry to the entire summit area.

Besides the political history of the summit, the isolation of the meeting location, the summit also played an important role. The summit is to be one of the beneficiaries of the free trade agreement by NAFTA. During the WTO meeting, Mexico wanted to showcase its modernity and development and liberties since the infamous slaughter of the 1990s. The isolation of the event, partly by the use of police, who mostly stayed behind the summit, created the perception of a well-organized summit. In Lefebvre's terms, the Mexican government's organization of conceived space, seeking to re-

WTO, which had tried to reterritorialize the world through isolation from any possible dissent. The 2001 Ministerial produced the illusion of legitimacy, it also validated claims that the WTO was illegitimate. As stated previously, these are two kinds of legitimacy. While they are different, they also require that populations be able to claim forms of governance. If the institutions weaken their claims to beneficent authority, their legitimacy is weakened. The decision to hide the WTO's by-then shaky credibility

was made when the WTO met in Cancún, México. Unlike the international climate than Qatar, the location was chosen for protesters. Unlike in Seattle, there were no protesters in Cancún, so there were few local protesters also relatively isolated, reached only through expensive air travel for protesters and expensive air travel for protesters. Locally, it offered a geographically easy location. Cancún is a narrow strip of land thirty-one kilometers wide, connected to the mainland by a narrow strip of land. During the protest dates, the local authorities closed the city, requiring dissidents to travel to protest close to the WTO meeting. A series of security checkpoints on the highway were inspected, and suspected protesters were kept in a hotel zone.

The locality and the ease of physically isolating the symbolic dimension of the locality around Cancún is supposed to be a trade regime, delivered, in this case, through the Mexican government sought development, including advances in civil liberties for university students in 1968. The use of high fences, and the restrained use of fences, were intended to reinforce a state that tolerates dissent. To put it in context, the government was engaged in the reproduction of México as modern state.

We witnessed a masked group of rioters demolishing it. Shortly after, the rioters surrounded the building but did not attack the police. The Mexican government had given the rioters what they wished to present México as a modern state. Officials wished to present México as a modern state. It was busy reterritorializing its own political space. Its franchises unprotected from anticorporate globalization.

Without appearing to enact political violence, the state nearly complete spatial closure of the city. The state to separate weary police from energetic rioters. The state nearly avoided a militarized image. The state shore did not go unnoticed.)

In contrast, a few years earlier, at the Summit of the Americas (Area of the Americas), the Canadian government used the security of geographical distance to keep the summit out of the Americas meeting. Canada invited the summit to host a democratic event when it could not host a democratic meeting, dividing the city.¹⁴ The fence was a “wall of shame” by protesters, press, and police. As protests began, the not very strong police force. The police then spent days (and neighborhood residents) with rioters. The police used rubber bullets, losing any hope of protest. Instead producing an image of lumbering police. The police del from the rabble. Conveniently, the fence was strategic on a symbolic level because it was a sign of militant conflict. Images of police and forth at each over a fence over the city. The fence ordinary regional culture but also as a sign of militant conflict.

One year after the protest in Québec, the summit meeting. This time, the gathering was held in a mountain resort. To ensure that the meeting was secure, the government territorialized a security perimeter by restricting travel along the nearest highway with a radius of 148 kilometers; it also restricted access of the wilderness by closing camping and the large perimeters made a mass presence. The isolation was a mass presence. The isolation was unable to get within viewing distance.

ernance

of people entering a Pizza Hut and
t police showed up and surrounded
protesters. Later, we learned that the
order to police the event lightly, since
as a developing democracy. México
political image, so it left international
porate activists.

ical closure, the state accomplished a
e summit's venue. By using the fence
tic and lively protesters, the Mexican
mage. (Two battleships stationed off-

Québec City 2001 FTAA (Free Trade
authorities could not afford the lux-
p protesters away from the Summit
nmediately lost its claim that it was
erected a perimeter fence around the
ace was promptly dubbed "Canada's
and the local population. Once the
fence was quickly breached by pro-
bombarding approaching protesters
tear gas, concussion grenades, and
resenting a democratic narrative and
ering soldiers defending a stone cita-
the location of the battle in Québec
ause the region already has an image
and protesters hurling tear gas back
several days could be dismissed as
un-Canadian.

bec City, Canada hosted the 2002 G8
as in Kananaskis, an isolated moun-
ting would be held in isolation, the
ty area of radius of 6.5 kilometers,
ghway and establishing a no-fly zone
so deterritorialized the organization
facilities in the area.¹⁵ The rural loca-
it difficult for protesters to organize
s so successful that protesters were
ce of the world leaders' meeting site.

Instead, activists had to territorialize the meeting, as the political location.

A similar tactic was employed for the eight most developed nations gathered ninety-six kilometers south of Savannah selected for its seclusion, which facilitated. No protesters were allowed on the island. Confined to Savannah.

Another criterion for selection between the 2005 G8 and Heiligendamm. The police publicly admitted that they found the location difficult to reach from major cities. The population was not likely to be involved in the 'activities'. This admission not only that police investigated the location but also that they studied the socio-political case of Gleneagles 2005 G8, officials noted the 'activist structures and a weaker tradition of protest'. The hotel in Gleneagles is situated in a hillside, accessed by one highway and a few roads. The nearest protest camp could be located about twenty-four kilometers from the hotel.

Heiligendamm 2007 G8 offered a unique opportunity for Angela Merkel, to present to the world. The little sea resort of Heiligendamm is located in the former East Germany. At the same time, it was geographically desirable because police could control access from only three sides and always had a way in and out by using the sea for transport. This was because activists blockaded all the land routes.

The luxury sea resort hotel chosen for the G8 was a sharp contrast to the poverty and social inequality. Like Cancún and Gleneagles, this resort was chosen for the benefit of having very few left-wing activists and a substantial presence of right-wing activists, this required putting in contact with the local population and could be necessary for the week of protest. The symbolic dimension could be reterritorialized.

the Calgary, some 112 kilometers from

Georgia 2004 G8. The leaders of the summit met at a resort on Sea Island, located in Savannah, Georgia. The location was chosen to facilitate the tight security measures. The island, and even journalists were con-

It becomes clear when we examine the 2007 G8. For both of these summits, organizers were looking not only for a remote location or cities but also for an area where the local population is very supportive of the alterglobalization mission is an important one, implying a favorable local political scene and population. The political history of that area. In the case of Scotland, it is noted that Scotland has fewer activists than England. The location of summit protest than England. The location is a rural area and is difficult to reach, being a narrow road that pass through small towns. The location is located only on the other side of a hill, making it the summit's venue.

It was a chance to the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, to visit the region where she grew up. The location is situated in the poorest region of Scotland. At the same time, the seashore location was chosen because police forces had to secure the meetings and a backup route for getting delegates to the summit by air (which they finally had to do, because of the bad roads).

It was then as the summit's venue stands in the face of high unemployment of that region. The location offered to summit organizers a region with a long history of strong activist structures and a history of anti-fascist and fascist groups. For months, a lot of energy into establishing connections and creating the infrastructure that would support the summit. For a moment, it looked as if the location was being memorialized by activists when they pre-

sented the fact that the avenue leading to the summit had been declared the most beautiful park in the world by a woman who was also still mentioned as citizen of the city of the town. These historical details were probably intended to create a little scandal about German history as the summit's venue.

We have seen that isolated social geography is a form of isolation. While Genoa is close to many other countries, Heiligendamm was isolated in Germany and fairly distant from other major cities. Gleneagles was far enough away from Edinburgh and Glasgow to dampen the influence of Europe that is now used for ensuring Cancún 2003 WTO, Kananaskis 2001, and G8 followed this pattern. From the perspective of cities, isolation is beneficial for controlling the flow of activists from elsewhere, for minimizing the risk of international sympathy, and for reducing the possibility of protests and actions at places near the summit.

In sum, geographical selection of summit venues can set the stage for controlling space and time from the outset, subdue the level of international activists to travel, gather, organize, and protest. In the past few years, there has been an increasing trend of meetings at isolated, easily defensible locations. Activists have politically deterritorialized their own political cultures and institutions through their presence in cities and territorialized politically their own spaces by taking advantage of their very differences. Summit venues have more and more become strategic spaces in the face of challenges of smooth spaces of global resistance.

Dividing

After the alterglobalization movement, the challenge of global governance through the power of local authorities' tactics for controlling movement and space is an attempt to reterritorialize dissent. This is a challenge Deleuze and Guattari's analysis of h

ing to the conference hotel had once
arkway in Germany by Adolf Hitler,
en of honor in the register of a nearby
cked up by the world press and initi-
istory and the political symbolism of

geography is as important as physical
many Italian cities and even close to
quite far from any major metropolis
other Western European countries.
om the two major Scottish cities of
protests. This is the conceptual map
ring summit security. Officials plan-
s 2002 G8, and Georgia 2004 G8 fol-
ctive of governing space, the distance
ing and restricting arrivals of activ-
access to activist infrastructure and
ibilities of and targets for disruptive

secluded places for summit meetings
ce. Selecting the right location can,
protest, making it more difficult for
and disrupt the meetings. Over the
creasing trend toward holding summit
e locations. In this way, summit plan-
d the political space of oppositional
at are active and networked in major
naïve or at least disorganized areas,
ent political territory. Summit meet-
iated spaces that easily defy the chal-
istance from below.

g Space

nt's success in challenging the space
penetration of summit meetings, the
ovement can be best understood as
into striated and anticipated spaces.
ow dominant power structures rely

on a tactic of closing off spaces that centralized organized processes of determining the functioning of the tactics of controlling movement revelation of flows. They try to disrupt movements by reterritorializing their flows. The central objective here is the characterization of zones and the incapacitation of spontaneous

Once a location is selected, authorities surround area by rating spaces on an explicit intent of channeling dissent from the actual gatherings, in order involved in a summit meeting and territorialized beforehand. This process is primarily the temporary reorganization of Left changing the social relations that exist from a "normal" stratification of daily users of the city are divided into new (businessperson, summit personnel). This transformation of the locale before a

Again, it should be clear how important summit has become for the government is still an important part of the actual will be discussed in the next section to prestructure the space in such a meetings become unlikely, if not impossible

The general logic of the operation dividing it can be captured clearly from cauld. The techniques of enclosure, tion-related units, and ranking, which emergence of a new type of social control and schools, are used in a similar way around summits. Foucault's ideas are access. Specifically, his notion of disciplinary space is divided for the purpose of control mechanism deployed against the plan how disciplinary diagrams emerged careful supervision of space, reinforced order.¹⁶ These basic ideas of containm

t have been opened through decen-
 ritorialization can be very helpful for
 tools for controlling movement. The
 al how authorities focus on the regu-
 the capacity of decentralized move-
 vs before and during protest events.
 nneling of dissent into preestablished
 taneity.

orities start to reorganize the sur-
 “danger scale.” This process has the
 into preestablished zones, far away
 er to secure the operational flows
 to control dangerous objects identi-
 arily about space. That is, it is about
 ebvre’s “conceived space.” It involves
 rist within a specific city or location
 y life to a new social existence where
 categories (e.g., dissenter, local busi-
 us, the division of space involves the
 protest occurs.

ortant the time preceding the actual
 ce of space. While control over space
 al policing during protest events (as
 of this chapter), authorities attempt
 way that disruptions of the summit
 possible.

ns involved in controlling space by
 om the framework provided by Fou-
 segmentation, subdivision of func-
 ch Foucault describes as part of the
 ontrol taking place in hospitals, jails,
 y for the governance of public space
 e instructive in examining this pro-
 linary diagrams helps to explain how
 ontrol. In his inquiry into the control
 ague, for example, Foucault showed
 that required the strict division and
 ed by inspection and maintenance of
 ment are also used to control protest.

The most sensitive and highly marked by ever-longer fences, a no-go in without displaying credentials that issued to residents whose homes are Québec City 2001 FTAA was 2.5 kilometers. The 2007 G8 summit in Heiligendamm stretched 12.5 kilometers. The fence has been steadily improved in security handbooks of transnational and more massive, with cement foundations, movement detectors and surveillance cameras. It prevented dissenters from actually articulating global governance decisions are made. Shipping containers are assembled during meetings in order to protect certain areas or to channel protest marches.

Preparatory spatial arrangements for the Genoa 2001 G8, the red zone was surrounded by Québec City 2001 FTAA, protest groups established several green zones, where protesters came from the red zone and purportedly were ultimately breached not only by the red zone but also by police. In 2007 G8, the red zone was inside the red zone, a concentric zone surrounded it. In the red zone, banned by a “general directive” issued by the police. Dissenters who entered this yellow zone were not allowed to pass the fence and although they were still quiet, they could be prosecuted for committing a crime. The red zone was subdivided into high- and low-security zones.

At Strasbourg 2009 NATO, the summit—Strasbourg, Kehl, and Baden-Baden—was divided into security zones. The cities of Strasbourg and Kehl, which hosted the NATO summit, were surrounded by a red security-zone concept, in which the red zone was the “highest security zone” could be adapted to meet the needs of the highest security zone could be accessed but the next zone could be accessed but was not accessible. Registered protests were permitted, but they were controlled. In addition, the German police

ernance

controlled zone is the “red zone,” no-go area (meaning that no one can go in or out without grant access, which are sometimes granted within the defined area). The fence at Heiligendamm is 1.5 kilometers long, while the fence at Heiligendamm is 3 kilometers. Also, the construction of the fences is standardized according to the requirements of all police agencies. Fences are higher than 2 meters, and are often equipped with surveillance cameras. These no-go areas prevent protesters from protesting at the place where the summit is held. In urban areas, walls composed of concrete blocks, during the days preceding the summit, were used as objects, to enforce the no-go areas,

but they do not stop here, however. Already at Heiligendamm, the area was surrounded by a yellow zone. For Québécois protesters, they even negotiated with police to establish a zone where protesters could gather—impotently far from the summit—safe from police action. These zones were often used by tear gas floating in from the saturation of riot police combat teams. At Heiligendamm, the fence, and a three-kilometer-wide yellow zone, protest and assemblies were held a few weeks before the summit. In Heiligendamm, despite not having trespassed a meter into the red zone, protesters could be charged with a criminal act. The sea and air space were also considered no-go zones, as well.

The three cities involved in the summit—Baden—were organized into leveled zones: Heiligendamm, Kehl, and Baden-Baden, which were subdivided according to a three-level system. The borders of the “flexible security zones” were determined by emerging police requirements. The first zone was a no-protest zone, accessed only by local inhabitants; the second zone was a no-protest zone. In the third zone, protesters were present, but there were constant identity checks. The police manipulated the protest prepara-

tions spatially by not allowing for an
 Protesters coming for several days th
 the French side, with no chance to
 the German side because of the in
 der crossing was further complicated
 border controls between EU membe
 gen agreement. This suspension ha
 Genoa 2001 G8.

While the spatial divisions for con
 of a preemptive type, other tools are
 to maintain spatial control. These too
 culture and include: police strategy, i
 of anonymous and safe space.

Police strategy. For Heiligendamm
 tigation police were responsible for
 while the national police forces were
 outside the fence. The region arou
 vided into areas secured by designa
 The major highways leading to the br
 stations and airports, were secured
 In preparation for Miami 2003 FTA
 town Miami into relatively small su
 and protesters. Each grid contained
 the Operations Center via radio. With
 was able to track the movement of “s
 tion, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Inves
 the Operations Center to further mo

Mobile blockades. In addition to us
 of fences and containers, police mob
 rows of police vehicles (e.g., cars, mo
 seal, and change routes of marches a
 from meeting one another (or from
 point); blocking, delaying, and direct
 able access points unprotected by ot
 used in all countries, Genoa 2001 G
 tactic. The militarized police forces c
 only to block roads and to encircle
 them with a tactic called “carousel,” w
 a circle in an area occupied by protes

...y protest camp on the German side. ...us had to get to the protest camp on ...participate in the protest events on ...ensifying border controls. The bor- ...d by the temporary reintroduction of ...er states, a suspension of the Schen- ...s become a habitual practice since

...trolling space discussed so far are all ...e employed *during* protests in order ...ols vary with national or local police ...mobile blockades, and the reduction

...a 2007 G8, the federal criminal inves- ...securing the space within the fence, ...e responsible for the no-protest zone ...nd the no-protest zone was subdi- ...ted police units from various states. ...ggest city nearby, as well as big train ...by the federal police and the army. ...AA, law enforcement divided down- ...rveillance grids to monitor marches ...undercover officers who reported to ...h their information, law enforcement ...pontaneous direct actions.”¹⁷ In addi- ...tigation provided a live video feed to ...nitor protesters.

...sing semipermanent blockades made ...ilize flexible barricades composed of ...otorcycles). These are used to define, ...and protests; prevent moving groups ...n arriving at the designated starting ...ing dispersal; and protecting vulner- ...her means. While police vehicles are ...8 is one of the best examples of this ...called *carabinieri* used their cars not ...demonstrators but also to disperse ...whereby a police vehicle drives fast in ...sters.

Another tool available to authorities is the use of police. Police use their bodies to separate protesters and to remain isolated either from other protesters or from the public. This is accomplished in several ways. For example, police use snake marches. This style of marching involves police routes, “snakes” around in and out of the crowd, a maneuver that make traditional police formations of traffic more likely. In response to protests, hundreds of officers to surround the entire protest area that can be reshaped on the move: it is a fluid space. The inside space contains protesters and the space outside remains reserved for the public. It remains separated from protesters. This tactic prevents protesters from mingling with the public and in the public spontaneously joining in. It also prevents protesters from departing the protest to stop.

In Germany and the United Kingdom, police use a tactic (kettle). Several lines of police officers surround the demonstration. While for demonstrations, the protest is accompanied by lines of police, with the intention that the march is stopped for several minutes, protesters are checked, or even arrested. When police used this tactic in Hamburg just a few days after the 9/11 demonstration, the organizers of the demonstration were surrounded by several lines of police for hours, trapped in a “kettle” (because of its immobility) and very close to the police (because of criminality). After the demonstration, the protesters dispersed. In another form of separation, police use “feeder” routes. At Miami 2003 FTAA, small “feeder” routes were used to join the main march.

Police use similar tactics to ensure separation. At New York City 2002 WEF (World Economic Forum), surrounded and isolated a large protest. To separate the protesters, the police had used the police to separate the protesters. Knowing the protesters, the police used officers, bikes, and motorcycles to control the protest. At one point, we observed what was contained between motorcycled officers.

ities is the bodies of police officers. and divide space so that protesters protesters or from the public. This is example, police isolate and separate , avoiding predetermined marching of streets spontaneously, a tactical izing more difficult and the disrupt- se, police sometimes use large num- e march, thus defining two territories inside the protest space and outside. s, who are now isolated within this relatively undisturbed, but the public In effect, this division of space pre- the public and prevents individuals n the march. It also prevents protest- p for food or to go to the bathroom. ngdom, this tactic is called “Kessel” rs corral dissenters or an entire dem- s this normally means that the march th smaller groups it normally means al hours until everyone is identified, ice used this tactic during a big dem- ays before Heiligendamm 2007 G8, aborted the march. Totally enclosed he demonstration was both invisible unattractive (because of its appear- nstration was aborted, several hours dissenters and police forces ensued. e prevent two marches from joining eder marches” were prevented from

e their control of permitted marches. orld Economic Forum), police sur- t. Facing an estimated ten thousand ermit process to establish a route for rs’ route, the police used barricades, onfine the march to a predetermined hat appeared to be the entire march ers on one side and a three-foot bar-

n the other side. The police ensured
 lished route. Ultimately, all ten thou-
 from the public, again reproducing

lice units focused on containing pro-
 strategically hindering the entrance to
 st by installing long lines of heavily
 o still insisted on making their way
 o find ways to break or circumvent
 ed. At the opening demonstration of
 thousands of protesters in Edinburgh
 ty, their mobility restricted for most
 ions. Once started, there was simply
 e flow of the masses in one direction.
 out of the demonstration during the
 nted that day that he “felt like a sheep

mitted march, U.S. law enforcement
 of the march that can hold thousands
 mon in New York City, where police
 l the space. In some instances, police
 a specific number of individuals into
 k down a march of twenty thousand
 wo thousand or fewer. The Washing-
 tic during 2002 IMF/WB (Internat-
 nk). A fortified and barricaded space
 riot gear awaited the marchers at the
 rch arrived at its end point, the timed
 e outside the pen were urged to dis-
 ly “protest space.”

space. Both constant police obser-
 tribute to this strategy, which clearly
 they can move freely and therefore
 e actions. Police habitually surveil
 of dissenters, such as camps, Con-
 media centers. In addition, during
 subjected to constant photo and video
 pace where dissenters can move and
 tool for gathering evidence for possi-

it. Anonymous space is reduced further as they begin on the routes toward points of assembly areas, allowing people to carry cards. Entering into protest space, they seek anonymity, and security.

Anonymous and safe space is the sabotage of infrastructure. Alterglobalization movements rely on the structure of Convergence Centers, often where protests start. This infrastructure includes support offices, camps, food kitchens, and information points. It provides a platform for various political actions, and offers opportunities for different modes of protest. Activists have acknowledged the strategic importance of these centers and often frustrate the creation of such infrastructure by operating in ways that allow legal ways to be blocked. In the German case, police forced individual protesters to leave before they could provide land to set up infrastructure. During the protests, infrastructure was targeted by police. This happened at the Convergence Center/WB, at the Hvitfeldtska School at the World Social Forum Independent Media Center in the Diaz Center in 2001. It also occurred at the Évian 2003 G8 summit in Geneva. Targeting the workers' infrastructure, authorities can disrupt activists' capacity for (unexpected) movement. In the German case, protesters were evicted during the night and a whole infrastructure had to find a way to get out of the city without being snatched by the police. In the case of the evicted camps of Heiligendamm 2007

This strategy is complemented by counterposing infrastructure. While protest camps, independent media centers, and Convergence Centers are frequently monitored and often targeted, authorities happily facilitate the organization of discussions in large buildings, often in a controlled way, dissenters are channeled into the countersummit rather than gathering in their own spaces. This clearly demon-

strates that the tactical division of space at channeling it into certain spaces that is reterritorialized into striated and a

Controlling Individual

Zones, barricades, and encirclements during a protest, are control mechanisms of groups. Another approach to cities and legal barriers to impede individual dissent. A whole series of regulatory the activist network: ban orders, travel obligatory registration, preventive restrictions for demonstrations and of) border controls.

Ban orders are a legal instrument the spatial regime of no-go and no-widely employed at Gleneagles 2000. In Scotland, an extraordinary legal Personal Justice and Public Order Act, on football disturbances, was mobilized. It resulted in dissenters receiving ban days before the opening of the G8 meeting region surrounding the summit's venue identified as being in this region after being charged with criminal activity. Ban orders the summit. German police banned actions in the region of the summit's advance. This way, the participation is frustrated even before the actual summit.

In order to frustrate the movement, coordinate internationally to impose and edly pose a risk. As early as Prague 2000, activists was held at the border of the claimed to have identified among them an international preparatory meeting. In London, officials did not let the train enter G8, Berlin's senator for internal affairs sixteen activists because they pose

space aims not at avoiding protest but at spaces that are easy to control. Global dissent is often in unanticipated spaces.

Individuals' Movement

Protests, whether used preemptively or as a response to mechanisms aimed at direct physical control, such as reterritorialization mobilizes political individuals' movements to express their dissent. Preemptive tools preempt the movements of individuals. Travel bans for foreign activists, daily detentions (mass) detention, imposed spatial restrictions, assemblies, and (the reintroduction

of travel bans to restrict movement and to extend the duration of protest zones. This instrument was used by the 2005 G8 and Heiligendamm 2007 G8. Article 60, paragraph, Section 60 of the Criminal Code was originally intended to prevent minor offenses but was used in order to enforce ban orders. Travel bans were issued during the protests in the G8 meetings; the orders covered the entire duration of the protest. Dissenters whom the police identified as being "banned" were subject to being detained. Travel bans normally last until the day after the protest. In the case of certain activists who participated in the protests, the bans were sometimes even months in duration. The impact of targeted dissenters was incapacitated during the protests started.

In the case of foreign dissenters, authorities issued travel bans on activists who allegedly participated in the 2000 IMF/WB, a trainload of Italian activists in the Czech Republic because authorities identified them as persons who had participated in the protests some months before. For this reason, the Italian government entered the country. Before Genoa 2001, the Italian government imposed a travel ban on at least 100 activists and a potential risk. This assessment

was based on their legal records; one had even been fined for graffiti painting. These protesters spent every day for a week at their local place of protest in conjunction with Heiligendamm, but were turned away at the German border. In some cases, on additional information requested from the country of origin; in other cases, simply the presence of luggage was deemed sufficient grounds for denial of entry to many.

This points to another tool being used at internal border controls. Internal border controls under the Schengen agreement, implemented in 1985, were temporarily suspended for summits in 1997, 2001, and 2005. It was suspended for Genoa 2001 G8, Heiligendamm 2005 G8, and Gleneagles 2005 G8, this step was not taken for London 2005 G8. Freedom of movement is not part of the Schengen agreement. At Genoa 2001 G8 and Heiligendamm 2005 G8, cars on the highways were suspended for foreigners heading toward Genoa. At Genoa 2001 G8, two train stations in Genoa were shut down to contain the dissenters coming by train. In London 2005 G8, heavily controlled. The Italian authorities also used Greek dissenters at the port of Ancona.

Another measure for controlling protests is the setting of conditions for demonstrations and assemblies. Porta and Herbert Reiter¹⁸ stress the importance of a negotiated management approach of police and protesters. The wider implications for the social contract are significant. It is common for authorities to determine the conditions a demonstration is allowed to take but not to determine when it will end, how long and how high the demonstration may start, and, sometimes, whether it is permitted. If demonstrators disagree with the conditions, they either perform an illegal action, go to court, or wait (which can take several months), or they negotiate. Meanwhile, define the criteria that determine whether a demonstration or assembly is behaving "well" or "badly." This includes preestablished route, or carrying excessive equipment, or disguising their faces, the police now

ernance

one of the persons, for example, had to register in person at the police department. During the week of Heiligendamm 2007 G8, 556 people were denied entry. In some cases, the decision was based solely on information from authorities in the dissenter's home country. Simply carrying a black hoodie in one's pocket was grounds for police to deny entry to Ger-

many. This was reemployed by authorities: massive border controls have been abolished by the Schengen Agreement in 1995, but this agreement is temporary. The Schengen agreement was not fully implemented at Heiligendamm 2007 G8. (For the United Kingdom, it was not necessary since the United Kingdom is not a member of the Schengen Agreement.) The border controls during Heiligendamm 2007 G8 were massive. At the border, people were supposed to line up in a special queue. At the same time, the airport and the sea were shut down in order to restrict and contain the protest. In both cases, nearby ports were also closed. Authorities turned away a ferry with 135 people on board.

The restriction of people's movement is the imposition of a permit system and assemblies. While Donatella della Porta and others see the advantages of this aspect of a negotiated protest, they do not analyze the control of dissent. In Germany, it is now required to register in advance not only which route a demonstration will take, but also where it will start and where it will end. The police determine where the banners may be, when the demonstration will start, and even how many people may participate. Under these imposed conditions, they may go to court to assert their right to protest or they may not do an action at all. The police, however, determine whether a demonstration is "peaceful." If people are deviating from the rules, such as carrying excessively large banners, or jumping, or shouting, they have a reason to intervene or even

to dissolve the assembly. Assemblies to the imposed conditions are defined as spontaneous or that do not adhere to "bad" or even "violent" and so criminalization allows police to invoke regulatory assault dissenters.

A final preemptive tool available during Göteborg 2001 EU, the police used space that was legally granted to protesting activities, and arrested about four were to start. Mass arrest can also be dissenters during protests. Six hundred Seattle 1999 WTO; 859 at Prague 2001 EU; 310 at Genoa 2001 G8; 600 at W at Gleneagles 2005 G8; 1,140 at Heil Copenhagen 2009 UN Climate Con G20 (the largest mass arrest in the hi

Distinct from mass arrest, snatch s to grab an individual, often with force who have been surveilled and selected are chosen spontaneously.

Authorities use preemptive exclusion to reduce the likelihood of creative, r tion (disruption) of the summit. On a activists of the encouraging experien

Militar

One of the most immediately striking militarization of the space surrounding say that the space becomes a war zone cated military gear and accompanied the actual meeting location, the more

Over the past couple of decades, t an increase in the use of both milit The growth and normalization of p mented in the criminology literature have clearly demonstrated that the li tutions is becoming less distinct.²² A

s that are “negotiated” and that stick
 d as “good,” while assemblies that are
 o the “negotiated” rules are defined as
 nalized. Criminalizing a demonstra-
 ry measures to outlaw, disperse, and

e to authorities is detention. Dur-
 rrounded the Hvitfeldtska School, a
 otesters for sleeping and coordinat-
 r hundred people before the protests
 e used to incapacitate groups of dis-
 l detentions or arrests were made at
 oo IMF/WB; 1,115 at Göteborg 2001
 ashington, D.C., 2002 IMF/WB; 700
 igendamm 2007 G8; nearly 2,000 at
 ference;¹⁹ and 1,000 at Toronto 2010
 story of Canada).²⁰

squads may intervene at any moment
 ce. Sometimes these are individuals
 ed in advance, and other times they

sion of foreign and veteran activists
 uncontrolled activist reterritorializa-
 a symbolic level, it also deprives local
 ce of international solidarity.

ization

ng visions of summit meetings is the
 ing the event. It is not hyperbole to
 ne, with officers dressed in sophisti-
 d by armored vehicles. The closer to
 e militarized the space becomes.

the policing of protest has witnessed
 ary tactics and military equipment.
 police paramilitarism is well docu-
 e.²¹ Peter Kraska and other scholars
 ne between police and military insti-
 s a result, it is now increasingly dif-

difficult to distinguish between war and the militarization and militarism present in the spread of SWAT teams trained in the use of assault rifles and armored vehicles. The use of military equipment as a cue or for engaging heavily armed crowds in less dangerous situations, such as protests, is also common.

The militarization of policing has had a significant impact on the policing of protest today, with significant consequences. The “less-than-lethal weapons” such as bean bags, pepper bullets, and tear gas are used by militaries for “peacekeeping” purposes and are also used by police departments. An example of the flow of military equipment to the police is the recent use of sound cannons, commonly called Long-Range Acoustic Devices (LRADs), which emit high-frequency sounds intended to disperse crowds. These were first developed by the U.S. Navy and used in the Persian Gulf close to each other. This technology has been used by the military in the United States for the first time in 2005. Subsequently, Canada threatened to use LRADs in addition to alter globalization protests in 2005. The use of this technology in Oakland, California, after the police murder of a young man in the 1990s, led to Kraska’s claim about the blurring of police and military roles.

Mainstream journalists use the images of militarized police to militarization they witness in the days of globalization, noting that the setting does not look like a city gathering but rather like a city preparing for a military operation. This militarization threatens the legitimacy of globalization and the option of avoiding these images, which is the option of space, while present, is less dense and more open. The militarization of the fence around Heiligendamm is an intrusion in a rural and forest context. Moreover, militarization of a seemingly rural site with residents and does not have the same impact as militarization of a familiar urban (often touristic) site used for globalization.

Summit security zones are depicted as a militarized space. Businesses and organizations are often required to provide an overwhelming number of police and military personnel to ensure security.

ernance

and law enforcement. For evidence on present in U.S. policing, Kraska points to the use of military tactics and armed with SWAT teams. Originally designed for hostage rescues of criminals, SWAT teams are now used for raids on houses of accused drug deal-

ers that began in the 1970s continues to grow, sometimes with devastating consequences. “Less-lethal weapons” used in policing protest (such as tear gas and acoustic weapons) were used first by the military and then diffused into police forces. The flow of technology from the military to police is evident in sound cannons (technically called LRADs) are weapons that are designed to stun and paralyze humans. They were used to prevent ships from getting too close to the coast. LRADs crossed the military/police boundary during Pittsburgh 2009 G20. They were used during Toronto 2010 G20. In London 2009 G20, police also threatened to use the LRADs after a contentious trial involving the disruption of the local train system. All this supports the blurring of police and military.²³

The phrase “war zone” to describe the areas around the perimeter before the start of an event, often used to describe a space for a peaceful global gathering, is a warning for civil war. Each such observation is a critique of global governance. Rural areas provide a stark contrast because the military reorganization is often disruptive, striking, and photogenic. The erection of the G8 summit 2007 G8 revealed its dramatic impact on the local context, but few journalists took photos. The disruption of a seemingly generic rural area shocks fewer people than the disruption of a familiar place. The disruption is regularly by millions of citizens.

The disruption of their usual users (businesses and schools required to close) and repopulated by police and military officers in combat gear:

5,000 at New York City 2002 WEF; than 3,000 at Miami 2003 FTAA; and 2007 G8 (18,000 police officers and 2

The use of actual military units for enforcement and the military. Several army were employed for Évian 2003 (Switzerland). Heiligendamm 2007 G8 (Germany) was the first time since the 1950s that military units were used for security at a summit in Europe, triggering controversy, especially, the involvement of the army in a city where military presence is constitutionally prohibited. However, the operations were framed as legally permitted "administrative" operations in an emergency situation. During security operations, the military was heavily involved in the construction of an exclusion zone, including the evacuation flights with Tornado airplanes. At Heiligendamm, the summit venue was overseen by a Tornado. A Tornado overflew a protest camp at a height of 10,000 feet. Military personnel were posted at a civilian airport. British Royal Air Force fighter jets also patrolled a no-fly zone around the G8 security zone.

While the preparation of a military operation takes several weeks, if not months, the demilitarization of a city goes much quicker. Often, within a few days, the protesters end and the delegates leave town, police are removed, fences and barriers are removed, and broken windows are repaired. Meetings impose a geography, changing the way people who participated in protest marches see the city. After protests had never taken place, as if no protest had ever taken place, walk through those streets can still see a landscape surreal in its demilitarization. It is as if anyone again to walk freely through the city without being checked, or arbitrarily arrested. In some ways, the protest is erased, made meaningless. In another way, the protest is remembered because the image and the possibility of protest are etched in the minds of every witness. Even years later, it is difficult to find access points open and unguarded. The protest is a "reminder" ²⁴—or reminder—of global governance.

Yet, this demilitarization is only partial. The lasting legacy of the demilitarization is that the space is forever al

5,000 at Kananaskis 2003 G8; more than 20,000 at Heiligendamm 2007 G8 (2,500 army soldiers).

This further blurs the line between law and order. Several thousand soldiers of the Swiss Army were deployed at Heiligendamm 2007 G8 (Évian is in France but is close to Germany). The 2007 G8 involved the largest military operation in Germany, sparking a public debate in Germany. Officially, the German internal security operations is considered as "administrative assistance" in case of an emergency. In the preparations the German army was used to clear an emergency road and several observation posts. The highway from the airport to the observation tanks of the army, a Torpedobootweg with a height of only eighty meters, and military hospital in Bad Doberan. Canadian no-fly zone over the Kananaskis 2002

transformed a war zone for a summit often followed by the reconversion into a "normal" state within a few hours after the official summit. The police and military have also left the city. Graffiti are cleaned, protest posters are removed, and windows are repaired. Global governance is a temporary thing, and then leave. For those who live in the city a few days before, it looks as if the summit had happened. Activists who see the action as if superimposed on a city of quiet. It suddenly is possible for protesters to walk the streets without being observed. In some ways, the protest has been successful. In other way, the city is forever changed, and the scars of its militarization are burned into the city. After a protest, it can be surprising to find the city guarded. This is the "ghostly remembrance."

partial. The reality for the local population is different, because some of the security

apparatus is left in place. While the summit is over, what remains behind are the security forces, the money purchased, and the police mentality. The soldiers who spent training to control crowds at the summit do not know it, this same apparatus will be used to mobilize for better wages or cleaner streets.

In Cancún, only one day later, the summit was held “freely” but in disbelief over the conditions that were held, rudely, nine kilometers from the opportunity to express our dissent. The summit was only was the militarization of the area, the shrine to the farmer Lee Kyu, the protest. It had seemed permanent, but it was over one night. These disappearances were not honest, dishonest. We felt deceived that the summit was that bridge, because such freedom was not free, fence and the soldiers, the deception was to silence our dissenting voices. The bridge was no longer just a bridge. The bridge was a space of restriction. That space now was a space of questions: “is it open now?” “Will it be open another way to get there, or not?”

After a summit, the location is no longer a place of governance. How precious, although the summit is over when the shadow that is economic globalization is cast and can be pointed to and screamed at. The summit is surrounded by armies, brutally uninterested in the summit for what they are. But as their summit is over, the summit becomes ethereal, and its haunted presence is a result of military visitation, unbelievable in the eyes of the scars on the psyches of the witnesses. The time of protest/war is erased from the memory, even survive as historical episode. The summit is to reclaim a summit place as a contested space. In November 2007, when severe sentences were handed to protesters resulting from the protests at G8, the people rallied there, with the slogan ‘

ernance

most obvious fences do come down, by cameras, the equipment that police resulting from the hours that officials. While the local population may likely be turned against them if they fail or to protest police brutality.

er, we found ourselves walking the bridge at km 0 where we meters away from the opposite to the Ministerial itself. Not gone; also gone was the huge ng, who had died in the protest when we gathered there last themselves felt violent and to be allowed to travel across freedom denied the ghosts of the decision to revoke our freedom presence. The bridge was no bridge reeked of the possibility w contained a series of questions: "Will it be open later?" "Is there not?" "Will they let us pass?"

longer a space for questioning global though also terrifying, that time seems, globalization affixes itself to a building at. A few men meet in a room surrounded in the voices outside, revealed summit recedes from physical space, it witnesses speak of an otherworldly their "free" city. The summit leaves, but we cannot point to it any more. from the spatial memory and does not the only time protesters were able to the site of global governance came in nces were announced against activists in Genoa 2001 G8. About sixty thousand "We are history."

Channeling

The networked and decentralized character of these movements contributes to a deterritorialization of space. Protests open a space for global conflicts that challenge political institutions to govern. Spatial practices are a process of deterritorialization. Direct actions are based on a decentralized model, giving various actors different favored tactics in a certain place, which accumulate the cumulative effects through the transmission (or diffusion) of these decentralized actions. This is in contrast with what Deleuze and Guattari have argued: that permit authorities work to reterritorialize space and make dissent manageable. They attempt to control space through location decisions, division of the space into zones, surveillance of individuals, and militarization.

As we have demonstrated in this chapter, the spatialization of dissent is to its manifestation in space. Dissent is often organized around IMF, WTO, and G8 meetings to exploit the vulnerabilities of globalization, while simultaneously challenging the hegemony of global governance by blocking the flow of capital at summit meetings. To regain and maintain control over space through a set of spatial strategies, choosing geographically strategic locations, dividing space, controlling the flow of capital, and militarizing the space. All of these are strategies to maintain governance, so that its spatial practices are not challenged.

Examining these mechanisms together with the spatialization of globalized dissent is increasingly revealing. Social control mechanisms do not aim to eliminate dissent; they seek to channel protest into predictable flows in order to foreclose the potential for disruption of space. Whereas the disruptive capacity of dissent is preemptively eliminated by eliminating anonymity, entire cities or rural regions are managed to ensure a smooth functioning of the flows of capital. For example, a summit meeting, while holding protests, is held in a controlled space.

Foucault describes such mechanisms as a form of social control. He shows how “modern

ing Dissent

character of alterglobalization move-
 zation of global governance. Summit
 ict by making it difficult for existing
 al tactics of protesters exemplify the
 t actions during summit protests rely
 rious groups a chance to apply their
 hile at the same time profiting from
 temporal simultaneity (and distribu-
 Such a mode of resistance coincides
 ve called deterritorialization. Sum-
 ize social conflicts in order to make
 o regain control over space through
 ace, regulatory controls imposed on

chapter, global governance is bound
 ers from all over the world gather at
 press their concern about corporate
 attempting to undermine the legiti-
 ding and disrupting the flows of sum-
 n control, police have developed a set
 aphically defensible and socially iso-
 rolling individuals movements, and,
 ctions affect the legitimacy of global
 e make it both visible and vulnerable.
 urther, we see that the spatial control
 organized in a preemptive way. The
 n so much at only protest avoidance;
 reestablished spaces and predictable
 ential for disruption of the summit
 city of movements is incapacitated
 ous space for unpredictable actions,
 ipulated spatially in order to guaran-
 s (of people and material) involved in
 otesters at a distance.

isms of spatial division as a form of
 rn” institutions such as jails, schools,

and hospitals rely on a similar refined segmentation, subdivision of functions over activities is gained through the temporal construction of actions, the control and the instrumental codification of time for the maximum possible exploitation of the space. In line with Foucault, organizations also allow for circulation.²⁵ That is, partition of bodies and products. Control, and importantly, about channeling flows in protest engages public discourse among fellow citizens. It is most effective when mobility, movement, and flow in order controls transform protest flows into more convenient and less disruptive to

The spatial control of dissent focuses on what Foucault has called “an undesired event or disruption, authorities ensure the flow of goods and people.” Foucault points out how the avoidance of protest is achieved by making the flows of goods and people more controlled. We argue that police strategically incapacitate protesters, while allowing others to move freely. This strategy is generally aimed at those protesters whose actions are considered dangerous or views as potential problems. Protesters are incapacitated.²⁷ Our study, however, focuses on “flows of movements” in order to avoid uncertainty. This strategy does not happen—or does not happen precisely as authorities have developed an entire system of controlled and contested spaces for the manifestation of dissent. We argue that authorities create spaces of resistance preemptively and preempted long before people gather.

However, let us not forget that the spatial control is inextricably linked to the symbolic control. The spatial control is therefore to its contested struggle for hegemony. The spatial control may have been right-wing, but when the 2001 World Trade Summit's, they did not blame the protesters. They did not perturb residents who are divided from the city by their own militaries.

ment of the techniques of enclosure, n-related units, and ranking. Control techniques of a daily schedule, the tem- ordination between body and action, he body, which ultimately leads to the ne body. These mechanisms, accord- ces that not only fix movement but ower organizes the flow and circula- then, is not only about restriction but, in more convenient directions. Effec- by directing itself to authorities and en it disrupts official flows. It requires er to achieve these tasks. Spatial con- dered, contained, restricted channels o the summits.

uses on the avoidance of what Fou- t.”²⁶ By precluding the possibility of ows involved in a summit meeting. ce of an “undesired event” hinges on ple predictable. Gilham and Noakes cite the movement of some protest- eely. This “strategic incapacitation” is whom law enforcement deems dan- s; their movement is then temporally demonstrates that the incapacitation esired and unpredicted events, does imarily—*during* protests. Police and arsenal of techniques to organize the on of global governance and to inca- otively. Dissent is spatially relocated ather in the streets.

spatial dimension of control remains dimension of governance, and there- mony. The farmers of Heiligendamm n their fences were mistaken for the ctivists. Spatial controls particularly om their accustomed flows and occu-

Toward a Political the Social Com

*In the light of the remarks of
Minister reassure the House
be served at the Gleneagles S*

Over the past thirty years, an indus-
ing global ministerial and summit
World Trade Organization (WTO)
(IMF), and World Economic Forum
became increasingly contentious t
responsibility for “securing” the su
the states to hosting the gathering
allocated for security, leading to a
law enforcement agencies. Some o
salaries, extra personnel (including
as transportation and waste mana
as special deployments of military
money is invested in new technol
local police agencies long after the
nologies and weapons includes ne
as aerial surveillance and fixed s
weapons” (such as beanbag shotgu
latest riot gear.

This chapter examines the politic
dissent. By political economy we m
using resources. To that end, this ch

Political Economy of Control of Dissent

*the French President, can the
that good Scottish food will
summit?*

—British Lord Wallace of Saltaire¹

Industry has developed around secur-
t meetings, such as the G8, G20,
O), International Monetary Fund
n (WEF) sessions. As the meetings
through the 1980s and 1990s, the
mmits became more important for
s. As a result, greater funding was
a large infusion of monies to local
f this money is spent on overtime
(private police),² city services such
gement, and federal services, such
and border agencies.³ Some of the
ologies, which are left behind with
e event. This arsenal of new tech-
w surveillance technologies (such
street cameras),⁴ “less-than-lethal”
ns and acoustic weapons),⁵ and the

cal economy of the social control of
mean the politics of mobilizing and
chapter provides a preliminary analy-

sis of security costs of summits. Such an analysis would also consider the power dynamics of the social control

This is a preliminary analysis for several reasons. There is no previous scholarship examining the costs of summits. Attempts have been made to examine the costs of a summit group at the University of Toronto,⁷ but no other organizations, such as the WEF, have done so. Host governments rarely disclose detailed budgetary data. In those cases where budgetary data are available, they are aggregate and without much detail. There is also no enforcement officials about funding. The data do not have access to the information needed for a comparison not comparable across summits. We have also spent overtime hours and in another the cost of catering. Thus, the work here is a preliminary and incomplete. Enters a new analytic approach that will help us uncover further information.

In the first section of this chapter we look at the data on expenditures. Next we explore the tensions about power relations—tensions about what is possible. Conclusions about what these expenditures mean will dissent.

What Does

Despite the limited information available, we know that security budgets for international summits are high. New York City 2002 WEF spent approximately \$1 billion alone. Expenditures for Washington 2009 G20, \$14 million; for Miami 2003 FTAA, \$1 billion; for London 2009 G20, \$30 million; and spent on Toronto 2010 G8/G20,⁹ more than \$1 billion. After Toronto, a debate unfolded about the cost of security. This could open up a new way to budget for these meetings. However, the costs will decrease.

John Kirton and colleagues have done a study of G8 and G20 summits from 2001 to 2010,

Such analysis can aid in revealing the role of dissent.

For several reasons. First, there is almost no data on these expenditures.⁶ While some data exist on the G8 and G20 costs by a research group, no similar attempts exist regarding the WTO, the IMF, and the WEF. Second, when detailed information on expenditures is available, it is sparse. When data are provided, they are given in the aggregate. When we have interviewed law enforcement officials, they either are not forthcoming or are incomplete. When details are given, they are often anecdotal. We have in one case the cost in police overtime, the costs of renting the venue, inclusive of security. As a first step, enticing but frustratingly incomplete, we hope that other scholars will follow.

Next, we assemble the available data on the costs of these events, the most visible manifestation of the social control of dissent. Finally, we offer some conclusions on the means for the social control of dissent.

How Much Does It Cost?

From the data available to us, it is staggeringly clear that the costs of these summits are extravagant. New York City spent approximately \$11 million for police overtime during the 2002 G8 Summit, D.C., 2003 IMF/World Bank were approximately \$23.9 million, and the 2005 G8 Summit they were approximately \$23.9 million.⁸ Approximately \$1 billion was spent on the 2005 G8 Summit, making it the most expensive event to date. The lack of data led in the media regarding the high costs of these events. Some much-needed discussion on the costs of these events, as of now, it does not appear that

we have documented the increasing costs of G8 summits, as summarized in Tables 1 and 2.¹⁰

TABLE 1
Cost of “Security”

<i>Year</i>	<i>Location</i>
2001	Genoa, Italy
2002	Kananaskis, Canada
2003	Évian, France
2004	Sea Island, Georgia, United States
2005	Gleneagles, Scotland, United Kingdom
2006	St. Petersburg, Russia
2007	Heilgendamm, Germany
2008	Toyako, Hokkaido, Japan
2009	L’Aquila, Abruzzo, Italy
2010	Toronto, Canada

TABLE 2
Cost of “Security”

<i>Year</i>	<i>Country</i>
2008	Washington DC, United States
2009	London, United Kingdom
2009	Pittsburgh, United States
2010	Toronto, Canada

To date, the Canadian government has not been forthcoming with information about security spending. The 2010 report of security expenditures per department is the only one available for the G8/G20. Although the government has provided information about how the money was spent, the report does not specify the enforcement agencies involved in security spending (police and military agencies, as well as intelligence agencies, organizations and even private institutions). The report is titled “Security” without further specification).

There are three types of expenditures associated with the operational costs of a secure summit, and each

TABLE 1.
"Securing" the G8

	<i>Cost</i>
Canada	\$40 million
France	\$93 million
Germany	No data available
Italy	\$40 million
Japan	\$140 million
United States	No data available
United Kingdom	\$124 million
Russia	\$280 million
South Korea	\$124 million
Spain	\$309 million

TABLE 2.
"Securing" the G20

	<i>Cost</i>
United States	No data available
United Kingdom	\$28.6 million
United States	\$98.7 million
Canada	\$574.6 million

ent has been the most forthcoming in responding. Table 3 shows the total cost of government and agency for Toronto 2010. The government did not release detailed information on the data do show the diversity of law enforcement security operations, including both direct and indirect costs as a number of nonlaw enforcement operations (noted in the table as "Industrial Security Operations": those for security itself, operational and collateral costs to the locality.

TABLE
Costs for securing the 2010 G8

<i>Department/Agency</i>
Royal Canadian Military Police
Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness
National Defense
Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Health
Canada Border Services Agency
Transport
Canadian Air Transport Security Authority
Public Health Agency of Canada
Industry
Contingency Reserve (Fiscal framework)
Total

Secu

Examining the overall budget of such a summit, a significant rise in costs after Seattle was noted. The enforcement in Seattle was criticized as excessive, and money to study the tactics of the protesters and the protest following the conflict in Seattle was responsible for policing summits too.

As noted earlier, a portion of the costs of a summit goes to payment for police officers. A report to the Canadian Parliament noted that one of the drivers increasing G8 summit costs is the number of law enforcement agents in relation to the number of summit attendees. The number is low, perhaps because then the costs are higher because it includes officers, vehicles, and military equipment. G8 summits require about 10,000 to 15,000 security personnel.¹²

Another aspect of the costs directly related to security equipment, including the increasing

TABLE 3.
G8 & G20 Summits in Toronto¹¹

	<i>Spending (in Canadian dollars)</i>
	\$507,459,400
Business	\$278,310,228
	\$77,570,000
Police	\$3,137,483
	\$2,266,619
	\$1,180,070
	\$1,240,581
Security	\$399,399
	\$583,330
	\$2,829,000
(Mark)	\$55,000,000
	\$929,986,110

Security

At summit meetings, one observes a significant increase in security. At the 1999 WTO, perhaps because law enforcement agencies were criticized for not having spent enough time on security during the alterglobalization movement.¹¹ In Seattle, law enforcement agencies took their work more seriously.

The security-related part of the budget was significantly increased and contractors were hired to supplement the local staff. In the report after Toronto 2010 G8/G20 states that the most significant security cost for the G8 security costs is the relative number of police officers and regular employment near the venue. If the venue is in a rural area, it is necessary to import officers, so that the G8/G20 summits deploy approximately twenty

people directly involved in security concerns. The security measures are significantly longer and more robust fences

being constructed. For Heiligendamm, a 10-kilometer-long perimeter fence came with the equipment are coordinated at the national level. In the case of Évian 2003 G8, for example, 100 police officers mobilized to surveil the summit are equipped with night-vision equipment, which is expensive; a one-hour flight of a German military helicopter used at Heiligendamm 2007 G8, cost £100,000 and other personnel.¹³

In addition, new equipment, such as night-vision goggles, boats, night-vision sights, protective equipment, and technology, is needed for police operations. The cost of renting a digital police radio system for the summit is 1 million. Summit meetings are a welcome event for the recruitment of local police forces.

Other material preparations are related to the transportation and catering for the police forces. For the 2007 G8, the costs for catering were £1.5 million. The building of temporary buildings for the police operations

Operations of a

Smooth transport of summit participants is a highly complicated operation. To avoid mixing summit participants and protesters, helicopters and boats have become common modes of transport. Helicopters are used to transport delegates during summit protests. The cost of the 2007 G8 amounted to £1.5 million, including the use of helicopters for approximately 4,400 flights. In addition, over, the airport of Prestwick had to be upgraded. A total of £35,000 was required for the team preparation, a temporary structure cost £197,000, and £6 million for the apron tarmac; such investments are necessary for summit operations.

The costs for official summit delegations, security, and entertainment are diverse. At Prague 2002, approximately \$67 million was spent converting a hotel into a conference facility. For Genoa 2001 G8, the Italian government used a luxury cruise liner that served as accommodation for the summit. These costs are normally paid by the official hosts of such meetings.

from 2007 G8, the costs for the twelve-
 to €12.5 million. Police and material
 national, provincial, and local levels.
 example, one hundred warplanes were
 a. Use of military equipment is very
 German army Tornado, such as those
 costs €41,804, plus the costs of the pilot

such as new police cars, helicopters,
 the clothes, and communication tech-
 nologies. The cost to the federal govern-
 ment network in Heiligendamm was €3.6
 on some occasion to improve the equip-

related to the provision of accommo-
 dation for delegates. In the case of Heiligendamm
 it was €630,100. The money spent on rent-
 ing amounted to €1,074,600.

Secure Summit

Participants has become a costly and com-
 plicated task. Transporting delegates with dissenters, helicop-
 ter vehicles for daily transport of del-
 egates, transport costs for Gleneagles 2005
 including buses, luggage trucks, cars, and
 for delegates and media persons. More-
 over, they have to be upgraded to security standards;
 planning these adaptations. A tempo-
 rary €35,000 was spent upgrading areas of
 that are not required for normal airport

delegations' accommodation, catering,
 for the 2000 IMF/World Bank, approx-
 imately €2.89 million was spent on a lux-
 urious accommodation for the political leaders.
 national governments, since they are

The most complete budgetary information is available for Gleneagles 2005 G8. Although not open to the summit, only 475 had access to the hotel. Reimbursement (including catering for the guests) for seven days (including setting up the conference facilities (rented from the company Jack Morton Worldwide) and other costs) were costs for interpreters (£145,000), security (£31,000), installation of a secure IT system (£66,000), transport and catering (£104,000), installation of backup generators (£104,000), the facility owner to make up for the loss of rental properties during the period of the summit. A breakdown rental time cost £104,000, a twenty-four-hour snack bar, cost £104,000, interpreters themselves (two working lunches), cost £104,000, the government hospitality budget a further £104,000, flowers. The parallel program for the summit cost £22,000.

As we discuss further in later chapters, the security dimension of the summit is an increasingly important dimension of the summit. At the 2003 G8, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) firm, GPC International, a partner of the summit, a major global player in the world of information security, information campaign. The expenditure was national security secret, but a contract was awarded to us that it was substantial.¹⁵ GPC International was in charge of the event from the onset, directing the operations operation that targeted different audiences: global media, local residents, and national security. GPC was involved in the planning process, and its role was to add a communications layer to the summit.

In their effort to control the message, the summit organizers, the protests against them, summits have been controlled from inside, covering the news of the summit, and covering dissent. At Gleneagles 2005 G8, the summit was accredited (about 2,100 of them actually attended). Inside the summit security zone, mobile phones, internet connections, edit suites, radio,

ferences given by authorities and services provided for journalists, the British media facilities and £1,454,000 on transportation for the G8, the German federal government for the press center,¹⁶ which was coordinated by the press and information office of the federal government. The German government in its annual budget for 2007 covers the costs of these tasks, including €81,000 for police protection.

Collateral Costs

The political economy of summit meetings involves significant collateral costs. The German administration spent approximately €600,000 for Heiligensee. The German government refused to take over these costs. The city of Heiligensee constructed two ambulant treatment brigades from Rostock and Bad Döberitz for the G8 summit, and an unknown number of volunteers from the brigade of Bad Güstrow. The volunteers worked a total of 63,243 hours.¹⁸ In addition, other German provinces, the "Technical Assistance Organization" (Technische Hilfsorganisation), and the German Air Force provided a response operation during the G8 summit. The German Air Force paid for these extra working hours, and the German Air Force agency response was with the city of Heiligensee and the administrative counties. In total, the monetary value of these services added up to €3,786,200.¹⁹

Another negative effect of summit meetings is the preventive closure of businesses. This is often recommended by authorities, often necessary for security, which restrict access, and always impacts the economy. In the media. It was difficult to purchase goods in the area where many of the protesters found themselves because most local stores were closed. The closure of businesses to accompany summit protests elsewhere is also significant. One or more days of closure can be significant. In Heiligensee, German authorities encouraged shop owners to keep their shops open during the day. However, in Heiligensee, nevertheless, the president of the Northeastern

summit officials. Including catering the British government spent £3,852,000 on transportation for journalists. For Heiligendamm the federal government spent €15 million constructed for the summit. The press conference the German government obtained an increase in the cost of executing the G8-related press and public relations work.¹⁷

Impacts on the Locality

The summit meetings also places demands on local resources. The seaside district of Bad Doberan spent €10 million for Heiligendamm 2007 G8. The federal government covered the costs, which resulted largely from the construction of command centers and cost of labor. Fire departments in Bad Doberan put in a total of 14,053 hours on the summit. A number of hours was put in by the British and German fire and employed rescue services worked on the summit. Officers from emergency units from the "Technisches Hilfswerk" (Technical Relief Force) of the German Army contributed to the emergency response for the summit. The provincial government of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern although the responsibility for emergency response in Rostock and the surrounding administrative region was spent for the emergency response

for the summit meetings for local resources. Small businesses, sometimes explicitly requisitioned by road closures or fences erected, were also stimulated by the scare tactics. People bought food near the Carlini stadium, and people sought accommodation at Genoa 2001 G8, and even barricaded. Similar scenes were seen in Rostock. Yet, for small-scale enterprises, the impact was significant. For these reasons, the German Retail Association urged owners in the city center of Rostock to close their stores for the days of Heiligendamm 2007 G8. Nevertheless, the German Retail Association, Heinz

Kopp, confirmed that many retailers lost as much as 80 percent during the week of the summit.

Yet another loss of profit for local businesses was the damage to shops (and especially their storefronts) from confrontations between police and protesters. In many cases, many shops cannily boarded up their storefronts to do business with and provide services to their customers. In the 2007 G8, it was the local farmers who were the provincial minister of agriculture, eight days of police-protester interaction in the city, resulting in an estimated damage of \$100 million to business and public infrastructure. The costs from property damage are often not included in the official tally.

Évian 2003 G8 exemplified the conventional “cooperation” around summits. It was costly not to police or enforce the law during the meeting. Micheline Spoerri, head of the Geneva local law enforcement had received a list of possible property damage in the city (including tests during the summit). The order was to prevent it. The municipal government in Geneva said that if a large protest, it would have to pay for the cost of their services. This would be true regardless of whether property damage resulted from protest activity or police officers in Geneva ready to control the crowd. In fact too expensive for the local government, widespread property damage was the result. The damage would likely represent a small fraction of the total bills the city would have to pay for the summit.

Officials often justify various summit-related costs as a net expected increase in tourism arising from the summit receives during such summits. The problem with this argument is a recurring theme that circulates around the study by Deloitte and Touche before the summit: the summit-related profit to the city of \$100 million to \$413 million coming through extra tourism over the years.²³ In a debate in the British parliament, Gordon Brown pointed out that the first minister of the United Kingdom to be around £500 million, ten times

saw their profits reduced by as much as 20% at the summit.²⁰

Businesses that can emerge from property damage (e.g., air windows) can be the victim of protesters. At Québec City 2001 FTAA, protesters damaged air windows while remaining open to protesters. At Heiligendamm 2007 G8, protesters lost profit. According to the protesters, farms were directly affected by the protesters' fields surrounding Heiligendamm, with damages of €32,000. Other damages to local businesses were assessed at €100,000.²¹ Costs were covered by the federal government.

The complexities and delicacy of international security. In some cases, it is less clear-cut. For instance, during a planning meeting with the police in Geneva, admitted that they gave orders not to intervene to prevent protesters from entering Geneva (which expected protesters) was based on a cost-benefit analysis. Geneva reasoned that to prepare for protesters from other cities for the summit, regardless of whether or not any protesters would be present, would be expensive for the municipality to cover. Tolerating protesters was the cheaper option, since this potential loss to the city was less than the substantial cost of French and German officers.²²

Host cities justify their expenditures by citing an anticipated increase in the worldwide attention a region can attract, the possibility of attracting future investment, and the economic stimulus that comes before summit meetings. A 2000 World Bank/IMF report predicted a \$26 to \$79 million, with another \$188 million in extra investment in the following five years. In the House of Commons, the Baroness Royall of Blisney expected the benefits to Scotland to outweigh the costs of security.²⁴ To convince

cities that these benefits were realized. The G8/G20 included \$2 million for a fall festival in the area.²⁵ The Italian government allocated \$1 million to “spruce up” the city before the 2001 G8.²⁶

However, these increases in tourism did not materialize. A tourist agency from the region of Liguria reported that the expected increase in tourism failed to materialize. In the English language about the project, the agency collaborated in the special “informal summit,” the tourist sector of Heiligenthal reported a significant increase in the two years before the summit. Gleneagles Hotel, which hosted the summit, reported a profit rate after the summit. Potential negative effects of summit meetings may suffer the same fate as the 2001 G8 that instead of being seen as the chance for economic growth, it easily be made to appear as a heavily criticized event. A lawyer from Genoa, pointed out that the summit in Genoa after the 2001 G8 and added that the police murder of Carlo Giuliani and the police violence that took place during the summit were tourist attractions. Although the federal government compensated the city for its financial losses resulting from the summit, the city of Genoa felt as if the soul of their city had been taken away and had nothing to do with their city.²⁷

This lesson is not lost on other cities that are lined up to host the next meeting.

Tensions

As often happens with projects that involve a high degree of complexity of spending the funds, there are tensions between local agencies participating in the project, tensions between police departments or between the local government and the federal government. An instance of such conflicts occurred in Washington D.C. 2003 IMF/WB. Experience from the 1999 WTO and Washington D.C. 2003 IMF/WB. Enforcement agencies were asked to control large groups to ensure that the

stic, expenditures for Toronto 2010
 ke lake designed to promote tourism
 t produced approximately \$100 mil-
 e delegates arrived in town for Genoa

ism may never materialize. As a local
 Gleneagles 2005 G8 confirmed, the
 to appear. Despite glossy magazines
 prospects of the region and a regional
 ation office for economy for the G8
 gendamm could also not attest to a
 rs after the 2007 G8. Similarly, the
 2005 G8, could not report a rising
 al rural venues that host global sum-
 te as urban venues: they may realize
 arming center of the world, they can
 y fortified war zone. Laura Tartarini,
 hat there was no increase in tourism
 ded that the city is famous now for
 i, an alterglobalization activist, and
 uring the summit, rather than for its
 eral Italian government compensated
 ng from the summit, the inhabitants
 y were being raped for a summit that

ies. After Genoa 2001 G8, fewer cit-
 ng of the global elite.

sions

t require large pools of money, the
 increases the chances of conflict
 g in the event; conflicts may arise
 een police departments and city gov-
 ct occurred during the planning for
 pecting fifty thousand protesters, law
 o develop a policing strategy to con-
 disruptions that occurred at Seattle
 oo IMF/WB would not reoccur in

D.C. To make this possible, the agents came from nearby cities, scrambling to find accommodations months prior to the protest, the D. expressed concerns about the impact on the local budget. He warned that, without federal funding, the D. to patrol a smaller area, restrict deployment of officers from federal law enforcement agencies. The *Washington Post* reported that police officers from the D.C. Police Department were “reluctant to accept the assignment because . . . the District might not be able to provide police protection—and thus might not be able to pay for the departments.”²⁹ This funding problem was addressed by the Clinton administration proposing to allocate and mark \$15 million from the national budget to the D.C.

While the example of Washington D.C. illustrates intercity conflicts, these conflicts can also be seen at the G8 offers an odd case of international security. At the official level, France hosted the summit meeting. The biggest part of the budget for the summit went to building a heliport for the summit on the island of Évian over Lake Lemman (£225,000). The heliport was close to France’s border with Switzerland. Swiss forces were involved in the security operations for the summit, and a thousand extra police and soldiers, spending an additional cost for the deployment of the Swiss forces, cost a million. Germany supported the operations for the summit, and was also confronted with the costs of security operations in the nearby cities of Geneva and Lausanne. The total cost was a hundred thousand euros.

A dispute developed after the summit over the costs and lasted for several years. The dispute began during the planning phases for the summit, and sometimes even make the national governments argue who is going to pay for security, local, national, or international. The point to one another. The exorbitant costs of the summit public debate about the appropriateness of the costs.

Évian 2003 G8 was not the only summit where the host who would pay for extra police support. In 1999, before the summit meeting there were

city hired thousands of police officers and the funding to pay overtime. Two D.C. police chief, Charles H. Ramsey, object on the department's annual budget assistance, police "might be forced to support the delegates' movement or seek more help from the National Guard."²⁸ The police jurisdictions approached by the department to send officers to Washington were reimbursed for the cost of the extra officers. The city was not able to pay officers from other sources. The issue was resolved by creative financing; the city requested that the federal government earmark budget to cover IMF security costs.

In Washington, D.C., 2003 IMF /WB revealed that the summit can also be international. Évian 2003 summit had major tensions over who would pay for the summit. It was organized, planned, and coordinated by the French government. Part of the French budget for the summit was used to pay those leaders who were flying directly to the summit. However, because the summit site was in Switzerland, Swiss and German police were also involved. Switzerland provided ten thousand police officers, including an estimated €16 million. The French army already added up to €4.3 million for the summit with 1,015 police.³⁰ Switzerland also covered the cost of damages that resulted from clashes between protesters in Lausanne, which amounted to several million dollars.

The summit regarding political responsibility was also a major issue.³¹ Debates over budgets are common at the summit security, and the disputes were widely reported in newspapers. When observers ask who is responsible for regional, and national governments, the high cost of securing Évian triggered a major debate about the cost of G8 summits in general.

On this occasion that led to conflicts about the summit site. For Gleneagles 2005 G8, even before the summit there were significant disputes involving the

Scottish Tayside police, the Scottish government in London. The skirmish between police officers and the material support of Metropolitan police and the British government advanced, since the entire cost of the summit had not been made clear yet. After the summit, the Ministry of Defense demanded compensation in the form of a bill of nearly £400,000³² for equipment used for international summits in Scotland (G8 summit).³³ Tayside police passed the responsibility to the British government, who responded that the British government was not related to the G8 summit.

The British government had made it clear that it would pay for policing costs for major events clearly beyond normal arrangements which apply to other events. The costs are dealt with in the normal way for an international summit or a major event. If not paid by Whitehall, we'd end up for the rest of the year. Moreover, the spokesperson for the British government what was happening was not a political issue between the government in London and the Scottish government, but a bureaucratic procedure based on the same as the army and the Scottish police under the same civil authorities."³⁵

At Heiligendamm 2007 G8, a coalition government of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and the federal government, which had initially promised to pay for the summit, as well as some of the costs, soon turned out, however, that the coalition government's contribution. The construction of the hotel for the summit cost €12.5 million. In December 2006, the total cost of the summit—€92 million—was made public. The coalition government adjusted its annual budget for 2006 for the summit, which was reserved for the G8 summit. Appropriate security operations by federal police forces were covered by the federal government, while the costs for police forces, arguing that the costs were the states' responsibility.³⁷ This left Mecklenburg-Vorpommern the costs for supplemental police officers.

government, and the central British government involved payments for the extra support requested from the London army. The dispute was not settled in the G8-related security operation had a summit meeting, however, the British government provided compensation from Tayside for an unpaid amount provided for the policing of two (there was also a British-Irish sum- responsibility to the Scottish authorities, government was responsible for costs

to state its position on supporting local security in advance, stating, "There are no extra costs to the costs of security wherever it is a normal way. If every time there was a major event the security costs were all being worked out an awful lot of money."³⁴ The Ministry of Defense stressed that the conflict between the central government and the Scottish government but a normal agreement between the British government and the Scottish government for the framework of "military aid to

conflict ensued between the provin- cial government of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and the federal government. The provincial government promised to contribute €22.5 million for the necessary security operations. It was estimated that the security costs would vastly exceed this con- tribution. The perimeter fence had already cost €126 million, the estimated security cost for the sum-

³⁶ The provincial government had to contribute about €126 million, €69.5 of which was approximately €10 million in G8-related costs for border control and the army was responsible for which, however, refused to cover the police responsibilities are the provin- cial government of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania facing security costs from other provinces.

Because funding for summit security revenues already strained by other economic increasing summit costs and responses more acute. These tensions will, we hope, public debate about the budgets need global elites and for criminalizing dis

Political Economy

Summit social control operations are dimensional. They cover not only domestic and international surveillance and control. They include not only police security for every aspect of the summit but also public relations and the cost communication strategies and a luxurious ph

When we examine its political economic makeup and character of the social control it looks less like protest policing and Intensity Operations (LIO, also called police actions are internal to the nation maintenance regarding domestic issues generally external to the nation-state the enemy. LIO refers to international declaration of war and also covers domestic fall short of full-scale warfare, mainly sion. As such, they often involve the public relations campaigns, and the external over, they seek to intimidate sympathizers to join the targeted social movement

Lest observers believe that the military of some intimidating equipment and that the security budgets demonstrate these operations, which are directed member of the military planning team the “security methodology” as “pretty security forces] were flying fighter planes where near the meeting, they would with anybody that tried to infiltrate th

curity comes out of national and local economic needs, the tensions between responsibility for the bills will likely become more acute, provoke intragovernmental and international debate, and be necessary for securing the agendas of the state and the public.

of Social Control

are expensive because of their multi-faceted nature: extensive crowd control but extensive coordination of intelligence operations, extending to border control but also ensuring a high level of security. They include not only security forces but also the employment of consultants to develop communication strategies and the physical containment of the media.

In the study of global dissent and find that they are more like a new version of Low-Intensity Warfare (LIEW). Generally, LIEW is a state and are focused on order and control. In contrast, military actions are more aggressive and aim to eliminate and destroy the enemy. LIEW is a form of military deployments without a formal declaration of war. LIEW is a form of military deployments.³⁸ LIEW is a form of military deployments to avoid the appearance of repression. LIEW is a form of military deployments of less-than-lethal weapons, public relations, and extensive gathering of intelligence. More sophisticated observers, persuading them not to use force.

Military involvement is limited to loans and a few advisers, we would point out that militaries are fully involved in the control of dissent. A report for Kananaskis 2003 G8 described the use of aggressive staff. We [the Canadian military] were en masse. If anybody got anywhere they would have been shot down; same thing in the areas where the leaders were gath-

ering. We made it very clear to everyone that we were not using weapons.”³⁹ LIO stretches beyond the traditional boundaries of war to involve an assortment of governmental activities, from low-intensity work to the operations of

Summits are microcosms of global politics. As security budgets climbing toward a billion dollars challenge the legitimacy of the neoliberal project, they reveal the localities, regions, and even member states that are reluctant to support the neoliberal economic model whose totality is often taken for granted. The struggles over who bears the costs for the security of global events suggest the limits of the neoliberal economic model whose totality is often taken for granted. They also reveal the much-debated question of the nation-state in the context of globalization. How do states maintain a domestic monopoly of force? How do they partner in mounting summit meetings? How do they bear the costs of economic globalization; the costs of security, whose striking budgets contrast with the costs in the maintenance of employment? How do some of the same parties that disrepute the summit process also benefit from summits.

ryone that we had soldiers with live
e use of police and military resources
ment agencies that contribute other
. . .
l governance. Operational and secu-
n dollars reveal to us the value of the
to promoters of global governance.
er nations to invest with increasing
is ultimately responsible for paying
est the internal contradictions of the
outed benefits are increasingly dubi-
ated uncertainty around the role of
lobalization. Most nation-states still
orce, and this is why they are useful
ings. Yet, nation-states also face the
ese costs are crystallized in summit
trast rudely with related contractions
t and social services. Interestingly,
spect dissenters may also denounce

Police

Alterglobalization

By all reports, it's a day to watch in Washington, D.C. April 2001. IMF and World Bank. It's vans. Our unarrestable jail suits carrying their driver's licenses. One is a very nervous driver. The way to our dawn position coffee, and two hours of sleep and I have the map and we're in the rearmost seat, which, usually out of the driver's earshot.

This is the first action and be different. Word on the street going to arrest everyone in suits and banners, water, cameras everything, so just go with nerves relieved that since we're not have a stinky vinegar-soaked ziplock into my jeans. Our leader. We're ready. But tension is high. One is worried that we won't be here before getting scooped. We want to be present dreams by standing in the street before the police ritual unfolds.

As we drive through the alert people shriek at every street come at us at every intersection gate from the floor of the van,

cing

ation Dissent

ear diapers. We don't. 3 a.m.
. Spring joint meeting of the
very complicated loading the
support team are the only ones
es, so they have to drive. But
And the energy in the van on
after an all-night meeting, no
is haphazard and frantic. B
in the lead van, but squeezed
with the nervous noise, is actu-
.

after Seattle. We know it will
et yesterday was that they're
ight. No point carrying signs
as, or backpacks. We'll lose
necessities in your pockets. I'm
anticipating tear gas, I don't
d kerchief draining out of a
gal support is well prepared.
gh in the vans because every-
get our moment in the street
drove two thousand miles to
ent, to manifest our rage and
reet for at least a few minutes
ls all the meaning.

e deserted streets, excessively
shadow. Phantasmatic police
on. B and I are trying to navi-
where the flashlight won't be

seen from outside. Periodical
ies crash down on us, and fl
ented. We have to start over
the map. Finally, we breathe
with a straight shot at our de

Someone shrieks. "Cop
responds meekly, "But it's a br
out of here!" We peek out the
to the map. Shit, now we're in
around and go back. Our driv
shouting at her. "Don't make
maneuvers us through a Ma
back across the bridge. Now w
another straightaway. "Stop s
energy calms. She can do it.
ahead of us, two cruisers, pa
wide boulevard. Doom. We're
in two vans. They'll snatch us
jail. "Turn!"

"Pull in here!" "Everybod
ster!" Suddenly the two ex-
taken command. "Get the v
They send the drivers away.
dumpster in an alley a mi
people are waiting for us, th
have to cross the street wit
The marines organize us tw
one-hundred-foot intervals.
I take the rear. We have th
we can report arrests to le
front of us make it across
darkness on the other side.
I'm shaking hard as we cro
to the other side, and I loo
as a cop comes out of a sto
his car carrying a six-pack
donuts.

ly, someone yells “duck”, bod-
ashlight and map are disori-
figuring out where we are on
relief. We’re on a wide road
destination.

car! Turn right.” Our driver
ridge.” “Doesn’t matter. Get us
window, then get back down
n Maryland. We have to turn
er nears collapse. Everyone is
any illegal turns!” She finally
arriott Hotel valet zone and
we’re within about a mile, on
screaming at the driver!” The
It’s just a little further. Then,
arked on opposite sides of the
so near the zone now, 24 kids
for sure and we go straight to

dy out!” “Behind the dump-
marines in our group have
vans out of here.” “Go! Go!”
Great, now we’re behind a
le from the location where
he vans are gone, AND we’ll
th the cruisers to get there.
vo by two and release us at
They take the front. S and
e group’s one cell phone, so
egal. We watch the pair in
the boulevard and into the
Our turn. We’re so obvious.
oss that street. We make it
ok back at the cruisers just
ore, moving gingerly toward
of coffees and a big box of

In this chapter and the next, we work through the history and evolution of protest policing. We begin with a review of the literature. In the remainder of this chapter, we present a conceptual framework, including and beyond the streetscape, leading to an empirically grounded analysis of police actions with regard to social movements.

As Jennifer Earl points out, studies that focus on repression explain repression (treating it as the dependent variable), movement resiliency (using repression as the independent variable), herself prefers to examine the dynamic relationship between the positions of repressive agent (private or public) and the target, leading to tightness of linkage with and without the target, and the character of repressive action (coercive or non-coercive, observed or unobserved police action (not synonymous with repression)). Similarly, Wilson focuses on the dynamic relationship between completeness, severity, and extensiveness of repression.

Some scholars focus on what we think of as the "causes" of repression (how repression produces its effects). Reiter identifies police strategies: coercion/negotiation; cooperation/collaboration; repression as weapon; selectivity (different policies for different target, ranging from tolerant to aggressive); political opportunity (political and cultural); police knowledge/image of the target; protesters (e.g., good/bad); police officer characteristics; and external forces (civil rights activists, etc.). Waddington focuses on the troubles of the police, which she calls "on-the-job trouble" (risky or dangerous situations in which the reputation of the police is at stake). She identifies situations (this explains police officials' motivation) and "out-of-the-ditch" situations in which the police are forced to act.

Other scholars focus on what we think of as the "consequences" of repression, seeking the explanation for repression. Earl and Wilson summarize the variables used in the literature: movement threatens political elites; repression is a tool that protects the movement; the political context (political opportunity or stability of the political opportunity); and other variables than can be used to study how repression influences repression: attitudes, mobilization, etc.

sent

ork to expand the conceptualization
brief review of the literature. In the
nt a thorough inventory of policing,
e. In the following chapter, we move
of the effects of these police tactics,
ventions that grasp the significance
l movements.

s of protest policing alternately try to
(dependent variable) or try to explain
on as an independent variable).¹ Earl
mics of repression: the institutional
e or state agents, categorized accord-
control by national political elites);
percision or channeling); observable or
onymous with “covert” and “overt”).²
namics of criminalization of dissent:
ness.³

hink of as the “supply-side” dynamics
es itself). In this vein, della Porta and
rcion (violent? preemptive?); persua-
ration; information gathering and use
ng for different groups, from soft/tol-
nity structures (political, institutional,
ages/perception of protest issue and
icers’ view of their own role in soci-
nd law-and-order coalitions).⁴ P. A. J.
f repression for the police themselves:
us operations); “in-the-job trouble” in
at risk due to bad press or investiga-
tivations for negotiation); and “die-in-
will risk both kinds of trouble.⁵

think of as “demand-side” dynamics,
on in the actions of protesters. Earl
ese studies: the degree to which the
movement weakness; media coverage
ical opportunity cycle; and the volatil-
nity structure.⁶ Wilson also identifies
ow movements’ own character influ-
on, goals, and organizations.⁷

The diverse approaches of these studies reflect the complexity of each variable. Even the methods used by scholars may be more intertwined than the severity of various police actions. For example, that the impact of arrests may have a more severe than the impact of police violence. Recent work on surveillance has shown it to be a more effective form of repression, despite a lack of formal evidence.

A common recognition of the literature is that it has a “backlash” effect, spurring increased protest in response to police violence; Earl’s study shows that the effect of repression is most pronounced in the phase of a social mobilization. Kauffman’s study shows a “micromobilization” response to repression, with a wide range of variables associated with increased mobilizations.¹¹ But the literature on surveillance, particularly the prolific Marx, shows consistently isolated effects.

Della Porta has gathered scholars’ work on policing of protest, the first of which was published in the emergence of the alterglobalization movement, and the emergence of direct-action confrontation, the second of which was published in the context of alterglobalization. The earlier volume, *Protest and Politics in the United States*, had for the most part replaced escalation with direct action in the United States. This shift was accompanied by a change in tactics: “underenforcement of the law, increased surveillance, scale collection of information.” The volume also discusses how these policing were political opportunities (in the context of alterglobalization), civil disobedience (in the context of alterglobalization), and police knowledge (ideas and images). In discussing the findings, della Porta, Peterson, and others note that

The dominant protest policing style is still the same. Different police styles are used for different types of protest, and repressive styles have survived. The same kind of stereotypes about protesters—peace, conspirators, and so on, as well as the same stereotypes and protest police tactics—continue to be used to a small minority among the protesters.

studies are further complicated by the seemingly straightforward variables more complex than they appear. How should they be measured? Earl has pointed out that repression has been underestimated as being less effective than violence,⁸ and Gary Marx's extensive work suggests that it can be as incapacitating as any other force or even direct interaction.⁹

The literature is that *sometimes* repression leads to increased mobilization.¹⁰ This is often the case, but however, the effect is hard to track. Mobilization depends on its timing and context. Earl Opp and Wolfgang Roehl observe that repression leads to some movement-organized likelihood of such backlash mobilization, which owes much to the polarizing and divisive impacts.

For two important edited volumes which appeared in 1998, just prior to the anti-globalization movement (although after the actions by Autonomen in Europe) and in 2006, well after the emergence of the movement, the authors happily determine that negotiation is the preferred force in Western Europe and the United States, as evidenced by the increasing use of three strategies: the search to negotiate, and large-scale mobilization. The variables identified to explain protest activities include police institutions, state political repression, rights or law-and-order coalitions, and media coverage about protesters). In summarizing the findings, Opp and Reiter conclude:

Repression in Europe is selective, that is, different actors. In this way, "brutal" repression is used. These styles are connected with the actions of professional disturbers of the peace of the past. The difference today is that the same styles are now applied only to protesters, whereas historically they

were used against large sections of
 bers and associations of the worki
 of continuity in the role of the po
 retically open to them, and in the
 viduate and label “dangerous” ene
 of the trend toward “softer” and m
 a possibility.¹²

Eight years later, della Porta, Pete
 of the alterglobalization movement
 lunge social scientists’ approaches to
 addresses two questions. The first ask
 has been reimplemented or whether
 style” has been developed; the second
 was ever really in ascendance or wh
 On these questions, there is far less a
 book than in the first volume, with s
 ing strategy and others maintaining
 existing elements of “emergency” p
 oddities connected to variables of po
 within police institutions. The 2006
 that “the massive use of intelligence
 brutal intervention on the street.”¹⁶

Most striking to us in the later
 tion of Copenhagen police chief Kai
 offensive paramilitary plan designed
 summit, determining the time and p
 controlling their development” thro
 exhaustion” and negotiation under
 Peterson notes that in both Denm
 “undermine . . . nonviolent civil disob
 by this chapter’s answer to the volu
 model for policing protest: there has
 selective to be sure but not reserved
 note that the shocking “Miami Mode

The 2006 della Porta et al. volume
 ings with regard to policing altergl
 nature of the protests has led to mom
 such as the closure of borders, which

sent

of the population, such as the mem-
bering-class movement. It is this kind
of police, in the range of options theo-
retical mechanisms with which they indi-
cates that makes arrest or reversal
more tolerant protest policing styles

erson, and Reiter assert that policing
involves “new strategies [that] chal-
lenge protest policing.”¹³ The later volume
asks whether the escalated force model
is “a new repressive protest policing
model and asks whether the negotiated model
whether its use was always selective.¹⁴
agreement among contributors to the
some authors arguing for novel polic-
ing that alter globalization policing used
policing,¹⁵ as well as negotiation, its
police knowledge and disorganization
study reconfirms the 1998 findings
” is “legitimized as an alternative to

volume is Abby Peterson’s descrip-
tion of Vittrup’s strategy, which involves an
effort to “maintain the initiative during the
preparation for the anticipated events and
through a combination of the “tactic of
contrived and theatrical conditions.
in Denmark and Sweden,¹⁷ police sought to
prevent obedience actions.”¹⁸ We are convinced
of the volume’s question about the prevailing
has been a shift to preemptive policing,
especially for violent or extremist activists. We
believe that the “model”¹⁹ is, in fact, the Vittrup model.

also identifies additional important find-
ings about globalization. First, the transnational
intermittent reversals of global integration,
which violates the EU Schengen agreement

to abandon internal border control agencies, including multiple local agencies of the force but not always willing to coordinate with various national and even foreign agencies, and also coordinating or even coordinating a central command structure. At Seattle 1999 G8; and Miami 2003 FTAA, the various police units.²¹ Third, the direction recognized by police as a “political subject” (treated as a “public-order problem”) to collaborate with the negotiated movement of police (and the state) to recognize connections with the moderate and cooperation movement, as well. (Another political subject is rejected as a political subject used as an excuse to delegitimize it.) British and Swedish police, nonviolent direct action, a significant concern, and they sought to prevent the use of Vittrup’s “tactic of exhaustion.”

Della Porta et al. imply that alternative to specialized policing. They argue that the Genoa 2001 G8 (based on tactics used in football riots, activities organized by organized-crime groups, and terrorism) after, Peterson examines inappropriate police unfamiliarity with chain-of-command and that police have been trained to work alone or in small units to determine that neither “escalated force” nor “rearranged” are used to accomplish “strategic incidents” who are “transgressive” (that is, violent or other forms of protest).²⁴

These scholars agree that police riot tactics: police unpreparedness and disorientation of protesters”; and aspects of police tactics (or the rush of physical conflict), which can lead to undirected violence.²⁵ We must wonder if such violence can be warded off by military gear and deployed in military tactics.

s.²⁰ Second, the multilayered police agencies (mobilized to increase the size of the force, often operating under joint command), as well as the various agencies, have difficulty agreeing upon a common strategy when operating together in a hierarchical structure. The 1999 WTO; Göteborg 2001 EU; Genoa 2001 protests caused severe disorder among the direct-action communities are not recognized as “direct action” (instead, they are persistently labeled as “riots”), and police may therefore refuse to apply the traditional model of policing.²² The refusal by the police to treat certain protesters as “political” affects the effectiveness of the cooperative sectors of the alterglobalization movement. One possible interpretation is that alterglobalization is not a subject *ideologically*, and its tactics are not “political.” As Peterson points out, for the Danish protests, the direct action itself was a source of significant concern, and to preempt its occurrence through raids

of alterglobalization protest *needs* more than the models used by the police at the time. The models used to handle other “emergencies,” such as those used by the Mafia or by other organized crime groups, were inappropriate.²³ In her chapter on police tactics, particularly officers’ use of force and operations, since most of them are trained to operate in small teams. Noakes and Gillham argue that “force” nor “negotiation” fully captures the nature of the “engagement,” detention, and disruption of protesters, particularly of protesters who refuse negotiation and predict-

able riots occur as a result of several factors: lack of organization; demonization of “bad culture and psychology (fear and/or anger), which whip them into unplanned and uncontrolled disorder, however, just how unplanned or uncontrolled when police are armed with paramilitary tactics and information. Della Porta and Reiter’s

volume relies on a presumption we v
 sirable for both sides.

Alongside della Porta and Reiter's
 conducted to date about social con
 ment has been done by legal collect
 academic observers.²⁶ The U.S. Natio
 event analysis and concluded that th
 preemptive model focused on bloc
 conducting broad-scale [illegal] sea
 confiscating or incapacitating protes

We organize our inventory of poli
 and legislative dimensions of policin
 nal prosecution, and transnationaliz
 areas may overlap.

Regulatory and Legislative

The very meaning and significance o
 ies have developed regulatory mech
 test. In advance of protests, city gov
 bureaucratic mechanisms to reduce
 political activity and speech. As a
 receive word that wooden sticks and
 gal" during the protest period. They
 distance of the meeting site. The city
 of thousands of police and is prepar
 demonstrators. The city proclaims a
 only aggressive but volatile. If we im
 the feet of a democratic society, the b
 test is a legislative period of earthq
 tainty. Anything can happen.

As discussed in chapter 2, city go
 nance agencies and with the police
 eters." Massive metal walls distort th
 dissecting neighborhoods, even tho
 checkpoints is a profound and quest
 are required to carry pass cards. Par
 but "official" credentialed participan
 are forced to close, and tourists' acce

sent

view as doubtful—that riots are unde-

s efforts, a great deal of the research
ontrol of the alterglobalization move-
ives, activists, and sympathetic non-
nal Lawyers Guild compiled a multi-
ne negotiated model has shifted to a
cking access, intimidating activists,
rches, raids, and mass arrests, and
t resources.²⁷

ce tactics into five arenas: regulatory
g, intelligence, event policing, crimi-
ation. Tactics implemented in these

Five Dimensions of Policing

of “negotiation” have changed as cit-
anisms to preemptively control pro-
vernments have used legislative and
or restrict constitutionally protected
ctivists prepare for a protest, they
bike locks have been defined as “ille-
will not be able to get within a given
has assembled and budgeted for tens
ed to arrest and detain thousands of
a regulatory environment that is not
agine the law as the ground beneath
behavior of cities in advance of a pro-
quakes, inducing anxiety and uncer-

overnments work with global gover-
to define and build “security perim-
he geography of the city, sometimes
ugh the erection of barricades and
ionable act of governance. Residents
ts of the city become off limits to all
ts in summits. Hotels and businesses
ss and movements are limited.

Another regulatory tactic is the pass specific protest. In advance of Miami Council defined two or more persons more and eight or more gathered outside minutes as an “illegal assembly.” For Directive” banned protest in the zone fence. Ordinances also restrict protest equipment, such as gas masks. By limiting for sign support sticks, ordinances used for human-powered barricade strong supports. At Heiligendamm 2 of front banners (carried perpendicular restricted, and side banners (carried to its direction) were entirely forbidden in Hamburg, the police conditions for several thousand people even included and down.

Miami removed the special “para the law immediately after the event (a sunset date, November 27, six days ended), but some restrictive ordinances in new limitations on local protest and Moreover, the experiences of summer nances, such as occurred after Göteborg ties quickly introduced a ban on the assemblies. After Heiligendamm 20 include face makeup as used by the Army in the list of prohibited forms of

Old laws may be resurrected. At threatened to charge masked protesters adopted to thwart armed insurrection who dressed and painted themselves enforcement officers over rent issues resurrected to criminalize queers (1 alterglobalization protesters (2002).

More recently, the city of Toronto Works Protection Act to expand police test. The legislation was first enacted War II, in 1939. The act defined a “pub

assage of city ordinances directed at a
 i 2003 FTAA, the Miami City Coun-
 oving down the street as a “parade”
 e a structure for more than thirty
 Heiligendamm 2007 G8, a “General
 ne immediately outside the security
 test materials and defensive equip-
 g the diameter and materials allowed
 render illegal lockdown equipment
 s and most puppets, which require
 2007 G8, even the maximum length
 lar to the direction of the march) was
 along the edges of the march parallel
 den. During a related demonstration
 or permitting a big demonstration of
 ed a prohibition against jumping up

de” ordinance (section 54-6.1) from
 indeed, the ordinance itself included
 ays after the 2003 FTAA meetings
 ces have no expiration and can result
 ctivity long after the protest is over.
 mit protests may lead to new ordi-
 org 2001 EU, when Swedish authori-
 e wearing of masks during political
 07 G8, German authorities tried to
 Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown
 of masking during demonstrations.

New York City 2002 WEF, the city
 sters under an 1845 law “originally
 ns by Hudson Valley tenant farmers
 s as Native Americans to attack law
 s.”²⁸ The law has been intermittently
 965), the Ku Klux Klan (2001), and

to resurrected and used the Public
 ice power during the 2010 G20 pro-
 d in Ontario, Canada, during World
 ublic work” as any railway, canal, high-

way, bridge, or other public resource of the government of Ontario, including a board or commission, municipal corporation, or act also includes any public building or site by the lieutenant governor in council. “Public work” is sweeping and nimble, easily expanded. Perhaps for this reason, the government used the Protection Act to temporarily give police powers. It accomplished this by designating the area as a “public work” space. This reapplication of powers but also transformed the type of protest and during the protest. The exact nature of the police was never clear. Prior to the protest, police could require identification and a six-foot security fence. Civil liberties were unconstitutional. Regardless of the protesters on the ground felt the effect was unclear what was and was not a legal

Requiring permits is another way to control the permitting process, police collaboration, and bureaucracy in systematically restricting the use of public space for rallies and marches. In 2004 RNC (Republican National Committee (UFPJ) requested a permit to use a traditional place for large political gatherings and tried to locate UFPJ’s rally on a street. This is the normal role of the local government. In 2009 and Strasbourg 2009 NATO were given special police departments created in Germany. These issues related to political assemblies and the authority to allow and forbid demonstrations carried out by the *versammlungsbehörden* (state or region). This development shows a shift from control protest but also the suspension of local authority.

Permitting may also require social services such as insurance, portable toilets, and garbage collection. The behavior of people who join the protest is to provide their own police (called “private

sent

that is either owned or operated by any public work constructed by any corporation, or private enterprise. The or place designed as a “public work” council. In sum, the definition of “public” applied to a variety of locations. Per Ontario used the Public Works police extended power; it accompanied around the G20 meetings a “public” of the law not only extended police type of activity that occurred prior to nature of what powers were given to the event, local media reported that and question and detain anyone within properties organizations proclaimed this legality of the extended power, protests, since the media reports made it act during a march.

to legally constrict dissent. Through collaborate with the city government maintaining lawful protest by restricting marches. Preparing for New York City (convention), United for Peace and Justice the Great Lawn of Central Park, a gatherings. The city denied the permit distant highway, instead. Sometimes ment is superseded entirely. The special Germany for Heiligendamm 2007 G8 given temporary authority over legal . These special agencies assume the demonstrations, a responsibility normally *Verde* (the “assembly office” of the city not only the manipulation of law to on of civil authority in favor of police

l movement organizations to pay for large cans and to take responsibility for protest. Protest organizers may have “marshals” in the United States), who

patrol the edge of the march route. (For example, if the march has a specific route, the marshals, rather than local police, are confined to that space.) Other than the “pits” (discussed in chapter 2). Since the terms of the negotiated agreement are consistent with the agreement, those who do not enter the protest pits are herded into the protest pits.

Such state “structuring of protest” is a form of impotent permitted activities and measures that have entered into a contract with other protesting groups, which is a form of control other protesting groups, which is a form of control between them. Several times, this has led to mutual accusations among groups of protesters. For example, at the demonstration of L’Aquila 2009 G8, we saw protesters physically attacking a group of black-clad protesters continuing the demonstration after the police cleared the incidents influence possibilities for future protests.

Another civic action is the preparation of a protest site. At Philadelphia 2000 RNC, a derelict jail was used. At Genoa 2001 G8, the Bolzaneto military facility, and at Heiligendamm 2007 G8, emptying youth prisons, were emptied to accommodate protesters. Other cities constructed protest sites, use of stadiums. In press releases before the protests, they announce their capacity and their vulnerability to the incarceration of protesters.

Intelligence

One of the most significant scholarly works is William H. Ingham’s analysis of memos from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Counter Intelligence Program (CIP) from 1971, counterintelligence missions directed to discredit, or otherwise neutralize, or otherwise neutralize were official FBI policy. However, the agency before, during, and after the protests, the same activity, with very similar effects.

and confront straying participants. Permit to close only one lane of traffic, may be responsible for keeping permits define “protest areas” or the permit covers only these areas, the caged zone are not protected by covering the protest or rally. Confrontation outside will be hassled, dispersed, or

²⁹ forces activists to choose between more transgressive ones. Permit holders with the state sometimes try to which creates tensions in the alliance has resulted in major friction and of protesters. At the opening demonstration organizers clad protesters who insisted on confrontation police had blocked the march. Such future cooperation between groups. ration of detention facilities. At Philadelphia was “reopened” to house protesters. military barrack was used as detention G8, various state buildings, including create places to hold arrested summit holding facilities or arrange for the before the demonstrations begin, cities willingness to engage in mass incar-

Intelligence

studies on surveillance is David Cunniff. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (COINTELPRO). From 1956 through designed to “expose, disrupt, misdiagnose, and discredit”³⁰ various political organizations the “normal” intelligence activities of the official program included much of effects on targets.³¹ Histories of surveil-

lance, police action, and incarceration—the violence of the state against political movements explicitly organized to disrupt political and social movements. The FBI's unit used a range of tactics calculated to meet its goals of “neutralizing” targets.

State surveillance inhabits a shadowy, secret and barely legal. Cunningham can serve two goals, investigation of (or) precautionary monitoring of organizations. Counterintelligence goal, to “actively restrict a target’s ability they may take the form of provocation catching targets engaged in criminal intelligence” activities routinely undertaken TELPRO that nevertheless had a pre were harassment by surveillance and tions, pressured recruitment of inform labeling or databasing, which harmed their abilities to communicate with raise funds, “exacerbate[ing] a climate institutions opposed the New Left in act as agents provocateurs is, according intelligence operations.³³

Surveillance—certainly in the case of corporate globalization—can also be this case multinational corporations ton document a number of cases of o ment groups.³⁴ However, corporate to investigate than state involvement accountable to citizens. A case that years afterward was the corporate and of an antirepression group in La 2003 G8.³⁵ ATTAC (an organization educate the public by using nonviolent interventions), along with many other Nestlé because of its involvement with

Since associations and social movements have interests separate from those

sent

n of political prisoners clearly reveal
ical activists. But COINTELPRO was
al organizations associated with sev-
t of analysis was the movement. And
have psychological and social effects
geted movements.

dowy realm of public affairs, often
explains that intelligence operations
of federal crimes and (more contro-
through information gathering about
operations may have a preventative
ility to carry out planned actions,” or
on for the purpose of entrapment—
l acts.³² Some of the “normal intel-
en by the FBI outside official COIN-
eventative counterinsurgent function
d/or purportedly criminal investiga-
ormants, infiltration, break-ins, and
ed groups’ reputations and impacted
the media, draw new members, and
e in which seemingly all mainstream
n some way.” Using infiltrators who
ling to Cunningham, part of normal

se of social movements protesting
be organized by nonstate actors, in
s. John Stauber and Sheldon Ramp-
corporate infiltration of social move-
social control is even more difficult
because corporations are not legally
t did not become public until a few
infiltration of local ATTAC groups
usanne, both in the context of Évian
a that aims to raise awareness and to
nt methods for often symbolic street
er groups, was campaigning against
th biotechnology.

ovements endure for decades, they
of their participants. The literature

shows that knowledge (or fear) of organizations to direct their energies away from the pursuit of their broad respond by turning from overt collaboration in more covert, individualistic forms, even violent, factions.³⁸ Organizations with other organizations, the press, well.

Researching the surveillance of all in the United States in 2006, we were nonviolent targets at a level comparable previous eras.³⁹ However, as Cunningham criminal standard or test as a basis for Frank Donner traces the recent history of pacifist organizations to the targeting of anti-death-penalty, and Latin American targeting was performed by both local disruptive, counterinsurgent activity against a criminal standard was officially for PRO. Yet, we documented that the same a network of law enforcement organizations.

So surveillance is more than “police” which aims to quell or weaken political surveillance include direct surveillance, such as cars, recording of automobile plate numbers; electronic surveillance, such as tracking of e-mail, and monitoring of identity; use of video, photo, and car-tracking including by police in disguise, and the agents provocateurs; and databasing information.

It is inaccurate to categorize direct as overt or covert methods of observation can be employed either way as part of exceptions are raids, which cannot be term infiltrators and agents provocateurs not to be expelled. But most of the other way. For example, telephone surveillance without alerting the surveilled person

surveillance and infiltration forces toward defensive maintenance and other goals.³⁶ In addition, activists may explore new forms of dissent and engage in new forms of dissent³⁷ or forge more militant, alter their funding and their relationships with the public may be affected, as

alterglobalization and antiwar groups were surprised to find that it included more than what was expected. As a result, the lack of a clear strategy for surveillance is nothing new. And the history of “terrorist” accusations against groups in the early 1980s of antinuclear, anti-imperialist solidarity organizations.⁴⁰ This history of surveillance by local police and federal agencies. Disruption of organizations that have not met the criteria for surveillance is still underway, now by other organizations.

“intelligence knowledge”;⁴¹ it is a policing tactic and a tactical activity. Technologies of surveillance such as observation and visits by officers, wiretaps, raids, questioning, and burgle, as well as phone taps, audio eavesdropping, monitoring of Internet and other computer activities, and the use of informants, infiltrators, and the sharing of databased infor-

direct and indirect technologies solely for surveillance, as most of these technologies are part of a counterinsurgency strategy. They are done covertly, and the use of long-term informants, who must remain covert so as to ensure that other technologies can be used either covertly or overtly. Surveillance can be conducted seamlessly, or it can be conducted obviously,

in order to signal the surveilled persons sounds on the line, disruption of send back of tapes on the line). “Clumsy” law enforcement officers intend for surveillance. This dimension is part surveillance. Even an overt revelation useful counterinsurgency technique and decreases communication in net

Overt direct surveillance is a threat on and functions as an immediate example arriving at a meeting may be successful police presence outside. This was around-the-clock guard or frequent, protest may be unsettled to find police playing roles of increased responsibility rallies or those who work as marshals subject of close-up surveillance phot

The threat has different significance in knowing to engage in gray-area activity knowing they can be identified on protect themselves better. First-time protesters employers or others will find out about attending meetings may doubt the meeting they are participating because illicit. People may feel uneasy about t

During major protests, overt and near activist spaces, such as sleeping educational events, art workshops, (Activists often organize a central meeting “spokescouncils” are held; these places Sacramento 2003 Biotech, outside a officers stood on the sidewalk near the move around them to enter the meeting sidewalk is not a trivial matter, as act assault on an officer for inadvertent brushing against police personnel.) were stationed directly across the street police trained a vehicle-mounted search short range, this powerful light was

sent

on that he is under surveillance (e.g.,
service, purportedly inadvertent play-
' operations suggest to activists that
them to be aware that they are under
of the counterinsurgent function of
on of long-term infiltrators can be a
, as it disrupts trusted relationships
works.

at similar to the brandishing of weap-
discouragement to protesters. Peo-
prised and alarmed to find a watch-
tchfulness may take the form of an
visible drive-bys. People arriving at a
re videotaping demonstrators. People
ity in the protest, such as speakers at
s or medics, may find themselves the
ography or video.

nce for various people. People plan-
may be discouraged from doing so,
videotape, or may be forced to pro-
otesters may be concerned that their
out their political activities. People
reputation of the group in whose
use surveillance suggests the group is
taking a visible role in organizing.

d constant surveillance is common
g and eating spaces, medical centers,
and meeting and organizing spaces.
meeting space, where decision-making
es are often called "Convergence".) At
spokescouncil meeting, several offi-
door so that activists had to carefully
ting. (Circumnavigating officers on a
tivists have been charged with felony
physical contact such as jostling or
Meanwhile, several police vehicles
street. Once the meeting started, the
searchlight on the building. At such
a striking intrusion into the space.

Persons approaching the door to e
 spotlighted. The light also shone thro
 the meeting space. There was also a
 ing, and patrol cars circled, their si
 participants anticipation of impendi
 rumors were circulated and quelled, b
 room became jumpy and had difficu
 was no raid, but the meeting was m
 blocks away, at the “Welcome Cente
 center and an information table), vol
 all the different kinds of vehicles doin
 ters circled overhead, while cars, mo
 all hours.

At Heiligendamm 2007 G8, police
 surveillance. Tornado planes from t
 bombing equipment) flew patrol flig
 delich and the region around the fence
 the first flights preceding the protes
 day before the blockades shocked th
 with an elderly activist, was giving an
 opment of action repertoires of soci
 use of violence and comparing that h
 The elderly activist had just pointed
 threatening state of emergency in or
 Tornado passed above our heads, ma
 the plane was flying below the legal
 meters). Interrupting the interview, t
 catch the Tornado. After it had passe
 see, this is what I am talking about.” A
 tures taken were intended to detect
 potential depots of explosives. Howev
 released to the public after the prote
 vehicles in the camp.

Electronic surveillance is very eas
 implement. They can join listserves
 mation on events, meetings, and p
 the Internet and intercept satellite-b
 They can access remotely the person
 known about exactly how governme

enter the meeting found themselves through the windows, eerily illuminating a helicopter hovering over the building. Screams screaming, inducing in meeting an assault on the building. Waves of about the three hundred activists in the faculty concentrating. Many left. There made ineffectual. Meanwhile, a few "er" (a small warehouse with a media volunteers continued to compile a list of drive-bys at their facility. Helicoptorcycles, and vans passed slowly at

mobilized a new form of militarized the German army (allegedly without flights above the action camp in Red- ce in order to take pictures. Although ts went unnoticed, the flight on the e entire movement. One of us, along interview about the historical devel- al movements in Germany and their nistory with the violence of the state. out how the state was establishing a rder to criminalize dissent when the aking an incredible noise (apparently lly required minimum height of 150 he camera immediately swung up to ed, the activist smiled and said: "You According to the authorities, the pic- transformations of the ground and ever, pictures taken by the plane and ests seemed focused on persons and

y for law enforcement authorities to and view websites to gather infor- plans. They can automatically trawl -based communications (ECHELON). al computers of targets. Not much is nts are using these technologies and

how often they secure warrants for electronic surveillance is used because dossiers of the criminal investigation "Gruppe" (militant group). Lawyers had a number of persons facing trial under 129a. By tapping the e-mail communications agents and the criminal investigators e-mails of several hundred activists tapped persons either personally or operations can also take either an invisible reported to us that, in meetings with have announced "we read your e-mail monitoring with counterinsurgent in

The partner of Andrej Holm told 2007 Chaos Computer Club Conference of her partner on charges of terrorism she did not dare to switch her cell phone interpreted as suspicious behavior and ever, the electronic surveillance of her vision reception, making it practically sion anymore. One evening, when she television series, she phoned her mobile services that were tapping her conversation her cell phone off in order to be able outcome of this phone call was that television stopped for a few hours with phone.⁴²

In the United States, the alterglobal extensive undercover surveillance. Secret ment culture, such as the emphasis ononyms, facilitate undercover operations ferent cultures, such as the Black Panther kinds of infiltration. A number of lonified, some through their roles as pros Scare (a series of investigations and tal activists in the United States). Secret compiling data and at times attempting affinity group at the Philadelphia 200 was an infiltrator when he drove the

sent

use. In Europe, the extent to which
ne apparent only after a study of the
n police in the case of the “Militante
ad requested access to the dossiers of
er the antiterrorist legislation Article
nication of only a few persons, intel-
stigation police actually collected the
(those who communicated with the
through mailing lists). Such opera-
le or a clumsy posture. Interviewees
th local police, departments agents
l.” Another clumsy form of computer
mpacts is theft of activists’ laptops.

d an insightful anecdote during the
ence about the period after the arrest
m. In the weeks after Andrej’s arrest,
one off because this could have been
imed at avoiding surveillance. How-
er cell phone interfered with her tele-
y impossible for her to watch televi-
e felt like watching one of her favorite
ther to make clear to the intelligence
rsations that she was going to switch
e to watch the show. The unexpected
the interference between phone and
thout her having to switch off the cell

alization movement has experienced
Some believe that aspects of move-
on anonymity and the use of pseud-
ons. However, movements with dif-
nther movement, suffered the same
ng-term infiltrators have been identi-
secution witnesses in the 2006 Green
prosecutions aimed at environmen-
ome have lived in “activist houses,”
ing to provoke militant actions. One
o RNC learned that their van driver
em into a police blockade, where all

on board were arrested.⁴³ In Europe more difficult or is simply harder to ever, is that intelligence services try to become known only when activists the invitation they received. Prior to bourg 2009 NATO, several such attacks discovered one case of successful recruitment.

Undercovers also join short-term obedience actions. Meetings and rallies police officers. Infiltration has become assume that most meetings are infiltrated surveillance easily available to police, an elaborate (but still clumsy) persona. Police even infiltrate groups and actions actually have any prior intelligence basis for suspecting violence or protest information-gathering purpose is being tion serves the specific counterinsurgency of trust among groups. But some actions of undercover agents enhances the since police, having observed the planned actions are designed to be entirely passive.

In early 2006, the U.S. federal government and investigations of environmental actions, dubbed "the Green Scare," with information from long-term infiltration surveillance technology, grand juries and under duress from entire communities testified, but they do not know what are not open court proceedings. They are under threat of jail time and that with Fifth Amendment protection that a questioning. (If witnesses refuse to Grand juries are a form of community insurgent impact of disrupting networking and threatening individuals, communities. Anticipating but never witnesses to be called, communities action.

e, long-term infiltration seems to be discover. What is well known, how-to recruit informants. These attempts refuse to cooperate and make public to Heiligendamm 2007 G8 and Stras-tempts became public, and activists ruitment.

actions, such as nonviolent civil dis- allies are rife with poorly disguised ome so pervasive that activists now crated. Given the other kinds of sur- activists wonder why they engage in l surveillance of nonviolent events. tions regarding which—if the police on the action planning—there is no perty crime. Activists, sure that no ing served, conclude that the infiltra- gent purpose of disrupting the bonds activists suggest that the participation moral authority of the movement, anning sessions, know well that the acific.

overnment began a series of indict- mental activism. The resulting prose- vere based on electronic surveillance filtrators. They also utilized another s, which gather information secretly unities. Communities know who has t has been said, because grand juries y also know that testimony is exacted itnesses do not have recourse to the allows them to remain silent under o testify, they can be imprisoned.) ty surveillance that has the counter- vorks of trust and solidarity. By iso- grand juries pit them against their er knowing about the next group of preemptively freeze information and

Another form of surveillance is raids with the intention of acquiring information from an office. They may or may not have a search warrant. They attempt to search the premises using threats and bribery to gain cooperation. A couple of months prior to the 2008 RNC, forces visited several activist houses without warrants and accused residents of spying on the convention. News of the visits spread. These raids were a first strike against the convention had even taken place. They sent a message that would not be tolerated. Raids and eight arrests preceded the 2008 RNC; activists were charged with conspiracy and "aidance of terrorism."⁴⁴ In advance of the 2008 RNC, forces searched forty houses, social centers, and community centers in many cities. Computers, address books, and other documents were confiscated. The victims were accused of "failure to report" under Article 129a of the German Criminal Code.

But counterinsurgent surveillance is not limited to physical information. Information is also organized and expanded qualitatively with the digitalization of data and interagency collaboration. Law Enforcement agencies facilitate direct and international (United States, Australia, and South Africa) information sharing.⁴⁵ In the EU, there are increasingly unified and shared databases of "political organizations" (a commission working on this has not yet been established). Moreover, the automatic exchange of flight details) between the United States and the EU implemented in the context of antiterrorism has led to the qualitative expansion of databases. This expansion is used to collapse politics, crime, and violence. "domestic terrorism," "criminal extremism," and "terrorism" are applied to political organizations and activist organizations such as the Quaker Peace and Justice Committee. A 2003 conference of the International Commission on the Rule of Law seeking to expose its private (but federal) surveillance and collection of data on noncriminal activities was criticized for evidentiary standards.⁴⁶

sent

ids or house visits. Purportedly with
on, a police team will visit a home or
search warrant. They may be heavily
premises and question those present,
operation when acting without a war-
New York City 2004 RNC, multiagency
in the U.S. Midwest in riot gear but
ents of planning acts of violence at
read quickly through activist circles.
t RNC protesters, before much plan-
t the message that protest would not
took place in advance of Minneapo-
l with “conspiracy to riot in further-
eiligendamm 2007 G8, federal police
, and activist projects in several Ger-
ks, and genetic materials were confis-
ormation of a terrorist organization”
riminal Code.

is more than intelligence gathering.
stored. Surveillance databases have
ization of information and increased
orcement Intelligence Units (LEIU)
among the United States, Canada,
agency collaboration and database
easing attempts to establish a fully
litical troublemakers” (although the
c so far agreed on a definition of the
exchange of collected data (such as
States and the EU has been imple-
rist legislation. In conjunction with
ng, categories are being created that
e. These include categories such as
remism,” and “eco-terrorism,” which
s and their members, including paci-
er American Friends Service Com-
LEIU in Seattle attracted protesters
derally funded) “network” nature, its
ivities (such as protests), and its low

Video and photo surveillance is used to monitor protest events. Some of this visual material is used to prosecute. Some goes into databases. This is alarming because it creates a law of chilling on the act of dissenting. It is of notable concern to others who may be concerned about their comfort expressing dissent.

Event Policing

While traditional approaches to protest policing on streets, today's strategies include legal tactics to promote these activities as part of a broader strategy. Unlike what happens—and doesn't happen—less in this section we will focus on a range of policing tactics are used in seemingly

According to the Vittrup strategy of protest policing immediately prior to the protest, individuals are stopped, questioned, detained, and arrested. This policing communicates to dissenters the nature of policing. Activist spaces are subject to inspections. On various pretexts (including the need to cover without the aid of the relevant authorities) round organizing spaces, cut off entrances, and confiscate art and educational materials.

At Genoa 2001 G8, masked police officers were in place, beating the activists they found. Three of whom were in comas, were hospitalized because they feel vulnerable to the repression by the police, with no hope of meeting their goals. They don't want to miss the political event. The fear of raids builds tension and a sense of urgency. Activists get the sense that meeting their goals is going to be difficult. But face-to-face interactions for multiple reasons: to evade electronic surveillance, to share information and plans, and to allow protesters to build relationships for the first time to build relationships.

Only part of protest policing involves the police. They spend a great deal of effort on performing

omnipresent at rallies and public is used in court cases when activists bases. The collection of this material enforcement/criminal record based le concern to youth, immigrants, and their criminal records and decreases

Policing

est policing focus on the battle in the legislation and public relations. Police “model” of protest policing insepa- n’t happen—in the streets. Neverthe- actions in the streets, where an array gely erratic combinations.

of “exhaustion,” in the days and hours individual activists and small groups nd searched without probable cause. nting groups the pervasive, saturated receive inordinately punctilious fire cluding building code violations dis- ant regulatory agencies), police sur- y and egress, arrest those inside, and ials.

e raided a media center and a sleep- found there. More than sixty people, re hospitalized. Activists fear raids risk of being trapped inside a build- media witnesses, and also because they ts they are preparing for. The threat of constraint before the protest has oving around or even having a meet- o-face meetings are essential for mul- rveillance, to verify and authenticate people who may be working together os quickly.

volves physical control. The police rmativ e activities designed to intimi-

date dissenters and to distract or diverting their plans. Groups of police in posture “patrol” the neighborhoods organizing. At Sacramento 2003 Bio-runners, on which between three a ride, combat-ready, as the vehicles slow hood where activists were organizing of a large meeting at Convergence to ist watchers observe this massing, a rumors of an impending raid disrupted exit, and business at Convergence are own security team vigilantly “locking of police visits.) Even when there is a meeting is under way), police assembled around the area with all sirens blaring parades”).

At Los Angeles 2000 DNC (Dem activist legal team won a rare injunction Center. But, given the instability of the activists had little confidence that this was still vulnerable to siren parades, ing to waves of fear and security lock

Once people have assembled in the gies to disrupt activity. They declare and at times that have been prenegotesters are often perplexed by the lack ing negotiated agreements. Having then threaten or engage in mass arrests ten thousand people during Heiligenvented from participating in the per the gathering place. Police provided the number of people would exceed t and that protesters were masked (wh wings and observers). The march started and was not allowed to follow the ini

Police are supposed to issue an au for people to disperse before taking a it is common for the order not to b even if it is both given and audible,

sent

ert mobilized groups from complet-
n extreme militarized costume and
in which activists are meeting and
tech, large SUVs were mounted with
and eight riot-gear-clad cops would
owly circled the residential neighbor-
g. Police often choose the moment
to mass a large force nearby. Activ-
nd, as the information is passed on,
and redirect activists' energy. (Entry,
e regularly disrupted by the building's
g down" the building in anticipation
no action going on (but often when a
ble a collection of vehicles and rush-
ng, implying imminent action ("siren

mocratic National Convention), the
ion against raids on the Convergence
e legal landscape regarding protests,
s injunction would hold, so the space
massing reports, and rumors, lead-
downs every few hours.

he streets, police use several strate-
e assemblies illegal, even in locations
otiated and that are permitted. Pro-
k of any immediate pretext for void-
declared an assembly illegal, police
st or violence. At a demonstration of
damm 2007 G8, protesters were pre-
mitted march before they even left
illogical reasons; they claimed that
the number mentioned in the permit
hich was disproved by video record-
ed only after several hours of waiting
tially agreed-upon route.

dible "dispersal order" and give time
action against an assembly. However,
e given or to be given inaudibly or,
for inadequate time to be given for

dispersal. A striking example of this curtailed a rally in the protest pen at a dispersal order, but the pen's one blocks. Rally attendees were shot in attempting to disperse around the block a rally at the courthouse was issued a order and then immediately surrounded New York City 2004 RNC, police used people, who were subsequently arrested shoulder to shoulder, clad in riot gear bicycles, as dual-purpose moveable force.

The mass surround-and-arrest tactic passersby, people coming out of work delivery workers. Mass arrests are of ers and protesters trying to disperse duce convictable charges and therefore so that they cannot engage in protest arily, to endanger them gratuitously future dissenting activity.

Political arrestees—the vast majority that would not ordinarily be arrested often held in unusual and illegal conditions their legal rights to counsel, same-sex bathrooms, blankets, heat, beds, time standard bonds. They are also subjected while in custody, such as denial of r cuffs, beatings, sexual abuse, death (particularly unwarranted for U.S. with violent crimes). At Miami 2003 were pepper sprayed at close range, fined spaces, without any chance for and faces. Political arrestees are also are unsafe, exposed, condemned, or c New York City 2004 RNC were held ing with extensive toxic residue.⁴⁸ A of protesters were kept for hours, so provisional detention facility. They v lance, subjected to 24-hour light, all given only a thin mat and blanket as

s occurred when the police abruptly Los Angeles 2000 DNC. They issued exit was laced with concrete traffic the back with rubber bullets while ocks. Likewise, at Miami 2003 FTAA, an inadequate three-minute dispersal ded and subjected to mass arrest. At ed nets to capture hundreds of peo- d.⁴⁷ Police use their bodies, standing r and using supersized nightsticks or ence and battering instruments.

actic often results in the arrest of k onto the sidewalk, journalists, and ten disorganized, infuriating observ- e. Moreover, they often do not pro- ore serve primarily to detain activists t for some hours or days and, second- in an effort to discourage them from

ity of whom are arrested for crimes st-worthy, such as jaywalking—are nditions. Protesters are deprived of sex searches, phone calls, access to mely arraignment and release, and ct to cruel and unusual punishment medical care, excessively tight hand- threats, and being held at gunpoint protesters, who are never charged g FTAA, a large number of arrestees then arrested and detained in con- r recovering and cleaning their eyes o often held in unusual facilities that otherwise inappropriate. Arrestees at d in a set of cages erected in a build- t Heiligendamm 2007 G8, hundreds metimes days, twenty to a cage, in a vere under constant camera surveil- lowed no contact with lawyers, and they slept on the floor.

The day prior to the courthouse although no “terrorist” appeared, the no roadways were blocked that were and no windows were broken or other p.m., activists remaining in the street. The march was told by a police officer that the demonstration could continue for seven uneventful minutes later, a wall of rioting rubber bullets and tear gas and was used violently for hours, moving through the summit site. They systematically cleared the neighborhood, where residents told they were forced by police to rob protesters with

Permitted and pacifist demos are particularly noticeable at Genoa 2001 G8:

Saturday. An enormous peaceful march was broken ten minutes the police, seemingly without provocation, began to fire tear gas canister after canister into the crowd. A wall of gas was directed towards them. Until then . . . people were peaceful. Soon protesters were throwing the tear gas. The most angry with the gassing moved to the front.

This clearly shows the falsity of the idea that the crowd “provoked” the violence. If we were all pacifists then the police would have no reason for their violent presumption in a way to believe that the police will react to us. We had an excellent response by gathering in the street and announcing our intention to get in front of the police in a provocative and confrontational stance. We were not throwing molotov cocktails. Then the police reacted for the violence on account of being provoked. . . . The police respond to your effectiveness and to your effectiveness. If you are effective you probably get a response from the police, but if you begin to be effective then you will probably get a response from the police, but if you begin to be effective or not, then you will be met with a

sent

mass arrest at Miami 2003 FTAA, where the fence was not breached, the area not preemptively closed by police, no property crime committed, at 3:53 AM. A police officer with a bullhorn that said "until there is violence." Just under 1000 of police moved on the protest, firing tear gas and hunting protesters indiscriminately. Police drove protesters into the Overtown area. Protesters felt that they had been encouraged to act with impunity.

Protesters were regularly attacked. This was particu-

lar in the case of 150,000 people. . . . For around 10 minutes without any aim or reason, fired canisters of tear gas. A crowd that was not even heading in the direction of the gas were raising their hands in the air. . . . Those who were hit with tear gas back at the police. . . . Those who were hit moved to the front and began to fight back.⁴⁹ The police had the idea that militant sections of the police would leave us alone. It is a ridiculous idea to believe that we can 'decide' how the police will respond. We assured we were going to get a violent response. The streets in such large numbers and in the Red Zone. This is a protest that is a protest to take, whether or not you are using violence. The black block⁵⁰ get all the blame for the violence. Being the only people actually present at the demonstration has inevitably led to the level of violence you threaten. If you are ineffective but violent, you will get a violent response from the police, if you are ineffective and non-violent you will not get much response from the police. If you are effective, whether you are using violence or not, you will get a violent response.⁵¹

Police action is often indiscriminate. Targeted groups are followed by helicopters, frequently surrounded, questioned, harassed, and attack preemptively groups from within the crowd in order to control the time and place of the protest. The 2001 G8 notes that "The attack was designed to make things kick off well away from the protest."

In addition, police target well-known individuals and identified infrastructure functions (providing medical care, supplying music, providing information or keep spirits up). These individuals are off for arrest or shot at. "Snatch" arrests involve rushing a crowd and extracting one undisturbed individual. At Philadelphia 2000 RNC, the subject of an extraordinary assault by police was charged Camilo with assault and other charges and a year prison term. Despite the fact that the story in court, the framing and fabrication were not resolved until 2004. Such arbitrary tactics also enrage and politicize the crowd.

There is some evidence in the literature that police introduce the possibility of violence to attract groups to attend protests. A number of incidents of the appearance of counterprotesters have been announced to the public. This may be a result of governments' use of paramilitaries or police to suppress rival political groups. (When they are present, it is always interesting to see how trustingly turn their backs.) Even if they do not engage in violence, they may incite arguments that, on a small-scale, become central to media coverage of the strife, even if the dispute is quite marginal. The conflict may have been created by the police, but the conflict changes the social context for the protest, moving the action frame from protesters.

Weapons used by police at protests include batons, tear gas, chemical weapons, electric weapons, projectiles (including bullets), water cannons (sometimes with high pressure), and whistles. Whistles has a high rate of dispersal and which

te, but sometimes it is targeted. Tar-
 opter wherever they go and are fre-
 crassed, and arrested. The police also
 which they expect confrontation in
 of the conflict. An observer of Genoa
 clearly pre-planned and designed to
 the Red Zone.”⁵²

own organizers and people with easily
 people doing communications, pro-
 or water, using bullhorns to provide
 e people are more likely to be picked
 arrests (in which a tight phalanx will
 distinguished person) may also be arbi-
 housing activist Camilo Viveiros was
 y Chief of Police Timoney, who then
 er crimes carrying a total of a thirty-
 at Timoney couldn't tell a consistent
 ation of evidence against Camilo was
 ry targeting instills terror. (Of course,
 e both activists and observers.)

United States that police may also
 indirectly, by encouraging opposing
 of groups we interviewed described
 or opponents at events that had not
 method is reminiscent of third-world
 r the private armies of the local elites
 When two opposing political groups
 to note to which group the police
 f these confrontations do not result
 nts, which, although they tend to be
 a coverage, creating an impression of
 riginal to the event itself—and, more-
 police. This artificial introduction of
 or assemblies and steals the strategic

sts include striking weapons, chemi-
 ectiles (plastic, rubber, and wooden
 with pepper spray in the water, which
 ch, unlike tear gas, is invisible), and

sent

former meant to make a scary explosion, to create a disturbing flash of light and injuries when they land on or close to people. For the first time in the United States, the National Institute of Justice is planning to study weapons developed by the U.S. mili-

A single case of weapons preparation was reported in the United States, and only a few in Canada. On the few occasions when a protest claimed was a weapon, they have had to be removed. Canadian protesters do return tear gas, but this is that the exploding canisters are used to break police lines, since the police have gas masks. (n.) European activists do use Molotov cocktails that can be used to start fires behind police lines, cobblestones and other materials at protests of European labor and other protest, and social movement. However, neither North American protesters carry any firearms, knives, or other weapons. Ester writes:

...tokenistic, symbolic—it illustrates the violence that can come on—a stone against a helicopter, a car—and they call us violent? To them, we are the real butchers, they are the real butchers, they are killed in blood.⁵⁵

These weapons are often used counter to the interests of participants and observers have suffered from non-lethal weapons whose “less lethal” status is often below the waist or at the ground. Gases are used in areas with inadequate exits. Moreover, these are non-lethal weapons. In a similar way, water cannons and may not be used to target individuals. The requirement that police aim at the crowd, was violated by police dissolving a crowd in the red zone at Heiligendamm 2007. A woman hit by a water jet, was blinded in one eye. At

Genoa 2001 G8, police used large amounts of force prohibited by the Geneva Convention on the Use of Force in Public Order Policing. While still not all plastic, and other alternative materials were used in the United States.

As use of these weapons increases, the number of deaths is apparent. A total of 334 people died in the United States or Canada by taser in the United States or Canada. There have also been more than one hundred deaths per spray, although the U.S. Department of Justice has stated that some of the victims were subjected to choke holds, so therefore the number per spray itself.⁵⁷ Protesters who have been shot at close range have suffered permanent injuries. Leaving a baseball game in Boston was a projectile. Police departments, community officials are investigating these weapons. These weapons are developed by the military and police.⁵⁹ A Police Chiefs' Association has been using these weapons.⁶⁰ Weapons proliferation is higher in the United States than elsewhere in the world. The situation is chaotic in the United States than in Europe. Police have such a wide array on hand at a given time.

European police have, however, used force. At the Genoa 2001 G8, Carlo Giuliani was shot. Protesters described this event as an assassination. The European Court of Human Rights—has ruled in favor of the police for their handling of the subsequent trial. A police officer had acted in self-defense. The police reconstructed the event using the video and the evidence available through the trials, however, concluded that the police officer aimed first at a fellow protester, shot him directly and that Carlo, probably trying to protect his mate from being shot, grabbed a rifle and ended up being shot himself. Just as in the case of the shot at Göteborg 2001 EU; one almost always finds police, armed with semiautomatic rifles, shooting hundreds of unarmed people, including children, outside the Schillerska School (the C

amounts of CN gas, a form of tear gas used in World War I but not forbidden for public use in most EU countries, rubber bullets, and tear gas canisters are regularly used in the United States, their lethality is becoming more apparent after having been attacked with a pepper-spray canister. Between 2001 and 2008,⁵⁶ there have been at least 10 deaths in custody associated with pepper-spray. The Department of Justice accepts as an extenuating circumstance if the victim was asthmatic or had previously been injured. In 2009, the deaths of three protesters were not due to pepper-spray but to being shot with tear gas canisters. In 2010, a man died from a debilitating injury, and a woman was killed by impact of a pepper-spray canister. Community coalitions, and government agencies, have been successful in their actions.⁵⁸ Meanwhile, other “less lethal” weapons have been developed and then quickly passed on to police. The use of these weapons project encourages the adoption of these weapons. The use of these weapons is much more rapid in the United States than in Europe. Weapons deployment is also more common in the United States than in Europe, and European police tend not to use these weapons against a given protest.

In the United States, police used live ammunition at protests. At least one person was shot at close range and killed. Activists have been arrested, but the 2009 judgment of the European Court of Human Rights while criticizing the Italian authorities for their subsequent investigations—held that the use of live ammunition was excessive. An attempt by activists to recon-struct the protest site and photo material that became available on YouTube convincingly makes the point that the use of live ammunition against a protester who was not threatening anyone by trying to do something to prevent a fire extinguisher lying on the ground, was excessive. At a month earlier, protesters had been shot and killed. At the same event, Swedish police used rifles with laser sights, forced several protesters to lay down, and a breastfeeding mother, to lay down (convergence) for nearly an hour.⁶¹ The

reason provided for this operation. The activist was supposedly inside the school. Weapons were found during this inter-

Prosec

Very few activists charged at summ era have been convicted. The major dropped, not prosecuted, or have be ing fines, such as a traffic citation. not convicted. Unchanged since Isa privilege of using mass arrest as a m accountable by the courts for provi dence.⁶² Serious prosecution of acti tions focuses on a handful of cases. 7 high-profile activists whose conviction of a skillful opponent and discourag concern for the increased penalties cases involve ordinary protest partic tend to rely on inflated charges and c get, multiagency security apparatus, Miami 2003 FTAA did not result in a

In late 2007, in contrast, twenty were sentenced to a total of 110 year years). According to Media G8way never been such high sentence dema ber 17 of that year, about sixty thousa test the trials of the activists and to s violent raids and the detentions of a from supportolegale points out that nient historical passage that question ety.”⁶⁴ Prosecutions related to Götebo high rate of convictions, usually on or “violent revolt” (*valdsamt upplopp*) had been convicted and sentenced to and Eric Wijk claims that the total ar years.⁶⁵

Activists are also sometimes arres activists planning to participate in M

sent

was that an armed German terrorist. However, neither the terrorist nor the operation was a massive operation.

Prosecution

Summit mobilizations in the post-Seattle era. Many of the hundreds of arrestees have had their cases dismissed. Many have been offered incidental charges involving property damage. Among those prosecuted, most are minor offenses. As Mac Balbus's 1973 study is the police method of control without being held to a standard of providing reasonable charges and evidence. Many activists arrested at summit mobilizations are of two types. Some involve those who would simultaneously rid the state of the others from taking his place out of the way for effective political action. Other types are those who are arrested for participating in chaotic evidence. The incredible budget of police violence, and mass arrests at a single conviction of an activist.

Forty-five activists from Genoa 2001 G8 summit served months of jail time (the state asked for 225 months). Giffelsoli Infogroup "There have been hundreds for street clashes."⁶³ On November 11, 2001, thousands of people marched in Genoa to protest the prosecution of the police for the arrest of activists at the summit. A statement from the group read: "25 people can't shield an inconvenience so strongly our lifestyle and society." The 2001 EU summit resulted in an unusually high number of arrests on the charge of "breach of the peace" (brottsbrott in Swedish). By 2003, sixty persons had served a total of forty-five years in prison, and the total amount of years people served was 50 years.

Many were arrested and charged preemptively. Eighty-five at the Minneapolis 2008 RNC were preemptively

tively arrested and charged with conspiracy to damage property, and conspiracy to damage property, convicted, they faced sentences of 12 years. The terrorism enhancement was dropped for three of the accused. Five accepted plea deals for minor convictions. Four served no time.

Prosecutions of U.S. activists charged with riotous events take place in the local courts, often by inexperienced local police working with interagency power struggles among federal agencies. European prosecutions were handled by national riot police, who can more easily handle strategic cases.

Social justice activists are also exposed to protests that do not involve summit protests. Protesters for repeated acts of civil disobedience (to the U.S. School of the Americas) received prison—shocking outcomes for symbolic acts. Three elderly Dominican nuns received forty-one months for the “symbolic act of spilling blood and a household hammer) of 2002.⁶⁷ Charges are also increasing against high-profile direct action, such as bank occupations, safe nature of this activity. Trespassing, vandalism, and gray areas of civil disobedience, are increasingly treated as crimes or even terrorism. A good example is the November 2008. Nine persons were arrested for trespassing on a train track as part of antiterrorist investigation of tagged train tracks in the context of the investigation of waste transports from France to Germany. The nine were in custody for six months without indictment.

Most striking is the FBI’s Operation Green Scare project that indicted fifteen activists for property crimes, such as freeing animals, burning technology field trial crops, and burning property. Activists call this wave of indictments the “Green Scare.” In none of these cases was this type of activism categorized as terrorism.” In early 2006, as mentioned

conspiracy to riot in the second degree with terrorism enhancement. If convicted, the maximum sentence is 15 years.⁶⁶ Under community pressure, the charges were dropped against the protesters. Charges were dropped against the protesters in exchange for guilty plea agreements for gross misdemeanor. The maximum sentence is 180 days in jail time.

The protesters were charged for opposing national or international courts, relying on evidence supplied by the protesters in an unfamiliar situation, fraught with cultural and hierarchical relations with other protesters. The protesters work with an integrated architecture of protest that can easily be prepared or unified around a common goal.

The protesters are experiencing increased prosecution for their actions. In 2001, routine prosecutions of protesters for disobedience (demonstrating too close to the line) resulted in sentences of six months in jail for symbolic, negotiated, pacific trespassing. The protesters received sentences ranging from thirty to ninety days for "disarmament" (involving their own weapons) and a Minuteman missile in Colorado in 2001. The protesters against persons involved in effective, non-violent action hangs, despite the peaceful and non-violent nature and property damage, traditional protest actions being recast as severe and violent actions. A good example is the so-called Tarnaq case of 2001. The protesters arrested in the French town of Tarnaq because they allegedly had sabotaged the annual protests against the nuclear power plant in Germany. One of the arrestees was held in custody pending initiation of a trial.

The protesters' actions Backfire, a major federal prosecution of protesters for various environmental actions such as burning fur farms, damaging biofuels, burning SUVs at automobile dealerships. The protesters and related investigations "the protesters were there risk to human life; yet, the protesters were labeled as "eco-terrorism" and "domestic terrorism." As mentioned earlier, the FBI began indicting

people for a series of such actions. In exchange for providing the names of people arrested in order to reduce the huge sentences handed down. They knew that these threats were real. They had been sentenced to twenty-two years in prison for the burning of three SUVs.⁶⁸ (The fact that Logan's sentence for rape insulted the efforts of the campaign to free him.) Although the maximum sentence in the United States is five years, many of the sentences were much longer, because of "terrorism" charges.

Another part of the Green Scare was the case of a group of activists who worked with a group called the London Animal Cruelty and organized a campaign against Life Sciences. Charged not with any criminal act, but to encourage others to engage in acts of civil disobedience at owners' homes, they were sentenced to prison under the Protection Act (formerly the Animal Welfare Act) for electronic civil disobedience (for acts of civil disobedience that use up the time and ink of the reporter). They were sentenced to one to six years in prison, with some receiving three or more years.⁶⁹ Sherwood was in prison (and was threatened with a gun) and his name was posted on his website.⁷⁰

During the Green Scare, grand juries were used in communities, hearing evidence from experts and witnesses, cooperative indictees. Much of the evidence was against accused movements and did not stand up to scrutiny by grand juries. The isolation and uncertainty of the sudden and severe criminalization of activists made activists feel unsafe in every space.

Similarly, Germany's Article 129 was used against activists accused of promoting terrorism. Three journalists, were detained in October 2002, and their works interrogated.⁷¹ After the arrests, the federal court rejected the charges against Holm, who was being investigated for his writings on gentrification and anti-imperialism. He was an antimilitarist group that had taken control of the streets. Other arrestees included his co-

sent

indictees were offered plea bargains in
of other participants, and many coop-
sentences with which they were threat-
were serious because Jeff "Free" Luers
years and eight months for the burn-
Luers's sentence was longer than Ore-
feminist community, which joined in
the median sentence for arson in the
the Operation Backfire sentences are
enhancement."

was the case against the SHAC 7, a
an organization called Stop Hunting-
against a company called Huntingdon
criminal activity but with conspiracy
ivities such as protesting at company
under the Federal Animal Enterprise
Enterprise Terrorism Act) and the
ivities such as sending black faxes
receiving machine). The SHAC 7 were
on, with all but one of the defendants
erman Austin served a year in federal
(great deal more) because of the links

ries were running in many U.S. com-
xtensive electronic surveillance and
e Left disassociated itself from the
and by the arrestees or oppose the
ertainty of this time, along with the
of former gray-area activity, caused
and relationship.

a antiterrorist legislation has been
perty crime. Seven people, including
ctober 2007 and their friendship net-
tees were held in isolation for three
e warrant for the sociologist Andrej
because of similarities between his
mperialism and the manifestos of an
credit for burning some military vehi-
editors of a book on Venezuela.

The criminalization of nonviolence. Our interviewees stated, “When people are charged with twenty-five years for destroying vehicles, they are more likely to comply and not pose to follow orders.” The U.S. record of prosecuting federal officers makes interfering with protesters a crime. Criminalizing pacifist actions at military bases is a suspect that creeping criminalization is a response to recent social movements refuse to be violent. The violence, either the violence has been reclassified. Another interviewee stated, “People committing the crimes that they want the police to take away, lock them up, so they will invent a crime.”

One other category of prosecution is brought against organizations in an attempt to disrupt participating in various protest activities. The U.S. sued Greenpeace USA, holding the organization responsible for the disobedience of members who had been arrested as individuals. Greenpeace was acquitted because it failed to prove any violation of the criminal law in question, but questions regarding the effectiveness of prosecution issues were not addressed.

Transnationalization

Steadily, protest policing is taking on a more international or alterglobalization. Personnel and agencies are becoming specialized and their strategies for managing protests are globalized. The Italian *carabinieri* assigned to manage protests. The French and Canadian riot police assigned to manage protests that policed Heiligendamm 2007 G8 summit. Although the U.S. military is commonly used for domestic action and protests are generally managed by the National Guard was mobilized to handle the 1999 WTO. Even before the advent of the “antiterrorist” Delta Force was attending to protests present in Seattle before the arrival of the 2001 WTO. Miami 2003 FTAA was a multiagency effort involving several agencies, seven of which were federal, and the U.S. Miami mayor Manuel Diaz as “the most powerful person in Miami.”

t activity is shaking activists deeply. People are being thrown in jail for articles, it means that we are just suppression of military recruiters as with them in any way a felony (thereby military recruitment centers). Activists is happening in part because curious; to justify the arrests and other to be invented or nonviolence has to be proposed that "People aren't committed to commit. They can't throw them out . . . charges."

aimed at dissenters is criminal suits effort to prevent them from participating. The U.S. government, for example, organization responsible for the civil already been tried and sentenced acquitted in 2004, as the prosecution obsolete 1872 "sailor-mongering" law, the First Amendment and selective ed.⁷²

n of Protest Policing

n a character specifically directed at agencies are increasingly federalized and managing activist citizens transnational to control protest are military police. are federal police. The German Kavala was an agency invented for that purpose constitutionally forbidden from taking generally policed by the local police, the handle the "emergency" of Seattle 1999 the "war on terrorism," the U.S. Army's ending alterglobalization events; it was of the National Guard.⁷³ Policing of effort involving forty law enforcement, in what was infamously described by model for homeland security":

sent

n police (17,000) since the end of
headlines . . . deployment of the
strators . . . a gigantic rehearsal for
systematically prepared for over a
ods and measures either tested or
s . . . 1,100 army soldiers deployed
ors.⁷⁴

ation of policing is under develop-
cies. Three important ones are the
tional Research Programs on Secu-
(), the United Nations Interregional
te (UNICRI), and the International
y during Major Events (IPO). EU-
sponse to Göteborg 2001 EU and
of this research program is to coordi-
EU member states and with Europol.
ublishes a handbook for security at
t to set and disseminate standard
at summit gatherings and to pro-
s for risk analysis. EU-SEC itself is
Nations institute consisting of sev-
th security. UNICRI publishes the
ook." IPO is part of UNICRI and
e security preparations for major
e to national governments. Founded
the preparations for St. Petersburg
ingapore 2006 IMF/WB, and Hanoi
c Coordination, another Free Trade
ublish a handbook for G8 member

ing the respective governments on
summit, these agencies aim to stan-
ations. The two handbooks that have
selecting summit locations. These
e increased cooperation between the
of various countries. The U.S. intel-
articipate in evaluations of potential

A Taxonomy of Political

How is it possible to assess the re-
sistances stopped by water cannons
stopped in their own kitchens by pub-
lic and guarding of the fence? In this chapter
through ten years of direct experiential
praxis undertaken alone, with fellow
team. After refining many iterations
I distilled a series of concepts that capture
control on dissent. We believe that scholars
these concepts.

The multifunctional operations of
require consideration of the connections
and psychic perceptions, between
works. Even the most tangible forms
also function indirectly as psychopolitical
power." Meanwhile, some of the least
and immediate effects: "I'm not going
to be on videotape."

These complex and subtle interactions
Alberto Melucci. He challenges the
of social movements that focuses on
resources to take advantage of political
gic campaigns and staging disruptive
"submerged networks" in which "new
of development and experimentation

networks composed of a multiplicity
fragmented and submerged in ev

onomy of Violence

relative impact on dissent of the bod-
in proximity to the fence and those
plicity about the funding and building
chapter, we present an analysis refined
ence, observation, theorization, and
activists, and together as a research
of our analytic framework, we dis-
re the dynamic effects of social con-
olars and litigators should focus on

of the fence and its infrastructure
ctions between physical constraints
individual reactions and social net-
s of social control, fences and force,
logical operations, Foucault's "bio-
t forceful forms have the most direct
g to the protest because I don't want

connections are articulated well by
common instrumentalist conception
a how formal organizations mobilize
cal opportunities by mounting strate-
e protests. Instead, he focuses on the
y ideas" are nurtured through decades
, eventually leading to social change:

city of groups that are dispersed,
everyday life, and which act as cul-

tural laboratories. They require innovation and practice of new customs and alternative perceptions. Various groups comprising these networks form in response to specific issues. They are a system of exchanges, in which individuals relate. Memberships are multiple and temporary;¹ personal involvement is a latent movement area create new rituals to put them into practice.²

In this passage, Melucci summarizes his theory. First, he theorizes connections between individuals and how each contributes specific actions. The social creates a suggestive laboratory through shifts in perception and the role of discursive space through which individuals act. Third, he highlights the physicality of protest and their need for space. The body is the site of action. The mind, communication, and physical social spaces are equally important. Not all acts are at protests, although these are often expressed there.

In articulating a new analytic framework for the control of dissent, we draw on Melucci's theory not only against bodies but also against traditional notions of political violence have focused on geographic: assemblies require public spaces, rooms to meet, construct art, provide a platform. This analysis of social movements also details the institutional qualities that nurture social movements: independence, and undirectedness (so a network is not there is a third meaning to space, which is the possibility of finding networks through which individuals propose, define, practice, and develop their own codes. How do we understand the kinds of actions that would constitute violence against the body? What are the "and meanings"?

individual investments in the experiential-cultural models, forms of relationships, and meanings of the world. The networks mobilize only periodically. The submerged networks function as individuals and information circulate. Involvement is limited and temporary, a condition for participation. The cultural codes and enable individ-

summarizes several important concepts. First, he discusses the relationship between the individual and the social network to movement development. Second, he discusses the laboratory, which individuals experience as a space of meaning. Second, he emphasizes the importance of the space in which information and ideas circulate. Third, he discusses the space of activity, experiments, and practice. Fourth, he discusses the space of the body is crucial, but it is only one site of action, and complex physical and non-physical. And, clearly, the action is multidimensional. And, clearly, the action is multidimensional. And, clearly, the action is multidimensional. And, clearly, the action is multidimensional.

Melucci's network for understanding the social movements. Melucci's analysis to consider violence not only in the physical space but also in the minds and social space. Traditional space is defined on the body. Space is, of course, defined by physical territories, and groups require physical space for services, and so on. But Melucci's analysis defines space as having particular institutional characteristics (such as privacy, independence, and so on). And this is yet more subtle. It is the position of space which to ask questions and to produce identities, cosmologies, cultures, and so on. What kind of space that trust needs? What kind of space for "alternative perceptions

Social spaces . . . independent of the party system and state structures. Practices developed in everyday life can be different from formal political institutions; identities are able to exist; ‘soft’ power is the appropriation of knowledge and resources; and open systems in which power is shared and controlled.³

Melucci also argues that the political life is “life.” Does this mean that protest is life? On the contrary, it means that the politics of politics are critical and vulnerable. The life of politics is the shifting, informal social movements “ask questions about meaning,” slow down orders, and create new “knowledge.” Then we need to be deeply concerned with informal, prearticulate politics, not just with We need to be concerned with formal courage, or redirect—whether they are papers.

In our work on the effects of various tactics it is nearly impossible to distinguish between tactics and to track separately those of individuals and communities. Assorted tactics use local consciousness of individuals and groups. Viewees’ discussions of experiences of urban security architectures and meaning. The analysis in this chapter explores social space, including discourse, and the actions of activists and the wider group of citizens. Realizing and preemptive effects of police tactics, the disastrous effects of the vulnerability of collectivity itself to the effects of discourse, culture, and history. We propose a proposal regarding the meaning of politics in the rest of the book, all uncited quotes are research.

the institutions of government, the In them the signifying practice can be expressed and heard independently . . . individual and collective institutionalized systems favoring and the production of symbolic which information can be circulated

political action takes place in “everyday space is not particularly important? psychological and social dimensions the points. If the heart of social movement networks through which people newly articulate “conflicts” with social “e” that ultimately changes society, concerned about the health of marginal, just formal, public, committed ones. forms of social control that limit, dis-manifest at marches or in the news-

ous forms of policing, we have found between the effects of various police effects on individuals, organizations, used by the police arrive in the political-groups in one lump. Generally, inter-f police violence seamlessly integrate media campaigns with street-level policies the effects of policing tactics on and on the social and individual psyche dissenters. We consider the marginal-police action, the accumulative effects of fear on political consciousness, to police tactics, and the evisceration we conclude the chapter with a strong political violence. Please recall that, as quotations are from our own primary

Marginal

A powerful indirect effect of protesting is the marginalization of political activists. Each policing tactic communicates a public relations function. Police tactics function to communicate a message that is marginal and, therefore, as illegitimate. The marginalization of the interests of elites and nonelites while promoting the interests of protesters' politics. It also communicates to protesters that what they are doing is not—as they see it—crucial to their society's well-being. It is, in fact, bizarre, and unsafe. Activists cannot ignore this. They may respond by trying to make their politics more useful, and popular. They may respond by trying to make their politics that scorns mainstream perspective more legitimate. They may accept the idea that their views are marginal and that their politics are an annoyance and irritation.

Activists we interviewed described their experience of marginalization, or what Foucault would call "disciplinary power." He explained, "Even the word 'activist' is a marginalization for what you do. You're not a common citizen. You don't recognize how their skills are delimited by their position." "When you're socially isolated, it's like being in a room with that kind of fear level it attacks . . . you feel like you're even see themselves as toxic to other people." One activist was vague about myself. I [imagine] myself as a target.

Policing tactics communicate several messages about public dissent is, as argued by critics, a criminal act. The use of surveillance cameras, riot gear, armored vehicles, advance planning, and the fact that the planned protests are a criminal act, the preparation of security arrangements (since that is what the police are supposed to do), and not just a criminal matter requiring a criminal investigation, for example, counterfeiting or double-crossing, and aggression, and imminent general dissent, the city must prepare for large-scale violence. The protesters are to be protected by security checks, barriers, and patrols. Dissenters reconceive their politics not as targets of a crackdown operation.

marginalization

st policing is the marginalization of
ic reviewed in chapter 4 has a pub-
function to identify protests as crimi-
his portrayal collapses the purported
e trivializing and dismissing protest-
o protesters and would-be protesters
they may have believed upon setting
eing but is instead incomprehensible,
t help internalizing these messages.
e their protests sane, relevant, cheer-
by embracing a subcultural identity
es. They may do neither but subtly
not a valuable part of public life and
inconvenience to fellow citizens.

oped their experiences of marginal-
all “technologies of the self.” They
is stigmatized. People have disgust
mitted, responsible citizen.” Activists
ted. They cannot function normally.
hard to be an organizer. If you’re in
your ability to relate to people.” They
r activists: “I must look suspicious. I
myself as an infiltrator.”

veral key concepts. The first is that
ical criminologists, criminal behav-
s, intensive police presence, special
g, and excessive budgets present as
riminal matter requiring the advance
ts to protect the general population
posedly for). Second, the protests are
the attention of the authorities (like,
e parking), but a matter of violence,
danger. The whole population of the
lence, from which the good citizens
ckpoints, fences, militarized police,
emselves not as political participants
ation. They camouflage themselves,

protect sympathizers from reprisal, and as not to draw police attention.

Traveling to Québec City for we took every precaution. We let them turn us back. We knew about the border controls. We SUVs traveling separately, in read People magazine. Everything. No political t-shirts, only Not too much black. Not a socialization literature. All of our at a rest stop more than a hour. No crucial maps of the city with trail maps of our purported diner, we had emptied our wallets social references. We had removed disguising all relevant information. The guys tucked long hair into back seat for good measure. We with our gusto, knowing we'd only the border. We made it. We our reason for being there. We would be like to prepare to presentments of political culture, and tions for rebuilding it.

Policing of protest also creates between “good” and “bad” protesters respect for the rights of “peaceful.” Those who refuse to follow the rules styles do not deserve the state’s respect who disturb in the slightest the character are violent, unpredictable, preternatural bounds of social mores. Political protestum with the architecture of state control of the amount of space and inconvenience state draws an arbitrary line. Those who assault against society itself. They are

and reduce communicative action so

For the FTAA protests in 2001, we had prepared too much to know about the fence. We knew we disguised ourselves in two ways in which we drank Pepsi and one item in the car had been vetted by Gap and Banana Republic. A single item of FTAA or global-training material disposed of a hundred miles from the border. A place where we'd be protesting. Only a remote camping destination. At a distance of a few miles, we programmed our cell phones, we had a list of names and political contacts. We wore baseball caps and sat in the car. We did all of this with punctilious care to have one chance to get across the border. Clean, that is, of any evidence. We failed to anticipate what it would be like to protest without the accoutrements we had made no prepara-

... a division and a false dichotomy between the state and its subjects. The state constantly asserts its right to regulate the "law-abiding" political expression. The state's list of protest permits, routes, and times is a list of threats. Thus, by definition, all those who are not in the channel provided by police are threats, and are naturally out of control, beyond the state's control. Policing cleverly merges social decoy with social control. Without public consideration of the convenience to be granted to dissent, the state's demand that those who transgress it are faulted with anarchy. Those who are "anarchists," those who defy what

the state says—whatever that may be. The popular/hysterical use of the word Action transgressing the state's dictum the transgression (such as feeding protesters) is portrayed as an explosive, corrosive virus and will turn you into an anarchist who can slit throats in a moment.

Marginalization and criminalization. An interviewee explains how “five to intimidation of millions of people of such activity is to isolate the movement using the fear of millions of people. This isolation changes everything—staying home to avoid being on a car cares.” When police drive by groups, other tactics such as writing down names dates people from coming to our meetings participation and preempt solidarity and movements; it also demoralizes politics as marginal.

Meanwhile, the focus of protest protesters provides another kind of disappears from view. Global government under a fake bush. The paraphernalia and is rationalized. The established multinational corporations, and their charters cussion, only the purported violence train somewhere, headed this way.

Preemptive

It is always “difficult,” in the words of what doesn't happen.” The absence of violence—militarized—and activists are the first effects of police violence are not direct experienced militarized protest or the advertisements of impending militarized spaces as spaces of immanent violence to supposedly free for assembly and

nce

today, no matter how absurd it is. The word “anarchy” captures the merge: (sums, no matter how benign or trivial (people in the park), is promptly porous. Anarchy will invade your house; neighbors will be at each other’s

tion isolate those who are active. When people’s homes being raided leads to isolation. It needs to be clear that a goal is to create that political isolation.” about political action. “People are on a list, so then it feels like nobody shows up to meetings regularly or engage in public meetings.” Not only does it reduce community relations between organizations but also isolates activists who renarrativize their

police on the immanent violence of marginalization. The political target of police, already unaccountable, hides a violence of debt holders, multinational governments is not up for discussion of some youths presumed to be on a

caption

of one of our interviewees, to “assess the impact of an occurrence is multiply determined by the police. But the preemptive police is difficult to find. Activists who have been subjected to militarization see public streets and public space, but by the police. Public space, expression, is reshaped by police

preparations into a dangerous zone. A fundamental political opportunity of protest strategy. Even experienced activists and participate in demonstrations. It is frustrating when you are shadowed by force when there are no illegal actions planned. As explained, "We barely did anything. It affects people's motivation. They are nihilists. Depression and alcoholism and nihilism is on the down and down."

Inexperienced activists, on the other hand, show a lack of force. In Colorado, just as the movement was becoming strong and diverse, a protest was inexplicably teargassed by police violence to occur during a global day of protest was dubbed "The World Says No to War" in Colorado on the international news. With marches, fewer than five experienced activists, many Colorado activists, who had been new organizing, were thereafter terrified. They brought their children. They were parked in their cars when it happened. "I can't go. I have gone to more spiritual activities. I have conversations and will not participate in protests over and over again from Colorado. There is a massive decline in turnout at events."

Vittrup's strategy aims to control protest by blocking and redirecting it. Police surveillance also aims to prevent political action. These strategies have indirect preemptive effects. It is activists' frequent use of the term "anticipatory conformity" that indicates an essence of the strategy. Activists adjust their plans on the basis of the actions of the police or prosecutorial repression. They are enacting "anticipatory conformity." They are not detained, charged, or convicted their own actions. They are enacting police repression at Heiligendar. They are enacting the Block G8 alliance to abandon a symbolic march toward the fence.

. This restricts and reduces the fun-
public assembly as a social movement
s become discouraged to organize
Interviewees explain, "It gets tir-
y cops ready to beat your ass down
anned. It's just a protest." Another
and got fucked with by the cops. . . .
become apathetic, depressed, alco-
re on the up and up. Political activ-

her hand, are easily put off by a single
ne movement against the war in Iraq
dispersing rally in Colorado Springs
ce. This was one of very few acts of
of protest, February 15, 2003, which
War." The violence put a little march
ewswire (of the eight hundred cities
ienced police violence that day). But
een emboldened by the war and by
fied to attend another rally. They had
packing strollers and kids back into
hink of three or four individuals who
s, like meditations, prayers, and con-
n public rallies." We heard this story
organizers who immediately saw a

l the emergence and unfolding of a
g assemblies. Counterinsurgent sur-
cal activities. However, many police
effects. The simplest measure of this
"intimidation," a description of police
th preemptive and effective. When
asis of their perceptions or expecta-
esponse they are likely to evoke, they
y." They have already assaulted, con-
own hypothetical actions. Anticipat-
mm 2007 G8, ATTAC tried to con-
on its blockading concept in favor of

Another preemptive control tactic is to make activists learn that formerly legal activities don't know what will be defined as illegal and become phantasmic, varying according to the level of intolerance. If property crime is violent, then activities, such as civil disobedience, become illegal as well. And this phantasm is real. Creech's experience with conspiracy charges, chills discredited by the fact that what may not be legal next week.

Security perimeters, permitting, and other measures seem meaningless by restraining it to a minimum. Permitting requirements preemptively control the expense and difficulty of organizing and participating in protests by creating and advertising a sense of the violation of lawful speech activity. Discrediting is a form of social control.

Publicity of large-scale surveillance and the use of tags such as "criminal extremist" and "terrorist" has made many dissenters to fear participating in protests and events. Interviewees explain that "People are now either just completely neutral or they are so afraid to participate impacts donations, participation at events, readiness to speak, volunteerism, and willingness to respond to announcements.

Activists are punctilious in acknowledging that membership and level of activity are not known. "We can never really know" why someone has stopped. Fewer new people have joined this year than last. Everyone we interviewed in 2006 in the United States of people they know personally who have stopped ceasing political activity because of surveillance. Interviewees stated that they personally knew of whom that was the case. When asked why they stopped, well who used to be active and who had stopped, they tailed their activism because of their surveillance. A participant counted at least two people who had stopped. Insisted that s/he could list three human beings who had explained, "I would not want to give

tic is creeping criminalization. As activities are being prosecuted, they as illegal next. The line of legality according to activists' perceptions of state violence, then surely formerly gray-area, will be excessively prosecuted, as creeping criminalization, in conjunction course about currently legal activities

and protest pits make planned protest to areas far away from its target. Perdiscourage protest by magnifying the. Protest-related legislation discouraging pretexts for police criminalization is a form of preemptive

ce databases, along with codes and and "domestic terrorist," have caused g in even completely legal political people who might be sympathetic are or don't want to know." Their reluctance to organizations, the number of sign petitions and public statements, receive educational newsletters and

knowing that quantitative shifts in the multicausal. Many said, "Well, you doesn't participate anymore or why year. Despite this cautiousness, nearly the United States was able to think had explicitly stated that they were of their fears of surveillance. Several ally knew twenty to thirty people for d to count specific people they knew m they knew or suspected had cur- fear of surveillance, every interview ple; many counted five to ten.⁴ One hundred people. Another interviewee you a small number because it is my

conviction that almost everyone that come out.” We observed a similar effect at G8. Many activists did not even come were still in shock from Genoa 2001. During an interview, “It’s sad, but the st don’t want to be confronted with a anymore.”

A number of our interviewees stated that database information to the media, Freedom of Information Action (FOIA) releases (files acquired under the Freedom of Information Act), are not what they appear to be. “The ‘transparency’ is strategic law enforcement and a tactic to get participants to think twice about participating.” One participant who had reviewed a lot of released files observed that the information was “extremely inept,” which they interpreted as a tactic to get law enforcement databasing increased. This provides an opportunity for subjects to purge or manipulate their information. Rapid information sharing (both domestically and internationally) exponentially increased the number of terrorist tags. The implications of data mining for established organizations. Knowing that their information donors may be spooked and withdrawn, interviewees wonder if they have been spooked and donors about the possibility of being spooked. Organizations sometimes pretend not to be spooked whether they are being watched.

Permeation and

Social control tactics cannot be analyzed separately. The tear gassing demonstration in Colorado Springs is an example of how not experienced other police tactics can have specific effects of that one police tactic. The effects of a single summit mobilization experience are the constraining effects of the permitting of the demonstration accompanied by several types of surveillance, arbitrary arrests and distorted descriptions of the media.

I know in [this city] doesn't want to effect in the context of L'Aquila 2009 consider traveling to Italy because they 1 G8. As one activist remarked during strategy of Genoa worked. I definitely *carabinieri* [Italian military police]

ated their suspicions that "leaks" of as well as Freedom of Information ed under the U.S. Freedom of Infor- ar to be. They believe this "informa- activity designed to cause potential political action. Activists who have ved that "the redaction was deliber- as a counterinsurgent act. Enhanced ses information collection with no correct errors or to challenge inter- ing among jurisdictions (including ses the impact of criminal and ter- abasing raise serious dilemmas for well that mailing-list members and aw their support from the organiza- ve an obligation to inform members surveillance. This may explain why ot to know or don't want to find out

Accumulation

zed discretely because they are rarely ng during the 2003 antiwar demon- ception. Many of those affected had s and were thus able to describe the ic. Typically, dissenters participating erience ten or more tactics, from the g process to menacing militarization, veillance; they also witness unneces- ns of events in police statements to

Moreover, social control actions are often frontations and selective prosecution. Police arrange an array of tactics that weren't truly frightening, their array might be humorously absurd. Over time, they affect everyone.

As activists and groups become more experienced, they move to more tactics. New activists may learn from the tactics of others. As the tactics come into focus, they become more effective. Vittrup's strategy of "exhaustive" tactics is based on the experiences over time and space. Of course, the presence of evident surveillance, police violence, and a badge of seriousness and commitment to the use of police tactics takes its toll in brittleness. The cumulative impacts are not proportionate or predictable. For some, political work after experiencing police violence is difficult. For yet others, it was infiltration. For one protester, the experience of a house search was the last affront.

This accumulative effect does not mean that there is no coordination. This is not to say that social control is targeted. In 2000, a diverse coalition of activists was converging in the Denver/Boulder region. The coalition included civil disobedients and younger direct action activists, including effectively to attract activists from other movements, solidarity, and student movements to the cause of alterglobalization movement. The coalition was composed of participating nongovernmental organizations. The coalition was in connection with an act of political violence that was masterminded by an agent provocateur. The act was contrived, the investigation was coordinated, the dismantling of the coalition, and it had a significant impact. It did not survive, and longstanding organizations were destroyed. Activists' willingness to collaborate was destroyed.

Dispersed implementation of social control is a strategy which is to convey a sense of permeability. It is, in fact, pervasive. The indirect effects are

ence

s interpenetrate. Frightening con-
sions are often evidence of surveil-
tics with suprarational relations. If it
y of weapons and surfeit of cameras
rkill ensures there's something for

more experienced, they are exposed
not immediately be aware of police
cus, however, their effect is cumula-
on" describes the accumulation of
ften activists prize their experiences
ce, and unpredictable prosecution as
ment. But the accumulated effect of
ness and a peculiar vulnerability. The
redictable. Some activists ended their
ice violence. For some, it was prose-
ion, for still others an affected friend.
hearing cops read her diary during a

t require sophisticated, multiagency
social control is unstrategic or untar-
of global justice activists was con-
on of Colorado. Including long-time
ct activists, the coalition was work-
n the peace and justice, international
that were part of the emerging U.S.
oalition was quickly destroyed when
nizations (NGOs) were investigated
al vandalism that some believe was
ateur. Whether or not the act was
ducted as an act of collective pun-
lasting divisive effects. The coalition
ganizations have still not fully recov-
orate across tactical differences was

al control tactics has another impact,
ation even when the tactics are not,
cts of police action gain their power

through the phantasm of total pre
 through history but also through see
 the omniscience it implies.

*The June night of the 2004 RNC
 at that time was an activist ho
 ashen, and whispered, "They j
 ver." We knew that if a house w
 would be our house. We conve
 yard, where we made a list of e
 that could be intentionally mis
 This was Colorado, so we were
 fuel and hunting knives. One
 was frustrated and didn't belie
 hunting crossbow. We made a r
 of the house, moving offsite all
 ing notes and our computers
 replace if they were taken).
 groups we didn't want to be
 locked the door and sat waiting
 member of our group was visit
 Our house was not visited, bu
 Believing we lived in a ration
 pated that raids were approac
 the ones raided, which meant h
 in nonviolent direct action live
 costs of that visit. We had eno
 inconvenience, and restraint up*

*We lived suspended, jum
 terrifying sound of knocking o
 unable without our computers
 didn't need to raid us. The d
 duced. We were much too te
 Although only five activist hou
 message was sent loud and cle
 was already accusing us of ter
 we were not armed or violent
 we were planning to participat*

sence—a reality imparted not only seemingly haphazard particularity and

*C raids, I arrived home, which
use. My roommate greeted me,
ust raided two houses in Den-
was to be visited in our city, it
ned the residents in the back-
very possible thing in the house
construed as weapons related.
looking for things like camping
of the nonactivist housemates
ve that he had to dispose of his
apid, shaky, and silent cleanup
activist paperwork and meet-
(which we couldn't afford to
We threw out literature from
associated with. And then we
g. The next day, sure enough, a
ed at his place of employment.
ut it might as well have been.
alized technocracy, we antici-
hing all houses comparable to
houses where activists involved
d. We readied ourselves for the
ugh time to impose the terror,
pon ourselves.*

*mping at the unfamiliar and
on the usually unlocked door,
t to do any work. Clearly, they
esired effect was already pro-
nse to organize for the RNC.
ses were raided that week, the
ar that the federal government
rorism, knowing full well that
organizations, simply because
e in protest against the RNC.*

Political Consciousness

Political consciousness is the outcome of these experiences. In other words, it is personal narrative and “make history,” taking the risks and decisions are sustained by immediate support. It is shaped by shared analysis, hope, vision, and strategy.

Parallel to the development of political consciousness is the deepening of the experience. The individual moves from discouragement and a sense of helplessness to acceptance of marginalization and a willingness to take risk. Although trajectories are diverse, the experience of recognition of marginality and insecurity is common.

- ✦ My dissent is not valued by my political system or government. I am marginalized, and my voice is of little consequence.
- ✦ As a dissenter I am an enemy. My dissent is not valued.
- ✦ As public space is subject to violence, dissenting in public space is a risk.
- ✦ As pacific actions are forbidden in public space, no tolerance for dissent.
- ✦ As social control touches my everyday life, it creates a personal sense of violence. The state is violent.
- ✦ I experience trauma at what I have experienced.
- ✦ I face the ultimate, existential political choice because of state repression. I must choose between my health or the safety of my family.

Simultaneously with the personal effects of political violence, communication are affected promptly by the effects of social control. These effects are well documented in *Networking Futures*, in which he describes the 2001 G8 from a protest site to a space of communication.

It is not an uncommon view among protesters that the important aspects of mass demonstrations are the experiences of arbitrary police violence. It is often these experiences that reliably radicalizing experiences. In these experiences, the experience crystallizes issues of power and resistance.

ence

Business and Terror

me of political dialogue. In Flacks's logic that lead people to decide to inconveniences that entails.⁵ These late and extended communities that strategy.

political consciousness and political experience of social control, which a sense of being misunderstood, to distortion, to a sense of danger and e, we can conceptualize layers of recy:

urportedly democratic society and trivialized, treated as an inconve-

ssent impedes the "rights" of drivers.

ence, I feel that to express myself

or assaulted, I feel that there is no

eryday life, I feel an ongoing, per- is at war with me/us.

re witnessed/experienced.

political choice. I cannot have a life

st choose between politics and my

ects, social spaces and flows of com- the fear and uncertainty induced by l documented in Jeffrey Juris's book scribes the transformation of Genoa e of terror.

mong activists that one of the most is that participants are exposed to argued that this is one of the more addition, it is often argued that this wer, order, and discipline in society

and forces people to address with
 “We left our copy of the European C
 agreeing that a lemon would be mor
 brings with it a dark reversal of pri
 that social control is the defining feat
 cal conversation of perspectives, valu

Many interviewees told us that s
 the government as lawless. Criminal
 fault line threatening to swallow ther
 tion without charges . . . I think tha
 like every moment of their day.” Ano
 walk, those are only civil infractions
 it’s so often arbitrary. Sometimes you
 you can’t. That’s the area most affect
 nation gets curtailed by repression.” A
 maybe one day the police will just v
 have a bunch of charges that I don’t k
 illegitimate. The way the government
 really matter the accuracy of the data

As the ground of criminality shi
 only by avoiding vaguely defined risk
 people. What is striking, again, is tha
 “I have really shifted the things that I
 that was progressive and radical to th
 one person told us. Another interv
 people I meet. I met someone from E
 I am choosing to get rid of materials
 the Middle East.” An interviewee des
 as surveilled and subject to criminali
 cal activity: “It’ll be easier for me to
 being passionate and political. . . . At
 whatever I do: [so I always think] Is
 Through on our 2006 research, we h
 been largely pacified.⁷ “There was a
 going to do something powerful. We
 ful. And it was all taken away. And ne
 the motions. I’m just verbalizing it, I’

Even more difficult to handle tha
 that one’s activism puts others at ris

clarity how their society functions: Convention on Human Rights behind are useful.”⁶ However, this knowledge or beliefs, that is, the understanding of the interaction, not the politics, ideas, and vision.

Social control has caused them to see the criminalization of dissenters is an unstable system. An interviewee explained, “Rendition enters into people’s subconscious, she said, “Like stepping off the side— and only circumstantially illegal . . . we can march in the streets. Sometimes they are used for people. Their political imagination. A young activist said, “It is scary that they can walk in my door and take me or I’ll know they are accumulating, legitimate or illegitimate. It is operating now it doesn’t seem to change.”

At the same time, activists can protect themselves by avoiding certain places, organizations, topics, and activities that are not illegal. “I’m willing to work on from anything that is more peace and justice,” she explained, “I’m cautious about my relationship with Pakistan and I have his card. But now I’m associated with him because he’s in the news. I described how seeing one’s every action being monitored discourages any and all political activities. “I hang out and drink beers instead of going to work. At this point I assume the FBI will know about this worth it being on my FBI file?” She learned that many U.S. activists had been in jail. “I spent time in my life when I felt like I was going to do something powerful. Now it feels like I’m just going through the motions. I’m not living it.”

Understanding one’s own risk is the recognition of the consequences, as well. This experience reframes

activism as selfish and individualistic, and the protection of family, friends, and communities in the first place. Activists come to understand the house searches undertaken in connection with their two activists explained how guilty they felt about their computer hard drives, which had been searched, that all their contacts might be targeted.

The collective dimension of political discourse, of formal and informal discourse that we find that, with increased awareness of surveillance, we are censoring in advance their expressions. Communications for the police, not for fellow activists. . . . Everything is being read puts pressure on everyone to make sure it's clean. . . . We spend a lot of time writing statements." What do they mean by "collective responsibility"; they are "concerned about surveillance." . . . We now have a departmental group interview laughed at this statement and they became grave, describing "an accepted dimension in how we have reconceptualized its assemblies: "We have to be more precise. You can't talk about public awareness rallies while chatting away you might say the wrong thing and you might be censored from associating themselves with the group. . . . because I don't want to get in each other's business. If someone is not being watched for, I don't want to be watched."

In the United States, a major event of political repression and solidarity was the media coverage of the assassination of Martin Luther Churchill. After an assault by conservative media, Churchill's university investigated his tenure. Radical allies scattered to defend him. A summary summarized the mood. "Anyone associated with Churchill is stigmatized. If you honestly come out in support of Churchill, you're a pariah." The state's overt lesson was to protect leftists. But the covert lesson was to be scared to enact its own sacred watch.

ence

c, counterposed with the well-being
s—those for whom one is fighting
see themselves as a toxin. After the
ection with Heiligendamm 2007 G8,
they felt about not having encrypted
ad been confiscated. They were afraid
ted, as well.

ical consciousness is the production
t supports analysis and ideology. But
ess of social control, groups are cen-

They are redesigning their commu-
ow dissenters. “The assumption that
are to word things carefully to make
ime reworking and rewording simple
clean”? It’s not about violence or ille-
eming inflammatory [or] confronta-
ent devoted to that.” Everyone in the
ement. But the joviality evaporated,
the significance of this vigilance as
operate.” Another organization even
e don’t hold ‘protests’ or ‘demonstra-
lies.’ Our language has changed. We
talk like a regular person . . . if you’re
ong things.” Groups are also discour-
with others’ ideas: “I don’t like even
on’t want to get either of us confused
is being watched for something I’m
o talk about politics with them.”

ent that discouraged political asso-
ated prosecution of Professor Ward
ervative talk show hosts who sensa-
y he wrote in response to the events
gated him with the intent to revoke
o the winds. One of our interviewees
ociated with Ward Churchill is con-
and say, ‘I think that Ward was right,’
sson was that even tenure could not
was equally chilling. The left was too
hword—solidarity. And leftists were

perfectly willing to blame the victim
wording (counterposed to Churchill'
tect them from a similar fate.

But many activists are well aware
defense. Groups don't need to genera
be assaulted. State counterinsurgenc
or simply demonize and criminaliz
ered legitimate. And it takes only o
ter would-be participants and supp
tion and political development. Poli
power of fear, which dramatically am

When organizations are marginal
through fear of contamination, they
multi-issue analysis and organizing. (t
tion developed directly from the mo
States, movements first took a deto
only later forged a new multi-issue "
ment groups continue to be challeng
tiple oppressions" and seek ameliora
but also of "everyday life" itself.⁸ In or
new issues (e.g., biotech, water priva
ment groups need to trust one anot
another enough to learn from one an
intense fear induced by police tactics

Collec

Sociology asserts that human collec
cal, economic, or philosophical theor
built on the recognition that collecti
lems differ fundamentally from indi
literature wrestles with the perversel
peculiar collectivity that is the form
social movement.

By asking the question of how ind
their action and how we may unde
to shift from a monolithic and me
towards the processes through wh

to bulwark the fantasy that careful (or supposedly rash) prose) could pro-

that watching your words is a feeble
 te evidence of criminality in order to
 cy projects will invent the evidence,
 e words and acts formerly consid-
 ne episode of police action to scat-
 orters, severing lines of communica-
 ce tactics benefit from the irrational
 plifies those tactics' effects.

alized and isolated from one another
 y also lose the cross-fertilization of
 In Europe, this strong cross-fertiliza-
 vements of the 1960s. In the United
 ur through single-issue politics and
 ('politics of difference.") Social move-
 ged by one another to address "mul-
 tion not only of working conditions
 der to develop continuous analysis of
 tization, immigration), social move-
 her enough and to interact with one
 other—capacities endangered by the
 s.

Activity

activity is unassimilable into biologi-
 ries. Social movements scholarship is
 ve popular responses to social prob-
 vidual responses. Social movements
 ly unpredictable phenomenon of the
 ation, diffusion, and dissipation of a

individuals and groups make sense of
 rstand this process, we are obliged
 metaphysical idea of collective actors
 hich a collective becomes a collec-

tive . . . (i) Collective identity as a set of shared beliefs and attitudes concerning the ends, means, and methods of action, leading to a network of active relationships that allow individuals to communicate, influence each other, and coordinate their actions. Forms of organization and modes of communication, the channels and technologies of communication, and the degree of emotional investment in the cause are all important. This is never entirely negotiable because the cause itself is never entirely negotiable. It is endowed with meaning which is not subject to cold calculation . . . passions and feelings are central to the process, particularly in those areas of social action that are not rational, such as the social movements. To label an act as "irrational," as opposed to "rational" (a euphemism for "good"), is simply to label it as an act without feeling and no meaning with respect to the cause.

As described so far in this chapter, the concept of collective identity is in complex ways. It also affects collective action in complex ways. It cannot draw a clear boundary. What is a group? Are all individuals who are connected (or who are affected by an event that affects one individual or a group) part of the group? Well, frightening others almost as if it were a group, or acting on collective dynamics as group history.

A special category of collectivity is social movements (SMO). These include formal organizations, such as labor unions, profit organizations, but much social movement activity is informal organization, in various informal forms. Temporary groups organize around a common goal (often convened by conveners). Other informal groups are organized around shared associations better described as communities.

Social control sullies the reputation of a group, the public relations function of criminal justice, by labeling an act as having occurred, simply through the act of labeling. Participants, donors, and supporters are labeled as criminal. Social justice groups and activists find that their implied criminality is a stigma with their communities. An interviewee who was watched and beat up, then there was a sign that said "what we're doing. . . . As if we're not

ence

process involves cognitive defini-
and the field of action . . . (ii) . . .
ships between actors who interact,
er, negotiate, and make decisions.
els of leadership, communicative
munication . . . (iii) . . . a certain
s required. . . . Collective identity
e participation in collective action
cannot be reduced to cost-benefit
gs, love and hate, faith and fear . . .
l life that are less institutionalized,
understand this part of collective
to the parts that are “rational” (a
nonsensical. There is no cognition
without emotion.⁹

ter, social control affects individuals
activities. Of course, here, again, we
t happens to collectivities also affects
no could be connected) to them. And
an ricochet through a collectivity, as
t had happened to them, while taking
ory, a shared story, and a crisis point.
is the social movement organization
izations, such as churches and non-
al movement work happens outside
rml groupings that are also SMOs.
d events (affinity groups and event
re long-term friendship-based asso-
ities.

ation of organizations—that is the
alization. Without any prosecution
vert police attention, potential par-
are led to perceive an organization
that are part of religious congreg-
minalization distorts their relation
iewee explained, “If we were being
must be something not right about
ot really [religious people]. . . . Our

reputation was tainted. If the police be wrong with you.”

As recognized by scholars, organizations shift their agenda from projects to survival, this repeatedly as “a distraction.” An interviewee doing is on the street holding a sign got pulled off into being concerned. An interviewee observed that the new leadership was antimilitary and protest. But we were “and nonviolence!” Members of other groups against the criminalization of war, a most striking example of this shifting agenda, a member whom we interviewed. The church was so spooked by surveillance that it cut off from its endowment. Fellow interviewees were shocked that the church refused even to meet after Katrina.

Once the immediate self-defensive response of an organization may be permanently shifted, a twenty-seven-year-old peace and justice organization (aftereffects of overt surveillance six years after it took place in 2006): “It scared us from a sense is we would have been much more involved in war. As an organization we’ve avoided participation in other groups’ events, [holding] back from contentious issues. We haven’t talked about the war.”

We found that police tactics had a significant impact on communication in organizations. In the activities they participate in, members interviewed have reduced their use of electronic “complicated” communications systems to one person. Typically, a pacifist group expects to be contacted for anything. We set our meetings at a location where the meeting was going to be held by phone.” An interviewee joked self-defensive about the character of any conversation. ‘Do you remember about last week? Well, it’s happening again, you later.’” Interviewees were quick to

ce don't trust you, something must
nizations under surveillance tend to
self-defense.¹⁰ Interviewees described
interviewee stated, "What I want to
ign and doing my protesting. But we
with countersurveillance." An inter-
ership of his group "avoids anti-war
've always been about war and peace
organizations described their strug-
restriction of demonstrations. The
g agenda came from a church mem-
rch's governing board, he said, was
curtailed charitable donations made
wees from his group expressed their
o give money for aid after Hurricane

ve activity is over, the agenda of the
ifted. A long-time board member of
ustice organization reflected on the
ears after it happened (the interview
om sponsoring events," he said. "My
more active against the [2003 Iraq]
ed initiatives. . . . We've participated
nners. . . . I think we've stayed away
said anything about immigration or

a widespread chilling effect on inter-
. Regardless of the legal status of the
rs of nearly all of the groups we inter-
e-mail and the telephone, instituted
ms, and try to have their meetings in
plained, "We did not use e-mail at all,
at rotating locations, and everybody
to be. We wouldn't communicate by
eprecatingly, "It totally changes the
ou remember that meeting we talked
ng tonight. What's it about? I'll tell
o point out how much this "slows us

down.” Because of the difficulty in coordination, efforts of planning don’t ever happen.”

Strategic campaigns require extensive coordination, and timing. Surveillance relationships and communication that are often secretive. Scared to be creative, wary of trust, and when organizations are private, organizations have no strategic plans. An interviewee explained that efforts to be strategic and creative tend to be stifled by “worry about the heat you’re going to get by talking about it . . . if we do *anything*, we’ll be mired down.” An interviewee from another group couldn’t think creatively.”

A German activist relayed to us a story about the IMF/WB. Although many groups have been active for months, during one of the last general assemblies, no group wanted to reveal its plans for the future, resulting criminalization was overwhelming. This was in activist circles as the “hush meeting” during the 2006 G8 explained how planners had to meet at night at cemeteries because they were free of surveillance. That this is a trend in postcommunist countries became evident during the G8. The last few action planning meetings were held in camps; participants moved to several locations in order to avoid infiltration and surveillance. In constant feeling of insecurity, this also turned out to be an exhausting maneuver.

Events and campaigns depend on coordination and on volunteerism. Several interviewees noted that people who are stepping up and taking on leadership roles, reach, or safety roles (e.g., marshals and coordinators) have a criminal taint (by implying accusations of terrorism) and logistics roles and on volunteerism in general. Relationships with organizations seem risky and temporary and less committed, with the focus shifting from long-term strategizing and coordination to short-term action.

Conservative decisions on the part of activists are made in light of the costs of surveillance to

ence

communicating, “things that take a lot of comprehensive logistics, interdependencies, and how surveillance disrupts the elements of relationships that make strategic planning possible. Informing anyone, aware that no conversation can have great difficulty generating strategies, is the “paralysis” that results when the ability to plan effective actions are affected by the fear of getting caught—even trying—for even trying, we are going to be watched, hampered. As another organization says, “We

have a telling anecdote about Berlin 1988. We had been preparing action for several months through several meetings preceding the protests, but the fear of infiltration and of the police overwhelming the meeting became known during the meeting.” A participant at St. Petersburg had to organize meetings in the middle of the city because they lacked other available spaces that were not only a problem for activists in general but also evident during Heiligendamm 2007. Meetings were organized outside the city in various different places during each meeting to avoid surveillance. Besides inducing a constant fear, it turned out into a time-consuming and

inefficient process. Organic leadership development and the fear of being observed (police targeting of individuals and making responsibility for logistics, outreach, and medics). Police surveillance puts a heavy burden on (allegations of agitation or conspiracy) on individuals in general. Moreover, long-term relationships become more tenuous, so affiliations become more temporary. The result that “I’ve noticed a big shift in community building.”

Some of the challenges of organizations are understandable given the lack of organizational resources. Govern-

ments provide little to no administrative support for false accusations, improper or unnecessary surveillance. One organization that has spent more than 1,500 hours of volunteer time on legal action related to surveillance.

Organizations rely on networks of volunteers as well as for analytic development, as well as for consciousness. A U.S. pacifist group was held in a church hall. After the media revealed the surveillance, it was no longer welcome to use that congregation have been strained and the church at risk. Groups that rely on volunteers may even become wary of social association's name is linked with another organization if we're going to trigger the alarm bells with these folks." Regional networks exist in one area of that region. "People [take social action] in [city]. It's scary, it's dangerous, you realize that the surveillance on you shouldn't have to stay home to be safe, you go to express yourself."

In the United States, 9/11 and the subsequent events eroded community and solidarity among organizations. Surveillance and terrorism attached to a wide range of informal groups became islands of resistance. Statements in support of others. The fear of stigmatization, frighten their donors, or end their (often reduced) campaigns and membership. Organizational work was primarily education and information, analysis, and vision with the paralyzing effects of social control, if you're trying to communicate with me.

Meanwhile, social movement organizations organizing surveillance and repression. In the face of repression, many organizations have found a space between legal and illegal political action. The organizations that refused to be intimidated.

erative mechanisms of accountability, unwarranted investigations, or erroneous searches that was illegally searched spent more time dealing with the fallout for its members and organizations. Of the seventy-one groups in our study, only two had managed to take

advantage of supporters for material resources as discussed in the section on political violence. One group in our study had been meeting in a church and had found that the group was under surveillance because of its use of the church, and its relations with other groups because it was viewed as having put its focus on their solidarity with other groups and associations: “As soon as your organization is under surveillance, . . . then there’s this sense of fear . . . just because we had a picnic and picnics can be disrupted by social control measures. For example, ‘I don’t want to go [to do political activities] there.’ When you hear that, [city’s] activists has worked. . . . You should feel safe wherever you

are.” The Green Scare broke ties of generosity and support. With federal accusations of violence against a wide range of organizations, formal and informal, reluctant to associate with or to issue statements, these associations might sully their reputations and endanger their ongoing (although much needed) work. And many of these groups’ political activities and communication—sharing their experiences with the larger society. After listing the names of these groups, an activist concluded pithily, “And millions of people!”

These organizations have persisted in rationality and nonviolence. Rather than opposing government policies, they worked to articulate a hard line between political activities (a distinction also claimed by groups interviewed by us on these grounds),

expending extensive resources in “order to keep them safe.”

In Europe, many direct-action groups and protests have meanwhile become NGO-like organizations gathering and awareness raising in civil society, European governments making it dependent on state money. In the United States, activists worry now that their organizations therefore refrain from organizing direct action.

Groups concerned about the criminalization of formerly legal activity take extreme precautions, destroying written records of their work. One activist notes at meetings: “We’re afraid to have anything written on it at the end of any meeting.” Another interviewee, having internalized the message, said that they don’t want to be seen as a criminal. This would make them look as if they were a criminal. In addition, concerned about future investigations, the lack of archiving is the destruction of records. This is a problem, and it has implications for social movements and reflexivity.

Space and

We use the concept of “space” to conceptualize “political opportunity” as a concept that has implications of constraint and creativity that social movements might use strategically. It is the communion that recognizes the communication and connection between people. “Laboratory” (formerly conceptualized as a space where movement activity is prepared, protocols are developed, physical space, but may take other forms). The mundane, are crucial, other kinds of space. These three kinds of space are interdependent.

Today’s system of social control has implications for their societies are not open to dialogic communication. In response to a police seizure of art materials, a group made a strong statement: ‘Our threshold for

nce

careful wording,” which they believe

ups of the early wave of summit pro-
-like organizations focused on infor-
-ising. Pretending to support critical
s effectively pacify dissent by mak-
-stead of fearing surveillance, former
-ization’s funding will be cut and they
-ruptive or transgressive activities.

oping criminalization of gray and for-
-recautions, forgoing inclusivity and
-ork. Groups also reported not taking
-have a piece of paper with anything
-ing,” said one activist. Further, many
-e general concern about undercovers,
-n writing anything down, because it
-ere surveilling the meeting. In addi-
-ations, they do not keep diaries. This
-n advance of the history of the move-
-social movements’ capacity for active

Discourse

combine several other concepts. “Politi-
-as been used to describe the conflu-
-t structure (and exclude) possibilities
-ategically. Movement space shelters
-se opportunities, as well as commu-
-people. A third kind of space is the
-ed as a “resource”) in which social
-otyped, and practiced. This may be a
-orms as well. Meeting rooms, though
-of physical space equally so. These
-ent and inseparable.

was communicated to dissenters that
-ue, no matter how peaceful. Reflect-
-, an interviewee explained: “There’s a
-r your dissent is so low, it’s way down

here. We're not going to tolerate per
things.”

Activists also perceive a foreclosu
able for civil disobedience. Civil dis
bolic actions such as crossing thro
(ready for a prompt and docile pre
also includes activities such as the
rides,¹¹ and squatting; these are legal
subject to escalated police action and
eral pacifist groups we interviewed
trated during civil disobedience act
civil disobedience is not covert, inde
so there is no need for infiltration
through the intense experience of
ing out that one of their fellow arres
deeply. After that, “you don't want t
people involved.” Civil disobedience
has in part closed off opportunities
harsh sentences and by refusing to
acts of civil disobedience to be con
cerating the political content of trial
apolitical technicalities).

Social space for discourse and c
“We're scared to openly and honest
nity. The state is using that informat
A middle-aged person in a peace gr
talk to me on the phone. . . . She's
and not anymore.” A member of a p
its members had made since experie
a lot closer. Now we sometimes talk
less information. We're all a bit mor
Another activist says, “People are sca
radical. There's almost no space tha
stopped expressing those views entir

On one hand, the spatial control
disciplinary gaze. This powerful gaze pl
observed, thus interiorizing the pow
activists become their own observe
own behavior. This strategy seeks to

perfectly legal building of perfectly legal

ure of political space formerly avail-
obedience includes negotiated sym-
ough a fence onto a military base
(arranged arrest). Civil disobedience
e creation of street art, mass bike
“gray-area” activities that have been
d criminal charges. Members of sev-
said that the groups had been infil-
tions. (This was surprising, because
eed often prenegotiated with police,
.) Interviewees reported that going
preparing for arrest and then find-
stees was an agent had shaken them
o get your friends and nuns and old
relies on the judicial system, which
for protest by imposing increasingly
allow the political motivations for
sidered in court proceedings (evis-
ds and forcing the defense to rely on

connection has also been reduced.
ly talk about issues in our commu-
ion to crush legitimate movements.”
roup told us, “My mom is scared to
not sure what she is allowed to say
peace group reported on the changes
ncing social control: “We used to be
k in code, we’re more cryptic, share
re reserved in terms of our speech.”
ared of the implications of just being
at we consider safe. . . . People just
ely.”

of dissent works like Foucault’s dis-
places the burden of discipline on the
er of observation to the point where
r, each person regulating his or her
o reduce feelings of anonymity, pro-

ducing more pacified forms of dissent. The purpose of policing is not new. A modern power lies behind the seemingly internalization that now permeates. From anonymity is ever-present in community policing tactics¹² to national security here is that reducing anonymity in how people act in those locations. In produce (obedient) individuals and must be “repressed.”¹³

The consequences became painful where the lack of safe spaces caused views. In the weeks preceding the suffered several waves of house searches. At nearly all the social centers, activities nothing to do with G8-related activities not available for protest coordination tional protesters.

Feeling

“The cultural turn” in sociology, and social movements, has emphasized finding social problems and providing (on) mobilization for social change. that social movements contain and ing particular styles of interaction. Andrew Jamison argue that cultural of social movements and thus the m considers everyday life as a site of p felt, articulated, and shared at the l collectivized and elaborated as cul politicization.

Social control at times takes the epic stage sets, elaborate costumes, But social control, too, has an “ever ings drain the energy of participants courtroom. Surveillance induces a j ized, trails targets far beyond their ag

nce

ent. The reduction of anonymity for
According to Foucault, the thrust of
ingly simple idea of surveillance and
modern society. This impulse away
ontemporary society, from commu-
curity investigations. Of significance
specific spaces can directly impact
n the end, these techniques of power
subjects, rather than people who

fully apparent at L'Aquila 2009 G8,
ed people to stop expressing their
ummit, activists in several cities suf-
es; social centers were also targeted.
ists hastily announced that they had
ties and that their social center was
n or as a meeting place for interna-

Culture

alongside the emergence of "new"
the significance of culture in shap-
g the material for (and constraints
"The culture of protest" recognizes
nurture their own cultures, includ-
and expression. Ron Eyerman and
l change is always the ultimate goal
medium in which they work. Melucci
olitical development; needs are first
level of the mundane. They are then
tural movements in the process of

e form of fearsome spectacle, with
loud explosions, and intense drama.
ryday life." Endless judicial proceed-
and erode the place of politics in the
ittery unreality that, when internal-
gents' assignments.

Among our methodologies is the use of traditional devices for studying the social

Normally and decisively resisting aggrandizing paranoia, Luis and I, while conducting our 2006 study in the States. Seeking to be “responsive” to cautionary practices to protect our data to avoid data loss, and to prevent appointment calendars only in three places every night, never didn’t discuss the data on the laptop in the hotel room and a copy of the day’s data taped to

Exhausted from travel and myself looping in my security to distinguish what needed to be protected. I wasn’t able to get a reality check because we weren’t going to discuss procedures over the phone. When I mentioned the name while reading an article, I had no way to seek any support. Back in the day, I fought the urge to feel safe in my security procedures for nearly a decade on our first article. Several times I was looking for things I had successfully forgotten in memory.

When people believe they may be taken on a funhouse quality, full of fear and looming combustion. This can make you inefficient and temperamental.

I’m dragging my laptop through the data in the small of my back. Ever aware of its vulnerability. An article, a hallucinatory (but not unrealistic) control, I was determined to protect my goods. My daily life has been

the use of our own bodies as observation and control of dissent.

*stant to what we view as self-
and I [Amory] fell victim to it
ly of surveillance in the United
ble,” we designed detailed pre-
ct our interviewees’ identities,
vent project delay. We kept our
e our minds, backed up data in
r left our laptops in cars, and
phone. The one night I left my
went out dancing, I carried a
my body.*

*and intense interviews, I found
logic, unable to clearly distin-
ected or even what could be.
check and support from Luis
discuss or revise security proce-
stumbled across my organiza-
interviewee’s FBI file, I had no
home after the research trips, I
my own home and maintained
a year until we had submitted
during the year, I spent hours
fully hidden even from my own*

be under surveillance, ordinary life
gross distortions, absurd oversights,
make you crazy, fast. It can also make

*gh the grocery store. I have CD
every time I leave my home, I’m
activist with a project, running
ulistic) obstacle course of social
make it through, to deliver the
transformed, infused with fear*

and caution, evacuated of openness for assault, and neutralized by fear as to survive it.

This is not a culture of dissent. This is a “security culture.” In an interview, a security “was the first thing we talked about we’re going to do.” The fundamental values are security and solidarity.¹⁵ The focus on security has devastating impacts on inclusivity, solidarity, and the bonds necessary to build a healthy community. Views suggest that security culture has emerged mainly because of the effects of state violence. “When I see people I don’t know, I get nervous,” says a community organizer. “When I see people I don’t know, I get nervous, I was amazed that we had a community that was sad when I found out they were not.” The interviewee described how people who fit in too closely and people who don’t fit in, arouse suspicion. The effects are exclusion, wariness, the withholding of information, and diversity. An activist described his group’s fear and unwelcomingness that results from a security culture. He described security culture as the “ice cream” that hinders community building “icebreaker.” The person described a signup sheet . . . people are not signing up, they’re asking for it.” A new activist described the culture as the opposite of unites? When I’m suspicious, I’m not conscious or not, about who people are.

Another interviewee described the culture as “this is a disaster in community building.” “People are afraid to get involved. It’s hard to build a movement because this is an important thing.” Another interviewee described the culture has become so common that people are afraid to need to be protected: “There’s confidential information, clandestine and what doesn’t.”

Again, we draw on the lived experiences of community organizers. And knowing the ravages of state violence, we feel us immune to it. Even at nonactivist events, we feel uncomfortable when we see a “sign-up list” at the event or a list of e-mail addresses, we feel uncomfortable.

ence

*n celebration of struggle, ready
the ambition to “run clean” so*

his is a culture of fear.¹⁴ Activists call
an activist explained to us that secu-
out, even before our name or what
s of organizing culture are inclusivity
y has, in some instances, had devas-
ity, and the production of friendship
tivist community. Many of our inter-
as in fact replaced organizing culture,
e surveillance. An activist explained,
t excited. When I first saw the under-
ttracted folks that don't fit in, and I
e undercovers.” Another interviewee
well with the group, as well as peo-
ns. The hallmarks of security culture
ing of information, and avoidance of
oup as showing “paranoia, freakiness,
om the fear.” Another activist jokingly
maker,” which has replaced the com-
son went on to explain: “Like handing
t only afraid to sign up, but afraid of
d the experience this way: “What's the
ious or they are, it creates a tension,
re and what their intentions are.”

e issue this way: “Secretive planning
The person added, “New people can't
vement on community when secrecy
viewee pointed out that security cul-
ople are using it for actions that don't
usion over what actions need to be

erience in our own bodies and con-
ges of security culture doesn't make
t gatherings, we instinctively bristle
entrance of an event, we give a fake
ble when people ask for more than a

first name in a meeting and when ev about a project over the phone. Whe hears the reluctance to be specific an damaged we are.

In addition to the displacement o ture, we found other distinct dimer movements. Cultures of protest rely community. After an infiltration wa back, uncommunicative, not feeling people. . . . [There's] something insid activist described how the intimacy was disrupted by infiltration: "We're tions where we work. So there's an i we meet [other peace activists]. We each other." An interviewee who lear was an FBI informant described the e of mine could be an informant, then true. My entire reality was disrupted thrown into question." The result?: "I

Social movement communities Experienced activists pass on what t to share strategies and tactics. But i with each other or can't trust each o sharing stop cold. "It was nice to be with this organization and can I hel that you all might be able to do. . . . N can't tell them stories of things you've snitch you'd be in a really bad situatio

Another cultural shift is the avoid ing debriefing, which would necessa in events that might be criminalized is intentionally reduced as a protecti about what's going on here. Next we And we can't talk about something part of it." If actions cannot be discu ment no longer advances. There are the history and the possibility of m pened, but no one will know exactly was done. There will be no expertise

When a friend asks for too much detail and the friend is an activist, the person understood understands. And we both see how

of organizing culture by security cul-
 tions of cultural change in protest
 on trust, bonds of friendship, and
 s revealed, “people were tense, held
 g good about themselves and other
 lious about destroying the trust.” An
 and urgency of political community
 lonely in our churches and organiza-
 ncredible sense of community when
 ’re hugging and learning to protect
 ned that a long-term and close friend
 effect of the experience: “If this friend
 anybody could . . . anything could be
 . . . all my friendships and alliances
 ’m not really doing much anymore.”

learn through “cross-pollination.”
 they have learned, and people travel
 if people are afraid to be associated
 ther, these networks of information-
 e able to tell stories of like I worked
 p you build. . . . Here’s what we did
 Now . . . you can’t help them out, you
 e done before. Because if they were a
 on.”

ance of historical reflection, includ-
 rily indict individuals for their roles
 d sometime in the future. Reflection
 ive measure: “Here, we can only talk
 ek we can’t talk about this anymore.
 else until it’s sure who’s going to be
 assed later, the strategy of the move-
 e too many witnesses; better destroy
 emory. Something might have hap-
 what it was, or who did it, or how it
 e to draw on for the next time. Social

control effectively provokes an erasure. Gatherings are often not kept anywhere after a mobilization. This way, they experience their own marginalization. They have turned their backs on their own people.

Many social movements aim to create a “counter-culture” or “alternative” cultural practice (which enacts a new way of life) as a dimension of their work on capital and power. They use prefigurative practices, such as open meetings, to infiltrate (although some believe that they are not) and to redirect agents who must participate in the system to maintain their cover). But the agenda-reorientation of social control may well elicit a reduction in participation, particularly when those practices are used by social movements and movements.

Cultural communities may slowly erode the process of developing meaning and values. But, as this practice is targeted as part of social control, its use by a church group whose members devalued social control caused the congregation to abandon) its formerly growing belief in social justice.

One of the most popular forms of social control is democracy. Under the pressures of social control, it moves to participatory democracy and transparency (which they describe as elitist). Groups are communicating much less and across much less constant discussion, which can be really hard to maintain if you can talk to everyone.” Many groups are no longer maintaining their former level of transparency. “Sometimes a handful makes decisions.” The loss of transparency also means that groups are not accountable. In addition, they need to make informed decisions by fewer people, but they are made more difficult by suspicion: “There’s not as many voices in the decision making as there are in different walks of life.” Participatory democracy and transparency. Activists are well aware

nce

ure of collective memory: minutes of
ore, websites are dissolved immedi-
activists effectively administer their
ed into “people without history.”

create what scholars call a “prefigura-
the liberation they strive to achieve)
ampaigns and projects.¹⁶ These very
ness and equity, make them easy to
t these practices function like jujitsu
ate in progressive practices to main-
orienting, fear-cultivating pressures of
ction of prefigurative practices, par-
ed as hallmarks to target participants

y become social movements through
ful practice to continually embody
verges on the political and is tar-
se may be reduced. We interviewed
scribed how the pressures of social
question (and ultimately to largely
f in a “Christian obligation” to social

as of prefiguration is participatory
social control, movements committed
sparency resort to secretive planning
roup members we interviewed were
s fewer media: “There isn’t that con-
beneficial. Then you get everybody’s
Many groups reported that they were
level of inclusivity in decision making:
ns, and it never used to be that way.”
s that members cannot hold leaders
a, people don’t have the information
ns. Not only are the decisions made
y a group whose diversity is con-
as many people involved, there’s not
ng, there’s not as many people from
democracy links accountability with
re that secrecy can be toxic to their

values; in seeing secrecy as unavoidable much of what they stand for. Transparency and inclusivity is perso

Political

If social control disrupts the health of groups, we might understand it to be. As we summarized in chapter 1, disorientation, efficacy, organizational network of hopefulness, and space. We have individuals' comfort and sense of the development of political consciousness, redirection and usurpation of agency, strategic framing, the foreclosure of tradition of culture.

In addition to these more or less defined irrational ones, those that result from social control threatens the. Fear coursing through them, individuals undermine their own values and abandon one another, justifying this abandonment as wasted by adrenalin and redirection, that represent mere dispirited shadows rationalize it all. They will be safe if they. Since they usually didn't do anything, it verges on irrationality. Can we use this to describe an organization that has lost its values—or, indeed, to recall them faithfully?

Rather than finding the customer activists become more militant while others wane,¹⁷ today we find signs of pervasiveness and Europe. In lieu of going “underground” many social movement groups are embracing online activities and moving toward experimental activities. Yet, knowing that even economic downturns, groups do not feel safe undertaking action. We heard from all types of groups that dialogue have been both reduced and

able, they know they have surrendered the cultural loss of the living values of morally and socially devastating.

Violence

h and activity of social movement have “maimed” the social movement. Dissenters require a sense of entitlement, trust in government, a sense shown how social control affects efficacy in expressing their dissent, consciousness, fundraising, networks, the displacement of space and dialogue, and the disruption

linear effects, we have also identified from fear. Like solitary confinement of people and organizations. Individuals become paranoid, and groups abandon their projects. And they avoid government as essential for survival. Later, they default to actions and methods of their former ambitions. They just don't inflame the authorities. In the first place, this belief in the phrase “organizational insanity” to test its ability to pursue its own objectives?

ry dualism in which hardcore activists become more moderate pacification in the United States “ground” to continue their actions,¹⁸ abandoning gray-area civil disobedience exclusively educational and permitted educational events are under surveillance even this most pacific type of groups that strategic and ideological and self-censored. L'Aquila 2009 G8

United States, can we continue to ma
reserves the analysis of state political

Purportedly democratic modern
violence, not only in their external r
the way they manage their own pop
as the legitimate, spontaneous use
criminals (sometimes executing them
in the administrative management o
Militarized police operations against
and separatists, are supposed to be
lence is also used to secure the “publ
and anonymous crowds, such as spo
in civil war mobilize violence throu
vigilante organizations.

Violence against political dissent
civil war is sometimes conceptuali
sometimes takes the form of crimina
tary action. When dissenters are cat
than judicial, means) as “threats to se
violence may involve federal agencies

“Political violence” is a concept
movement tactics²⁰ and totalitarian
political territory between these co
violence against social movements
beyond forceful protest policing.²²

Citizens and residents of modern
against the state, including individual
insurrections, strategic sabotage, gue
of this action is political; it is dissent
ing recent examples of violent confro
in several poor suburbs of Paris in 2
2008 after the police murdered a fift
ropoulos. In both cases, the violenc
tations between the police and citize
Molotov cocktails; burned cars and u
trashed shop windows; and looted. T
heated debates among activists and
definitions and coming from diverse
lar, Black Bloc tactics²³ produce stron

like sense of an analytic tendency that violence for “dictatorships”?

States are engaged in a good deal of relations with other states but also in operations. This includes what is seen of force in apprehending suspected (in the process). Violence is routine of detainees, prisoners, and migrants. Organized groups, such as squatters taken under judicial directive. Violent order” against large, disorganized, sports fans or paraders. States engaged through the police, prisons, military, and

others in situations that do not involve organized as a “public order” conflict. It is a militarization and judiciary-directed military categorized (usually by political, rather than “security” or “domestic terrorism,” state and military resources.

that has been used to study social structures and societies.²¹ There is a fair amount of research on state political violence in democracies has not gone much

far. Democratic states can enact violence through acts of rage, seemingly spontaneous terrorism attacks, or military action. All through by other means. The most outstanding confrontations with the state were the riots in 2005 and the upheavals in Greece in 2009. The 2005 riots consisted widely of mass confrontations, who threw stones, rockets, and used rubbish bins to erect barricades; The concept of violence can produce different scholars alike, each using different ideological perspectives. In particular, the reactions. Appendix B in this book

contains an e-mail dialogue between Vittorio Sergi, that focuses on these two. The dialogue is included because it is an issue and will likely prove useful for the

Our research shows that overt, is part of a dense continuum of state because bodily violence is neither dispensed to an activist nor yet entirely session, over which it looms as an explicit a multimedia assault that arrives in, including each other, both bodily violence a cumulative force and impact, as do. While we do not intend to diffuse this into debate about its proper understanding forms of state repression wreak comp

We are cautious about undermining violence by expanding it. Nevertheless, against dissenters, we feel the need to violence. Is political violence the subject a political source, or does political violence rights?

- ✦ If a dissenting group is restricted by conditions, or metal barricades from the extent that its ability to create a media curtailed—although no bodies are
- ✦ If a dissenting group whose members expressed enthusiasm for political environment of protest has changed are now frightened or newly impotent dissenting view—although no bodies are violence?
- ✦ If a dissenting group whose members festation the planning of which police know there are no plans for searches or finds its access to the is terrorized at gunpoint, or has no bodies are injured—is this political

ence

n two scholars, John Holloway and
actics and their relations to violence.
clearly shows the complexity of the
the reader.

bodily violence against protesters
te activity. The density is important
tinctly the worst thing that can hap-
parable from other forms of repres-
licit or implicit threat. Repression is
the psyche all at once. By referenc-
and other forms of repression have
ocumented in studies of state terror.
ne meaning of “violence” or to enter
standing, it is apparent that less overt
parable damage.

ing the usefulness of the concept of
ess, when considering state violence
to ask about the meaning of political
oset of overt bodily violence that has
violence refer to damage to political

d by legislation, permitting condi-
access to public space to such an
eaningful challenge is eliminated or
e injured—is this political violence?
bers, although marginalized, have
cal expression now finds that the
ged such that these same members
otent to express their planned dis-
s are injured—is this political vio-

bers have embarked upon a mani-
has been surveilled such that the
r any violent actions, is pestered by
e start point restricted or rerouted,
s its members arrested—although
litical violence?

- ✦ If a dissenting group finds that it has not initiated that associates and that seeks to convince the public about the substantive issues the group considered attending events organized to learn more or express their view and to avoid contact with its members—bodies are injured—is this political?
- ✦ If a dissenting group finds that it is a “terrorist” group in government data receipt of literature from it will affect members, recipients, and donors and mental effect on budget, audience, and reputation—although no bodies are injured.

What kind of subjects can expect? Communities? Social movements? Have “bodies” or legal “standing,” how? This is a question of unit of analysis. Not only individual speech, which may be but also rights of political association. The only (and not necessarily the most) the exercise of these rights.

This recognition identifies a need for standing for informal political organizations. Corporate political donations are protected then surely such assaults on members understood as a form of political violence. Protected by tort law from libel, denial of customer access to premises (tortious organizations and civil society groups) interference with advantageous relationships their capacity to mobilize them, and public discourse.

And let’s not forget that social control is not the only one. Global activists often that a human rights lawyer or in the Global South. And Global North been killed abroad. A U.S. woman a

receives extensive media coverage as it with property crime or violence public (including persons concerned group works on who may have concerned by this group as an opportunity views) to view the group as criminal ideas and members—although no real violence?

It has been labeled a “domestic terrorism” databases such that donations and attach a similar label also to members if this labeling has a sharp detrimental, and operations of the organization—*is this political violence?*

Does it experience political violence? Organizations? If some of these subjects do not how must we conceptualize violence? Civil rights protections embrace not be made impossible or discouraged, and assembly. Bodily violence is not (most powerful) method of disturbing

for a legal concept that can establish organizations and social movements. If protected as a form of “free speech,” membership-based organizations must be violence. If private enterprise is protection of service, and interference with (unjustified interference), then nonprofit groups should also be protected from relationships that affect their resources, and their opportunity to participate in

Control does kill persons. Carlo Giuliani networks now bring the news too a labor leader has been assassinated worth alterglobalization activists have and two British activists were killed

by Israeli forces in Palestine, and U.S. agents in 2006 and 2008 in Mexico. . . .
ing outrage at assassinations of Global
safety seems like an expression of im

But the relative safety of Northe
global power relations—the very p
ization movement confronts with it
when Israel and México feel comf
visionary children of their powerful
are an assault on the movements of
are called mistakes or are blamed o
clear: the governments are united ag
plans and will collaborate in trivializ
journalists. Some assassinations are
the message is clear. Democratic nat
means safe to express yourself.

ence

. activists were killed by government
Activists are uncomfortable express-
al North activists; an expectation of
perialist/white-skin privilege.
ern witnesses abroad is a matter of
ower relations that the alterglobal-
s solidarity. Something has changed
ortable assassinating the rebellious
political allies. These assassinations
f international solidarity. The deaths
n paramilitaries, but the message is
gainst those who oppose their global
ing political murders of pacifists and
e aimed, others are incidental, but
ions will kill activists. You are by no

Antirep

Resisting the Social

San Francisco police have repeated spatial control tactics, including preparing another antiwar protest at a single location or march route, providing information about potential targets for protest. Dissidents feed to receive text messages identifying some simultaneous. Meanwhile, activists provided information about police reports from protesters in the streets. An elaborate infrastructure was not. Clearly, they wanted to escape spatial control. Important?

We believe that activist responses provide insights into its meaning and significance. Expression, the tactics activists use to resist the control of dissent. We have organized to match our three approaches to political economy, and violence.

Resisting Spa

We have identified five antirepression tactics: confronting the zones with blockades, organizing in decentralized affinity groups, control through observation, and distribution about the protest territory.

Antirepression

Spatial Control of Dissent

...edly frustrated protesters by using
 ...g holding pens, and mass arrests.
 ...in 2008, rather than announcing a
 ...test organizers released a large list
 ...sentsers subscribed to a Twitter.com
 ...ifying targets and gathering times,
 ...tivist DJs on a pirate radio station
 ...e massing and action and relayed
 ...ets. Why did activists feel that such
 ...ecessary to express their dissent?
 ...tial channeling, but why is this so

...s to social control contain profound
 ...ance. This chapter describes antire-
 ...protect themselves from the social
 ...d our analysis of antirepression work
 ...social control, by looking at space,

Spatial Control

...on tactics that resist spatial control:
 ...es or invasions, marching disobedi-
 ...finitivity groups, disturbing police con-
 ...outing spatially aggregated informa-

Breaching the Zone

Protesters fight back against spatial control. The fundamental spatial project of the Red Zone is to exclude protesters from the conversation and decision-making. Since this exclusion is not only symbolic but also a physical issue, it can be challenged in the most direct way: by breaching the zone. Protesters enter the meeting site, showing the world that they are present and participate by generating mass-media images.

In the Tute Bianche tactic, a group of protesters wear protective and padding personal body armor made of household items such as foam, rubber, and empty plastic water bottles. Protesters wear white painter's coveralls, giving them a comical, bulky look. They carry collections of household items made of balloons, old inner tubes, or other objects. In a humorous way, they ponderously march through the police lines and announce their intention as citizens to pass through the police lines to attend the meeting. They march against the police, producing comical images of bodies against police violence and a series of (often unsuccessful) attempts to push through police lines. This tactic has several spectacular interventions using household items and a near-total disappearance after the clash. Protesters have applied this tactic in various other countries, but it is most common mainly in Europe.²

Protesters also organize to refuse to enter the zone. There are two striking examples. At Québec in 2001, protesters arrived (after a very long walk) at the meeting site and walked in to the Red Zone. Unfortunately, the police were expecting or prepared for this turn of events, so the few who did were shot. At the 2003 WTO, where protesters (organized by the Korean delegation) collectively tugged at the fence, the protesters did not pass the fence. They tore down the torn-down fence as a message.

Protesters at Seattle 1999 WTO used a similar strategy: if ordinary people wouldn't enter the zone, then they proposed that no one should enter the zone. They added the flow of delegates into the

es, Blockading Back

control with their own spatial tactics. At summits is to exclude all but elites making about the global economy. Symbolic of the issue but is the actual in direct manner by attempting to get the world just how difficult it is to participate in the meetings of police keeping people out.

The group stays close together while wearing household products such as cardboard, water bottles.¹ Over the armor, many display shields and life preservers, resulting in a form of active shielding such as massive rafts of plexiglass. Invoking a medieval army, protesters slowly approach the police lines, stop to pass “with arms up” peacefully through the meetings. Then they push slowly through the mayhem. This way, they protect their own and also stage theatrical (and often successful) breaches of police lines while getting clubbed. After using this tactic in Italy (followed by its use in clashes at Genoa 2001 G8), protesters used it in other countries and at many other summits,

using the exclusion more assertively. There was a breach at the Dec 2001 FTAA, a large march breached the fence, promptly breached it, and unfortunately, most marchers were not injured at the events and didn't seize the opportunity to be rebuffed by police. At Cancún 2003, protesters organized by the very well-prepared South American group breached down the fence with big ropes, and they stayed where they were and left

Protesters used a different spatial and symbolic tactic. They weren't allowed to enter the meetings, but they could be able to go in. Protesters blockaded the meeting by blocking intersections,

using a variety of creative methods. In Seattle, similar (and more or less successful) tactics were used in all subsequent summit protests. Whether in urban or rural venues, protesters applied more creative tactics than at Évian 2003 G8 and Heiligendamm 2007.

Marching Tactics and

Various marching tactics are used to break through police lines and actions. In Europe, linking arms is a common tactic to fill the space of a demonstration and prevent police from making arrests. Alternatively, marches have been used to break through police parts to circumvent police lines in Prague 2000 IMF/WB, a unified march in London 2001 G8, and marches using different routes (and tactics) in London 2005 G8. Similarly, at Heiligendamm 2007, protesters split up into five pre-established groups, each time they encountered a police line they would force the police to stretch their lines until they could “trickle” through them. The advice given to organizers of the mass blockades to the protesters was to “aim for the gaps in between them.” In London 2005 G8, all the blockades were to be staged, all the “

A few months after Heiligendamm 2007, a group of protesters organized in Hamburg to protest against the G8 summit of dissent. In response to the kettle tactic used by the police, the call to action for this demonstration was to “stay outside the police encirclement and remain outside the police encirclement and remain outside the police encirclement of control.” (The response of the authorities was to clear the sidewalk during this specific assembly.)

Affinity

Affinity groups are a tactic inspired by the tactics used in the Spanish civil war. They are used for organizing mass direct actions. An affinity group is a tactical unit of a mass direct action. They enable quick communication and coordination, are self-sufficient, providing their own food and

s. Since the successful blockades in (successful) attempts have been staged at when global summitry shifted to remote decentralized blockades, such as at 2007 G8.

And Organizing Crowds

to evade spatial control during street frequently used tactic for protecting preventing police intrusion or snatch been intentionally split into several order to occupy a certain space. At march broke into three color-coded (tactics!) to reach the conference cen- 2007 G8, after starting as one march, established (and color-coded) “fingers” line. In this way, they forced the they were so thin that protesters could given by the BlockG8 coalition orga- protesters was: “Don’t aim for the cops, Later, on the street where the sitting “fingers” came together again.

in 2007 G8, a demonstration was security politics and the repression tactic that had been used by police, tion asked participants to attempt to ent by constantly being on move, “out priorities was a ban on walking on the (y.)

Groups

by the organization of the anarchist Since the 1970s, this tactic has been ions. Affinity groups are the organi-. They provide security for individu- and decision making, and try to be self- and medical supplies. Affinity groups

determine their own contribution to (and adapt to) these guidelines) and have a high degree of autonomy. New action forms that have flourished in the past include the adapted this organizational model, such as the Clowder Blocs, and the Clandestine Insurgent Tactics Squad (CITS), an action form that tactically exploits the weaknesses of the police and others. A large Clowder Bloc can quickly fall apart into many affinity groups, each doing its own thing. The ensuing chaos frequently disrupts police attempts to maintain spatial control and creates space for dissent.

Affinity groups enable dissenters to operate in functional units that can pull together at times independent of each other. This form of organization allows for a frontation without becoming impotent. The groups pull together and continues decentralized.

Counterobservation

Activists and sympathetic legal workers use a variety of structure and method of watching and documenting police efforts of volunteer medics and independent observers (also known in the United States as Civilian Observers) a non-professional volunteer role taken on by people who do not dissent. Law students, legal workers, and others are often motivated by a concern for political rights. At some point during police and protester interactions, medics and observers attempt to record identifiers, violent officers, and commanders. This information is used to trace the flow of police officers' violence and to identify those who are most responsible.

Legal observers serve several layers of purpose. First, their presence that may be useful in the defense of protesters who must face charges. Second, they collect data that may form the basis of police accountability against a specific police agency. Some observers also discourages police misbehavior. However, legal observers are not mediators during conflicts, remaining in the background. In any way, legal observing becomes a form of spatial control with significant spatial effects. When legal observers are present, they are less often so isolated by police that

the action (within the general action of autonomy during the action. Many shined around summit protests have such as samba bands, pink and silver at Rebel Clown Army. The last is an the figure of a clown, which confuses n Army confronted by a police line nity groups (“gaggles”), each doing its ently spoils police attempts to main- for other protesters.

to maintain spatial mobility by oper- pursue their own goals and functions, . Activists can disperse after a con- ent, because each affinity group stays l disruptive actions.

Observation

ers have developed a grassroots cul- documenting police behavior. Like the pendent journalists, legal observation (CopWatch) has become a paraprofes- ple who want to support protest and and lawyers provide this service out summit mobilizations, they watch for ove in close to the action, record its ntifying information of arresting offi- ers on scene. Their presence disrupts nd efforts at control.

red functions. First, they gather evi- se of protesters who are arrested and mpile data longitudinally, and these ecountability campaigns or litigation etimes the presence of observers dis- ver, observers do not serve as nego- instead in their role of observers. This n of counterobservation with signifi- rvers are present, protest spaces are they can assert total control. Police

often try to hinder the work of observers and even journalists. At Heiligendamm, the work of the observers by not letting them be arrested, by keeping them away from the protest, by forbidding one to record what he or she sees.

Legal observation skills are transmitted to a group of activists through popular education and grassroots networks. People trained in legal observation can then do observations at protests to identify signs of police misbehavior. At home, they can monitor local police, watching for harassment of immigrants, and other vulnerable groups. They can spontaneously watch and document police activities, groups with patrol schedules or volunteer groups when police harassment is anticipated. Activists can be on edge of the law, and official markings, such as uniforms, call. These practices disrupt police procedures. They can on events they may be hostile to, such as protests.

A more popular but less formal form of observation is by a broad range of people, including family members. People can watch for signs that a fellow activist is a police officer. If they have evidence of police misbehavior, they can take photos or videos of the officer. Evidence of their undercover status (such as possession of weapons, video of the officer going behind police lines). This material can be used as independent media to warn activists and the public.

Communication

Resisting spatial control requires adapting to the spatial possibilities. Pirate communication is about enabling the circulation of information among protesters. Pirate communication is based on networks of trusted face-to-face communication. This includes radios, walkie-talkies, cell phones, and the internet.

A common element of communication is a newswire run on a website (usually on the Media Center network) set up to provide real-time information.

observers, photographers, videographers, and during the 2007 G8, police severely limited their ability to get close to a person being observed at a corralled demonstration, and even to be observed.

Open to participation beyond legal workers to a wider audience through education, spreading virally through social media at workshops associated with summit protests, and spontaneously whenever they see an opportunity they feel empowered to keep an eye on the police. People of youth, people of color, immigrants, and to train and encourage others to observe and police. Some even set up formal observation teams to observe at social events where they are armed with recording devices, knowledge of police tactics, and watchers patrol or post observers on the streets to observe and police power to impose their will arbitrarily on events such as hip hop parties.

Open observation can be undertaken by anyone but not limited to official observers. A person who is a protestor is in fact an undercover observer, and someone who is in fact an imposter, can be a person, preferably including evidence of their activities, strange communications equipment, and a person getting into a police car or van. This information can be distributed through independent media and is sometimes relevant to litigation.

Communication Infrastructure

Open communication about (shifting) tactics and information is an important tactic for resistance and therefore the tactical flow of information is organized through a combination of traditional communication and use of technology, including social media and the Internet.

Open communication during summit protests is often facilitated by an IMC, part of the Independent Media Center, which provides news and information about the

protest. The newswire summarizes reports (e.g., “Independence Plaza is still occupied and dancing”; “Commerce Ave. and River St. on north side of intersection.”). Protesters follow the ticker and receive this information on television and pirate radio are new ways to organize.

At Prague 2000 IMF/WB, the Center for Communications Programs organized the flow of communication among the protesters to the summit’s venue. The physical communication room, whose location was secret from the summit, was fed by a team of volunteers by radio. Placards were used to differentiate the different marches. In the early afternoon the Tute Bianche march stuck on the route, but the pink and silver march had reached the summit and use some reinforcement. The Center for Communications Programs, rather, one part of a decentralized network that provided information to action groups so that they could use their own energies as the situation across the city changed. The marches encircling the conference center used decentralized communication structures. Although mobile phones are commonly used in protests, the Center for Communications Programs was one of these facilities during Pittsburgh. Protesters’ info-house were charged with “hindering the summit” by providing information on movements and routes. The state’s attempt to criminalize use of mobile phones for these purposes was dropped, and the charges were dropped.³

At Heiligendamm 2007 G8, the center for communications control was organized through a network of information centers located in the area around the conference venue. Again, these information centers provided information and distributed it to people.

The Political Economy of

Organizing solidarity against the legal system is a costly endeavor. To meet the financial needs of these collective structures for sharing the information, the German “Rote Hilfe” (or Red Help) is a local

reports from protesters in the streets occupied. DJs have arrived. People are on the streets: arrests now taking place at various points in the streets can subscribe to the information on their cell phones. Twitter technology can distribute this information.

The Centrum coordination center enabled the various marches trying to get close to the main space of the Centrum was a hotel that was empty of all but its few staff. This community network of cyclists who provided status reports and sent text messages about the situation at various points in the afternoon, for example, protesters of the Nussle bridge were informed that they could reach the conference center and could use the Centrum as a command center but, rather than a command center, it was a network. It compiled and disseminated information so that they could decide where to put their tents as the protest unfolded. In addition, the various coordination centers also organized their own inter-city networks through info-houses like the Centrum in Berlin. The FBI made the first successful raid on the Centrum in Pittsburgh 2009 G20. The workers in the Centrum were "being prosecuted" because they were providing information to the police (via Twitter). However, the use of Twitter was unsuccessful, and the

circulation of information about space through a horizontal network of on-the-ground coordination camps and in the region around the Centrum. Information points pooled incoming information from people passing by and calling.

Autonomy of Solidarity

The social consequences of social control is a heavy social burden, social movements create high social costs of legal prosecution. The German long-standing collective structure that

supports activists who find themselves as a fund, this organization pools the efforts and redistributes them. In Europe, raising money (often for specific cases) of solidarity concerts or parties. To help protesters facing trials after major summits organized in many cities all over Europe, concerts spread awareness and knowledge.

At Heiligendamm 2007 G8, Rote Kasse supported activists. Equally important was the legal support group and contributed to the activities of supported activists needing legal defense. They filed complaints against police and other officials.

Legal costs can start even before the trial. During a march at Heiligendamm 2007, a general ban order for the entire area around the G8 summit. Activists planned a Star March, starting in the middle of the area, which directly challenged the ban. However, the activists' lawyer explained that the case could be four times the estimated cost. The March had to be defended separately from the other activities, without steady financial structures, and they had to push the case to the Constitutional Court, a demanding and lengthy process.

While some street activists are involved in the work described below, most of the legal support action in these projects because they are not for political rights. They do not accept the necessity of court meetings and give their time and energy to the practices of political rights.

Legal Support

Activist legal teams are part of the broader movement commonly found in Europe and North America, and includes various protest sectors. Many are organized by unions, peace groups, and environmental groups. These groups negotiate with the state and their own internal policing through

es in political litigation. Functioning as a financial contributions of support-type, one successful ad hoc tactic for (protests or mobilizations) is the promotion of help defray the costs incurred by permit protests, such events have been popular. Besides raising money, solidarity and knowledge about legal defense.

Hilfe was an important resource for money raised by the campsite work-antirepression team, which not only helped but also encouraged activists to challenge authorities, leading to trials.

the protests take place. For example, during the 2007 G8, authorities issued a general ban around the meeting location. Activists from different points and coming together challenged the legality of the prohibition. They argued that the expenses involved in the ban would cost €5,000 if each part of the Star March coalition decided to appeal to the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, a financially

involved in the various forms of legal action. Many workers are sympathizers who take part in the protests. They wish to defend citizens' political rights against the possibility of suspending rights for summit security to protect the most expansive

Teams

the summit mobilization framework in North America. The action framework for Major permitted marches are organized by other large organizations or coalitions. The police and often even provide a "marshal" system that attempts

to keep participants on the negotiation action sector (which may participate) also mounts other actions before a organized through a working-group headquarters space for distributing, creating art, and storing supplies; a home media facility (chapters of workers strategists and spokespeople; a school protest; clinics and medics; a kitchen action scenario teams. Activist legal of several autonomous but coordinating provide infrastructure specific to the by the direct-action sector, these work service to all protest sectors, including tors. Media, medical, and legal groups from all the sectors.

The majority of workers in the legal team must include a few lawyers who have legal credentials, such as filing injunctions and appearing in court. The majority are professionals, who in the process gain skills.” The work they do includes teaching preparing materials; mapping the path tracking arrestees through the jail system at activist meetings (interpreting statistics, and reporting on the status compiling data; and staffing a hotline and provide information to arrestees. Experienced protest legal workers teach techniques for advising and representing from normal criminal defense strategies.

In advance of a summit mobilization line phone number and encourages participants to mark their skin daily in indelible ink. (Not permitted events may not know about the team answers calls at this number to provide information surrounding the actions. The legal team supports participants and arrestees (who may include workers and participants from different protest

ated course. Meanwhile, the direct-
e in the permitted marches but often
nd after the permitted marches) is
p system, which usually includes a
information, holding meetings, cre-
using-assistance group; an indepen-
vw.Indymedia.org); public relations
ool that provides training in nonvio-
tchen; a communications team; and
teams are part of this structure, one
nated action “working groups” that
he protest. Attached to and staffed
orking groups see themselves as in-
ng the nondirect-action protest sec-
ps are likely to be used by protesters

al team are nonlawyers. However, the
o are responsible for the tasks requir-
tions, visiting arrestees in detention,
r of the work can be done by nonpro-
skills and knowledge as “legal work-
ning Know Your Rights trainings and
articipating police agencies and jails;
stem; communicating legal informa-
ng proclamations, summarizing sta-
of arrestees); issuing press releases;
e to record reports, field questions,
ees, their families, and supporters.
rain volunteer lawyers in preferred
nting political arrestees, which differ
gies.

ion, the legal team announces a hot-
all activists to write this number on
vertheless, many of those attending
out this phone number.) The legal
wenty-four hours a day for the week
eam provides support to all partici-
de nonactivist passersby, journalists,
est groups). Given the mayhem that

accompanies protest arrests, the acti responder, since other lawyers are un test detention systems. In Europe, a ciations (such as the German “Repr participated in Heiligendamm 2007 manent European Legal Team to sec avoid having to build a new organiza

Support for arrestees includes through various facilities, ascertain ing arrestees in jail to check on the arrestee’s status to his or her suppor ee’s release, documenting any unus negotiating with city officials regard ventions regarding specific cases (e. people, those held in solitary confin tion), and even arranging to post bon anyone else to do it for them. The le able information to the public relatio action scenario team, and Convergen subjects, including the number of a for release, needed logistical suppo transportation, medical care, housin demands being made (such as demar ferred from dangerous facilities, alth “Release all arrestees now”).

After all arrestees are released fro on to two phases of postaction wor for civil suits. To mount a criminal munication with arrestees, tracks in charges, recruits volunteer lawyers f an evidence archive for use by the team can help develop a strategy fo ees in collective defenses (sometim train volunteer lawyers in defense str other arrestees to the maximum exte of the arrest and prosecution at the f may also engage in press work.

To prepare for civil suits, the legal and excessive use of force by the po

ivist legal team is often the best first prepared for the peculiarities of pro- a number of left-wing lawyers asso- "republikanischer Anwaltsverein," which (G8) are working to establish a per- ure a continuity of experience and to tion for each mobilization.

vigilantly tracking every arrestee ning conditions for release, visit- eir conditions, communicating each rters to assist in securing the arrest- usual conditions, archiving evidence, ling arrestees, mounting legal inter- g., foreign nationals, youths, injured ement, arrestees who need medica- d or sign for people who do not have gal team is expected to provide reli- ns team, the independent media, the nce (via nightly meetings) on various rrestees, their locations, conditions rt for released arrestees (e.g., food, g), and the most important political nds that groups of arrestees be trans- ough usually the demand is simply

om detention, the legal team moves k: criminal defense and preparation defense, the team establishes com- ormation regarding court dates and or court appearances, and organizes defense team. In addition, the legal or the defenses, organize the arrest- es conjoining individual cases), and ategies (e.g., maintain solidarity with nt, and keep the political dimensions forefront of the case). The legal team

team archives reports of harassment lice, along with testimony about the

conditions and treatment to which a person is subjected. This material may be used as part of a lawsuit in the preparation of multiple lawsuits against police officers or groups of protesters or others who violate the law. One of the most extensive archives of police actions during the Diaz raids, is the work of the support team founded to help protesters.

Activists trained as legal workers can be used to use their skills for other solidarity work, such as filing appeals (e.g., Up against the Law, which is now inactive), supporting homeless people (e.g., Toronto), and advocating for the release of political prisoners.

Street Legal

In addition to serving as legal observers, a person familiar with the relevant law sometimes acts as a liaison during protests. There are several types of street legal known in the United States as a “police liaison” or “spokesperson,” may serve as a communication link between the police commander on scene and the protesters. They may communicate offers from the police and introducing themselves to the protesters. In some action, they may be able to maintain a calm atmosphere and heat up (when access to the police liaison is taken by protesters via the use of communication). The police liaison communicates with the protesters. This person does not need legal training, just communication skills. This person does not interpret the law, just communicate.

A second type of street legal is a person who stands self at a location where police action is taking place. This person does not represent any organization. They defend protesters and spaces by introducing themselves to police and their commanders about illegal actions. They do not intend to commit. This person may travel with protesters who has a video camera and other equipment. These lawyers may later head civil suits against the police actions they have witnessed.

arrestees were subject while in detention of civil inquiry processes, as well as suits against the city on behalf of various groups and as part of the social control of protesters, despite the material destroyed by the work of "Supporto Legale," a legal support group at Genoa 2001 G8.⁴

These activities in political contexts have gone on to inspire other work, such as assisting prisoners in the Law Legal Collective, Chicago, which helps people in fighting tickets (as in the case of detained immigrants).

Legal

Protesters, lawyers and legal workers families provide legal services in the street through various types of street legal work. A person, often called a "police liaison" and in Europe as a "police communication device between protesters and police." Liaisons do not negotiate, although they act as a bridge from one side to the other. By identifying the police commander on duty early on in the protest, they gain access to that person once things get tense (access is often restricted). Decisions are made through consensus decision-making procedures, and those decisions are communicated to commanding officers through their training or credentials, as they are communicating.

A lawyer who stations himself or herself at the protest, including raids, seems imminent. The lawyer acts for protesters but acts alone proactively by invoking the law. Lawyers who take on a more aggressive role inform officers of the acts they are committing or threatening. They often work with a legal observer or assistant to document any incidents. They also file suits against the police regarding viola-

as a liaison between the legal team and the charge of police operations. This relationship is on the legal team days or weeks. The liaison has no authority to negotiate on behalf of the team, since he or she has direct contact with the police. The liaison's role, therefore, is to get clear information on the location of formerly permitted protest areas, the names of arrestees. The liaison can then provide information to this person and activist media and organizing spaces. Information on street tactics they plan to use, they often will provide information on the legal and about the location of prisoning in all three street legal roles are crucial. For example, volunteers in Miami 2003

Litigation

criminal defense (discussed earlier) and government agencies. There are roughly two types of litigation. Individuals and groups of similar damages in connection with injuries sustained or in custody. Social movement litigation suits alleging violations of civil liberties, exclusion zones, police use of weapons of social control. Although both are costly, bringing media attention to the misbehavior, class-action suits are common in police operations regarding dissent. The literature on proactive civil litigation is mixed. It finds the literature split on the effectiveness of litigation. . . . prevent immoral behavior. . . . stop construction of nuclear power plants." Even when litigation is successful, it is often with social justice concerns are not resolved. A study of environmental justice struggles found that neither litigation nor any other

single tactic appeared to be effective litigation, was often successful in securing facilities.⁶ Legal victories that established precedent, and this, according to Barkan, identifies four lines of inquiry with regard to litigation: “At what stage of social movement do resources to] litigate?”; “To what extent do social movements affect decisions by social movements and courts?”; “What is the influence of the threat of nonobedience and on decisions to conduct litigation?”; “Under what circumstances lead to decisions by groups to litigate as a means of social control?”

Proactive litigation focuses on proactively challenging a creeping affront on their expressive freedoms and practices. Efforts to guarantee protection of expressive freedoms are not as numerous as cases alleging violations of expressive freedoms but there are a variety of efforts undertaken, including a few that are closely associated with the anti-globalization movement although there are many other relevant cases. For example, many alterglobalization activists are involved in hundreds of local resolutions suppressing the World Trade Organization Act in the United States and lawsuits against the World Trade Organization and war crimes.

- ✦ After Seattle 1999 WTO, Trial Lawyers United filed its challenge to the legality of the World Trade Organization agreement from the city for 155 protesters arrested in a protest zone with no probable cause.
- ✦ In 2002, the ACLU, joined by a coalition of groups including the Denver police department and supported by over 3,200 Colorado activists and citizens, filed a lawsuit against the Denver police department and the FBI. The plaintiffs were the pacifist Quaker American Friends Service Committee, some nuns, and many activists. The lawsuit challenged the FBI's collection of “spy files” and, once they were revealed, the ACLU organized people to request the FBI to delete the files. The ACLU, on December 2, 2004, filed a lawsuit to expose and limit FBI spying on people practicing their faith.

was the filing of Freedom of Information Act requests in ten states and in the District of Columbia to illustrate that “FBI and local police–Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs)—war, political, and faith-based groups—have been gathering all kinds of information: (1) the actual names of individuals targeted for their political views; (2) information about how the structure and policies of these groups; (3) rampant and unwarranted spying on individuals; and (4) requests have been answered and denied. This is in part due to the number of FBI agents assigned to these groups. Information were denied.

- ✦ Savvy media work around the revelation that the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. had been infiltrated led to the passage of the Lockyer, to mandate that the state of California follow the California State Constitution’s prohibition on infiltrating groups that are not engaged in criminal activity.”¹⁰
- ✦ The Partnership for Civil Justice Fund, Washington, D.C., regarding infiltration, mass arrests, mass intelligence-gathering, the use of Civil Disturbance Act’s mission requirements for persons arrested during the inauguration as president of the United States, agents provocateurs. They have been successful for individuals, as well as policy changes. They no longer engage in the “illegal picketing” of demonstrators for “parading” and “demonstrating” and opportunity to leave.” The District of Columbia that prohibits use of riot gear at government-protected assemblies without a permit, requires display of names of demonstrators, and the release of First Amendment information within 24 hours.¹¹
- ✦ After an egregious attack on an attorney at the ACLU of Northern California, the ACLU hired a team of prominent civil rights attorneys to sue the Oakland Police Department to end its use of force against demonstrators.¹²

formation Act (FOIA) requests in Columbia in an effort to demonstrate working through so-called Joint are spying on environmental, anti-groups.” The FOIA requests seek two FBI files of groups and individuals or their religion; (2) information of the JTTFs are encouraging g.⁹ But by 2010 few of the FOIA and the requests for information assigned to JTTFs and for budgetary

revelation that a group called Fresno California’s attorney general, Bill ce’s law enforcement agencies “fol- tion, which prevents them from under investigation for criminal

has ongoing litigation in Wash- on, long-term undercover spying, gathering operations on protest- e Units, checkpoints, odious per- as who planned to protest the sec- of George W. Bush in 2004, and succeeded in gaining settlements changes; for example, police may practice of rounding up and arrest- without a permit’ without notice D.C. city council has adopted a bill and encirclement of First Amend- without establishment of probable plates and badges, and mandates t assembly arrestees within four

antiwar demonstrators in 2003, the the National Lawyers Guild, and a attorneys successfully pressured the and the use of crowd control weap-

- ✦ Individual and group lawsuits related to Miami 2003 FTAA have resulted in numerous claimants. But these suits have not established a policy that governs the police.
- ✦ Three female activists charged with protesting the 2003 FTAA were strip-searched. A lawsuit against Miami-Dade County for mistreating women arrestees facing charges for prostitution, loitering, traffic offenses, and other offenses has been changed, and a \$6.25 million settlement for women violated during a five-year period has been reached.
- ✦ The New York City Civil Liberties Union sued the city to destroy the fingerprints of protesters. In New York City 2004 RNC arrests, the city's arguments regarding undercover infiltration were dropped in advance of the protest.
- ✦ The Partnership for Civil Justice sued the City of New York on behalf of two groups to sue the city to protect the groups' access to Central Park. The city denying permits, including one for a protest at RNC in 2004, the city was essentially restricting its use to corporate events, and not allowing demonstrations. The ruling provided for damages of \$50,000 (plus payment of legal fees) if the park must remain available for public use for research and planning undertaken by the groups. The city not sustain permanent damage.¹⁴
- ✦ There are two major lawsuits related to the 2004 RNC. The first concerns the violent raid on the protesters. The lawsuit was reached in November 2004. The police defendants were convicted of excessive force. Officers. As Italy has no law against excessive force, the raid are trying to take the case to the European Court of Rights. The second case, the Borelli case, concerns police, jail staff, and doctors accusing protesters of victims of "misuse of authority, cover-up, and falsification of evidence."¹⁶ The protesters were fined ranging from €2,500 to €15,000. The protesters were convicted, and the maximum

lated to policing and incarceration
ted in payment of \$1.05 million to
addressed only personal damages,
ng of protest.

with “failure to disperse” at Miami
while in jail. In preparing their law-
, they found that strip searches of
for nonviolent behavior (e.g., pros-
) were standard policy. The policy
million settlement was distributed to
r period.¹³

ties Union successfully pressured
nt records of people arrested dur-
ad won the release of police docu-
tration of groups across the nation

brought litigation against the City
social movement organizations to
entral Park. They argued that, by
for a planned protest against the
cially privatizing the park, restrict-
ad denying the right to public mass
ded both a settlement to the plain-
(legal fees) and a court order that
or First Amendment activity, with
en to ensure that the park would

garding Genoa 2001 G8. The first
Diaz School.¹⁵ The verdict on this
er 2008. Thirteen of twenty-nine
ed, but none of the commanding
nst torture, the victims of the Diaz
to the European Court of Human
olzaneto trial, involved forty-five
used by a group of three hundred
onstraint, abuse, intimidation and
plaintiffs were granted compensa-
,000. Only fifteen of the accused
um sentence given was five years,

eight months, but the person who was the commanding officer, the chief of police, appealed, but their convictions were

Despite the occasional successes with the law, there are thousands of citizens who remain unrepresented. After ten years, only a few of the many illegalities have been represented in suit. Fewer than fifty of the thousands of protesters who have been represented in suit. Few of the state's illegal actions have been represented in suit. Only a few hundred of the protesters at Genoa were represented in court, and only those with the most resources. Many who attempt to express themselves violate the law and have not been represented at all. Organizations with dedicated lawyers, capital to cover the costs of litigation, and sustained vigilance at the courts have been successful in inadequate prosecution is that police officers violate the law with relative impunity. They engage in most of the illegal activities they understand. The practice of taking out insurance policies and settling, the police and officers do not conform to the law. In the long term, the law as practiced by the practices of the police; de facto law increasingly diverges from the law.

One final observation regarding the current law is very different from that of previous laws. In the law described earlier, many antirepressive laws were diffusing, highly participatory, and syndicalist. The current law is centralization and its dependence on executive power. It lacks these qualities. While all other laws require the participation of diverse actors and organizations, both strategy and operations, civil suits are conducted in isolation. While radical democracy is enforced in every other aspect and the current law, the litigation process involves "trusting the law (the judicial apparatus), a concept that goes against the other moment of action. This change in the law means the litigators are the same lawyers who

who received this sentence was a security of the jail. The defendants were upheld.

on by proactive political litigation, whose rights have been violated and in years, Seattle has been challenged by the violence perpetrated at Seattle 1999 WTO. The rights of activists violated at Miami 2003 have been challenged against the state, and only a handful of suits have been challenged. Fewer than four suits against the 2001 G8 have been represented in court. Those who had their rights violated but who received minor injuries from these suits requires a team of lawyers to cover the costs until the case is completed, which is often years. The immediate and tragic result of this litigation is that commanders, and cities can violate rights and know that they will get away with it. Moreover, thanks to the new policies to cover the costs of litigation, officials are under even less pressure to do anything. It means that the law is undermined and the social control of dissent increas-

of this litigation: its social organization and its efforts to combat social control. As a result, these practices have empowering, self-organizing qualities. Because of its decentralized nature, civil litigation tends not to replicate the phases of antirepression involve the constant communication regarding suits are strategized and implemented. Democracy and egalitarianism are fiercely practiced. In the process of the movement, the civil suits are "run by the experts" (and trusting the state's legal system). Global justice activists abhor in every way. This happens in part because generally those who participated in the legal team, per-

haps in the streets, and in the criminal justice system. They have proved themselves and are the subject of many lawsuits. The other factor is that (with a few exceptions) they turn proactive litigation into a participatory process.

Perhaps the lawyers are concerned about the cost of this strategy, or perhaps the task of training a new generation of this kind of case seems unwieldy. As a result, they often use reactive resources such as volunteer lawyers and criminal defense phases), savvy legal strategies, and other actions. Despite the historical recognition that political lawsuits is closely related to the process of decarceration, political litigation teams often lack the coordination of news of the cases through activist networks. Many people don't even know the status of the cases. This lack of coordination cannot be coordinated with the broader movement's goals, and a culture and a method of participation that often do not define their procedural or substantive goals. They often act autonomously. This is not to say that there are dedicated lawyers who bring these suits, but that this is one of the few methods of compelling change. Despite the nature of social control, its limitations are still being explored.

Surviving Police

In addition to protecting space, activists are also working to protect their bodies, minds, psyches, and emotions. This is discussed in chapter 5.

Know Your Rights, Know C

The most basic aspect of antirepression is education. A program to teach people their rights is often the most effective form of workshops, pamphlets, Internet resources, small size cards, and stickers covering issues such as interactions with police, rights in court, and other issues such as remaining silent.

Know Your Rights educational materials are often used at political events, in which case they are often more effective. They have also been developed by p

al defense of the activists. They have
ct of great respect and gratitude. But
(exceptions) activists have not made
ry process.

ed that winning requires an expert
ning volunteer legal workers for this
sult, litigation does not benefit from
rs (so important to the legal team
activist media teams, and solidarity
ition that the success of social justice
rsistence of social movement mobi-
ten do not manage to publicize the
etworks, with the result that activists
ses. Moreover, the legal strategy may
r social movement strategy. Without
on, activists are unable to collectively
ve demands, so the lawyers are left
criticize the few and extraordinarily
uits. But, given that such litigation is
ng state accountability for the effects
riking.

Political Violence

vists have developed tactics for pro-
s, and culture from the violence we

Our Past, Know Your Enemy

ssion is a grassroots viral education
s as dissenters. Education takes the
ernet resources, video clips, pocket-
ues such as speech and expression,
ustody, and recommended behavior

aterials are customized for particular
address local or event-specific laws;
political activists for solidarity work

with immigrants, youth, sex workers, and other marginalized groups, creating information flows beyond speakers and turning them into spontaneous learners and turning them into spontaneous learners.

A special form of Know Your Rights training relates to preparation for appearing before grand juries. Grand jury proceedings don't have the right to a lawyer, for example, they can be jailed for refusing to appear. Grand jury proceedings are secret and there is no judge, and they happen throughout a community. This is why many groups and other groups recommend receiving grand jury subpoenas. They provide information on how to prepare to deal with grand juries.¹⁸

In addition to educating people about their rights, building social control is also about sharing stories and histories. Grounded and situated knowledge is essential to push tactical innovation. All the tactical discussions that take place before, during, and after an arrest are an important part of building a collective consciousness.

Solidarity

Political arrestees are often subjected to harsh conditions, excessive charges, and tactics that increase the dimension of their criminalization. Tactics that are happening and also later in the process of collective action. The legal strategies for dealing with the conditions to which people are subjected are often determined at the moment of arrest. Solidarity is a key element of grassroots viral education offered in the context of mass mobilization. Viral training in solidarity often takes place in arrest vehicles and community centers.

Activists have developed a set of tactics for dealing with the jail in order to protect endangered people, and pressure for collective release. When hundreds of people are in jail, the impact is significant. They include refusing to be identified (refusing to carry any form of identification), refusing to provide names (in solidarity with noncitizens), refusing to sign procedures, singing, chanting, dancing, and other forms of resistance.

ers, and other groups.¹⁷ This empowers specific political contexts, empowering numerous educators.

rights education in the United States before grand juries. Witnesses called rights that criminal defendants have; refusing to testify. Since the proceeding it is easy to use witnesses to sow fear by the Grand Jury Resistance Project, refusing rather than cooperating with community training to help people

about their rights, this form of resisting antirepression experiences and knowledge is often the most useful way reports, magazines, and mailing-list after, and between protest events are active tactical memory.¹⁹

arity

to exaggerated detention, unusual targeted abuse based on the political. These conditions can be addressed as court through various forms of collective addressing the poor or illegal conditions are called solidarity, and they begin is one more subject of trainings and the weeks and days prior to a sum- solidarity principles and tactics even continues in jail.

tactics that enable arrestees to disrupt and compatriots, demand better conditions and/or minimal charges. When impact of these tactics can be significant (this requires that people refusing to identify their citizenship using to cooperate with processing, stripping, going limp, clinging

together, and staging hunger strikes. Winning concessions such as return of return of isolated prisoners to the la of charges. Jail solidarity works in between city officials and lawyers from activists outside the jail, press conferences generating encouraging and disruptive

When jail solidarity is not feasible charges, arrestees may use court solidarity. Court solidarity includes tactics more important, help arrestees strategize course focused on the political context of trials. Court solidarity tactics include (including sympathetic nonarrestees); signing to violations of free speech; petitions, and sentences; demands for full many people request full court proceedings attorney to dismiss charges in order impose onerous workloads on staff) the court proceedings; and press conferences draws attention to the trials and sentences

A focal point of solidarity is always severe crimes. The resistance of a large helps maintain a spotlight on the political and criminalization facing the smaller those charges. Arrestee networks can encourage to minimize the number of court Philadelphia 2000 RNC was particularly

The normal strategy for criminal defendant's risk by accepting reduced charges on the basis of technicalities, and distinguishing them from alleged group criminal activists generally takes a different strategy to defense (individuals are being tried in collective action), keeping the political extending court proceedings to the maximumers' innocence and insisting on the right to protected expression), while discouraging the costs and burden of such prosecution

These tactics have been successful in
of prescription medicine to arrestees,
rger group, and collective reduction
onjunction with ongoing negotiation
om the legal team, solidarity vigils by
rences, and phone campaigns (often
ve noise).

ible or is unsuccessful in reducing
solidarity to address their criminal
ctics that may be disruptive but that,
egize collectively and keep public dis-
nt of activists' court appearances and
e mass appearances in court (includ-
s and costumes that draw attention
ns for combined charges/cases, tri-
trials, speedy trials, or jury trials (if
eedings, it pressures the prosecuting
not to clog up the court system and
; introduction of political content in
ferences and other media work that
ences.

s the subset of arrestees charged with
rger group facing less serious charges
olitical nature of the serious charges
er group, in an effort to delegitimize
n develop strategies and share experi-
nvictions. The arrestee network after
arly strong and democratic.

defense seeks to minimize the defen-
ges, pleading guilty, seeking dismissal
nguishing individuals in order to sepa-
ity. The defense of prosecuted political
ategy, maintaining a collective dimen-
targeted because of their participation
ics in the forefront of the defense, and
ximum (asserting prosecuted dissent-
ecognition of charged activity as pro-
the prosecution of activists by increas-
ctions on the police and courts.

Collective organizing of arrestees enables large groups of arrestees to plead guilty pleas to minor charges. In this way, minimizing the burden on the courts while increasing the pressure on court proceedings for charges of acquittal and to maximize exposure to constrain dissent. Following Heilbrunn, the legal team available to the protesters in rejecting the state's prosecution went through a real trial and were acquitted in its bid to establish criminal records.

Trauma

Trauma groups are part of the established social control of dissent. Along with organized around a summit mobilization space and services to assist activists to a trauma center may operate during the months afterward. People with strength join this working group and focus their efforts after their experiences of social control.

In Europe, a well-known trauma group of a group of protesters who attempted to prevent the Évian 2003 G8 delegations from a blockade consisted of a rope across the river (experienced climbers) hanging from either side. The police installed a careful security and warned the protesters to get off instantly. It did not take long for the protesters to try to communicate with the activists on the other side of the road and to push the activists to get off. There were German, Swiss, and French protesters. Soon as the road was more or less cleared, the protesters pass underneath. The police commanders hanging on the two ends of the rope were on film as he looked down the bridge. A little bit later, the same police officer, Martin Shaw fell twenty meters into the River. He survived but sustained seri-

s and access to movement lawyers reject states' attempts to negotiate away, the state is prevented from minimizing still criminalizing protest. Insisted dissenters is more likely to yield of the state's undemocratic attempt Gendamm 2007 G8, the strength of protesters reduced the risk run by charged proposal of a small fine; instead, they quitted. The state was thus thwarted for the protesters.

Groups

ned repertoire of strategies for resisting with many of the other working groups ation, healers and psychologists offer to recover from trauma. The healing or e days of action and may continue for ths in various methods of healing may ir energy on caring for fellow activists l in the street and/or in jail.

group was started after the experience ed to block a bridge in order to pre- from reaching the summit venue. The the bridge, with two activists (expe- ner end of the rope. The group had ning system, and traffic was stopped e police to arrive. The police did not sts but immediately started to clear the sides. More police arrived soon; nch police and military present. As ared, they lifted the rope and let cars nder was clearly aware of the climb- rope. Another policeman was caught ge to check the rope construction. A r walked to the rope and cut it. Mar- e stony bed of the shallow Aubonne ous injuries. On the other end of the

rope, Gesine Wenzel avoided a similar fate. She managed to catch her rope. Many of the participants frequently started the healing group to process their experiences of police brutality and violence.

Security

Security culture refers to practices common in the social movement, practices that allow activists to minimize police infiltration and surveillance. Activists already know that law enforcement, often using “state security” and terrorism as an excuse. Activists’ practices may include being private, organizing in smaller groups, and avoiding large meetings that are easily infiltrated. Overall, the emphasis on security provides some protection; while they provides some protection, they also tend to disrupt organizational aspects of movement culture, such as outreach and reach. Sometimes security culture is induced by a heavy dose of paranoia, which creates barriers for including newer members.

For example, during preparatory meetings for the G8, we experienced a familiar security ritual. At the start of the meeting, one person would be switched off, a common practice to avoid surveillance. Nevertheless, several people had not taken out their batteries, a bit of fumbling around for the phone was prolonged by a short discussion about the importance of taking out the batteries in the cell phone. Activists use cell phones not only to intercept surveillance of real-life meetings. While switching off the phone, the batteries still send signals. Law enforcement can potentially trace who is present at the meetings, therefore, prefer to take out the batteries. For greater security, to leave their cell phones on is a danger of interception, activists have developed a ritual. In this case, the ritual is relatively benign. But security culture can easily become excessive, and it is not always necessary to build a social movement.

ar fate because activists on the bridge
the participants in this action subse-
deal collectively with their traumatic
olence.

Culture

ommonly used in the alterglobaliza-
activists to take precautionary actions
rveillance. These tactics demonstrate
enforcement will infiltrate the move-
the threat posed by acts of terrorism
y include keeping some information
and avoiding the use of technologies
ese practices serve as a double-edged
ection from overzealous law enforce-
nizing activities and other important
as the development of trust and out-
practiced at an unhealthy level, usu-
oia. Most damaging is the difficulty it
in the group.

meetings for Heilingendamm 2007
ty culture ritual. A few minutes after
n asked whether cell phones should
that everyone at the meeting knew.
turned off their phones, so there was
nes. This ritualized moment was pro-
whether it was necessary as well to
ones. Activists are aware that police
phone conversations but also to tap
off cell phones prevents such a pos-
s, which means that intelligence ser-
esent at a given meeting. Many activ-
battery during meetings or, for even
phones at home. Being aware of the
e developed a security culture. In this
ut, as discussed in chapter 5, security
undermining the trust and discourse
t.

Activists are innovative in finding new and interesting street actions.²⁰ Street actions and protests are most exposed to physical violence. Protesters are most exposed to physical violence and injured protesters at several summits and protests, taking such precautions. The protective measures also include tactics used to protect bodies.

The most spectacular form of protection is the tactic of the Italian White Overalls/Teardrop (WB). Two long-standing tactics used by protesters are wearing masks and of wearing black clothing to make bodies unidentifiable and protect protesters from police techniques used by authorities. The tactic of wearing black clothes is used to describe protesters who dress in black. A German court as part of an attempt to prosecute protesters for criminal association. Besides inhibiting identification, wearing black clothes and masks (certainly not wearing a threatening image. At the same time, it is other, less militant protesters, as was the case with the WB. The tactic of resisting identification is reinforced by holding banners on each side of the face. Gas masks (when not prohibited by law) are also worn as protection against tear gas and other irritants. Protective protection against tear gas is a virtue.

Most countries have a structure of emergency services during big protest events. More advanced countries have convergence Centers or action camps that provide information about how to deal with the specific event and how to help wounded people. Ideally, during big protest events include at least one person with this information. Emergency medical services at mass protests have been successful. Some of the most effective emergency services following Hurricane Katrina were the result of the U.S. alterglobalization movement.

Another more precautionary measure to avoid injuries from police violence is de-arresting protesters (i.e., protesters placed under arrest). De-arresting

g Bodies

ways to protect their bodies during the moments when the bodies of physical harm, and the high numbers of protests testifies to the urgency of protective structures developed by activists before and after actions, as well. Protecting bodies in the streets is the *Blancs*, described earlier in this book. Used by protesters are the practices of wearing black clothes. Both serve to make individual protesters against the widespread surveillance. The rather arbitrary term “Black Bloc” refers to a group dressed in black. The term was created by a group of protesters to prosecute activists for being part of a group. To avoid identification, the practice of wearing black clothes (when marching in a tight bloc) creates a sense of anonymity. At the same time, such a bloc can serve to protect individuals. This was seen at Washington, D.C., 2000 IMF/World Bank protests. Wearing black and forming a tight bloc is often used to protect individuals on each side of the demonstrating group. In some cities, a temporary ordinance; they are also referred to as a “passive armament”) are also used to protect against tear gas and pepper spray attacks. An alternative is wearing a vinegar-soaked cloth.

of action medics who offer their services. However, they offer trainings at the Convergence. In order to spread basic knowledge about the effects of police weapons and how to avoid them during actions, each affinity group would offer training. People trained to provide first aid have also served in other emergencies. In New Orleans, the medical personnel in New Orleans were part of the medics network developed in the

method of protecting individual bodies during actions (retrieving a person who has just been injured is often carried out by organized

affinity groups in spontaneous response. However, the refined police tactics of riot police insulate the arrest team, making it difficult to implement this tactic effectively.

Besides their organizational and tactical functions, Convergence Centers also fulfill another important role: they provide a safe space for protesters' bodies. Offering a safe space where activists can rest, regenerate, and eat is a key structure of activist (mobile) food kitchens and such camps. In Europe, most countries have activists with the materials and skills to cook and eat. It comes as no surprise that police tried to prevent protesters from entering France prior to Strasbourg. Hundreds of kitchen knives would cut through police lines, and kitchen towels could serve to mask their faces.

Camps also provide a medical clinic. Many activists do not feel safe visiting (and in some cases, visiting) a hospital for help with injuries. During the 2003 WTO was a rare occasion in which police agencies upon providing healthcare to activists. Activist medic police agencies. Activist medics provide first aid and care for injuries from police weapons.

Since police attacks on Convergence Centers have opened several times, activists have developed systems for guarding, protecting, and de-escalating tension in the organization of the camps. In Europe, these chill-out spaces are essential. They are especially important for activists who use a camp to perform a lot of organizing and to deal with traumatic experiences. Creating a rest space is the daily pressure at a protest camp is a frequent phenomenon of burn-out.

Remaining C

Activists want to remain out of order. The message sent must be potent, loud, well placed, and clear. Our sympathizers know we need action, and more. We need the psychical

onse to the arrest of an individual.
of snatch squads, whereby several
make it more difficult for activists to

spatial function, protest camps and
an important function in protecting
pace for retreat, they provide a place
sleep, and eat. The skills and infra-
tchens are crucial for the daily life of
ries have one or several such groups
for up to several thousand people. It
ed to bar such a mobile food kitchen
ourg 2009 NATO. Police argued that
constitute illegal armaments and that
ne Black Bloc.

ic, which is important because activ-
the United States cannot afford to
s caused by police violence. Cancun
which state medical services insisted
sts while refusing to cooperate with
ide prompt, free, and knowledgeable
s (and accidents).

ence Centers and camps have hap-
developed more careful security sys-
defending these spaces. Another inno-
ps is the creation of chill-out spaces,
re often called “out-of-action” tents.
tivists staying for a long time at the
asks and for protesters who have had
elaxed atmosphere for relaxing from
s an important step in countering the

Out of Order

er. We understand that effective dis-
ed, expansive, and free. Activists and
cess to political rights in their full-
e space to nurture creativity, courage,

and connection. We need to experience the political scene and therefore worth a visit must first stay visible. Spatially charac-terized, activists innovate tactics for their in. We dissolve on one side of a boundary use creative combinations of high- and low- and small mobilizations. We present a new language, from armies to tug-of-war, we are used to reterritorializing the political boundaries, refusals, enforcing democracy in the streets of this neighborhood, that village, those streets of control, only our insistent presence is very wrong.

Summits have huge budgets at the expense of sumptive “leadership” and to criminalize those who defend our rights and lives with volunteerism on the fly, answering the phone all night long. Social control is a bill that someone will pay. The protest is encamped in a borrowed space, participatory, stuck in another long meeting, bringing home memorabilia in the form of gifts to communities. Lay medics learn to deal with “lethal” weapons. Lay legal workers learn to deal with the system, to provide counsel and evidence. The activist scene compile the data: they are the unarmed activists and the illegal immigrants.

As we have shown, political violence affects not only bodies, daily lives as well as communities, as well as criminal records. All of the effects are visible and, if necessary, healed. Activists build solidarity, communal institutions, and resilience from these violences. How to build a community that can respond to the effects of social control? For people who may not yet even have a clear idea of what is less clear. Just as social control extends beyond the protest event to the pervasive and preemptive effects

...nce our own actions as crucial to the
 ...all the effort and risk. To dissent we
 ...anneled, held at a distance, and mar-
 ...or invading, blockading, and seeping
 ...ndary and re-form on the other. We
 ...and low-tech communications, large
 ...ourselves in every possible symbolic
 ...r teams to dancers. We are commit-
 ...landscape with our rights and our
 ...war zone that has imposed itself on
 ...e fields. Disrupting the presumption
 ...ce indicates that something is very,

...their disposal to normalize their pre-
 ...alize unwelcoming citizens. Activists
 ...nter lawyers, training legal workers
 ...ight. The political economy of social
 ...y later. The political economy of dis-
 ...hool or stadium, voluntaristic, par-
 ...eting, due back at work on Tuesday,
 ...form of legal skills that will change
 ...care for the wounds caused by “less
 ...earn the relevant laws, the court sys-
 ...ce. The ragtag legal collectives of the
 ...y can prove the political integrity of
 ...brutality of the police.

...nce takes many forms, affecting trust
 ...as mass mobilizations, self-concepts
 ...ese violences must be avoided if pos-
 ...vists develop technologies of educa-
 ...ns, and culture to thwart and recover
 ...continuous solidarity structures that
 ...control measures in the daily life of
 ...considered participating in protest is
 ...ends beyond those present, so must
 ...can only advance the struggle against
 ...of social control.

Democracy C

*There is only one good democracy
the catastrophes of democracy*

This is a book we wish we did not have read it. At stake in those who see the liberal democratic progressive social change, that progressive democracy, we must confine it because. Thus, we witness the reduction of the preservation of democracy itself. Democracy is becoming an indelicate matter. Rancière, who concludes that democracy the elite, an object of “hatred” among a discovery, those who believe that the in the interests of capitalism, this book project.

We began our investigation with of “policing” is inadequate to describe complexity, and diversity of social control test” is the wrong unit of analysis. What ratuses of control were impacting a Their unit of organization is the social

Exploring the literature on social the legitimacy of social control is both neutral and positive for social cohesion. to a narrowing of the field to deviant criminologists questioned the const

Out of Order

*cracy, the one that represses
ic civilization.*

—Jacques Rancière¹

not have to write. You might prefer
our subject is democracy itself. For
c state as a medium of peaceful and
mise is in deep trouble. To protect
use too much democracy is danger-
of democratic liberties in the name of
Defending democracy from democ-
g, as pointed out so lucidly by Jacques
cracy is (and has been) the enemy of
g that class. To those unfazed by such
ne liberal state manufactures consent
ok confirms the consolidation of that

two observations. First, the concept
ibe the temporality, spatiality, com-
l tactics we witnessed. Second, “pro-
e surmised that the impressive appa-
a much broader public—dissenters.
al movement.

control and dissent, we found that
ased in the idea that it is both neu-
This perspective led for some period
ce and criminal deterrence. Marxist
ruction of criminality in the context

of capitalism. Most helpfully, social theorists of media and education, have postulated the production of norms, so that people experience coercion. With a few notable exceptions, scholars have focused on the policing and control, leaving aside analysis of the impact on would-be dissenters. Dissent is generally understood as the right of individuals to free speech. But dissent is primarily linked to social change—is primarily collective. This collectivity is embodied in assemblies and associations have social impacts that governments do not.

Seeking to better describe the landscape of globalization, we began with geography. The analysis in chapter 2 demonstrates that the social control of dissent is not about silencing dissent completely but rather about channeling it into a specific form of protest. Many observers expect that the goal of social control of protest—to make protest less effective. But these observers may not have fully understood dissent in democracy. Skeptics might ask: If protest is so easily controlled, why does it still exist? Aren't people still expressing dissent? The answer is that the state's attempt to reduce its social impact ultimately fails.

Channeling predesigns the space of protest, creating the stage for some forms of dissent and silencing others. Social movements scholars argue that the effective expression of dissent is disruption. Without the opportunity to be disruptive, protest is ineffective and unable to effect the political change that is the goal of a democratic society. Disruption, in this sense, is not unexpected. This means that dissenters must disrupt the normal routines, to dislodge the normal habits of the state. Opportunities for fellow citizens to participate in the state channels a protest through the state. If the state incapacitates movement, dissent becomes ineffective. Denying protest the capacity to be disruptive is to deprive dissent of its disruptive capacity. Without the opportunity for participatory participation in the political arena, dissent is ineffective.

The territories defined by security are the result of a preemptive rearrangement of space. A

theorists, along with critical scholars stated that control is exercised through people discipline themselves and do not notable exceptions, social movement of protest as the locus of social contracts of political criminalization normally envisioned as based on the legal but dissent—particularly dissent ultimately produced in a landscape of activities is part of social movements. While some legal protections, social move-

landscape of social control in the era of why, territory, and space. Our analysis social control of space is not about pre- about channeling and controlling the ect the state to engage in some degree sure that it doesn't "get out of hand." ly appreciated the historic role of dis- k, "So what if the state moves the pro- sing themselves?" Channeling dissent diminishes the quality of democracy. es of possible confrontations, set- ssent, while reducing the possibility ars have concluded definitively that a function of its *disruptive capacity*. ptive, dissent is impotent, decorative, ntion that is its aim, and right, in a turn, relies on access to the unex- must have the right to disrupt spatial ppenstance of everyday life to create pause, think, reflect, and act. When n permits and established routes or becomes predictable and governable. e unexpected in space and/or time pacity, thereby canceling its conten- ena.

y fences are only one aspect of such A second aspect is spatial operations,

such as intruding into activist headquarters, incapacitating the creation of Convergences, depriving activists of materials, attacking activists, the state again channels their forms.

Preemption is not only precaution but also the criminalization of dissent. It demarcates a space inhabited by legitimacy, but also by illegitimate assault. In these spaces, the participant in democracy but a violator of the law, who must be fenced, channeled, and controlled. The implications are clear to those who must live with it: today, you are already a criminal.

Next, we turned to the political economy of globalization. As we show in chapter 4, the costs of globalization. In addition to the official expenditure on security, massive direct and indirect costs are (borne) by states and regions. Moreover, summit security is supported by permanent security think tanks, departments, and collaborative agencies. More striking are the international networks, which attend to security. These networks comprise the military, intelligence services, and other civil agencies. More striking are the low-intensity operations performed by these agencies are advised by international experts. Each time, these operations might be a new one each time, these operations are a formally networked agglomerate of agencies that provide an accumulation of experience. This is the global control of dissent.

The institutionalization of this external control makes the threat ever more real and concrete. This mobilization as communicating the threat is not part of us; dissent is an Other that is not a normal part of history, political history, an extraordinary threat that governments must respond to.

The architecture of Othering (or the Other) is becoming increasingly more costly and complex, which are now routinely the most expensive parts of nations' history. The expenditure and the control of dissent has no precursor in normal political history.

quarters and preparatory meetings or
Emergency Centers or protest camps. By
works, and the capacity to organize,
of expression.

tion or prevention of effective conten-
of dissent. Security territory clearly
legitimate authority and a space occu-
spaces, the protester is no longer a
silent offender, a ferocious unknown,
and guarded. The explicit and implicit
might consider expressing themselves:

economy of social control in the era of
2003, summit security budgets are huge.
has bankrolled at a federal level, exten-
(contentiously) imposed on localities
Security has become an industry, with
departments of the European Union, and
yet is the scope of the multiagency
to each successive event. These net-
migration and border control agencies,
of several countries. The
by a mix of military and civil agen-
experts; while the local police agency
agencies are increasingly advised by
of security organizations, which pro-
that otherwise could not take place.

extensive mobilization for social con-
and ever more "Other." We must read
in no uncertain terms that dissent is
that we must defend against. Dissent is
a process, and daily life but a new and
things have to be ready for.

of "security") is very expensive. It is
to police global governance events,
expensive police operations in host
of networked control of a summit pro-
policing operations; summits mobilize

extraparliamentary national budgets. The willingness to spend increasingly to the discourse and practices of war, but must be borne. But recent wars have provoked a massive public debate about morality, strategy, and the security operations for global governance that have not been granted. The budgeting for security and the budgeting for war, but there is no end to the operation, and never a victor. The security operations are informative.

The abrupt, jarring, and intense moments, followed by an equally abrupt and equally intense, can be described as the creation of what Agamben calls *exception*—a legal event in which the rule of law, purportedly in order to protect the state, the state calls for martial law so that the state can deal with a national or internal threat. Agamben argues that the state of exception, once used, becomes the permanent rule.² The state of exception is around civil flashpoints (or “emergencies”) where rights are suspended in order to impose “control.” The state of exception does not generally involve long-term investments, but it does involve “border controls, security geography, and surveillance.” So “state of exception” is not an emergency.

Another possible comparison is the state of emergency involves a long time scale, a focus on the expenditure of extensive and focused resources, and a focus on domestic militarization, ongoing control, and a focus that far outlast the flashpoint event. The state of emergency suspension of rights as in a “state of emergency” comparison are the European and U.S. states of emergency associated with the alterglobalization movements (and the organized counterinsurgents) and the organized movements to criminalize, prosecute (with punishment), and assault them (with extrajudicial force).

While imperfect, these comparisons are subject to a physical and budgetary war. Protests are now routinely defined as “acts of terrorism.” Activism relating to global governance is now a protest, the right to which is guaranteed.

and international expert advisement. Larger sums of money is comparable war, for which costs steadily increase have been accompanied by extension, strategy, and expense. In comparison, finance summits are mostly taken for that global governance events looks like no political objective for the military search for a comparison is elusive and

militarization of space for brief periods and surreal return to “normality,” could what Giorgio Agamben calls a *state of exception* where sovereign power dispenses with the law to preserve the rule of law. For example, the rule of law can survive an emergency that the state of exception, overstates. States of exception are constructed (emergencies”), such as riots, in which laws are suspended. “But domestic riot control does investigations and prosecution of “organography, and appellations of “terrorism” is an entirely adequate comparison.

counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency focus on individuals and groups, and government resources. It involves campaigns against insurgent groups (low-intensity operations), and the “state of emergency.” Most striking in this U.S. efforts regarding individuals associated with terrorism (who have been treated as state programs to identify, isolate, and sentence up to twenty-year sentences), (force).

are revealing. Protest events are in an environment comparable to that for which is necessitating a “state of exception” where governance is being dealt with not as a crisis in every modern democracy, but

as counterinsurgency. It is important story. National elites are not at war domestic Other (and his confederate discourse of terrorism is the public face of counterinsurgency).

In preparing the material for chapters 4 and 5, we were caught in a tangle of police machinations and police operations that relate to global governance events, we were perpetually tangled in their own web. We knew best and most personally, we were policing itself from public relations and policing from prosecution. Most of the time, we were distinguishing those public order tactics. Recognizing that this tangle pointed in the wrong direction, we turned to a more inductive approach that emerged to structure chapter 5. We explored the tactics, permeation, and impacts on public discourse, and movement culture. We recognized that public order tactics have psychological impacts and they are powerful. We recognized, finally, that public order tactics get outlays, personnel mobilization in public order weapons, and the rest of the police tactics have an unmistakable effect of discouraging public order to nurture dissent and thus constitute, in effect, a war against the population as a whole.

As we demonstrate in the chapters, the control of protest is taking the form of criminalization is now familiar in a public order painting graffiti and skateboarding. To analyze the criminalization of protest tactics, we must conclude that the criminalization is a right asserted at the foundations of public order. Executing it do, indeed, constitute public order policing.

We conclude that the control of public order which might resemble war but is not, indeed not be a new practice, it makes a new form of violence for these international look different in an era of the "rule

, however, that this not be the official
with their own people but with the
es from nearby countries). Thus, the
ace of elites' mobilization for domes-

chapter 4, which describes the legal
that take place immediately proximi-
e found our data-organizing schemes
eb. When we tried to analyze what
we were unable to clearly distinguish
s, surveillance from event policing,
t frustrating, we had great difficulty
ctics from psychological operations.
to knowledge we had yet to articu-
nd experiential analysis. The themes
were about marginalization, preemp-
olitical consciousness, collectivities,
e recognized that *every* policing tac-
at these impacts are in fact its most
at security perimeters, massive bud-
in the tens of thousands, use of new
actics discussed in chapter 4 have the
participation in the social spaces that
singly and together, political violence

rs on geography and policing, social
of preemptive criminalization. Such
world where teenage activities like
have been criminalized. When we
st and the use of counterinsurgency
crime is insurrection. But this "crime"
of democracy. So, policing and pros-
litical repression, rather than public

issent has become a project in itself,
not quite the same. While this may
akes sense that there is a newly orga-
ternal wars. Counterinsurgency will
of law" and manufactured consent.

This form of violence is organized to the tactical level, not only through criminalization but also through othering, marginalization, and dehumanization.

Chapter 6 describes “antirepression” as a form of primary responsibility, which is to assert responsibility about the points of impact between the state and dissent. Antirepression activism avoids ideology and hypothesis, and uses incontrovertible data to the press and public, accompanied by severe frugality, affords a unified front.

We showed that antirepression works to counter social control functions. This is possible through a particular kind of data through time. In the case of the police operation in total and complete instance, the Miami 2003 FTAA legal team used data to demonstrate that the police operation was not a terror operation. The legal team was able to determine that the assault on the *Disobedience* was a preplanned police attack, rather than a spontaneous act. However, antirepression work eventually leads to the realization that the police are neither terrorists nor violent in their actions (except for some passersby) they qualify as a form of social control.

Social movements, to be effective, must be able to think are particularly important sites of resistance. They require diverse, secure, and information-rich spaces to nurture collective intellectual and creative work. Would-be dissenters enter to find solidarity and collaboration as they look for ways to challenge the system. The case study on political violence shows the demands also require access to public spaces and the ability to challenge the existing system. Organized movements preemptive foreclosure of this public space.

Critical criminologists have long argued for the criminalization of dissent. Our chapter on political criminalization of dissent through laws, policies, and execution. Our chapter on political economy and controlling alterglobalization can be seen as a form of dissent. Our chapter on civil war counterinsurgency and civil war counterinsurgency forms of legal defense (antirepression).

to operate against dissent at the psy-
 alization and the threat of force but
 on and trivialization.

ion” activism. This work has a soli-
 mble sober and precise information
 dissenters and the state. Antirepres-
 perbole in the interest of presenting
 d in court. This stark focus, accompa-
 que view on social control.

ork produces key analyses about how
 ble because antirepression collects a
 and space and can therefore analyze
 mpare it with other operations. For
 al defense team was able to assemble
 operation had shifted from a security
 at Genoa 2001 G8 was able to deter-
ddienti march to the red zone was a
 an a public order operation. More-
 gains precise information about vic-
 ovides the decisive finding that they
 surrectionaries and, moreover, that
 lify as dissenters.

, require two kinds of space that we
 es for studying social control. First,
 ormal social space for exploration to
 eative development. This is the space
 olidarity, education, encouragement,
 ays to express themselves. Our chap-
 estruction of this space. Social move-
 pace where they can effect disruptive
 ur chapter on geography shows the
 space.

questioned the political motivations
 policing shows the creeping criminal-
 ice behavior, surveillance, and pros-
 onomy shows that the expenditures
 be compared to those for low-inten-
 surgency. Yet our chapter on activ-
 sion work) shows how this work has

documented that the victims of social violent insurrectionists. We must control insurrection and that political violence and the degradation of democracy.

Tragically, social control of dissent is reduced to individuals and formal organizations. The important sociolegal project is to gain legal recognition for the poor class so that the interests of innumerable people can be litigated.

Until then, it's cameras, lemons, and

al control are indeed dissenters, not
clude that dissent is being treated as
ce is now directed against the foun-

t has been litigated only around harm
ons. We believe that the most impor-
l standing for social movements as a
able affinity groups of dissenters may

nd fast sneakers.

Appendix

Summits Directly Cited

- ✦ Seattle November 1999 World Trade Organization
- ✦ Washington, D.C., April 2000 International
Bank (IMF/WB)
- ✦ Los Angeles August 2000 Democracy
- ✦ Cincinnati November 2000 (TABL
Dialogue)
- ✦ Prague September 2000 IMF/WB
- ✦ Québec City April 2001 Free Trade
- ✦ Genoa July 2001 G8
- ✦ Washington, D.C., September 2001
- ✦ Göteborg June 2001 EU
- ✦ New York City February 2002 WTO
- ✦ Washington, D.C., April 2003 IMF
- ✦ Denver May 2002 International C
- ✦ Sacramento June 2003 U.S. Depa
meeting for WTO
- ✦ Évian June 2003 G8
- ✦ Cancún September 2003 WTO (I
- ✦ Miami November 2003 FTAA
- ✦ San Francisco February 2004 Ant
- ✦ Gleneagles July 2005 G8
- ✦ Heiligendamm July 2007 G8
- ✦ Strasbourg April 2009 NATO

ndix A

Observed by Authors

ade Organization (WTO)

ternational Monetary Fund/World

cratic National Committee (DNC)

D (Trans Atlantic Business

3

de Area of the Americas (FTAA)

01 Antiwar protest

EF

F/WB

Chamber of Commerce (ICC)

rtment of Agriculture preparatory

Biotech)

tiwar protest

This page intentionally left blank.

onally left blank

Appendix

Of Stones and Flowers

*This is an electronic mail dialogue between me and Vittorio Sergi, both of whom are active in the anti-globalization movement. The dialogue was published in the journal *Wissenschaft und Kulturelle Bildung* 2007 G8 summit. We include it here because it demonstrates the importance of non-violence in the alterglobalization movement. It is included with permission of both authors. The *Elipses*, where they appear, were omitted.*

“Of stones and flowers,” a dialogue between me and Vittorio Sergi around the events in Rostock on August 1, 2007.

Dear Vittorio,

The events at the end of the anti-G8 march in Rostock, Germany, when there was an outbreak of police violence against some of the demonstrators (the so-called “stone-throwers”) disturbed and challenged me. I felt the need to block, but also felt the need to discuss the events. Many people on the march felt the same way. I want to understand rather than condemn (the police simply condemned the action, but that is not enough).

I wanted to discuss with you in particular because you are in the middle of the battle and because you are a philosopher and I think we can discuss honestly. My main aim for me is not to win an argument but to understand.

(1) Let me explain the way I experienced the events.

ndix B

nd Flowers'

*ogue between John Holloway and
e involved in the alterglobaliza-
was initiated following the Hei-
We include the entire correspon-
ates the complex perspectives on
on movement. It is reproduced
rs. Nothing has been removed.
e used in the original text.*

between John Holloway and Vittorio
n June 2, 2007.

march in Rostock on Saturday 2 June,
longed and violent fighting between
called “black block”) and the police,
critical of the violence of the black
uss and understand. I think a lot of
way—critical but wanting to talk and
ere were, of course, others who sim-
s not my position).

articular because I know you were in
e I have a very great respect for you
y and without disqualifications. The
nt, not to come to an agreement, but

perienced the march:

My friends and I did not have a part in the march. We walked along the main street, a very attractive place to insert ourselves. There were many people (generally young, mostly men) and many with their faces masked. We were at the front of the march, just behind the clowns and their dancing. From our perspective, the march was serious and fun. There was a massive, but at the same time, at the side of the road. We were particularly interested in the way in which they went up to the clowns, imitating them, blowing bubbles, and so on.

When the march reached its end, it was a successful, enjoyable and colourful event. Shortly afterwards and a friend I was with, they were ready for a fight. A minute later, columns of heavily-armoured police appeared. Young people dressed in black threw stones. I saw of the violence which would do much to change and many of the discussions in Rostov.

(2) I think there are three main reasons for being disturbing.

Firstly, I felt that it was the unfolding of a conflict. There were two sides prepared for battle. The preamble of the march was complete. It was a conflict, in which the majority of people were spectators. What was disturbing was the asymmetry of the conflict. In this there were clowns who confronted the police in an unorthodox way: in terms of sexuality, morality, and so on, the clowns were the opposite of the police block, in terms of uniform, sexual conservatism, and solemnity were very like the police.

Secondly, I was disturbed by the behaviour of the clowns. Although there were some women, the block was dominated by young men. The behaviour was of the sort often associated with young men: aggressive, boastful, insensitive, and surrounded by a crowd.

pre-established place of affiliation on
march before it started, looking for an
We walked past the large block of
) dressed in black, many with hoods
We inserted ourselves finally near the
samba group with their drums and
, the march was very big, colourful
t that stage inactive, police presence
icularly impressed by the clowns and
squadrons of police and made fun of
es at them, dancing around their cars

point, the harbour, I felt it had been
ul march. The "black block" arrived
s with remarked that it looked as if
te later the fighting broke out, with
e rushing back and forth and lots of
ing stones at them. This was the first
minate both the reports in the media
ock over the next few days.

asons why I found the violence dis-

ing of a two-sided, predictable ritual.
attle, two sides who knew that, once
pleted, there would be open, violent
ople present on the march would be
g was the predictability and the sym-
was a sharp contrast with the clowns
predictable and absolutely asymmet-
vement, dress, behaviour, solemnity
osite of the police, whereas the black
omposition, disposition to violence,

the macho tone of the black block.
n and perhaps some older people,
g men, and the atmosphere gener-
ted with large gatherings of young
ive to the feelings of those who

Thirdly, the action was divisive. It was not the great majority of those present, among many. The participants in the action dismissed the other demonstrators as irrelevant and the other demonstrators were in some way being divisive. In other words, the action was divisive and dismissing their feelings and their approach would recognise other people and to find a way of stirring the contradictions.

A very different and more sympathetic approach would say that that was precisely the aim of the action and to move people to action and to move people to action compared throwing stones at the police and to help people to overcome their feelings and to understand, but I think it is probably that the action probably did not have this effect and the police was probably far more effective.

Perhaps I am saying that in any action that is very important: not that the action is important, but that its capacity to resonate and that its capacity to resonate in repressed form in most people is that but that resonance is a question of what to stir inside people is their anti-capitalist feelings and we can do that is through actions that are different from actions that propose ways of behaving that are unlike those of capitalism. The resonance is the key to thinking about forms of anti-capitalist action.

(3) In explaining why I feel disturbed by the actions of 2 June, I do not simply condemn the actions used by the demonstrators was virtually the violence exercised every day by capital and the circumstances in which the use of violence is a movement against capital. But this is not what seemed to be separated from any comment as a whole. I may well be wrong in much that I have said, but then I would be wrong to me (and to anyone else who may read this).

seemed to me to go against the wishes
 and caused considerable resentment
 action seemed to dismiss the feelings
 want. I had the feeling that the other
 labeled as reformist or non-revolu-
 as identitarian, imposing a label upon
 as unimportant. An anti-identitarian
 as being self-contradictory and try
 tions within them.

etic reading of the action would be to
 the violence: to appeal to the hatred of
 on. Someone in one of the discussions
 ce to occupying a house: in both cases
 ear of authority. This argument I can
 not true, in the sense that I think the
 ct. I think the clowns' mockery of the
 e in demystifying state authority.

tion, the question of its resonance is
 should be judged simply by its reso-
 te with the rebelliousness that exists
 of very great importance. Not only
 a of asymmetry. That which we want
 pitalism, and the only way in which
 hat are anti-capitalist in their form,
 ng and ways of relating that are quite
 nance of asymmetry seems to me the
 capitalist action.

bed and challenged by the events of
 violence. It is clear that the violence
 ally nothing compared with the vio-
 against us. I accept too that there may
 of violent methods strengthens the
 s the problem: the action in this case
 nsideration of its effect on the move-
 g about this and I may be quite unfair
 ould be glad if you could explain it to
 d this).

Best,
 John

Caro John,

Your letter, in which you express your frustration and the opportunity to begin an honest and necessary dialogue on all your major questions. My reply is to bring forward an apology of violence and the urgency to explain, as a participatory state of an open process of rebellion.

The march of June 2nd had, in all its character. The fact that it would take place at the summit cast a shadow on the following week which would confront a long week of activities and events during the days of the summit. It was to represent a united movement, directly and closely linked to the customary dynamics of the summit which has, for the past ten years, seen public expressions of anti-capitalist resistance.

On the other hand, due to the pressure in Europe, the march of June 2nd had a sense of urgency and hope for a new drive for social change. A large number and strong militant spirit were present on political subjects, from the clowns you mentioned in the "black block" itself, wished to be represented on the big stage. And so did the police, which carried out the biggest security operation of its kind in the world and it couldn't fail. . . .

The so-called black block was created and made up by various smaller groups from different geographical origin. The etiquette (I don't want to fool anyone as to the diversity of the movement)

The Dissent! group took up the role of coordination and distribution of information. The group more inclined towards direct action and the group more inclined to participate in the Block G8 alliance. The character included, amongst others, the group from ATTAC and the German section of the group known as "Die Linke."

Thus, the block included anarchists from various countries (Poland, Germany, Denmark, Holland)

your criticism towards the violent
k, seemed to me an excellent oppor-
sary discussion. I will try to answer
s not motivated by the abstract need
ence or of the “black block,” but by
nt myself, the reasons, problems and

l its aspects, a ritual and predictable
ke place before the beginning of the
ring days, when more radical groups
ons without the coverage of a great
The march also constituted an effort
espite its differences. This aspect is
amics of summits and counter sum-
s at least, constituted one of the main
movements around the world.

ecedents in Germany and the rest of
a different air to it; there was energy
l movements: that also explains the
irit of the participants. All organized
ou mention to ATTAC and the “black
d and have their space of representa-
police, actually . . . it had announced
history, with a contingent of 17,000,

reated as a large group of affinities,
which varied as to composition and
black clothes, covered faces) should
subjects present.

le of a “hub,” that is, a centre of con-
ation amongst groups which were
and did not consider it convenient
ce, which due to its broad and plural
important reformist subjects such as
he European Left party, known today

st groups from many different places
nd, England, United States, Greece,

Catalunya), as well as autonomous Euskadi, Switzerland and Germany, and

Also, many anti-fascist groups without formal organization but are largely influenced by the Party (part of the Interventionist Left, i.e., the Bloc) and the Block from the bus bearing the slogan

The block thus included 3,000 to 4,000 people, covering their faces and carrying shields for self-defence in the marches. The common tactic of the block was to directly attack the private corporations, as well as the police. There was a large amount of force which could be used at the end of the rest of the march; almost the entire block which would not harm it.

So I do not believe that this choice of tactics and intentions of the rest of the march. However, there is always a great deal of difference between these marches. However, throughout these forms of protest should have the right to respect for others. Also, the block did not represent the fringes of the march for a political party. They are also a part of the movement and the struggle of action, or simply those who support the struggle respect other forms of struggle; there was no

The tactics of the block was an essential part of a direct confrontation once having reached the police forces were concentrated.

It is true that, as you mention, the block did not involve the rest of the march in a direct confrontation attacking corporations and their factories. The police, frustrated at not being able to directly attack the entire march as well as the private corporations. Those present reacted in many ways, from throwing stones to creating chains and advancing towards the police to contain the offensive of the police. The water tanks.

It is true that the block was made up of a small fact that there were not so many women. However, the initiated participation in actions and in

groups from Italy, Sweden, France, amongst others.

which in Germany do not have a sole led by the Antifascistische Linke Berlin (also of the Block G8 coalition) joined slogan "Make Capitalism History."

5,000 people who defied the ban on sticks and other instruments of self-intention of the participants in the private property of banks and corporations were also discussions as to measuring employed according to the response majority agreed on acting in a way

was in total contrast with the spirit ch. Maybe of one part, but then again erences in this kind of international years it has been established that all of "citizenship," in the boundaries of d not wish to stay in the background reason. Radical forms of direct action militant groups involved in that kind port it or individually participate in it, would be no sense in separating them. calation of actions which would lead ng reached the harbour, where most

the block also aimed at motivating and resistance against the police and in ades. Indeed, that did happen when e to defend itself from the beginning, as the people watching the concert. when that happened, from throwing ing with their hands in the air, man- police, despite the armoured cars and

up mostly of young people and the men as men is an aspect of a differen- initiatives; however, that is something

that occurs in many communities a broader problem surrounding the form. Nonetheless, I was surprised by the the clashes, by much larger than what

You also consider the majority of hension towards other forms of life a it to be a starting point, as well as a common movement which, as always the urgency, rage and passion with v exercised, “the negation of the negati

Turning our gaze towards México very different composition in the bar and social “popular” form that exists Europe. The division between young and relates to complex causes which ever, this issue cannot be solved in or

Against those who speak of a de felt, on the contrary, a lot of positiv gent. Many different ways of living a conspiring and cooperating altogether change.

Action, in the case of a march, is effectiveness. It has shown, for exam when put up against a multitude that It has also shown that the struggle a tary system cannot limit itself to even tion (and mediation), but that it rath it can mark the time, space and form called class struggle, that it does not the few collective riches that still rem

For this reason, I attach the docum sion between various groups that par of June 2nd and has been put up on t

Plan B has started already: join to t

4 June 2007—international brig

There are certain moments whe ever being a matter of calculation, as simple and direct as possible. O

and organizations and depends on a
forms and languages of political action.
the number of women participating in
it could have been observed in Italy.
young radicals as a lack of compre-
and ages. On the contrary, I consider
necessary form of construction of a
s, begins amongst the young, due to
which the negation of the existing is
on" in practice.

o, Oaxaca for example, we observe a
arricades, but that is due to a political
s only in few occasions and places in
g generations and the rest is deeper
also bear political implications; how-
ne march.

pressed and apathetic generation, I
e energy and passion in this contin-
and a lot of decisiveness and will for
er in order to achieve a radical social

not simply symbolic; it seeks direct
mple, that the police is not invincible
t seizes the initiative and cooperates.
against an economic, social and mili-
nts or public moments of representa-
er overflows and takes the initiative,
n of a confrontation that can also be
t have to restrain itself to defending
main in hands of the people.

ment which resulted from the discus-
ticipated in the confrontation march
he Dissent! website.

the battle of joy
ades

en it seems appropriate, without it
to address everybody in a manner
ne of these moments has arrived.

We want to speak briefly about
in the city of Rostock during the
speak, of course, from a partisan p
voices which at certain moments n
these moments has arrived.

This 2nd of June, thousands of
which we have so often been subj
itself out: mobilizations, demonstr
conferences crowned with pat co
some obscure functionary. Nor did
postures of those who pretend to
world and abandon themselves to
misfortunate.

These thousands, on the contrar
reacting or resisting, but took the i
places where, day after day, capita
effectiveness of the global civil war
the expression of the domination o
of dubious quality where the leade
ual, one that serves to codify their
G8 is the symbol of the suffering in
That we should be reproached for
have their hands full of blood!

In the end what happened was v
collectively and practically oppose
baleful face of the state incarnated
assemblies and long speeches, if th
in the streets of our metropolis, pr
tion.

We want to also recall another t
in the battle of Rostock: they are v
every corner of the world and ha
recognize each other, constitute g
of life. We are the nationless who
much material as symbolic—which
bodies. We are made of multiple
order to create the conditions of a
everywhere, it is why we are every
trary are brazen-faced liars.

what happened on the 2nd of June demonstration against the G8. We position, but one forged of multiple manage to become singular. One of

if people didn't wait for the ritual expected to in this movement to play actions, less than symbolic actions, conclusions long ago prepared by they accept donning the worn out be concerned with the state of the a pious compassion for the most

ry, did not content themselves with initiative, consciously attacking the alist exploitation and the material r are extended. The G8 is not only of capital over the world, a theatre ers put onto the stage another rit- rule over the lives of subjects. The nflicted daily on millions of people. r our violence when it is they who

very simple: free beings decided to the symbols of capitalism and the by all the police of the world. The hey are not followed by irruptions roduce only suspicion and resigna-

truth in relation to the combatants women and men originating from ve no need of an identity card to gangs, and experiment new forms seek to destroy the frontiers—as h separate our lives, thought and singularities who desire to join in more ecstatic life. We come from where. Those who affirm the con-

There is another truth: under every stone thrown against the com-
 body revolting against oppression,
 sad passions and resentments, if t
 have fought and resisted for so lo
 at those with whom you are conn
 you will find one of these bodies,
 hands engaged in the struggle. Joyf
 joined to the assault on command
 waged in the heart of the asymme
 the sadness of the weapons and bo
 nothing, together we are a power.
 commune of Rostock.

We all arrived here with a pers
 tory of struggle and battle waged
 don't want this event to be perceiv
 old cycle of struggle which, since
 many disappointments. We believ
 June was the signal of a powerful
 phase of defeat and that this battle
 this breach permits us to flee toget
 the side of freedom.

And now comrades, we block th
 Long live the commune of Rostock
 International Brigades

June 2nd must also be judged in a
 lowing days, the same people that en
 in constructing and participating in
 from the kitchen to the collective
 parties, political and artistic work
 young . . .) returned to its everyday p

The massive blockades of the 6th
 variety of forms of struggle and actio
 the others. Dissent!, as well as Block
 individuals joined the marches and b
 Everyone, from the most radical
 groups, cooperated in order to avoid
 to make blockades effective.

every black mask was a smile, in
common enemy there was joy, in every
there was desire. We don't harbor
that had been the case we wouldn't
ong. Thus don't be deceived, look
ected, or whom you love; perhaps
one of these smiles, one of these
ful passions placed in common and
l—such is the secret of the battles
trical conflict which opposes us to
odies of power. Individually we are
Together we are a commune: the

sonal and collective history, a his-
in every corner of the earth. We
red as a simple continuation of the
September the 11th, has known so
re on the contrary that the 2nd of
and determined rupture with this
e inaugurates new offensives. That
her to the other side of the mirror,

ne flows . . .

ock and Reddelich!

a broader time frame. During the fol-
ncouraged the clashes were involved
many self-managed camp activities:
bars, workshops, alternative media,
shops, the multitude (yes, mostly
positive forms of action.

a, 7th and 8th were in benefit of the
on; none was more determinant than
k G8 and non-organized groups and
lockades, other forms of swarms. . . .
pacifists to the toughest anarchist
a violent escalade of the conflict and

That leads us to the conclusion that the participants in the June 2nd march, the "army of the people," is a swarm, and not the "army of the people" form that is closely linked to the informal movement of the 80s, as well as to the movement especially active in the environment. It is a form, a kind of intelligent mob with a history in Europe and the United States. The decision to cover faces is of a practical utility in times of repression, it reflects the resonance of powerful symbols like the clava. From the Zapatistas of 1994 to the present, rebels cover their faces in order to be anonymous.

The clashes of June 2nd and the formation of the "army of the people" as to how to react against the repression and the ethics cannot be an alibi for impotence. It is not an alibi for the collaboration with the repression. There have been consistent pacifists, but they have been gas discharges in the face for trying to block a blockade, on the ground with dogs. Nonetheless, we must work together in a common sense in order to be able to defend ourselves, defend the cities, defend strikes, defend meetings, in a growing state of siege as in Europe.

That is why I do not believe that the "army of the people" is an efficient response to these matters either by being confusing and delegitimizing the authorities, but we cannot all become clowns, nor can we be tanks with flowers. We need everyone to be part of this movement and uneven power relations.

By the way, we will always love flowers. The flowers in gun barrels have gone by. The flowers in the hands of thousands of urban assault troops, gas charges, water tanks, and the less crowd speak of the madness and the violence in our days. That is not insignificant. The most radical groups do not respond to the repression, there is a conscience and a rejection of the formal organization and authority. How

that in the minds of most of the par-
 black block is but a transitory form,
 movement.” It also adopts an aesthetic
 influences of the “Autonomen” German
 the Anglo-Saxon anarchist movement,
 tal struggle. It is, thus, a transitory
 in a long history in radical dissent in
 onning of black clothes and covered
 of generalized video control. It also
 symbols of rebellion such as the bala-
 Carlo Giuliani in Genoa in 2001, the
 e seen.

Following days urgently pose the ques-
 repressive apparatus. Pacifism and its
 ce, or worst, as in the case of ATTAC,
 ressive military apparatus. However,
 whom I have seen receive blows and
 to break the police lines or resist in
 gs and truncheons biting their skin.
 er in a wider and more coordinated
 autonomous spaces, in the countryside
 ad and train blockades, marches and
 and militarization, in México as well

the clowns that you so admire are an
 ther. They have a very positive role in
 ority and aggressiveness of the police,
 either will we always be able to stop
 one, we cannot disqualify anyone in
 lation.

owers, but the days of putting flow-
 e images of military helicopters fly-
 unarmed protesters, launching police
 nks and horses against the defence-
 dangerousness of the police appara-
 ant. Put up against this phenomenon,
 with militarization; on the contrary,
 n of symmetrical violence, of hierar-
 iver, this does not mean there is not

a search for forms of power, for ways
asymmetrical forms of resistance and

I hope I have answered a few of
doubts. However, everything is under
creation; that is the positive aspect of
partial, but encouraging victory. We

Caro Vittorio,

We agree on much, but not on all.
the “black block” (or perhaps “black
although I do remain suspicious of a
men, and I would be even more suspic
men. And I agree that it is important
the week’s actions, where the atmos
of respectful unity-in-diversity. I also
issue: my argument is not a pacifist
stone-throwing keeps worrying me.

Let me emphasise again that I res
police. But for me respect cannot m
it means saying “we are comrades, th
ences and doubts openly.” That is wh

We are at war. Let’s start from the
especially the last five years) have se
ist violence against humanity. We ca
(as the Zapatistas put it) or as the w
Eloína and I put it in an article a few
we should fight this war.

The notion of war is perhaps unf
asymmetry: one army fights another
ence between the organisation (the se
erally, it does not matter very much
and the militarization which accomp
for the sort of social relations that we
more numerous, better equipped, mo

There are two problems about thi
in these symmetrical terms. Firstly,
way we can match the military pow

of changing power relations through
d attack.

questions and maybe cleared some
er an open process of discussion and
of today's movement. Rostock was a
continue to walk and discuss!

Saludos,
Vittorio

The question of the composition of
(“non-block”) is not so important—
ny group composed largely of young
icious of one composed largely of old
at to see the march in the context of
phere was certainly a very good one
o agree that violence is not the central
one. And yet the whole thing of the

spect those who throw stones at the
ean just a side-by-side co-existence:
at is why we must discuss our differ-
at these notes are about.

ere. The last twenty years or so (and
een a great intensification of capital-
an see this as the Fourth World War
war of all states against all people (as
years ago). The question then is how

ortunate, because it usually suggests
r army, and there is not much differ-
ocial relations) of the two sides. Gen-
which side wins: either way, the war
pany it signify a defeat for humanity,
e want to construct. It is generally the
ore cleverly aggressive side that wins.
nking of the struggle for a new world
we would probably lose: there is no
ver of the capitalist states. And sec-

only, and even more important: symbolically, we are reproducing the social relations.

The question then is how we think symbolically. The enormous strength of the confrontation with the police is that they clearly “our strength is that we are not like you.”

You suggest that clowns and flower-carriers are not strong enough. You say “we must work together in a sense in order to be able to defend ourselves in the cities, defend strikes, road blockades, meetings, in a growing state of siege as we see it in Europe. That is why I do not believe that flower-carriers are an efficient response to these major problems. What do you mean? It does not mean “defence” in the traditional sense of the state could overcome stone-throwing. It does not mean flower-carriers or clowns. Defence is not about persuasion. How do we dissuade the state from using its armed power? Is stone-throwing more effective than carrying? Probably not, because the strength is not of physical strength but of resonances: our actions succeed in stirring throughout society, in making the state impose limits on state action: the degree to which the state is afraid of the social reaction that our actions provoke. Thinking in terms of resonances makes it easier for the state to violently repress a group of flower-carriers? Violent repression is probably easier for the state in the case of flower-carriers.

Take the Zapatistas, for example. The Zapatistas resist (so far) a violent repression of their movement in terms of “defence” but in terms of persuasion. They have persuaded the state from violent repression of their movement but above all by their communiqué, their actions, their presence through the world. Maybe we should think of ourselves as armed by being armed but always acting in a symmetrical relation with the state. Their resistance to the army attacked on 9 February 1994 was a question of persuasion. Perhaps the greatest strength of the Zapatistas is that they understood war as a question of aes-

ymmetrical organisation means that
ns that we are struggling against.

nk about fighting this war asymmetri-
flowers in the guns and of the clowns
emphasise this asymmetry. They say
ot like you and that we shall never be

rs may be important but that it is not
ther in a wider and more coordinated
autonomous spaces, in the countryside
oad and train blockades, marches and
nd militarization, in México as well as
ve that the clowns that you so admire
tters either." But what does "defence"
any absolute sense. The armed force
rowers just as easily as it could over-
nce really has to be understood as dis-
te from exercising the full force of its
e effective in this respect than flower-
dissuasive effect is not a question of
f the resonances that the participants
y. It is above all these resonances that
ree to which the resonances make the
t might follow from a violent repres-
s and reactions, we must ask: is it eas-
group of stone-throwers or a group of
possible in both cases, but I think it is
e of stone-throwers.

How do we explain the ability of the
repression by the state? Not so much
dissuasion. The Zapatistas have dis-
sion by being armed for self-defence,
s which have resonated so strongly
l see the Zapatistas as armed clowns:
a way that emphasised their asym-
r flight, with marimba and all, when
5, is an outstanding example of that.
e Zapatistas is that they have always
thetics, of theatre. The obvious con-

trast in México is with the EPR, who and has never succeeded (or perhaps chances that would act as a defence ag

Which is more radical, the EZLN or the EZLN, because they are constant because they are far more asymmetrical can see that for some people, groups cal, because they appear to represent tion with the state.

The state, in its fight against us, resonances of our movement, in direct, symmetrical confrontation with then open repression becomes poli my worry: not a moral condemnation appears to be more radical is in fact against capital.

If we think of the issue in terms of fight that war, then I would suggest struggle that our struggle must be asymmetry (the clear manifestation that like them) is crucial to the strength should be room for people who th room for people who say that stone- of fighting (and of course that guns w

Caro John,

By a strange coincidence, I write this in México. I had to return for personal confrontation is feared in the town of C thousands of people who wished to Guelaguetza were violently repressed ing in many men and women impriso

The reality of violence, of its men formists, is presented over and over inequality, of exploitation. That is, as

And also as a form of organization and apparatus, such as the army a

which is a classical armed organisation (as tried) in stirring the sort of resonance against a state.

or the EPR? For me, without doubt, by re-thinking the struggle, above all in their relation to the state. But I like the EPR may appear more radical a more direct and violent confrontation

constantly tries to weaken the social part by pushing us more towards with it. If they succeed in doing that, it is more easy for them. That is the case of stone-throwing, but that what is less radical and weakens the struggle

of the Fourth World War and how we can use as a principle of the effectiveness of the struggle asymmetrical to that of capital. Asymmetrical struggles are not like them and will never be reduced to the level of anti-capitalist resonances. There are many ways to throw stones, but there must also be ways to throw stones (stone-throwing is not a very effective way and would be an even less effective way).

Saludos,
John

these lines while returning to Italy from Mexico for political reasons, today, when a new confrontation is taking place in Oaxaca, where I was last week, when the police and the army, result in the death and injury of many people.

the use of force and its use against the nonconformist as the reality of oppression, of the state as a social relation.

of military and militarized groups and the police. The history of these

people is filled with this violence, it Europe, records a long chain of violence perpetrated by these organizations, in defence of the State and capital.

Now, our discussion has led us to I still disagree with you: I agree with of great importance and an obvious rent situation. Parting from the unequal power relations, it is reasonable to accomplished in a symmetrical revolution but rather through a diagonal change. This perspective obviously affects politics of confrontation with the established does not exclude open confrontation.

I see the need for blending various symmetrical confrontation, in the same relation of violent domination which depend greatly on cultural differences. For example, the same practice of very different in Germany, against in order to boycott the Guelaguetz ment, in the same way that participat Guinea Conakry or Colombia can mean ing to the context, the violence use of different forms and natures than has different political aims, it respects the defence of dignity and not of the legality.

Obviously, aspects of symmetry present. When we think of an asymmetry cannot ignore the issue of organization and creative, but it must also be considered others, so as to consider three fundamentals of all revolutionary politics: time, space opportunity. Referring to a violent you say: "Firstly, we would probably the military power of the capitalist system important: symmetrical organisation social relations that we are struggling

s memory, in America as well as in
ations, injustices, unpunished crime
whose reason of existence lies in the

o some important points, on which
n your approach on asymmetry. It is
s significance in relation to the cur-
quality of power in the current social
think that no radical change will be
ution, in a sort of topsy-turvy world,
ge, a tearing, thousands of ruptures.
litical practices and, therefore, prac-
blished powers. However, I believe it

ious forms of action in this asym-
way that the forms of breaking the
ch imposes relations of exploitation
es and different historical heritages.
participating in a demonstration is
the G8, or in Oaxaca, this morning,
ca of the authoritarian PRI govern-
ating in a pacific march in Pakistan,
mean risking one's life. Thus, accord-
d by the people for their defence is
the ones used by those in power, it
onds to different criteria, to that of
imposition of an abstract order and

and forms of coordination are also
metrical confrontation with power we
on. Our action must be spontaneous
ordinated and organized along with
amental aspects of the development
ace and, as Machiavelli pointed out,
confrontation with the state forces,
lose: there is no way we can match
states. And secondly, and even more
n means that we are reproducing the
g against.”

I do not agree. Given that we are in a “Fourth World War” and that the violence of power is presented as a police officer safeguarding order, if the soldier enters our house in order to steal, we must resist and pledge our commitment to the struggle. A moment of confrontation could also put the nation in a difficult position.

If we think that it is not possible, we are contributing to the oppression of the armed groups. A moment of confrontation for gaining power (and not for peace) would once again be the only tragic outcome.

My second comment is on your observation about the theatricality of the indigenous peasants. From their point of view, the military is being called “brothers.” The military is the enemy, they try to conserve its structure. However, they have managed to avoid fratricide, despite their numerous crimes. Their behavior is, without doubt, peculiar and the fact that the war in México has not ended in carnage, a *mal de la mala*, is without a shred of doubt something to be proud of on the EZLN itself. However, we must not forget that it still has, a disposition to war. In this sense, the EZLN should be considered more or less as a political group. To this day, the latter has a modern structure, forms of the past, more openly confronting the state army; however, despite its clear Marxist ideology, it would adopt markedly asymmetrical tactics if this were to lead to a tactical advantage. From a tactical point of view, the EZLN had the capacity for political action, and its experience in the field is a base for thinking about possible forms of struggle in the near future.

Despite our differences, I agree with you that we must turn asymmetrical struggle into a violent one. It is necessary to express our rejection towards the current system of power.

Taking “Fourth World War” seriously is a system of violence set up against

...e going through the “Fourth World
...is not simple defensive, i.e., it is not
...ding a bank, but rather as a thief who
...e must consider defence as necessary
...possibility that asymmetrical forms
...military power of capitalist states in a

...that it is not possible to put an end
...roups of the state, then symmetrical
...d control over the repressive bodies)
...options for us, who are underneath.

...mention of the EZLN. I agree with
...cal and ritual sense of this army of
...point of view, I have even heard the
...The Zapatistas do not dehumanize
...s human face and, to this moment,
...de war with the paramilitary groups
...r form of political struggle has been,
...that the conflict in the South East of
...s happened ten years ago in Guate-
...something positive that partly depends
...ust consider that the EZLN had, and
...sense, I do not believe this organiza-
...less radical than the EPR, for exam-
...us operandi which is much closer to
...ontational and focused on the enemy
...arxist-Leninist political positioning,
...cal forms of guerrilla warfare if that

...We could rather say that, from our
...acity to adapt and innovate its forms
...e of “asymmetrical” struggle is a good
...ms of revolutionary political struggle

...with your concern about the need to
...rtue of the anti-capitalist movement,
...system in a negative, non-dialectical

...usly amounts to admitting that there
...t us. Therefore, our strategy of con-

frontation cannot be accused of triggering supply media elements for its justification: the latter can occur without the need for

You say: “It is above all these resources that define our action: the degree to which the resources available to us, the social reaction that might follow a violent action, the degree to which our action can indeed put a limit, doubt no doubt, marches and actions where stones are thrown instead of stones. However, as the resources available to us shows, there are moments when it is not from above, against our flowers and

We began our discussion in the streets of Oaxaca and ended up in the streets of Oaxaca. . . . We know there is an ongoing process of simultaneous confrontations, and the United States is being militarized and organized

However, we also know that our victory, has to commit to the defeat of the enemy in time. It would be meaningless to win

How this is possible, we can only know. México—Madrid, 23 de julio de 2007

Caro Vittorio,

You are right, of course, that we are facing many different situations in the world

Thinking of México, there is one image that has been in my mind in the last few days: the famous photo of a young woman pushing back big armed soldiers. This photo has been very widely used and undoubtedly had an enormous political impact. It is a force of asymmetry, but it could be a very powerful and unreal image of the conflict in Chiapas. The next dialogue (for the moment) would be to

gging the repression; maybe it can
 cation, but then again we know that
 l for an effective excuse.

onances that impose limits on state
 onances make the state afraid of the
 violent repression.” The resonances of
 dissuade the State, and there will be,
 re it will be better to throw flowers
 cent history of the people of Oaxaca
 becomes clear that violence comes
 our dancing.

protests against the G8 in Germany
 aca, without a conclusion, it would
 ng confrontation, made up by differ-
 d that the security machinery of all
 ized against the “internal enemy.”

ictory, from a revolutionary perspec-
 f war and of the enemy at the same
 a war and lose dignity.

y found out in practice. Ciudad de
 7.

e talking not just of Rostock but of
 d that require different responses.

image that keeps on coming to my
 s photo of the Zapatista women liter-
 who were trying to invade their vil-
 r circulated all over the world and has
 ical impact. For me it illustrates the
 rgued that it also creates a romantic,
 as. Perhaps one way to close the dia-
 leave that image as a question.

Ciao,
 John

This page intentionally left blank.

onally left blank

Appendix

Suggestions for

We believe that the new landscape we have articulated should be in Table 4, which encourages a common social movements with ours for social

TABLE

<i>Social Movements</i>	Geography	
Resources		
Political Opportunities		
Framing		
Cultures of Resistance		

Political violence, particularly psychological violence, particularly ongoing prosecutions, and cultures because they affect everyday life through the geography of cities and the geography of global governance itself, they are not only for street fights but also for Criminalization steals the frame from the movement to retain their personal, organizational, and surveillance invade the everyday life, disrupting their capacity to build and maintain

ndix C

Future Research

scape of social control of dissent that
e explored through the matrix shown
bination of analytic categories from
al control.

LE 4.

Social Control

Political Economy	Political Violence

chological operations, constrains the
own frame. Laws affecting activists,
as we've described, affect movement
y lives. As states exert social control
public space and manage a geogra-
deny and create political opportuni-
o on a symbolic and discursive level.
m dissenters, who must struggle to
and political focus. Prosecution and
e of activists and organizations, dis-
aintain cultures of resistance.

We hope that this book inspires and thereby contributes to vigorous investigation and equally vigorous protection of dissenters who would like to see further developed a

- ❖ The quantitative extent of discouragement
- ❖ The long-term effects on local politics and intense “Othering” of citizens
- ❖ The extent and content of critical security budgets
- ❖ The extent of linkage between domestic management institutions and terrorism
- ❖ The international cooperation of nations in criminalizing dissenters
- ❖ An assessment of how far national security operations globalize
- ❖ The interrelation of social control and channeling dissent

as many questions as it answers and investigation of social control and an nt. Some of the research agendas we re:

agement of dissenters

police of temporary militarization

s

al intragovernmental discourse on

domestic and regional dissent-man-

m-management institutions

intelligence services and their role

alisms counter the tendency to glo-

ol and cooptation mechanisms in

CHAPTER 1

1. Ben Trott, "Gleneagles, Activism and C Down! The G8, Gleneagles 2005 and the M et al. (Dissent! and Autonomedia, 2005), 213.
2. Morris Janowitz, "Sociological Theory Sociology 81, no. 1 (July 1975): 82–108.
3. George Herbert Mead, "The Genesis tional Journal of Ethics 35, no. 3 (April 1925).
4. George Vincent, "The Province of Soc (January 1896): 488.
5. Karl Mannheim and Edward Shils, M tion: Studies in Modern Social Structure (F
6. Edward Shils, "The Theory of Mass S
7. Barrington Moore, "Reflections on C cal Power and Social Theory (Harvard Univ
8. Janowitz, "Sociological Theory and S
9. Noam Chomsky, *Necessary Illusions: ies* (Pluto Press, 1989); Edward S. Herman a Consent: The Political Economy of the Mas McChesney, *The Problem of the Media: U.S. First* (Monthly Review Press, 2004); Sut Jha Media Education Foundation, 1997, <http://www.cgi?preadd=action&key=101>.
10. Jack P. Gibbs, "Social Control, Deter Social Forces 56, no. 2 (December 1977): 40
11. Jack P. Gibbs, *Social Control: Views P. Gibbs, Control: Sociology's Central Noti*
12. Dorothy E. Chunn and Shelley A. M or Analytical Quagmire?" *Contemporary C*
13. Robert F. Meier and Weldon T. John Legal and Extralegal Production of Confor no. 2 (April 1977): 292–304.
14. Richard Quinney, *Critique of Legal C* (Transaction, 1974); Peter B. Kraska, "Crim

Ordinary Rebelliousness,” in *Shut Them Down: Movement of Movements*, ed. David Harvie
 1–33, <http://shutthemdown.org/details.html>.
 and Social Control,” *American Journal of*

of the Self and Social Control,” *Internation-*
): 251–77.

ciology,” *American Journal of Sociology*

an and Society in an Age of Reconstruct-
 Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1949).

society,” *Diogenes*, no. 39 (1962): 45–66.

onformity in Industrial Society,” in *Politi-*
 iversity Press, n.d.).

ocial Control.”

Thought Control in Democratic Societ-

and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing*

ss Media (Pantheon, 2002); Robert W.

S. *Communication Politics in the Twenty-*

ally, *Advertising and the End of the World*,

www.mediaed.org/cgi-bin/commerce.

rence, and Perspectives on Social Order,”

8–23.

from the Social Sciences (Sage, 1982); Jack

on (University of Illinois Press, 1989).

. Gavigan, “Social Control: Analytical Tool

Crises 12, no. 2 (1988): 107–24.

son, “Deterrence as Social Control: The

mity,” *American Sociological Review* 42,

Order: Crime Control in Capitalist Society

inal Justice Theory: Toward Legitimacy

and an Infrastructure,” *Justice Quarterly* 23
 al., “Leaving a ‘Stain upon the Silence’: Con
 of Dissent,” *British Journal of Criminology*

15. P. A. J. Waddington, *Policing Citizens*
 64.

16. Nicos Ar Poulantzas, *Political Power*
 1973).

17. György Lukács, *History and Class C*
 (Merlin Press, 1923); Antonio Gramsci, *Pris*
 Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dial*
 Fragments (Stanford University Press, 1944
 (Routledge, 1970); Theodor W. Adorno, Ne
 bert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man: Stud*
 Society (Beacon Press, 1964); Herbert Marc
 of Pure Tolerance, ed. Robert Paul Wolff, B
 (Beacon Press, 1965); Louis Althusser, “Ideo
 first published in *La Pensée*, 1970,” in *Lenin*
 Ben Brewster (Monthly Review Press, 2002)

18. Paul E. Willis, *Learning to Labor: Ho*
 Jobs (Columbia University Press, 1981); Jay
 and Attainment in a Low-Income Neighbo

19. Chomsky, *Necessary Illusions*; Herm
 sent; Michael Parenti, *Inventing Reality* (Pa
 Problem of the Media.

20. Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Co*
 McCarthy (Beacon Press, 1981).

21. Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Femi*
 ledge, 1990); Annamarie Jagose, *Queer The*

22. Erich Goode, *Deviant Behavior* (Pre

23. Michel Foucault et al., *Technologies*
 Press, 1988); Michel Foucault, *The History*

24. Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to*

25. Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cl
 They Succeed, How They Fail (Vintage, 197

26. David P. Waddington, Karen Jones, a
 Public Disorder (Routledge, 1989); David P.
 Public Disorder (Routledge, 1992).

27. Pamela Oliver, “How Does Repressio
 edu/~oliver/PROTESTS/PROTESTS.HTM
 important by Piven and Cloward.

28. John Wilson, “Social Protest and So
 (April 1977): 470, 475.

29. Pamela Oliver, “Repression and Crim
 ars Should Pay Attention to Mass Incarcera
 tion 13, no. 1 (February 2008).

30. *Ibid.*

, no. 2 (2006): 167–85; Paddy Hillyard et al., *Contemporary Criminology and the Politics of Punishment*, no. 3 (May 2004): 369–90.

...ns: Authority and Rights (Routledge, 1999), ...

...r and Social Classes (Humanities Press, ...

...onsciousness, trans. Rodney Livingstone ...son Notebooks (International, 1929); Max ...ectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical ...); Theodor W. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory* ...gative Dialectics (Routledge, 1966); Her- ...dies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial ...cuse, “Repressive Tolerance,” in *A Critique ...erkeley Commune, and Herbert Marcuse ...ology and Ideological State Apparatuses, ...n and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. ...*), 272.

...ow Working Class Kids Get Working Class ... MacLeod, *Ain’t No Makin’ It: Aspirations ...rhood* (Westview Press, 1987).

...han and Chomsky, *Manufacturing Con- ...algrave Macmillan, 1986); McChesney, The ...*

...mmunicative Action, trans. Thomas ...

...nism and the Subversion of Identity (Rout- ...ory (Otago University Press, 1997).

...ntice-Hall, 1984).

...of the Self (University of Massachusetts ...of Sexuality (Vintage, 1988).

...Revolution (McGraw-Hill, 1978).

...loward, *Poor People’s Movements: Why ...* (1977).

...and C. Critcher, *Flashpoints: Studies in ...* Waddington, *Contemporary Issues in ...*

...on Work?” 2002, <http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/>

... She excludes the cooptation seen as ...

...cial Control,” *Social Problems* 24, no. 4 ...

...ne Control: Why Social Movements Schol- ...ation as a Form of Repression,” *Mobiliza-*

31. Ibid., 185.
32. Robert Weissman, "First Amendment Rights," *Multinational Monitor*, May 1998, mm1998/051998/weissman.html.
33. Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr., "Dissent, for the 'Central Meaning' of the First Amendment: A Meditation on Law, Religion, and Harvard University Press. 1998. *Dissent*, In: By Steven H. Shiffrin. Princeton: Princeton Review 98, no. 6 (2000): 1613–77.
34. Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, C Press, 1992).
35. Cass R. Sunstein, *Why Societies Need* 2003).
36. William A. Gamson, *Power and Dis*
37. David C. Schwartz, *Political Alienati* action, 1973).
38. Stephen C. Craig and Michael A. M Action," *Journal of Politics* 43, no. 2 (May 19
39. Henry A. Giroux, "When Hope Is Su
40. Sunstein, *Why Societies Need Disse*
41. Bryan S. Turner, "The Erosion of Cit no. 2 (June 2001): 189–209.
42. John Gaventa, *Power and Powerless* Appalachian Valley (University of Illinois P
43. *Kusper v. Pontikes*, 414 U.S. 51, 56 (1
44. Archon Fung, "Associations and Der Realities," *Annual Review of Sociology* 29 (
45. For a nice summary of the major opt Nick Crossley, *Making Sense of Social Mov*
46. Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement* tics (Cambridge University Press, 1998).
47. Ron Eyerman and Andrew Jamison, (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991).
48. Richard Flacks, *Making History: The* (Columbia University Press, 1988); Paul Gil Double Consciousness (Verso, 1993); Carlo cano Movement (Verso, 1989); Ann Bookm erment (Temple University Press, 1988). Th 1962), which initially shared Weber's conce the form of political consciousness studies, of activists. Recent North American explor Gloria Anzaldúa, *Making Face, Making Sou* Perspectives by Feminists of Color (Aunt L
49. Mayer N. Zald and Roberta Ash, "So Decay and Change," *Social Forces* 44, no. 3

- nt Follies: Expanding Corporate Speech
<http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/>
- Free Speech, and the Continuing Search
 ndment. Review of *The Dissent of the Gov-*
Loyalty. By Stephen L. Carter. Cambridge:
 justice, and the Meanings of America.
 University Press. 1999," *Michigan Law*
- ivil Society and Political Theory (MIT
- ed Dissent (Harvard University Press,
- content (Dorsey Press, 1968).
- ion and Political Behavior (Aldine Trans-
- aggiotto, "Political Discontent and Political
 1981): 514–22.
- ubversive," *Tikkun*, 2004.
- nt.
- izenship," *British Journal of Sociology* 52,
- ness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an
 Press, 1980).
- 1973).
- mocracy: Between Theories, Hopes, and
 August 2003): 515–39.
- tions and what is at stake in them, see
 vements (Open University Press, 2002).
- : Social Movements and Contentious Poli-
- Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach
- e American Left and the American Mind
 roy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and*
 s Muñoz, *Youth, Identity, Power: The Chi-*
 an, *Women and the Politics of Empow-*
 e collective behavior tradition (Smelser
 rns about dangerous crowds, continues in
 which focus on explaining the psychology
 ations of political consciousness include
 ul: *Haciendo Caras: Creative and Critical*
 ute Foundation Books, 1990).
- ocial Movement Organizations: Growth,
 (1966): 327–41.

50. John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Social Movements: A Partial Theory," *American Journal of Sociology* 70, no. 2 (1964): 1212–41.

51. Peter K. Eisinger, "The Conditions of Political Mobilization," *American Political Science Review* 67, no. 1 (1972): 11–27; Debra C. Minkoff, "Conceptualizing Political Mobilization," *Journal of Democracy* 25, no. 3 (June 2004): 1457–92.

52. David A. Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micro-Mobilization, and Movement Participation," *American Sociological Review* 54, no. 4 (1989): 464–81; Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, "Movement Participation: An Overview and Assessment," *Annual Review of Sociology* 32 (2006): 1–28. annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.soc.32.060105.105553

53. Eyerman and Jamison, *Social Movements: A Cognitive Perspective* (1988).

54. Pamela E. Oliver and Hank Johnston, "Frames in Social Movement Research," *Movements* 1, no. 1 (2002): 1–12.

55. Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance," 817–42.

56. Alain Touraine, *The Voice and the Eye* (Cambridge University Press, 1981).

57. Alberto Melucci, *Nomads of the Present: Needs in Contemporary Society* (Hutchinson, 1986); *Exchange and Collective Identity in Industrial Societies: Conflict in Western Europe since 1968*, ed. Alberto Melucci (vol. 2 (Macmillan, n.d.), 277–98).

58. Eyerman and Jamison, *Social Movements: A Cognitive Perspective* (1988).

59. Susan Bibler Coutin, *The Culture of Politics: Bureaucracy, Sanctuary Movement* (Westview Press, 1999); *Activist Cultures*, eds. Susan Bibler Coutin and Robert D. Benford (Routledge, 2006); *Moral Protest: Culture, Biography, and Creative Activism* (Chicago Press, 1999); George McKay, *DiY Culture: The Politics of Community in a Consumer Age* (Verso, 1998); Francesca Polletta, "Cultural Politics: Framing on the Cultural Dimensions of Protest," *Journal of Democracy* 25, no. 3 (June 2004): 431–50; Richard Gabriel Fox and Orin Starn, *Cultural Politics and Social Protest* (Rutgers University Press, 2004); Evelina Dagnino, and Arturo Escobar, *Cultures of Politics: Visioning Latin American* (Westview Press, 1996); *Cultural Studies*, ed. Paula Treichler, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2004).

60. Melucci, *Nomads of the Present*.

61. Ulrich Beck, "World Risk Society as a New Paradigm of Modernity: Conditions in a Framework of Manufactured Uncertainty," *Journal of Modernity and Modernization* 13, no. 4 (1996): 1–32; Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society in the Late Modern Age* (Stanford University Press, 1984); *Political Virtue and Shopping: Individualism and the Moral Economy* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

62. Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (1990).

ld, "Resource Mobilization and Social
Journal of Sociology 82, no. 6 (May 1977):

f Protest Behavior in American Cities,"
1 (March 1973): 11–28; David S. Meyer and
al Opportunity," Social Forces 82, no. 4

ent Processes, Micromobilization, and
ological Review 51, no. 4 (August 1986):

now, "Framing Processes and Social
," November 28, 2003, <http://arjournals.w.soc.26.1.611>.

ments, in the later case summarizing Rucht

a, "What a Good Idea! Ideologies and
obilization 5, no. 1 (2000): 37–54.

7–58.

ye: An Analysis of Social Movements

sent: Social Movements and Individual
on, 1989); Alessandro Pizzorno, "Political
rial Conflict," in *The Resurgence of Class*
Colin Crouch and Alessandro Pizzorno,

ments.

Protest: Religious Activism and the U.S.
3); Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans,
edge, 1995); James M. Jasper, *The Art of*
ativity in Social Movements (University of
Culture: Party and Protest in Nineties Brit-
ure and Its Discontents: Recent Theoriz-
' Sociological Inquiry 67, no. 4 (fall 1997):
n, *Between Resistance and Revolution*:
s University Press, 1997); Sonia E. Alvarez,
ures of Politics, Politics of Cultures: Re-
, 1998); Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson,
d. (Routledge, 1991).

Cosmopolitan Society?: Ecological Ques-
certainties," *Theory, Culture and Society*
odernity and Self-Identity: Self and
University Press, 1991); Michele Miche-
uals, *Consumerism, and Collective Action*

and the Subversion of Identity.

63. Deborah B. Gould, "Passionate Politics into the Study of Social Movements," in *Re-Making Meaning, and Emotion*, ed. Jeff Goodwin and David Gaeremynck (New York: Routledge, 2003), 307.
64. Melucci, *Nomads of the Present*, 26, 100.
65. Ibid.
66. Tarrow, *Power in Movement*.
67. Eyerman and Jamison, *Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach: Authority: How Ordinary People Change A*
68. Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker, and David Collier, *Transnational Social Movements, 1960-2000* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).
69. William F. Fisher and Thomas Ponnert, *Alternatives to Globalization at the World*
70. *Notes from Nowhere, We Are Everywhere: A Handbook to Anticapitalism* (Verso, 2003).
71. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Penguin, 2004).
72. Étienne de la Boétie, *The Politics of Servitude*, trans. Harry Kurz (1552; Black River, MA: Black River Press, 1991).
73. Henry David Thoreau, *The Varieties of Government* (Twayne, 1849).
74. Voltairine de Cleyre, *Direct Action* (New York: Arno Press, 1970).
75. David Graeber, "The New Anarchist Movement," in Saskia Poldervaart, *The Utopian Politics of the Amsterdam School for Social Science Research* (Amsterdam School for Social Science Research, 2004), <http://www.uva.nl/assr/workingpapers/>; Barbara Epstein, "The New Anarchist Movement," *Monthly Review* 53, no. 1 (2001), <http://www.monthlyreview.org/0901epstein.htm>.
76. George McKay, *DiY Culture: Party and Politics* (London: Routledge, 1998).
77. Tarrow, *Power in Movement*.
78. George Katsiaficas, *The Subversion of Politics: Latin American Movements and the Decolonization of Everyday Life* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).
79. Tim Jordan and Adam Lent, *Storming the Castle: How to Change* (Lawrence and Wishart, 1999).
80. Max Weber, "The Types of Legitimate Domination," in *Outline of Interpretive Sociology* (University of Chicago Press, 1985).
81. Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (University Press, 1998).
82. James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance* (Yale University Press, 1990).

ical Processes: Bringing Emotions Back
 thinking Social Movements: Structure,
 and James M. Jasper (Rowman and Little-

11.

ments; Frances Fox Piven, *Challenging
 America* (Rowman and Littlefield, 2006).

and Kathryn Sikkink, *Restructuring World
 Networks*, and (University of Minnesota

iah, *Another World Is Possible: Popular
 Social Forum* (Zed Books, 2003).

where: *The Irresistible Rise of Global*

Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age

*Obedience: The Discourse of Voluntary
 ose Books).*

n Civil Disobedience (Resistance to Civil

Mother Earth, 1912).

s,” *New Left Review*, no. 13 (2002): 61–73;

*Feminist Alterglobalisation Groups: The
 Personal Change for Utopian Practices*

earch, January 2006), <http://www2.fmg>.

in, “Anarchism and the Anti-Global-

. 4 (n.d.), <http://www.monthlyreview>.

and Protest in Nineties Britain (Verso,

*of Politics: European Autonomous Social
 ryday Life* (AK Press, 1997); Barbara

olution (University of California Press,

ng the Millennium: The New Politics of

*te Authority,” in *Economy and Society: An
 ty of California Press*, 1925), 2.*

ereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford

Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts

83. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (London: Pluto Press, 1967).

84. Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Vintage, 1975); Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Continuum International, 2004); David Graeber and David Wengrow, *The Dawn of Everything: How a Small Tribe Disrupted the World* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2021); Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Harvard University Press, 2000); Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Multitude: War and Democracy at the End of the Age of Empire* (London: Routledge, 2004).

85. Piven and Cloward, *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail, and Why They Don't* (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

86. Amory Starr et al., "The Impacts of Social Isolation and Association: A Socio-Legal Analysis," *Journal of Law and Society Studies* 42 (2008): 251–70.

87. For a broader discussion of the innovation of the 'right to the city' see Christian Scholl, "Desiring Disruption. The Politics of the City in the Age of Protest in Europe," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Cambridge, 2019.

88. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Emancipation and Democracy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (London: Routledge, 2001).

CHAPTER 2

1. John Walton and David Seddon, *Free Trade and the World: The Economics of Global Adjustment* (Blackwell, 1994).

2. Walden Bello and Stephanie Rosenfeld, *Globalization's Double-Edged Sword: Economies in Crisis* (Penguin, 1992); Davis, *Revolution and the World: Mr. Camdessus—Open Letter of Resignation to the International Monetary Fund* (New Horizons Press, 1997); *Is Enough: The Case against the World Bank* (South End Press, 1994).

3. Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).

4. David Harvey, *Spaces of Hope* (University of Minnesota Press, 2000); David Harvey, *Spaces of Capital: Towards a Critical Theory of Urban Accumulation* (London: Routledge, 2006).

5. Edward W. Soja, *Seeking Spatial Justice* (London: Routledge, 2010).

6. See Randall Amster, *Lost in Space: The Urban Ecology of Homelessness* (LFB Scholarly Publishing, 2017).

7. Charles Tilly, "Contention over Space and Place," *Journal of Law and Society Studies* 37 (2003): 221–25.

8. Doreen B. Massey, "Politics and Space," *Environment and Planning A* 16 (1984): 65–84.

9. Luis A. Fernandez, *Policing Dissent: Surveillance and the New Social Movement* (Rutgers University Press, 2008).

10. John A. Agnew, *Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics* (London: Routledge, 2005).

11. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Continuum International, 2004).

Earth (Grove Press, 1965).
ish: The Birth of the Prison (Vintage,
Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and
2004); Agamben, Homo Sacer; Michael
d University Press, 2000); Michael Hardt
democracy in the Age of Empire (Penguin,

Movements; Tarrow, Power in Move-

State Surveillance on Political Assembly
Qualitative Sociology 31, no. 3 (2008):

ations in protesters' repertoires see
e Two Sides of a Barricade during Summit
iversity of Amsterdam.

Hegemony and Socialist Strategy:
ndon: Verso, 1985).

Markets and Food Riots: The Politics of

d, Dragons in Distress: Asia's Miracle
on L. Budhoo, Enough Is Enough: Dear
on to the Managing Director of the Inter-
ress, 1990); Kevin Danaher, Fifty Years
ak and the International Monetary Fund

pace (Wiley-Blackwell, 1991).

ersity of California Press, 2000); David
cal Geography (Routledge, 2001).

tice (University of Minnesota Press,

ne Criminalization, Globalization, and
larly Publishing, 2008).

e and Place," Mobilization 8, no. 2 (June

e/Time," New Left Review, no. 196 (1992):

Social Control and the Anti-globalization
).

oning World Politics (Routledge, 1998).

Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and
2004).

12. See the work of the following authors on the character of the movement: Kevin McDonald, "Movements beyond 'Collective Identity'—7," *Movement Studies: Journal of Social, Cultural, and Political Studies* 109; David Graeber, "The New Anarchists," *Journal of Cultural Studies* 109.
13. Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*.
14. At the time, this fenced-in protest perimeter was common after these types of perimeters would grow in size.
15. States News Service, "Public Announcements for G8 Summit in Alberta Creates Potential for Protest," *AP Wire*.
16. Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*.
17. City of Miami Police Department (2007).
18. Donatella della Porta and Herbert R. Kitschelt, *Social Movements in Western Democracies* (1998).
19. Because the exact legal definition of arrest differs across countries, we conflate the terms.
20. Josee Legault, "We Need a G20 Protocol of Control in Toronto," *The Gazette*, July 9, 2009. http://www.gazette.ca/story/2009/07/09/legault.html?hl=en&q=++Legault%2C+Josee+We+need+a+g20+protocol+of+control&as_ylo=&as_vis=0.
21. Peter B. Kraska and Victor E. Kappeler, "The Rise and Normalization of Paramilitary Units in the United States," *Journal of Criminal Justice* 30, no. 4 (2001): 381–94.
22. Peter B. Kraska, *Militarizing the American Mind: Changing Roles of the Armed Forces and the Police* (2007).
23. Peter B. Kraska, "Militarization and the Police," *Policing* 1, no. 4 (2007): 501–13.
24. Avery F. Gordon, *Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociology of Struggle* (University of Minnesota Press, 1997).
25. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*.
26. Michel Foucault, Michel Senellart, and Paul Rabinow, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France* (2009).
27. Patrick F. Gillham and John A. Noack, "Transgressive Protests and the Limits of Normalization," *Policing* 1, no. 4 (December 2007): 341–57.

CHAPTER 3

1. House of Commons, G8: Gleneagles Summit, www.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldhansrd05060601.htm.
2. For example, private security guards were hired for the G20 Summit in Toronto, as this newspaper story chronicles: "Private Security Firm Hired for G20 Summit," *Ottawa Citizen*, May 31, 2009. <http://www.ottawacitizen.com/2009/05/31/Private+security+firm+hired+summits/3096101.html>.

ers for a discussion on the decentralized world, "From Solidarity to Fluidarity: Social The Case of Globalization Conflicts," *Social and Political Protest* 1, no. 2 (2002): New Left Review, no. 13 (2002): 61–73. Plateaus.

perimeter was considered large, but shortly to encompass much larger areas.

ncement by the U.S. Department of State: r Disruptions," June 17, 2002.

ish: *The Birth of the Prison* (Vintage, 1975). 004). FTAA: After Action Review, 2004. eiter, eds., *Policing Protest: The Control cracies* (University of Minnesota Press,

the difference between detention and the numbers here.

be: Arrest Record Shows Police Were out 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=arrest+record+G20+probe&btnG=Search&as_

ler, "Militarizing American Police: The its," *Social Problems* 44 (1997): 1.

merican Criminal Justice System: The he Police (UPNE, 2001).

Policing—Its Relevance to 21st Century

Haunting and the Sociological Imagination

nd François Ewald, *Security, Territory, ace*, 1977–78 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

kes, "More Than a March in a Circle: egotiated Management," *Mobilization* 12,

Summit Costs, 2005, <http://www.publica->
[vo050706/text/50706-03.htm](http://www.publica-vo050706/text/50706-03.htm).

were hired for the 2010 G8/G10 meeting cles: "Private Security Firm Hired for G8/ 10, <http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/93558/story.html>.

Officer, Assessment of Planned Security
Ottawa, Canada, June 23, 2010, <http://.../SummitSecurity.pdf>.

Installed on Nearly Every Corner
June 3, 2010, <http://news.nationalpost...>

Installed-on-nearly-every-corner-of-down-

“Police Buy New Style Sonic Devices,” Washington Times,
[www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/oct/01/police-buy-.../](http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/oct/01/police-buy-...)

Unpublished, scholarly report: John Kirton,
“G8 and G20 Summit Costs,” unpublished report,
Department of Global Affairs, University of Toronto,
www.g8.utoronto.ca/.../factsheet/factsheet_costs.html.

www.g8.utoronto.ca/; “G8 Research

Edited in Luis A. Fernandez, *Policing Dissent: Social Movement* (Rutgers University Press,

simultaneously.

“G8 and G20 Summit Costs.”

“Complexity and Irony in Policing and Protest,” *Social Justice* 27, no. 2 (n.d.): 212–36.

Officer, Assessment of Planned Security

were used for the security operations in
however, claimed that these flight hours
, which have to be completed by the sol-

“Antwort der Landesregierung Mecklen-
burg-Vorpommern der Abgeordneten Birgit Schwebs, Frak-
tion (March 31, 2009).”

“Land und Meer: Der G8-Gipfel als Höhepunkt
der G8-Summit,” *heise.de*, 2007, <http://www.heise.de/tp/r4/>

“Antwort der Landesregierung Meck-
lenburg-Vorpommern der Abgeordneten Birgit Schwebs,

“Antwort der Landesregierung auf die
Drucksache 5, no. 1160 (December 20, 2007).”

“Antwort der Landesregierung auf die
Drucksache der NPD,” *Drucksache* 5, no. 1811

“G8-Gipfel—Genua,” July 28, 2007, http://gipfelsoli...e_davor/3843.html.

21. Von Manuela Pfohl, "G8-Gipfel-Bilanzzahlen," STERN.DE, August 28, 2007, <http://www.stern.de/wirtschaft/g8-gipfel-bilanz-meck-pom-muss-fuer-gipfel-bilanzzahlen>.
22. An estimated one-third of the shops of Geneva were broken during the summit.
23. Andreas Beckmann, "Central Europe: World Bank meetings in Prague," Central Europe Review (2000), <http://www.ce-review.org/00/31/beckmann.html>.
24. House of Commons, UK, G8: Geneva Summit.
25. Elliott Lianne, "G20 Fake Lake Revelations." *World Post*, August 27, 2007.
26. Paul Marsden, "What Price a Global Summit?" *World Post*, August 27, 2007, <http://www.worldpost.com/content/v1.1/paulmarsden.html>.
27. Anneke Halbroth, "Hätten sie das nicht besser gemacht?" *World Post*, August 27, 2007, <http://www.stadtgespraeche-rostock.de/2007/08/27/anneke-halbroth>.
28. D. A. Farenthold, "D.C. Police Struggles as Riots Hesitate," *Washington Post*, August 27, 2007.
29. Ibid.
30. "Nach Krawallen beruhigt sich Lage in Rostock," *World Post*, August 27, 2007, <http://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/rostock/2007/08/27/nach-krawallen-beruhigt-sich-lage-in-rostock>.
31. Initially, France had promised to cover the cost of the summit.
32. Michael Howie, "MoD Accuses Police of Keeping Line Troops," *news.scotsman.com*, April 9, 2005, <http://www.scotsman.com/news/military/military-accuses-police-of-keeping-line-troops-1.3960688.jp>.
33. Interestingly, the Ministry of Defense in Iraq and Afghanistan would impose budget cuts.
34. Bill Jacobs and Brian Ferguson, "Blair Refuses to Help Meet," *news.scotsman.com*, March 9, 2005, <http://www.scotsman.com/news/military/military-blair-refuses-to-help-meet-1.2609125.jp>.
35. Ibid.
36. Interestingly, the rise in the estimate of the number of police officers in the protocols related to the alleged danger of Iraq and Afghanistan beyond the influence of the provincial government, "Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht der Bundestag zur Beratung und Beschlussfassung dem Gesetzentwurf der Landesregierung," *Bundestag*, August 27, 2007.
37. Deutscher Bundestag, "Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Fraktion Die Linke," Drucksache 16, no. 16, August 27, 2007.
38. K. M. Mathur, *Challenges to Police*, (Gyan Books, 2003).
39. From an interview with a member of the organization of Fernandez, *Policing Dissent*.

CHAPTER 4

1. Jennifer Earl, "Tanks, Tear Gas, and Tearful Repression," *Sociological Theory* 21, no. 1 (2002): 1-15.

- nz: Meck-Pom muss für Gipfelschäden
[//www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/felschaeden-zahlen-596306.html](http://www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/felschaeden-zahlen-596306.html).
- windows in the wealthy shopping district protests.
- e Review—A Bubble Burst: The IMF-
 Europe Review 2, no. 31 (September 18,
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/er/2003/er31.htm).
- agles Summit Costs.
 "The Summit Is a Bubble Burst," June 23, 2010.
- Future?, 2001, <http://globalization.icaap.org/>.
- cht woanders machen können?," April 20,
www.stern.de/046/0229/.
- uggle to Staff IMF Protests; Outside Agen-
 cy, 2002.
- in Genf-hohe Sachschäden," February 6,
www.stern.de/046/0229/.
- ver two-thirds of the costs of the protest.
 ce of Keeping G8 Cash Needed for Front-
 2008, <http://news.scotsman.com/uk/MoD->
- e pretended that the actual wars going on
 getary restrictions on homeland support.
 ir Refuses to Help Meet Cost of G8 Sum-
<http://news.scotsman.com/edinburgh/>
- ed costs was justified by citing security
 international terrorism, protocols that were
 ument. Landtag Mecklenburg-Vorpom-
 des Finanzausschusses (4. Ausschuss) zu
 Drucksache 5, no. 100 (May 12, 2006).
 Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage
 . 6090 (2007).
- Human Rights and National Security
- f the planning team, first published in
- Taxes: Toward a Theory of Movement
 (January 1, 2003): 44–68.

ial Control,” *Social Problems* 24, no. 4

ter, eds., *Policing Protest: The Control of*

es (University of Minnesota Press, 1998).

Order and Political Contention,” in A

Willan Publishing, 2003), 928.

ontrol,” 470, 475.

, but You Can’t Beat the Ride’: Bringing

Research in Social Movements, Conflicts

the Agents of Social Control,” *Journal of*

on Work?” 2002, <http://www.ssc.wisc>.

. She excludes the cooptation seen as

nl, “Repression, Micromobilization, and

ecember 1990): 521–47.

est, 30–31.

n, and Herbert Reiter, eds., *The Policing of*

eborg 2001 EU.

us Politics at Transnational Summits:

the Policing of Transnational Protest, ed.

Herbert Reiter (Ashgate, 2006), 60–63.

in Miami, Florida.

the Policing of Transnational Protest, 16.

‘Netwar in the Emerald City: WTO

and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime,

Ronfeldt (Rand, 2001), <http://www.rand>.

the Policing of Transnational Protest,

the Policing of Transnational Protest in

Protest, ed. Donatella Della Porta, Abby

06), 75–96.

the Policing of Transnational Protest, 33.

“Aspects of the ‘New Penology’ in the

in the United States, 1999-2000,” in *The*

atella della Porta, Abby Peterson, and Her-

ec City,” rabble.ca, April 26, 2001, <http://>

Québec-city; For example, regarding the

Québec City 2001 FTAA meeting, see Judy rabble.ca, April 22, 2001, <http://www.rabble.ca>, Klein, "The Bonding Properties of Tear Gas" www.naomiklein.org/articles/2001/04/.

26. Heidi Boghosian, *The Assault on Freedom* (New York: Basic Books, 2004); A National Lawyers Guild Report on Government Surveillance and Civil Liberties Rights in the United States (North River Press, 2004), [sentBookWeb.pdf](http://www.nlg.org/sentBookWeb.pdf); New York Civil Liberties Union, *Police Brutality: A Special Report about Police and Protest* (New York: New York Civil Liberties Union, 2005), www.nyclu.org.

27. Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, *Organized Unemployment: How They Succeed, How They Fail* (Vintage, 1977).

28. RNCNotWelcomCollective, <http://slingshot.org>, "Face Masks" Slingshot Issue #082.

29. Piven and Cloward, *Poor People's Movements*.

30. David Cunningham, *There's Something Wrong with America: The Klan, and the FBI* (University of California Press, 1992).

31. *Ibid.*, 185.

32. *Ibid.*, 6.

33. *Ibid.*, 180–214.

34. T'Okup, "Nestlegate ist Kein inzelfall, sondern ein Musterfall!" *spitzelin entlarvt!*, 2008.

35. John Clyde Stauber and Sheldon Rampton, *Corporate Power, Global Threats* (Common Courage Press, 1995).

36. Jules Boykoff, *The Suppression of Dissent: How the Government Squelch US American Social Movements* (New York: Basic Books, 2004); *Something Happening Here*; Christian Davenport, *Agents of Change: Action: The Case of the U.S. Government and the World* (University of California Press, 2004); *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 1 (February 2005); *Journal of Fear: Poland and East Germany before 1945* (Columbia University Press, 1998); Robert J. Merton, *Social Structure and Social Theory* (Free Press, 1936); *Modern America* (Schenkman, 1978); Marx, "The Agent Provocateur and the Control"; Gary T. Marx, "Thoughts on a New Participant: The Agent Provocateur and the Control," *Social Problems* 21, no. 2 (September 1974): 402–42; Gary T. Marx, "Control or Facilitate Social Movements," in *The Dynamics of Social Change: Mobilization, Social Control, and Tactics*, ed. Christian Davenport, *Frontiers of Sociology Symposium*, Vol. 1 (University of California Press, 1979), 94–125; Gary T. Marx, *Uncensored: The Control of Information* (University of California Press, 1988).

37. Christian Davenport, "Killing the Affirmative Action: The Decline and the Death of Black Power," 2004, <http://www.davenport.com/killing%20the%20afro%20041006.pdf>; *Speech Acts and Resistance in Authoritarianism*, ed. Christian Davenport, Hank Johnston (University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 108–137.

Rebick, "Policing the People in Québec," www.cbc.ca/news/policing-people-Québec; Naomi Klein, "The Shock Doctrine," Naomi Klein, April 25, 2001, <http://www.naomiklein.org/>

Free Speech, Public Assembly, and Dissent: Government Violations of First Amendment Rights (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 2004), www.nlg.org/resources/Dissent.htm; American Civil Liberties Union, Rights and Wrongs at the RNC: A Report from the Republican National Convention (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 2004), www.nyclu.org/pdfs/rnc_report_083005.pdf; Naomi Klein, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism and the Selling of the Poor* (New York: Picador, 2007).

www.slingshot.tao.ca/displaybi.php?oo82020,

movements.

What's Happening Here: The New Left, the New Right, and the New Center (New York: Basic Books, 2004), 6.

ll: Eine Weitere securitas-angestellte als

ampton, Toxic Sludge Is Good for You

Dissent: How the State and Mass Media Control Dissent (New York: Routledge, 2006); Cunningham, *There's No Alternative*, "Understanding Covert Repressive Operations Against the Republic of New Africa," *Journal of Democracy* (2005): 120–40; Helena Flam, *Mosaic of Dissent* (Boulder: East European Monographs, Boulder, 1989); Justin Goldstein, *Political Repression in Mexico* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); "Civil Disorders and the Agents of Social Change: A Neglected Category of Social Movement," *Journal of Social Issues* (1977); "The Informant," *American Journal of Sociology* (1977); T. Marx, "External Efforts to Damage Social Movements: Resource Mobilization and the Informant," *American Journal of Sociology* (1977); Mayer N. Zald and John David McCauley, *From Protest to Politics: The Case of the Student Movement* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); *Undercover: Police Surveillance in America* (New York: Basic Books, 2004).

ro: State Repression, Social Movement Organization, and the Informant," *American Journal of Sociology* (1977), <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/davidson/papers/robertson.pdf>; Hank Johnston, "Talking the Walk: The Role of the Informant in Authoritarian Regimes," in *Repression and Mobilization: The Role of the Informant* (New York: University Press of America, 1977); Gilda Zwerman, Patricia Steinhoff, and

Donatella della Porta, "Disappearing Social New Left Protest in the U.S., Japan, Germany 85–104.

38. Donatella della Porta, *Social Movements Comparative Analysis* (Cambridge University Press, 2006).

39. Marx, "Civil Disorders and the Age of Surveillance on a Neglected Category of Social Movements"; Marx, *Undercover: Gangster Social Movements*; Marx, *Undercover: Gangster Social Movements: Some Reflections on the Law Enforcement*, *Criminal Justice Ethics and Fear*; Ward Churchill and Jim VanderWall, *From the FBI's Secret Wars against Dissent to The Age of Surveillance: The Aims and Methods of the System* (Vintage, 1980); Frank J. Donner, *Police Repression in Urban America* (University of California Press, 1970); Schultz and Ruth Schultz, *It Did Happen Here in America* (University of California Press, 1997); The Price of Dissent: Testimonies to Political Repression of California Press, 2001); Richard Gidycz Hoover (Free Press, 1987); Cunningham, *The Report*, "Understanding Covert Repressive Action: Repression, Social Movement Decline and Suppression of Dissent."

40. Donner, *Protectors of Privilege*.

41. Della Porta and Reiter, *Policing Protest*.

42. At <http://annalist.noblogs.org/static>

43. Cliff Pearson, "Released Dallas Activist," *Independent Media Center*, August 4, 2000.

44. At <http://rnc8.org>.

45. At www.leiu.org.

46. Chip Berlet, "The Law Enforcement Menace (Political Research Associates, 2004), http://www.pra.org/Hunt_For_Red_Menace-07.html.

47. New York Civil Liberties Union/American Civil Liberties Union, "Trampled Civil Rights during Republican National Convention," October 7, 2004, <http://www.aclu.org/freeing-republican-national-convention-nyclu>.

48. Erin Starr, "Little Guantanamo and the Hunt for Red Menace" (widely circulated on the Internet), 2004, <http://www.yahoo.com/groups/msg00022.html>; Drew Pinsky, "The Hunt for Red Menace," [nyc.indymedia.org](http://www.nyc.indymedia.org), November 17, 2004, [play/132549/index.php](http://www.nyc.indymedia.org/play/132549/index.php).

49. Adam Porter, "It Was Like This Before: The Hunt for Red Menace in Genoa and the Anti-capitalist Movement (October 2001)." www.indymedia.org, October 2001.

l Movements: Clandestinity in the Cycle of
ny, and Italy," *Mobilization* 5, no. 1 (2000):

ments, Political Violence, and the State: A
ity Press, 1995).

nts of Social Control"; Marx, "Thoughts
ent Participant"; Marx, "The Dynamics of
ary T. Marx, "Under-the-Covers Under-
the State's Use of Sex and Deception in
11, no. 1 (1992): 13–24; Flam, *Mosaic of
The COINTELPRO Papers: Documents*
(South End Press, 1990); Frank J. Donner,
thods of America's Political Intelligence
rotectors of Privilege: Red Squads and
ersity of California Press, 1990); Bud
ere: Recollections of Political Repression
1989); Bud Schultz and Ruth Schultz,
cal Repression in America (University
vers, Secrecy and Power: Life of J. Edgar
here's Something Happening Here; Daven-
ction"; Davenport, "Killing the Afro: State
the Death of Black Power," [http://www.
ne%20afro%20041006.pdf](http://www.ine%20afro%20041006.pdf); Boykoff, *The*

est.

/library.

ist Recounts Jail Abuses," Philadelphia
, <http://www.phillyimc.org/en/node/33582>.

Intelligence Unit," in *The Hunt for Red*
93), <http://www.publiceye.org/huntred/>

American Civil Liberties Union, "Police
National Convention, NYCLU Charges,"
speech/police-trampled-civil-rights-dur-
charges.

the Republican Convention" (e-mail

<http://www.mail-archive.com/laamn@>

Poe, "Pier 57: The LMDC / RNC Connec-
04, <http://nyc.indymedia.org/feature/dis->

re . . . 75–79," in *On Fire: The Battle of*
One-Off Press, 2001), 77.

50. Anonymous, "Being Busy," in *On Fire: The Anti-capitalist Movement* (One-Off Press, 2001), 49.

51. Please see Appendix B for an extensive list.

52. John Hughes, "Life during Wartime," in *On Fire: The Anti-capitalist Movement* (One-Off Press, 2001), 50.

53. Allison Kilkenny, "Police Use Painful Weapons," *Truthout*, September 28, 2009, <http://www.truthout.org>.

54. Colin Clark, "Marines Fund Non-Lethal Weapons," *Defense Security Solutions*, October 9, 2008, <http://www.defensesecuritysolutions.org>.

55. A. Fulghum, "High Power Microwave Near-Death Ray," *Aviation Week*, October 9, 2008, <http://www.aviationweek.com>.
56. "Protest in America: Microwave 'Non-lethal' Weapon," *www.GlobalResearch.ca*, October 14, 2008, <http://www.globalresearch.ca>, [php?context=va&aid=10564](http://www.globalresearch.ca/php?context=va&aid=10564).

57. Jazz, "Life during Wartime," in *On Fire: The Anti-capitalist Movement* (One-Off Press, 2001), 51.

58. Amnesty International, USA: Less than Lethal, www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/less-than-lethal-toll-hits-334-mark-20081216.

59. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, "The Effectiveness and Safety of Pepper Spray," *Report*, 2003, http://74.125.95.132/search?q=cache:nij/195739.pdf+safety+of+pepper+spray&hl=en&as_sitemap=1&as_sitemap=1.

60. For a summary of medical literature on the use of pepper spray, see *Investigative Reporting*, December 1, 2008, <http://www.investigativejournalism.org/articles/aretaserssafe>.

61. Michael Bond, "Could Non-lethal Weapons Replace Lethal Weapons?" *New Scientist*, September 17, 2008, <http://www.newscientist.com/mg19926745.700-could-nonlethal-weapons-replace-lethal-weapon-testing>.
62. "U.S. Police Could Get 'Pain Beam' Weapons," *New Scientist*, September 24, 2008, <http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn19926745.700-could-nonlethal-weapons-replace-lethal-weapon-testing>.

63. See <http://www.less-lethal.org>.

64. "Coverage from Gothenburg EU Summit," *Indymedia*, June 17, 2001, <https://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/2001/06/1000000.html>.

65. Isaac D. Balbus, *The Dialectics of Law: A Study of the American Criminal Courts* (Russell Sage, 1968), 10.

66. Media G8way Gipfelsoli Infogroup, "Gipfelsoli: 225 Years of Jail Sentences," *Gipfelsoli*, October 1, 2007, http://www.gipfelsoli.com/Heiligendamm_2007/MediaG8way_Heiligendamm_2007.

67. Supporto legale, "In Any Case, No Right to Life," www.supportoingle.org/?q=node/1271.

68. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gothenburg>.

re: The Battle of Genoa and the Anti-capi-

ive discussion of this concept.

' in *On Fire: The Battle of Genoa and the* (2001), 26.

l New Weapon on G20 Protesters," *Alter-*
about.org/092909D.

thal Heat Ray," www.defensetech.

www.defensetech.org/archives/004461.html; David

ly Operational," *Aviation Week*,

www.defensetech.com/aw/generic/story_channel.

8.xml; Tom Burghardt, "Curbing Social

' Weapons to Be Used for "Crowd Con-

2008, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index>.

ire: The Battle of Genoa and the Anti-

, 88.

an Lethal?, December 16, 2008, <http://>

www.defensetech.com/aw/generic/story_channel

f Justice Programs, National Institute of

pper Spray (Research for Practice)," April

m5xsZVHst4J: www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/

l=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us&client=firef

, see "Are Tasers Safe?," Center for Inves-

<http://centerforinvestigativereporting.org/>

Weapons Increase Conflict?,"

<http://www.newscientist.com/article/>

ns-increase-conflict.html; David Ham-

' Weapons," *New Scientist*, December

article/dn16339-us-police-could-get-

nmit Protests," www.indymedia.org.uk,

www.indymedia.org.uk/en/2003/09/277946.html.

gal Repression: Black Rebels before the

973).

"G8 Genoa: State Prosecution Demands

ober 29, 2007, <https://gipfelsoli.org/Home/>

endamm/english/4366.html.

regret," press release, 2007, <http://www>.

burg_Riots#Statistics.

66. Chris Steller, "Minnesota Independence See You Next Year," Minnesota Independent www.minnesotaindependent.com/20527/judge-to-rnc8-see-you-next-year/, accessed 10/20/09.

67. Keith Coffman, "Nuns Sentenced to Prison," [www.commondreams.org](http://www.commondreams.org/news/03/07/26-01.htm), July 26, 2003, <http://www.commondreams.org/news/03/07/26-01.htm>.

68. See <http://www.freefreenow.org>. Last accessed 10/20/09.

69. See <http://shac7.com>.

70. See <http://www.freesherman.org>.

71. Wolfram Metzger, "Repression in Germany: Prisoners Incarcerated for Terrorism," www.venezuelaindependiente.com/einstellung.so36.net/en/ps/630.

72. Greenpeace USA, "Bush vs. Greenpeace," www.greenpeace.org/usa/news/bush-vs-greenpeace.

73. Rick Anderson, "Delta's Down with It," www.seattleweekly.com, December 22, 1999, <http://www.seattleweekly.com/1999/12/22/with-it/>.

74. Marius Heuser, "Germany: Huge Security Summit," World Socialist website, June 21, 2002, http://www.wsworld.org/html?act_id=17014.

CHAPTER 5

1. "[a]ctors who experience and contest their situation do not do so all their lives and do not belong to a particular class."

2. Albert Melucci, *Nomads of the Present: Social Movements, Needs in Contemporary Society* (Hutchinson, 1986), 173.

3. *Ibid.*, 173.

4. After asking this question, the interviewer left the room so that participants could discuss the question with anyone twice.

5. Richard Flacks, *Making History: The Social Movement Movement* (Columbia University Press, 1988).

6. John Hughes, "Life during Wartime," *Anti-capitalist Movement* (One-Off Press, 2002), 10. In one case, a low-tech chemical barrier against tear gas was used instead. In both cases, those attacked wet a cloth over their nose and mouth.

7. Amory Starr et al., "The Impacts of Social Movements: A Socio-Legal Analysis," *Qualitative Sociology*, 2002, 10.

8. George Katsiaficas, *The Subversion of Politics: European Radical Movements and the the Decolonization of the Mind* (Borgo Press, 2004), 10.

ent: News. Politics. Media. Judge to RNC8:
at, December 17, 2008, [http://minnesotain-
rou-next-year](http://minnesotain-
rou-next-year) And see <http://www.rnc8>.

Prison for Colorado Nuclear Protest,”
<http://www.commondreams.org/head->

ers is due to be released early in December

ermany: Editor of Venezuelan Book
[analaysis.com](http://www.commondreams.org/head-), November 17, 2007, <http://>

Peace Overview,” May 10, 2004, <http://www>.
[peace-overview](http://www.commondreams.org/head-).

It: The Justice Department and the Elite
against WTO Protesters,” *Seattle Weekly*,
[kly.com/1999-12-22/news/delta-s-down-](http://www.seattleweekly.com/1999-12-22/news/delta-s-down-)

Security Operation Exposed in Wake of G8
2007, http://www.tni.org/detail_page.

the system’s contradictory requirements
ing to a single social category” (p. 61).
ent: *Social Movements and Individual*
on, 1989), 60.

fewer turned off the tape recorder and/
coordinate their tallies so as not to count

American Left and the American Mind

in *On Fire: The Battle of Genoa and the*
(2001), 25. In Europe, lemon is the favored
In North America, vinegar is used,
a cloth with the liquid and place it over

State Surveillance on Political Assembly and
Comparative Sociology 31, no. 3 (2008): 251–70.
of Politics: *European Autonomous Social*
Everyday Life (AK Press, 1997).

9. Alberto Melucci, *Challenging Codes: Postmodern Politics and Digital Culture* (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 70–71.

10. Jules Boykoff, *The Suppression of Dissent: How the Right Squelch US American Social Movements* (Rowman and Littlefield, 2004); Christian Davenport, “Under the Radar: The Case of the U.S. Government against the R.I.C.,” *Resolution* 49, no. 1 (February 2005): 120–4; Christian Davenport, “Agents of Social Control,” *Journal of Social Issues* 60, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 697–717; Gary T. Marx, “Thoughts on a Neglected Category: The Agent Provocateur and the Informant,” *American Journal of Sociology* 79 (September 1974): 402–42; Gary T. Marx, “Under the Radar: Some Reflections on the State’s Use of Sex Workers,” *Criminal Justice Ethics* 11, no. 1 (1992): 13–27; Christian Davenport, *East Germany before 1989*, East European Monographs (Columbia University Press, 1998).

11. Critical Mass is an international tactic of bicyclists who ride city streets together to defend rights of bicyclists. Acting on the concept “We aren’t blocking traffic, we’re challenge traffic policy. In several U.S. cities, police have arrested riders, and so on; see <http://www.criticalmass.org>.

12. The reduction of anonymity is clearly illustrated by its association with Neighborhood Watch, which relies on the vigilance of neighborhood residents to monitor and report anyone entering the neighborhood.

13. Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (Vintage, 1975), 237.

14. Barry Glassner, *The Culture of Fear* (Basic Books, 1999).

15. Francesca Polletta, *Freedom Is an Everlasting Fight: How Women’s Social Movements Shaped America* (University of Chicago Press, 2006).

16. Marianne Maeckelbergh, *The Will of the People: How the Social Movement Is Changing the Face of Democracy* (New York University Press, 2006).

17. Mark Irving Lichbach, *The Rebel’s Dilemma* (University of Michigan Press, 1995); Robert W. White, “From the Streets to the Micromobilization of the Provisional Irish Republican Army,” *Journal of Sociology* 94, no. 6 (May 1989): 1277–1300; Christian Davenport, *Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (University of Chicago Press, 1998); Gilda Zwerman and Patricia S. Schuler, “Social Movements and the New Left Cycle of Resistance in the United States,” in *Resistance and Mobilization*, ed. Christian Davenport and Hank Johnston (University of Minnesota Press, 2004).

18. Christian Davenport, “Killing the Affirmative Action: The Decline and the Death of Black Power,” <http://www.criticalmass.org/killing%20the%20afro%20041006.pdf>; Hank Johnston, “Acts and Resistance in Authoritarian Regimes,” in *Resistance and Mobilization*, ed. Christian Davenport, Hank Johnston, and Gilda Zwerman (University of Minnesota Press, 2004).

Collective Action in the Information Age

Present: How the State and Mass Media (Routledge, 2006); David Cunningham, *There's a Klan, and FBI* (University of California Press, 2005); "Standing Covert Repressive Action: The Republic of New Africa," *Journal of Conflict Studies* 10, no. 1 (Spring 1970): 19–57; Gary T. Marx, "Civil Disorders and the Issues 26, no. 1 (Winter 1970): 19–57; Gary T. Marx, "The Role of Social Movement Participant: The American Journal of Sociology 80, no. 2 (September 1975): 300–314; Helena Flam, *Mosaic of Fear: Poland and the 1980s* (University of California Press, 1988).

atic in which a group of bicyclists travel together on bicycles, oppose automobilism, and have fun. "If we are traffic, we are traffic," participants directly address the issue. Critical Mass has been criminalized and is now a critical-mass.org/.

ny present in community policing, as individual Watch programs. These programs use cameras to reduce the anonymity of any "outsider"

ish: The Birth of the Prison (Vintage Books, 1977).

asic Books, 2000).

ndless Meeting: Democracy in American History (New York: Basic Books, 2002).

f the Many: How the Alterglobalisation of the World is Changing Democracy (Pluto Press, 2009).

Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005).

From Peaceful Protest to Guerrilla War: The Rise and Decline of the Republican Army," *American Journal of Sociology* 102, no. 1 (September 1996): 1–45.

2; Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

steinhoff, "When Activists Ask for Trouble: The Case of the United States and Japan," in *Repression and Mobilization*, ed. Hank Johnston, Hank Johnston, and Carol McClurg Mueller (University of Michigan Press, 2005), 85–107.

ro: State Repression, Social Movement Studies, and the Internet (<http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/davenport/>).

k Johnston, "Talking the Walk: Speech Acts and the State," in *Repression and Mobilization*, ed. Hank Johnston, Hank Johnston, and Carol McClurg Mueller (University of Michigan Press, 2005), 108–131.

Minnesota Press, 2005), 108–37; Gilda Zweig della Porta, “Disappearing Social Movement Protest in the U.S., Japan, Germany, and Italy”

19. Melucci, *Challenging Codes*, 386.

20. Donatella della Porta, *Social Movement Comparative Analysis* (Cambridge University Press, 2006).

21. Luis Corradi, Patricia Weiss Fagen, and Manuel Antonio Garretón, *Fear at the Edge of America* (University of California Press, 1999); *Ethnography of Political Violence* (University of California Press, 2005); C.G.M. Robbens, *Political Violence and Transylvania*, 2005).

22. Donatella della Porta and Herbert R. Kitschelt, *Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies* (University of California Press, 1998).

23. Black Bloc is a tactic in which a group of protesters wears black clothing, boots, and black ski masks, bandanas, or hoods. The tactics, which originally developed in Germany, are used to avoid identification of the protesters.

CHAPTER 6

1. For a material description of the equipment used in Black Bloc, see “Black Bloc Tactics and Self-defence for the Modern Protester,” <http://www.blackbloc.org/article2008041819.php>.

2. The tactic of Tute Bianche is influenced by the Zapatistas in Chiapas, México: expressing a form of politics that does not seek to take the state, but to make the invisible visible. Politically, Tute Bianche blocs are used to demand rights, prisoners, marginalized radicals (including women), “everyone else made invisible by the free market,” and so on. See from Rome, quoted in *The Guardian*, July 1, 2009. It is not a standing organization with members, but a tactic used in the Tute Bianche tactic on demos.

3. Ed Pilkington, “New York Man Accused of Violence during G20 Summit,” *The Guardian*, October 4, 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/04/man-arrested-twitter-g20>.

4. Several films have been made on the Black Bloc tactic (2005), *OP Genova 2001* (Genoa Social Forum, 2005), *Genoa. Il Libro Bianco*.

5. Steven E. Barkan, “Political Trials and the Need for a New Understanding of Social Movement Litigation”

6. Robert D. Bullard, *Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class, and Environmental Quality* (Westview Press, 1990).

7. Barkan, “Political Trials and Resource Allocation”

erman, Patricia Steinhoff, and Donatella
nts: Clandestinity in the Cycle of New Left
aly,” *Mobilization* 5, no. 1 (2000): 85–104.

ents, Political Violence, and the State: A
ity Press, 1995).

Manuel Antonio Garretón Merino, and
: *State Terror and Resistance in Latin*
92); Cynthia Kepley Mahmoud, ed., *The*
y of Pennsylvania Press, 1997); Antonius
uma in Argentina (University of Pennsyl-

eiter, eds., *Policing Protest: The Control*
cracies (University of Minnesota Press,

up of protesters wear black clothing, black
motorcycle helmets to cover their face.

Germany in 1980s, is intended to prevent

ment used, see Sarin, “Bodyhammer:
protester,” <http://www.wombles.org.uk/>

ed by the struggle and methods of the
fierceness that avoids violence, radical-
itics beyond ideologies, and face for
s are generally aligned with immigration
cluding communists and anarchists), and
arket”(Giorgio, a member of Ya Basta
9, 2001. Like other tactics, Tute Bianche is
. Persons from many groups participate in

ed of Using Twitter to Direct Protesters
ber 4, 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/>
g20-us.

basis of these archives: *Difesa Legitima*
am), *L'Ordine Pubblico durante il G8* (2007),

l Resource Mobilization: Towards an
ion,” *Social Forces* 58, no. 3 (1980): 946–47.

Race, Class, and Environmental Quality

e Mobilization,” 948.

8. *Hickey v. City of Seattle*, 236 FRD 659,
9. American Civil Liberties Union, "FBI acclu.org/national-security/fbi-spy-files.
10. Mike Rhodes, "Local Law Enforcement bay.org, April 6, 2005, <http://www.indybay.org>.
11. Washington, D.C., City Council, "Firearms Standards Act of 2004, Bill 15-968," 2004, <http://www.cityofdc.gov/officeofthechief/legislation/legislation.htm>.
12. ACLU of Northern California, "In Landmark Agreement, Police Agree to Use Less Lethal Weapons for Crowd Control," *News/press_releases/in_landmark_agreements_for_crowd_control.shtml*.
13. Noaki Schwartz and Trenton Daniel, *Miami Herald*, April 18, 2005, http://www.miamiherald.com/stories/04/18/05on_strip_searches_settled/.
14. U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, *et al. v. et al.*, 04-CV-6602 (WHP), www.justiceonline.org.
15. For a description of this event, see N. *The Guardian*, July 17, 2008, <http://www.guardian.co.uk>.
16. Media G8way Gipfelsoli Infogroup, "Gipfelsoli, July 15, 2008, <http://gipfelsoli.org/eng/5384.html>.
17. For an example, see <http://www.midwestjournal.com>.
18. See www.grandjuryresistance.org.
19. A lot of activist discussion texts emerge from these events and are collected on the website www.gipfelsoli.org.
20. For a detailed account of the epistemic protests in Europe see Christian Scholl, "The Construction of a Barricade during Summit Protests in Europe," *Journal of Cultural Studies*, Amsterdam.

CHAPTER 7

1. Jacques Rancière, *Hatred of Democracy*.
2. Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception*.

APPENDIX B

1. This material previously appeared in *Journal of Cultural Studies*, <http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav>, <http://jcs.sagepub.com>, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1748011807307800>, <http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav>, <http://jcs.sagepub.com>, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1748011807307800>, with permission from John Holloway and V.

660 (WD Wash. 2006).

"Spy Files," April 25, 2005, <http://www>.

"Government Violates the State Constitution," [Indy100.com/newsitems/2005/04/06/17317531.php](http://www.indy100.com/newsitems/2005/04/06/17317531.php).

"First Amendment Rights and Police Standstill," [dcwatches.com/archives/council15/15-968](http://www.dcwatches.com/archives/council15/15-968).

"Landmark Agreement, Oakland Prohibits Police from Using Less Lethal Weapons," November 9, 2004, http://www.aclunc.org/pressroom/2004/11/09/landmark_agreement_oakland_prohibits_less_lethal_weap.

"Lawsuit on Strip Searches Settled," [americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/pubs/misc/ambar_magazine/2005/05/strip_searches_settled.pdf](http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/pubs/misc/ambar_magazine/2005/05/strip_searches_settled.pdf).

City of New York v. American Civil Liberties Union v. The City of New York City et al., 2004 WL 18811 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).

Nick Davies, "The Bloody Battle of Genoa," [guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/17/italy.g8](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/17/italy.g8).

"G8 Genoa: Police Receive Low Sentences," [guardian.co.uk/Home/Genua_2001/Genoa_2001_eng](http://www.guardian.co.uk/Home/Genua_2001/Genoa_2001_eng).

[nightspecial.net/comic](http://www.nightspecial.net/comic).

Emerging in the context of summit protests, see www.infoshop.org and www.infoshop.org.

Technology of the use of bodies during summits, "Desiring Disruption. The Two Sides of the Coin," Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley.

Police Power (Verso, 2006), 4.

Police Power (University of Chicago Press, 2005).

Gipfelsoli (http://gipfelsoli.org/Home/Heilbrunn/2007_Texts/4087.html) and is reprinted here with permission from Vittorio Sergi.

This page intentionally

onally left blank

graphy

rk Agreement, Oakland Prohibits Less
November 9, 2004. http://www.aclunc.org/ement,_oakland_prohibits_less_lethal_

ledge, 1970.

University of Chicago Press, 2005.

ure Life. Stanford University Press, 1998.

orld Politics. Routledge, 1998.

State Apparatuses," first published in *La
nd Other Essays*. Translated by Ben Brews-

uro Escobar. *Cultures of Politics, Politics of
Westview Press, 1998.*

Files." April 25, 2005. <http://www.aclu.org/>

hal? December 16, 2008. <http://www.es/usa-safety-tasers-questioned-death->

lization, Globalization, and Urban Ecology
ng, 2008.

Justice Department and the Elite Delta
inst WTO Protesters." *Seattle Weekly*,
weekly.com/1999-12-22/news/delta-s-

Battle of Genoa and the Anti-capitalist
Press, 2001.

ul: Haciendo Caras: Creative and Critical
Lute Foundation Books, 1990.

eporting, December 1, 2008. <http://cles/aretaserssafe>.

ld City: WTO Protest Strategy and Tac-
re of Terror, Crime, and Militancy. Edited
and, 2001. <http://www.rand.org/pubs/>

ression: Black Rebels before the American

Source Mobilization: Towards an Under-
." *Social Forces* 58, no. 3 (1980): 944–61.

opolitan Society?: Ecological Questions in
nties." *Theory, Culture, and Society* 13, no.

ew—A Bubble Burst: The IMF-World
Open Review 2, no. 31 (September 18, 2000).
ann31.html.

Dragons in Distress: Asia's Miracle Economies

raming Processes and Social Movements:
ber 28, 2003. <http://arjournals.annualre-26.1.611>.

gence Unit." In *The Hunt for Red Menace*.
ociates, 2003. <http://www.publiceye.org/>
nl.

Wh, Public Assembly, and Dissent: A National
Explorations of First Amendment Rights in the
www.nlg.org/resources/DissentBookWeb.

as Increase Conflict?" *New Scientist*,
[newscientist.com/article/mg19926745.700-could-ml](http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg19926745.700-could-ml).

Empowerment. Temple University Press,

How the State and Mass Media Squelch
ork: Routledge, 2006.

for Mr. Camdessus—Open Letter of Resigna-
International Monetary Fund. New Horizons

in America: Microwave “Non-lethal” Weap-
www.GlobalResearch.ca, October 14, 2008.
?context=va&aid=10564.

and the Subversion of Identity. Routledge,

Light Control in Democratic Societies. Pluto

igan. “Social Control: Analytical Tool or
Crises 12, no. 2 (1988): 107–24.

COINTELPRO Papers: Documents from the
End Press, 1990.

TAA: After action review, 2004.

eat Ray.” www.defensetech.org, October 9,
ives/004461.html.

er Earth Publishing Association, 1912.

- for Colorado Nuclear Protest." *www*.
[/www.commondreams.org/head-](http://www.commondreams.org/head-)
- Society and Political Theory*. MIT Press, 1992.
 st: Religious Activism and the U.S. Sanctu-
- protests." *www.indymedia.org.uk*, June 17,
[/2003/09/277946.html](http://2003/09/277946.html).
- ements*. Open University Press, 2002.
Opening Here: The New Left, the Klan, and
 4.
- Case against the World Bank and the Inter-*
 ss, 1994.
- ate Repression, Social Movement Decline
<http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/davenport/>
- Action: The Case of the U.S. Government
Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 1 (Febru-
- " *The Guardian*, July 17, 2008. <http://www>.
 g8.
- nce: The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude*.
 books, 1552.
- sand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophre-*
- Political Violence, and the State: A Com-*
 Press, 1995.
- r, eds. *Policing Protest: The Control of*
cracies. University of Minnesota Press,
- Herbert Reiter, eds. *The Policing of Trans-*
- regierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der
 6090 (2007).
- e Sonic Devices." *Washington Times*, Octo-
- Squads and Police Repression in Urban*
 1990.
- d Methods of America's Political Intelligence*
- 'You Can't Beat the Ride:' Bringing Arrests
earch in Social Movements, Conflicts and
- rd a Theory of Movement Repression."
 2003): 44–68.

- Eisinger, Peter K. "The Conditions of Protest." *Political Science Review* 67, no. 1 (March 1993): 1-10.
- Epstein, Barbara. "Anarchism and the Anti-State." *Political Science Review* 53, no. 4 (n.d.): 1-10.
- . *Political Protest and Cultural Revolution*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1993.
- Eyerman, Ron, and Andrew Jamison. *Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1991.
- Fahrenthold, D. A. "D.C. Police Struggle to Control Protesters." *Washington Post*, August 27, 2008.
- Fanon, Frantz. *The Wretched of the Earth*. New York: Grove Press, 1968.
- Fernandez, Luis A. *Policing Dissent: Social Control and the State*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2008.
- Fisher, William F., and Thomas Ponniah. *Activists to Globalization at the World Social Forum*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2008.
- Flacks, Richard. *Making History: The American Social Movement*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1988.
- Flam, Helena. *Mosaic of Fear: Poland and Eastern Europe*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2008.
- Foucault, Michel. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. New York: Vintage, 1979.
- . *The History of Sexuality*. New York: Vintage, 1978.
- Foucault, Michel, Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, and Jonathan Faubion. *Power/Knowledge: Selected Essays and Lectures*. New York: Random House, 1980.
- Foucault, Michel, Michel Senellart, and François Ewald. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. New York: Vintage, 1979.
- Fox, Richard Gabriel, and Orin Starn. *Between Protest and Politics*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2008.
- Fulghum, David A. "High Power Microwave Radiation." *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, October 9, 2008. <http://www.aviationweek.com/aviation/story.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/MICR100808>.
- Fung, Archon. "Associations and Democracies." *Annual Review of Sociology* 29 (August 2003): 1-24.
- "G8 Information Centre," n.d. <http://www.g8live.org>.
- "G8 Research Group," n.d. <http://g8live.org>.
- Gamson, William A. *Power and Discontent*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2008.
- Gaventa, John. *Power and Powerlessness: Chicago and the World*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2008.
- Gibbs, Jack P. *Control: Sociology's Central Theme*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2008.
- . *Social Control: Views from the Social Sciences*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2008.
- . "Social Control, Deterrence, and Peacemaking." *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 56, no. 2 (December 1977): 408-23.
- Giddens, Anthony. *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Modern Age*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991.
- Gillham, Patrick, and Gary T. Marx. "Compulsory Globalization: The World Trade Organization and the World Bank." *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 38, no. 1 (2008): 1-10.

st Behavior in American Cities." *American* (1973): 11–28.

-Globalization Movement." *Monthly*

ution. University of California Press,

l Movements: A Cognitive Approach. Penn

Staff IMF Protests; Outside Agencies

002.

rove Press, 1965.

Control and the Anti-globalization Move-

iversity Press, 2008.

another World Is Possible: Popular Alterna-

Forum. Zed Books, 2003.

can Left and the American Mind. Columbia

ast Germany before 1989. East European

rsity Press, 1998.

e Birth of the Prison. Vintage, 1975.

38.

Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton. *Technolo-*

etts Press, 1988.

ançois Ewald. *Security, Territory, Popula-*

77-78. Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

een Resistance and Revolution: Cultural

ersity Press, 1997.

e Nearly Operational." *Aviation Week,*

week.com/aw/generic/story_channel.

0098.xml.

cy: Between Theories, Hopes, and Real-

gust 2003): 515–39.

g8.utoronto.ca/

/.

Dorsey Press, 1968.

Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appala-

, 1980.

otion. University of Illinois Press, 1989.

Sciences. Sage, 1982.

rspectives on Social Order." *Social Forces*

tivity: Self and Society in the Late Modern

plexity and Irony in Policing and Protest-

ttle." *Social Justice* 27, no. 2 (n.d.): 212–36.

- Gillham, Patrick F., and John A. Noakes. “Aggressive Protests and the Limits of Negotiation.” *Journal of Peace Research* 4 (December 2007): 341–57.
- Gilroy, Paul. *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness*. London: Verso, 1993.
- Gipfelsoli. “28.7.2007 Heiligendamm—Germany: A Day of Repression/Heiligendamm_2007/Texte/28.7.2007 Heiligendamm—Germany.” <http://www.gipfelsoli.com/28.7.2007-Heiligendamm-Germany-Texte/28.7.2007-Heiligendamm-Germany-Texte.html>.
- Giroux, Henry A.. “When Hope Is Subversive.” *Journal of Cultural Studies* 1, no. 2 (Spring 1998): 137–52.
- Glassner, Barry. *The Culture of Fear*. Basic Books, 1999.
- Goldstein, Robert Justin. *Political Repression in America*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978.
- Goode, Erich. *Deviant Behavior*. Prentice-Hall, 1971.
- Gordon, Avery F. *Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the In-between*. University of Minnesota Press, 1997.
- Gould, Deborah B. “Passionate Political Protest: A Case Study of Social Movements.” In *Rethinking Social Movements and Emotion*. Edited by Jeff Goodwin and Deborah B. Gould. New York: Routledge, 2003.
- Graeber, David. “The New Anarchists.” *New York Times*, 2007.
- Gramsci, Antonio. *Prison Notebooks*. International Workers Order of America, 1971.
- Greenpeace USA. “Bush vs. Greenpeace Oil Spill.” <http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/news/bush-vs-greenpeace-oil-spill>.
- Grossberg, Lawrence, Cary Nelson, and Paul A. Miller. *Cultural Studies*. Routledge, 1991.
- Habermas, Jürgen. *The Theory of Communicative Action*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1981.
- Halbroth, Anneke. “Hätten sie das nicht wollen?” <http://www.stadtgespraeche-rostock.de/2008/12/24/haetten-sie-das-nicht-wollen/>.
- Hambling, David. “U.S. Police Could Get ‘Frustrated’ by Protesters.” *Washington Post*, December 24, 2008.
- Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. *Multitude*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004.
- . *Empire*. Harvard University Press, 2000.
- Harvey, David. *Spaces of Capital: Towards a Critical Geopolitics*. University of California Press, 2001.
- . *Spaces of Hope*. University of California Press, 2005.
- Herman, Edward S., and Noam Chomsky. *The Manufacturing Consent: The Economy of the Mass Media*. Pantheon, 1988.
- Heuser, Marius. “Germany: Huge Security Measures for G8 Summit.” *World Socialist Web Site*, June 21, 2008. http://www.wswj.com/article/Germany-Huge-Security-Measures-for-G8-Summit/2008/06/21/17014.html?act_id=17014.
- Hillyard, Paddy, Joe Sim, Steve Tombs, and Pauline Topley. “The ‘Silence’: Contemporary Criminology and the Question of the ‘Silence’.” *Criminology* 44, no. 3 (May 2004): 369–91.
- Horkheimer, Max, and Theodor W. Adorno. *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Fragments*. Stanford University Press, 1992.

- More Than A March in a Circle": Trans-
 otiated Management." *Mobilization* 12, no.
- and Double Consciousness. Verso, 1993.
- ua." July 28, 2007. http://gipfelsoli.org/_davor/3843.html.
- ive." *Tikkun*, 2004.
- Books, 2000.
- ion in Modern America. Schenkman,
 Hall, 1984.
- g and the Sociological Imagination. Univer-
- cesses: Bringing Emotions Back into the
 ing Social Movements: Structure, Meaning,
 and James M. Jasper, 307. Rowman and
- w Left Review, no. 13 (2002): 61–73.
- ational Publishers, 1929.
- verview." May 10, 2004. <http://www.green-e-overview>.
- ula Treichler. *Cultural Studies*. 1st ed.
- catative Action. Translated by Thomas
- banders machen können?" April 20, 2007.
 /046/0229/.
- Pain Beam' Weapons." *New Scientist*,
- ude: War and Democracy in the Age of
- 000.
- e Critical Geography. London: Routledge,
 rnia Press, 2000.
- Manufacturing Consent: The Political
 , 2002.
- Operation Exposed in Wake of G8 Sum-
 007. http://www.tni.org/detail_page.
- l Dave Whyte. "Leaving a 'Stain upon the
 and the Politics of Dissent." *British Journal of*
 90.
- b. *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical*
 044.

- House of Commons. *G8: Gleneagles Summit*. parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldhansrd/vol
- Howie, Michael. "MoD Accuses Police of Keeping Troops." *NEWS.scotsman.com*, April 9, 2005. http://www.scotsman.com/news/2005/04/09/090405_accuses-police-of-keeping.3960688.jp
- Hughes, John. "Life during Wartime." In *On Fire: The Capitalist Movement*, 23–29. One-Off Press, 2001.
- Jacobs, Bill, and Brian Ferguson. "Blair Refuses to Help Meet." *NEWS.scotsman.com*, March 9, 2005. http://www.scotsman.com/news/2005/03/09/090305_refuses-to-help-meet.2609125.jp
- Jagose, Annamarie. *Queer Theory*. Otago University Press, 2000.
- Janowitz, Morris. "Sociological Theory and the State." *Journal of American Studies* 81, no. 1 (July 1975): 82–108.
- Jasper, James M. *The Art of Moral Protest: Costly Activism and Movements*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004.
- Jazz, John. "Life during Wartime." In *On Fire: The Capitalist Movement*, 80–99. One-Off Press, 2001.
- Jhally, Sut. *Advertising and the End of the World*. <http://www.mediaed.org/>
- Johnston, Hank. "Talking the Walk: Speech and the State." In *Repression and Mobilization*, edited by Hank Johnston, and Carol McClurg Mueller, 10–25. Routledge, 1995.
- Johnston, Hank, and Bert Klandermans, eds. *Repression and Mobilization*. Routledge, 1995.
- Jordan, Tim, and Adam Lent. *Storming the Gates: The 1968-69 Student Movement*. Lawrence and Wishart, 1999.
- Juris, Jeffrey S. *Networking Futures: The Movement for a New World*. Duke University Press, 2008.
- Katsiaficas, George. *The Subversion of Politics: Global Connections and the Decolonization of Everyday Life*. Routledge, 2003.
- Khagram, Sanjeev, James V. Riker, and Kathleen Thelen, eds. *Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Activism*. Routledge, 2002.
- Kilkenny, Allison. "Police Use Painful New Tactics." *NEWS.scotsman.com*, September 28, 2009. http://www.scotsman.com/news/2009/09/28/280909_police-use-painful-new-tactics.3960688.jp
- King, Mike, and David Waddington. "The Police in Canada." In *The Policing of Transnational Social Movements*, edited by Abby Peterson, and Herbert Reiter, 75–95. Routledge, 2003.
- Kirton, John, Jenilee Guebert, and Shamir Taubman. "G8-G20 Research Groups." Munk Centre for International Studies, Toronto, 2010. <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/>
- Klein, Naomi. "The Bonding Properties of the State." http://www.naomiklein.org/articles/2003/03/03_bonding_properties_of_the_state
- Kraska, Peter B. "Military and Policing." *Journal of American Studies* 1, no. 4 (2007): 501–13.

Costs. 2005. <http://www.publications.20050706/text/50706-03.htm>.

"Keeping G8 Cash Needed for Front-line Workers." 2008. <http://news.scotsman.com/uk/MoD-20080706>.

In Fire: The Battle of Genoa and the Anti-globalization Movement, 2001.

"Blair's Budget Cuts to Help Meet Cost of G8 Summit." 2008. <http://news.scotsman.com/edinburgh/Blair-20080706>.

University Press, 1997.

"Social Control." *American Journal of Sociology*, 1997.

Culture, Biography, and Creativity in Social Movements. Chicago Press, 1999.

The Battle of Genoa and the Anti-capitalist Movement. Media Education Foundation, 1997.

Acts and Resistance in Authoritarian Regimes. Edited by Christian Davenport, Hank Johnston. 2008–37. University of Minnesota Press, 2005.

Social Movements and Culture. London: Routledge, 2005.

Millennium: The New Politics of Change. Routledge, 2000.

Movement Against Corporate Globalization. Routledge, 2000.

Politics: European Autonomous Social Movements and the Challenge to Globalization. AK Press, 1997.

Maryn Sikkink. *Restructuring World Politics: Norms, Networks, and Norms*. University of Minnesota Press, 2005.

"The Weapon on G20 Protesters." *AlterNet*, 2008. <http://www.alternet.org/092909D>.

"Policing of Transnational Protest in the 21st Century." *Global Protest*. Edited by Donatella della Porta, 2006. Ashgate, 2006.

Anna. *G8 and G20 Summit Costs*. Unpublished Working Paper, School for Global Affairs, University of Toronto. http://www.sga.utoronto.ca/evaluations/factsheet/factsheet_costs.html.

"Tear Gas." *Naomi Klein*, April 25, 2001. <http://www.naomiklein.org/01/04/>.

"The G8—Its Relevance to 21st Century Police."

- legitimacy and an Infrastructure." *Justice*
- Justice System: The Changing Roles of the*
- 1.
- Militarizing American Police: The Rise and
- Social Problems* 44 (1997): 1.
- speech, and the Continuing Search for the
- nt." Review of *The Dissent of the Governed:*
- y. By Stephen L. Carter. Harvard University
- Meanings of America*. By Steven H. Shiffrin.
- American Law Review* 98, no. 6 (2000): 1613—77.
- Democracy and Socialist Strategy: Towards a*
- wort der Landesregierung Mecklenburg-
- r Abgeordneten Birgit Schwebs, Fraktion
- ch 31, 2009).
- die Kleine des Abgeordneten Udo Pastörs,
- 11 (February 10, 2008).
- die Große Anfrage der Fraktion der NPD."
- 007).
- des Finanzausschusses (4. Ausschuss) zu
- g." *Drucksache* 5, no. 100 (May 12, 2006).
- Wiley-Blackwell, 1991.
- rest Record Shows Police Were Out of
- o.
- June 23, 2010.
- a. University of Michigan Press, 1995.
- ness. Translated by Rodney Livingstone.
- as and Attainment in a Low-Income Neigh-*
- any: How the Alterglobalisation Movement*
- Press, 2009.
- nd Society in an Age of Reconstruction: Stud-*
- e and Kegan Paul, 1949.
- In *A Critique of Pure Tolerance*. Edited by
- and Herbert Marcuse. Beacon Press, 1965.
- e Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society*.
- ? 2001. <http://globalization.icaap.org/con->
- over Investigations: Some Reflections on
- Law Enforcement." *Criminal Justice Ethics*

- . *Undercover: Police Surveillance in America*. Princeton University Press, 1988.
- . “External Efforts to Damage or Facilitate Social Movements: Resource Mobilization Theory.” In Mayer N. Zald and John David McCarthy, eds., *Resource Mobilization Theory*. Symposium, Vanderbilt University. University of Michigan Press, 1980.
- . “Thoughts on a Neglected Category: The Agent Provocateur and the Informant.” *Journal of American Studies* 8, no. 3 (September 1974): 402–42.
- . “Civil Disorders and the Agents of Social Change.” *Journal of American Studies* 4, no. 1 (winter 1970): 19–57.
- Massey, Doreen B. “Politics and Space/Time.” *Environment and Planning A* 17, no. 3 (1985): 301–17.
- Mathur, K.M. *Challenges to Police, Human Rights and the Law*. New York: Routledge, 2003.
- McCarthy, John D., and Mayer N. Zald. “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory.” *American Journal of Sociology* 75, no. 6 (1970): 1212–41.
- McChesney, Robert W. *The Problem of the Media*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 2004.
- McDonald, Kevin. “From Solidarity to Fluidity: The Emergence of ‘Collective Identity’—The Case of Globalization.” *Journal of Social, Cultural and Political Studies* 1, no. 1 (2004): 1–15.
- McKay, George. *DiY Culture: Party and Protest*. New York: Routledge, 2003.
- Mead, George Herbert. “The Genesis of the Moral Ethic.” *Journal of Ethics* 35, no. 3 (April 1925): 25–34.
- Media G8way Gipfelsoli Infogroup. “G8 Genoa: State Prosecution Demanded.” *Gipfelsoli*, July 15, 2008. <http://gipfelsoli.org/eng/lish/5384.html>.
- . “G8 Genoa: State Prosecution Demanded.” *Gipfelsoli*, October 29, 2007. https://gipfelsoli.org/eng/8way_Heiligendamm/english/4366.html.
- Meier, Robert F., and Weldon T. Johnson. “The Moral Ethic and Extralegal Production of Conformity.” *Journal of American Studies* 11, no. 1 (April 1977): 292–304.
- Melucci, Alberto. *Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Post-Political Age*. Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- . *Nomads of the Present: Social Movement and the Making of a New Society*. Hutchinson, 1989.
- Metzger, Wolfram. “Repression in Germany: A Case Study for Terrorism.” www.venezuelanalaysis.com/so36.net/en/ps/630.
- Meyer, David S., and Debra C. Minkoff. “Collective Action and Social Forces.” *Social Forces* 82, no. 4 (June 2004): 1457–78.
- Micheletti, Michele. *Political Virtue and Strategic Action*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

merica. University of California Press,

ilitate Social Movements." In *The Dynamics of Social Control, Social Control, and Tactics*. Edited by [unclear], 94–125. Frontiers of Sociology Symposium, 1979. University of California Press of America, 1979.

of Social Movement Participant: The Case of the American Journal of Sociology 80, no. 2 (1975): 1–12.

Social Control." *Journal of Social Issues* 26, no. 1 (1970): 1–12.

ne." *New Left Review*, no. 196 (1992): 65–84.

Rights and National Security. Gyan Books, 1998.

Resource Mobilization and Social Movement: A Theory of Resource Mobilization. *American Journal of Sociology* 82, no. 6 (May 1977): 1368–1404.

Media: U.S. Communication Politics in the Twentieth Century. University of California Press, 2004.

arity: Social Movements beyond 'Collective Action Conflicts.' *Social Movement Studies: Protest* 1, no. 2 (2002): 109.

test in Nineties Britain. Verso, 1998.

the Self and Social Control." *International Journal of Sociology* 15, no. 1 (1980): 51–77.

Genoa: Police Receive Low Sentences." *Gipfelsoli*, http://www.gipfelsoli.com/Home/Genoa_2001/Genoa_2001_eng.html.

lands 225 Years of Jail Sentences." *Gipfelsoli*, http://www.gipfelsoli.com/Home/Heiligendamm_2007/MediaGipfelsoli.html.

Deterrence as Social Control: The Legal System as a Social Control Mechanism." *American Sociological Review* 42, no. 2 (1977): 241–258.

Collective Action in the Information Age. Cambridge University Press, 2002.

ments and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society." *Journal of Sociology* 39, no. 1 (2003): 1–12.

y: Editor of Venezuelan Book Incarcerated in Prison." *Gipfelsoli*, http://www.gipfelsoli.com/Home/Heiligendamm_2007/MediaGipfelsoli.html, November 17, 2007. <http://einstellung.com>.

Conceptualizing Political Opportunity." *Journal of Sociology* 39, no. 1 (2003): 1–12.

opping: Individuals, Consumerism, and Collective Action." *Journal of Sociology* 39, no. 1 (2003): 1–12.

and Collective Identity in Industrial
Conflict in Western Europe since 1968. Edited by
, 2: 277–98. Macmillan, n.d.

connection." *nyc.indymedia.org*, November 17,
/display/132549/index.php.

*Feminist Alterglobalisation Groups: The
and Personal Change for Utopian Practices*.
research, January 2006. <http://www2.fmg>.

Meeting: Democracy in American Social
, 2002.

at Theorizing on the Cultural Dimensions
(fall 1997): 431–50.

75–79." In *On Fire: The Battle of Genoa and*
e-Off Press, 2001.

Social Classes. Humanities Press, 1973.

Life of J. Edgar Hoover. Free Press, 1987.

summits." *Ottawa Citizen*, May 31, 2010.
ivate+security+firm+hired+summ

Crime Control in Capitalist Society. Trans-
orso, 2006.

"." *rabble.ca*, April 26, 2001. <http://www>.
bec-city.

rabble.ca, April 22, 2001. <http://www.rabble>.

ulates the State Constitution." *Indybay.org*,
newsitems/2005/04/06/17317531.php.

nce for the Modern Protester." <http://>
9.php, n.d .

the Two Sides of a Barricade during Summit
University of Amsterdam.

of Dissent: Testimonies to Political Repression
SS, 2001.

Political Repression in America. University

of Political Behavior. Aldine Transaction,

lawsuit on Strip Searches Settled." *Miami*
nancenter.org/content/elert/lawsuit_on_

Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. Yale Uni-
y." *Diogenes*, no. 39 (1962): 45–66.

- Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford Jr., Steve
 “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobility
American Sociological Review 51, no. 4 (A
- Soja, Edward W. *Seeking Spatial Justice*. UR
- Starr, Amory. *Naming the Enemy: Anti-Corpo*
 Zed Books, London, 2000.
- . *Global Revolt: A Guide to Altergloba*
- Starr, Amory, Luis Fernandez, Randall Ams
 Impacts of State Surveillance on Political
 Legal Analysis.” *Qualitative Sociology* 31,
- Starr, Erin. “Little Guantanamo and the Re
[mail-archive.com/laamn@yahoo.com](mailto:laamn@yahoo.com)
- States News Service. “Public Announcemen
 Summit in Alberta Creates Potential for
- Stauber, John Clyde, and Sheldon Rampton
 Courage Press, 1995.
- Steller, Chris. “Minnesota Independent: Ne
 You Next Year.” *Minnesota Independent*,
independent.com/20527/judge-to-rnc8-se
- Stumberger, Rudolf. “Molli, Macht und Me
 Politik-Inszenierung.” *Telepolis*, May 26,
[artikel/25/25332/1.html](http://telepolis.net/artikel/25/25332/1.html).
- Stephen C. Craig, and Michael A. Maggiot
 Action.” *Journal of Politics* 43, no. 2 (May
- Sunstein, Cass R. *Why Societies Need Dissen*
[supportolegale](http://supportolegale.org). “In Any Case, No Regret..”
supportolegale.org/?q=node/1271.
- Tarrow, Sidney. *Power in Movement: Social*
 bridge University Press, 1998.
- Thoreau, Henry David. *The Variorum Civil*
ment). Twayne, 1849.
- Tilly, Charles. “Contention over Space And
 221–25.
- . *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Mo
- T’Okup. “Nstlegate ist Kein inzelfall: Eine
 lin entlarvt!” Lausanne, 2008. <http://ch.pdf>.
- Touraine, Alain. *The Voice and the Eye: An A*
 University Press, 1981.
- Trott, Ben. “Gleneagles, Activism and Ord
The G8, Gleneagles 2005 and the Moveme
 Keir Milburn, Ben Trott, and David Wa
<http://shutthemdown.org/details.html>.
- Turner, Bryan S. “The Erosion of Citizensh
 (June 2001): 189–209.

- Worden, K., and Robert D. Benford. "Mobilization, and Movement Participation." (August 1986): 464–81.
- University of Minnesota Press, 2010.
- Corporate Movements Confront Globalization.*
- Globalization.* Zed Books, London, 2005.
- Wright, Lesley Wood, and Manuel Caro. "The Social Assembly and Association: A Socio-ecology." *Environment and Planning A*, no. 3 (2008): 251–70.
- "Republican Convention." 2004. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/msg00022.html>.
- Statement by the U.S. Department of State: G8 Summit Disruptions." June 17, 2002.
- Wright, M. *Toxic Sludge Is Good for You.* Common Courage Press, 2002.
- Wright, M. News. Politics. Media. Judge to RNC8: See Wright, M. December 17, 2008. <http://minnesotaindependent.org/see-you-next-year>.
- Wright, M. Der G8-Gipfel als Höhepunkt von Globalisierung." 2007. <http://www.heise.de/tp/r4/>
- Wright, M. "Political Discontent and Political Mobilization." *Environment and Planning A* (July 1981): 514–22.
- Wright, M. *Justice: A Guide to the 2008 Election.* Harvard University Press, 2003.
- Wright, M. Press release, 2007. <http://www.supporto.org/>
- Wright, M. *Movements and Contentious Politics.* Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Wright, M. *Disobedience (Resistance to Civil Government).* Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Wright, M. "Place." *Mobilization* 8, no. 2 (June 2003): 1–10.
- Wright, M. Graw-Hill, 1978.
- Wright, M. Weitere securitas-angestellte als spitzenfunktionäre." <http://www.indymedia.org/media/2008/09//62886>.
- Wright, M. *Analysis of Social Movements.* Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Wright, M. "Primary Rebellion." In *Shut Them Down! A Guide to the 2008 Election.* Edited by David Harvie, M. Wright. Dissent! and Autonomedia, 2005.
- Wright, M. "The Role of the State." *British Journal of Sociology* 52, no. 2 (1999): 1–10.

- U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs. "The Effectiveness and Safety of Pepper Spray." <http://74.125.95.132/search?q=cache:rm5n0j195739.pdf+safety+of+pepper+spray+refox-a>.
- Vallis, Mary. "G20: Security Cameras Installed in Downtown Toronto." *National Post*, June 3, 2010. <http://www.nationalpost.com/2010/06/03/g20-security-cameras-installed-in-downtown-toronto/#ixzzotgTRNfLa>.
- Vincent, George. "The Province of Sociology (1896): 488.
- Von Manuela Pfohl. "G8-Gipfel-Bilanz: Mecklenburg-Pommern muss fuer Gipfelschauspiel aufpassen." *STERN.DE*, August 28, 2007. <http://www.stern.de/wirtschaft/bilanz-meck-pom-muss-fuer-gipfelschauspiel-aufpassen>.
- Waddington, David P. *Contemporary Issues in Policing*. London: Routledge, 1989.
- Waddington, David P., Karen Jones, and C. J. Bratton. *Disorder*. Routledge, 1989.
- Waddington, P. A. J. "Policing Public Order." In *Policing*. Edited by Tim Newburn, 928. London: Routledge, 1998.
- . *Policing Citizens: Authority and Rights*. London: Routledge, 1998.
- Walton, John, and David Seddon. *Free Markets and Social Justice*. Blackwell, 1994.
- Washington, DC, City Council. "First Amendment Rights of 2004, Bill 15-968," 2004. <http://dcwater.com/bills/15-968/>.
- Weber, Max. "The Types of Legitimate Authority." In *Interpretive Sociology*, 2. University of Chicago Press, 1985.
- Weissman, Robert. "First Amendment Follows the Money." *Multinational Monitor*, May 1998. <http://www.multinationalmonitor.com/mm1998/051998/weissman.html>.
- White, Robert W. "From Peaceful Protest to Violence: The Case of the Provisional Irish Republican Army." *American Journal of Sociology* (1989): 1277–1302.
- Willis, Paul E. *Learning to Labor: How Working Class Kids Move to Middle-Class Careers*. Columbia University Press, 1981.
- Wilson, John. "Social Protest and Social Control." *American Journal of Sociology* (1977): 469–81.
- Zald, Mayer N., and Roberta Ash. "Social Movements and Change." *Social Forces* 44, no. 3 (1965): 451–65.
- Zwerman, Gilda, and Patricia Steinhoff. "Women and the New Left Cycle of Resistance in the United States." In *Mobilization*. Edited by Christian Daver, 85–107. University of Minnesota Press, 1998.
- Zwerman, Gilda, Patricia Steinhoff, and David W. Thelen. "Movements: Clandestinity in the Cycle of Resistance in Germany, and Italy." *Mobilization* 5, no. 1 (2000): 1–15.

Programs, National Institute of Justice.
Spray (Research for Practice)," April 2003.
5xsZVHst4J:www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us&client=fi

lled on Nearly Every Corner of
e 3, 2010. <http://news.nationalpost>.
-installed-on-nearly-every-corner-of-

gy." *American Journal of Sociology* (January

ck-Pom muss für Gipfelschäden zahlen."
w.stern.de/politik/deutschland/g8-gipfel-
eden-zahlen-596306.html.

in *Public Disorder*. Routledge, 1992.

Critcher. *Flashpoints: Studies in Public*

r and Political Contention." In P. A. J.

d Political Contention," in *A Handbook of*
Willan, 2003.

ts. Routledge, 1999.

kets and Food Riots: *The Politics of Global*

ndment Rights and Police Standards Act
ch.com/archives/council15/15-968.htm.

hority." In *Economy and Society: An Outline*
California Press, 1925.

ies: Expanding Corporate Speech

8. <http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/>

o Guerrilla War: Micromobilization of the
American Journal of Sociology 94, no. 6 (May

king Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs.

ontrol." *Social Problems* 24, no. 4 (April

Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay
66): 327–41.

When Activists Ask for Trouble: and the
ted States and Japan." In *Repression and*

port, Hank Johnston, and Carol McClurg
ta Press, 2005.

onatella della Porta. "Disappearing Social
of New Left Protest in the U.S., Japan,

1 (2000): 85–104.

- affinity group, 106, 125–26, 143
- alterglobalization, 2, 15–18, 20, 29, 40, 65, 67, 76, 84, 155
- anarchism, 95, 125, 158, 162
- anticipatory conformity, 97
- anti-terrorist legislation, 76, 78, 87–88, 109, 150; Joint Terrorism Task Forces, 135
- arrest: as a method of social control, 16, 38, 43, 65, 68, 71, 78–83, 86–87, 111, 120; antirepression work regarding, 126, 130–33, 135, 138–41, 144; conditions in jail, 71, 131, 136, 139–41
- assassination of activists, 121
- assembly, 12, 97, 121
- association, 12, 72
- ATTAC, 72, 97, 158, 163
- Autonomen, 65, 163

- backlash, 65
- ban orders, 41, 129
- biopower, 4, 7, 17, 91
- Black Block, 42, 82, 120, 143–44, 155–68, 188n23
- blockading: by police, 37; by protesters, 30, 124
- body, 14, 17, 19, 38, 48, 120–21, 143–45, 189n20
- border controls, 37, 41–42

- channeling, 35–36, 39–41, 47, 95, 147
- civil disobedience, 16–17, 66, 87, 98, 111
- civil society, 10, 27, 110
- COINTELPRO, 9, 71–72
- colonialism, 2

Index

- Convergence Center, 40, 74, 80, 86, 144, 148
- CopWatch, 126–27
- corporation involvement in social control, 72
- counterinsurgency, 10, 72, 77, 149
- counterprotesters, 83
- countersummits, 40
- criminalization, 43, 75, 78, 89, 94–98, 103, 105, 139, 140; effects on social movement organizations, 106
- criminal standard 73
- culture of fear 1, 114
- cultures of resistance/culture of protest 14, 76, 112–17
- databases, 72–73, 78, 98–99, 121
- detention, 43, 71, 79, 81
- direct action, 16–18, 47, 67, 87, 125, 130, 158–59
- disruption, 17–18, 26, 147
- dissent, 10–15
- Do-It-Yourself(DIY) concept, 18
- escalated force, 65–66
- exhaustion, tactic of, 67, 79, 100
- fence, 1, 32, 36, 52, 68, 81, 91; breaching, 124
- flows, 7, 26, 29–30, 35, 102, 162
- framing, 13, 117
- global governance, 26–29, 34, 36, 44–48, 61, 149–50, 171
- grand juries, 77, 88, 139

Green Scare, 77, 87–88, 109

“grey area” of legality, 87

grid 37

identity, 13, 94

IMF riots, 24

infrastructures, activists, 40

injunction, 80, 130

intimidation, 60, 68, 79, 96–97, 136

Kessel/kettle, 38, 125

Know Your Rights 130, 138

legal observation, 126–27

legal standing/strategy, 121 151–52

legislative forms of social control. *See*
regulatory/legislative social control

legitimacy, 20, 27, 44

“less lethal” weapons, 44, 49, 60, 82,
84–85, 145

litigation regarding state actions, 132–38

locality, political context/history of,
31–33; courts, 87; long-term effects
on, 46 69; remoteness/isolation,
32–34; rurality, 33, 44

Low-Intensity Operations (LIO) 60
148–49

“marshals,” protest, 70

Miami model 66, 89

militarization: of activism 163; of social
control 43, 53, 60, 75, 89–90, 149

NAFTA, 31

negotiated management, 36, 42–43,
65–68, 80

networks, as a dimension of social
movements, 8, 11–12, 14–15, 25, 27, 77,
91–93, 106, 109, 115, 117, 128

Operation Backfire, 87

pens, 39

performativity, 79

permits, 42, 70–71, 80, 95

police: culture, 76; riots, 67; multi-agency collaboration, 37, 67, 87, 148

political consciousness, 13, 102

political opportunity structure, 13, 25, 110

precarity, 1

preemption, 11, 30, 37, 41, 43, 47, 66, 68, 72, 86, 96–99, 148

prefigurative, 116

property damage, 56, 87

prosecution: of activists, 46, 81, 86–89, 112, 128–32; antirepression work regarding, 140; of social control acts by the state, 132–38

protest, 14; structuring of, 71

protest pits, 71, 118

public relations, 54, 94

queer theory, 6

raids, 40, 75, 78–80

regulatory/legislative social control, 41, 69–70, 98

representation, 17

resistance, 14

resource mobilization, 13–14, 68, 91, 108, 110, 118, 121

Schengen Agreement, 37, 42, 66

security culture, 114, 142

selective enforcement, 5, 32, 65, 89, 100

snake march, 38

snatch squads, 43, 83, 125, 144

social control, 3–10

social movement, 12–15, 105; cross-fertilization between, 105; legal standing for 121; social movement organization, 106; as target of social control 72, 110, 116; as unit of analysis, 19, 106

space, 26–29, 31, 92, 110–12, 148, 151 anti-repression work to defend, 123–28

spokescouncils, 74

state of exception, 149

strategic incapacitation, 48, 67

summit meetings, 19, 25, 49, 61

surveillance, 39, 65, 71–79, 88, 107–10, 112, 149

targeting, 9-10, 40-41, 60, 71-73, 83, 94,
108, 112, 116, 140
technologies of control, 6
technologies of the self, 7, 10, 94
temporal dimensions of social control
25, 35, 48
territory 30, 38, 123, 148
terrorism. *See* anti-terrorism legislation
tourism 56-57, 68
Tute Bianche 124, 128, 143, 188n2

unit of analysis 12, 72, 106, 121

violence: 82, 89; against activists; 72, 75,
102, 121–22, 142; by activists, 155–69

Vittrup, Kai 66, 79, 97, 118

“We are history,” 46

weapons: activist, 84; police, 83, 85, *See*
also “less lethal” weapons

working group 130, 141

zones: established for social control,
23–24, 35–37, 41, 45, 54, 69, 82–84,
123–25, 133, 151; war, 43–45, 57, 145

This page intentionally left blank.

onally left blank

About the

AMORY STARR is the author of *The New*
Enemy: Anti-Corporate Movements
Revolt: A Guide to Alterglobalization
University of California, Santa Barbara.

LUIS FERNANDEZ is Assistant Pro
fessor of Sociology and Criminal Justice at No
author of *Policing Dissent: Social C*
Movement.

CHRISTIAN SCHOLL is Lecturer o
f Amsterdam.

e Authors

many books, including *Naming the*
Confront Globalization and *Global*
. She holds a Ph.D. from the Univer-

professor in the Department of Crimi-
northern Arizona University and the
Control and the Anti-Globalization

of Political Science at the University